IR 05000266/1998017
| ML20155A770 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155A720 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-98-17, 50-301-98-17, NUDOCS 9810290247 | |
| Download: ML20155A770 (16) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 .
l Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301 License Nos:' DPR-24; DPR-27 I Report No: 50-266/98017(DRP); 50-301/98017(DRP)
Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company j l
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Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 6610 Nuclear Road l Two Rivers, WI 54241-9516 l l
Dates: August 18,1998, through October 5,1998 i
- Inspectors: F. Brown, Senior Resident inspector P. Louden, Resident inspector P. Simpson, Resident inspector
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R. Walton, Resident inspector, Quad Cities Station Approved by: M. A. Kunowski, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 9810290247 981026 *
gDR ADOCK 05000266 PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-266/98017(DRP); 50-301/98017(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 7-week inspection period by the resident inspector Operations e The plant was operated safely during the report period. Minor problems were noted in the areas of equipment status control, comrnand and controlin the control room, controls for operator manipulation of equipment, and auxiliary operator performance of rounds. Each of these issues was entered into the licensee's corrective action progra '(Sections 02,03, and 04)
Maintenance e The licensee conducted a good pre-job briefing for the Unit 1 "A" steam generator feedwater pump repair work. The repair work was completed in a timely manner, ,
consistent with planned estimates. (Section M1.1)
e Plant operators were challenged by some material condition problems in the secondary systems. Licensee response to individual problems was generally good; however, the inspectors were concerned by the potential for long-term degradation of plant systems from high vibration or high pressure transient loadings. No immediate safety concerns were identified by the inspectors, and the licensee indicated an awareness and appreciation of the potentiallong-term degradation. (Section M2.1)
Enaineerina e The licensee identified inadequacies with the original design calculations for the effects of a tornado on the circulating water pumphouse. The pumphouse was subsequently determined to be operable but degraded. (Section E1.1)
e The licensee identified an unexpected foaming of the coolant for the two Train "B" emergency diesel generators. Licensee management and system engineers displayed conservative decision-making in response to the foaming; however, the initial efforts to correct the condition were hampered by the absence of effective oversigh ;
Performance improved after a project manager was appointed. (Section E2.1) !
. Plant Suooort !
! Licensee performance during an emergency planning drill was improved compared to performance in a previous drill. (Section P1)
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status
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Both units were operating at 100 percent rated thermal power at the beginning of the inspection period. On September 1,1998, Unit 1 power was reduced to approximately 52 percent while a vibration-induced fatigue crack on a pressure sensing line from the suction of the "A" steam generator feedwater pump was repaired. Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent power on September 3,1998. On September 12,1998, another vibration-induced fatigue failure caused an oilleak on the Unit 2 "B" steam generator feedwater pump speed controller sensing lin Power for Unit 2 was reduced to 50 percent for several hours while the sensing line was repaired. Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power later the same day. On September 28, 1998, Unit 1 power was reduced to 50 percent to replace the rotating assembly of the "A" steam generator feedwater pump. This replacement was required to reduce flow-induced vibration in the Unit 1 feedwater system. Following this work, Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent power on October 2,1998. Both Units remained at 100 percent power through the end of the inspection period on October 5,199 . Operations 01 Conduct of Operations O1.1 General Comments (Inspection Procedures (IPs) 71707. 60855)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, including Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room shift turnovers and daily control room operations. No major problems were identifie j The inspectors also observed portions of the spent fuel operations associated with loading the site's third dry storage cask. Again, no major problems were identifie Observations of cask loading operations will be documented in Inspection Report (IR) 72-005/98018(DNMS).
