IR 05000266/1989024

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Insp Repts 50-266/89-24 & 50-301/89-23 on 890716-0831.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety, Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Security & Engineering & Technical Support
ML20247K926
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/14/1989
From: Defayette R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247K922 List:
References
50-266-89-24, 50-301-89-23, NUDOCS 8909220068
Download: ML20247K926 (17)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:_ - --_ .- I p, ' e '; S' , p .. , ' U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III-Reports No. 50-266/89024(DRP); 50-301/89023(DRP) . Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 l Licensee:.. Wisconsin' Electric Company ' 231 West Michigan.

., ' ' Milwaukee, WI.53201 FacilityLName: Point Beach Unit 1 and 2 ' Inspection At: Two Rivers, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: July 16 through August 31, 1989 Inspectorsi C. L. Vanderniet J. Gadzala k/ .

Approved.Ly: Robe t W. DeFayette, Chi . Reactor Projects Section 3A Date ' - w Inspection Summary Inspection from: July 16 through August'31, 1989, (Reports No. 50-266/89024(DRP); No. 50-301/89023(DRP)) Areas Inspected: ~ Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of outstandi_ng. items; operational safety; radiological controls; maintenance and surveillance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and' technical support; and safety assessment / quality verification.

Results: During this inspection period, both units mostly operated at full power. with only requested load following power reductions. Unit 1 commenced weekend load reductions to 50% power to conserve fuel and thereby meet the scheduled outage commitment.

Issues addressed in this inspection report include: Control board labeling (paragraph 3.a); cable spreading room and service water system deficiencies (paragraph 3.b); Station battery and , - containment spray system walkdown results (paragraph 3.c); Moisture separator / reheater failure (paragraph 3.d); August 20 Unit 2 trip (paragraph 3.e); Inadvertent chlorine discharge (paragraph 3.f); Strike contingency (paragraph 3.g); Discharge of the 8 holdup tank (paragraph 4.); G02 diesel maintenance (paragraph 5.a); Gas turbine testing (paragraph 5.b); and Two ' security events (paragraph 7.). New issues which remain unresolved include: Operation with safety injection accumulators cro.cs connected (paragraph 2.d); Inadequate fire system design pressure (paragraph 8.b); and Incorrect FSAR LOCA analysis (paragraph 8.c).

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> . - t "i. L',, ~ x, . Plsht; Manager [ C N M $ ' ~ l 9&1 yg ,p m.] l ' ' ,,. , ' g% fQ p-o f *J.TJ UZach MTXJ.iKoehler,tGe'neral Sup~erintendent/ Maintanan' e4 d g y m c > < d ? *GWMaxfieldf GeneraliSuperintendent? Operationsi p@h" 4 'd

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iJ. CD Reisenbuechler, Superintendent,u0perations; ' , . ,i &,, %, M WXJW Herrman,1 Superintendent,- Maintenance 1 j . N ' 4,1 ' ' < , id ?.. # N.-LC HoeferthSuperintendent, z Instrument' & ' Controls : l~ fa ". R.sJJBruno, Superintendent? Training: ' ' + ~ o1 - >

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' JT. : L. Fredrichs',T Superintendent, Chemistry, ,1 ' ' (4( -, w JD.L FGJohnsonkSuperintendent, Health Physics ' Ty < ~ w V;

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RC C MZyduckhSuperintendent,-. Technical Servicesi

', , /H ' dV . L*J4 E. : Knorr,: Regulatory. Engineer: ' ' '

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- technical 'andfengineeringlstaffsf and' reactor and. auxiliary operators.

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W - symmation:ofsprel,imina'rpfindings.' ,Ap , , J ~. _ , . . .. - .r , , . sH m (2.

! Licensee" Action ~ on: Previous-Inspection Findings ~(92/01) (92702) '& ' " , , y w a - - s

, ,[h [Qjk jakJ(Closed)ONn!ItemL(2'66/88002-0'1)s.Ina' equate, Procedure"-Operatiod ' i d

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, During(testing 'of faL diesel generatorf(DG), an operator was unable tos y~ 4 j 4' ' m . "y" # . restart t* diesellengine following.a run.

The'cause was attributed Jn is o ... -. N P w , ' toi his1fp lurelto wait for the! stop; timer to. time-~out.after,.. . .. .w .! ! % M,' completing the, previous.run.

ProcedureTTS-1:" Emergency Generator 3D "N ^ , ". Biweekly" did:not contain s'ufficient~ information to guide the ' ' . f 'i y* % q r ', ,, , operator'inithel operation.of the timers? a '* ' y ,

. , . . < . n r ' The licenseethas: revised Procedure'TS-1 to' address this deficiency.

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' ' . P~ The. inspector (reviewed. Revision'25, dated February 24, 1989, and

' H?' noted that'the' procedure now contains. precautionary statements to

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prevent inadvertentLactuation ofidiesel shutdown timers'on a failed; ediesel' start. >The inspector was satisfied with the changes'to the~

'l $ ' ~ procedure and this item is closed.

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(Closed)~ Violation ~(266/88020-03): Failure'to Properly Position;a ' > ,, . W Test Switch as; Required by Procedure.

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< l ' KM During preparations to perform ICP 2.1 " Unit 1 Periodic Test Reactor ' $. , Protection and' Safeguard Analog, Channels I through IV,"_the. Safety c - %, ' 3^. ' ' Injection;(SI) Unblock Bistable Test Switch.was found out of its < .SW . normal: position'. :The switch had'apparently been left in the trip i M Epositibn after theilast completion of ICP 2.1 instead of being ~ " ' > .jH .retu'rned to normal as required by the procedure, m.

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W , , <j ng g , , Ed, tThe: licensee responded.toJthe violation in:its' letter-(VPNPD-88-558, ) ~ +g-NRC-88-111) of November 17, 1988.

Corrective' action proposed included J . - Q.

