IR 05000266/1990019

Insp Repts 50-266/90-19 & 50-301/90-19 on 900905-1015. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety, Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Security,Technical Support & Safety Assessment

ML20058H133
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	10/30/1990
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058H113	List: IR 05000266/1990019 ML20058H100 ML20058H116
References
50-266-90-19, 50-301-90-19, NUDOCS 9011140264
Download: ML20058H133 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/90019(DRP); 50-301/90019(DRP)

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Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301-Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27

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Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201

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Facility Name:

Point Beach Units 1 and 2 i

Inspection At:

Two Rivers, Wisconsin

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Dates:

September 5 through October 15, 1990

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Inspectors:

C. L. Vanderniet J. Gadzala

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P. Castleman f b k hl. h Approved By:

1. N. Jackiw, Chief

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Reactor Projects Section 3A Date

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t Inspection Summary Inspection from Se3tember 5 through October 15,1990. (Reports No. 50-266/90019(D1P): No. 50-301/90019(ORP))

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of outstanding items; operational safety; radiological controls; maintenance and

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surveillance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical support; and safety assessment / quality verification.

Results: During this inspection period Unit 1 operated at full power with

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only requested load following power reductions.

Unit 2 operated at full power until September 14, when it began an end of life Tavg coastdown.

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unit was shutdown October 6 for refueling outage 16.

Issues addressed in

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this inspection report include:

Inadvertent Migratory Waterfowl Deaths,

paragraph 3.f.; Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Actuation, paragraph 3.g.;

Inadvertent Of f site Release, paragraph 4.a.; Emergency Preparedness Training Drill, paragraph 6.a.; Inattentive. Security Guard, paragraph 7.a.; Single Failure Potential on Bus Tie Breakers, paragraph 8.a.; Service Water q

Radiography, paragraph 9.a.; Failure to -Issue an Event Report, paragraph 9.d.,

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and Plant Management Changes, paragraph 9.e.

New issues which remain unresolved include:

Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Actuation,

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paragraph 3.g.; and Single Failure Potential on Bus. Tie Breakers, paragraph S.a.

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9011140264 901030 PDR ADOCK 05000266 o

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted (30703) (30702)]

• J. J. Zach, Senior Manager, Nuclear Power Department

• G. J. Maxfield, Plant Manager

T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent, Maintenance J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent, Operations

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J. G. Schweitzer, Superintendent, Maintenance N. L. Hoefert, Superintendent, Instrument & Controls

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W. J. Herrman, Superintendent, Technical Services T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent, Chemistry J. J. Bevelacqua, $0perintendent, Health Physics-M. L. Mervine, Superintendent Training l

• R. D. Seizert, Superintendent, Regulatory & Support Services F. A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist Other licensee employees were also contacted including members of the

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technical end engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operators.

• Denotes the personnel attending the management exit' interview for

summation of preliminary findings.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92R1]

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(Closedj Unresolved item (266/90010-03; 301/90010-03):

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Load Sequencing

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The utility discovered that a phrase was omitted from Technical Specification 15.4.6.A.2 in 1985 during retyping of that page to incorporate an unrelated amendment. Omission of this phrase, in effect, changed the meaning of the specification to require Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) load sequencing times be within a tolerance band on either side of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) = limit.

The original intent was that they be less than the limits stated in the FSAR, Certain required equipment was subsequently found to not meat the original intent of the specifications, although the largest deficiency was 1.6 seconds.

I Wisconsin Electric performed an evaluation of this situation for its

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safety significance in a design basis event. The licensee determined that all equipment whose start times were outside the original

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specification intent were nonetheless well inside the design basis l

for those times.

Furthermore, they determined that the original intent was actually less conservative since its tolerances were wide l

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enough to have permitted multiple components to start simultaneously

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and thereby possibly overload the EDG.

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The corrective actions that the utility decided upon include changing the Technical Specifications to require EDG load sequence

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times to confonn to those of the FSAR with an appropriate tolerance-

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band. This will confirm the existing practice as being not only i

acceptable, but preferable.

The inssector reviewed the_ analysis and.

discussed the corrective actions wit 1 the~ licensee.

No additional

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concerns were noted and this item is closed, r

3.

