IR 05000266/1988012

Insp Repts 50-266/88-12 & 50-301/88-11 on 880501-0630.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Surveillance, Maint,Physical Security & Radiological Protection

ML20151B223
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	07/07/1988
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151B218	List: IR 05000266/1988012 ML20151B214
References
50-266-88-12, 50-301-88-11, GL-87-06, GL-87-6, IEB-88-003, IEB-88-3, NUDOCS 8807200293
Download: ML20151B223 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY ~ C044ISSION .!

REGION III

- Reports No. 50-266/88012(DRP);50-301/88011(DRP)

Dockets No. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27

- Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Unit 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted: May 1 through June 30, 1988 Inspectors: R. L. Hague R. J. Leemo Approved By: obert DeFayette, Chi 7 Reactor Projects Section 3A Da'te ~

_ Inspection Suranary Inspection from May 1 through June 30, 1988 (Report Nos. 50-266/88012(DRP); l 50-301/680ll(DRP)) {

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; radiological protection; Temporary Instruction followup; IE bulletin followup; and verification of containment integrit Results: All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identified. All other inspection results indicated acceptable licensee performanc .

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1. Persons Contacted

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• J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operations J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - EQRS W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction D. F. Johnson, Superintendent - Health Physics R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor

• r. A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent - Chemistry The inspectors also talked with and , interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, Chemistry and Instrument and Control Section * Denotes personnel attending exit interview . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)(92702)

(CLOSED) Oper Item (301/67017-01(DRP)) Followup of Commitments Made Regarding MSIVs Tagged Open Inadvertently: Control Room Alam Needs To Be Installed. The alarm is now installed in the control room on both units to alert the operator if DC control power is lost to the MSIVs; therefore, all of the corrective actions for this event are complete and this open item is close . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of inspection. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected s emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to

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service of affected components. Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to a verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need j of mintenanc The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions. During the period of inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible <

portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical Diesel Generating, '

Service Water, Fire Water, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operability, j

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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under-Technical Specifications,10 CFR and administrative procedure Unit 1

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At 2:22 a.m., on April 9,1988, Unit I was taken off line to begin refueling outege number 15. Major worx scheduled for this outage included: primary and secondary in-service inspections, steam generator eddy current inspections, a steam generator handhole modification, a hydrogen recombiner modification, replacement of copper bearing heat exchangers, and the replacement of "A" phase on the main transforme The unit was scheduled to be back on line May 8, 1988. The retaining rings of the main electrical generator were inspected. This inspection revealed some surface pitting, and a decision was made to replace the rings. Since this had been anticipated, the licensee had spare rings on site. The diameter of the spare rings was, however, incorrect and replacement rings were immediately ordered from Westinghouse. The new rings arrived on site on May 2 and 3, and they were installed on the generator rotor. The rotor was placed back in the generator on May On May 15, with the plant in mode 3 (hot shutdown), a steam leak was detected on the 1 "B" Steam Generator Feed Isolation Check Valve (CS-476B) while inspecting containment isolation valves during the primary leak test. The unit was returned to the cold shutdown condition in order to rep:ir the leak. Repairs were completed on May 16, and the primary system was heated u T'n e reactor went critical at 4:40 on May 1 The unit was placed on line at 2:00 p.m. on May 20. This ended a 42-day refueling and maintenance outage. On May 21, the turbine was overspeed tested. Following the test, power was ramped to 30% and held until 1:50 a.m. on May 22 in order to establish proper chemistry in the two steam generators. During the ramp up to full power on May 23, rod position indicators for assemblies G-7 and C-7 were declared inoperable due to apparent misalignment with their bank position indications. As required by Technical Specification, power was held at i less than 75% while hot channel factors were analyzed. The analysis results indicated that design limits would not be exceeded and the ramp ;

up to full power was recomenced. The unit achieved full power at 1:30 !

p.m. on May 2 Unit 2 Load was reduced for forty minutes to approximately 475 5'e net on May !