. revising test procedures'ICP 2.1 and ICP.2.2 to require independent j

verification of the test (switch positions at the completion.or..'
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' N . interruption'of' testing as; applicable. The. inspector reviewed the ,; . revised procedures and was satisfied with the changes. :This item is;

' s closed. ' j , , , , , $ . 'c.

(Closed) Vio'lation (266/88022-03; 301/88020h03): Failure to Follow ' Procedures; Radiation Protection, Training' Incident.

q ": u .. , .. . + . ... , ' , NRC Region III. received an allegation"that; workers had cheated.

, during a September 13,.1988 General Employee Training examination n 'x Jfor' incoming personnel-.becaus~e ofsinadequate proctoring. The.

p l preliminary investigation into the allegation ~ revealed that the)

instructor failed to follow the' proctoring requirements of Procedure

i TRNG 9.0-6.3 for which the licensee was subsequently cited.

> ~ ., i A detailed einbestigation of; the iincident was. completed by' the.

licensee. ;The findings 1show that the. instructor had briefly left ' the examination room twiceduring.the ' test on examination related- - i business. This was the' principle' source.of concern.

Although he

, was out'of sight of some of the' participants, he was never out of' l

hearing range.

Nevertheless,-the instructor was counseled by the >1icensee regarding-the' requirements-of remaining in.the classroom

duringl examinations.

, ' Additional factors contributing to this incident' included

. . overcrowding of the class and.a false sense of uegency to complete , the course, examination, and grading in the same day.

This. urgency ' compelled thetinstructor to' attempt grading-' examinations as they were handed in, diverting his attention from the class. -The , licensee has addressed these factors by limiting individual class size, expanding _the number of facilities available for examinations during peak demand times such as outages, and expanding the duration of!the course to eliminate any perceived need to rush through the material..' This;will allow processing large number of people while stil1' maintaining adequate control over the testing process.

. >The inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation. report, , , participated in a training session, and interviewed training ' personnel.

The investigation report noted that two of the ' examination ~ participants admitted talking to each other during the test.

0ne trainee was apparently missing the final estion on his , B'1 exam and inquired of his neighbor for the question.

No evidence of cheating could be substantiated during the test.

Regardless, all

- % the participants of that exam were restricted from the plant until.

' h they.had completed retraining and a second examination. The _' inspector was satisfied with the implementation of the licensee's corrective action. This: item is closed.

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'(0 pen) Unresolved Item (266/89020-02; 301/89019-02): Multiple Failure of Safety injection Accumulator Level Detectors.

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[, .,, , On June 12,11989, three of four level detectors for the two safety.

injection accumulators on Unit 2 were found to have failed (one-of these was known.to be out of service).

A subsequent investigation-ofLthe incident is documented ~in Licensee Event Report (LER).

89-003-00. The. licensee determined'that during this event;;when the two accumulators were being cross connected to allow using the one remaining level indication.for both accumulators, the B' accumulator-level exceeded the high level limit cited in' Technical Specification 15.3.3.A.1.b.

All.the failed detectors'have since been repaired and returned to

service.

The cause of the level detector malfunction was attributed to moisture intrusion between the halar insulator and the sensing rod.

The moisture. intrusion shorted the circuit, causing a. resistant path as opposed to a normal capacitance path. The moisture intrusion was attributed to the detector design lacking a waterproof seal on the adapter nut at the top of the detector.

This feature was not-considered necessary'at the time.

Long term corrective action includes replacemer.t of all accumulator level detectors with a new mooel which features a fusion joint to j seal the halar insulator to the adapter nut at the top of the detector.

This decign will provide more protection against moisture intrusion. ' Two of these detectors had already been installed in Unit 1 in April 1989 and are satisfactory. The remaining two Unit 1 detectors are to~be installed during the next refueling outage in April.1990. 'All four Unit 2 detectors are scheduled to be replaced in Octobia 1989.

The inspector will review this area in a future report.

The NRC review of the LER discussing this event noted that details were only provided about the B accumulator level detectors even though'one of the three failed detectors is on the A accumulator.

~The licensee indicated it will reissue the LER to include. details on all the failed detectors.

The' licensee Off Site Review Committee raised a concern regarding the safety implications of operation with the accumulators cross ! ' connected if a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) were to occur. The safety analysis assumes that during a LOCA, one accumulator floods the core while the other drains through the ruptured loop.

Therefore, operating cross connected, pressure in both accumulators

' may equalize at the value determined by the ruptured loop, which will be less than the pressure in the core. Consequently, flow to the core by the other accumulator may not occur. The licensee is evaluating this concern * > determine the need for a Limiting Condition for Operation 20) in Technical Specifications for l operating with the accumulators cross connected.

' This item. remains open pending reissue and subsequent NRC review of the LER and final determination of the need for an LC0 concerning operating with cross connected accumulators.

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[P1 anti Operations- (71707) ~ (71710) (93702)- I ' ' J i , a.

_ Control' Room Observation (71707).

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The inspector _o'b'erved control room operatioht,-reviewed' applicable s

x 11ogs and conducted discussions with contrcl room operators during; ' l >

=the. inspection _ period..During these discussions and observations,.

', e the inspectors ascertained that the ' operators were. alert, cognizante , 9F of current, plant conditions, attentive to changes 1intthose .l

conditions and took prompt action when; appropriate.

The inspectors 4 h

l 'noted that a high. degree of_ professionalism attended all facets of-j Lcontrol roomloperation'and,that:both unit' control boards were ! r ' E generally in a ' black board' condition-(no non-testing annunciators-

s in alarm condition).

Several, shift turnovers were also' observed and^ ' . appeared.to b'e handled in a thorough manner.

' a i . ! ' ' s' Thelinspectors' performed walkdowns of the control boards ~to: verify the_ operability,of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout:

g' ". records and verified proper return to service of affected

. ._ components.

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The Plant' Manager was observed making periodic tours of _ the ' control Ei e

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" . Room and through the plant. 'The Vice President,-Nuclear, was also-d ' - observed. conducting an extensive ~ tour of the plant.