Plant Operations (71707) (71710) (93702)-

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Control Room Observation (71707)

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable.

logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during.

the inspection period.

During these discussions and observations, I

the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant

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of current plant conditions, attentive to changes.in those

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conditions and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors

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noted that a high degree of professionalism attended all facets of control room operation and that both unit control-boards were.

generally in a ' black board' condition:(no non-testing annunciators

in alarm condition). Several shift turnovers were also observed and

appeared to be handled in a thorough manner.

The control room has only one copy of alarm response cards for use

in responding to various annunciators on the control boards.

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copy is maintained at the shif t superviso_r's-station, requiring-the.

_I unit operators to leave their control panels' if they need to-obtain.

an alarm response card. Having only a single copy would also be

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an inconvenience if:both units were to receive the~same alarm simultaneously. The inspector. discussed this issue with plant

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management and the licensee plans to take appropriate corrective action, i

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the control boards toL verify

i the operability of selected emergency. systems,-revieweo tagout.

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.ecords and verified proper return to service of.affectej

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components.

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Facility Tours (71707)

Tours of the turbine building, primary auxiliary building, service water building, and Unit 2 containment were conducted to. observe

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plant and equipment conditions including plant housekeeping /-

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cleanliness conditions, status of fire protection equipment, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and-to verify.that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment:in need of' maintenance.

During facility tours. inspectors-noticed several~ steam leaks on the

- secondary side of, Unit 2.

Normally, very few leaks are in evidence.

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The noted leaks were identified with tags 'as. requiring _ maintenance

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work. All equipment appears to be in good operating condition..

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_. 6 Plant cleanliness has improved noticeably during the recent

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Institute of Nuclear Plant Operations (INP0) evaluation.. Portions

t of the service water system piping continue:to show heavy surface-.

rust, especiall pump bearings. y the sections leading to the auxiliary.feedwater.

ihe insped. ors noted several installations of temporary hoses connected ta vent fittings or hooked between vent and drain..

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I.xamples include-the auxiliary feedwater pumps and the charging pnps.

The length of time these temporary hoses;have been i

connected suggests a permanent installation; The licensee informed

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the inspector that connecting hoses to permanent vent or drain J

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fittings does not fall under the, jurisdiction of.their' temporary

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modification requirements, hence no controls are necessary. =They.

added that plans are nonetheless being made for replacing these-I hoses with hard piping under a permanent modification.

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Unit 1 Operational Status (93702)

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The unit continued to operate at full power during this-period.withL l

only. requested load following power reductions and one power i

reduction to,86% on September 7, to repair a. leak on:a feedwater

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heater operating vent.

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Unit 2 Operational Status ( d 70_2)

The unit continued to operate at full pow r:d'uringithisiperiod until

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September 14, when it began an end of life Tavg coastdown.3 The unit

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was-shutdown October 6 for refueling outage-16.. The inspector

verified that the plant had reviewed their controls'for mid-loop-

operations and Jiat applicable. administrative procedures were in I

place for use prior to the unit's entering:into a partially drained condition.

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, Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF)' System Walkdown-(71710)

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i The inspector performed a detailed walkdown.of portionslof the'

containment air recirculation cooling systemsLin order to-independently verify operability. - The containment air recirculation -

cooling system walkdowns included verification of thet following-

items:-

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Inspection of system equipment conditions.

• Confirmation that the system check-off P 4 (COL) and operating procedures are consistent wit nt drawings.

• Verification that system valves, breake nd switches ~are properly aligned.

• Verification that instrumentation is properly' valved in and i-operable,

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Verification that valves required to be locked have appropriate locking devices.

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Verification that control room switches, indications, and controls are satisfactory.

• Verification that surveillance test procedures properly implement the Technical Specifications surveillance requirements.

Several vent cooler valves inside containment were found to have only the original construction labels identifying them. Several'

vent cooler differential pressure indicators also have either the construction label or a hand written identifier under the gauge.

The system drawing did not correctly depict the loci. tion of three fire hose connections on the service water piping supplying the vent-caolers.

The inspector conveyed these. discrepancies to the licensee -

for correction, f.

Inadvertent Migratory Waterfowl Deaths (71707)

Approximately 275 Double Crested Cormorants (Phalacrocorax Auritus).

have been found dead in the water intake forebay at the plant.

