IR 05000266/1998016

Insp Repts 50-266/98-16 & 50-301/98-16 on 980713-17.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Plant Support Activities Re Physical Protection of Facility

ML20237A582
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	08/10/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237A569	List: IR 05000266/1998016 ML20237A566
References
50-266-98-16, 50-301-98-16, NUDOCS 9808140191
Download: ML20237A582 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket Nos: 50-266;50-301 License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27 Report Nos: 50-260/98016(DRS); 50-301/98016(DRS)

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241 Dates: July 13-17,1998 Inspector: Terry J. Madeda, Physical Security inspector Approved by James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety 9808140191 900810 PDR v

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I

Point Beach Nuclear Powei Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Reports 50-266/98016; 50-301/98016 This inspection included a review of plant support activities relating to the physical protection of the facility. The inspector assessed and evaluated performance for the following elements of the security program: access authorization program, access control-vehicies, protected area

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detection aids, compensatory measures, security program plans, security training and qualification records, management effectiveness, staffing levels, and follow-up on previous inspection t,.1 dings. The inspection was conducted from July 13-17,1998, e' Some fingerprint cards containing criminal history information that were received by the licensee from the Federal Bureau of Investigation were not promptly reviewed by the licensee upon receipt. These failures were not indicative of a programmatic breakdown and were low in safety significance. Personnel error caused the failure. Adequate corrective action was implemented. (Section S1.1)

e ' Licensee security management was proactive in identifying and implementing aggressive security compensatory measures for two identified security problem (Section S6.2)

I e On two occasions security management was deficient in providing adequate oversight and ownership to resolve problems identified in the security program in a timely manne In both cases extended security compensatory measures, which required considerable overtime, were required to be implemented. In one case the compensatory measures were in effect for 10 months, in the other case the compensatory measures were in effect for 4 months. Compensatory measures remained in affect at the conclusion of the inspection. (Section S6.2)

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Report Details IV. Plant Suonort S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S.1.1 Review of Criminal History Information Delaved Insoection Scooe (81070)

The inspector reviewed and evaluated the licensee's implementation of selected aspects of their access authorization program. Review activities included interviews with cognizant licensee personnel and review of access authorization personnel files for current and past t ,nployees granted unescorted acces Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through a sample review of personnel access files of plant personnel granted unescorted access and interviews with cognizant licensee staffers that the licenservas implementing their personnel access authorization program in an effective manner, except for the finding noted belo During a July 14,1998 interview with a licensee's security access authorization spec'alist, the inspector learned that 15 fingerprint cards results, containing criminal history information recently received from the FBI, had not been reviewed by the licensee's for derogatory information. The licensee staffer indicated that usually criminal history informatic , is immediately reviewed upon receipt from the FBI. The inspector interviewed another access authorization specialist who provided the same informatio The inspector determined that the criminal history information was received by the licensee's acceso authorization staff between July 9 and 10,1998. The responsible licensee staff member was knowledgeable that criminal history information was to be immediately reviewed upon receipt. However, in this case, the staff member had forgotten to conduct the review because of a recent heavy workload in processing personne When identified by the inspector, the responsible staff member conducted an immediate review of the criminal history information contained in the 15 fingerprint cards. One fingerprint card contained derogatory information, a dated arrest record. Subsequent licensee evaluation determined that the derogatory information did not negatively effect the individual's unescorted access statu When identified, the licensee took corrective actions to ensure that fingerprint cards are reviewed for derogatory information upon recsipt. Corrective actions included briefings

. to the licensee's access authorization s%ff to heighten their awareness to review l criminal history information immediately upon receipt, and to date stamp fingerprint j cards upon arrival at the site to show their receipt date.

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Paragraph 1.0 of Section 2.4 of the approved licensee's security plan requires the establishment and implementation of procedures to implement access authorization l: requirements in 10 CFR 73.56. The Licensee's Nuclear Procedure 1.7.2, " Regulatory

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Access Authorization Requirements" requires that a review of individual's criminal history information be conducted upon receipt. Inspector review determined that the failure appeared to be an isolated case and was low in safety significance.' The failure was caused by cognitive error. Actions to prevent further failures were implemented in a timely manner. Therefore, this failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violatio (NCV 50-266/98016-01(DRS); 50-301/98016-01(DRS)) Conclusions l

Some fingerprint cards were not reviewed by the licensee for derogatory information in a

timely manner. The lack of a timely review was not a programmatic failure, was of low actual safety significance, and was caused by an individual personnel failure. Adequate corrective action was implemented.

