IR 05000266/2023001

Integrated Inspection Report 05000266/2023001 and 05000301/2023001

ML23121A104
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/01/2023
From:	Billy Dickson NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To:	Strope M Point Beach
References
IR 2023001
Download: ML23121A104 (1)

Text

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2023001 AND 05000301/2023001

Dear Michael Strope:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On April 10, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Thad Edmonds, Operations Site Director, and other members of your staff.

The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.May 1, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000266 and 05000301

License Numbers: DPR-24 and DPR-27

Report Numbers: 05000266/2023001 and 05000301/2023001

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Inspection Dates: January 01, 2023 to March 31, 2023

Inspectors: K. Barclay, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Masse, Resident Inspector J. Park, Reactor Inspector V. Petrella, Project Manager A. Shaikh, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Stafford, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Unsupported Motor-Operated Valve Rate-of-Loading Assumption Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000266,05000301/2023001-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)50.55a(b)(3)(ii) for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured motor-operated valves (MOVs) continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.

Specifically, the licensee failed to validate their rate-of-loading (ROL) assumptions and used incorrect values in its MOV operating parameters calculation. The error resulted in a reduction in the capability margin for the majority of the safety-related MOVs at Point Beach with one MOV having a negative final design margin.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000266,05000301/ Potential Inadequate 71111.21M Closed 2022010-01 Basis/Justification for Motor-Operated Valve Rate-of-Loading Assumptions

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On February 15, 2023, the unit began coastdown for the upcoming refueling outage. On March 11, 2023, the unit was shut down for a refueling outage and remained shut down throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) G-04 emergency diesel generator starting air, the glycol cooling system, and fuel oil transfer system on February 24, 2023

(2) 1P-29 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump on March 6, 2023

(3) Control room emergency filtration system on March 7, 2023

(4) Unit 2 residual heat removal system on March 12, 2023

(5) G-02 emergency diesel generator starting air on March 22, 2023

(6) Spent fuel pool cooling system on March 23, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire Zones 304N, 304S, 311, and 318 on January 25, 2023

(2) Fire Zones 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, and 310 on January 25, 2023

(3) Fire Zones 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142A, and 143 on January 26, 2023

(4) Fire Zones 326, 333, 334, 335, 336, and 337 on January 26, 2023

(5) Fire Zones 142, 150, and 151 on January 27, 2023

(6) Fire Zones 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 156A, and 159 on January 27, 2023

(7) Fire Zones 608, 611, 615, and 618 on March 27, 2023

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on February 19, 2023.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms.

===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===

The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:

(1) Ultrasonic Examination Reactor Pressure Vessel Baffle to Former Bolts Reactor Pressure Vessel Clevis Insert Bolts Loop A Hot Leg Pipe to Elbow

(07) and Elbow to Pipe

(02) Welds

Dye Penetrant Examination Regenerative Heat Exchanger Bottom Shell Attachment Weld

Visual Examination Bare Metal Visual of 36 Bottom Head Penetrations Reactor Pressure Vessel Internal Vessel Visual Examination

Volumetric or Surface Examination Records and Associated Evaluations for Relevant Indications from the Previous Outage that the Licensee Analytically Evaluated and Accepted for Continued Service Recordable Liquid Penetrant Examination Indications Identified on 2SI-833B Final Weld W-4 Recordable Liquid Penetrant Examination Indications Identified on Unit 2 A Reactor Coolant Pump Welded Attachment

Welding Activities Welded Fabrication of Unit 1 A Loop Hot and Cold Leg Resistive Temperature Detectors Manifolds PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:

(1) AR 02446867 AR 02446969 AR 02445603 AR 02408032 AR 02421780 AR 02422583 AR 02431209

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during the Unit 2 shutdown on March 11, 2023.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator requalification in the simulator on January 3, 2023, and January 10, 2023.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to entry into a 10-hour shutdown statement and reduced coincidence during the performance of 1ICP 02.005B, Engineered Safety Features System Logic Train B Actuation Logic Test, on January 5, 2023

(2) Unit 1 elevated risk due to reduced coincidence on reactor protection and safeguards analog logic during the performance of 1ICP 02.001RD, Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features Red Channel Analog Surveillance Test, on January 3, 2023

(3) Unit 2 elevated risk due to turbine trip block testing and trip transient potential during stop valve testing during the performance of TS 4A, Turbine Trip Test Unit 2, on January 5, 2023

(4) Units 1 and 2 elevated risk due to planned maintenance on-site fire alarm control panels, on February 9, 2023

(5) Unit 2 elevated risk due to core reload on March 24, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Operability of 1PT-4069A, 1P-53 auxiliary feedwater pump suction narrow range pressure transmitter

(2) Operability of W-13B2, control room recirculation fan

(3) Functionality of G-05, station blackout gas turbine

(4) Operability of G-02, emergency diesel generator, exhaust line

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 298339, Temporary Power B29-X-90 from PP-87-20

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

(1) (Partial)

The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 2R39 activities from February 16 to March 31, 2023.

