IR 05000266/1986018
| ML20210S887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1986 |
| From: | Allen T, Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210S854 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-86-18, 50-301-86-17, NUDOCS 8610080242 | |
| Download: ML20210S887 (9) | |
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a U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-266/86018(DRSS); 50-301/86017(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name:
Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, WI Inspection Conducted: September 8-11, 1986 J. u3.ters2&
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//so/sc, Inspectors:
Team Leader Date T.A$n J/yo/n bate W. w. s J Snell, Chief
/Jo/m Approved By:
Emergency Preparedness Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection on September 8-11, 1986 (Reports No. 50-266/86018(DRSS);
No. 50-301/86017(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Point Beach Power Station emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection involved three NRC inspectors and three consultants.
Results:
Although no items of noncompliance, deficiencies or deviations were identified, five exercise weaknesses were identified and are summarized in the attachment to the report's transmittal letter.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Foster, Contrc,1 Room, TSC, OSC, E0F, AE0F, JPIC T. Allen, Inplant Teams, Medical Drill, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
T. Colburn, Control Room, TSC, OSC, E0F, Alternate Emergency Operations Facility (AE0F), JPIC G. Arthur, Control Room and Technical Support Center (TSC)
G. Wheman, TSC, Operational Support Center (OSC)
G. Stoetzel, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
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b.
Wisconsin Electric Power Company
- J. Zach, Plant Manager
- R. Bruno, Superintendent Training
- R. Winget, Emergency Planning
- P. Dent, Supervisor, Staff Service
- J. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer
- D. Stevens, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- C. Krause, Licensing
- D. Schoon, Licensing
- J. Reisenbeucher, Duty and Call Superintendent E. Ziller, Shift Superintendent I. Bleeker, Shift. Superintendent T. Koehler, Site Manager (EP)
R. Mitchell, Shift Superintendent W. Hennig, Duty Technical Advisor A. Shedlosky, Shift Superintendent S. Gucua, OSC Controller D. Kois, JPIC Controller P. Scheffel, Health Physics J. Lundgren, JPIC Director H.- Nieves, JPIC Assistant Director R. Janka, JPIC News Writer R. Shebesta, Rumor Control M. Baumann, E0F Controller H. Gleason, Field Team Controller N. Hoefert, TSC Controller M. Crouch, OSC Observer R. Heiden, OSC Controller G. Krieser, OSC Controller T. Quay, TSC/HP Controller I
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Also Contacted R. Hague, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending exit interview.
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2.
General An exercise of the Point Beach Power Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Point Beach station on September 9, 1986.
The exercise tested the applicant's and offsite emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario. The exercise was integrated with a test of the State of Wisconsin, Manitowoc County and Kewaunee County Emergency Plans.
This was a full participation exercise for these counties and the State of Wisconsin.
3.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Point Beach Power Station Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination l
The applicant's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the events had been real, the actions taken by the applicant would
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have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to
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take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
c.
Observers The applicant's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise
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along with six NRC observers and a number of Federal Emergency p
Management Agency (FEMA) observers.
FEMA observations on the response of State and local governments will be provided in a separate report.
d.
Exercise Critiques A critique was held with the applicant and NRC representatives on September 10, 1986, the day after the exercise.
The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview.
In addition, a public critique was held at the Manitowoc County Office building on September 11, 1986, to present the preliminary onsite and offsite findings of the NRC and FEMA exercise observers.
4.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room The Shift Superintendent was obviously in charge in the Control Room.
He maintained an orderly and low noise environment.
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Procedures were used extensively.
Control room personnel were aware of which procedure to use, and how to properly apply the procedure.
The Control Room operators prudently and methodically proceeded to quantify the reactor coolant system leak rate early in the exercise when an initial report gave 150 gpm as the leak rate.
There was an excellent and innovative use of IBM Personal Computer programs to simulate a safety parameter display system output, and clever use of chart information to simulate actual control room readouts.
No negative findings were made for the Control Room.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was manned in a timely fashion, and procedures and their related forms were used extensively throughout the exercise.
Accountability was completed in approximately twenty-five minutes after the evacuation siren was sounded.
The use of a formal agenda for the TSC staff meetings was considered innovative, and provides a good checklist of potentially important subjects to be covered in such meetings.
However, the TSC staff meetings were excessively long, diverting managers from their primary responsibilities.
The trend charts used for tracking radiological data were highly visible and well maintained.
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The injured / contaminated man's family was promptly notified of his status.
Fuel clad failure was not noted on any visual status board, log, or message.
However, it appeared to be common knowledge that fuel clad
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failure had occurred.