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i JThe' inspector noted'that operators do not rotjtinely. check all' alarm ' panelsfwh'n silencing an alarm.

This' allows an additional alarm to- % ~ e

actuateJalong with the first alarm and remain' unnoticed by the u

operator.

Such an: event occurred in the inspector's presence during. L a. surveillance test.

The Unit 1 control-operator silenced an' . expected. alarm' associated with the test and did not notice a , . simultaneous unrelated alarm on another panel.. Fortunately, the alarm was ' minor in nature and was ' noticed by an alert Unit 2 >,! operat'or who notified the Unit"1 operator. Appropriate corrective action lwas then taken by the Unit l' operator.

Control Board Labeling . ,e % Minor deficiencies exist in labeling on. the' control boards. _ Among

these are numerous 3 position switches (CLOSE-AUT0 0 PEN) which do ' not have the AUTO position labeled and the 1B-1 steam generator level-indicator-which is missing its label.

The inspector also . noted an operator's, uncertainty regarding the meaning of indication lights for moisture separator / reheater and feedwater heater control valve positions /on panel:C031D. The operator explained that there wasn't enough room on;the panel for two sets of lights per valve, so ~ .nP one light now indicates both open or closed positions depending on its brightness < The licensee commenced'a major relabeling of the control panels 'during this' inspection period as followup to a human factors design review,of the control room layout.

This relabeling is expected to correct!all existing deficiencies.

Additional information will be.provided in a future report.

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-Tours of the1 Cable Spr:eading Roomi(CSR)? Gas Turbine'(b )-Building "

and. Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)>were conducted'to' observe plant

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. equipment conditions,:.. including plant housekeeping / cleanliness. conditions, status of fire protection equipment,. fluid, leaks:and? >

' excessive vibrations and to verify that, maintenance requests had ,

, been initiated for, equipment in need;of maintenance.. IThehinspector:no$edseveral[discrepanciesinthefCSR.-Severallarge > , ,i

mobile. testing ~ devices including a multiemp. tester were found.with-

, .their wheels unblocked nr otherwise unsecured. 2Several extension' - ' - [i

cords were dangling out of the' overhead including one wrapped around ' 'an electrical conduit; The Control Room Transciever Station Control.

Panel.is attached,Lat le'ast in part,~to its' power supply by ani.

extension cord..The' licensee was notified of these findings ~and

L took appropriate corrective action. -The testing. devices'were removed , " -from the CSR until wheel chocks are made for them.

The Transceiver.

c Station Control Panel-power supply is scheduled to.De permanently- , . connected as part of a planned control room modification.

Several deficiencies were noted inLthe PAB.

Examples include: ~ ' Service water (SW) system piping' appears' excessively corroded --- , in several place.s.. _ .. . The pressure gauge; downstream of ISW-190 reads zero though' --- there is. flow through^its associated cooler.

. --1 The' cable to 1 TIS-2901~ appears inadequately supported compared .to;the cables on the remaining temperature indicating switches.

! ' The stanchion,under IIA-3047 is not bolted to the floor.as is -- - m its companion.._, ' The 1SW-212' handwheel is missing its retaining nut.

--- Housekeeping in general appeared weak"with several items' of

- equipment laying adrift including an unsecured spoolpiece and m < D' several large ubber hoses. A.large pool of containment tendon greate wm % nd on'the Unit 2 side under the 26'; elevation containmen', tendon grease. vent fittings.

These issues'were brought . to the licensee's attention for correction.

This area area will be ' reviewed in a future inspection.

t During facility tours, inspectors noticed very few signs'of leakage I and that all equipment appears to be in good operating condition.

- Overall, plant cleanliness is adequate.

Plant management has expressed its concern about the appearance that housekeeping may be a declining and has' discussed possible corrective actions.

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Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) System Walkdown (71710) ' , The inspector performed a detailed walkdown of portions of the l ! D105/0106 station batteries and the Containment Spray systems in ' ' Ej, order to independently verify operability.

The D105/0106 and ' Containment Spray system walkdowns included verification of the

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p p ,': - , -c s _l, = .a- - ' ' p ,a ' --LInspection'ofsystemequipmentconditions.

. , ' ' ' Confirmation that the system check-off-list (COL)land operating " Lprocedures are' consistent _with plant drawings._ _ , ~ ' '-- VeH fication thatisystem' valves',: breakers.' and ' switches' are; J ia?

properly aligned.

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- : Verification that instrumentation is ~ properly valved in andL ' = operable.- -- Verification 'that valves required to be locked have appropriate ^ < ' ' , . locking ' devices. ' - Verification that control room switches, indications and controls ' 'are satisfact'ory.

. . i ' , -- Verification that' surveillance test procedures properly implement y' the' Technical" Specifications surveillance requirements.

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Neither the hatter 40mpartmerits nor the batteries themselves were

' ' " labeled. This' creates"the potential.for performing a maintenance.or ' ' < surveillance l action on the wrong battery.

Signs at-'the entrance of ' _ < the ba_ttery rooms.r'equire5 that: the c'ontrol room be contacted prior lto entry andith'e; doors: blocked'open.

A plant operator was seen ' entering without'doing either.

When' questioned, he replied that the - ,

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. battery room' ventilation ^ system hadlbeen-changed and the signs were no' longer ap'plicable. 1 hese issues were brought to the licensee's ' T , . attention.

The' licensee has indicated that the batteries will be ' , , / l labeled.

Although some test gear was laying adrift,. housekeeping in > l general was' good.

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The.1P-14A' Containment Spray 1 Pump coupling to.the motor.is corroded.

There is a small water leak onto the pump housing which is spreading-over and acrossla marked contaminated area' boundary.' A wheeled. cart containing tsst equipment is. stored unsecured.in this room. The ' licensee considers this' cart storage acceptable.

The inspector observed technicians installing new labeling and flow indicators on.

