IR 05000266/1987018
| ML20235X194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1987 |
| From: | Foster J, Patterson J, Hironori Peterson, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235X187 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-87-18, 50-301-87-18, NUDOCS 8710190248 | |
| Download: ML20235X194 (21) | |
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f U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-266/87018(DRSS); 50-301/87018(DRSS)
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Dockets No. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee:
Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name:
Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, WI Inspection Conducted: September 14-17, 1987
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Inspectors-
. Foster
/4//F/ f 7 Team Leader-Dat(
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/Of/V/h0 DaYe 7
. Peterson
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Approved By:
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e Emergency Preparedness Datd
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Section Inspection Summary Inspection on September 14 - 17, 1987, Reports No. 50-266/87018(DRSS); No. 50-301/87018(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection involved five NRC inspectors and one consultant.
Results:
Althcogh no items of noncomp'liance, deficiencies or deviations were identified, three exercise weaknesses which require corrective actions are identified in this report and in the Appendix to the report's transmittal letter.
i 8710190240 871014 PDR ADOCK 05000266 l
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. DETAILS.
1.
Persons Contacted a.
NRC Observers and' Areas Observed
- J.- Foster, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations
s Support Center-(OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
- i H. Peterson, Inplant Teams,; Medical Drill.
F. Carlson, OSC-
~Mi Smith, Technical Support Center (TSC)
J. Patterson, Field Monitoring Teams
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E. Williams, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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Wisconsin Electric Power-Company'
- J. Zach,. Plant Manager l
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- R. Bruno, Superintendent Training
- P. Dent, Supervisor, Staff Service
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- J. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer.
- D. Stevens, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- C. Krause, Licensing.
- D. Schoon, Licensing Engineer
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- J. Reisenbeucher, Duty and Call Superintendent
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- F. Flentje, Administration Specialist, EQRS I
- R. Chonacki, Quality Specialist, EQRS
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T. Koehler, General Superintendent
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M. Baumann, Radcon/ Waste Manager
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M. Crouch, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance & Construction.
D. Johnson, OSC Controller R. Gerrol, Assistant to Maintenance Superintendent
M. Reiff, OSC Radio Operator
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L. Kamazek, Operations Support Coordinator
C.' Andrews, Security Supervisor
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E. Lipke, Emergency Support Manager j
E. Mercer, EOF Communicator
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K. Johanson, Assistant Radcon/ Waste Manager J
E. Epstein, Offsite HP Director l
H. Hoelscher, Duty TechMcal Advisor
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Also Contacted R. Hague, NRC Senior Resident Inspector R. Leemon, NRC Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending exit interview.
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2.
Licensee Action on 'Previously Identified Item
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- (Closed) Open. Item (266/85018-02; 301/85017-02) Operations Support Center (OSC) Procedures.and logging responsibilities were unclear or deficient during the previous exercise.
Pre exercise discussion with licensee
' personnel indicated that a procedure specific to OSC activation and
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Operation (EPIP 6.6, " Operations Support Center Activation & Operation")
-had been developed, and tested during a previous drill.
Relevant personnel had been trained to the procedure, and would use the procedure during the present exercise.
Licensee personnel indicated that they wished to see the' procedure utilized in an evaluated exercise prior to.
procedure finalization, and this was considered acceptable.
The OSC function, as. observed during this exercise, was much improved over last year's performance.
While some minor changes to the procedure were indicated by the exercise ' observations, the licensee indicated that the approved procedure was issued on September 16, 1987.
While additional procedure refinements or modifications may be necessary upon the licensee's final exercise analysis, the present procedure is workable.
This item is closed.
3.
General An exercise'of the Point Beach Power Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Point Beach station on September 15, 1987.
The exercise tested the licensee's emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to'a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluent.
This was a utility only exercise.
State and local counties participated to a very limited extent to allow notification simulation.
Attachment 1 describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
4.
General Observations a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Point Beach Power Station Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety, c.
Observers
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The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with six NRC observers.
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d.L Exercise-Critiques-
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A critique was' held with)the. licensee and.NRC representatives o'n l
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l September 17, 19 % two' days after the exercise.