===71111.21M - Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) (IP section 03.01) (1 Partial)

(1) (Partial)

Unresolved Item 2022010-01; Potential Inadequate Basis/Justification for Motor-Operated Valve Rate-of-Loading Assumptions

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01)===

(1) TS 5, Rod Exercise Test Unit 1, on January 17, 2023

(2) TS 82, Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Monthly, on January 8, 2023

(3) ORT 3B, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train B)

Unit 2, on March 16, 2023

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) IT 400, Test of 1P-53 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valves, on February 28, 2023

(2) IT 765, Flow Test of High Head Safety Injection Check Valves (Refueling) Unit 2, on March 20, 2023

Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) ORT 59, Train A Spray System Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Test Unit 2 on March 28, 2023

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) opportunity during an operator requalification scenario in the simulator on January 3, 2023, and January 10,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

===71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)===

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends with a focus on risk management actions.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Unsupported Motor-Operated Valve Rate-of-Loading Assumption Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000266,05000301/2023001-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) for the licensee's failure to establish a program that ensured motor-operated valves (MOVs) continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically, the licensee failed to validate their rate-of-loading (ROL)assumptions and used incorrect values in its MOV operating parameters calculation. The error resulted in a reduction in the capability margin for the majority of the safety-related MOVs at Point Beach with one MOV having a negative final design margin.

Description:

During the 2022 Point Beach power operated valve (POV) inspection, the inspectors identified Unresolved Item 2022010-01 following their review of calculation 2003-0014, MOV Operating Parameters, Revision 8. Specifically, the inspectors questioned the appropriateness of assuming a zero ROL for valve 1AF-4000, "Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Valve to Steam Generator A Inlet." The term ROL is used to refer to the loss of thrust output of an MOV actuator during operation of the valve under dynamic (pressure or flow) conditions compared to static (no pressure or flow) conditions caused by the stem lubricant being squeezed out of the interface between the stem and stem nut threads under stress load conditions. Since its original usage, the ROL term has been more accurately referred to as load sensitive behavior where the conversion efficiency of actuator torque to output stem thrust is reduced by the load on the interface between the stem and stem nut threads in either the valve opening or closing directions. The inspectors questioned the licensees low ROL assumption and reviewed the supporting reference, licensee internal correspondence PBM 92-1200, Rate of Loading/Stem-To-Stem Nut Coefficient of Friction, dated October 7, 1992. The inspectors and NRC MOV subject matter experts from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation found the licensees methodology for incorporating the ROL effects into the Point Beach MOV program was not consistent with existing industry methods.

A review of correspondence between the NRC and the licensee found the NRC staffs concern with ensuring proper validation of the ROL methodology dated back to the inspection and closeout of NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance, and GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves. NRC Inspection Report 50-266/95007 (DRS),50-301/95007 (DRS), dated July 13, 1995, which described the NRC staffs inspection of the licensees response to GL 89-10, stated, The licensee developed a method to predict the effects of rate of loading for valves without a dynamic test; however, in-plant test data was inconclusive to fully support the method. Based on dp [differential pressure] test results, the method used plots taken during static testing which correlated torque from the stem thrust versus spring pack deflection. The inspectors encouraged the licensee to continue their research but were concerned with the inconclusive data from the valves that had been tested and the lack of data used to verify the method. The licensee committed to continue to compile data from periodic verification tests, both static and dynamic, to validate the rate of loading assumptions and prediction methodology.

On March 17, 1997, the licensee submitted a letter titled, "Response to NRC Generic Letter 96-05 Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves," to the NRC. This letter stated, in part, NRC Inspection Reports 50-266/95007 (DRS)and 50-301/95007 (DRS), dated July 13, 1995, document our commitments in response to the GL 89-10 closeout inspection items. As documented in this report, the following commitments were made and will be completed within 5 years of that inspection report:

3. We will collect and trend further static and dynamic periodic results to validate the valve factor study and rate of loading assumptions and prediction methodology.

