IR 05000266/1989006

Insp Repts 50-266/89-06 & 50-301/89-06 on 890130-0331.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety Verification,Radiological Controls,Maint,Security & Engineering & Technical Support

ML20245A450
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	04/13/1989
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245A443	List: IR 05000266/1989006 ML20245A440
References
50-266-89-06, 50-266-89-6, 50-301-89-06, 50-301-89-6, GL-88-17, NUDOCS 8904250204
Download: ML20245A450 (16)

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- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

i Report No. 50-266/89006(DRP); 50-301/89006(DRP)

Docket No. 50-266; 50-301 License No. DPR-24; DRP-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231_ West Michigan .l Milwaukee, WI 53201 l l

Facility Name: Point Beach Unit I and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks, Wisconsin

Inspection Conducted: January 30 through March 31, 1989 )

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Inspectors: C. L. Vanderniet R. J. Leemon Y, ,,

\*r f Approved By: RobertW.DeFayette, Chi [ il

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l ReactorProjectsSection3A Date Inspection Summary Ins 3ection from January 30 through March 31,1989, (Reports No. 50-26ii/8900 (DR)); No. 50-301/89006(DRP)

' Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of previous inspection findings; operational safety' verification; radiological controls; maintenance and surveillance; emergency preparedness; sectrity; engineering and technical support; safety assessment / quality verification; and f temporary instruction followu Results: During this inspection period unit 1 continued coastdown towards refueling and unit 2 continued at full power, except for a reactor trip and a turbine runback (paragraph 2f.). An Emergency preparedness drill.and an exercise were conducted with Region III players and observers (paragraph 6).

Licensee conducted testing and repair of emergency notification sirens (paragraph 6). Three unresolved items were identified regarding: "A" and "B".

stat' ion batteries (paragraph 8.a); both trains of containment spray for unit I being inoperable (paragraph 5.b); and emergency diesel generator turbocharger bolts sheared (paragraph 5.a). 0ne open item was identified regarding the control of the list of personnel qualified to hang. red tags (paragraph 3.a). ;

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

• J. J. Zach, Plant Manager T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent - Maintenance

• G. J. Maxfield, General Superintendent'.- Operations J._C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent.- Operations W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenanc N. L. Hoefert, Superintendent - Instrument &' Controls l

R. J. Bruno, Superintendent - Training T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent - Chemistry

~ D. F. Johnson, Superintendent - Health Physics R. C. Zyduck, Superintendent - Technical Services

• A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist

• J. E. ' Knorr, Regulatory Engineer

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The inspector also contacted'other licensee employees including members'of the technical and engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operator * Denotes the licensee representatives attending the management exit interviews.

! Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

' (Closed) Unresolved Item (266/85013-01 and 301/85013-01): Lack of Procedures for Timely Deportability Review and Evaluation of E0 Deficienc This item concerned the lack of licensee evaluation and deportability of the auxiliary feedwater flow transmitters. This' concern was incorporated into Violation 266/85013-02 and 301/85013-02 and the above Unresolved Item was closed in a follow-up letter to Inspection Report 266/85013 and 301/85013.

l l (Closed) Open Item (301/82020-01): Inservice Testing Program Requires l Review Af ter NRR Approva (Closed) Unresolved Item (266/85001-02 and 301/85001-02): ESW Pump Testin (Closed) Open Item (266/85001-04 and 301/85001-04): " Unlimited"

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Maximum Valve Stroke Times, (Closed) Unresolved Item (266/86015-01): Technical Specification Exceeded - Temperature Valu (Closed) Open Item (266/87007-01 and 301/87007-01): Lack of Permanent Safe Shutdown Communication Syste = ______-_______ _ _ _ _

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' (Closed) Open Item (266/87007-03 and 301/87007-03): 4160 Switchgear Room P.nig (Closed) Open Item (266/87007-04 and 301/87007-04): Licensee Requested to Provide Technical Evaluatio (Closed) Open Item (266/87007-05 and 301/87007-05): Licensee Requested to Reevaluate the Current QA Progra (Closed) Open Item (266/87007-06 and 301/87007-06): Licensee Requested to Develop Technical Evaluatio Items "b" through "j" were closed during this inspection period based on a directive by the Division Director, Division of Reactor Safety,