The NRC discussed
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.the: observed strengthf and weaknesses during the exit interview.
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Specific'0 observations e
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Control Room-a
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The Shift Superintendent wat ot;viously in charge in the Control Room.
He maintained'an orderly.and low noise environment.
Persennelwerekno'wledheableoftheirproceduresandusedthem
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extensively.. Control Room personnel were aware of which procedure-
to utd,'ar.3 how to properly apply the procedure.
Classifications g
were broperfy and promptly made.
Notifications were correctly-performed on a timely. basis.
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Con {rol Room personnel aggressively investigated any anomalous-
instrument' readings presented to them by the exercise scenario,
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'and t'eacted well:to'informatic^ presented to them.
As:the exercise'
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progressed, operators correctly surmised that there was no break or
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leak in the Reactor Coolant System.
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.There was an excellent and innovative use of ' IBM Personal Computer -
programs to simulate a Safety Parameter Display System output, and
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clever use of chart information to simulate actual Control'. Room L
readouts.
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Based.on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program)
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is ac'ceptable. /
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b.
Technical / Support Center (TSC)
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The TSC was staffed and activated within one hour of the Alert'
classification.
Procedures and related documents were immediately
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utilized and followed-throughout the exercise.
Plant status boardn and radiolo@ cry data trend charts were well rnaintained.
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Administratfdpsuppliesandsupportpersonnelwereadequateand responsi d ta the requirements of technical personnel.
All necessary technical references were available for use by personnel responsible for plant safety.
Procedures and their related forms were used i
. extensively throughout the exercise.
Good health physics practices were' observed'in the TSC.
Personnel were reminded several times
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(formally and informally) to check their dosimeter ~
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Frequent management staff meetings were held.
A ti e schedule was
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established'for the frequency and length of these meetings, ensuring j
that meetings were not excessively long, diverting managers from their primary responsibilities; A status update of the TSC staff was
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- M held ~following each management meeting.
As.a result of the t"'
briefings, the TSC staff was cognizant of significant activities g,W
'throughout'the' exercise.
All exercise participants maintained an
'jI excellent attitude, f
The initial Alert notification calls were not completed within the 15 minute time requirement.
Plant personnel were capable of n
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demonstrating the requirement and attempted to do'so.
However, Kewaunee County had turned off their telephone hand set, and,
' National Warning System (NAWAS) Warning Center 2 was' involved in a shift turnover and did not respond to the call.
Verification
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calls were slow being returned. The Security Officer managed to complete _the notification procedure within 30 minutes in spite of the above problems.
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' Although the Chemistry group was knowledgeable of their procedures f"
and utilized their, checklists, there was some confusion in their area
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at times. ~ Members of tne TSC staff would go directly to the computer technician to obtain needed information rather than through _ the Chemistry Director.
Several staff members went directly to the j
computer in order.to get their information and the technician would have to restart his tasks..This caused problems for the chemistry group.
The Director was not always in control of priorities for his group and group members periodically had more work than they could
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accomplish at one time.
The Chemistry Director should establish control of his staff, and provide all work assignments and priorities.
A formal announcement of EOF activation was not made in the TSC and this led to confusion over control of some functions and
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responsibilities.
Dose projections were being performed in both
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Emergency Response Facilities when the formal responsibility for response control and protective recommendations was transferred.
Due to the lack of a formal announcement, some TSC personnel were not aware that the formal responsibility had been transferred.
Also, responsibility for notification and status updates to offsite I
agencies had been transferred and TSC personnel were unaware of their responsibilities when this transfer occurred.
TSC procedures should require a formal announcement of transfer of command and control to the EOF to assure a smooth management transition.
Event classification was adequately demonstrated.
The TSC staff correctly demonstrated their knowledge of classification procedures and emergency action levels.
Assuming a Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
leak, based on increased vent monitor readings, they correctly escalated to a General Emergency classification.
However, the assumption of an RCS leak was incorrect (partially due to exercise scenario problems) and indicated that TSC personnel were not fully aware of plant conditions.
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Site' accountability was completed in less than thirty minutes, with all' personnel accounted for.
