IR 05000266/1988006
| ML20151H773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1988 |
| From: | Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H757 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-88-06, 50-266-88-6, 50-301-88-06, 50-301-88-6, IEB-79-01, IEB-79-1, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, IEB-88-001, IEB-88-1, NUDOCS 8804200519 | |
| Download: ML20151H773 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-266/88006(DRP);50-301/88006(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. OPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks, Wisconsin Inspection Conducted:
February 1, 1988 through March 15, 1988 Inspectors:
R. L. Hague R. J. Leemon b
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Approved By: Ro ert DeFayette, Chie I-4 Reactor Projects Section 3A Date Inspection Summary Inspection from February 1, 1988 through March 15,1988,(Reports No. 50-266/88006(DRP); 50-301/88006(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; temporary instructions; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; radiological protection; bulletin followup; spent fuel pit activities; and licensee event report follow-up.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operations
- J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - EQRS W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction D. F. Johnson, Superintendent - Health Physics R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
- F. A. Flentje Administrative Specialist
- J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent - Chemistry The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation.
Maintenance, Health Physics, Chemistry and Instrument and Control Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insoection Findings (92701) (92702)
(Closed) IN 87-41, Failures of Certain Brown Boveri Electric (BBE) Circuit Breakers: Although the subject breakers are not used at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, the inspectors verified that the generic implications of the information notice were adequately addressed by the licensee.
(Closed) Violation (266/87013-02;301/87012-02), Failure to Alert Operator of the Possible Consequences of his Actions: Appropriate procedures were revised and further operator training was accomplished.
(Closed) Violation (266/87013-03; 301/87012-03), Failure to Follow Procedures:
The procedure was revised to require a sign-off for the step missed by the operator.
3.
Temporary Instructions (25586)(25584)
(Closed) TI 2515/86, Inspection of Licensee's Actions Taken to Implement Generic Letter No. 81-21, Natural Circulation Cooldown:
The inspectors verified that the licensee has revised procedures and provided training in accordance with their response to Ger.eric Letter No. 81-21.
(Closed) TI 2515/84, Verification of Compliance with Order for j
Modification of License:
Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation (Event V) Valves.
The inspectors completed the inspection requirements of Temporary Instruction 2515/84. One anomaly was noted during this
inspection. The licensee does not adjust measured leakage as prescribed in the SER to account for testing at pressures other thar normal service pressure.
The purpose of this adjustment is to nonnalize measured leakage for trending purposes.
The licensee's failure to perform this adjustment
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has not affected trending because all measured leakages to date with the exception of one have been 0 gallons per minute. The licensee will modify their procedures to incorporate this adjustment. This is an open item (266/88006-01, 301/88006-01 (DRP)).
4.
Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 71710)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of inspection.
During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.
During the period of inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR and administrative procedures.
On February 19, 1988, the licensee made an informational emergency notification system call to report a possible unanalyzed condition.
The licensee identified the possibility that during a steam line break accident in containment, if the main feed regulation valves fail to isolate as designed, there will be a short period (less than two minutes)
during which the condensate pumps and the heater drain tank pumps would
be adding water to the faulted steam generator.
The original analysis assumed feed line isolation and did not consider this potential added
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source of inventory. Operators have been given instruction to secure the condensate and heater drain tank pumps if main feed fails to isolate during this accident.
The licensee has submitted a justification for continued operation to NRR and has requested a modified safety analysis of this accident from Westinghouse.
The inspectors will follow the licensee's action upon receipt of the new analysis. This is an open item
(266/88006-02;301/88006-02(DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
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testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and
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Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was perfonned in accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
ICP 2.11 Rod Position Testing ICP 2.8 Axial Offset IT 04 Inservice Testing of Low Head Safety Injection Pumps
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and Valves (Unit 2)
IT 07 Inservice Testing of Service Water Pumps & Valves, (Units 1 & 2)
IT 102 Inservice Testing of Connon Auxiliary Feedwater Valves (Quarterly)
IT 10 Inservice Testing of Electrically-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pumps (Units 1 & 2)
TS 71 Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test TS 79 Periodic Surveillance of Fire Hose Stations No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and cor.ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
i The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were cemoved
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were perfonned prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records
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weie maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controis were implemented.
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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed /revicwed:
3D Diesel Generator Annual Maintenance
- 4D Diesel Generator Meter Calibrations Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Oil Change
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Physical Security (71881)
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that physical security was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the security force compliment was as required by the security plan, that search equipment was operational, and that access control for personnel and packages was implemented in accordance with licensee procedures.