, Region III. The decision to close these items is based on the length of time the item has been in existence and the recognition of limited safety significanc . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707) (71710) (64704) Control Room Observation The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of current plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors noted that a high degree of professionalism attended all facets of control room operation and that the control boards were generally in a " black board" condition (no non-testing annunciators in alarm condition). Several shift turnovers were also observed and in all cases the turnovers appeared to be handled in a thorough manne The inspector performed walkdowns of the control boards to verify the operability of selected emergency Lystems, reviewed tagout )

records, t.nd verified proper return to service of affected component During this inspection period the procedures and controls used in the issuance and hanging of red (danger) tags at the facility were reviewe The use of these tags is controlled through the use of Operations ,

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Administrative Procedure 4.13, Equipment Isolation Procedure, l Revision 13. The above procedure requires that all personnel who install, verify, or remove red tags be listed on the " Qualified Red j Taggers" list. This list is maintained as an Operations Group

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Standing Order 4.12.2, Qualified Red Taggers, Revision 11 dated April 27, 1988. A copy of this list is att9'hed to the front of the

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active red tag log and is referred to when issuing a red. tag. The copy however, is different from the list in the Standing Order in that pen and ink changes are made to it. These changes constitute-changes to the Standing Order list since its last issue and therefore, should also be included in the Standing Order. This discrepancy'has been discussed with the licensee and the licensee stated that corrections to the the Standing Order will be made. Correction of this discrepancy will be followed by the resident inspectors and will be tracked as an Open Item (266/89006-01 and 301/89006-01).

b. Facility Tours Tours of the Auxiliary, Turbine, and Service Water Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, fluid leaks ~and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc During the facility tours inspectors noticed very few signs of leakage and that all equipment appears to be in good operating c.onditio Overall the plant cleanliness is good with the exception of the lower level of the turbine building and the service water building {

where more attention is needed, c. Safety System Walkdowns During this inspection period, the inspector walked down the J accessible portions of the Auxiliary feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling,-Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit During a walkdown of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) G01 in  ;

response to Information Notice 8907 the inspector noticed that a stainless steel gage line and a copper. fuel return line were in contact with each other. Due to the contact and the vibrations that are caused by operation of the EDG the gage line had worr. a notch into the fuel lin This condition was also noticed on EDG G02 but to a very minor degree. The inspector informed the licensee and wall thickness measurements were taken and a wear stress calculation  ;

was performed. The results of the measurements and the calculations indicated that sufficient tubing wall thickness remained to allow j for safe operation. The licensee separated the tubing from the gage

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lines on both EDGs and has written a Maintenance Work Request (MWR)  ;

to replace the line on EDG G0 The inspectors will continue to  !

follow the replacement of the worn lin ;

During a walkdown of the Auxiliary Feedwater System the inspector noted that the mini-flow recirculation line was in contact with a

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floor drain line and that some minor wear was evident. Thi l discrepancy and other minor discrepancies were discussed with the !

licensee and a Maintenance Work Request was issued-for.the mini-flow !

line, j d. Fire Protection / Prevention Program

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During routine tours of the facility the inspectors observed the j status of fire protection equipment and attempted to. identify any potential fire hazards. They also observed the response of.the licensee's fire brigade to an actual fire on March 28, 1989 when a R fire was reported in the health physics: station as a result. of smoldering clothing in an electric dryer. The material was '

extinguished and the area was ventilated to remove smoke. The fire brigade responded properly and in a timely manner and no further problems were identifie e. Unit 1 Operational Status Unit I has commenced a coastdown from full power operation in preparation for a refueling outage' scheduled to commence on April 1, 198 A load reduction to 75% of full power was initiated on March 14, 1989 due to grid disturbances and a negative sequencing alarm on the unit I generator. The unit stabilized and was returned to 90% of full power on March 18, 1989, and coastdown operations were continue f. Unit 2 Operational Status Unit 2 operated at full power until March 29, 1989, when a reactor trip occurre * On March 29, 1989 Unit 2 experienced a generator trip / turbine trip / reactor trip, due to a failure of 2-X01 (Unit 2 main transformer) C phase. The resultant loss of. load and generator lockout caused the licensee to declare an Unusual Event at approximately 0855. Coupled with the loss'of load was a- 3 momentary decrease in the switchyard 345 KV voltage, which )