NRC Inspection Reports 50-266/99012 (DRS) and 50-301/99012 (DRS), dated July 14, 1999, which described the NRC staffs inspection of the licensees response to GL 96-05, stated, The inspectors reviewed the status of the long-term MOV actions planned following completion of GL 89-10 close-out inspection. In particular, the licensee had not completed the overall review of the assumptions for valve factor and load sensitive behavior because of the limited progress made in performing dynamic testing as part of the long-term MOV program.

The report stated further, With respect to the long-term GL 89-10 issues, the licensee had not adhered to its efforts to implement planned dynamic tests, to perform an overall evaluation of program assumptions for valve factor or load sensitive behavior, or to perform qualitative and quantitative trending of MOV performance.

During the 2022 POV inspection, the inspectors requested the licensee information and data used to validate the ROL assumptions and prediction methodology. The licensee found historical MOV program trend reports that stated there were no valves identified that exhibited rate-of-loading effects; however, the licensee was unable to locate formal documentation detailing the methods used to make these determinations or details of the test data evaluations that validated the licensees ROL assumptions and prediction methodology.

At the conclusion of the 2022 Point Beach POV inspection, the licensee entered the ROL issue into its Corrective Action Program and created an action to perform an ROL study to document the basis for the ROL assumptions in calculation 2003-0014. The licensee, with the support of an independent contractor, reviewed the existing ROL methodology at Point Beach. The independent review concluded the original ROL basis was outdated and did not include other important considerations (such as plant or industry data, standard methods, and lessons learned since early 1990s). The independent review also concluded the use of a zero ROL factor for most of the MOVs at Point Beach was not supported by plant test data and the basis for the existing non-zero ROL factor used for a few MOVs at Point Beach was not well defined. The ROL evaluation performed as part of the independent review determined the correct ROL value to be 15 percent based on the licensees valve test data. In response to the independent review, the licensee applied the corrected ROL value to its MOVs, which reduced their overall capability margin. The licensee found that after the 15 percent ROL value was applied to MOV 1SI-866A, "Cold Leg Injection Line Isolation," the MOV had a negative capability margin, which required the licensee to perform an operability assessment.

The inspectors reviewed the operability assessment and did not identify any performance deficiencies.

Corrective Actions: The licensees short-term corrective actions included assessing the operability of MOV 1SI-866A. The licensees planned long-term corrective actions included updating the MOV operating parameters calculation, adjusting the closing thrust for SI-866A on both Units to restore margin above 5 percent, and assessing the impact the margin reductions had on MOV test frequencies.

Corrective Action References:

AR 2417688; 2022 POV Inspection - Calc 2003-0014 RE. MOV Rate of Loading AR 2437188; 2022 POV Inspection - MOV Rate of Loading AR 2452194; URI - MOV ROL Debriefed As Potential Green NCV

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensees failure to validate the rate of loading assumption for their MOVs was contrary to their 1995 commitment and was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to validate ROL assumptions and verify MOV 1SI-866A was capable of closing during a design basis event adversely affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Similar to example 3.l of IMC 0612, Appendix E, the licensee had to re-perform many MOV design calculations to demonstrate multiple safety-related MOVs could meet their design basis functions. In addition, two MOVs were found to require more frequent testing per the site MOV program procedures because of the loss of capability margin that occurred once the correct ROL was applied to the valves.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because they answered "Yes" to Question 1 in Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions,"

Section A, "Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality (except Reactivity Control Systems).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. Specifically, the incorrect ROL values were selected prior to the 3-year period used to assess present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) states, in part, the licensee must establish a program to ensure that MOVs continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.

Calculation 2003-0014, MOV Operating Parameters, Revision 8, is a licensee calculation established to determine the operating parameters necessary to ensure that MOVs are capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Correct ROL inputs are necessary to determine the minimum required stem thrust to operate each valve under dynamic conditions. The determination of the minimum required stem thrust to operate a valve is essential to provide reasonable assurance that an MOV is capable of performing its design basis safety functions. Without a proper assumption for ROL (or load sensitive behavior), the requirement in 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) for a licensee to ensure that its MOVs are capable of performing their design basis safety functions cannot be met.

Contrary to the above, as of September 19, 2022, the licensee failed to establish a program that ensured MOVs continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.