4 LContainmentiSpray. system pipes, valves and components.

These- ~ labels, part of an' extensive ongoing labeling ~ program, significantly . improve the ease and accuracy 4of.. identifying system components as well as greatly enhancing the ability to walk down a system.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

di Unit 1 Operational Status (93702) < ,

The C Moisture Separator / Reheater (MSR) valve positioner suffered a ruptured bellows on' August 11.

This caused the associated MSR steam supply valve to' shut, thereby securing heating steam to the MSR.

Reactor power consequently decreased about.5%. The inspector was in Lthe' Control Room during the event and observed the corrective .acti on's.

Control Operators responded promptly and verified the reactor was in a stable condition.

Appropriate procedures were y ! consulted and recovery actions initiated after.the bellows were = repaired.

The inspector was satisfied with the operators' response.

The licensee implemented a new fuel management plan for Unit 1 on August 5, 1989.

Power is being reduced to approximately 50% over ' , e , .j ' y

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W g.fsW 9 , b (, y ,% c, ] Ji - at > $ hi, ' N ithiweekerids/thiconservernuclear fuef and thereby extend _ the current: A ' WC e { Ecoreilife,tolallow a: satisfactory marginsforLmeeting' the next. A , - irefueling? outage 1 commitment. :The.uniticontinued to operate at full x81M&~bl ' - , ^ - B ipowerffor;the} remainder of this perio'd with only requested load

following power ~ reductions., Wgg'? - a , , . ........ . ,

m x 'p.- e; Junit 2 Operational?Stsths.(93702); - <' yN ' , o - , " qw ' 9 Unit?2scrammedfrom100%poweratf1631ronA'ugust20H1989due:toa ' ~ . ' ~ i Lmain transformerilockout which tripped the main turbine.: TheS ' ' ' ,tlockout vas;cause'd by :a' nitrogen >lsu'dden pressure" protective trip b :,, m m M i - i M on..the' transformer': An' Unusual eventLwasLdeclared;in accordance with' " M plant emergency ~ procedures'duestoEthe: loss offelectrical load. The.

4., 'W . M ' reactor was placed in hot shutdown with!forcedLrecirculation in the ' ' , Q", primary cooling system:and steam dumpingLof theisecondary. cooling- ' ~ - V* NE s

system to' remove decay heat. The Unusual Event was terminatedLafter~

- ' u , v ...therreactor wassdetermined to be in a ' stable. condition.

Extensive f, (troubleshootingtfailed to Lfind a cause for;the sudden pressure trip a , onLthe. main transformer.

After testing'the sudden pressure trip- ' 4 @?

mecha'nism"to.' assure itself that sit was functioning' properly, the-

^ ., , < F ' ' .licenseeLrestarted"the unit August l21.

No abnormal radiation +,i - i freleaseloccurred from this' event.

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?The licensee-evaluated the main transformer protection. circuitry and i (.f,, * ' determined;that adequate protection is provided against transformer 4'J'

failure by the phase differential
current trip when power is above.

C # the reduced: sensitivity region of-this; trip circuitryr /As a= result ['i iof-this'. determination, the Unit'2 Biphase' nitrogen sedoen pres'sure ~ - , d & ftrip will:be'disablodsat power' levels above 25% under; temporary modification 69-034. ' The B phase sudden pressure rel.ay will still.

' E l annunciate in the control room requiring operators?to check the- ' 1 transformer for possible faults.

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W' , Several complications arose during this incident.. Shortly'after the-turbine tripped, Lone of the crossover ste'am dump valves-(which vents < y* the moisture. separators to atmosphere upon:a turbine overspeed trip) " ' ' p"'

failed to Lreseat completely afterscompletion of ~ venting; This left an'open path between the' atmosphere'and'the main condenser resulting

' ' ' _ , lin' an inrush of air and subsequent loss of condenser vacuum.

%, 's consequently,csecondary steam had to be vented to atmosphere vice the- . condenser to> remove decay heat until condenser vacuum was restored.

@'. . ?' During the followup investigation, the licensee found that the valves had reseated after cooling.

Further troubleshooting failed to reveal - any deficiency associated with the valves. CThese valves have a ' - history'of failing to close as noted in maintenance records.

Their J 1-Lonly function,is to open upon turbine overspeed! Their failure to ? j % close is not, considered * a significant detriment' to their operation.

' , - p , ~ The B Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) did not indicate shut after this ' > event as. required. -A local verification found that the FRV in fact did shut butcthe~ valve indication' continued to-show open.

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' ' ' ,on' the valve-positiori indicator caused Jt to change' indication to ' , %

1 shut. : Adjustments were'madetto,the valve position indicator to - ' ,m~ ,. ' " ' correct this deficiency, a x ~ Q, U I e i i[ e -

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' p?q 1..,.......L,,. ' ' ' ~ ' - ' s*.. W%~ open?as?l req'uiredlwhen the;FRV shutx The: valve was" subsequently's.

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$$4M' / Jopened manually allow-recifculationLby' an operator; venting >the.

t hyI! I , + ; control}airjtoj The problem wasifound~to'be with X faulty? / f ' icnntrol solenolo _nich wasithen replaced.

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cr ' ,$ ,.4.. .. O ne,.of;twoisourcefrangenuclearjnstrumentL(SRNIMchan.nelsi(N32)was4 e, ~4.* elys - , , b' found to: havel failed 'as: power level decreased'into:thefsource ranger . , , The1 fault?wasyfound' to: beJa failed SRNIf detector.' t A' replacement of/ < $ %f f " ',

7

. L ' ~theTdetector.was-scheduled forithe. upcoming. refueling: outage.

sTechnical" Specifications allow continued 'reactorfoperation with only- ' N,' G %,,- ' ' ' F % ionelSRNIvoperable.

q , , Ty','x

7.,.,. - ..... " f.' ' :Inadv,ertent. Chlorine Discharge (93702),

- , ,

, y'"

' - ' ' g.,T, s, 30n July 24,198N ' routine chlorination was' commenced on" Unit is ", % , circulating" water:to control biological growth"in the main condenser of~>e "f Jh( Ltubes.,3To minimize the amount'ofTchlorine. discharged to the lake, a5 chlorine' neutralizer is' added tolthe circulating water at the. ~ _" "' ! discharge"fromithel condenser. _ Unfortunatelyidueito a communication' m " l error, the neutralizer was' added' to:the: Unit'2 discharge vice the' V ,