caused both emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to start and i loa * The failure of the C phase of the transformer was apparently ,

caused by the initiation of the C phase' main transformer deluge

. fire protection system. At the time of the initiation ;

maintenance personnel had been troubleshooting problems with :

the fire protection system for the Unit 2 2-X02 transformer under Special Maintenance Procedure (SMP) 90 It appears they may i have accidentally initiated the deluge systems for 2-X0 The '

operation of the deluge system' appears to have prompted arching l

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in the bushings and arrester of the transformer resulting in the failure'of both. The failure resulted^in holes being burned l

through the the upper and lower bushings and in the arreste The Unusual Event was terminated at approximately 1205 after-the switchyard lineup was returned to normal and both EDGs were placed back in automatic. .The unit will be shut down until repair parts'can be obtained and installed. The. resident inspectors will continue to monitor the situation until the licensee has identified.the root cause and identifies appropriate corrective actions. 'This item will be tracked l

as Open Item 301/89006-0 * On February'3, 1989, the licensee transferred Channel 2 (white)

120V AC Instrument Buses 2Y103 and 2YO3 from the alternate inverter (DY0C) power supply to normal inverter (20Y03) power supply. The supply breakers for bus 2Y103 are located in the computer room above the control. room. The alternate and normal power supply breakers are mechanically interlocked and, therefore, the alternate breaker was opened simultaneously with the closing of the normal breaker. This manual transfer of bus 2Y103 was completed without inciden Instrument bus 2Y03 power supply breakers are located in a panel behind the main control board in the-control room.' After the successful transfer of bus 2Y103 the power supplies to bus 2Y03 were to be transferred. These breakers are also mechanically interlocked and therefore the transfer of power on this bus is alsc done simultaneously. However, when the operator opened the alternate supply and closed the normal supply the normal supply breaker did not latch and returned to the open position after the operator released the breaker This resulted in the loss of power to bus 2Y03 and resulted in a runback of 2% reactor power (100% to 98%). The operator noticed that the normal supply breaker had not closed and immediately reclosed the breake The mechanical interlocks only insure that both alternate and normal power supplies are not closed at the same time. The interlock does not inhibit both breakers from being open'at the same tim It appears that the operator performing the transfer did not

. push the normal power supply breaker firinly enough in the closed direction, thereby failing to engage the breaker latching mechanism. The resident inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's possible corrective action !

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility i

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operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure I

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . Radiological Controls (71709)

l During normal plant tours the inspectors routinely observed the licensee's radiological controls and practices and the inspection of work activitie Inspection in this area includes direct observation of the use of radiation work permits (RWPs); work practices inside contaminated barriers; maintenance of radiological barriers and signs; and health physics (HP)

l activities regarding monitoring, sampling, and surveying. The inspector-

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also observed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste processin l From a radiological standpoint the plant is in good condition which  ;

allows access to most portions of the facility. During tours of the

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facility the inspectors noted that_ barriers and signs were in good condition. When minor discrepancies were identified, the HP staff-cuickly s responded to correct any problem At 11:45 on March 22, 1989, the auxiliary building ventilation system at Point Beach was turned off for a ventilation filter tes At about noon, people leaving the auxiliary building began showing low levels of-contamina6 ion on the high sensitivity contamination monitor. The activity was identified as Rubidium-88, an 18-minute daughter of noble gas Krypton-88. Of the fifteen individuals contaminated, ten had contamination only on their plastic security cards. No one showed greater than 100 CPM above background on a frisker and none showed detectable activity after ten minutes. Nasal swipes and a whole body count of a representative individual.showed no internal contaminatio The monitor on the auxiliary building vent showed a small increase but remained below one percent of the monitor alarm setpoint. The personnel contaminations apparently resulted from a buildup of noble gases in the-auxiliary building when the ventilation exhaust system was secured. The noble gases originate from multiple small- release points-in systems -

handling radioactive liquids and gases in the auxiliary building. 'The radiological safety significance of this incident was minimal. After i restoration of ventilation flow no further problems were encountere No violations or deviations were identified'in this area during this

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inspection perio . Maintenance / Surveillance Observation (62703) (61726)