Specifically, the licensee did not use correct ROL values in Calculation 2003-0014 for numerous MOVs. The incorrect ROL values resulted in valve 1SI-866A having negative margin and did not ensure this MOV continued to be capable of performing its design basis safety functions.

Based upon the issuance of this green NCV, Unresolved Item 2022010-01 is considered closed.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes URI:

05000266,05000301/2022010-01

URI Potential Inadequate Basis/Justification for Motor-Operated 71111.21M Valve Rate-of-Loading Assumptions URI 05000266,05000301/2022010-01

Description:

This item was closed to a Green NCV included in this inspection report.

Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152S The inspectors performed a semiannual review to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant issue. For this review, the inspectors focused on risk management actions.

From January 2023 through March 2023, the inspectors identified two issues related to risk management actions and reviewed a third example identified by the licensee.

The inspectors noted that these cases involved a gap in communication between work groups, which failed to recognize specific risk management actions. In these cases, the various work groups performed the correct actions but were unaware of having assigned responsibilities per the work activity risk management plan. The licensee discussed these observations with the different work groups. The inspectors did not notice any further examples of communication gaps or failure to recognize risk management actions.

The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations during their review.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On March 28, 2023, the inspectors presented the Inservice Inspection Exit Meeting inspection results to Michael Strope, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

On March 31, 2023, the inspectors presented the Motor-Operated Valve Rate-of-Loading Assumption Unresolved Item 2022010-01 inspection results to Kim Locke, Regulatory Affairs and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 10, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Thad Edmonds, Operations Site Director and other members of the licensee staff.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS

Inspectors reviewed the most recent Institute of Nuclear Power Operations report from 2021 during this inspection period.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04 Drawings 110E018, Sheet 4 Auxiliary Cooling System 53

110E029, Sheet 1 P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System 54

M-144, Sheet 2 Heating & Ventilation Temperature Control P&ID 24

M-202, Sheet 2 Feedwater System 56

M-209, Sheet 12 Em. Diesel Air Starting Sys. 29

M-209, Sheet 15 P&ID Starting Air System Diesel Generator Building 13

M-214, Sheet 4 P&ID Auxiliary Steam, Heating Steam, Chilled & Hot Water 38

Systems & Details

M-217, Sheet 1 P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System 107

M-219, Sheet 3 P&ID Fuel Oil System Diesel Generator Building 17

M-227, Sheet 2 P&ID Glycol Cooling System Diesel Generator Building 11

Procedures CL 11A G-02 G-02 Diesel Generator Checklist 33

CL 11A G-04 G-04 Diesel Generator Checklist 13

CL 13E Part 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Turbine-Driven Unit 1 53

CL 5C Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Refueling Water Circulating 15

Pump Normal Operation Valve Lineup

OP 7A Placing Residual Heat Removal System in Operation 57

OP 8A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Water System Operation 26

71111.05 Corrective Action 02448803 Radio Communications 8' PAB MDAFW Pump 02/19/2023

Documents

Corrective Action 02446856 PFP-0-CB NRC Technical Questions on Walkdown 01/26/2023

Documents 02446877 PFP-0-PAB 8 NRC Technical Question on Walkdown 01/26/2023

Resulting from 02447769 PFP-0-PAB 8 - Pre-Fire Plan Primary Auxiliary Building 02/07/2023

Inspection Eleva

2450428 Additional Questions from NRC Walkdown of PFP-0-PAB 8 03/08/2023

Fire Plans PFP-0-CB Pre-Fire Plan Control Building Elev 8 ft, 26 ft, 44 ft and 66 ft5

PFP-0-PAB-8 Pre-Fire Plan Primary Auxiliary Building Elevations 8' and 5

Below

PFP-2-CONT-Pre-Fire Plant Unit 2 Containment Building/Facade 3

FAC

Procedures AOP-40 Response to Fire 8

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

AOP-40F Response to Fire in PAB 8 ft. Central Area and Below 7

PC 74 Conducting and Evaluating Fire Drills 26

71111.06 Calculations 2014-0007 Allowable Flood Levels 5

2014-02058 Internal Flooding Effects 2

Corrective Action 02450341 Eye Wash Station Inadvertently Actuated 03/07/2023

Documents

Drawings M-223, Sheet 1 Potable Water 52

M-223, Sheet 2 Potable Water 27

Miscellaneous DBD-T-41 Hazards - Internal and External Flooding (Module A) 16

Procedures AOP-13C Severe Weather Conditions 53

NP 8.4.17 PBNP Flooding Program 37

RMP 9422 Circulating Water Pumphouse and Turbine Hall Barrier 2

Placement

71111.08P Corrective Action AR 02407819 Recordable Indications on 2SI-833B Final Weld FW-4 10/16/2021