These birds, which are large migratory waterfowl, are a protected

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Point Beach has a large doughnut shaped intake structure-about.

300 yards offshore that is surrounded by concrete' riprap.. The intake doughnut resembles a rocky island, which is a favorite roosting place for the birds. Since the birds began" roosting on the intake structure, numerous birds have either fallen intoithe-inside of the-riprap, or dived in af ter fish. Once in the' water on the inside of, the intake structure, the birds become too water-laden to be able to.

fly out of the structure.

It has been postulated that these. birds tire fror, swimming or accidentally dive into one of the suction vortexes end are drawn into the plant, thereby drowning-in the process.

This.is the first such occurrence of.these birds roosting at the plant. The plant is.taking action to; remedy the: situation. -A propane-powered air canon has been installed at the intake structure l

to frighten off the birds. Though this worked for-the first couple -

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of_- days after installation, it has. since become ineffective.' The:

licensee-is considering further options to' prevent the entry of the-b'rds into the intake structure.

Representatives from the State of Wisconsin Department of Natural-Resources (DNR) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have'been:

sent to. investigate this issue. The DNR 1s in the process ~of considering enforcement action against1the utility for this event..

Media interest has occurred and severa1' articles an'd news items-have

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.been circulated.

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Inadvertent Auxiliaty Feedwater (AFW) Pump' Actuation-(93702),

On October 9, the licensee notified the NRC_via the emergency notification system regarding the inadvertent. initiation of motor-driven AFW pump (P38A).

Po1_nt Beach has two motor-driven AFW pumps which are shared between the two units.

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The event occurred during the performance of a main steam line hydrostatic test on Unit 2..During this test, an. unrelated maintenance action was being performed on the Unit 2 "B" train:

safe uards relays. This maintenance-required the~deenergizing of the tr;in of sateguards power and. removal of the:B steam generator-leve4 bistable.

Consequently, although both steam generators were full, the AFW actuation circuitry sensed a low-low level from'the-B steam generator.- This-satisfied logic for the initiation of AFW,.

however, the main feed pump coniml switches were in the pull-to-lock position, which blocks the signai.

The intended pressure source for.

the hydrostatic test was the Unit 2A main feed pump.

When the main feed pump control switch was' taken out of the. pull-to-lock position in preparation for starting the pump, the initiation signal was unblocked and the A AFW pump started.. The B AFW pump was already running as part of the' hydrostatic test.

The Unit 1 operator attempted to secure the A AFW pump by placing-the control switch in "0FF".

Since the actuation _ signal was stil1 present, wnen the spring loaded switch returned to the "AUT0" position, the pump restarted.

The rapid. restart'apparently; tripped the A AFW pump breaker on overcurrent. After determining what'had happened, the operator reset the breaker and allowed the pump to i

restart in the "AUT0" position. Some water was injected into the Unit 1A steam generat-durino= the event:although its effect on level was neg 11ble.

The A AFW-pump discharge into the Unit 1A stu m generat s was shut to preclude continued water addition.

The simulated low-low level signal' from the Unit 2B steam generator-

was subsequently reset and the motor driven AFW pumps were secured.

The hydrostatic test was then completed without further incident.

This event remains unresolved pending an evaluation by the licensee and subsequent review by the NRC-(266/90019-01; 301/90019-01).

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were. conducted safely _.andiin conformance with requirements established under technical specificaticas, federal regulations, and administrative procedures.

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Radiological Controls (71707), (93702)

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The inspectors routinely observed theilicensee's radiological controls-and practices during normal _ plant.tourscand the inspection of work cctivities.

Inspection in this areatincludes direct observation of the use of Radiation Work Permits '(RWPs); normal work: practices inside

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contaminated barriers; maintenance off radiol' gicalf barriers; and signs; l

o and health physics (HP) activities regarding monitoring, sampling, and

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surveying. The inspector also observed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with.radwaste. processing.-

From a radiological standpoin.t the plant lis in good condition,-allowing access to most sections.of the facility.