At the end of the. exercise, TSC personnel demonstrated a limited discussion of.aLrecovery program.
Based upon the above findings,'this portion of' the licensee's -
~ program..is acceptable.
However, the following item should be'
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considered for improvement:
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.When an Emergency Response. Facility (ERF) is activated,
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c.
. Operational Support Center (OSC)
Health Physics personnel who initially-arrived at the 0SC/TSC area-quickly established the Health Physics support room with equipment (anti-contamination clothing,. survey meters, etc.).
Habitability of the area was rapidly determi.ned by radiation surveys and area i
radiation monitoring equipment was confirmed to be operating.
Procedures and checklists were made available and used-for establishment of.the OSC.
The procedures appeared well written, providing improved guidance for the activation and operation of the.0SC as compared to.last year's exercise.
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Periodic briefings were held in the OSC, generally by a TSC l
representative.
These briefings kept OSC personnel apprised of significant facility events.
Poor coordination of the Health Physics (HP) control stations at the TSC/OSC area and at the Health Physics office (Checkpoint Charlie)
led to confusion in the staging, dispatch, return'and debriefing of teams.
This was compounded by a lack of coordination between the HP Director and the plant Operations Manager in issuing orders to the teams.
In one case, this resulted'in a delay in dispatching the fire fighting brigade for over 30 minutes.
The-lack of a definitive establishment and command and control of the OSC organization was, in part, the result of two teams having already been dispatched from the HP office area before the OSC was operational.
This was
considered as an Open Item (Item No. 266/87018-01; 301/87018-01).
l Teems dispatched by the OSC did not always report back to the OSC for debriefing, to allow for finalization of team radiation exposure
documentation.
This affected the adequacy of both the team status sheets (for personnel accountability) and the Radiation Work Permits (for personnel exposure control).
The incomplete status of this paperwork would complicate reconstruction of accident events, and compromise worker protection from overexposure.
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Team formation'was hampered by' a'la'ck of " qualified" persons in.
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several disciplines such as Health Physics and first aid,-even though there were many people available to'the OSC for assignment.
In addition, the plant announcing system cannot be clearly heard in the OSC.
.The Communicator assigned to the OSC/TSC had not been trained on use of the OSC radio, nor was'he aware that he was to be the radio Communicator for both the TSC and OSC.
The Communicator very quickly-learned to operate the radio system'and functioned well in his positioa.
"This is'a drill" was routinely used in radio communications.
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The. labeling'of plant maps used for recording radiological survey
data was incomplete, making it impossible to quickly tell if a reading was 100 mR/hr or 100 R/hr.
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Based on the ab>ve fincings, one Open Item was identified.
d.
'Inplant Teams and Medical Drill Temporary Shielding Team The shielding team was quick in responding and received an excellent briefing of the actions they were to accomplish.
The team took.along adequate radiation survey' equipment and adhered to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) practices.
The team did not' adequately perform surveys, but simply asked the controller for radiation levels.
The controller showed the scenario
. radiation survey map to the players.
Medical' Drill - Rescue Team
The team did not take along any equipment (first aid kit, trauma kit, stretcher) except a radio for communication.
Once the medical team arrived at the scene of the injury, no first aid actions or concerns were demonstrated, and the team members took no actions with the exception of taking vital signs (pulse and pupil reaction) for 30 to 35 minutes.
At approximately 0906 hours0.0105 days <br />0.252 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.44733e-4 months <br />, a Security Guard and a controller arrived, and at approximately 0913 the controller indicated that the injured man was simulated to be evacuated from the plant, transferred to an ambulance and the ambulance was on its way to the hospital.
The amount 'of simulation involved in the drill was considered as excessive, and further degraded the demonstration of a medical response to an injured individual.
This was considered as an Exercise Weakness (Item No. 266/87018-02; 301/87018-02).
Fire Brigade The Fire Brigade adequately discussed the mechanics of, and possible
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con' erns 'related' to fighting' a charcoal vessel fire such as presented '
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Primary and alternate methods of fighting and
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' mitigating the. fire were discussed.