l S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documents S Security Plan Clarification Insoection Scooe (81018)

' The inspector reviewed security plan requirements in relation to observed activities of the security organizatio Observations and Findinas During observation of security activities the inspector noted that some members of the licensee's uniformed contractor security force were unarmed cod conducting specific security related duties. Review of the approved security plan showed that thos3 unarmed positions were identified in the plan as security force member Interviews of several of those unarmed security personnel determined that they had been specifically hired to be unarmed security officers and had received training to perform specific security plan related tasks. The Site Security Supervisor (SSS)

. confirmed that the role of unarmed security officers had been in effect for approximately one yea The SSS indicated that prior to using unarmed personnel a review of the security plan was conducted. The SSS had initially believed that a security plan change was not i necessary because the term " security organization members", already in the plan, met

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the criteria of an unarmed security officer, because other sections of the plan define l- specific duties of an armed officer. However, further review by the SSS determined that l- the term " security organization" is not an NRC defined term. Therefore, to improve plan clarity and to specifically identify the position of an unarmed officer to include duties,

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training, and equipment the SSS plans to submit a security plan change by September 17,1998.

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Inspector review determined that licensee ~'s implementation 6f an unarmed personnel program appeared to be in accordance with 10 CFR 73 regulatory requirements. The inspector also agreed that a security plan change that specifically identified unarmed personnel as watch-personnel would improve pler. clarity and be in accordance with NRC regulatory requirement Conclusions The licensee's will be submitting a security plan change to described their incorporation of unarmed personnel into their sevarity organizatio S6.2 Lack of Management Vigilance insoection Sc50e (81020)

The inspector reviewed management oversight of maintenance and operational elements of the security program. Inspection activities included review of security and maintenance records and interviews with cognizant licensee personnel who monitor performance of those programs, Observations and Findinas During review of security-related Licensee's Condition Reports (CR), the inspector identified two events that appeared to show weak oversight and coordination between security and two site operational organizations. Those two examples are described belo l (1) Ir>spector neutw of CR No. 97-3104 showed that on September 29,1997,

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licensee security personnel identified that a vital area barrier was not totally effective in deterring penetration. As a result, security compensatory measures were implemented on September 29,1997. The inspector determined that licensee security management was proactive in the identification and evaluation of this issu The inspector observed that the compensatory measure was still in effect during this inspection. The SSS stated at the exit meeting that those measures would remain in place until barrier repairs are completed. No completion date had ,

been established. On August 3,1998, the licensee's Emergency Response and Security Manager advised the inspector that repairs have been adequately completed and that compensatory measures had been discontinue Inspector review determined that the licensee's work order written to address the

! repair activities of the barrier was assigned a priority 6. This priority is the lowest in the licensee's system and does not require the establishment of a completion

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date. Licensee security manage:nent was aware of the low priority and did not j effectively monitor work progress because they believed that the cognizant work l groups, engineering and maintenance, would complete repairs in a expeditious I manner. However, the inspector determined this was not the case. The responsible work groups took limited action to repair the barrier due to the low priority assigned and lack of resources. Security management did not follow up to determine why corrective action had not been completed until just prior to our inspection. The inspector also determined that security officers required to provide compensatory measures were frustrated because of the amount of overtime they were being required to work to maintain an adequate !evel of j protection for the degraded barrier and their perception that their management was not effective in resolving the issue. Inspector review showed overtime per officer assigned to the compensatory measures averaged approximately 15 !

hours per wee I Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, the SSS stated that action would be completed by approximately August 10,199 (2) Inspector review of CR No. 98-1446 showed that since April 2,1998, two security compensatory measures had been implemented to address self-identified security weaknesses in the licensee's defensive security strategy. The l CR was assigned to the licensee's operations department and was designated a i priority 3. A priority 3 is a mid-level resignation and does not require the l

establishment of a time limit to finish the project. Security management was i adWsed in May, by operations, that coordination between ope:ations and l

engineering was required to complete this project. Security was not aggressive in coordinating activities between them and the two other groups. As also identified in item No.1 noted above, the inspector identified that security officers were frustrated on the length of time that compensatory measures had to be implemented and the lack of security management action to resolve the issue in a timely manne Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, the security staff was continuing to work to setup a meeting between the cognizant group Licensee action to resolve the two specific issues noted and to develop an effective process to monitor security projects assigned to other organizations will be tracked as an Inspection Followup item (IFl 50-266/98016-02 (DRS); 50-301/98016-02(DRS)). j c. Conclusions The inspector noted on two occasions security management was proactive in identifying and implementing compensatory measures for degraded security equipment. However, {