The inspectors verified that the protected and vital area barriers were being well maintained and, when required, appropriate compensatory measures
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were taken.
On February 18, 1988, the licensee made an infomational emergency notification system call to report a design flaw in combination fire door / vital area access door locking mechanisms. A fire near the door could cause the door to fail unlatched, potentially spreading the fire.
Proper compensatory actions were taken and the locking mechanisms were modified by February 19, 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Radiological Protection (71709)
During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that health physics supervisory personnel conducted plant tours and were aware of activities which may cause unusual radiological conditions. The inspectors verified that radiation work permits (RWP) contained required information and for selected RWPs the inspectors verivied controls were being implemented as required at the work site. The inspectors observed personnel within radiation controlled areas and detemined that personnel monitoring equipment were properly worn and that the licensee's procedures for entry and exit were followed.
The inspectors observed the posting of radiation areas, hot spots, contaminated areas, and labeling of containers holding radioactive material and verified postings using a calibrated beta-gamma portable survey meter.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Event Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, t~ e following licensee event reports (LERs) were n
reviewed to detennine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, t
innediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical
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specifications. The following events were of minor safety significance and did not represent program deficiencies. These reports are closed.
(Closed)LER 266/87004-00, 266/87004-01: Loss of Red Instrument Bus.
On May 15, 1987, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 shut down, the station battery (005) breaker was opened to isolate the station battery for cell replacement. When the battery (005) breaker was opened, the battery charger (007) initiated a voltage spike on the DC bus (D01). The voltage spike affected both units' power supply inverters (10Y01 and 20Y01) and the standby (swing) inverter DY0A.
This initiated a reactor protection system actuation in uoth units. The voltage oscillation was cleared within 10 seconds by manual reclosure of the battery breaker.
The licensee submitted the original LER on June 14, 1987, a supplemental LER on November 16, 1987, and a followup letter dated March 2,1988.
The followup letter outlined testing that had been completed and final maintenance / adjustment which were performed on the battery chargers which should preclude recurrence of this problem.
(Closed)LER 301/87006-00, Potential loss of Containment Integrity Due to i
Misadjusted Valve.
On December 19, 1987, during an instrument air system walkdown, the handwheel gag on the instrument air containment isolation valve, IA-3048, was found to be partially engaged such that if the valve were automatically closed, it would not have fully shut.
The gag was innediately removed,
and the valve was tested to verify operability. The instrument air containment isolation valve is an air-operated valve which closes upon a containment isolation signal.
It is in series with a check valve. The check valve did not leak during the testing of IA-3048. The gags on all containment isolation valves were verified to be disengaged, and red locks were placed on them to con:rol their operation administratively.
This event occurred because a locknut on the valve gag mechanism became loose and out of position, thus preventing the gag from being completely removed.
Total containment leakage was not affected because the in-series check valve did not leak; therefore, there were no adverse safety consequences.
Maintenance work requests have been written to have the locknuts removed from these valves during the next refueling outages.
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(Closed) LER 266/88002-00, Design Error on Electric Strike Doors Used as Fire Doors.
On February 18, 1988, a design deficiency was discovered on doors with electric lock strikas which were designed as fire doors. The design deficiency allowed the doors to open upon loss of electrical power.
Since the loss of electrical power could occur because of a fire near the door, the fire barrier function of the door could be compromised. Upon discovery of the design deficiency, the fire barrier function of these doors was declared out of service and continuous fire watches were posted.
As a more permanent corrective action, the doors were modified to fail in the latched position upon failure of power.
The corrective action was completed on February 19, 1988.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Bulletin Followup (92703)(25026)
For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action conrnitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written rest.onse to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action t6 ken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
79-01 Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment. This
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Bulletin was superseded by 10 CFR 50.49.
87-02 Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable
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Material Specifications. This Bulletin was closed by inspection in
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accordance with Temporary Instruction 2500/26.
88-01 Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breakers.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)
The inspectors observed the handling of new fuel, reviewed applicable logs, fuel receipt and inspection procedures, and conducted discussions
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with fuel handling personnel.
During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that fuel handling operations were in a
confonnance with Technical Specifications or approved procedures, that the personnel handling fuel were qualified to do so, and that they were appropriately supervised. The inspectors also observed the inspection of spent fuel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and 3.
13. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period to sumarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' coments. The inspectors also discussed the likely infonnational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.
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