Unit 11 discharge? sSincerthe two discharge' paths ~
are separate,' the'

g"" , s -

-,

neutralizer waslunable to mix with-the chlorine to neutralize it. ~

' ,

Consequently, chlorine at 0.84 ppm was discharged to the lake.for ' > J ? I' Labout half an hour;in excess of the 0.2 ppm limit setiby the t , ?<' Wisconsin' Department of Natural Resources. (DNR).. The licensee , n'otified"theDNRioffthisLeventand to' the NRC; ; A recurrence 'ofl this. made a: subsequent-4 hour report - m g , eventioccurred on L ast.4, ' ' ar i l fM s J m 'resultingLin chlorinelat:0.73 ppm being discharged'to a lake for- >

  • W Labout[3' minutes. ~

g - J ' ~ g ~ , , M ' Chlorinatic' was ins 5itided at the plant in 1985 toL control marine <

~ Q growthiin the; main co'ndensers following a'switcil from. brass to - s ~ stainless steelfcondenser tubes.

Though the brass' tubes were s . resistant to marine growth, they became' prone toLcorrosion when the m* ' ~ s J W plant changed to volatile chemistry in the steam ~ generators.

Very " ( ofew errors}have'previously occurred in the operation of.the chlorination system since"1985.

The licensee is investigating the - , causes of"these"twotincidents to determine'a course of corrective g action'to prevent. recurrence.

~ " ' ig.

l Strike ' Contingency -(92709) ~ ?,,a % 1, A

The' labor contract covering' maintenance and health' physics R

e personneltlicensed and non licensed operators (excluding SR0's), p$

expired:at midnight on August 15,-.1989.. Approximately 150 people <2,s.

Lare affedtedLb9,this ' contract'. The < contract was extended day to'-day .While'dontrhet negotiations continue'd. -Plant" operations remained N" " '. .." " normal and no unusual activity was observed. The inspector. reviewed 4h the licenseef s strike' contingency plans and had no concerns.

A . 4 ';'. .' { tentative agreement was' reached on August 24 and the contract

~proposalisubmitted; for a ratification-vote on August 29.

Results of , the vote are1 scheduled to be: released September 7.

Preliminary ' , Indications'are that the. contract will be ratified.

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, [ !E .Tu'rbine Building R'oof Flashidg' Collapse"(71707)- y ' t . ... _ v, ,.,, .. .... . .0n August 10.~at about 11 00 p.m.,.the roof flashing at the south end ,,

of1theiturbine building fellsoff.its/ support.

The. flashing ' fasteners 'were removed earlier that" day by a roofing contractor and: the flashing was'left l'eaning against'the building frame.

Some of- ' m " ~ the flashing fell onto= the Unit 1 main transformer damaging the M Ldeluge system.

No damage _ occurred 1to' the transformer itself andino. transient was observed on the reactor.

The_ licensee repaired the- _ deluge system and replaced the flashing with a temporary covering'- o . n pending completion of roofing renovations.

These: reviews and observations were conducted to yerify that facility

operations were conducted safely and in conformance with requirements-established under technical specifications, federal regulations, and 1-administrative procedu es.

J4.

Radiological ContEols'(71707) ' L The inspectors yJutinely observed the licensee's radiological controls cnd practices during. normal plant tours and the inspection of work , ac.tivities..-Inspection:in this' area includes direct observation of the use. of Radiation' Work. Permits (RWPs);. nornal work practices inside y contaminated barriers; maintenance of radiological barriers and signs; '

and health' physics-(HP) activities regarding monitoring, sampling, and

~ ! surveying.. The,inspecto.r also observed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste processing.

- ' < From a radiological standpoint the plant is in good condition, allowing access'to most sections of the facility.

During tours of the facility, a theiinspectors noted_that barriers-and signs also were in good candition.

' When minor' discrepancies were identified, the HP staff:quickly responded (. to correct'any problems.= ~ A_ discharge of the B Holdup Tank to the. lake was performed during this , period.

47,550 gallons of:a 7869 ppm boron solution containing 74.3 Ci

of. Tritium and 0.0427 Ci of other radioactive material was discharged _! during August 9 11.

The inspector reviewed Discharge Permit 89-061 and - observed the discharge, both of which were satisfactory. One of the- > > radiation monitors used in the discharge path (1RE-229) was noted to have Lan inaccurate drawing on it for use as an operator aid.

The P&ID print for the' Waste Gas system was also noted to contain labeling, inaccuracies.

, These were brought to the licensee's attention for correction.

j - ' All activities.were conducted in a satisfactory manner during this inspection period.

5.

-Maintenance / Surveillance Observation (62703) -(61726) a.- Maintenance (627031 r St'ation maintenance activities of safety-related systems and j components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that ' V , x ,

4 , ' . . j 'j , . W ' " ' _ __ _ __

gy y x q x , a nv - .. , ~4y , . .. . {they were conducted in accerdance with approved procedures, , ' , w

regulatory guides and industry codes.or standards and in, conforinance '

.with technical specifications ' . , ~o "1 ' The following items were; considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation iere. met while components or ' systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior;to to . initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved J . procedures and were.. ins'pected as applicable; functional testing; Land /or calibrationsLwere performed prior to returning components. or systems to service;{ quality control records were maintained;; activities were accomp1.ished by qualifled personnel; parts'and: materials used were properly certifie.d; radiological controls were implemented; Land fire prev.ention controls wererimplemented.

' r d.. . - ' , Work requests were reviewed 4to' determine status of outstanding jobs

and to-assure that priority #iF assigned to safety-related equipment-maintenance which may: affect system performance. ' Por'tions of!the following' maintenance activities were' observed /reviewedi , , Repair.'of:a ruptured bellows on the 1C Moisture Separator /~ -- Reheater (MSR) control valve.

