IR 05000266/1990018

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Insp Repts 50-266/90-18 & 50-301/90-18 on 900820-24. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Previously Identified Electrical Distribution Safety Functional Insp Deficiencies
ML20059M105
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/24/1990
From: Darrin Butler, Gardner R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059M100 List:
References
50-266-90-18, 50-301-90-18, NUDOCS 9010030155
Download: ML20059M105 (17)
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V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  ! 

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REoiON 111 

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Reports No. 50-266/90018(DRS); No. 50-301/90018(DRS) 

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Docket Nos.: 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 

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Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 9 231 West Michigan Street - P379 ' i Milwaukee, WI # ' 53201 , 

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Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant 'Jnits 1 and 2 ' Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two River;, WI 54241 i Inspection Conducted: August 20-24, 1990

lespector: D. 5. Butler 9/2.hO Date ! 

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Approved By: .f 1 R. N. Gardner, Chief O 9,9 [O-Date Plant Systems Section inspection Sumary , inspection on August 20-24, 1990 (Reports No. ~50-266/90018(DRS); , No. 50-301/90018(DRS)) , 

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Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection to follow 9p previously-ldentified Electrical Distribution Safety Functional Inspection (EDSFI) deficiencies (Inspection Procedures 62705 and 37701).  ! Results: In the area that was reviewed, the following items were identified: one apparent violation of design control criteria with six-(6) examples t (Paragraphs 2.a.,2.g.,2.h.,2.j.,2.o.,and2.w.);oneapparentviolationof quality assurance program criteria (Paragraph 2.y.); one apparent violation of , Technical Specification 15.6.8 required procedures-(Paragraph 2.z.); one , apparentdeviationfromFSARcommitments(Paragraph 2.e.);and-threeunresolved -i items (Paragraphs 2.r., 2.t., and 2 u.). During the course of the inspection, the following strengths were noted: 

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The licensee's staff provided good technical responses in a timely manne 'I 

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The corrective actions which the licensee has committed to implement were comprehensive and should correct the deficiencies identified by the EDSF The licensee identified addi'.ional related inspection action' items that i they were pursuing.

! 9010030155 900927 PDR ADOCK 05000266 G PNV 

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l -DETAILS-  ; q 

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^        " Perso'ns( Conta cted -

Wisconsin Electric Power Company- (WEPCo)' G. Maxfield, Plant Manager  ? . 

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  *T. Koehler, General Superintendent'- Maintenance
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m *Ji Reiserbuechler, General. Superintendent - Operation . 

  *P. Katers,lSenior Electrical Engineer .
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  : W.: Hennig, Electrical and ' Instrument' System Engineer    t
  *J.1 Jack,. Quali.ty Specialist, Regulatory Services     1
  *K.. Nickels,;QualityiSpeN11st, Regulatory Services    ,
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LE. Flentje,: Administrative W cialist, Regulatory Services? , si j 

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  ~ S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisd on (NRC)
  'C.'Vanderdiet, Senior Resident inspector     I
  '*J.:Gadzala, Resident Inspector'     '

The NRC inspector also contacted and interviewed ;oth0r : licensee personnel., 1 , j 

  *Denotesthosepresentattheexitfinterviewon/ August 24=, 199 ;
   ~ Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findingsi     i
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The' purpose of this inspection was to follow up-deficiencies previously y ,, 

  -identified in Electrical Distribution. System Functional : Inspection 1(EDSFI):

Reports No'. b0-266/90201 and No.lS0-301/90201. ?AEnumber:ofLthe'EDSFly s; deficiencies will be closed in'this-report based onJadditional inspectio.ns' 

    '      a conductefand a review of licensee commitments documented in.the licensee's   ei August 3, 1990 response to the EDSF1 report. LThe: remaining deficiencies-   q will be asJigned a tracking. numberf associated:with this report. The   4 attached appendix contains' theNomplets listfof: deficiencies: and their .   ,

statu ' Deficieri > No. 90-201-01:- Non-Conservative: Diesel Generator- * 3teady_-State' Loading C 'culatio The safety-related AC eles t cal 4 1oads appl'ied to the emergency 

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dio elfgenerators (EDGs) during the-injection.and recirculation 