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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Eauioment Status Control (IP 71707)
The inspectors observed that a normally open manualisolation valve for one of the eight j Unit 1 condenser steam dump valves was closed. In addition, the valve was not tagged '
or otherwise marked to specify the abnormal position The inspectors asked the unit reactor operator and the duty operating supervisor (DOS), a senior reactor operator, whether they were aware of the position of this manual valve. The operator and DOS were aware that the valve was close The inspectors then asked how the valve's abnormal position was being tracked. The DOS stated that an equipment out-of-service entry for the associated condenser steam dump valve was the method for tracking the abnormal valve position. The inspectors
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I discussed with senior plant management the lack of specificity associated with this method and with other indirect methods of monitoring equipment status. Control of equipment status has been an area of concern to plant management and the NRC for some time. The managers indicated that this weakness had been independently identified, and that actions to restrict the number of allowed methods for tracking equipment status were planned. The inspectors had no further concerns at this tim .2 Command and Control in the Control Room (IP 71707)
During a review of routine control room activities, the inspectors observed two separate occasions when the command and control function appeared to be handled different i from that described in Operations Manual (OM) 1.1, " Conduct of Operations,"
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Revision 0. The inspectors considered both cases to have been nonsafety significant, I and passed the specific observations to plant management for resolution. These occurrences were indicative of a continuing need for the licensee to ensure that OM accura'ely reflected management's expectations and to reinforce the expected compliance with the requirements of OM O3 Operations Procedures and Documentation 0 Procedural Controls for Eauioment Manipulations (IP 71707)
A minor water hammer event occurred in the Unit 1 heater drain tank high level dump line to the condenser on September 29,1998. The licensee followed up on this event in accordance with the procedure for assessing the potential consequences of water hammer events. The licensee concluded that the water hammer was an expected result of dumping hot water from the heater drain tank to the conder.ser, and that the dump line was designed to handle the water hammer pressure transient. The inspectors had no concern with the licensee's conclusion In reviewing the circumstances of the event, the licensee identified that an auxiliary operator had manipulated the position control switch for the Unit 1 condensate pump minimum recirculation flow line control valve. This action was orally directed by the DOS, who believed that the valve was not in the optimum position. The manipulation of the switch led to cycling (from open to closed to open) of the valve. This cycling caused a minor condensate system flow transient; however, the transient had no effect on the Unit 1 feedwater system or steam generator leve Plant management was concerned that operators had manipulated a control system in a manner outside of the system's intended design. The inspectors concluded, based upon discussion with licensed operators, that plant operators generally considered operations such as manipulation of the switch to be within the " skill-of-the-craft," and thus not subject to procedural controls. The operations department manager initiated training and procedural changes to address the divergence between management's expectations and the operators' practices. The licensee wrote Condition Reports (CRs) 98-3526 and 98-3557 to document the problem and initiated an assessment of, and corrective actions for, this issu ;
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The inspectors shared plant management's concern that operators had taken an action, j which had the potential to impact normal feedwater flow to the steam generators, without the review and evaluations associated with procedural controls. However, the inspectors concluded that regulatory requirements and the Point Beach licensing basis did not mandate the use of procedures for the type of operation performed by the operator. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the inspectors considered the operators'
tolerance of equipment which did not operate as expected and the operators' willingness to take compensatory actions outside of procedural controls to be performance issues with the potential to impact the normal operation of the reactors. A similar performance issue was discussed in Section 01.2 of IR 50-266/98003(DRP); 50-301/98003(DRP).
In addition to the issues discussed above, the inspectors noted that OM 1.4, "Use of j Operations Group Procedures and Work Plans," Revision 0, contained guidance on i partial performance of procedures and performing work without procedures, which I appeared to be less restrictive than the upper tier guidance contained in Nuclear Power i Business Unit Procedures Manual (NP) 1.1.2, " Procedure and Administrative Controls," l Revision 2. Because the inspectors identified this concern near the end of the inspection period, there was not sufficient time to completely assess whether the 2 operations department (or other departments) had adopted procedural adherence standards which were less restrictive than the plant's upper tier requirements. The inspectors will track the evaluation of this concern under an existing Inspection Follow- 2 up Item ((IFI) 50-266/97020-02(DRP); 50-301/97020-02(DRP)). A similar issue was
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addressed in Section 01.2 of IR 50-266/97026(DRP); 50-301/97026(DRP).