. Annual Inspection of'the G02 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).

- , ~ This maintenance action was performed using procedure-RMP;43 - (Rev.5), ' Routine Maintenance Procedure Dieseli Annual J! . Inspection.' The licensee voluntarily entered a 7 day Limiting Condition ~for Operation (LCO) to' perform this five day job which this year included both the 3 andl6 year inspections.

- Step-2.3.3 of RMP 43 recomme_nds against taking'an EDG-out.of service if the Gas Turbine Generator (G05) is also out of ) service.' As discussed in paragraph 5.b, the licensee had declared the auxiliary support diesel for G05 to be out of service during this time period, without which G05 could not be started under station blackout conditions.

This concern was discussed with-the licensee.

The licensee had considered this condition and made the determination that since the auxiliary diesel was only declared out of service administratively, it would belable to function if called upon during the EDG outage, allowing G05 to operate.

" The inspector'noted that the maintenance work appeared well + planned and well executed.

Technicians performing the work appeared knowledgeable.of their job.

A vendor-technical' . representative was brought in to assist.

Several levels of-management were present supervising and directing the effort and appropriate won k plans and mainten?.nce manuals were readily ^ > , available and.in use at the work site.

The work ~was completed ' ahead of schedule.

A small oil leak was found under the duplex ' l ;, oli. strainer which was conveyed to the licensee for correction.

' l'

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. , ' b.

Surveillance (61726) m 'The inspector observed surveillance tu ting and verified that

testing was. performed in'accordance with adequate procedures; that

, ',, ' ' test instrumentatiorLwas_ calibrated; that limiting conditions for.

. operation were met;-that' removal and; restoration of.the affected components. were accomplished;. that test results conformed with technical. specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual; directing the test; and that any deficiencies. identified during the testing were.

. properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

_ The inspector witnessed and reviewed the following test activities: ICP 2.3 (Revision 20) Reactor Protection System Logic -- The inspector noted that the Shift Superviscr's initials upon conclusion of terting verify his being informed that the test was completed.

They do not infer that he also reviewed the test results--nor does the procedure require him to. review it.

Discussions with several Shift Supervisors indicates' that they review test results before initialing.

PC-29 (Revision 11) Gas Turbine, Auxiliaries & Load Test - 'This was a n,odified version of the procedure to allow'a one . time 8 hour' acceptance test per 10CFR50.63 of the'5G gas a turbine generator to qualify it for emergency power use u'nder station blackout conditions.

It involved an eight hour run-of SG using its' associated auxiliary diesel generator (G501) to supply power to' all of the SG support loads.

The first run ended after 5 minutes when a low lube oil pressure trip shut down the gas turbine.

Resultant s troubleshooting under Maintenance Work Request (MWR) 887 was unable'to duplicate.the low lube oil condition 'but uncovered some pitted contacts in the lube oil pressure susor circuitry.

This led.the licensee to believe that the turbine trip was caused by a spurious signal and that lube oil was satisfactory.

The pitted contacts were subsequently replaced and the test repeated.

The next two runs lasted 18 minutes and 31 minutes respectively before being terminated by the auxiliary diesel generator shutting down on high temperature.

The G501 coolant system was thought to be the proble'n behind the trip so the coolant system was cleaned and flushed.

The inspector monitored G501 during the subsequent-(4th) test.

This diesel is located in a corner of the SG building and the forced airflow through its coolant radiator blows directly against an adjacent wall.

The result is that the diesel recirculates much of its waste heat with a consequent gradual temperature rise. When an operator noticed that the coolant

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' , .- 6 3: fallowing'coolo~utsideairito'entertherdiesehspace." This.

' ' ! brought,theitemperatures down0a'nd' allowed them to stabilize > $y.,u' i - > m , Theelicenseelevaluated. this_ conditiokand decided that . q > , , foperatingLwith'the. generator) building'doorsLopeniconstituted~an 26: g,V, + e ' ' p ~

ab' normal lineup and thereby-invalidated'the test.

The gas ' ' . , , ~ turbine was shut 1down afterfabout 2' hours and'arcontractor' QO

.calledcin.toievaluate<the U501 cooling system. 1The:e' valuation

, Q C - Jconcluded that inadequate ventilation exists around G501. ' @J '_ ' > > 'g _ Alfifth attempt was made August.24 operating SGTwithSthe b -'^ m.

.. , . . _, p L ' ~. .< '

> , ' ' t' 'e 1buildingLdoors open for ventilation to verify?that' G5011couldi

' ,, ._, , " ' ' (support all SG loads for the fullitestiduration; This attempt U

  • '

W,,< .failedJafter about 7.5 hours when the?G501 cooling water; pump; .. ' ', * ' seals;1e'akedkresulting:in'a high temperature trip;of G501.

' * > . , ' Further information will be provided in a future ~ report.

' >> >

,,y, >

, ! << , , , , . .;,

f iThe.insp'ectorL noted that a procedurally note required byithe'

"

- , / p' t1 (Temporary Change (TC) sheet.regarding the'returi of SG.

> W W1 _ auxiliary power to. normal was not; entered in'the procedure.* ". ,,m '

This was. brought to'the licensee's' attention and promptly..

' $ corrected.

S ' o , , y

m x

~ ' ? Nk: discrepancies were(noted d'uring'the observance of any1of the' _ "

- .,' ', ab6ve tests.

~ , _ Mie ic ' m , ~ , NN Iw f6.1 Emergency'Prepa"rddness'(71707) , %g.g - An inspec' tion:sfeemergency preparednessiactivities was. performdd tio' - ..

cassess theilicensee's implementation"ofithe. site emergency plan and-_.

' D g implementing' procedures.

The inspection included monthly-review. and tour'- __ of emergency facilities and equipmentf di.scussions with licensee staff, ' q Landf aLreviewLof' selected procedures; a C_[ tThe inspector. reviewed p'rocedure EPIP '3.2 ~(revisio'n 10), ' Paging System

' , Operation,8.and-had n concerns.