I The site manager departed the TSC, arrived at the E0F and returned
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to the TSC (due to the exercise scenario requiring evacuation of the E0F).
The Site Manager's location, and change of location was not logged on any status board nor announced.
Therefore it was not l
clear to the observer who was in control at all times. This is an
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Open Item (266/86018-01; 301/86017-01).
Excessive time expired between the declaration of the Site Emergency
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Public Address announcements for the
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above followed the declaration by 14 minutes and 20 minutes, respectively.
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It was observed that the status update form (No. 13) does not have a location for a time entry for which the information provided is effective.
Based on the above information, the following items should be considered for improvement
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l Procedures should be established for timely public address
system announcements of emergency classifications.
The status update form (No. 13) should be revised to provide
for a notation as to the timeframe for which the information is applicable.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
There was good direct contact between personnel in the OSC and TSC.
Plant procedures require that the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD)
be worn beneath the outer layer of protective clothing (to prevent contamination of the device).
Since the TLD is almost universally attached to the identification / access card, the access control card was not accessible by the entry team for use in card readers.
This prevented the turbine building team from gaining quick access to the cable room.
This is an Open Item (266/86018-03; 301/86017-03).
The responsibility to maintain the events log and the entry team status board (these are maintained in the TSC) was not assigned to one individual, and the entry team status was significantly out of date in the latter stages of the exercise.
It was also noted that EPIP 6.5 " Technical Support and Operational Support Center Activation" does not deal with the OSC elsewhere than in the document's title.
Licensee attention is needed in this area, to proceduralize, to the extent possible, OSC actions, including activation, tracking of teams, and dose tracking / projection for team members. This is an Open Item (266/86018-02: 301/86017-02).
A single radiation control point was established at the door to the turbine building (Door 116) and the TSC/0SC area.
It is unlikely that positive radiation control could have been maintained at this point due to conditions experienced during the exercise. There was a strong inflow of air present when the door was open. Also, if an individual were found to be contaminated, he would have to pass the checkpoint to reach the nearest shower (for decontamination).
Loss of radiation control at a checkpoint so located would have compromised nearby sample analysis and counting rooms and the TSC/0SC.
This is an Open Item (266/86018-05; 301/86017-05).
The health physics team sent to the turbine room was not sufficiently protected from the environment predicted by the exercise scenario (water / steam and contaminants from steam generator tube leakage).
Canvas hoods and canvas shoe covers were provided.
Also, good
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l health physics practice indicates that more than one survey instrument should be.taken by an entry team, especially when entering a hostile environment, and the instrument should also be protected from the environment.
This is an Open Item (266/86018-04; 301/86017-04).
d.
Medical Drill An inplant auxiliary equipment operator was simulated as having fallen and received a forehead contusion and indefinite lower back injury.
His lower left leg was simulated as being contaminated with radioactivity.
A plant worker (contractor) discovered the injured person and promptly reported the person's location, apparent condition, and needed medical assistance to the Control Room.
About ten minutes later the contractor called the Health Physics (HP)
station to try and expedite assistance. Within a few minutes, two H.P. personnel arrived with blankets and a stretcher.
They quickly realized, after checking the injured person, that a stretcher was inadequate and obtained a " scoop litter."
The medical assistance team dispatched in response to the contractor's call to the Control Room did not arrive until about 25 minutes after the call.
Some of the delay resulted from the contractor not knowing the Control Room phone number designated for exercise use.
However, the delay caused by the transfer of emergency response control to the Technical Support Center should have been avoided.
Responding medical assistance personnel recognized the potential severity of the back injury and demonstrated corresponding handling care.
The injured person was transported on the scoop litter to the HP station where the ambulance team waited.
Contamination control for the injured person was consistent with health physics practices for combinations of medical injury and contamination.
The injured person was transferred to the ambulance team and an HP representative accompanied them to the hospital at Two Rivers, Wisconsin.
The ambulance crew had been issued personnel dosimetry devices at the plant gatehouse.
An inspector review of the dosimetry issue records indicated that the devices were collected when the ambulance team left the plant and that documentation was adequate for exposure records.
The hospital's nuclear first aid room was prepared to receive the injured person before the ambulance arrived. The hospital medical staff worked well as a team and demonstrated adequate contamination control practices while providing timely medical treatment and stabilization for the injured person.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate. However, the following item should be considered for improvement:
Medical assistance teams should be dispatched as soon as
practicable.
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Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The. licensee's JPIC. staff. functioned in a coordinated manner,
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provided accurate and timely information, and demonstrated adequate
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coordination'with State and County emergency government personnel.
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Press releases made by the licensee contained factual information, as known at tne time, and were' approved by the licensee's' Emergency Director at the EOF prior to issue.
