IR 05000266/1989023
| ML20245L640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1989 |
| From: | Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245L627 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-89-23, 50-301-89-22, NUDOCS 8908220215 | |
| Download: ML20245L640 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Reports'No. 50-266/89023(DRSS); 50-301/89022(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301-
. Licensee:
Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Mi.Jaukee, WI' 53201
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Facility Nanse:
Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Point Beach Site, Two Creeks', Wiscensin Inspection Conducted: July 10-14 and August 3,1989 1Nt f!/// @
' Inspector:
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Dat'e /
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Qran d 32
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- Jp111am Snell,' Chief 6/////M Approved By/jiladiological Controls
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Section
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Inspection Summary Inspection on July 10-14 'and August 3, 1989, (Reports No. 50-266/89023(DRSS);
50-301/89022(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the following areas of the
- Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness program: Licensee action on previously-identified items (IP 92700); followup on actual emergency plan activations (IP 92701); operational status of the emergency preparedness program (IP 82701).
Section 5 of this report contains the status of Emergency
' Preparedness related Safety Issues Management System-(SIMS) items. This
- inspection involved one NRC inspector.
.Results:
No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified.
Routine
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ma-intenance of the' emergency preparedness program appears well implemented, with the exception of those training related items carried from previous-inspections,as Open Items.
the licensee has not completed action on several outstanding Open Items,'but progress is being made towards resolution of these items.
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l 8908220215 890814 PDR ADOC.K 05000266
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. DETAILS 11.
Persons Contacted-
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- J. Zach, Plant Manager
- R. Bruno, Superintendent Training
- G. Maxfield, General Superintendent Operations J. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer
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- D.- Stevens, Emergency _ Preparedness Coordinator
- R. Chojnacki, Quality Specialist - EP
- H. Gleason, Training Coordinator
- F. Flentje, Administrative Specialist
- E. Mercier,' Engineer, Nuclear Plant; Engineering M. Baumann, Engineer-II, Corporate -
- Denntes those' attending the exit interview cn July 14, 1989.
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The inspector also contact'd other members of the licensee'r, staff during e
the course of the inspection.
2.
Lice'nsee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 92701)
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a.
(Closed)-Open Item (No. 301/87900-01)i Licensee action on'NRC Information Notice IN-87-058 " Continuous Communications Following Emergency. Notifications." This information notice reminds recipients that 10 CFR 50.72(c)(3) requires that licensees maintain continuous. communications with the NRC when requested.
The licensee has completed'-its review of the Information Notice, and concluded
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that no action is necessary.
The basis for this' conclusion is that EPIP 2.2 "NRC Notification" provides general guidance, and procedure DCS 2.1.1 " Requirements and Guidance for Immediate Notification to NRC of Significant Events at PBNP" specifically addresses continuous communications with the NRC upon request.
A February, 1989 modification to Section 5.1 of EPIP 1.3 " Emergency. Event - Immediate Actions" (Revision 15) clarified that additional Duty Technical Advisors "may be required for continuous manning of the NRC ENS-telephone." This item is closed.
b.
(0 pen) Open Item (No. 266/88007-01):
Licensee procedures did not assure annual Emergency Plan training for all personnel assigned duties in the' Emergency Plan. 'The licensee revised their Emergency plan on January 19, 1989 adding a requirement (Section 8.3.1.lb) for specialized annual training for key plant personnel and those individuals assigned specific duties associated with the Emergency Plan.
The method of conducting this annual training is still under review, with an estimated completion ti!neframe of September,1989.
The area of EP training was the focus of a previous inspection (No.
50-266/89013; 50-301/890012, conducted in June 1989).
Pending completion of licensee actions, this item will remain open.
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(Closed) Open Item (No. 266/88021-02)h lDuring the emergency.
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preparedness exercise held on September 14, 1988,. the individual-
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in charge..of the Emergency Operations Facility did not document
.his review and approval of hardcopy: messages prior to' transmittal
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t Loffsite. 'During the emergency preparedness exercise: held 'on
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' March.15n 1989, documentation.of such review and approval was~
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complete and acceptable. -lhis; item 1is closed.
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d.
(Closed) Open Item (No.' 266/88023-02): ;On the morning of OctoberL20,
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1988,_a: review of siren test printouts.from.the' siren status feedback
. system indicated that a significant number of' sirens Ecre not;
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operational. -A." growl test" was conducted, which indicated that 8 c
of.-14. sirens were not responding'to Central Control Station, signals.
