IR 05000266/2021001
| ML21112A147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/2021 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Strope M Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR 2021001 | |
| Download: ML21112A147 (18) | |
Text
April 21, 2021
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2021001 AND 05000301/2021001
Dear Mr. Strope:
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On April 13, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation, or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room, in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000266 and 05000301
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000266/2021001 and 05000301/2021001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0047
Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Location:
Two Rivers, WI
Inspection Dates:
January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021
Inspectors:
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Ng, Project Engineer
V. Petrella, Resident Inspector
C. Zoia, Senior Operations Engineer
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Improper Field Change Resulted in Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000266/2021001-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71153 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, Design Control," and Technical Specification (TS)3.4.13, RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Operational Leakage," was identified when the licensee failed to subject field changes to design control measures that were commensurate with those applied to the original design. Specifically, the licensee made a field change when installing a pipe to the Unit 1 B steam generator and did not subject it to the applicable design control measures. This resulted in RCS pressure boundary leakage.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000266/2020-001-00 LER 2020-001-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leak on Steam Generator Bowl Drain Line Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 3, 2021, Unit 1 lowered power to 98.5 percent rated thermal power to support leading edge flow meter maintenance.
On February 6, 2021, Unit 1 returned to rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 3, 2021, Unit 2 lowered power to 98.5 percent rated thermal power to support leading edge flow meter maintenance.
On February 6, 2021, Unit 2 returned to rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities, as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all, or portions, of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather for high winds, cold temperatures, and snow on January 26, 2021.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 train A component cooling water system on February 18, 2021
- (2) G-04 emergency diesel generator on March 2, 2021
- (3) Unit 2 train A component cooling water system on March 10, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)fire zone 187 on March 8, 2021 (2)fire zone 318 on March 9, 2021 (3)fire zones 138, 139, and 142A on March 8, 2021 (4)fire zones 142, 150, and 151 on March 8, 2021 (5)fire zones 156 and 156A on March 8, 2021
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator written and operating test examination failure rates for the requalification exams administered for 2020, in accordance with the COVID-19 extension granted through March 31, 2021. The licensee developed remediation plans, as appropriate, for operators who failed portions of the exam.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during power ascension on February 11, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator exam on February 9, 2021.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)emergency diesel generator starting air system (2)spent fuel pool level indications
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)red grid condition while G-02 emergency diesel and Unit 1 train A component cooling pump out of service on February 18, 2021 (2)emergent work on Unit 2 component cooling water system due to potential system leak on March 4, 2021 (3)emergent work on Unit 2 leading edge flow meter equipment due to instrument spiking on March 16 and March 23, 2017 (4)dry fuel campaign dry runs on March 16, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) FLEX diesel Z-2000B failed to start (2)seal leak on Unit 1 train B component cooling water pump (3)lowering pressure on Unit 2 main feed isolation valve accumulators (4)potential through wall leak on Unit 2 component cooling water system (5)component cooling water piping analysis not updated when modification removed piping penetration
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)leading edge flow meter (LEFM) cabinet replacement/upgrade
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) TS 82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Monthly Testing, after maintenance on G-02 emergency diesel generator on February 24, 2021
- (2) TS 83, Emergency Diesel Generator G-03 Monthly Testing, after maintenance on G-03 emergency diesel generator on March 2, 2021 (3)1-SOP-AF-001, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation - Motor Driven, after maintenance on Unit 1 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on March 4, 2021 (4)partial TS 9, Control Room Heating and Ventilation System Checks, after maintenance on recirculation fans W-13B1 and 2 and flow switch FS-04133C on March 23, 2021
- (5) IT-21, Charging Pumps and Check Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1, after replacement of relief valve on March 26, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
(1)1ICP 02.003A, Reactor Protection Logic Train A 31 Day Surveillance Test, on January 14, 2021 (2)1ICP 02.005A, Engineered Safety Features System Logic Train A 31 Day Staggered Actuation Logic Test, on January 14, 2021
- (3) TS 4, Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip Test (Biannual)
Unit 2, on February 11, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) IT 05 Train B, Train B Containment Spray Pump and Valves Unit 1, on March 3, 2021
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) a crew simulator evaluation with Drill Exercise Performance (DEP) on February 9,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) Unit 1 January 1 - December 31, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 January 1 - December 31, 2020
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 January 1 - December 31, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 January 1 - December 31, 2020
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 January 1 - December 31, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 January 1 - December 31, 2020
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 1 reactor coolant system pressure boundary leak
===71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000266/2020-001, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leak on Steam Generator Bowl Drain Line Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML20330A283). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Improper Field Change Resulted in Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000266/2021001-01 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71153 A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, Design Control," and Technical Specification (TS)3.4.13, RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Operational Leakage," was identified when the licensee failed to subject field changes to design control measures that were commensurate with those applied to the original design. Specifically, the licensee made a field change when installing a pipe to the Unit 1 B steam generator and did not subject it to the applicable design control measures. This resulted in RCS pressure boundary leakage.