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The fire Brigade leader was knowledgeable of the-plant and was aware of the consequences of such a fire,. i.e., the-charcoal bed's function, plant location, and the problems'related to thef release of radioactive materials into the environment from such a fire.
There was.a good demonstration of-donning firefighting clothing and equipment.(" turndown gear") and Self Contained Breathing Apparatus.
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The Fire Brigade's response to the fire was delayed, due to the
OSC not giving them permission to' proceed once they were ready.
OSC personnel were considering concerns over radiation-dosage to-
.the team, expressed by Radcon personnel, and temporarily halted the fire' brigade.. As fire brigade members were appropriately protected, trained, and equipped with survey meters, the-team
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should not have been. delayed, but advised of possible hazards, given a "turnback' level" of radiation, and allowed to proceed.
During the drill, the team members would ask what the radiation levels were' and the controller would provide multiple readings without surveys being taken.
The players did not document survey readings, and-it was observed that the controller displayed the scenario survt y maps.
Chem-Sampling Team j
This team was dispatched from the OSC, HP support area, and was fully dressed in anti-contamination clothing and equipped with self-contained' breathing apparatus.
There was a good demonstration of donning end use of anti-contamination gear, and the team adequately followed their procedures for replacing and transporting the sampling cartridge.
i The communication devices provided for aiding communication while wearing SCBA equipment, which use throat mikes, were not fully
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Team members had to yell at each other to be heard.
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Based on the above findings, one Exercise Weakness was identified.
In addition, the following item should be considered for improvement:
Additional training in the roles of Exercise players and
Controllers should be provided,
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was not prestaged for the exercise and was set up in an efficient and effective manner by a team from the plant which checked I
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out and installed equipment, put out supplies and forms, filled out i
status boards and arranged work stations.
Checklists were used i
extensively during the EOF setup.
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The Emergency Support Manager was very effective in the command and l
control of the E0F staff.
He held frequent briefings and coordinated his activities with the Site Manager and the TSC staff.
He tried to ensure that the offsite authorities were notified and given hourly updates on accident conditions.
The Emergency Support Manager and the Radcon/ Waste Manager did an excellent job of developing Protective Action Recommendations using dose projection information and site meteorology, effectively utilizing their procedures.
The use of offsite monitoring data to establish on-site conditions was extremely limited at the EOF, particularly for the first several hours of the exercise.
The Radcon/ Waste Manager seemed unaware of the exposure rates being measured at the North side of the site
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(30 mR/Hr gamma and 120 mR/hr beta).
Although the offsite HP Director briefed the Radcon/ Waste Manager on offsite monitoring data during the exercise, hard copy data was not usually provided and the space on the Emergency Support Center Status board for offsite monitoring data was never used.
The space for this data on the board is inadequate and a separate status board for offsite data should be
considered for use in the EOF, The EOF staff misunderstood plant status and the significance of the fire for more than an hour after it began, and they did not understand why the TSC escalated to a General Emergency condition.
This appeared to be caused by a lack of information on offsite radiation monitoring data in the plume, the failure to recognize the significant increase in the release rates being measured by the auxiliary building vent monitor and the lack of information from the TSC on the location of the fire and the problem with the filter dampers.
This lack of adequate information flow from the TSC to the E0F is considered as an Exercise Weakness (Item No. 266/87018-03;301/87018-03).
Except for the meteorological data and the status of the notification updates to offsite agencies, the Emergency Support Center Status Board was poorly maintained.
For example, an erroneous value for the 133Xe Equivalent Release Rate was listed on the board for more than two hours.
Several new dose projections were entered on the board, but the time of estimation was not changed when the new dose projection was entered.
Although the plume from the release was traveling over the lake and a General Emergency declaration (with a recommendation for sheltering the public within 5 miles of the plant) had been made, the Coast Guard was not notified of this situation until approximately 20 minutes after the recommendation to shelter had been made.
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- The Emergency' Organization Status Boardfwas not corrected.to show a j
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change'in the person acting.as Security Supervisor'for more.than four
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Theideployment of.offsite monitoring teams was ineffective.
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appeared to be caused by the Offsite-HP' Director not being kept
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.up-to-date on the. plume location and not locating the teams J
appropriately in the plume once the location was known.