Prompt ~ corrective action was taken, and over'90% of the sirens were
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. functional by the end of the' day.
Some problems were identified in l
M a new type' of circuit board installed to allowla " remote' reset" of-a-
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. N siren.
A number. of sirer: circuit boards' have been replaced"it th'e interim,; '
,and it has b'eens found that the siren status feedback system is not -
entirely reliable.
The licensee has been monitoring the accuracy _
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of theisiren status feedback system, but does notipresently consideri the system as in service (this is_not.a requ, ired system).
The licensee conducts siren aests at a frequency welloNr minimum
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'NRC requirements, and has a system for rapidly determining the..
percentage of the Emergency Planning Zone population which would be
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saffected by-a siren's failure.
There are provisions for co,mpensatory notification measures shculd these'be required. This item is closed.
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Le; (Closed) Open Item (No. 266/89008-01):
During the last exercise,
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the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the capability to
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coordinate the flow,of~Information~from the' Control Room to offsite agencie's and the proper use of EPIP 1 1. -Discussion with licensee personnel and review of'information in a May.10,1989 " licensee -
' letter responding to NRC~ exercise items indicated that this item was an " exercise artifact" caused by the' use of a " Drill Control Room."
A review of exercise' events indicated that the observed problem would'be unlikely to. occur; inian actual event ~ involving the Control c
Room.
This item is closed.
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f.
(0 pen) Open Item'(No'.-266/89008-02):
Exercise Weakness:
During the last exercise, licensee personnel did not recognize and aggressively
. pursue the existence'of the (scenario) containment release path.
The licensee responded'to this item via letter dated May 10,;1989,
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indicating that the Weakness was a performance problem, not a generic issue and'no corrective action could be identified or implemented.
Region III personnel did not accept this pcsition,
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and the transmittal letter for NRC Inspection Report
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No. 50-266/89013(DRSS);;50-301/89012(DRSS) requested an additional
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response.
This item will remain open.
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(0 pen) Open Item (No. 266/89008-03):
Operational Support (OSC)
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procedures should be modified to require activation of the OSC j
concurrently.with the Technical Support Center (TSC), to provide
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augmentod manpower to carry out any TSC directed initiatives.
Licensee personnel committed to revise the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) to require concurrent-activation of the TSC-and OSC at the Alert declaration or higher.
Discussion indicated that EPIP 1.3 (Revision 7) would have the OSC activate,-'at an Alert, up to the point of assuming OSC responsibilities for plant equipment function and maintenance.
.This is' so that the normal maintenance organization can continue to
. function if OSC support.is not required by the~coaditions of the Alert.
Pending completion of licensee actions ~, this item will remain open.
h.
(Closed) Open item (No. 266/89008-04):
Emergency Plan Emergency Kit inventories should be revised to ensure adequate supplies are
.available to support multiple inplant teams.
Supplies maintained under the Emergency Plan Maintenance Procedures (EPMPs).have been increased considerably for inplant team items.
Review of the June, 1989 inventory checklist revision indicated that such supplies were adequate.
This item is closed.
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(0 pen) Open' Item (No. 266/89008-05):
During the previous exercise, sample handling techniques.were poorly demonstrated by both field teams.
Licensee personnel stated that.a review of the present training' program indicated that it was adequate in the area of Health Physics; additionally, the findings of the exercise inspection. report were discussed with the Health Physics staff as training.
The major concerns developed from the NRC findings were hand contamination and possible sample-cross-contamination, as vehicle contamination was expected under the scenario conditions.
The training department has been requested to complete a Training Needs Analysis for field sampling team members.
Pending completion of licensee actions, this item will remain open.
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(Open) Open Item (No. 266/89008-06):
Unresolved Item:
During the previous emergency preparedness exercise (March 1989), the licensee was unable to obtain and analyze a containment atmosphere sample when containment air pressure exceeded 5 psig.
The sampling procedvee indicated that this maximum pressure was implemented because the sample pump seals would not be adequate for higher pressures.
During the inspection, documentation was reviewed which indicated that tho 5 psig limit was~most likely based on the operating manual provided by the vendor of sample pump 707A.
A review of the Point Beach Final Safety Analysis Report,
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Section 14.3.4, " Containment Pressure Transients" indicated that
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peak containment pressure for a worst case accident was calculated to be between 52-53 psig.
For the most conservation worst case analysis, resulting containment pressure could remain above 10 psig 1.
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for.over 2.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />,. delaying utilization of the containment atmosphere sampling system.'