The press releases were also coordinated with State and County representatives.
The. licensee's JPIC Director served as the media briefing moderator.
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He did a good job of scheduling and controlling briefings..He established briefing schedules' and the sequence of topics:to.be "
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discussed, based on events most likely to be of concern to'the media \\
and public.
He demonstrated flexibility by changing th'e order of speeches when audience interest indicated a chang 2 Mould be-beneficial. The licensee's Technical-Spokesperson demonstrated a thorough knowledge of plant conditions.
He used simplified diagrams and pictures effectively in his presentations, which were factual without being excessively technical and essentially void of terms the audience might not understand.
The licensee's_ rumor control person was located in the JPIC and was kept informed of current plant conditions by the licensee's JPIC staff.
A variety of rumor telephone calls appeared to be properly'
and politely handled by the rumor control office.
JPIC evacuation planning was initiated when a_ State emergency government representative announced that the State intended to recommend evacuation to a distance beyond the JPIC.
The licensee's-i JPIC Director initially indicated that the JPIC would be moved to the licensee's facility in Milwaukee. After some confusien and'
discussions with State, County, and licensee < personnel, the Director announced that the JPIC would'be relocated to the Kewaunee High School in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
Although the
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simulated evacuation was not significantly delayed by the wrong initial relocation choice, it would have progressed more smoothly if the high school had been the initial choice, as provided for in the. Emergency Plan.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate; however, the following item should be considered for
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improvement:
The JPIC Director's training should include discussion of the
alternate JPIC location,'and where this is specified in the
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Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
Players took the exercise seriously, played out all actions unless told to simulate by the controllers, and used and followed-procedures well throughout the exercise.
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'The setup-of the health physics area in the Site Boundary Control Center (SBCC, the. primary Emergency Operations Center) was done in an efficient and= timely manner.
Initial briefings, given to the-field teams, were good and positioning of the teams throughout the exercise was good.
The decision to evacuate the EOF was timely and.the move to the Alternate E0F (AE0F) was smooth.
From the time evacuation was ordered to the time all personnel were officially accounted for in the AEOF was approximately one hour.
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=Fo,llowing the time shift, recovery discussions and actions by the EOF' staff were good.
Shift changes were discussed'and phone calls were.actually made to the alternates.
Discussions
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were held with State radiological personnel on defining.
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radiation levels in the environment.
The field teams on several occasions reported progress obstructed by locked gates in close to the plant. This re3ulted in delays in getting environmental samples into the plant for counting, and also could have resulted in additional radiation dose to sample runners
when'they had to find alternate routes.
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Field teams did not count air sample cartridges for radiciodine concentrations in the field, but rather transported them to the TSC by runner for counting. This is a time consuming process (e.g., one
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air sample was taken at_1230 hours, and as of 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, the
results were still not available for_ dose assessment personnel in the AEOF).
Since the exercise scenario' included an unmonitored release: path, dose assessment personnel needed this information
quickly, to get a handle on environmental radioiodine levels.
The-licensee should consider doing a rough count of exposed cartridges with-a portable survey instrument to provide an initial estimate of radioiodine concentrations.
A frisker station was set up at the entrance to the AEOF, however, no health physics personnel were stationed at the entrance, nor were
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frisking directions provided to assure that proper frisks were j
performed.
Several security personnel were observed using poor frisking techniques.
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Exercise Scenario and Control j
The licensee's scenario was challenging, including: a contaminated / injured
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man, medical drill, assembly / accountability, unmonitored radiological release pathway, meteorological changes, evacuation of the E0F to the AE0F,
-a highway accident, and the unplanned evacuation of the JPIC.
The degree
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of challenge in an exercise scenario is considered when assessing observed exercise weaknesses.
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Exercise control was considered adequate.
The individual who was to be
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the contaminated / injured man was not at the designated location due to a controller error, was missed by the Controller who was to inform him that i
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he was injured, and the individual had to be sent out into the plant again.
A minor scenario technical problem resulted in difficulty in quantifying a large primary to secondary leakrate.
6.
Licensee Critiques The Licensee held three levels of exercise critiques, one at each individual facility immediately following the exercise (mini-critique),
a critique for key exercise players followed the mini-critiques, and a large critique for controllers / observers.
NRC personnel attended each of the critiques, and determined that exercise deficiencies of significance had been identified by licensee personnel.
7.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on September 10, 1986, with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The applicant was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
The applicant responded that none of the information was proprietary.
Attachment 1:
Point Beach 1986 Exercise Scope and Objectives Attachment 2:
Point Beach 1986 Exercise Scenario Outline i
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