During tours of the facility,:

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the inspectors noted that barriers and signs also werelin good condition.-

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When minor discrepancies were identified, the HP staff quickly responded-

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Inadvertent Offsite Release-(93702)

I While preparing to obtain a weekly. gaseous sample of Unit.1 reactor coolant on October 3, 'a ' release of radioactive gas occurred. A.pumpi seal in the Unit 1 gas analyzer failed allowin vent into the primary auxiliary building:(PAB)g coolant gasses -to',

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analyzer was aligned to the volume control tank for sampling. The l

gasses were then drawn-into the PAB ventilation system, driven-through roughing and high efficiency. filters, and finally, exhausted

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out the vent stack.

The plant made an informational notification to

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the NRC via the emergency notification system.--

t The release commenced at 0740 and caused the PAB exhaust. vent radiation monitors to alarm... Another: process radiation monitor.

located nc. the gas analyzer also alarmed due.to the radiations

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levels produced by the released. gasses. The radiation monitors have

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two alarm setpoints,; a110wer alert limit-to warn of above: normal

levels, and a high alarm limit to warn.of radiation levels above

.f permissible l_imits. The peak reading on thetvent stack monitor was'

d about 6.2E-5 microcuries/ml, which is' above theialert limit of

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2.1E-5 but well below the high alarm limit of 5.0E-3.. JThe radiation-L monitor stayed above the alert limitsfor about one hour while the

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gas was vented out of:the PAB..

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j Upon receipt of the radiation. alarm-c" trol room' operators l

attempted to determine' thol source of 7 release. The1 operatorr

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involved in the sampling. activity <we m v.ut initially aware they had a

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PAB' ventilation was shifted.to exhaust through.

charcoal filters to further reduce the release rate.

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about one-half hour into the event.. They responded by isolating the

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l supply line' to the gas analyzer. and initiating'a partial evacuation d

I of the PAB. Operators dressed :in anti-contamination clothing and H

l breathing apparatus were-then:sent back in to' isolate the entire gas

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analyzer. -The inspector noted that the plant' manager and other

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management' personnel responded:quickly to thel control room:to' assist'

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Four operators involved int.thel sampling process. received skin N

contamination due to-immersion:in the gas cloud. Thel principal

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contaminants were isotopes of Cesium and Rubidium. The'four;

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operators were decontaminated and received whole body cou' nts. The

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highest intake measured or one.of the operators was 263. nanocuries ~

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with the principal isotopes being Xe 133 and'Xe-135.. All: personnel-l who were in the PAB at the ' time of the' event :also: received whole

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body counts and no abnormal levels wereLfound. The operatorst

involved in the sampling activity-were estimated to have received

doses of 34 mrem to the skin and 20 mrem whole' body from immersion in the gas cloud.

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i The licensee calculated the total offsite~ release to be 1.2 Curies'

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consisting entirely of noble gasses. :Their worst case assessment of airborne activity during the one hour: release determined the highest

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activity level to be 0.07% of:the maximum permissible concentration:

at the site boundary.' Wind conditions at the time of the eventLwere

~i-favorable, being out of the south with gusts of.up to-25 miles por hour.

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-t Of note is that the. letdown gas stripper was outiof service for maintenance during this event.

Had.it been operating. much of:the

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gaseous activity that was released would have' been previously

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removed, resulting in a - reduct:d reler.se amount. The inspector-observed the event recovery process and discussed the details with

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plant personnel.

No additional concerns were noted, o

All activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner during this

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inspection-period.

5.

Maintenance / Surveillance Observation (62703):(61726)

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Maintenance (62703)

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Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and

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components listed below were observed /reviewedLto ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved' procedures,-

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regulatory guides and.i.idustry codes -or. standards and in

conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during'this' review:

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limiting conditions for operation were: met while ' components or

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systems were removed from service;iapprovals.were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved i

procedures and'were inspected asTappl.icable;1 functional: testing-

and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or

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systems to service; quality control r'ecords were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;; parts ~and

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materials used were_ properly. certified;; radiological _ controls were--

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implemented; and fire prevention controls were impleinented,

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t Work requests were reviewed to determine;statusfof outstanding' jobs.

and to assure that priority is assigned :to safety-related equiprmnt

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maintenance which may affect system performance.