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phases of accideat mitigation 1wsre' identified in the Final Safety: Analysis Report .(FSAR), Tables No. 8.2-1 and 8.2-2. The EDSFI noted' , that the steady-state diesel generator load' analysis performed in ' Calculation-No. 0870-103-911- was. based on an'assumptionithat was  : different than identified in' the ESAR. JThe emergency ' operating * procedures (EOPs) were 1so used as:a design input'to the calculation; ' H and.the EDSFI noted*that the'EOPs manually;added addition 6 loadsLtol the EDGs. The-ED5FI postulated that the c1 ready marginaily sized" 

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   (near full load: capacity ratings) EDGs would'be manually everloadd -

when using the E0P a 

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 'The licensee walked.down1the E0P!proceduresiandicalcul5ted (N N o^-042,.06/28/90) the new EDG load values for the E0Ps. -The . 9 waltdown determined that-there werelloads that'wereTnot required and:
 ?could be manually; stripped.- The11 odds removed were greateri than the=   {

FSAR loads ~to be added.As a result,ithe truelload'on both EDGs * actually: decreased. - t . 

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Failure of/the licensee'to consider:all-thefa'vailable loads in the ~ 

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EDG loading:calculationLis'an example ofian; apparent" violation of- A 10 CFR;50, Appendii B, CriterionllI', Design Control-(266/90018-01a;. 4 3C1/90018-01a).

-TheaffectedE0PprocedureshavebeencorrectedLanbtheoperators( a trained;on the procedure corrections,. t , 

 , .,The G02 cieset ;s the: highest loaded.EDG'ano will automaticall ~ load to' 2246 lKW during' a , reactor. tripf or.~ safety injgetion'-(E0P-0). 4
 'The addition of' manual-loads will result + a-load of 2947 KW.4 Thef   i overload alarm is' set at the:2000; hour EDG' rating'of, 2850. KW, Duringa   {

a. loss of reactor.or secondary containment [(EOP-1)Lthe EDG< could have been loaded to 3030 KW; Subsequently, theiliceasee has: determined that the boric acid. heat tracing was not; z required and removal:of, this load would:ultimatel 2 

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sump recirculatiom E0P-1.3) 

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the load load to 2949 K Nmained'at 2949 During K containment ' The following are-th'e manuf actt rar's recommended operating ratings:- .[ y 2500 KW continuous nperat'.on , 

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  '2850 KW for 2000 hours pst year. .  ,   ,

y 2963 KW for 200. hours per year'  ; 

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3000 KW for 4 hours per year' 

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3053 KW for 0.5' hours per year - u The inspector d scussed these ratings with MorrisoniKnudsen (Power-Systems Division) engineering. The;above' ratings are' based o_n the, ,' one year annual .EDG.mintenance schedule. ~ The hours periyearc ratings [ Lare not accumulative. If the diesel is operated at;3033iKW for_-30:  ; minutes, it'should; receive it's: annual maintenance. inspection.J Also,c 

 : load. testing- at the' continuous rating ;(2500 KW)fas adequate :to=

prcve operability at higher loads. 'The lead testing; requirement-7 perElectro-MotiveDivision(enainemanufacturer)wastoexceeda-minimum load of 200 of unit. rating'. Testing at'2500'KW would alsoi t  % keep from accumulating maintenance hours. During accident-co'ditions,i n it is tp to the opeNtdr to determine what loads should.be placed 'on ' 3 the EDG arxd when it should be shut 'down.' The. ratings could .therefore i be exceeded up'to 3053 KW. The engine capacity is ' limited ;by;the' 

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neximumiinjection of fuel at 3053 KW.: The licensee informed the' inspector that tne EDGs have been operated at the 3053.KW ratingn during adjustment and/or replacement of the mechanical'averspeed trip' 3 

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mechanism. This.run time was typically for only five (5) minute : Dur.ing site acceptance testing (1970 time' frame) theLG01-diesel wa , run at approximately 3053 KW for, ten (10) continuous _ours h followed 1 by load cycling between 2850 to-3053 KW for an additional: fourteen (14) hours. . Based on the above information, the PBNP emergency- : diesel generators would have been able to. handle a design basis- , acciden . Deficiency No. 90-201-02: Lack of Transient- Analysis of Diesel : 

  'PEnerator Loading     '

The EDSFI was concerned %at the steady-state EDG loading calculation j thould have included a' ej..amic analysis of the capacity. of the diesel '; 

