IR 05000266/1986020

Insp Repts 50-266/86-20 & 50-301/86-20 on 861001-1130.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety, Maint,Surveillance,Refueling & Spent Fuel Pool Activities, IE Bulletin & LER Followup & Action on Previous Findings

ML20214W802
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	12/22/1986
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214W783	List: IR 05000266/1986020 ML20214W779
References
50-266-86-20, 50-301-86-20, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-004, IEB-86-081, IEB-86-3, IEB-86-4, IEB-86-81, NUDOCS 8706160190
Download: ML20214W802 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION'III Report Nos. 50-266/86020(DRP); 50-301/86020(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Unit 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks. WI Inspection Conducted: October 1 through November 30, 1986 Inspectors: R. L. Hague R. J. Leemon Approved By: R. DeFayette, Chief , .

Reactor Projects Section 2B late u Inspection Summary Inspection on October 1 through November 30, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-266/86020(DRP); 50-301/86020(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; refueling activities; spent fuel pool activities; IE bulletin follow-up; and licensee event report follow-u Results: No-violations or deviations were identifie ,,

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP T. J. Koehler, General superintendent G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operation

• J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - EQR W. J..Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor

• F. A. Flentje Staff Services Supervisor

• J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Section * Denotes-personnel attending exit interview . Followup on Licensee Action (92701)(92702)

(Closed)OpenItem(266/85003-01;301/85003-01): Inform NRC of results of evaluation of qualification of containment leak chase channel Submittal to NRR letter Fay to Denton dr.ted July 24, 198 (Closed)OpenItem(266/85022-03;301/850?l-03): Establish feedback mechanism for cold weather preparation check list. Licensee includes deficiencies in tracking syste (Closed)'Open Item (266/86004-01;301/86004-01): Corrective action to prevent repetitive high radiation area barricade violations. Licensee has installed swing gates barricades for bigh traffic area (Closed) Violation.(266/86010-01;301/86009-01): Loss of white instrument bus. Procedures were in place as of September 1,1986, and operator training is included in the present training cycl (Closed) Violation (266/86010-02): Rod misalignment between Rod Position Indicator (RPI) and bank position. Training and more familiarity with the

. new computer appears to have adequately resolved proble (Closed) Open Item (266/86010-03): Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)

inadvertantly opened by control operator-trainee. A training needs analysis has been performed.

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(Closed) Open Item (266/86010-04): Auxiliary operator internal contamination. Event investigation done by regional specialist. See Inspection Report (266/86016; 301/86015) for detail (Closed) Regional Request: Periodic Inspection of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation. Completed questionaire and submitted to regio . l

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(Closed) Regional Request: National Survey on PWR Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Syste Provided answers to regio (Closed) Regional Request: Valcor Engineering Part 21 Repor Reviewed licensee's actions as a result of I.E. Information Notice 86-72 and submitted findings to regio (Closed) Regional Request: TI 2500/17, Inspection Guidance for Heat Shrinkable Tubing. Reviewed licensee's actions as a result of Information Notice 86-53 and submitted findings to regio (Closed) IE Bulletin 86-04: Defective Teletherapy Timer May Not Terminate Treatment Dose. This Bulletin is not applicable to license (Closed) Unresolved Item: (266/86015-01(DRP)) Possible incorrect Technical Specification temperature limit. Details of this item are explained in paragraph . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of October and November. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviend tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Unit 2 Containment, the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plant was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspector observed a security drill from the central alarm statio The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of October and November, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedure . , , . _ . _ _ . _ - . __ _

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. At 6_:08 p.m. :on November 17,1986, Unit 1 tripped from -100% power due-to a loss-of the red instrument bus. The indicated first out was'B g Steam' Generator-low level with feed flow steam flow mismatch. _ This is

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L 'the expected indication on loss of the. red instrument bus. The loss of N thetinstrument bus wastcaused by the loss of the inverter supplying the

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red instrument bus ~due to a shorted diode which blew all four. output-fuses. During the trip all systems functioned as expected with the

' exception of: Source Range 32 failed low due to a detector malfunction; Intermediate Range 36 apparently failed low, however subsequent checks'

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one; auxiliary feed pump discharge valve-did not open due to the loss of i power from the red instrument bus. The red instrument bus was repowered 4-

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from the alternate supply approximately four minutes after the tri The reactor was taken. critical at 10:01 p.m..on November 17,_1986, and the unit was tied to the grid at 1:05 am on November. 18, 1986.