~ o ,, . , , ,

All activities were coriducted in a satisfactory manner during this i . .' inspection period.

...

N.[: .

-

, ~ 'f s 7.

Security (71707) i , . i , ,

The inspectors, by direct observation and interview, verified that 3+

portions ~of, the physical security plan were bei.ng implemented in @p _ .accordance with the; station. security plan.

The inspectors. also continued ' m' to monitor ' compensatory m' asures that have been! enacted by the licensee.

q e j' ih' / (The. licensee notified the'NRC regarding a p'otential tampering with "' '

security equipment discovered on August'14, 1989.

A security officer on j ' routine patrol. notice _d a rubber stopper in the barrel tip of his issued j - ' 5A L-shotgun. -All_other weapons were promptly checked with no abnormalities' i i noted. The investigation of.this. incident, revealed that this weapon had ' ]j e~been cleaned the day be' ore and found satisfactory.

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. ,,..., ... , M dE . Uthejarmoywhere <this w'eapon wasistored the?previousidayn l0ne,of. the A :; b,sM ~ Tsecurity persohnell s6bs' quentlyf came < forwa'rd andjadmitted:toltrifling1 Sf ~ e Ph 2 s A'" i"with7alrubber stopper;the evening before it Was discovered lodged in:the' Y m W^ shotguk ;HeLclaimedL he hadnidly:put itiin the tip of the barrel 'when at ' nM Lphone.rsng which he?answeredi During the phone; call,7 e;forgotjaboutithe? l h < Q 3 stopper and consequently leftjit'in theLshotgun. cThisiperson was.

a , ,. 4N simmediatelydrestricted'from access to theisite.and placed on suspension.

, He subs _eque_ntlyLresigned afterjbeing evaluated byla plant psychologist.

g - > M.m.

The; inspector had no further2 concerns regarding.this incident.

u g y . c' q- 'A(site security guard wasifound; sleeping August 31,: whilelassigned to?

e . escort 7a; roofing' contractor inithe protected area. T Another. security - o .. " g' jIofficer~ conductingta routine security patrol noticed both"the contractor Land'hisiescort' asleep inLthe/ cab of the contractors vehicleyat 10:34 a.m.

_ , .c , 'i ' Interviewssconducted by theilicens'eirevealed that the contractor:was.

e , M' g I-checking his. equipment:at eight minutelintervalscand.had dozed offiabout-

10;S0 after completin'g the latest check.

He stated;thatEhis-escort.was:. M < , " awake'whenthefdozed off; The guard admitted to~ dozing;forfabout three'to: , s f.. ' four: minut'es.. Thelguard, who had'been working on site aboutt six nonths,- '

'was; suspended ~ pending a' final: determination ~ of. disciplinary measures.

The' , > Q ~ , ' event wasL: classified as=a; loss of control of an escorted l person:since the yA ccnntractoE wasLunescorted less than ten minutes.

e e, , All other activids wereL conducted in a' satisfactory manner during this i ' 'f m9L iinspection period.

~ ' . N l8J Engin'eerindand: Technical? Support (37828)- ,

' The inspector evaluated licensee' engineering and technical support . ' , W

activities to determine theirJinvolvement 'and support of facilityL

, ' operations.

This was1 accomplished during'the course'of routine.

+ ' evaluation of! facility: events and concerns through direct observation p, offactivitiesiand: discussions with engineering personnal.

, , .a.

Installation and' Testing ~of Modifications'(37828) .. The: inspector observed onsite activities and hardware associated . with the installation of selected plant modifications to ascertain a that modification activities are in'conformance with requirements:. ,This, inspection; included verification of the following items: Verification by direct observation that work is being performed -- by: qualified workers and in accordance with approved procedures.

7" ' Verification that the installation conforms to the as-built -- " ' ': drawings.

. . Confirmation that the equipment and material being used is -- 1' correct.- Determination whether the modified equipment was properly . X-c

- prepared for preoperational testing.

Verification' that preoperational testing was conducted using ' -- ' properly reviewed procedures and the test results appropriately , levaluated^against established criteria.

. ., ,

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s l ' ' ' Verification that test performance records received ~an

-- iindep5ndent'QAraudit.

g$' ' Selecited/portionibf the' following modifications!were revi,ewed:

-..iMod88-38junit'2;SteemGeneratorShellThermocouple^

~ ,LInstallatio'n fy; ' > , .

.

  • ,,

n

  • -

' ' TThelinsdectoirevieJedthemodificationpackageand'had'no; ' > . significant concernst -Installation of this modification is- ' + , scneduled'for the;0ctober 1989 refueling l outage.

This area.

' will;be reviesedlinf"a future /repor.t.

E

< , ,

- ' Mod 89-023"Mid'LoohRCSLevelIndication;Enh'ancement'- -. a.

m q,' - < - ; . , ' ?The' inspector ~obs'ervedworkdoneundeiMaintenanceWork' ' 9> - .. Requests (MWR) 892885 and'892886 and SPEED 89-62'.' Replacement- " of Unit.1 Reactor Vessel Level Bistables.' The' technician . < the workJappeared. knowledgeable and~ referred-performing?to the work plan.

. ' ' " N frequently ~ The inspector noted that the work plan-referred tolone of the bistables as LS-447-while the label- .on the: bistable read LC-447.

The licensee explained that the.

'LS is an error in their computer database and wi1F be ' corrected.

' < , No unacceptable conditions were identified.

  • b.

Inadequate Fire System Design Pressure (71707)

The licensee informed the inspector that during review of a fire fsy. stem' modification package,: plant engineers discovered-that the cshutoff head of the fire pumps, about 170 psig, is greater than the

" . fire system design ~ pressure of 125 psig.

Plant personnel have . stated _that previous hydrostatic' tests of the fire system.were y performed at.215 psig, verifying that the system.will withstand pump , shutoff head pressure.