. Maintenance Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain

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f that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to sarety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

• Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) G01 Annual Inspection EDG G01 was removed from service on March 6, 1989, for the performance of an annual maintenance inspection. Because both units were in full power operation this required the voluntary entering of a 7-day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for the diesels. During the maintenance period the testing of the other EDG was accomplished without incident and EDG G01 was returned to service prior to the expiration of the LC The inspectors observed vat ious portions of the maintenance and the post-maintenance testing and noted that all activities were conducted in a professional and timely manner. However, during a tour of the diesel generator room and a review of the maintenance activities, the inspector discovered a broken bolt on the flange connecting the EDG turbocharger to the engin This was not part of the scheduled maintenance activities and not routinely inspected by the licensee. The bolts are installed, three on each side of the turbocharger, to prevent the turbocharger from twisting and causing a misalignment which could lead to rubbing of the turbocharger internals. The broken

. bolt was brought to the attention of the licensee which then found that a second bolt on the same side of the turbo charger was cracked; the licensee replaced all six bolt The inspector also inspected the bolts on EDG G02, which were i found intact, and noticed that the three bolts on one side of I the EDG used a stack of several flat washers instead of the

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. single hardened dished washer used on the EDG G01. When questioned as'to the difference the licensee stated that these bolts had broken on EDG G02 sometime in the early 1970's but they could not determine why.the different washer arrangement was use The licensee also stated that the bolts were not QA-parts and that most of the replacement parts on the EDG were not QA part The inspector has requested that the licensee determine why the washer arrangement is different; what parts on the EDGs are supposed.to be QA parts; and why inspection of these bolts is not part of EDG maintenance. The responses to these inquires will require further evaluation by the licensee and the inspector and therefore this item will remain as an Unresolved Item (266/89006-02 and 301/89006-02).

• Repair to Heater Drain Pump The work is being completed in a professional manner and no problems have been identifie * "B" Service Water Pump Replacement The work on the repair and replacement of this pump'has been completed in a professional manner and the pump has been returned to service with no problems identifie b. Surveillance The inspector observed surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that limiting conditions -l for operation were met; that removal and restoration of the affected J components were accomplished; that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing th test; and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne ,

The inspector witnessed and reviewed the following test activities:

• ICP 2.1 (Revision 40) Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog (Long Form) Unit 1

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• ICP 2.7 (Revision 17) Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range

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Channels N41, N42, N43, N44 Unit ;

• IT 03 (Revision 17) Inservice Testing of Low Head Safety' ;

Injection Pumps and Valves (Monthly) '

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• IT 04-(Revision 18) Inservice Testing of Low Head Safety Injection' Pumps and Valves (Monthly)

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• IT 540A (Revision 2)- Leakage Reduction & Preventive l Maintenance Program Test of Containment Spray System (Annual)

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• ~TS 2 (Revision 25) _ Emergency. Diesel Generator G02 Biweekl No discrepancies were-identified during the' observance of any of the above test * IT 05 (Revision 16) Inservice Testing of Containment Spray Pumps, Eductor., Supply Check Valves & Sodium Hydroxide Addition Valves (Monthly) Unit This test was performed on March 22, 1989, concurrent with emergency diesel generator (EDG) G02 being out of service for testing. EDG G02 is the "B" train emergency power source and as such its operability affects the operability of the emergency'

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equipment that it supplies power to. When it is out of service, all emergency equipment supplied by_it also is technically.out

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of service and no testing should be done on.any emergency-equipment on the "A" train (for the case'.in point, the

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B train CS pump was technically out of service).

In preparation for the test Unit I personnel had closed the-discharge valve of the "A" train containment spray (CS) pump (P14A). It remained that way for about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 40 minutes:

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until the Unit 1 operator announced in the control room that he was about'to start the "A" CS pump. At that point the Unit 2 operator, who was not involved in the test, immediately- -!

questioned the action because of EDG G02 being out of servic Upon recognizing the error, the licensee restored the "A" train CS pump to service until.such time that the EDG was operational. Since the technical specifications allow both trains to be out of service for up to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, the licensee did not violate technical specification '

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Although no violation of technical specifications occurred the

