IR 05000266/1986014

Insp Repts 50-266/86-14 & 50-301/86-13 on 860804-08.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensed Operator Training & Nonlicensed Staff Training

ML20206N623
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	08/21/1986
From:	Eng P, Hasse R, Phillips M, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206N620	List: IR 05000266/1986014 ML20206N615
References
50-266-86-14, 50-301-86-13, NUDOCS 8608260329
Download: ML20206N623 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO MISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/86014(DRS);50-301/86013(DRS)

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Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Rivers,,WI Inspection Conducted: August 4-8, 1986

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Inspectors: P. L. Eng bcd/-b Date 3 - 11~ % b Date K. R. Riagway 1 '7 \ '3 (

Date Approved By: M ps Chief

Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 4-8, 1986, (Reports No. 50-266/86014(DRS);

No. 50-301/86013(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by three regional inspectors of Licensed Operator Training (41400) and Non-Licensed Staff Training (41701).

Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000266 G PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Wisconsin Electric Power Company

• J. J. Zach, Plant Manager

• J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer

• R.-J. Bruno, Superintendent, Training

• P. A. Dent, Supervisor, Staff Services H. J. Gleason, Training Coordinator P. J. Matson, Senior Training Specialist T. L. Ross, Training Coordinator-J. K. Smith, Training Specialist

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USNRC R. L. Hague, Senior Resident Inspector

• R. J. Leemon, Resident Inspector Other licensee personnel were contacted during the course of the inspectio * Denotes those attending the exit interview on August 8, 198 . Training Program Effectiveness The inspection consisted of a review of events which had occurred during the period January 1,1985 through July,1986, to determine the effectiveness of the training programs. The inspectors also evaluated modifications to the training program made as a result of these events to preclude recurrence. The inspection was not designed to be an evaluation of the licensee's overall training progratr. This evaluation is currently performed by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) as part of the training accreditation process. At the time of this inspection, five training programs were scheduled to be submitted to the INP0 training accreditation board on August 21, 1986 for accreditation. These programs were: non-licensed operator, reactor operator, senior reactor operator, .

shift technical advisor and radiological protection technician. The

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licensee stated that the self evaluation reports for the remaining five training programs were scheduled to be submitted to INPO for review in late September 198 The inspectors reviewed 18 Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and 7 Significant Operating Events (SOEs) to determine if they were caused by personnel error or deficient training and if lessons learned from the events had been factored into the training program The licensee routinely routed copies of LERs and S0Es to the training department for analysis. The training department used a Needs Analysis form to document the review process by various members of the training staff for consideration as a training topic. Training coordinators for

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each major area of training would review the needs analyses and determine l if a training need exist Based on the need, subject matter, urgency, I

and individual training program, a formal action plan would be developed i

and an associated lesson plan written. This lesson plan would then I generally be presented to trainees as part of their continuing training program and incorporated into the initial training program as appropriat During the course of the inspection, the inspectors noted that no means existed for cross referencing different needs analyses which stem from a

. common event or source. This could lead to missed training topics and commitment dates. The licensee noted the inspectors' comments and stated

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that review of training documentation associated with needs analysis and lesson plans was planne Licensed Operator Training (1) Training Program Update Mechanisms Two means of disseminating information were routinely employed at Point Beach for licensed personnel. These were continuing training and required readin Continuing training at Point Beach was conducted on a six-week cycle. This effectively placed each shift crew in training one week out of every six. Personnel vacations were generally scheduled around the training week. Needs analyses for potential training topics were reviewed by the licensed operator training coordinator and formal action plan and lesson plans generated if deemed necessary. The content of the lesson plans would then be disseminated during the next six week continuing training cycles. Continuing training was the official mechanism by which updated information was incorporated into the training l for licensed operator Required reading was provided in a book located in the control i room. The training department audited the required reading book l on a quarterly basis. The inspector noted that a Technical l Specification change which had been placed in the required reading book in October 1985 was not signed off as being complete until April 1986. The inspector stated that should the licensee continue to use the required reading method to disseminate significant. information, more stringent controls related to the timeliness of required reading completion were necessar (2) Review of Abnormal Events Of the events reviewed, five were chosen for detailed investigation:

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Event Description LER 86004, Unit 1 Misaligned Control Rods due to Failure to notice computer alann LER 85001, Unit 1 Inadvertent Safety Injection SOE 85003, Unit 1 RPI Turbine Runback Due to Loss of 1YO6 LER 86002, Unit 2 Misalignment of Shutdown Bank "B" Rods LER 85004, Unit 1 Low Voltage Station Transformer Lockout 1X04 LER 86004, Unit 1, dealt with the failure of several operators to notice that two control rods were out of alignment from the bank demand position as indicated on the new plant process computer. Since the misalignment went unnoticed, reactor power was increased above the 75% limit imposed by Technical Specifications. As a result of the event, a needs analysis was performed, formal action and lesson plans prepared, and pertinent training materials incorporated into the continuing training program. Training included discussion of the event, discussion of the capabilities of the new process computer and >

a discussion of the control rod position indicator LER 85001, Unit 1, dealt with an inadvertent safety injection due to low steam line pressure resulting from failure to block safety injection while conducting reactor shutdown. This resulted in revision of the pertinent shutdown procedure to emphasize the importance of blocking safety injection and associated auto unblocking features of the safety injection system. As a result of the event, a needs analysis was performed, formal action and lesson plans prepared and pertinent training materials incorporated into the continuing training program. Training conducted included a description of the event, ways of avoidirg recurrence and relevant procedure revision SOE 85003, Unit 1, dealt with a turbine runback due to loss of normal power to the RPI system. Upon attempting to return the system to normal following the event, it was discovered that the control rods would not move. This was because Panel YO6 and 1 C158 were still deenergized. As a result, a needs analysis was performed by the training department and a formal action plan and associated lesson plan developed. This resulted in the addition of a similar scenario into the simulator training program and classroom discussions of the cause and ramifications of the event as well as ways of precluding recurrenc LER 86002, Unit 2, dealt with the failure of control room personnel to notice that a disagreement between the digital and analog rod position indicators existed. As a result, it was

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discovered that shutdown bank "B" was positioned 6 inches farther into the core than allowed by Technical Specifications. As a result of the event, a needs analysis, formal action plan, and lesson plan were developed. .This training material will be administered to affected staff in the next continuing training cycl LER 85004, Unit 1, dealt with a turbine runback due to a lockout of the.1X04 station transformer which resulted in a momentary loss of power to 1Y06 which feeds the Reactor Protection System. An Unusual Event was declared. The LER submitted by the licensee discussed both the event and improvements needed in the area of event notification. As

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such, the licensee committed to train personnel and revise i relevant procedures including a detailed discussion of Unusual

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Events and the timeliness of periodic updates to all offsite agencies by January 1, 1986. Documentation, including the

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needs analysis, formal acticn plan, and lesson plan were found

! -for the event described in the LER; however, documents

! associated with the discussion of Unusual Events was not l readily found. After an intensive search by the training staff, sufficient documentation related to the training of personnel on Unusual Events was located. This was complicated

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by an entry into the required reading book which identified a

> given required reading assignment as fulfilling the NRC

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commitment. From the documentation available, the inspector

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determined that all training commitments were met; however, it was noted that explicit referencing of_the various sources for the needs analyses as well as identification of the. reason for.

.L procedure revision would have facilitated the investigation and

subsequent determination that the consnitment had been met. The inspector stated that for those events for which several needs analyses are derived, or for which it is assumed that needs

analyses generated from other sources may also address the

identified concern, coordination and documentation should be

reviewed to ensure that priorities are assigned properly. In

this case, since the procedure in question had been revised i several times and corresponding needs analyses and action plans i generated, it was difficult to determine which revision

fulfilled the NRC commitment. In fact, training of personnel

! on proper. conduct during an Unusual Event took place 2 and

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1/2 months prior to the procedure issue date of December 30,

1985. Review of the training received and the most recent revision of the pertinent procedure indicated that the correct information had been presented to the licensed staf (3) Training records j

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The inspector reviewed training records associated with those

. individuals who'had been involved in some of the events investigated. It was verified that those individuals had received training which should have precluded the occurrences for the above events with the exception of SOE 85003, Unit . _..._ _ ._ __ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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It was also verified that both senior reactor operators (SRO)

and reactor operators (RO) had been subsequently trained on those events chosen for investigatio During the inspection, it was noted that one SR0 had not been examined since 1978. The licensee stated that provision to exempt individuals from taking the licensing exam if they had prepared the exam was noted in their NRC approved License Requalification Program. The inspector stated that while the exemption existed, it was not the Commission's intent to waive the examination requirements for such an extended period of time. The licensee stated that the individual would take the license exam during the next cycl The inspector noted that the licensee's requalification program stated that for those individuals who did not achieve the minimum allowed exam score, an oral examination to determine candidate adequacy would be administered within two weeks. Based on the results of the oral examination, the candidate may be removed from shift. Discussions with members of the training staff indicated that exam grading times may be as long as one wee This means that candidates who have demonstrated deficiencies ,

as noted in their licensing exams may continue to perform licensed ' duties for periods as long as three weeks before any compensatory actions would be taken. The licensee stat ~ed that this provision was included in the requalification program and no further action was planne The licensee also provided the following facility adninistered requalification examination results for licensed personnel over a three-year period:

Year License Total Exams Given % Passed 1983 R0 15 73 1983 SR0 17 65 1984 R0 16 88 1984 SR0 21 90 1985 R0 18 100 1985 SR0 19 100 (4) Personnel Interviews The inspector interviewed several licensed operators, some of whom had been involved in the events chosen for investigatio All interviewees were aware of the circumstances surrounding the events and conversant in measures that could be taken to preclude recurrence. Individuals stated that training received was relevant to their jobs and enhanced performance of their activities.