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-At'7:52 a.m.'on November _ 28, 1986, Unit 1 experienced'a 5% runback from

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'100% power. The. runback occurred while switching power supplies to the

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Unit'l white instrument bus for maintenance. Although the procedure for -

accomplishing ~the switch calls for-placing the nuclear instrumentation rod' drop circuitry for the associated power range-in the bypass position,- ,

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it was discovered that the bypass circuitry is also powered from the white instrument bus.' Therefore when a momentary power' loss occurred during the

switch, the turbine started to runback but as soon as the bypass circuitry

! was reenergized the runback was terminated.

On October 2, 1986~, at 4:30 p.m with the unit in cold shutdown and the

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reactorntrip breakers open, during the performance of a tagout required-for_. maintenance, an operator _ opened the breaker for the motor operator of an auxiliary feedwater flow control . valve. .This action caused a fuse to blow in the breaker which in turn caused a voltage spike on the Unit-2,

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instrument bus. -The voltage spike introduced a reactor trip signal. On

October 8. 1986_at 12:42 p.m., a-second perturbation to the Unit 2 instrument bus caused all low power trips (trips less than 10% power

, -associated with the P-7 interlock) to come in. The perturbation was not 1 attributed-to any testing or maintenance activities in progress at the

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i-On October 4,-1986, at 2:00 p.m., the new source range cable required by

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. Appendix "R" was being meggared._ This induced a signal into the existing -

source range cable which was high enough to cause a source range reactor trip signal. At the time the unit was in cold shutdown and the reactor trip breakers were already open for the shutdow On~0ctober 12,.1986, Unit 2 received a containment ventilation isolation "

due to an indicated spike from radiation monitor (RE 303). The average

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G-reading was 10E-10 and the spike was 10E-2. A sample taken on the exhaust stack showed no increase in iodine. The spike from the radiation monitor appeared to be caused by noise. The defueling was stopped and the containment was evacuated. Containment air samples were then taken.

i Containment purge supply and exhaust was restarted and the containment i clean-up fans were started. The air samples showed that the containment was at 12.9% MPC for a 60-hour work week. During the period of time that

the purge and supply was secured, portable blowers were exhausting the

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steam generatorLmanways to.the containment.- This caused the increase in

. activity. . The blowers were shut off and two hours later the containment atmosphere was 2% MPC for a 60-hour work week. Defueling was then recommenced., A regional inspector. reviewed the licensee's actions and

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proposed ~ modifications-to prevent recurrence (see Inspection Report-50-266/86016(DRSS); 50-301/86015(DRSS))..

At.5:56 a.m. on November- 28, 1986, Unit.2 was taken critical ending refueling-12. Major work accomplished during the outage included; reactor; vessel.up-flow modification, containment integrated leak rate test, and various fire protection modifications. At 8:43 a.m. on November 28, 1986, during BOL Physics Testing, a reactor trip occurred from "A" Steam Generator low low level. At the time the operator was controlling temperature with the atmospheric steam dumps. The steam dump for the "B" S/G stuck shut which resulted in all the steam being-dumped from the "A" Steam Generator. Attempts to recover level with--

auxiliary feed flow were unsuccessful. All systems functioned as require On November 28, 1986, while the reactor.was subcritical, a mechanic entered the Unit 2 containment to take hot measurements on snubbers attached to'the pressurizer power operated relief valve discharge header. The mechanic noted that one of the snubbers was not perpendicular.to the pipe it was supporting. Further investigation by the mechanic revealed that three of five snubbers were improperly

~a ttached to the piping. The snubbers were~ reattached and declared operational at 1:30 p.m. and .the reactor.was.taken critical at 2:021 .

on November'28, 1986. A check of the corresponding snubbers in Unit 1

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disclosed one snubber which was not properly secured to the pipin .The licensee is investigating the cause and the-safety implications of the loose snubbers. This is an Open Item (301/86020-01(DRP)).

A Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on steam generator minimum pressurization temperatures has been submitted to the licensee by Westinghouse. This matter was considered an Unresolved Item in report-50-266/86015-01(DRP) which described an apparent discrepancy between the-requirements of Technical Specifications (TS) and the technical manual for the new model 44F steam generators installed in Unit 1. The safety evaluation concluded that there were no outstanding safety or TS issues.-

The evaluation stated that the requirement that steam generators may not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator vessel shell is below 70 degrees F.was valid and conservative for both units steam' generators. Therefore, no TS change was required. The

-. Technical Specification only establishes one point on the temperature-pressure curve for pressurization of the steam generator Other. points are established administratively by the license Westinghouse's SER also showed these administrative limits to be valid and conservativ No violations or deviations were identifie .