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generator to hondle str ;ing-loads and sequencing intervals.. The- .- licensee does perform a. partial. transient load test of the EDG each refueling outage. Procedure No. -0RT 3, " Safety Injection Actuation , with Loss of. Engineering Safeguards AC Unit l'" starts the residual 

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heat removal,--service water, and auxiliary feedwater pumps; verifies- 

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that certain valves travel to their required _ position;' verifies load-shedding; and verifies sequencing. times. The largest pumps, safet injection (SI)', are not start'ed during this' test. The: inspector , discussed the S1 pumps with? the Duty. Shif t Supervisor (DSS). l The 

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DSS indicated that the starting of the SI pump's on .recirculatio'n ; test lines was not a. preferred alignment. This alignment'may cause' l excessive equipment vibration. The DSS indicated that it was als difficult to. establish actual operating-conditions. The DSS also-indicated that the Point Beach Nuclear Phnt was looking'into a , future full scale (start all loads) SI plus Loss of 0ffsite Power , 

  (LOSP) tes The EDGs are currently tested monthly to>2500 kW' .. T M licensee 3 determined that the non-shed loads plus the automatic sequenced-loads were.2246 kW. The'EDGs-are being tested to a load greater than the injection phase required autontatic loeds and receive a partial transient type load test uach ref.ueling outage. :The licensee has !

committed to analyze the transient behavior. of the EDG and related systems. Computer sof tware will have' to be purchased to perform this-type of analysis. Based on the above commitments and-based on'the * determination that the EDGs were sized to start and carry the engineered safety features required loads (2246.kW), this -item is considered close 'l 

       : Deficiency No. 90-201-Oh incorrect Load Ratings Listed in the
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imergency Operiting Procedures The EDSFI was concern-ed that'incor 'ct load tables could result in overloading the EDGs during manuas ioading. The EDG-loading ~ issue was previously di.scussed in Deficiency No. 90-201-01. The inspector-reviewed the followfng list of procedures: E0P 0, App. C. Rev. 8 ECA 0.0, App. D, Rev. 7 J E0P 1, App. A,.Rev. 8 ECA 0.2, App. A; Rev. 5-E0P 1.1, App. A', Rev. 6 . ECA 2.1', App. A, Rev. 7 q E0P 3, App. B, Rev. 8' ECA 3.1, App..A; Rev.'8' 6 3 

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All of~the above procedures _have been revisedLwith,the new EDG loading lis The above procedures were previously' inadequate; however,'the root? cause. appears'to be-a result of inadequate Calculation-N . Apparent violation numbers 266/90018-01a and-301/90018-01a addressed this calculation. Therefore, this item _is considered closed.- 

       " De ficiencyi No. 90-204-04: EDG Loading as Instructed by E0Ps for a-.

Design Basis Accident (DBA)- . The EDSF1 was concerned that the EDG manual loading steps-were not detailed enough to-prevent EDG overloading'during o'DBA.=' The EDG-loading Lissue was previously addressed in Deficiency No.L 90-201'-0 ' Procedures EGP-1 cod E0P-1.4-were adequately t. hanged to provide * additional guidance to-the-operators for managing EDG loads during an- i accident. Therefore, this item is considered close ? 1 Deficiency No. 90-201-05: Nonconformance to Design Basis Criteria for Electrical Cable' Tray Fill and Cable Ampacity Derating The EDSFI was concerned that FSAR and:Bechtel cable fili requirements I had been exceeded. The:Bechtel design criteria' required that cable q ampacity oe decreased using a derating factor for-a maximum of'24  ; cables in a tray without maintained spacing. The team identified that i tray FK07 contained 55' cables. The licensee issued Nonconformance . Report-(NCR) N-90-092 _ xThe_ inspector reviewed the: results of the NCR = 1 and concluded that the cables.werel adequately sized to handle the l load current. WEPCo determined thati 210 power and control cabk '"ay , sections and 15 instrumentation cable tray sections also did nu H conform to FSAR and Bechtel electrical design xriteria. This i ; considered an apparent deviation (266/90018-02;.301/90018-02) from FSAR Section 7.2, " Protection l Against Multip'.e Disability. for-j J Protection Systems." '! 