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' Non-Licensed Personnel Training (1) Training Program Update Mechanisms

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The method for updating Training Programs for non-licensed personnel were similar to those used for licensed personnel.

- All received continuing training which incorporated new material generated by needs analyse (2) Review Of Abnormal Events Five events were chosen for detailed investigation

LER 86003, Unit 1, Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Power

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on White Instrument Bus LER 86001, Unit 2, Reactor Trip Due to Tripping B Reactor Trip Breaker When A Bypass Breaker Was Closed LER 85005, Unit 1, Locating Insufficiently Cooled Spent Fuel Assembly Next To Spent Fuel Pool Wall LER 85009, Unit 1, Nuclear Instrumentation Runback 4 Due to Operating Wrong Switch

! Radiation Event Report Improper Storage of Radioactive RER 85-0080 Material LER 86003, Unit 1, involved a reactor trip due to loss of power on the white instrument bus. The loss of the' instrument bus was caused by improperly returning an inverter to service on that bu's. The inverter was being returned to service by an Instrument and Controls (I&C) Technician using Operating Instruction (01)-37, " Instrument Bus Switching." The 01 did not address the fact that the inverter capacitors must be i

' recharged prior to placing it on the bus. In this case, the failure to perform this step led to the loss of the bu During an' interview, the technician stated that he had never

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performed the task before as it was nonna11y done-by the

! electricians. Further, he had never had trainina on putting an i inverter into service though he had received training on the system. The inspector concluded that given the level of detail

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included in the 01, the technician had not received adequate training for performing the task. However, the root cause in this case was probably more closely related to job control since the task had been assigned to a position that would not F

normally perform that function. A needs analysis was being conducted as a result of this event, although it had not been completed. The current draft called for inclusion of the lessons learned from this event in the continuing training

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program for operations personnel, including the I&C Technicians. Other corrective actions included placing a label on the inverter to remind the operator to recharge the capacitors (complete), and revising procedure 0I-3 LER 86001, Unit 2, involved a reactor trip during a routine test of the "A" reactor trip logic circuits. The technician inadvertently tripped the "B" reactor trip rather than the "A" reactor trip breaker trip after closing the "A" bypass breaker. The inspector's evaluation of the event disclosed that the technician had performed the test trany times and was fully qualified. There were no apparent training deficiencies. The needs analysis identified routing of the LER to I&C personnel for review as the only required training action. The inspector concurre LER 85005, Unit 1, involved the storage of spent fuel, cooled less than one year, near the fuel pool wall. The inspector's evaluation disclosed that the person preparing the storage schedule was well qualified, had prepared storage schedules many times and that no training issue was involved. The needs analysis indicated routing of the LER as the only required training action. Also, during an interview with the supervisor of the group preparing the storage schedules, the inspector was told that the independent and supervisory reviews of these storage schedules had been made more rigorous. The inspector indicated that this was appropriate since the failure of the review and approval process was probably more significant than the initial error in this cas LER 85009, Unit 1, involved a turbine runback when an I&C Technician operated the wrong switch while performing a calibration. The inspector's evaluation identified no training issues. The technician was well trained and had performed the operation many times. The needs analysis identified routing of the LER as the only training actio RER 85-0080 involved the improper handling of a blowdown evaporator bottoms loop filter. Upon removal, the filter was improperly surveyed and then improperly stored by the auxiliary operator (A0). The inspector's evaluation determined that a training issue was involved; the training of A0's in radiation control. The needs analysis identified both long term and short term training needs and included a formal action pla The short term training had been completed. Long tenn action was being develope In summary, the review of events identified two training issues. The first, the training of an I&C Technician for a specific task, did not represent a programmatic problem. The second issue, the radiation control training for A0's, did indicate a potential program weakness. The licensee was pursuing this issu .. -

(3) Training Records The inspector reviewed a sample of training records including those of individuals involved in the events evaluated. All records were readily retrievable and complet (4) Personnel Interviews The inspectors interviewed several individuals involved in the events investigated as well as other general, non-licensed personnel. The individuals were knowledgeable of their responsibilities for emergency response, safety, and work controls. They also felt that the training program was generally responsive to their need . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

at the end of the inspection on August 8, 1986, and summarized the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspection. The licensee stated that the inspectors had no access to proprietary information during the inspectio