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security management was deficient in providing oversighYownership to resolve the identified problems in a timely manner. In both cases, tr.c lack of monitoring resulted in the implementation of long-term compensatory measure i u___

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S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S (Closed) Unresolved item (50-266/96017-04: 50-301/96017-04: Some sealed packages were not searched prior to being brought into the protected area and were stored in an u:. locked storage room until opened for use. NRC regulation 10 CFR 73.55(d)(3)

requires that packages be searched. The issue was referred to NRC Headquarters ,

(NRR) for resolution by letter dated December 31,199 i

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The inspector verified by observation and personnel interviews that the licensee has

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established a sealed package search program that provided the required contro {

Sealed packages if not opened and searched at the protected area access point are j stored in a locked area. If not stored in a locked crea, they are under continuous control i until searche On July 1,1998, NRR responded to the issue. The NRC determined that the licensee's (

actions as described by the inspector during an inspection conducted in late 1996 were {

not in accordance with their security plan requirements. Subsequent inspector review showed that since the item was identified, the licensee had taken significant action to improve their package search program. The inspector determined that the licensee's package search program is being implemented in accordance with security plan requirements. This issue is close S8.2 (Closed) Violation (50-266/98002-01: 50-301/98002-01: A vehicle was inadequately searched. During the course of this inspection, three vehicles searches were observed and searches were determined to be adequate. In addition, the inspector reviewed oversight activities and procedure changes that addressed vehicle search activitie These measures appeared adequate. This item is close S8.3 (Closed) Violation (50-266/98002-02: 50-301/98002-02): Failure to implement compensatory measures for a degraded intrusion alarm zone. The inspector verified by observation, on several occasions, that compensatory measures were properly implemented. Review of records subsequent to the last security inspection showed that compensatory measures were also appropriately implemented. This item is close S8.4 (Closed) Violation (50-266/98002-03: 50-301/98002-03): Armed response personnel were posted at compensatory measures posts, which reduced their ability to respond in a timely manner. The inspector verified during this inspection that compensatory measures posts were staffed by unarmed personnel or armed personnel not required to respond. Armed personnelin response positions were fully capable to respond in a timely manner. Interviews of 10 armed responders verified that they were not posted at compensatory measures posts. This item is closed.

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V. Management Meeting XI Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection resuu to licensee management at the conclusion of th]

onsite inspection on July 17,1998. Subseque,it to the exit meeting the inspector contacted the Licensee's Site Security Supervisor (SSS) requesting additional information regarding inspection findings in Section S6.2. That information was provided to Region ill on July 23, 1998. Our review of that information was completed on July 23,199 !

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee C. Andrews, Security Access Authorization Specialist M. Findlay, Manager, Eniergency Response and Security J. Gadzala, Regulatory Services Specialist T. Garraway, Quality Assurance Specialist M. Hansen, Operations Specialist V. Kaminskas, Manager, Regulatory Services and Licensing J. Knorr, Manager, Regulatory Compliance B. Kopetsky, Secunty Specialist J. McCullum, Site Security Supervisor S. Patulski, Site Vice President NHC P. Louden, Acting Senior Resident inspector P. Simpson, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 81018 Security Plan

- IP 81020 Management Effectiveness IP 81022 Security Organization IP 81070 Access Control- Personnel I

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ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-266/301/98016-01 NCV Failure to conduct a timely review of criminal history informatio /301/98016-02 IFl Security management was deficient in resolving some security related problems in a timely manne Closed 50-266/301/98016-01 NCV Failure to review criminal history information in a timely manne /301/96017-04 URI Control of " factor-sealed" packages within the protected are ,

50-266/301/98002-01 VIO Failure to conduct a proper vehicle searc /301/98002-02 VIO Failure to implement compensatory measures in a timely manne /301/98002-03 VIO Inadequate posting of a response team member, LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CR Condition Rep irt DRS Division of Reactor Gafety FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation IFl inspection Followup Item NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SSS Site Security Supervisor DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Licensee Security Related January 1998 to July 1998 Condition Reports Point Beach Security January 1998 to June 1998 System Tracking Reports i

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Security Event Logs January 1998 to June 1998 Work Monitor Reports January 1998 to July 1998

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