        : Deficiency No. 90-Pol-06: Lack of Assessment of-Available Short-Circuit CL rent Due to Hign dattery Temperature The EDSF1 was concerned that the DC system short-circuit curren analysis- should b'e analyzed at .the maximum battery temperature rather - ,

than 77'F. The 77T battery electrolyte' temperature is= a standard j temperature used by battery manufacturers and-is adopted in the'lEEE j' Standards for rating batteries. The EDSFI postulated-for' batteries-005 and 006 that the available short-circuit current at'77'F was: 

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g approximately 20,00C A. -The licensee performed Calculation No.' N-90-058 and determined the short circuit current to be 20,983 A- j 

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  (DOS) and 20,977 A (005) at 90 F. -While the IEEE Standards do not
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define:the temperature _at which the maximum short-circuit. current- a should be determined, the maximu_m battery tenperature should be  : 

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considered to ensure breaker interrupting capability is' adequat The licensee has committed to factor the increased short-circuit:  ! current into the existing DC distribution system calculation. = Based 1 on this commitment, this item is' considered close !

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-' V f Deficiency No. 90-201-07: Inadequate Seismic-Evaluation for
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9  ! Mod fications to C60 Vac Safeguards Bus Tie-Breaker - 9 > 

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The EDSFI determined that a seismic evaluation had not been considered ' l-by the: licensee for racking-out the Unit 1;(1A52-61)'and Unit 2: 4 (2A52-72) maintenance tie-breakers. .The-breakers were placed in- a their racked-out position as-a result of a. Westinghouse:(W) Part 21 ' 

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notification-(October 21',1987) on the malfunction'of W: Type W-2 cell 

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switche The . racked-out positio_n of a= breaker completely disconnects a breakers 1 for personnel-and equipment safety. . This' is a designed position for i a breaker'to:be placed in. The W Type DH air circuit breaker, used: at PBNP,11s' completely-free of'ils racking mechanism when in; thei racked-out position. .The breakers are equipped with wheelsito 

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  -facilitate moving the breakers.. Mounted on1the-switchgear cbbicia, door are the safety-related busLundervoltageL(UV) relays:(1-27172 and

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l'-272X2) - One set of the ,UV contacts are in the' auto-close circuitry

of the'EDG (G01) output breaker. The potential existed forla: seismic , 

        ~l event to produce motion in the racked-outi " ;kers whichiwould-  ~

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disable the=l" mlays and' prevent G01 from automatically loading its safety tr . The breakers were subsequently removed from:  ; their cubic ~ , 

        :r Failure of the licensee to consider the-effect offseismic. events on i the racked-out tie-breakers is' an example of. an apparent violation' of -

10 CFR 50,-Appendix B, Criterion III,-Design: Control:(266/90018-01b;;~ > 301/90018-01b).

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only the G01 diesel would have been affected ifJ such ian eventLhad q occurred, Deficiency No. 90-201-08: Single Failure of Safeguards 480 Vac' D Bus Tie Breaker 

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The EDSFI identified that'a short circuit betwee'n adjacent:cablesiin-a shared raceway .could result in the spurious closure of the 480.Vac- ' ." safeguards bus tie-breakers (IB52-16c or 2B52-400). <This had the'. , potential'to' parallel redundant voltage: sources. -The licensee had ; 

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implemented a modification.(MR 85-G53) toicorrect'other single-failure- ! deficiencies associated with the 480,Vac tie-breakers,tbut did not . identify this failure mechanis . Failure of the. licensee'to identify the. cable single-failure mechanism i is an example of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50,- Appendix B,- y CriterionIII,DesignControl(266/90018-01c;1301/90018-01c).

u The: licensee placed the breakers' control power l fuse blocks if their off ~ position and placed an operator ' aid near: the fuse blocks ~ and on1 , I the main-control boards. The inspector _-ver.ified that the fuFe-: blocks j were off and adequatelyLidentified. In addition,: the- inspreto'r .  : l 

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verified that Operating Instruction (01) 35, "ElectricailEq11pmenti 3" Operation," was revised to reflect _the new control power con'iguration.~ p r> 6- 

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J , ThelicenseesubmittedLicensee.EventReport(LER)No. 90-004-00 to 

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the NRC describing the single fai. lure and their corrective action : This deficiency has. existed since original plant constructio l ' Deficiency No. 90-201-09: Incorrect Safety Classification aad Non-Conformance with Seperation Criteria of Control Cabling of 480 Vac Bus Tie-Breaker The EDSFI identified thst' the control cables associated with the 480 Vac tie-breakers were incorrectly classified as nonsafety-related.'- The licensee committed to determine the appropriate classificatio These cables are the cables identified.in apparent violation numbers 266/90018-01c and 301/90018-01c. A determination of any additional- 1 corrective actions will be included with the corrective actions 