04 Operator Knowledge and Performance (IP 71707)
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During routine walkdowns of risk-significant safety systems, the inspectors observed oil and boric acid buildup on the Unit 1 "B" and Unit 2 "A" safety injection pump pedestal The amount and size of the buildup indicated that the condition had existed for at least several days. The inspectors had previously observed this condition and documented the observation in Section O4 of IR 50-266/98014(DRP); 50-301/98014(DRP). At that time, the inspectors also discussed with station management the poor performance of auxiliary operators in meeting management expectations for general housekeeping and monitoring equipment leakage. Operations management subsequently issued a " night
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order" instruction re-emphasizing the expectation for equipment cleanliness. However,
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the inspectors' recent observations indicated that the night order had not been effectiv The licensee agreed and concluded that additional supervisory presence in the auxiliary building was necessary to ensure that expectations were being met by auxiliary operators.
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08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (IP 92901)
08.1 LClosed) IFl 50-266/96018-04(DRP): 50-301/96018-04(DRP): " Revise Technical Specification (T/S) Bases on Accumulator Cross-Connect." The inspectors verified that the licensee planned to include a revision to these T/S bases as part of the improved T/S upgrade initiative which was underwa '
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08.2 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-266/96018-05a. b. and c(DRP): 50-301/96018-05a. b. and c(DRP): " Examples of Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedure Problems." Three examples of inadequate procedures were identified. The inspectors verified that the inadequacies had been addressed through procedure revision .3 (Closed) VIO 50-266/96019-01a(DRP): 50-301/96019-01a(DRP): " Valve Mispositioned by Operator." The licensee changed OM 1.1, " Conduct of Operations," to clarify management's expectations for procedure adherence. The inspectors verified completion of the corrective action commitments associated with this violation. The inspectors will continue to track procedural adherence issues as described in the last paragraph of Section O3 of this repor .4 (Closed) VIO 50-266/96019-01b(DRP): 50-301/96019-01blQRP): " Failure to Document Deficient Conditions on Condition Reports." The inspectors had identified several instances of deficient conditions not being entered into the corrective action progra Since that time, the licensee has demonstrated better performance in the identification of problems. The inspectors continue to monitor the status of the licensee's corrective action program as part of the routine core inspection progra .5 LQlosed) VIO 50-266/97009-01a(DRP): 50-301/97009-01a(DRP): " Failure to Take l Adequate Corrective Actions for Previous Valve Mispositioning Events." Recurring valve mispositioning events prompted the licensee to perform a root cause evaluation. Based on the results of the evaluation, the licensee concluded that the events were due to lack of management expectations, and/or vague or unclear expectations. The inspectors determined that appropriate corrective actions were taken by the license l 08.6 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-266/97019-00 and Escalated Enforcement item (EEI) 50-266(301)/96018-08: " Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Not Aligned in ,
Accordance With T/S." The licensee rendered both trains of RHR inoperable during I testing of certain RHR and safety injection valves. The inspectors reviewed the i
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licensee's corrective actions as stated in the LER and in response to EA 97-075. All actions were complet .7 (Closed) VIO 50-266/97026-01(DRP): 50-301/97026-01(DRP): " inappropriate Procedure Adherence Guidance." During a loss of a station transformer event, the inspectors identified that a blanket authorization to perform steps out-of-sequence was inconsistent with a licensee upper tier procedure. The licensee implemented procedure changes that rectified the inconsistencies. The inspectors will continue to track procedural adequacy issues as described in the last paragraph of Section 03 of this repor .8 (Closed) LER 50-266/98-024: 50-301/98-024: " Inadvertent Emergency Safety Features Actuation During Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Testing." On July 21,1998, during post-maintenance testing of the Unit 1 Train "A" EDG, technicians installed an electrical jumper wire which unexpectedly actuated " fast start" relays and started the EDG. The root cause of the event was an inadequate procedure which instructed the technician to jumper a contact for the start failure auxiliary relays but failed to identify that the fast start relays would also be affected. Installation Work Plan 97-040,
" Removal of Start Failure Auxiliary Alarm," was revised to include the appropriate relays
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to be jumpered for testing 'and the personnel responsible for the inadequate procedure !