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Portions of the following maintenance activities wer$

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observed / reviewed:

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2P-118 component cooling water pump motorLrepair;

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The inspector expressed concern about the. method bfLlifting,the-pump motor.

A. cable used to support'the motor was:being partially deflected by an intervening pipe. ;The i.nspector's:

concern regarded the side loading being placed'on;the

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intervening pipe. The. licensee informed the inspector that-

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they had performed an informal-evaluation on the side loading.

and determined that it was well within.theilimit of-the pipe.

• MI-5.'2 (Revision 4)' Air diaphragm ' operated control valve

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maintenance.of AF-4012'

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The specifications for valve:-operating; pressure and regulator setting;11sted in the procedure specifiedla single value' '

without providing any tolerance band'around that value.

This practice tends to produce).incorisistencies ein the tolerances.

that a given technician thinkstis acceptable. - The technicians-performing the work used:a:0-150' psi range pressure gauge.to:

measure a 1 psi test pressure.

Wheniqu_estioned about this.

s practice, the technicianseproved knowledgeable. about the' gauge.

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range suitable for. the pressures being' worked with, but the 1 procedure only-~specified a generic test -rig,Lwhich they used.--

The procedure also did;not require logging ??as found'! data on the-valve to be worked. The technicians obtained this: data anyway because-they. knew it would bejneeded;for comparison later.

No flush of'the valve was}specifiedldespite the need.

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for grinding inside the valve bodyn The technicians also took it upon-themselves to. perform this task.

The11nspector-discussed these concerns.with theilicenseelfor correction.

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.ICP 9.11 (Revision 6), Special Maintenance Procedure, Tavg:

Range Change j

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After installation of resistorsT oihange. the in.dicating range j

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of the Tave instruments, reactor' engineers must. update the h

plant computer database conversion parameters 1to enable-it' to j

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e correctly. interpret the new signals 1There is.no procedure for this evolution so it-is done bycreviewing' log ; entries Lfrom when

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l the evolution. wasL last performed and. entering:'the same data as

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IWP89-188*D(Revision 0),ReplacementofBr:eakers'2,4,=14,:16'

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Surveillance (61726)

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The. inspector observed surveillance testing and. verified ;that -

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testing was performed in accordance withJadequate pro'cedures; that a

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test instrumentation-was calibrated; that limiting conditions for

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operation were met; that removal and restoration of the effected"

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components were accomplished; that test results, conformed'with -

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technical specifications and procedure requirements ~and were

reviewed by personnel other than the-individual: directing _the test;--

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and that any deficiencies identified duringithe testing _ were

properly reviewed and resolved by; appropriate management personnel.:

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The inspector witnessed and. reviewed the following test activities:--

a IT-1181.2;(Revision 0) Ten Year Hydrostatic : Test of Emergency

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Diesel Generator _ Fuel Oil System -

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The procedure used for thisI est appears to have been t

inadequately reviewed by'the plant's engineering staffLprior

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to its performance.

One step ino:the' procedure' directs shutting.

of. a pressure control valve,:although the intent is to throttle =

it until.150 psi _ backpressure is reached. However, no gauge ~is__

A provided in the system to read that high a. pressure.. The. test-

had to be suspended whem fuel, oil could,not be pumped into the test rig as specified inithe procedure.. An-investigation

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r::tec1::d that there were microporeLfilters installed upstream -

of the point u:ad for the test' connection.' These filters are only designed to transmit static; pressure and were quickly-clogged when fuel oil flow was induced through'them.

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presence of this filter was not determined before the start of -

the test.

The procedure.was; eventually revised and;the: test; completed without further incident.'- The inspector discussed

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these weaknesses with the licensee.L

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ICP'2.16 Appendix A.(Revision 2),;-Overp'ressure Mitigating System

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Step 2.21 of the procedure: directs!the~ technician to reduce.

voltage to less than 26.3 to allow relay CX?to energize. The.

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relay energized at 26.32 and the: technician did not reduce voltage further. "When questioned by the inspector:aboutL the need to reduce voltage below 26.3 as stated in the procedure, the technician stated that.the-intent of the procedure.was only-

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to reduce voltage sufficiently;to energize the relay and the.

t value of the voltage was only. an approximation. During further discussions with the technici.an's, supervisor, the licensee'

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agreed that although the technician was correct in his; interpretation, the wordingLof;the procedure was not conducive

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to procedural compliance and:would be changed. - The inspector i

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'had no further concerns.