Description:
On February 20, 2020, the licensee noted an increasing trend on the Unit 1 containment air particulate monitor. After chemical analysis, the licensee found isotopes that were not normally present in containment, which indicated a possible primary leak. During a Unit 1 containment entry on April 5, 2020, an active leak was identified on the B steam generator loop platform near the bottom of the steam generator. The exact source of the leak could not be identified due to significant dose rates on the platform. The licensee made several reasonable attempts to confirm the source of the leakage. However, the licensee was unsuccessful because the leak location was inaccessible while operating the unit. The licensee reasonably assumed the source was packing leakage from valve 1RC-526B, HX-1B SG Channel Head Drain," because the valve was in the general area of the leak and had a history of packing leakage. The unidentified leakage rose to a maximum of 0.143 gallons per minute which was less than the licensee's adverse condition monitoring plan of 0.5 gallons per minute and Technical Specification 3.4.13.b requirement of 1 gallon per minute for unidentified leakage.
However, on October 3, 2020, after shutting down Unit 1 for a refueling outage, the licensee conducted an inspection of the B steam generator and determined that the leakage was pressure boundary leakage from a weld on the steam generator bowl drain piping. Point Beach Unit 1 TS 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," requires that pressure boundary leakage be limited to zero while the unit is in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4. When pressure boundary leakage exists, Condition B requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The licensee did not meet this requirement because they believed that the leakage was packing leakage when operating the unit.
The licensee performed a failure investigation and determined that valve 1RC-526B was close to the harmonics range of the reactor coolant pump, resulting in increased vibrations of the pipe and valve. After further investigation, the licensee determined that the length of pipe that attached 1RC-526B to the steam generator was not in conformance with the design.
Specifically, on October 20, 2017, the pipe was installed with a length of 5.095 inches while design change drawing 2D31917 required the length of pipe to be 4.5 +0.12/-0.00. The licensee also found that, in work order 00390455-01, the installer made a note stating that the length of the pipe was 5.22 inches.
Procedure EN-AA-100, Revision 6, "Design Control Program," stated that the Design Control Program requirements applied to field changes. It also stated that field change requests must be promptly followed by an engineering change revision to incorporate the change. This program requirement was not followed.
Corrective Actions: The licensees immediate corrective actions were to remove the valve and install a pipe cap in place. The licensee also did a resonant bump test of the newly installed pipe cap to test the frequency of the pipe. The licensee grounded out indications on the bowl drain welds and on the steam generator surface. At the time of this inspection, the licensee also planned to revise the Field Activity Monitoring Plan procedure (i.e., PR-AA-100-1004) and form. The licensee requested the vendor to initiate an action request in the vendors corrective action program, stressing the importance of meeting the applicable design criteria and of obtaining responsible engineer concurrence for any deviations, and to provide the results of their investigation to the Point Beach Engineering managers. The licensee also initiated a work order to obtain operating vibration data and incorporate it into an engineering model.
Corrective Action References: AR 02345306, AR 02346204, AR 02360109, AR 02370320, AR 02370198
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to subject field changes to design control measures that were commensurate with those applied to the original design was a violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, and was a performance deficiency, which resulted in pressure boundary leakage. Specifically, the licensee made a field change when installing a pipe to the Unit 1 B Steam Generator and did not subject it to the applicable design control measures.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee's failure to subject the field change to design control measures resulted in RCS pressure boundary leakage from a weld failure.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Specifically, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in exceeding the RCS leak rate for a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), or likely affect other systems used to mitigate a (LOCA).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Teamwork because the individuals installing the pipe did not communicate and coordinate the field change with the organization responsible for controlling the design of the pipe.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, Design Control," requires, in part, that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. It also requires these measures to include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents, and that deviations from such standards are controlled.