Many of the above problems in the'E0F operations appeared to be the result of inadequate staffing which resulted in the Radcon/ Waste'
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Manager, the E0F Communicator, and'the Assistant Radcon/ Waste Manager
being significantly overburdened with functions and duties.
This is
. considered as~an Exercise Weakness (Item No.. 266/87018-04; 301/87018-04).
The status-boards in_the EOF.should be redesigned and updated to. reflect current. procedures.
Space or a separate display for i
offsite monitoring data, corrections in titles and staffing
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positions on the Emergency Organization Status Boards, separate
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dose projection.information for thyroid and whole-body dose and
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meteorological data for both met towers is needed.
The maps should be relocated for more effective use and data such as offsite
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monitoring data, plume location and areas where Protective Action
Recommendations have been made should be illustrated.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that a revision to the physical i
layout'of the EOF, incorporating human factors considerations, noise reducing carpet, and-improved status boards is in the review process.
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This.is an Open Item (Item No. 226/87018-05; 301/87018-05).
Based on the above findings one Exercise Weakness and one Open Item was identified.
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Field Monitoring Teams Equipment needed for the offsite monitoring vehicles was assembled, j
tested, and calibrated (where necessary) in a thorough and orderly manner.
This included gasoline generators, air sampling devices, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), dosimetry and portable survey monitoring equipment.
Meaningful briefings were held by the Offsite Health Physics Director (OHPD), the lead technician, and the person assigned to the shuttle vehicle utilized for transporting samples back to the OSC laboratory.
Both teams were pre positioned in the field about 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br />, and were told to stay there until their first assignment.
This was a good example of pre planning by the OFPD.
1-Team No. 1, adequately demonstrated the donning of protective clothing (PC's) and SCBAs with face masks prior to taking air samples.
Due to increasing radiation readings North of the plant, the team was instructed to take potassium iodide (simulated).
The team discussed removing anti-contamination clothing subsequent to sampling, but made
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a proper decision to leave the clothing on and not remain in the plume any longer than necessary.
The inspector witnessed the proper obtaining, handling, labeling and packaging of a silver zeolite air sample and an air particulate sample.
Team No. 1 took radiation level readings at various locations as requested, taking both open window and closed window readings.
Readings were reported to the radio dispatcher as Gamma / Beta readings, as the team had been instructed.
Team members followed g
their procedures well (Section 6.0 of EPIP 7.31) in taking smears
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for ground deposition at the North Parking lot.
Smear surveys were taken on a 55 gallon drum, a fence and the bumper of a car.
Neither of the teams were informed of changing plant conditions or even notified when the General Emergency was declared.
The OHPD should have instructed the offsite teams of changing plant conditions and emergency classifications, since they were a part of the i
emergency response effort and should be made aware of changing i
emergency conditions which could effect their personal safety.
l Plume tracking was being pursued by both teams but it was not
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clear that the most effective use was being made of the teams.
The observed team made at least two trips North beyond the k
Kewaunee plant (6-7 miles), then West and out to the 9-10 mile limits traversing the edge of the EPZ.
More surveying of the 2-5 mile limits around the plant just beyond the North Parking Lot could have been more productive.
During this exercise, the teams were not delayed by closed gates at the plant boundaries, as occurred during the previous year's exercise.
A Security Officer was on duty at each gate and opened then without delay.
The time to transfer field samples to the OSC laboratory from a shuttle vehicle was much reduced from last year's times.
The counting of air samples is not performed by the field monitoring teams.
As sample transportation times have been decreased, this is less of a problem than it was in the previous exercise.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate, however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
The offsite monitoring teams should routinely be informed of
changing plant conditions during an emergency, as well as any change in the Emergency Classification.
6.
Exercise Scenario and Control The licensee's scenario was challenging, including: an injured man, medical drill, assembly / accountability, an unusual radiological release pathway, meteorological changes, evacuation of the Primary Auxiliary
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-building..The degree of challenge in an" exercise scenario is considered when assessing observed exercise weaknesses.
Overall' exercise' control was cons _idered adequate.
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Far.to'o much simulation was used in some areas.