were counseled on the need for self-checking. The inadequacies in Work Plan 97-040 were considered a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedu'r es, and Drawings," which requires, in part, that activities affecting quality, such as the testing of the EDG, be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. However, this non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation ((NCV) 50-266/98017-01(DRP); 50-301/98017-01(DRP)) consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the '
NRC Enforcement Polic a ll. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Repairs on the Unit 1 "A" Steam Generator Feedwater Pumo Inspection Scope (IP 61707)
The inspectors reviewed documentation and observed licensee repair activities involving the replacement of the pump impeller for the Unit i "A" steam generator feedwater pump. Documents reviewed during this inspection activity included the following:
e Maintenance Work Plan 110, " Steam Generator Feed Pump Overhaul,"
Revision 1, e Unit 1 Work Order 9815630, " Steam Generator Feed Pump 1P-28A," and e NP 8.4.10, " Exclusion of Foreign Material From Plant Components and Systems," Revision Observations and Findinos i The inspectors attended the licensee's pre-job briefing on September 29,1998, for the 1 replacement of the impeller for the Unit 1 "A" steam generator feedwater pump. The briefing was attended by all workers involved in the around-the-clock job, which was scheduled for 5 days. The designated maintenance project leader provided the work )
overview and identified key individuals for the evolution. Many good clarifying questions were asked and contingency plans were discussed during the briefing. The inspectors determined that the pre-job briefing was good as evidenced by attendance of all workers involved with the job, the detailed review of the planned work review, and a good discussion between workers following the overvie The inspectors observed work activities frequently during the job. Early in the work evolution, the inspectors noted that workers seemed to increase their attention to administrative type requirements, such as foreign material controls and procedural adherence, when they were aware of the inspectors * presence in the area. Performance appeared to be consistently good later in the work evolutio l l
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- - The Unit 1."A" steam generator feedwater pump was returned to service on October 2, e- 1998, close to the planned outage time scheduled for the repairs. The planning and
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. scheduling aspect of this work was well controlled by work-week managers, indicating j ' that the effectiveness of the licensee's work control and planning group continued to improve from that noted during earlier observations of that group by the inspectors.
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l The licensee conducted a good pre-job briefing for the Unit 1 "A" steam generator [
- feedwater pump repair work. The repair work was completed in a timely manner, j' consistent with planned estimates.
- M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Material Condition (IP 71707. IP 62707)
The inspectors observed continued improvement in the planning and executing of L planned and emergent maintenance activities. Licensee staff were effective in ensuring
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applicable T/S limitations were observed. However, the need remained for continued efforts by the licensee to ensure that all site organizations were effectively working !
l together to ensure that equipment outage times were minimized and that emergent l equipment problems did not challenge operators. The licensee was aware of this issue,
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and continued to focus on improving performance in this area.
. As indicated in the " Summary of Plant Status" section of this report, each unit was
! forced into a rapid power reduction in response to fatigue-induced failures of small diameter piping associated with the steam generator feedwater pumps. Repair of the 6 j rotating element in the Unit 1 "A" steam generator feedwater pump resulted in significant
- reductions in the vibration in the feedwater system pipes; however, the high vibration
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[ action being taken. Point Beach Inspection Reports for 1997 and 1990 document high ( transient loadings, such as water hammer occurrences, in other plant systems (both safety- and nonsafety-related). Additionally, the inspectors had observed occasions
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when operators " worked-around" equipment which did not function as expected or
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intended (see Section O3.1 of this report). In assessing these issues, the inspectors
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considered licensee management's strong emphasis on eliminating operator work-
. arounds and on making conservative operability determinations to be strengths. On the l other hand, the reactive nature of the response to these issues concerned the
{ inspectors. For instance, the licensee was increasing the use of fatigue analysis to
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assess conditions of high vibration, but did not have a comprehensive program for j' assessing areas of historically high fatigue loading in the plant (no regulatory
, requirement exists for such a program). The inspectors discussed with licensee
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management the possible impact of these issues on potential power uprate and life-extension projects. Licensee management acknowledged these issues, and inc%ted that plant staff had already been directed to consider such possible impacts.