. licensee acknowledges that this is not an acceptable method of operation. At present two items have been identified as contributing causes to the occurrence of the above even First, the Duty Shift Supervisor (DSS) allowed IT-05 to ,

commence while the "B" train EDG was out of servic It is l a responsibility of operations personnel in the control room, ;

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occurring by al_ ways remaining aware of current plant condition Secondly, the procedure appears to be inadequate in that no precaution or' caution exists in the procedure to have operations personnel check that the opposite train of equipment is operabl {

The use of a precaution could have: averted the problem by_

reminding the DSS to ensure opposite train equipment was operabl The licensee is evaluating this event and is i attempting to establish possible-corrective actions including {

the addition of precautions or cautions to train related testing. This item will remain unresolved until final corrective action is established and initiated and will be tracked as Unresolved Item 266/89006-03 and 301/89006-0 !

No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . Emergency Preparedness (82301)

An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to assess the licensee's implementation'of the emergency plan and I implementing procedures. The procedure included monthly review of emergency facilities and equipment, discussions with licensee staff, and a review of selected procedure l On February 22, 1989, an emergency preparedness drill was conducted and j on March 15, 1989, an emergency preparedness exercise was conducte During both of these events Region III personnel participated as players in the Region and at the site. During the' March 15, 1989 exercise the performance of-the licensee was observed and evaluated by personne from the Region III Emergency Preparedness Section, and NRC performance was observed and evaluated by personnel from NRC Headquarters. A written evaluation of the licensee's performance is contained in Inspection j Reports No. 266/89008 and 301/8900 On March 1, 1989, a test of the licensee's emergency planning zone sirens was conducted and several sirens were determined to be inoperable. The area encompassed by the inoperable sirens covered approximately 19.2% of the energency zone population. The licensee took appropriate' compensatory measures and notified the siren contractor and work was initiated to correct the inoperable sirens. The system was retested on March 7, 1989 and all but two sirens performed as expected. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the two failed sirens and will return them to service when repairs are completed. Due to the aggressive approach in correction of

. this problem no further evaluation of this event appears to be necessar No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio f _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ -

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• Security (71881]

The inspectors, by direct observation and interview verified that portions of the physical security plan were being implemented in BCCordance With the station. security pla During this inspection period two potentially degraded vital areas were l identified by the licensee. These problems were discussed with the j licensee and Region III security personnel and were turned over to the regional security personnel for further evaluatio I Also during this inspection period new metal detectors were installed in the south gatehouse; these should have improved reliability over the older models that were replace No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . Engineering and Technical Support (37701)

The inspector evaluated licensee engineering and technical support activities to determine their involvement and support of facility operation This was accomplished during the course of routine evaluation of facility events, through direct observation of activities, and by discussions with engineering personne Evaluation of "A" and "B" Station Batteries During this inspection period the inspectors identified three concerns with the licensee's "A" and "B" station batteries:

(1). Upon entry into the "A" battery room the inspectors noted that the fill caps had been removed from several battery cells and no work appeared to be in progress. With the battery cell fill caps open the flame arresters on the battery cells may be bypassed possibly allowing damage to the cell in the event of a fire. The inspector informed the licensee of the condition of the fill caps and requested an explanation for having them removed. The licensee immediately replaced the fill caps and is evaluating the reason for the caps being remove (2). The inspector also noted that there was an accumulation of l white material floating on the surface of the electrolyte in some of the battery cells. In some cases the material obscures ;

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the level indications such that the craft people must estimate levels when taking electrolyte level readings. The material is present in some of the newer cells in D05 and D06 as well as all of the cells in D105 and D106. The inspectors are concerned that the material could affect battery operation,

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but the licensee stated that routine tests show no effect on i battery performance, and that the last full service test also  !

showed no effect on performanc The licensee called the vendor's representative to the site for a visual inspection and to take pictures to send to the vendor -

for analysis. The vendor's representative told the licensee j that the white material was fiberglass type material which  !

comes from the separators in the cells between plates. The representative explained that a dull band saw blade must have been used in cutting out the separators and the resulting rough edge material was not removed prior to cell assembly. After  !