When the unit is in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, Point Beach Unit 1 TS 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage," requires, in part, No pressure boundary leakage. When pressure boundary leakage exists, the associated Condition B requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, on October 20, 2017, the licensee failed to subject a field change to design control measures that were commensurate with those applied to the original design and control deviations from quality standards specified in design documents. Specifically, the licensee made a field change when installing a pipe to the Unit 1 B steam generator with a length that differed from the standard specified in design change drawing 2D31917 and failed to control this deviation. As a result, the valve attached to this pipe (i.e., 1RC-526B) was close to the harmonics range of the reactor coolant pump, which led to increased vibrations, crack formation, and an unrecognized pressure boundary leakage. The pressure boundary leakage also resulted in a TS 3.4.13 violation from approximately February 20 to October 3, 2020.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
- On April 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the 71111.11A review of results of the 2020 written and operating exam inspection results to Mr. A. Moore, Operations Training Supervisor, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 13, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. M. Strope, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
AOP 13C
Severe Weather Conditions
Drawings
110E018 Sheet 3
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
110E029 Sheet 3
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
M-209 Sheet 15
P&ID Starting Air System Diesel Generator Building
M-219 Sheet 3
P&ID Fuel Oil System Diesel Generator Building
Miscellaneous
1-CL-CC-001
Component Cooling Unit 1
2-CL-CC-001
Component Cooling Unit 2
CL 11A G-04
G-04 Diesel Generator Checklist
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan Control Building Elev 8 ft, 26 ft, 44 ft and 66 ft
PFP-0-PAB 26
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 & Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 26 ft
PFP-0-PAB-8
Primary Auxiliary Building Elevations 8' and Below
Miscellaneous
Hourly Fire Rounds on 3/8/2021 for the PAB
Every Four Hours Fire Rounds on 3/8/2021 for the PAB
Hourly Fire Rounds on 3/9/2021 for the Turbine Hall and
Miscellaneous Areas
Every Four Hours Fire Rounds on 3/9/2021 for the Turbine
Hall and Miscellaneous Areas
Procedures
Response to Fire
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Event Notification Worksheet
2/09/2021
Nuclear Accident Reporting Form (NARS)
2/09/2021
PBN LOC 000
017E
NRC Annual Simulator Exam
Procedures
Startup to Power Operation Unit 2
Corrective Action
Documents
K-4C Diesel Driven Air Compressor for G-03 Failed to Start
2/06/2020
K-5C G-03 Electric Air Compressor Interstage Relief is
Lifting
03/30/2020
K-5C G-03 Electric Air Compressor Interstage Relief is
Lifting
04/08/2020
Bearing Chatter
04/10/2020
PS-6353C Pressure Switch As-Found OOT, Adjusted As-
Left SAT
06/02/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PS-6353B As-Found OOT, Adjusted and As-Left Within
Limits
06/02/2020
G-02 EDG Air Bank Pressure Drop
10/11/2020
K-4D-D Failed to Start
2/11/2021
PS-3058A Is Not Holding its Calibration
2/19/2021
PS-3058B Is Not Holding its Calibration
2/19/2021
External OE Eval Needed - RS/RG2 EAL Level Validation
03/18/2021
Drawings
M-209 Sheet 12
P&ID Emergency Diesel Air Starting System
M-209 Sheet 14
P&ID Starting & Service Air System Diesel Generator
Building
M-209 Sheet 15
P&ID Starting Air System Diesel Generator Building
Engineering
Changes
NRC Order Fukushima Strategy - Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation Upgrade
2/16/2014
Miscellaneous
Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan - G-03
Air Bank Pressure
Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan - G-03
Air Bank Pressure
Operators Logs
3/29/2020 -
4/25/2020
G-03 Diesel Air Pressure Trend
03/28/2020 -
04/26/2020
Procedures
ICP 03.017
Calibration of Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation
Systems
WNA-TP-04709-
GEN
Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation System Calibration