 'to be taken for the apparent violations. Therefore, this-item is-
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considered close Deficiency No. 90-201-10: Nonconformance with FSAR<Se)aration' Criteria, and Potential for Consequential Common-Mode ailure of' IfotTirains of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pumps - r The EDSFI identified the potential for a. cable line to~line DC short within vertical Riser No. '2 that could simultan'_oNly~ blow control power fuses for both :n. 1 CCW pump breaker . This condition also existed in the lnitL2 CCW pump circuitry. The' licensee- 

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opened (slide links) the low-header pressure start circuit for the 

 "B" pump in each unit. !The "A" pump circuit was ;lef t as-is and the operators were informed that the B" pump was the-preferred running
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pump. Failure of the licensee to identify the cable separation and : common-mode failure of either unit's CCW pumps is an_ example of'an _ apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111, Design Control (266/90018-01d;301/90018-01d). i 

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This deficiency has existed since original pl mt. constructio The operators had available annunciators (such as motor trip and low CC header pressure) and CCW flow indication. In addition, Procedure No. A0P-98, " Loss of Component Cooling,'l provided the operator's adequate steps on how to manually' restore CCW flo Deficiency No. 90-201-11: Use of Non-Qualified. Components in Safeguards Bus Breaker Control Circuits- 

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The EOSF1 identified that a common control relay in-the miscellaneous relay rack (MRR) was shared by both trains of CCW. The rack assembly and relay had not been seismically qualified. The licensee stated that the MRR rack and relays were of the same type as the adjacent - safeguards relay racks (SRR) which were qualified as.part of the-- original design. The inspector observed the MRR' installation.and _ 

      'l determined the racks, relays and rack mounting to be simile" ".o the-SRRs. The licensee committed to evaluate the adequacy of tn MRR There is also an ongoing industry study by the-Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) which will also. address'these types of inttallation ,

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J A unit's CCW pumps may be manually or automatically started by a CCW ! low header pressure signal. Normally, one pump is running all the time. On a loss of offsite_ power, the CCW pumps are load.shed; j however, they are not automatically reloaded onto the bus. An 86 relay will energize on the' load shed and seal-in to prevent the automatic start of-the CCW pumps until1 the,86l relay circuit-is reset by a reactor operator. If the common relays'were to chatter (during a seismic event), the 86 relay contact would prevent the common relay-contacts from automatically starting.the CCW pumps during1 automatic j t loading of the EDGs. This would prevent the transient loading of the CCW pumps onto the EDGs during-the first minute of.the injection-phase when other large motor loads are being sequenced onto th EDG j Subsequent manual loading of,the CCW pumps onto the EDGs had been analy7ed and was acceptable. The licensee has'taken additional H l corrective actions which are described in the preceding deficiency _ q (No. 90-201-10). Based on the above, this item is considered close . Deficiency No. 90-201-12: Vulnerability of Switchgear Control * d to Seismic Event That Opens Manual Transfer Switches

This item was previously addressed in:NRC Inspection Reports N /89033 and No. 50-301/89032. During.an enforcement conference, the use of manual transfer switches (knife switches) was discusse The licensee determined that during a seismic event, these-switches would not inadvertently open. Based on the above,-this item is considered closed,  ; t Deficiency No. ',0-201-13: Nonconforming Diesel Generator Sequ a ce Logic-The EDSFl identified that the_ EDG breaker closing logic operated _ differently than represented on vendor Drawlag No..'8413730. The  ! breaker would close if the EDG was at speed and _the generator field ! had flashed within six (6) seconds instead~of'at speed:and-voltage'. _ - l The licensee performed a special test of both EDGs. This test - demonstrated that the G01 -output breaker would close' at 4432 volts and the G02 output breaker would'close at 4274 volts. These value are acceptable. The licensee made a commitment to modify the. circuit to close the breaker on an at voltage signal or to change thel FSAR to better repre unt the design, and to evaluate the need to perform periodic testig to determine the EDG output breaker closing voltage. Based on the above commitments, this item is-considered closed, , Deficiency No. 90-201-14: Excessive DC Voltage Applied to Equipment Terminals 4 8 -