This load reduction was initiated by Operations personnel in anticipation j of electrical generator over-heating after receiving a hydrogen header i low-pressure alann and noting that generator hydrogen pressure was decreasing. The low header pressure was caused by a ruptured tube on the generator's hydrogen dryer. The expeditious and anticipatory corrective actions by shift personnel resulted in isolating the leak within two minutes of receiving and announcing the header low-pressure alan _

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Inverter DYOB-On June 13 spare safeguards inverter DYOB was discovered smoking in the .

control building cable-spreading room. -The inverter was de-energized, l and a fire brigade was mustered to cool a shorted Sola transformer internal

. to the inverter. The faulty Sola transformer was replaced. The inverter i was load tested and returned to service. The cause of the failure has

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been attributed to end of the transformer's lifetim _;

Drills On June 8 at 6:15 p.m. the licensee conducted a fire drill in Unit _2 Primary Sample Room. The drill included a limited plant evacuation and personnel accountability by the security force. All personnel were accounted for in a timely manne On June 9 at 12:42 p.m. the licensee conducted another plant evacuation and personnel accountability drill. By about 1:07 p.m. all personnel were accounted fo All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; the test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions for operation were met; that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual l directing the test; and that any deficiencies identified during the '

testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test )

activities:

TS-4 Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip Test (Monthly), Unit 2

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TS-30 High & Low Head Safety Injection Check Valve Leakage Test, Unit 2 TS-33 Containment Accident Fan-Cooler Units. Unit l'

TS-34 Containment Accident Fan-Cooler Units, Unit 2 TS-70 Diesel Eigine-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test  ;

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TS-71 Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test TS-73 Fire Protection Control Valve Position Verification TS-77 Smoke Detection System Integrity Test - Appendix "A", Non-Technical Specification Related Smoke Detector System Integrity Test Checklist TS-79 Periodic Surveillance of Fire Hose Stations IT-1 Inservice Testing of High Head Safety Injection Pumps &_ Valves Unit 1 IT-5 Inservice Testing of Containment Spray Pumps & Eductor Supply Check Valves 847A&B, Unit 1 ,

IT-6 Inservice Testing of Containment Spray Pumps & Eductor Supply Check Valves & Sodium WMTP 4.2 Control Bank A Heasurements WMTP 9.23 Gravity Fill of Diesel Day Tank ORT-1 Flow Test of Safety Injection Pumps ORT-3 Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC ORT-7 Operation of Backdraft Dampers ICP- Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog, Unit 2 l ICP- Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range Channels N41-N44, Unit 1 I ICP-2.11 Analog Rod Position, Unit 1 ICP-2.13 4160 Volt Undervoltage, Unit 1 ICP-5.23 Rod Insertion Limit Control, Unit 1

ICP-10.12 Instrument Lineup Verification Post-Refueling, Unit 1 ICP-13.2 Containment Hydrogen Monitors, Units 1 & 2 All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification '

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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting

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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed f rom service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

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performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls wera implementedt and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to detennine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

MS-02033 Lower Left Turbine Governor Valve MS-02034 Upper Right Turbine Governor Valve SI-00889B P-15B S1 Pump Discharge Check Valve MS-02053 HX-1A SG Sample Isolation Control Valve 15-446 Fire Hose XS-05268 Smoke Detector (Circ Water Pump House)

Diesel Fire Pump Unit 1 Containment Upper Hatch Ir.ner Door The diesel driven fire pump did not start on June 7, 1988, while it was l being tested. The diesel has two batteries in each of two starting circuits (ALB). One circuit cranked the diesel over, but it did not !

start. Then the other circuit barely cranked it at all. During i trouble-shooting, it was discovered that the fuel start solenoid failed to open. This solenoid was mar.uaily bypasseJ # the diesel was cranked over agai This time it did start and run. The soicnoid was examined and it tested fine. Apparently there was not enough voltage from the circuit to actuate the solenoid. Absent any other abnormalities, it was 1 assumed the batteries were defective; however, the prior month's battery l readings taken on each battery cell for voltage and specific gravity were I normal. The licensee installed two new batteries for starting circuit '