Documents AR 02408032 Dry White Boric Acid on RVLIS Piping of Unit 2 Reactor 10/18/2021

Head

AR 02408088 Indications Identified on Unit 2 A RCP Welded Attachment 10/18/2021

AR 02421780 LE-40A-B Boric Acid Buildup Above SFP Water Level 03/17/2022

AR 02422583 Boric Acid Leak on 2CV-300B Post Valve Adjustment 03/24/2022

AR 02431209 Boric Acid Residue at Packing on 2SI-870A 07/03/2022

AR 02445603 2SI-897A Boric Acid Leak 01/10/2023

AR 02446867 2SI-888B, Active (Damp) Boric Acid Leak 1Q23 BALCM 01/26/2023

AR 02446969 2SI-829B, Active (Wet) Boric Acid Leak 1Q23 BALCM 01/27/2023

NDE Reports INR-2R39-001 Framatome Indication Notification Report 03/21/2023

INR-2R39-002 Framatome Indication Notification Report 03/21/2023

INR-PBU-23-001 Framatome Indication Notification Report 03/19/2023

P32-UT-23-004 Ultrasonic Examination on Loop A RC-10-AC-2001-02 03/15/2023

Elbow to Pipe Weld

PB2-PT-23-001 Liquid Penetrant Examination of Regenerative Heat 03/15/2023

Exchanger Bottom Shell Attachment Weld

PB2-UT-23-006 Ultrasonic Examination Loop A RC-10-AC-2001-07 Pipe to 03/15/2023

Elbow Weld

PB2-VT-23-006 Visual Examination of Boric Acid (BMV) of 36 Bottom Head 03/12/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Penetrations

Operability WEPM-RV010- Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Clevis Insert Wear Prediction 03/22/2023

Evaluations TM-LO-000001

Procedures 54-9308165-001 Procedure for Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Baffle to 0

Former Bolts in Westinghouse 2-Loop NPP

ER-AP-116-1000 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 7

Framatome 54-Ultrasonic Examination of Westinghouse 2-Loop 001

ISI-138-001 Replacement Baffle to Former Bolts

Work Orders WO 40678285 Replace Unit 1 A Loop Hot and Cold Leg RTD Manifolds 03/23/2022

71111.11Q Procedures OP 3A Unit 2 Power Operation to Hot Standby Unit 2 22

OP 3B Reactor Shutdown 49

71111.13 Corrective Action 02410227 TS-4A, Discovered Overspeed Trip Oil Pressure Out of 11/03/2021

Documents Range

2432550 TS 4A - Turbine Trip Test Unit 2 07/22/2022

2445203 2P-37D DC Pump Start Pressure Out of STPT Doc 01/05/2023

Tolerance

2445702 During TS-4A, 2PI-6032 Outside the Normal Range 01/11/2023

(Overspeed)

Corrective Action 02445794 TS 4 - Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turb 01/12/2023

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous Work Activity Risk Management Plan for the 1 ICP 02.005B 01/05/2023

Work Activity Risk Management Plan for the 1 ICP 01/03/2023

2.001RD

Work Activity Risk Management Plan for the Unit 2 Turbine 01/05/2023

Trip Block Testing, TS 4A

PBF-1562 PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection 03/23/2023

Checklist

Procedures NP 1.9.14 Fire Protection Plan 26

OI 40A Fire Alarm Control Panel and Fireworks PC Operation 10

OM 3.27 Control of Fire Protection and NFPA 805 Equipment 82

WM-AA-100-1000 Work Activity Risk Management 24

Work Orders 40773690-08 T-32B/OPS Support of Reprogramming of Fire Det. Sys. 02/07/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

40809342-01 TS-4A, Unit 2 Turbine Trip Test 01/05/2023

40849051-01 1ICP 2.5B - Safeguards Logic Test - Train B 01/10/2023

71111.15 Calculations WE-200079 EDG Exhaust Piping from the Turbocharger Exhaust Flange 2

to the Top of the Vent Stack at Elev. 118-0

Corrective Action 02446619 1PT-4069A 6 PSIG Step Change on PPCS 01/23/2023

Documents 02448438 102-1/G-05 Relay 11P has LOP 60 LED Illuminated 02/15/2023

2449183 W-13B1 Started Inappropriately During TS-9 02/22/2023

AR 02445396 G-02 Exhaust Leak from Exhaust Pipe at Wall 01/08/2023

Drawings P-100 Job 10447 Diesel Generator Exhaust Inside Turbine Building 22-HB-298