The EDSFI was concernd + cat PBNP was exceeding the battery float voltage as recommene L the EXIDE vendor manual. The vendor manual t stated that a leac-o.ciurr '1.215 specific gravity) battery should be 'h floated at an avet'ge vo' ege between 2.17 to 2.26 volts per cel The licensee uses procca.re RMP 45, " Station Battery," once per month to set the float voltm per the battery's temperature. _ . In additfon,- Operating Instruction (01) 33, " Paralleling Battery Chargers," limits 

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. Deficiency No. 90-201-22: Inadequate Physical Independence of'

R dundant Class lE Cables g This deficiency was written io-address overall EDSF1 concerns relating to cable separation. The litensee identified twenty-five (25) additional cases of inadequale cable separation. The cables identified in Deficiency Nos. 90-201-10 and 90-201-23 were the only ones:that had an. impact on equipment operability.z The licensee was in the process of upgrading the Cable and Raceway Data System (CARDS) prior to the EDSFI. In addition,-the licensee committed to review the , CARDS data base for any needed program changes;. to verify existing routing information; and to upgrade the CARDS data _ bank.- Deficiency Hos. 90 201-10 and 90-201-23 have been categorized as examples o apparent design control violation numbers 266/90018-01d,301/90018-01d-and 301/90018-01f. Even though the 25 cases of inadequate cabl separation are all examples of;a deviation from FSAR commitments . only two affected operability. The licensee promptly corrected the- ' two deviations af fecting operability and has completed evaluation of' the other cases. Corre"ive actions include physical separation by modification and correction of' errors in the-CARDS database. The licensee anticipated completing these actions by the end of 1990 for - " 

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Unit 2, subject to the availability of required equipment, and for Unit 1 by the end of -the spring;1991' refueling outage. Based on the above, this item is considered close Deficiency No. 90-201-23: Potential for Common-Mode Failure of Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater.( AFW) Pump Automatic Start The EDSFl identified that cables ZC2NA012D and ZD2NA012B, which provide redundant.open signals to the Unit 2 turbine driven AFW , steam supply valve, were routed through a comon conduit. A single = 

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failure of any cable withih the conduit could defect the undervoltage , automatic start signal. The licensee. corrected the original desto deficiency by rerouting one of the cables into the correct cNaul The motor driven AFW pump was ' operable at the time of discovery. The _ Uni t 1 turbine driven AFW pump steam supply valve control circuit was correctly wired. Failure of the. licensee to provide adequate cable separation for the Unit 2 steam driven AFW steam supply valve' auto open circuit is an example of' an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix,B,CriterionIII,DesignControl(301/90018-01f).

Pie inspector reviewed Procedure No. E0P-0, " Reactor leip on Safety Injection," and determined that there were sufficient procedure steps on how to perform 9 manual start of the steam driven AFW pum Deficiency No. 90-201-24: Venting Steam on Safety-Related Cables The EDSF1 team observed that a Unit 1 condensate receiver tank vent - - was venting steam onto safety-related cable trays JE06, JE07, FV12, and FV13. The licensee inspected the cable trays and determined- ' that several safety-related cables had some jacket discoloration and L 1 

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several nonsafety-related cables.had some' jacket damage. The -! licensee taped the nonsafety-related cables and' has committed to  ; change out the affected safety-related cables. Steam is emitted from a this: vent only.during a Unit 1 outage. The-licensee had developed a modification package-(89-04) to correct this'overpressurizatio , Based on the-above, this item is' considered close , t Deficiency No. 90-201-25: Inadequate Program for Calibration of= Protective Relays - 

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The EDSFI found thattall of the protective relays at PBNP were bein calibrated by the WEPCo relay group from Appleton, Wiscon_ sin. -The'g team determined that their. activities at.PBNP were not being-controlled by WEPCo's approved ~QA propam. The. licensee placed a 

     -

Stop_ Work Order on the Appleton group until the extent of the rela ; group's involvement at PBNP could'be determined. The licensee has conunitted, as a minimum,. to' provide:QA' orientation to the relay _ 

      .

group; to control the measuring and; test equipment used at'PBNP for relay calibrations; to assure'that th.e relay settings match the PBNP- j setpoint document; to write and issue additional test procedures fo ! non-Technical Specification safety-related relays; to control the . 