The NRC criterion for such sampling is
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'that the sample be.obtained and analyzed within three hours of the l
decision to sample.
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Per an-August >3, 1989 telephone discussion with the licensee's
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Emergency Preparedness Coordinator,.the licensee has reviewed this information 'and concluded that the system is unacceptable with a 5 psig limitation.
Discussion indicated that the licensee has further reviewed the sampling system.' The pump vendor advised the licensee that the pump seals are not at risk, but the pump motor can only tolerate a sample pressure of.15 psig in " continuous use" and 20 psig for " intermittent use" (no more than 15 minutes).
The 5 psig limitation does apply to the seals at a radiation detector which is bypassed in the containment atmosphere sampling configuration, and is not a concern.
Design review did identify a drain trap upstream of the sampling pump, which has a glass collection bowl rated at 5 psig.
Licensee.
personnel-are pursuing either replacing the glass collection bowl with a metal bowl qualified to a higher pressure, or modifying the system to utilize a different trap mechanism.. With an appropriate modificb N 1, tho system would then.have a 20 psig capability.
A pressure.est of the modified system would then be performed to confirm its acceptability.
The licensee has performed a maximum sample time analysis, utilizing the. containment, atmospheric pressure transit data above, and conservatively assumed that the sample was requested at the time of
' transient' initiation.
Their analysis indicated that..a 20 psig system will. allow a containme'nt atmosphere sample to-be collected and analyzed within three hours, as containment pressure would decrease to the 20 psig point in an acceptable amount of time.
Licensee review of the sampling procedure has indicated that the present pre-sampling recirculation time of 15 minutes is unnecessary and could be significantly reduced.
The above analysis of total sampling time was performed without reduction of the present 15 minute recirculation. time.
This Unresolved Item is converted to an Open Item to track licensee corrective actions.
Pending completion of licensee actions, this item will remain open.
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(0 pen) Open Item (No. 266/89008-07):
Unresolved Item:
During the exercise it was noted that the licensee lacked a procedure for counting an air sample taken from the plant which had (scenario)
elevated levels of radioactive iodine present.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that this item was under active review.
It appears that elevated plant air iodine measurement can be l
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conducted using a relatively short procedure and series of-tables (related toLreactor shutdown time).which would allow' conversion of
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- a sample dose rate into an airborne concentration.
Predicted
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completion of this item was within three months.
This Unresolved Item is converted to an Open Item to track licensee' corrective action's. 'Pending completion of licensee actions, this item will remain.open.
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1.
(0p'en)'Open Item (No. 266/89013-01): More emphasis should be placed on the accurate documentation of Emergency Preparedness training.
The. licensee has formed a Emergency Preparedness training plan task force which has reviewed and updated training records, and.'is reviewing-wno needs. such training. ' A " punch list"' of items in need of' correction has resulted..from this. review.
Pending completion of licensee actions,,this item will remain open.
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(0 pen) Open' Item (No. 266/89013-02): -The^ licensee should assure
.t at the training. program is: easily auditable and that the records h
ofitraining provided are maintained in one area.in order to verify the requirements of'the training program are being met.
The
- licensee has formed a Emergency Preparedness training plan task i
force which has_ reviewed and~ updated-training records, and is reviewing'who~needs such training.
A " punch list" of items in need
- of correction has resulted from this review.
In addition,.various-
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tracking' systems are being evaluated by the training group.
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Pending completion of licensee actions, this item will remain open.
3.
Activations of the Licensee's' Emeroency Plan (IP 92700)
The following activation of the licensee's emergency plan.was reviewed during.the previous inspection.
Further review took place during this inspection.
On March 29,1989 at 0843 hours0.00976 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.207615e-4 months <br />,- Unit 2 experienced a main step-up transformer lockout main generator breaker trip and concurrent turbine
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and reactor trips.
This was caused by a loss of (grid). load.
The plant-is designed to accept, without a reactor trip, a full loss of load while below 50% power,.and a 50% los's of load while at 100% power.
A loss of more than 50% load while at 100% power will normally cause a reactor trip.
Documentation relating to this event was reviewed and analyzed to determine if actions met those required by the Emergency Plan.
All actions and notifications initiating and terminating this event were appropriately made and the event was properly classified as an Unusual L
Event per the Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme.
Category 6 of the EAL table (EPIP 1.2, Table 1.2-1, Page 9) " loss of electrical load"
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was utilized.
Guidance on EALs, contained in NUREG-0654, does not address loss of load incidents.