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l M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (IP 92902)
M8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-266/96015-01a and -01b(DRP): 50-301/96015-01a and -01b(DRP):
" Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedure Violation." The licensee completed the corrective actions to this violation. The inspectors verified that the licensee had addressed the procedure compliance concerns discussed in the violation involving inadequacies in work packages and work control processes. The inspectors continue to monitor the quality of maintenance activities and work control process improvements as part of the routine core inspection program.
M8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-266/96019-01c(DRP): 50-301/96019-01c(DPP): " Safety injection Pump Repaired Without Appropriate instructions." Administrative inadequacies in the licensee's equipment repair / replacement program was determined to be the root cause of the identified violation. The inspectors verified that the identified inadequacies had been effectively addressed.
M8.3 (Closed) IFl 50-266/97009-03(DRP): 50-301/97009-03(DRP): " Inspectors identified Procedures Which Did Not Contain Required Post-Maintenance Testing." The inspectors verified that the licensee performed a thorough review of procedures and corrected any identified post-maintenance testing inadequacie Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E Circulatina Water Pumphouse Desian inadeauacies (IP 37551)
During this inspection period, licensee engineering personnel identified that the original design and as-built condition of the circulating water pumphouse may not have been in I accordance with the original design bases for tornado loadings on the structur Licensee Event Report 50-266/98023; 50-301/98023 was written to document the l problem. The pumphouse was subsequently determined by the licensee to be operable but degraded. At the completion of the inspection, this issue was forwarded to the NRC 1 Office of Enforcement for evaluation and proper resolution in accordance with the NRC '
Enforcement Policy. This matter will be closed in the next routine inspection report.
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment l E Operability Determination for EDGs (IP 71707. IP 37551)
During routine surveillance testing of the Unit 1 train "B" EDG (G-03), the licensee identified that a small portion of the glycol engine coolant had overflowed out of the coolant expansion tank. Subsequent licensee reviews of the surveillance test data identified that the coolant was foaming during engine operation. A similar condition was also identified with the coolant in the Unit 2 train "B" EDG (G-04). The licensee declared both train "B" EDGs inoperabl The inspectors observed that the initial licensee response to the foaming condition was hampered by a lack of knowledge about the probable causes and potential consequences of the foaming condition. System engineers were conservative in that they did not assume the foaming condition was acceptable simply because it may have I existed in the past. After some delay, licensee management recognized that j assignment of a project manager was necessary to have a single point of contact and to maintain oversight of the troubleshooting activities. Performance improved after the assignment of a project manage Overall, with the exception of the early difficulties in efforts to assess and correct the foaming problem, licensee mar.agement was conservative in declaring the two Train *B"
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EDGs inoperable until the conoition could be evaluated and addressed.
E2.2 Testina of Feedwater Check Valves (IP 37551)
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As described in Section M2.1 of this report, the Unit 1 feedwater system experienced '
excessive flow-induced vibration during this reporting perico. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's testing of the feedwater check valves (1CS-466AA, -466BB, -476AA, and -476BB). The purpose of the testing was to ensure that adequate flow from the auxinary feedwater system would be directed to the steam generators in the event of a main feedwater pipe failur The inspectors were initially concerned with the test methodology and acceptance criteria as contained in the applicable test procedures. After discussions with the licensee, regionalinspectors, and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's test program for these valves satisfied the plant licensing basis requirements. The inspectors also identified several human factors issues with the test procedures. These issues had not affected the most recent test perforriance, so they were communicated to the responsible engineers as areas for potential procedure improvemen E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (IP 92903)
l E (Closed) LER 50-266/97005: " Core Deluge Valve 1SI-852A Not Tested in Accordance l With Technical Specifications." The issue was the subject of a violation discussed and l closed in Section E8.2 of this repor I E8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-L66/96019-03(DRP): 50-301/96019-03(DRP): " Core Deluge Valve 1SI-852A Not Tested in Accordance With T/Ss." The root cause of this violation was determined to be a failure to appropriately ensure that inservice testing procedures ident!Eed all valves subject to the test requirements. As part of its corrective actions, the ;
licensee verified that surveillance testing frequency requirements for all applicable I components had been adequately inccrporated in procedures. In addition, the licensee was revising the entire inservice testing program at the station.