  ~

procurement and replacement of~ parts; to maintain' proper documentation; i and to assure that completed work'is reviewed by PBNP personne Failure of the licensee to apply adequate QA measpres'to assure:that J the calibration of safety-related protective reluys were-being 6 i adequately controlled is considered a violation of-10-CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion ll, Quality Assurance Program -(266/90018-06; . 301/90018-06)- 1 Deficiency No. 90-201-26: Inadequate Surveillance Procedure for Elgar Inverters The EDSF1 identified that Procedure RMP-45, "Elgar Instrument Bu Inverters,". did not include.a check of- the inverter's low-voltage' .i shutdown circuit. The licensee tested the. shutdown circuit ~* setpoints and detern.ined the following: .! Inverter As-Fou'nd (Vdc)' As-Left(Vdc)

10Y03 .110.84 100.04 m DY0C -101.13: 100.05 j~ 2DYO3 101.10 100.05 10Y04 9 .1.- DYOD 98.05 99.97 1 2DYO4 9 . . 

   .

Inverter 10Y03 was- the only inver ter that had-a nonconservative 

     -

setpoint. This inverter .isisupplied from battery D105. The most, recent performance test of-battery D105 (November 9,1989) determined' - L the battery's capacity 'to be '103%. The inspector requested th ilicensee to determine'if the inverter woul,d,be,able to meet FSA a 

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. Table 8.2-3 one (1) hour load ~ profile prior.to tripping the inverter on a low-voltage shutdown = trip.,:The licensee determined that'after
 :a one.(1)' hour discharge, the voltage at the inverter would be 111c ,
 'Vdc;_therefore, inverter IDYO3 wastoperable. In-addition, common  i inverter DY0C'was operable with-its as-found low-voltage shutdown:

trip at-101.13.Ydc.-' Procedure No.-RMP-45-provided adequate steps- 

     
       ;

on how to transfer inverter ! Failure of:the licensee to test the inverter low-voltage' shutdown trip is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 15.6.8- 

 - "Plant-Operating Procedures"-(266/90016-07; 301/9018-07).

aa. Deficiency No' 90-201J27: 'No Acceptance Criteria in Routine Maintenance- 

  .

Procedure (RMP-46) for Locating Grounds 

      -

t Tne licensee has been monitoring'and recordingi the' ground resistance i readings on eachtof the DC systems. , The:EDSF1 observed that ' Procedure - 

 -No. RMP-46, " Station Battery," calculatedithe ground resistance;: j however,'no specific acceptance criteria was given. The -licensee ' ,
       -'

committed to; develop-such criteria ind was pursuing the. purchase o more sensitive equipment.to perform this measurement. ?The inspector .,:4 reviewed the F.%R and Technical . Specifications and determined that-the ground detection circuitry was not specified in 'he safety- _ 

      ,
       *
 . analysis or Technical Specification bases. Based on the_ above,-this q
       '

item is considered closed.~- 

       '
    . .

In'sumary, the licensee provided the inspector with good' technical- answers for the questions that were asked. Theilicensee ir.volved*both plant and-corporate personnel to-resolve the questions and provided the, answers in , 

 -a timely manner. The inspector noted!that the'commitmentsEmade by.the- -
       .

licensee in recponse to the.EDSFI were good and:should correct;the; deficiencies identified. LIn addition-torthe:EDSFiscommitments, the licensee j identified other related inspection action items:that they were pursuing'.on l their ow j t Unresolved Items l L Unresolved items are matters about which more information is requirednin order to ascertain whether they are acceptable Litems,- items of noncompli'ance, or deviations. . Unresobed items disclosed during the -inspection are ]1 b 

 . discussed in Paragraph Nos. 2.r., 2.t....and 2.u. .
     '
       .j
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4 Exit Interview 4 h The inspector met with licensee representatives-(denoted in Paragraph 1);  ! 

 :following the. inspection on Angust 24, 1990, to discuss.the. scope and'

findings of the inspection, including:thetapparentiviolations. JThe' ' inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection-report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector? 4 during the inspection. Licensee representativestdid not' identify any 4 j such documents or processes'as proprietary.. ! l p, i ! 14 - , a 

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APPEND'IX? A l t 

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      ... A'
 ' Deficiency Number-   * Status
   . .    - . 90-201-01u Honconservativ~e Diesel .3 ..266/90018-01a:    .
,

Generator Steady-Statet i301/90018-01a, ij Loading CalculationL: , q 1+ 2 a 

, 02 Lack of(TransientLAnalysis lof Diesel Loading::
     '
      .