Procedure
Work Orders
ICP 3.17 (Fall Occurrence) - Spent Fuel Pool Level
09/12/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Work Light Attached to U2 SI Piping
2/18/2021
Improper Wheel Chock Usage
2/18/2021
Miscellaneous
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist
2/18/2021
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist
03/04/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist
03/17/2021
Point Beach Elevated Risk Focus Activities for the 2021 Dry
Fuel Storage Load Campaign / Spent Fuel Pool Fuel
Assemblies Inspections / Fuel Handling and Fuel Moves in
SFP, Inspect Fuel Cell Inserts
Procedures
NP 10.3.7
On-Line Safety Assessment
Corrective Action
Documents
Z-2000B FLEX Generator Failed to Start During Quarterly
Run
01/11/2021
Change in Seal Leakage Flow on 1P-11B CC Pump
2/16/2021
Pressure Trending Low on 2T-233A and B (MFIV Accum's)
2/25/2021
Potential Thru Wall Leak on CCW Identified
03/02/2021
CCW Piping Analysis Not Updated for Removed Pipe
03/10/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
1P-53 MDAFW Pump Recirc Flow Below Admin Limit During
IT 400
03/04/2021
Work Orders
03/02/2021
FS-4133C Perform Visual Inspection of Flow Switch
03/23/2021
G-02, Post Maint Testing per RMP 9043-27A
2/25/2021
G-02, Ops PMT/RTS (TS-82)
2/25/2021
Ops PMT/RTS
03/05/2021
W-013B1 Inspect Fan and Lube Bearings
03/26/2021
1CV-283C 1P-2C Charging Pump Relief Valve Lifted
03/26/2021
Procedures
1ICP 02.003A
Reactor Protection Logic Train A 31 Day Surveillance Test
1ICP 02.005A
Engineered Safety Features System Logic Train A 31 Day
Staggered Actuation Logic Test
IT 05 Train B
Train B Containment Spray Pump and Valves Unit 1
TS 4
Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip
Test (Biannual) Unit 2
Miscellaneous
Nuclear Accident Reporting Form (NARS) - Drill
2/09/2021
Event Notification Worksheet (Drill)
2/09/2021
71151
Miscellaneous
Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Unplanned Power
Changes Per 7000 Critical Hours
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Unplanned Scrams
with Complications
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2020
Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Unplanned Scrams
Per 7000 Critical Hours
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2020
Point Beach PI Reporting Data; Units 1 and 2; Unplanned
Power Changes Per 7,000 Critical Hours
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2020
Point Beach PI Reporting Data; Units 1 and 2; Unplanned
Scrams Per 7,000 Critical Hours
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2020
Point Beach PI Reporting Data; Units 1 and 2; Unplanned
Scrams with Complications Per 7,000 Critical Hours
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
1RC-526B Liquid Penetrant Indications
10/05/2020
Miscellaneous
NUC PRJ NCC
2
Field Activity Monitoring Plan (FAMP) Training Instruction
NUC PRJ NCC
003
Contract Coordinator Responsibilities & Oversight of
Supplemental Personnel Using a Field Activity Monitoring
Plan (FAMP)
03/30/2021
PR-AA-100-1004-
F01
Detailed Monitoring Plan
Procedures
Field Activity Monitoring Plan
Corrective Action
Documents
Increasing Trend on 1RE-211 Particulate Monitor
2/20/2020
Unit 1 Enters Action Level 1 for RCS Unidentified Leakage
2/26/2020
Shortfall in Documentation of Considerations
06/17/2020
1RC-526B, As-Found Boric Acid Leak
10/03/2020
1RC-526B Liquid Penetrant Indications
10/04/2020
Drawings
2D31917
Steam Generator Channel Head Drain System
Engineering
Changes
295378
Replace 1RC-526A and 1RC-526B With A Pipe Cap
Miscellaneous
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage
10/03/2020
Point Beach Unit
LER 2020-001
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leak on Steam
Generator Bowl Drain Line Results in Operation Prohibited
by Technical Specifications
11/25/2020
Procedures
Design Control Program
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Design Change Packages
Field Activity Monitoring Plan
Work Orders
WO 00390455 01
1HX-001B / Nozzle Repair of SG Channel Head Drain
10/20/2017
WO 40713753 26
Primary Leakage in U1 Containment B Loop
10/11/2020
WO 40713753 28
Primary Leakage in U1 Containment B Loop
10/16/2020
WO 40713753 29
Primary Leakage in U1 Containment B Loop
10/18/2020