ICP 2.1 Appendix A (Revision,8), Protection and Safeguards Analog-No other discrepancies were noted during.the observance of any:of-the above tests.

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Emergency Preparednesj (71707)

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An inspection of emergency preparedness (-(EP)' activities was~ performed to q

R assess the licensee's -implementati_.on'of the site emergency plan andi

implementing procedures. The inspection included. monthly review and tour j

of emergency facilities and equipment,. discussions with licensee staff,

and a review of selected procedures.

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Ep Training Drill (71707)-

S The site conducted an EP training drill:on September 17? to assist-

in preparing personnel for handling their assignments during

--declared emergencies ~ The technical support center was activated

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and an accident scenario was played out., The inspector observed-

'r portions of the' training and played the' role,of_the:NRC head. quarters-

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duty officer.. Although there were notable flaws;inithe scenario

data, the training was considered worthwhile..

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All activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner Juring this yi inspection period.

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Security (71707)

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The inspector, by direct observation-and interview; verified that portions of-the physical security program were being implemented in _.

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i accordance with the station security plan.. This include'd: checks that-identification badges.were properly displayed, vital areas ~were locked and alarmed, and personnel 'and -packages entering the protected area were?

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appropriately searched.- [The inspector also monitored any compensatory'

i measures that may have beenienacted by the licensee.]

Inattentive Security Guard (71707)

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.i On.0ctober 10, the licensee notified'the NRC via the emergency-j notification system that a security guard at the Unit 2 containment H

hatch had fallen asleep while on duty. The~ inspector' discussed this i

event with the licensee and determined that appropriate compensatory J

measures were subsequently taken. No additional concerns were i

noted.

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All other activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner during this-j

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inspection period.,

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Engineering and Technical Support (71707)-

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.The inspector eval.uated licensee engineering and. technical!suppor.t-

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evaluation of facility eventsiand concerns through direct observation of.

y activities and discussions ~with engineering personnel, a

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Single Failure Potential on Bus Tie Breakers (71707)

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On October 8, the licensee identified a-potential for a single failure on the tie breakers between the safeguards and non-safeguards electrical busses (801/B03 and B02/B04) to accidentally

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shut the tie breakers. _If this accident happened:while a: diesel generator was supplying the safeguards bus, it would tie the non-safeguards bus onto the diesel generator and probably overload it.-

As immediate corrective' action, the licensee removed the control

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power fuses for these tie breakers and is administratively

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controlling the breaker control switches'in the pull-to-lock

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position. This removes the potential for the' inadvertent closurer

The breakers are used only for maintenance purposes and.have no safety function.. Wisconsin Electric is performing anLanalysis.of,'

this situation and this item remains unresolved pending1 completion)

of that analysis and subsequent review by the: inspector-(266/90019-02;301/90019-02).

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All activities were conducted.in a satisfactory manner during this-

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inspection period.

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Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (92701) (90712)'(92700)

The licensee's quality assurance programs were inspected to assess the implementation and effectiveness of programs associated with management-control, verification, and oversite activities.

Special? consideration was given to issues which may be indicative of overall management ;.<

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involvement in quality matters such as self improvement programs,

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response to regulatory and industry initiatives, the frequency ofl,

management plant tours and control room observations, and' management personnel's attendance at technical and_ planning / scheduling meetings, a.

Service Water Radiography (92701)

An extensive radiographic examination program was performed on the.

service water system in response to Generic Letter 89-13,;" Service-Water System Problems Affecting Safety _ Related Equipment",- and Information Notice 89-001/01, " Valve Body Erosion. ' AboutL 70 -

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selected areas were radiographed including 1C areas inside;the.

Unit 2 containment during-the current outage. This examination-identified piping areas in the service water system that1have'up-to a 75% wall loss in highly localized areas. The areas of high wall'

loss are in the form of-pitting rather than general thinning.' The licensee has determined that this is a _ leakage concern instead of 'a pipe wall strength concern. The inspector discussed this with thei licensee and was informed that plans are being made to repair'

several sections of piping once the evaluation is complete, f b.

. Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (90712)

TheinspectorreviewedLERssubmittedto'theNRCtoverifythatthe-details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the' description

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and corrective action taken. The inspector determined whether i

further information was required, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup, _ The t

following LERs were reviewed and closed:

• 301/89-010 Unanticipated Containment Pressure Trip Signal

On October 8, 1989, an inadvertent actuation-of the reactor i

protection system occurred while performing a surveillance'on the

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containment pressure trip instrumentation.

Unit 2 received a trip

signal when two of the trip bistables generated a-trip s_ignal

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satisfying the two of three logic requirement. The unit was

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shutdown at the time. The cause was~ determined to be a combination-of operator error and procedure inadequacy. The procedure did not

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contain any precautions instructing the operator'to check for the i

existern of a tripped channel prior to performing the test and the operator did not notice that one channel was already in the: tripped D

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position from an earlier unrelated maintenance. The licensee

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subsequently revised the procedures' involved to include appropriate caution statements regarding1 tripped' channels. This event report j

was submit ed nearly one year late as discussed in paragraph 9 d.-

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LER Followup (92700)

d, The LER denoted by asterisk above was selected for additional followup.

The inspector verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility was assigned and that continued

operation of the facility was' conducted in accordance'with Technical

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Specifications and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined'in 10 CFR 50.59. Report' accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements 9d applicability to other site

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systems and components were also re Q wed.

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d.

Failure to Issue an Event Repor'i(9071'2)

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During a review of LERs, the inspector noticed that no report was l

filed for a reactor protection system (RPS) actuation which occurred on October 8, 1989. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50.73, " Licensee d

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EventReports"(301/90019-03).

The event in question is-documented

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in inspection report (266/89027;-301/89026) and'is similar to another RPS actuation which' occurred two days prior to this one.

,i An LER was submitted for the earlier RPS actuation. The inssector

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determined that corrective action;for this second actuation lad already been completed even though'no'LER was submitted. The licensee has since submitted.the missed LER, therefore, no written response to this violation is required. Although this incident N

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meets the criteria for considering enforcement discretion,' the

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licensee's past history of missed commitment dates for. LER

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I corrective actions and occasional weaknesses noted in the material

content of some LERs warrants; issuance of the violation citation.

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Plant Manaoement Chanaes (71707)

On September 17, the mechanical systems. lead engineer was promoted

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to superir,tendent of maintenance. This position had-been filled d

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since August:1 on a temporary basis:by the maintenance assistant.

d All activities were conductedlin a satisfactory manner ~ during this.

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inspection period.

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Outstanding items-(92701)--

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_ Unresolved Items j

V Unresolved items are matters about' which more 'information'is-required.

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E in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items,' items of

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noncompliance, or;devjations;. Unresolved items ' disclosed -during: the u

inspection are discussed in' paragraphs 3 9 and 8.a'.

11. - Management Meetings (30702)'(94600)'

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A Meeting was held between NRC Region III management 5and plant. management:

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on September 28, to discuss items of interest and foster improved

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consnunications'between the J11censee and the NRC.

Items of discussio'n

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included corrective action stat 0s_ of a previous electrical inspection,<

status of increasing.personne1L resources, personnel-retention, the;

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plant's corrective action improvement program, and procedural controli improvements.

o The Senior Resident inspector: met with local emergency government-officials and provided a brief on' the-resident -inspector program.

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also fielded questions regarding recent events and issues. at the. plant, j

The NRC Region II AdministratorLand a. representative from NRC'

headquarters accompanied a team from the Institute of Nuclear Plant'

Operations (INPO) during INP0's annual inspection of Point Beach from:

?q September 10 through 21.

The NRC; personnel were evaluating,INP0's N

inspection methodology with an emphasis on the maintenance area.

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12.

Exit Interview (30703)

A verbal summary of preliminary findings was provided to the licensee-

representatives denoted in.Section 1 on October 16,1990. - at' the,

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conclusion of the inspection..lNo' written inspection material was provided to the licensee during:thelinspection, y

The likely informational content _of;thesinspection report with regard to documents or processes' reviewed:during the inspection was also discussed.;

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The licensee did not identify any; documents or_ processes as proprietary.

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