Reactor trip events which do not involve other system
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fail ses or perturbations (systems operate as designed) are not normilly.
regarded as Unusual Events,:although they may be reportable under the-requirements of 10 CFR 50.72.
Discussion with licensee. personnel indicated
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that consideration will.be given to' deletion of this _EAL during the next EAL review.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensea's program.was acceptable.
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4.-
Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program-(IP 82701)
a.
. Emergency Plan ar.d Implementing Procedures By letter dated May 9,.1989, NRC Region III staff approved Revision 30 (dated April 12, 1989) to the Point Beach Nuclear ~ Plant Emergency Planc A review of documentation associated with Revision 30 indicated'that the changes had received internal review, comment and approval by'
, appropriate management personnel.
Copies of the Emergency Plans and implementing procedures are considered as' " uncontrolled copies, as they are not aeditable
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by licensee personnel.
The onsite' staff distribute copies to State'and local government agencies, while the corporate staff distribute copies to.the NRC,~whether to Region III'or NRC Headquarters.
Copies of documents sent to the NRC are provided to-the plant staff.
Distribution of documents is essentially done
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to all parties;at the same time, and documents reviewed indicated that copies are promptly provided to the NRC.
Documentation irdicated that during May 1989, a copy of EPIP 1.2
" Event Classification" was provided to State and local authorities for review and comment.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
b.
Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), Equipment and Supplies By letter of December 14, 1988, the licensee proposed relocation of the backup Emergency Operations Facility to the Corporate Emergency Center in the Wisconsin Electric corporate headquarters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
This proposal is under review and additional information has been requested.
The Technical Support Center (TSC), Onerstions Support Center (OSC)
and the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) were toured by the inspector and verified to be in an adequate state of operational-readiness.
The TSC and EOF are presently dedicated facilities,
while the OSC is normally utilized for training.
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-A number of. improvements were noted during facility tours.
Additional space is available in the TSC/OSC area due to removal of vending machines near the turbine doorway area.
Hardwired radio desksets are now' positioned in the TSC/OSC facility, with units in
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the Health Physics areat chemistry area, TSC proper, and OSC proper.
A passive radio antenna. hts also been installed to facilitate use of
- hand-held radios in the TSC/OSC area.
A new offsite dose projection program,.MADCR has been reviewed, approved, proceduralized, and'is~in use-in the TSC dose projection
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area.
NRC Emergency Notification System (" red phones") were tested in each area, including the office spaces assigned to.the NRC, and were functional In the E0F, an autodialer has been connected to the telefax machine, and wire covers have been installed throughout the facility, reducing wire clutter and eliminating a trip hazard.
During the Control Room tour it was verified that the most recent-revisions of the Emergency Plan, Emergency. Plan Implementing Procedures'and Emergency Plan related forms were available.
A' review of inventory checks' performed in accordance with Emergency Plan Maintenance Procedures (EPMPs) 1.1 and 1.2 was performed.
This review indicated that a comprehensive and detailed maintenance, calibration and inventorye program was 'in place for equipment-
-associated with the Emergency Plan, including Health Physics equipment. ' Monthly, quarterly, semiannual and annual checks are made of various pieces of equipment.
A large volume of documentation was reviewed.
Licensee personnel indicated that, as of July 1,.'1989, all of the various inventory checklists _were revised to twelve' monthly forms including affected equipment.
This will greatly simplify the system and avoid any possible duplication of effort.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's_.
program was acceptable.
c.
Organization and Management Control The licensee emergency organization and procedures were largely unchanged from the last routine inspection.
The onsite organization consists of an Emergency Planner who has the full tin'e assistance of a Quality Specialist and part-time assistance of one individual at the corporate office.
The Emergency Planner reports to the Regulatory Engineer, who reports to the General-Superintendent,.
Operations.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
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- Emergency Preparedness Training-
j Emergency (Preparednessitrhiningwas:the[ focus lof-aninspection
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conducted.during May 22-25,11989?(Reports No'.750-266/89013;
,( k 50-301/89012);
That inspections resulted min three open itemsiand; Q~
concerns'regarding the overall. effectiveness.of;the licensee's.
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< training program' in cthe. area off emergency preparedness.1 : As licensee
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- acti_on had beenlinitiated'in response to~the above inspection, but
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not completed l the overall training = program for emergency-
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' preparedness waslnot assessed'during this~ inspection.
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Annual hospital training was provided on May.1, 1989, by Wisconsin Public Service Corporation.(WPS) personnel.