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Simulation of :
. handling of the_ injured man, simulation'of.the ambulance'and emergency
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medical technician, and simulation of health physics practices and decontamination detracted from the exercise' performance in several cases.
Simulation of one thing led to problems in another; an example being the q
- simulation of health physics practices at the. control point (including
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'. decontamination) for the returning fire brigade, which would have' led to contamination of subsequent teams.
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_j portal radiation monitors were alarming wasn't given to,the offsite HP
director until-approximately noon.
This information would have been f
useful in offsite; team positioning.
Controllers were' prompting emergency team members via the way information was presented; i.e.. instead of taking a reading and asking for the o
result, team members were shown the survey sheet from the exercise control
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manual.
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Licensee Critiques The Licensee held two levels of exercise c'ritiques, one at each individual facility:immediately following the exercise (mini-critiques), and a large critique for controllers / observers.
NRC personnel attended each of the critiques, and determined that NRC identified exercise deficiencies of i
I significance had also been identified by licensee personnel.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview two days after the exercise on September 17, 1987, with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit interview was proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
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Attachment 1:
Point Beach 1987 Exercise Scope and Objectives
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Attachment 2:
Point Beach 1987 Exercise Scenario Outline i
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EP EXERCISE SEPT 1987
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SECTION 3 I
_A f-3.0 OBJECTIVES 3.1 General 3.1.1 Demonstrate timely notification of on-site emergency response personnel of an emergency plan activation.
f 3.1.2 Demonstrate timely notification of key corporate emergency l
support personnel:
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Emergency support manager b.
Rad / Con waste manager c.
Emergency director d.
Vice president communications (or designee)
3.1.3 Demonstrate the ability of emergency response facilities to communicate using, as appropriate, the following:
a.
Dedicated telephone lines b.
Land lines c.
Radio 3.2 control Room 3.2.1 Demonstrate the ability of the control room staff tc provide data in a timely fashion to the TSC.
3.2.2 Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of emergency classification using the plant Gai-tronics and alarm system.
3.2.3 Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of an evacuation using the plant Gai-tronics and alarm system.
3.2.4 Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC within one hour of event classification using EPIP 1.3.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
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3.2.5 Demonstrate the ability to notify the State DEG and both counties of event classification within 15 minutes using EPIP 1.3.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
3.2.6 Demonstrate the ability to conduct an orderly evacuation to on-site assembly areas.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the TSC.)
3.2.7 Demonstrate the ability of control room staff to correctly classify ao emergency event using EPIPs 1.1 and 1.2.
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EP EXERCISE SEPT 1987 h n-SECTION 3 sL)
3.3'
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3.3.1 Demonstrate the ability of TSC staff to correctly. classify.
an emergency event using EPIPs 1.1 and 1.2.
3.3.2
. Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site personnel of emergency classification using_the plant Gai-tronics system.
3.3.3 Demonstrate the ability to maintain' meteorological status boards with current data.
3.3.4 Demonstrate the. ability to notify the NRC within one hour of event classification using EPIP 1.3.
3.3.5 Demonstrate the ability to notify the State DEG and both counties of event classification within 15 minutes.
3.3.6 Demonstrate the ability to provide regular (e.g.
hourly)
status reports to appropriate state and county agencies.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the EOF.)
3.3-7 Demonstrate the ability to perform computer calculation of
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offsite radiological consequences using the RMS-CRT, based
'v upon a monitored release path.
3.3.8 Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate offsite protective action recommendations using EPIPs 1.1 and/or 1.5.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the EOF.)
3.3.9 Demonstrate tha ability to conduct a plant evacuation to on-site assembly ar::s.
(This objective may be demonstrated from the control room.)
3.3.10 Demonstrate the ability to accomplish personnel accountability within 30 minutes of a plant evacuation.
3.3.11 Demonstrate the ability to assure contamination control in the TSC/OSC.
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3.3.12 Demonstrate the ability of TSC/OSC personnel to maintain an emergency reentry team status board.
3.3.13 Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to consistently conduct thorough, but brief staff meetings.