E8.3 (Closed) IFl 50-266/97009-02(DRP): 50-301/97009-02(DRP): " Multiple Instances of l Loss of Control Room Annunciators Due to Replacement of Blown Indicator Bulbs." The licensee was addressing the issue by replacing the incandescent bulbs with light
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I emitting diodes. The replacement project was scheduled to be completed in March 199 l
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E (Closo1) VIO 50-266/97026-05(DRP): 50-301/97026-05(DRP): " inadequate Testing of Containment Accident Fan Coolers." The licensee identified that nonconservative i values had been used for service water temperature, flow rate, and piping fouling factors. The resulting calculation determined that the fan coolers could not meet design heat removal rates. The licensee later determined that the system was operable and confirmed that determination with a tes !
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R General Comments The inspectors did not note any performance issues in the radiological protection area during routine tours of the radiologically controlled area or during observation of work activities. Health physics technicians were typically present at job sites and provided adequate oversight of activitie R8 Miscellaneous RP&C lasues (IP 92904)
R8.1 - (Closed) VIO 50-266/97009-01b(DRP): 50-301/97009-01b(DRP): " Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions for Previous Valve Mispositioning Events." The hensee's root cause evaluation of this event identified a need to reinforce procedural adherence with workers and provide additional administrative controls. Several chemistry procedures were reclassified as " continuous use" which required personnel to read each procedure step prior to performing the task. The inspectors determined that the actions !
taken adequately addressed the original concer P1 Conduct of Emergency Planning Activities (IP 71750)
The inspectors observed portions of an emergency planning drill conducted on September 30,1998, and concluded that the emergency response organization's performance was markedly improved compared to its performance during a previous drill described in IR 50-266/98014(DRP); 50-301/98014(DRP).
F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues (IP 92904)
l F (Closed) IFl 50-266/97009-05(DRP): 50-301/97009-05(DRP): " inadequate Lighting of Fire Protection Areas." This IFl is being closed to Apparent Violation 50-266/97010-07(DRS); 50-301/97010-07(DRS) of 10 CFR Part 50, :
Appendix R, Section Ill.J. " Emergency Lighting."
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F (Closed) LER 50-266/97020-00 and 50-266/97020-01: 50-301/97020-00 and 50-301/97020-01: " Conditions Outside 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis." A fire protection inspection reviewed these conditions and documented these conditions in IR 50-266/97010(DRS); 50-301/97010(DRS). The issues were dispositioned in Enforcement Action 97-347. This LER and its revision are being closed to the following apparent violations:
l e 50-266/97010-04(DRS); 50-301/97010-04(DRS) - 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2, e 50-266/97010-05(DRS); 50-301/97010-05(DRS)- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section ill.L.1, e 50-266/97010-06(DRS); 50-301/97010-06(DRS)- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix Criteria V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management, after the conclusion of the inspection, on October 7,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l l
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Wisconsin Electric Power Comoany M. E. Reddemann, Site Vice President R. G. Mende, Plant Manager l J. R. Anderson, Operations Manager '
D. P. McCloskey, Maintenance Manager C. R. Peterson, Director of Engineering ,
J. G. Schweitzer, System and Component Enginee'ing Manager l R. P. Farrell, Radiation Protection Manager V. M. Kaminskas, Regulatory Services and Licensing Manager
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering .
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IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems _ l lP 60855: Operation of an ISFSI [lndependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation]
IP 61726:
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' Surveillance Observations '
IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations -
IP 71750:. Plant Support Activities l IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineering IP 92904: . Followup - Plant Support ;
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened
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50-266/98017-01(DRP) NCV Inadvertent Emergency Safety Features Actuation During 50-301/98017-01(DRP) EDG Testing Clos 9d
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~ 50-266/96018-04(DRP) IFl Revise T/S Bases on Accumulator 50-301/96018-04(DRP) !