electrolyte addition, vibration and buoyancy forces act to dislodge the rough material and it floats to the surfac The representative stated that the vendor had seen the white floating material in other instances. The vendor assured the licensee that the material is inert and does not affect the electrolyte specific gravity, but the only documentation of this is a recent letter (February 4,1988) to the licensee from the vendor's representative which makes a statement that the vendor's engineers maintain that the material will in no way affect the capacity or the battery's lif The licensee noted that it already had planned to replace DOS and 006 this year with batteries from another manufacture (3). The inspector identified another concern regarding an apparent modification of the battery rack The licensee has been asked for the documentation regarding seismic evaluation and changes to the rack but has not yet provided i The issues on the "A" and "B" station batteries will be tracked as Unresolved Item 266/89006-04 and 301/89006-04 pending completion of further evaluation, b. Operator Requalification Examination During the week of February 27, 1989, the NRC administered requalification examinations to twelve licensed operator As a result of the examination five individuals failed the written portion of the examination. The licensee also evaluated the tested individuals and determined that one other individual had faile The licensee immediately removed all six operators from licensed ,

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duties and assigned them to accelerated remedial trainin {

The licensee met with Region III personnel on March 23, 1989, to discuss the action they had taken. As a result of this discussion the NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)89-009 which renumerates the actions that are being taken by the licensee and

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identified a completion date commitment of June 1, 1989. No further evaluation of this item by the resident inspectors appears to be necessar No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (35701) (35502)

An inspection of the licensee's quality programs was performed to assess the implementation and effectiveness of programs associated with management control, verification, and oversite activities. The inspectors consider areas indicative of overall management involvement in quality matters, self improvement programs, response to regulatory and industry initiatives, the frequency of management plant tours and control room h observations, and management personnel's attendance at technical and planninghcheduling meeting During this inspection period the inspectors communicated several NRC concerns to the licensee. Facility management appeared to be receptive to the concerns raised and committed to resolve those items with the inspectors. However, resolution has been slow and in some cases the requested information had not been provided by the close of the inspection period, even though it had been requested over 3 weeks prior to that tim The inspectors will continue to evaluate the progress of the licensee in response to the aforementioned item No violations or deviations were identified in this area during this inspection perio . Temporary Instructions (TI) (255100) (255101) (Closed) TI 2515/100 Proper Receipt, Storage, and Handling of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Oil The licensee was given the questionnaire and responded in writing to the inspectors. The licensee used approximately 24 manhours in researching the questions and preparing the response. A copy of the response will be sent to NRR for inclusion in its surve (Closed) TI 2515/101 Loss of Decay Heat Removal (Generic Letter No. 88-17).

The inspector verified that the licensee has met the requirements of

, this Temporary Instruction:

(1). The necessary lesson plans dealing with this TI have been generated, and they have been taught to the required personne (2). A new containment closure checklist (CL-IE) has been generated i to ensure that containment closure can be achieved before :

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(3). Two independent int <e thermocouple will remain operational when the head is located on top of the. reactor vessel during -

reduced inventory operation. Parameter values will be set to provide a computer alarm in the control roo (4). Level Instrumentation:

(a) Currently one reduced inventory level transmitter is installed on each unit, LT-447. This level transmitter provides level indication in the control room when at a reduced -inventory condition. The electrical current loop-for LT-447 also includes a bistable which provides a high level alarm in the control room. This indication can also-be displayed on the plant process computer and on a digital. display in the control room. A modification request has been initiated to replace the existin bistable with a dual setpoint bistable that will supply the existing annunciator window with both.high level and low level signal (b) A second channel of level indication will be installed in each unit using another 0/P transmitter similar to LT-44 This channel will also have input to the plant process .

computer system (PPCS) and will provide low level alarm indication in the control roo (c) A modification request has been initiated to install a permanent sight glass to replace the tygon level tube, The licensee has prepared procedures and established-administrative controls to avoid perturbations while

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in a reduced inventcr The licensee has two additional means of adding water to the RCS if DHR is lost.

l Plant Procedure SMP-907 addresses the installation and removal l of the steam generator nozzle dams. This procedure required that the cold leg nozzle dams be installed prior to the hot leg nozzle dams, and not removed until after the hot leg nozzle dams are removed.

I The licensee does not have stop valves in the primary system.

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I 1 Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action

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on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3 . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs If, 4a, 4b, and 8 . Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on April 5, 1989. The inspectors discussed the purpose of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any documents / processes as proprietary.

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