Closed' 

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 'c.- 1 90-'201 -03 .~ Incorrect Load Ratings;  Closed:   :

Listed;iniEOPs' jl EDG Loa' ding las l'nstructed' Closei byiE0Ps for a: Design.Basist 

     '
       .,   -1 Accident- '
       . .  . n' Nonconfermance to Design 3 -266/90018-02'

Basis Criteria for 

    ~

- 301/90018-0 Electrical Cable Tray Fi ), and Cable Ampacity? 

     ..

j t f.- 90-201-06 Lack of! Assessment.of - Closed J AvailableiShort-Circuit .;" Current'Due to.High-:  : Battery Temperature' 

        ' Inadequate Seisinic ' . 266/90018-01ti   l Evaluation for:Modificab '301/90018v0lbf '

j tion to 4160 VacLSafe- f, guards-Bus. Tie-Breaker" 4 

        '  " Single; Failure;of; Safeguards?:266/90018201c?    }

. 480 Vac BV Tie-Breaker; '301/90018-01c1 - J . incorrect. Safety Classifi-. t blosed' '! - cation and.Nonconformance with Separation' Criteria of ControlLCabling fo . 

   .480 Vac . Bus' Tie-Breakers   ,
         '
          -d j .- 90-201-10 NonconformancewithFSAR  266/9001f001d,   ;

Separation: Criteria'an /90018-01d? Potential for Common-Mode i 

 ,   Failure ofLBoth CCWsPumps     !
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Appendix;-A' =2' { 

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 ~        > ,i i 0eficiency Numtier t  ; Title  S_t, a tu s :
        '

    ~ . Use of.Nonqu'alifie .,

Closed: . 

          *

LComponentslin Safeguards , i Bus Breaker' Control. Circuit , 

          :; '

Vuln'erability of Switchgear -Closed 1 Control Power to Seismic' . l Event-thatL0 pens Manuait ' 

    ~ Transfer Switches    '  *

n Nonconformance' Diesel C1'osed , M 

         '

Generator. Sequence Logic N j . " Excessive DC Voltage Applied LC1 sed l , 

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to Equipment TerminalsL . m J 

          'a o.- 90-201-15'. Incomplete Fuel, Oil' System 266/90018-01 ;

Seismic Category 1- 301/90018-01 , Classificatio j Fuel 011. Cloud Point Closed Substantially, Higher ,  ; than Required 

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           , No Procedure to Control  -Closed Upgrade of LFuel Oil System     1 to Safety-Related : Status -     j ~

90-201-18 Undocumented Upgrade of. Fuel 266/90018-03: 2 Oil' System to QADStatus 1301/90018-_03 . 7 . Procedure.4.12.22,- Revision 13, Deficient 

       .Clo' sed-   ] ,

for Delivering Fuel-011 4 Under Emergency Conditions q 

      ' Feasibility.;of'A'pendix p R- :260d0018-04
    ; Scenario. Inadequatel ?301/90018-04
    : Investigated by :Licersee - .Nonconservative Calculation- 266/90018-05'
    -

af ' for. Emergency Diesel ? a301/90018-05: 1* Generator Room Temperature 

 = '90-201-22-  ' Inadequate Physical  Closed
          "

Independence of? Redundant; Class 1E Cables , , a

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Apperidix A' M3 n , 

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   < Deficiency' Number ~  Titlez    ..S t a tu s .  , ,r y 'l-23'  Potential Common-Mode?   4301/90018-01f Failurefoi" Turbine-Driveni   ;    *
     ; AFWfump Automatic? Star "
     : Circuitry:
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       - ~.Ventingi Steamion' Safety'-:-
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         :ClosedL Related CablesD'
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              * :Iriadequate Program for;E   2t /90018-06!
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Calibration of Protective- '301/90018v061 

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Relays . 1 . Inadequ4teSurveilldnde; \: 

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90-201-26  : 

         -266/90018'-07(.

ProceduroTfur. Elgarll ' 301/90018-07l- _ , , , d r ' 

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     .in: Rout-ine Maintenance        1 Procedure;46:for Locating;;        j'

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