Through a. cooperative agreement; WPS; shares = offsite: training responsibilities with -
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Wisconsin: Electric Power: Company.
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Annual training for.offsite' Ambulance / rescue; personnel was; provided e
by WPS personnel on May 11, 1989.
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- Offsite emergency; response training for State and county pub.lic-information officers was conducted on April 25, 1989, and
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coordinated:by WPS and hUTECH Engineers.
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, Emergency Preparedness training for offsite agencies was conducted on September 1. 7, and.86 1988, with a-total of 154: individuals
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In addition;' cross training was held with State of.
> Wisconsin' personnel;on. August 22, 1988, and with'the' Division of
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' Emergency Government and the Department of. Health and Safety on-
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Septembcr 1, 1988.
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Based upon the above' findings, this portion of the licensee's
- program was acceptable.
A'dits'
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The licensee normally. performs two audits of emergency preparedness annually, one, addressing the'overall function of.the program,'and
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one addressing emergency preparedness training.
This year, one audit was performed, addressing both, areas, but'with a primary focus in the area of emergency preparedness traiaing.
The audit was
conducted during April 15-21, 1989.
t Audit-No. A-P-89-05 "PBNP Emergency Preparedness Program" was reviewed.
Thel audit was performed by two QA engineers from the (corporate) Nuclear Quality Assurance Department.
The audit
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resulted in six Audit Finding Reports (AFR).
One AFR' dealt with a-documentation'n deficiency related to letters of agreement, and the
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- others were related to emergency preparedness training.
One AFR'
regarding controller / observer attendance at briefings was closed:
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as not requiring corrective action.
The audit concluded that the emergency preparedness program remains "well developed, adequately
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documented and sufficiently implemented to assure emergency preparedness except for the deficiencies noted."
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- AFR1 documentation.wasireviewed and found to be accurate and
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f Lcomp~lete ' Items;had'been placed on,a: tracking system as AFRs~
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"A-P 05-012 through.A-P-05-16.
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Respon'es to AFRs'were'provided via s
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memdofLJune 15,71989.
Corrective actions were~ ongoing for several g,
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'of)the outstanding AFRs.related-to training.
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' As required: by '10 CFR 50.'54(t)Ja portioniof.. the. a'udit reviewed the
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adequacy.of the interface with offsite authorities. '10 CFR B0.54(t)
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also requires'that;the-portions of>the; annual audit dealing with the
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, adequacy of.offsite interfaces be'made available to. State and local
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n gov'ernment personnel.. Documentation was available to indicate that-
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- personnel'in.the State 'of Wisconsin, Kewaunee and Manitowoc: counties
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i had been advised of the performance of the audit'andithe availability:
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of a ~ copy. of ~ the Taudit and-recommendations for corrective: action via '
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. letters dated May 1989; Based upon;.th'e above findings,ithis portion of. the licensee's t
program wa vacceptable.'
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5.
TMI Safety Issues Management System'(SIMS): Items
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OnL0ctober 31,'1980',i the NRC issued NUREG-0737, 'which ~ incorporated into-
one documentiall TMI-related items. approved'for implementation by the
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. Commission at that time.e On December 17,:1982,;the NRC issued
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Supplement,;1eto NUREG-0737 to provide additional clarification regarding.
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N l Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2) - Application' to: Emergency. Response Facilities, andl Meteorological Data, as well as other areas. 'The status
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- e of the completion of these TMI SIMS items are internally tracked by the'
NRC.
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.The October 6,1988. Inspection Report"(No. 266/88021,301/88019) provided a. status 11isting of the1SIMS items related to emergency preparedness;
- The'following listing provides an updated status'of those SIMS items
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Lthat remain open.
All'other emergency preparedness related SIMS items-are closed (complete);or no longer applicable;
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MPA-F-63 Current Status:
Open
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This item involves.a review of the TSC during a future
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inspection.
~MPA-F-65
- Current, Status:
Open
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L This item involves a" review of the EOF during a-future
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inspection.
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' 6 '.
Exit Interview (IP 30703)
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' Th'e inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1
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on July '14,1989.
The" inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection report.
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. Routine maintenance of the emergency preparedness program appears well implemented, with.the exception of those training related. items carried
.from previous. inspections as open items.
The licensee indicated that'
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,none of:the.information disclosed during the inspection was considered
. proprietary in nature.
The inspector discussed the status of Unresolved' Item No. 266/89008-06
.in a.subsegeent telephone conversation with the Emergenca-Planning Coordinator.on August 3, 1989.
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