' 50-266/96018-05a,b,c(DRP) VIO Examples of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
- 50-301/96018-05a,b,c(DRP) - Procedure Violations 50-266/96019-01a(DRP) VIO Valve Mispositioned by Operator 50-301/96019-01a(DRP)
50-266/96019-01b(DRP) VIO ' Failure to Document Deficient Conditions on CRs 50-301/96019-01b(DRP)
50-266/97009-01a(DRP) VIO Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions for Previous 50-301/97009-01a(DRP) Valve Mispositioning Events 50-266/97019 LER RHR Not Aligned in Accordance with T/Ss 50-266/96018-08(DRP) eel RHR Not Aligned in Accordance with T/Ss 50-301/96018-08(DRP)
50-266/97026-01(DRP) .VIO Inappropriate Procedure Adherence Guidance 50 301/97026-01(DRP)
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50-266/98024 LER Inadvertent Emergency Safety Features Actuation 50-301/98024
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50-266/98017-01(DRP) NCV inadvertent Emergency Safety Features Actuation !
50-301/98017-01(DRP) During EDG Testing
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50-266/96015-01a,b(DRP) VIO ' Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedure 50-301/96015-01a,b(DRP) Problems 1
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50-266/96019-01c(DRP) VIO Safety injection Pump Repaired Without Appropriate !
50-501/96019-01c(DRP) Instructions 50-266/97009-03(DRP) IFl Inspectors identified Procedures Which Did Not Contain l 50- 301/97009-03(DRP) Required Post-Maintenance Testing
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, 50-266/97005 LER Core Deluge Valve 1SI-852A Not Tested in Accordance
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With Technical Specifications
50-266/96019-03(DRP) VIO Core Deluge Valve 1SI-852A Not Tested in Accordance
- 50-301/96019-03(DRP) With T/Ss 50-266/97009-02(DRP) IFl Multiple instancei of Loss Of Control Room Annunciators !
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50-301/97009-02(DRP) Due to Replacement of Blown Indicator Bulbs
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50-266/97026-05(DRP) VIO inadequate Testing of Containment Accident Fan Coolers
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l 50-301/97026-05(DRP)
50-266/97009-01b(DRP) VIO Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions for Previous
, 50-301/97009-01b(DRP) Valve Mispositioning Events
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50-266/97009-05(DRP) IFl Inadequate Lighting of Fire Protection Areas 50-301/97009-05(DRP)
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50-266/97020-00,01 LER Conditions Outside 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Safe l 50-301/97020-00,01 Shutdown Analysis
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Discussed 50-266/97020-02(DRP) IFl Assess Procedural Controls 50-301/97020-02(DRP) j
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN POINT BEACH REPORTS A'C Alternating Current
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AF Auxiliary Feedwater ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CFR .. Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report
, .DNMS . Division of Nuclear Materials Safety DOS Duty Operating Supervisor DR Division of Reactor Projects DS Duty Shift Superintendent l -EA Enforcement Action I ECC Emergency Core Cooling System
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EDG Emergency Diesel Generator r
- eel Escalated Enforcement Action -
L ESF Engineered Safety Feature EP Emergency Planning IFl Inspection Follow-up item IP inspection Procedure IPE Individual Plant Evaluation IR Inspection Report ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation LCO Limiting Condition for Operation LER- Licensee Event Report NCV Non-Cited Violation NP Nuclear Business Unit Procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 01 Operating Instruction OM Operations Manual OSTI Operation Safety Team inspection PASS . Post-accident Sampling System QA Quality Assurance RCS Reactor Coolant System .
RHR Residual Heat Removal RMP Routine Maintenance Procedure ,
F'.P Radiation Protection RP&C'
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Radiological Protection and Chemistry RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SER Safety Evaluation Report ,
SFP Spent Fuel Pool SI Safety injection
-- SW Service Water T/S- . Technical Specification I TS- Technical Specification Test URI ' Unresolved item VIO Violation l
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