Procedures 0-SOP-480-B11 Gas Turbine (G-05) Auxiliaries 480V Buses 12

TS 9 Control Room Heating and Ventilation System Checks 53

Work Orders 40737837-22 G-02/Perform Inspection West of Cross Fitting 07/12/2022

40825731 TS-9, Control Room H/V System Checks 02/23/2023

71111.18 Corrective Action 02448624 Two Blown Fuses on A29-X-90 02/16/2023

Documents 02448706 X-90 SFMR to PP-97 Found with Internal Damage from 02/17/2023

Arcing

2448724 Temp Generator Trip Results in Loss of Water Treatment 02/18/2023

2449791 PP-87-20 03/01/2023

Engineering 298339 Temporary Power B29-X-90 from PP-87-20 1

Changes

71111.20 Corrective Action 02451564 Indications on PB2 Reactor Vessel Clevis Inserts 03/18/2023

Documents 02451906 Foreign Material Identified During MRP-227/IVVI Visual 03/21/2023

Exams

Corrective Action 02450820 NRC Identified During U2 as Found Walkdown 03/11/2023

Documents 02452441 W-35 Abnormal Noise, Possible Belt Slap Noted 03/27/2023

Resulting from 02452885 Writing on Wall of U2C SG A Platform Wall 03/31/2023

Inspection

Procedures 2RMP 9096-1 Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using Biach 24

Tensioning System

MA-AA-101-1000 Foreign Material Exclusion Procedure 30

NP 7.7.36 Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program 9

OI 105 RCS Heatup/Cooldown Plotting 12

OM-AA-101-1000 Shutdown Risk Management 19

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

OP-AA-1000 Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions 19

71111.21M Calculations 2003-0014 MOV Operating Parameters 8

Miscellaneous IST Background Document; Appendix N; 1SI-866B 1

292-0081-RPT-Determination of Plant Specific ROL and Updated ROL 0

001 Methodology for PBNP MOV Margin Assessment

PBM 92-1200 Rate of Loading / Stem-To-Stem Nut Coefficient of Friction 10/07/1992

Evaluation

71111.24 Corrective Action 02446082 Detector B for Position D7 Didn't Go in on Scan for 2nd Pass01/17/2023

Documents 02449475 IT 400 - Test of 1P-53 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 02/26/2023

ANDV

2449742 IT 400- Test of 1P-53 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump 02/28/2023

ANDV

2451195 Procedural Issue in IT 765 SI Flow Test 03/15/2023

Procedures IT 400 Test of 1P-53 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valves 17

IT 765 Flow Test of High Head Safety Injection Check Valves 20 and 21

(Refueling) Unit 2

ORT 3B Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered 50

Safeguards AC (Train B) Unit 2

ORT 59 Train A Spray System CIV Leakage Test 37

Work Orders 40726502 ORT 59, 2P-14A/2SI-862A/2SI-864A 01/16/2022

40795727-01 ORT 3B, SI/Loss of AC (Train B) U2 (IPTE) 03/14/2023

40801985-01 IT-765, U2 High Head SI Check Flow Test (RF) 03/17/2023

40802032 ORT 59, 2P-14A/2SI-862A/2SI-864A 03/20/2023

40819831-01 TS-82, G-02 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test 01/10/2023

40826498-01 IT-400, 1P-53 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valves 02/28/2023

40831234-01 TS-5, Unit 1 Control Rod Exercise 01/17/2023

71114.06 Miscellaneous Nuclear Accident Reporting System Form (NARS) for the 01/03/2023

Operator Requalification on 1-3-2023

Nuclear Accident Reporting System Form (NARS) for the 01/10/2023

Operator Requalification on 1-10-2023

71151 Procedures LI-AA-100-1003 NRC Performance Indicator 4

NP 5.2.16 NRC Performance Indicators 23

71152S Corrective Action 02448296 Required 1-Hour Fire Round Not Implemented 02/13/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents

Procedures MA-AA-100 Conduct of Maintenance 27

MA-AA-100-1002 Scaffold Installation, Modification, and Removal Requests15

WM-AA-100 Risk Management Program 3

WM-AA-100-1000 Work Activity Risk Management 24

18