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EP EXERCISE. SEPT 1987
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SECTION 3
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3.3.14 Demonstrate'the ability of TSC personnel to maintain the-personnel status board up to date.
3.3.15 Demonstrate the ability of TSC and EOF staff to maintain an -
awareness of the site manager's ERF location.
3.3.16 Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposure of all persons assigned to the TSC.
3.3.17 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers.
3.3.18 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
3.4 Operations Support Center 3.4.1 Demonstrate the ability to assure contamination control in
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the TSC/OSC.
3.4.2-
. Demonstrate the ability to organize, dispatch, and manage a y
reentry / repair team into a high radiation area according to
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EPIPs 12.1 and 12.2.
3.4.3 Demonstrate the ability of TSC/OSC personnel to maintain an emergency reentry team status board.
3.4.4 Demonstrate the use of res'piratory protection equipment and associated communications equipment (skull mikes, boom boxes, etc.)-
3.4.5 Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control worker exposure.
3.4.6 Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposure of all persons assigned to the OSC.
3.4.7 Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to properly outfit reentry teams with protective clothing based upon anticipated environmental conditions.
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EP EXERCISE SEPT 1987 g
SECTION 3
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3.5 Emergency Operations Facili_ty-3.5.1 Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers.
3.5.2 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays'to
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support' emergency operations.
3.5.3
. Demonstrate the ability to provide regular (e.g., hourly)
status reports to state and county offices of emergency government.
3.5.4 Demonstrate the ability to provide r, gular (e.g. hourly)
status reports to the NRC.
3.5.5 Demonstrate the ability to perform computer calculation of offsite radiological consequences based upon a monitored release path.
3.5.6 Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control worker (including security) exposure.
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3.5.7 Demonstrate the ability of EOF staff to maintain an awareness
of the site manager's ERF location.
3.5.8 Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure.
3.5.9 Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate offsite protective action recommendations.
3.5.10 Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information to the JPIC.
3.6 Offsite Health Physics Facility 3.6.1 Demonstrate the ability to collect an emergency plan vegetation sample and soil sample.
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3.6.2 Demonstrate the ability of the off-site health physics director to locate and characterize the plume by managing offsite survey and sample teams.
3.6.3 Demonstrate the ability to maintain meteorological status boards with current data.
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EP EXERCISE SEPT 1987 fS SECTION 3-
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3.6.4 Demonstrate the ability of personnel using radios to communicate effectively.
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3.6.5 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
3.6.6 Demonstrate the ability of monitoring teams to perform radiological surveys and report results.
3 '. 7 Security 3.7.1 Demonstrate the ability to accomplish personnel accountability within 30 minutes of a plant or limited plant evacuation.
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3.7.2 Demonstrate the ability to control access to the plant site.
3.8 Joint Public Information Center (Communications Dept.)
3.8.1 Demonstrate the ability to staff the Corporate Emergency Response-Public Information Center (CERPIC).
j 3.8.2 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate a rumor
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control program at the JPIC.
3.8.3 Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination with j
offsite agencies of information released to the public.
3.8.4 Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate ouu timely information to the public.
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EP EXERCISE SEPT 1987
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SECTION 4 l
4.0 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCOPE The 1987 PBNP emergency plan exercise scenario will require activation of the TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC and various corporate support facilities.
It will provide exercise participants several opportunities to identify and classify emergency events.
The scenario is unique in that it begins with an " Unusual Event" as an initial condition and may escalate only to a " Site Emergency." Although protective action evaluations will be required, scenario data will not require a recommendation of protective measures to offsite authorities.
Scenario events lead to a monitored release of airborne radioactivity to the environment. Plume tracking, dose projection, and protective action decision making are all complicated by a simulated lake effect wind. In addition, the scenario will require a medical emergency response to an injured employee, and activation of the PBNP fire brigade.
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System failures introduced into the scenario are such that the projected offsite dose can be reduced by implementation of effective maintenance activities.
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Several events are included in 5.ne scenario to complicate public information activities at JPIC.
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The release of radioactivity to the environment is initiated from Unit 2.
j The scenario begins with the unit in a degas mode and a stable hot shutdown o
condition. The shutdown was required because of high primary coolant
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activity caused by gross fuel failure. The fuel failure prompted
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declaration of an " Unusual Event" (Table 1.2, Category 3) several hours
prior to the initiation of the exercise.