The licensee is continuing to evaluate this

situation to verify the actual design and operating pressures'of the

' fire system..This item will remain unresolved pending a final determination of system status by the licensee-and subsequent NRC.

review (266/89024-01;.301/89023-.01).

, c.

' Incorrect FSAR LOCA Analysis (71707) , During preparation of an instrument line modification package, plant engineers noted that FSAR LOCA analysis calculations appear to be erroneous.

FSAR section 14.3.1 states; "A makeup flow rate from one charging pumpLis typically adequate to sustain pressurizer pressure "

at.2250 psia for a break through a 3/8 inch diameter hole.

This I break results'in a loss of approximately 17.5 lb/sec." However, the maximum flow from one charging pump is only 8.32 lb/sec (60 gpm at 1985 psig at 120 deg'F.). Therefore, 2.1 charging pumps would be required to make up.for a 3/8 inch hole (the plant has three pumps).

' Theflicensee has used the 3/8 inch break as the basis for primary _ ,

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, , , ,q [,* ~ ' S E: ' ' ' u > , , + .. .. w- . .. . , dy,(. ," ' instrument; tubing QA' applications M Thisibasis'may have'to be , , , ,. ( L resvaluateoN This titert will; remainlunresolved pending ?a: final.

W&4 ~ '4

QWR, :' ' * ',, 7266/89024-02;z 301/89023-02); w . Determination by,thel licensee and ' subsequent.NRC review , , "'

  • '

&ym.

bb 3( y.,, 3, - - y $3 9 V All?otherJactiMt'ies were; conducted ini satiNActory manner 'during(this.. I , . inspection periody VW -, ' ' '> '

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  1. ~ 9; e ' Safety' Assessment / Quality Verification'n '(35502). (40500) '(90712) (92700)-

, y< %v . [ N v &' ' ' implementation aad effectiveness:o_f programsEassociated with mana[ P ~ The licensee'si oualityl assurance program's we.re?insp~ected to assess l.the ; C

p'dG contro.1, verification., andLoversite activities.( Special? consideration Y < -s , ,

'was given;toiissues which may be indicative"of'overall management- ,, yg,W

involvement inpqualityl matters such-as self improvement programs, 3~

+ ' ,, d]y

response to1 regulatory and industry initiatives', the: frequency of t J

' ' ' ,( ~

e management plant tours and control room observations, and management' , B,C . personnel's attendance atitech'nical and planning / sche,duling meetings.

'

,y , en .. . - ~ynager'sSupervisoryStaffMeeting(40500)L E %- la.. iM , r. ' i

~

The' ins'ltpector. noted that plant' management conducted.a1 spirited : , ( ,,; ,,.i ,,,.p - ~ ,

, , '

. .'discussi6n regardingJweaknesses in the site's QA. program during'a

"_

g;g: 1Managerfs Supervisory' Staff Meetir.g. L Several proposals ton , ys jg y " .. "La Lstrengthen"the;prpgram Eere outlined during3the course of-this.. - %> 1 discussion'.-..The staff' alto had a frank discussion on thel excessive \\ J Y @# ; T t

f 1ength of time pbrsonnel q alifications have been requiringi w ' 'recently. ' ' - " . , > a _m7 . M11factivities were conducted in a satisfactory manner during this ' .F< ' insp~ection2 period.

' .- - , ,4 - w

10.7iTemporary Instructions'(TI)' ' , T(Closed) TI 25bO/017-01 Inspection Guid'ance.for Heat Shrinkable.

a.

'N rTubing' ' ' ' .Using thelTI for guidance, a visual inspection of splices using heat ' ishrinkable (Raychem) tubing was performed. The inspector al_so ' reviewed the following essociated~ documentation to verify the licensee's conformance with the TI: '

Procedure.CP-E2.0, 'Constr"ction Procedure for Insulated Cable

- Terminations, Splices, and Connections'-(Revision 2).

.

Training: records-of personne1~who. received hands on training forfinstaliation of-Raychem splices. " '

Theinspehtion.determinedthat'thesplicesweremadeusingqualified

'

,

splice kit's,and the sork was performed and inspected by qualified personnel.

The)1icensee"is preparing to issue-a new maintenance _7 - > , L - procedure; MI 23.2h' Installation of Raychem; Materials,' which will < . f.

f formalize-the current' process of installing' heat shrink splices.

y > . LThis' TIsiEclosed.

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,, .11.

Outstanding Items (92702) . , Unresolved Items' -

.t.

, . Unresolved items are matters about which core information'isirequir'ed;in.

order to ascertain whether they are acceptableLi_tems,. items'of: , , ' h noncompliance, or deviations.. ' Unresolved items disclosed ^during the inspection are discussed.in paragraphs'8.b and 8.c.

"> E ' 12.

Managemeat Meetings (30702) ' .. ] , - A Meeting was held betwecn NRC Region-III: management and' plant management.

_ ' " on August 24',E1989 to discuss items of interest and foster. improved-R . communications between the. licensee'and the NRC.

Items of' discussion included the-August 20 reactor scram; the recent Safety Injection q 'J Accumulator level ~ instrumentation failures, the Licensee Event Report- ' , (LER) system,? status of the licensee's purchase of a third ' diesel ' generator,' qualification ~ testing of'the gas turbine generator,

grp communications between the plant and -the NRC, and1 housekeeping..The NRC-

i personnel' toured the plant after the meeting and observed portions of the

gas. turbine generator qualification' testing, j ' ' Commissioner James Curtiss visited the site August.30 to meet with plant H ~

" - personnel and tour the plant.

'. ,

13.. Exii Interview (30703)L -= u . A; verbal summary of preliminary find 3ngs'was providedLto the. licenses- - representatives denoted in.Section 1 on September 5, 1989, at the

"y' conclusion of the inspection.

No written inspection material was- ' provided to the licensee 1 during the inspection.

d ' The likely informational content of the inspection report with' regard to " documents. or processes reviewed during theiinspection' was 'also discussed.

i . The licensee:didgnot identify'any documents or processes as proprietary.

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