"B," cleaned battery connections, and repaired connections on the battery jumpers. The "A" batteries were charged, the diesel fire pump was start tested from each start circuit, and the diesel fire pump was returned to scrvice. New batteries for the starting circuits are presently on orde On June 10, Unit I upper containment inner door would not close due to mechanical problems with the interlock. The inner and outer doors were never opened at the same time. The interlock was repaired the same da i

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. I All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identifie . Physical Security (71881)

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The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that physical security was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the security force compliment was as required by the security plan, that search equipment was operational, and that access control for personnel and packages was implemented in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors verified that the protected and vital area barriers were being well maintained and, when required, appropriate compensatory measures were take On June 6, corporate security personnel conducted a drill which involved an attempt to smuggle simulated explosives onto the plant site by sending them through the mail. The station security force, by using the licensee's package search procedures and search eqt.inment, detected the simulated explosives. The security force then notified all the appropri-ate supporting agencie All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Protection (71709)

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that health physics ,

supervisory personnel conducted plant tours and were aware of activities I which may cause unusual radiological conditions. The inspectors verified that radiation work permits (RWP) contained required information and for selected RWPs, the inspectors verified that controls were being implemented as required at the work site. The inspectors observed personnel within ,

radiation controlled areas and determined that personnel monitoring ;

equipment were properly worn and that the licensee's procedures for entry and exit were followed. The inspectors observed the posting of radiation '

areas, hot spots, contaminated areas, and labeling of containers holding radioactive material and verified postings using a calibrated beta-gama !

portable survey mete '

All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identifie j l Temporary Instruction 2515/84 (MPA) B-45 (25584) 1 (CLOSED) Generic Letter (GL) 87-06, "Periodic Verification of Leak Tight Integrity of Pressure Isolation Valves." The licensee responded to the Generic Letter in a letter, Fay to Denton, dated June 12, 1987. The inspectors reviewed Technical Specification Tests (TS-30 and TS-31),

"High & Low Head Safety Injection Check Valves Leakage Test." They

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believe that the requirements of GL 87-06 are met by these tests;-

therefore, Generic Letter (266/87006-HH, 301/87006-HH) is considered close . I. E. Bulletin Followup (92703)

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For che IE Bulletin listed below the inspector verified that the written response was submitted within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the infomation required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action comitments based on infomation presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that infomation discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written respons ^

(CLOSED) I.E.Bulletin 88-03, "Inadequate Latch Engagement in HFA Type Latti:ing Relays Manufactured by General Electric (GE) Company". In a letter sent to NRR dated April 11, 1988, the licensee stated that GE-type HFA relays are not used at Point Beach. NRR replied ir a letter to the licensee dated May 26, 1988, stating, that NRR concurred that Bulletin 88-03 is not applicable to Point Beac All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identifie . Verification of Containment Integrity (61715)

Thirty-seven containment isolation valves were checked to verify that the

"Containment Integrity Checklist" (CL-1B) was completed. Items considered during the inspection included; that manual valves used for isolation were shut and red locked; that switches were in the proper position for remotely operated valves; that valves which receive an automatic containment isolation signal had been tested prior to heatup of the ,

reactor coolant system above 200 degrees F. A walkdown of the Containment Spray System was perfomed to verify that the system was 1 properly aligned prior to heating the plant up above 200 degrees l 1 Exit Interview (30703)  ;

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period to sumarize the scope and findings of the inspection activitie i The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' coments. The inspectors alsa discussed the likely infomational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or proces:es reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar <

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i, On June 1,1988, H. J. Miller, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, toured the Point Beach facility. He held discussions with the shift

' supervisor, two control room operators, and had an exit interview with '

Mr. Fa .

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