Subsequent primary coolant chemistry results require escalation to an
" Alert" (Table 1.2, Category 3).
Some time later a cryogenic charcoal bed vessel is punctured and an i
unexplainable fire initiates. The fire results in an airborne release of I
radioactive iodine and noble gas to the auxiliary building.
l The auxiliary building vent stack charcoal filter damper falls to direct effluent through the charcoal filter. Therefore, auxiliary building i
atmosphere is vented directly to the environment without passing through
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the charcoal filters. A dose projection based on the release through the l
auxiliary building vent and worst case meteorology necessitates the declaration of a " Site Emergency" (Table 1.2, Category 5).
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EP EXERCISE SEPT 1987 SECTION 4 The magnitude of the release will not decrease until the fire has burned out or until repairs to the auxiliary building vent charcoal filter damper are completed. Deescalation to an " Alert" will then be warranted.
The exercise will be terminated by drill controllers sometime after the deescalation to an " Alert".
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f EP EXERCISE SEPT 1987
SECTION 6 f
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('J 6.0 TIME SCHEDULE OF REAL AND SIMULATED SCENARIO EVENTS NOTE: EVENT TIMES PRECEDED BY THE LETTER "A" ARE DEPENDENT UPON PLAYER l
RESPONSE AND WILL OCCUR AT SOME TIME A_FTER THE TIME INDICATED.
0615 Shift turnover initiated in the control room.
0650 Massive fuel failure is indicated by 2RE-109 reading greater than 600 mR/hr. Other indicators, including reactor coolant system sample results, support the indication of massive fuel failure. An " Alert" declaration is required per EPIP 1.2, Category 3.
0822 An employee is injured on the controlled side of the plant. The injury is severe but is not compounded by contamination, nor is it life threatening.
1007 A cryogenic charcoal bed vessel (T-100B) is inexplicably ruptured.
Charcoal in the tank ignites and begins to smolder. Control room I
indication of these events includes, but is not limited to, the I
component cooling water (CCW) pump area smoke detector alarm, 2RE-104 alarm and RE-214 alarm.
(~'i The auxiliary building stack charcoal filter damper fails to direct (_,/
effluent through the charcoal filters. A monitored release to the
environment is initiated which is proportionately high in iodine.
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1010 Offsite dose projections require declaration of a " Site Emergency" using default source terms (Table EPIP 1.2-1, Category 5).
Dose projections do not suggest that the release will result in an exceedance of EPA PAGs.
A1010 The fire brigade is dispatched to the fire scene but is unable to effectively fight the fire because of its location and the configuration of the cryogenic charcoal bed cubicle.
A1010 A plant evacuation to onsite assembly areas followed by personnel accountability is conducted in response to the " Site Emergency" declaration. The release of nonessential personnel to offsite assembly areas and/or home will be simulated.
A1010 Environmental monitoring teams are dispatched to track the plume and draw ambient air samples.
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A1010 Maintenance teams are dispatched to inspect and repair the auxiliary building vent stack charcoal filter damper.
fm A1010 The State Division of Emergency Government does not concur with the (j protective action recommendations made by the utility and recommends evacuation of all sectors out to 5 miles.
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EP. EXERCISE SEPT 1987 SECTION 6
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1040.The Joint Public Information Center director faints. He-immediately
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regains consciousness, but his skin is pale.and cool'and his breathing rapid and irregular. His responsibilities must be delegated.
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1100 Meteorological data indicates that a lake effect wind has initiated.
1120~ The dedicated telephone circuit between the JPIC and the public service building fails.
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1240 Repairs to the auxiliary building vent-stack charcoal filter damper are successful and the magnitude.of the release is reduced.
(If players determine that repairs are not warranted from an employee dose-benefit standpoint, the fire will burn out resulting in 'a reduced release rate.)-
A1240 The event can be deescalated from a " Site Emergency" to an " Alert"
-because of the reduced environmental release.
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1400 The exercise is terminated by the main exercise controller.
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