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.. . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications require'd surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and

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Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in accordance'with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure

. requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing vere properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities on Unit 2:

Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Pressurizer Pressure Calibration Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing and Tube Pluggin tubes in the "A" Steam Generator and 58 tubes in the

"B" Steam Generator were plugge Reactor Vessel Inspection ORT 3: Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of AC No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc ,

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iThe followirig maintenance act' /ities were observed / reviewed:-

Repair"of_ Unit 1 containment upper hatch interlocks -

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Installation of nozzle _ dams in~ Unit 2 steam generators

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Installation of new 2X01-C main power transformer

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Completion of limitorque wiring modification

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Replacement ~of valve 755A-Unit 2 component cooling water system >

Installation 'of new computer for Unit 2

' Inspection / repair of Unit'2 MSIVs

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Eddy current testing of the 4D diesel generator glycol cooler Installation of thermocouples in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump During the shutdown of Unit 2 for the refueling outage the Main Steam

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Isolation Valves (MSIVs) could not be' shut from the control room. The-

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licensee prepared a 'special maintenance procedure to _ inspect and-repair as necessary. :The Atwood.& Morrill Technical Representative was called-to the site.for consultation. Upon disassembly of the valve, it was determined that the cause<for the MSIV failure was binding of the

. packing on the shaft. The valve operated normally after loosening the

. gland. nu Prior to receiving an operating license, the licensee made a modification to the~ valve ~which removed a lantern ring from the stuffing box and replaced it with additional rings of packing. When the' valves were disassembled, they were found to have 12 rings of packing in each stuffing box. After: evaluation,.the licensee decided to reduce the number of packing rings to eight in each stuffing box. After reassembly, a series of tests for valve hang-up with varying gland nut torque-values at both

- cold and hot conditions .was performed. -During the final hot testing'

the: gland nuts were' torqued to 90 ft lbs and no apparent sticking eviden The gland nut torque was then reduced to 60 ft lbs no appreciable gland steam leakage-was observed. Stroke time tests were performed afterwar The."A" MSIV closure test was performed three times with a maximum closure time of 1.38 seconds. The."B" MSIV closure test was performed 10 times with a maximum closure time of 3.37 seconds. Technical Specifications-require a closing time of five seconds or les The MSIVs at Point Beach, although Atwood & Morrill, are not the same type as. described in I.E.~Information Notice 86-81, " Broken

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Inner-External-Closure Springs on Atwood & Morrill Main Steam Isolation Valves".

The licensee plans to perform a special maintenance procedure on Unit l's MSIVs during it's next refueling outag '

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Refueling Activities (60710)

The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by Technical Specifications; observed 5 shifts of the fuel handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical Specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedure The major modification performed on Unit 2 during the refueling outage was the up-flow modification to the core barrel. The purpose of the modification is to minimize the differential pressure across the baffle plates, thereby eliminating baffle jetting which caused fuel' rodlet wear and eventual cladding failure. Evidence of this failure mechanism was noted during the last refueling outage on both units. The up-flow modification required the plugging of 16 holes in the core barrel which allowed inlet coolant to flow down between the core barrel and the baffle plates. In addition eight holes were electrostatically cut in the upper most baffle support plate to allow coolant to flow up between the core barrel and baffle plates. Although this modification has been performed on other Westinghouse Reactors, Point Beach has experienced delays due to tooling problems and the confines of the annulus between the thermal shield and the core barrel. During the plugging process four parts from the tool and one plug were dropped between the thermal shield and the core barrel. The plug and two of the tool parts were located and retrieved. The other tool parts, a nut and a key, could not be foun Although these missing parts probably fell to the floor of the cavity, an analysis was performed to verify that based on their size and mass they would not cause any problem even if they found their way into the primary syste Another modification completed during the outage was the installation of nozzle dams in the Unit 2 steam generators. This modification will allow eddy current testing of the steam generator tubes to proceed concurrently with other activities requiring t!ie cavity to be full of water. This will make future outage planning less dependent on eddy current testing or tube plugging problem At the completion of Unit 2 refueling catage and after installation of the upper internals and control rod iatching, the licensee performed individual control rod lift testing. While testing control rod E-3, lift force deflections were noted at various intervals throughout the lif Investigation revealed that these deflections corresponded to the elevations of the guide cards internal to the guide tube. The upper

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internals were: removed and the control rod,.the= lead screw, and the

guide tube internals were inspected. The control rod was found-to thave~a bent. vane. -No other abnormalities were identified and the control rod was replaced from spare No violations'or deviations were identifie .. Surveillance - Refueling (61701)

-The inspector. observed refueling outage related surveillance.. testing on Unit 2 to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures, that the procedures used were consistent with regulatory requirements,' licensee commitments, and administrative controls; that

. minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were completed,

..special test _ equipment was calibrated and in service, and required data was recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of personnel conducting the. test were adequate; and that the test results were adequate. The inspector witnessed all or portions of_.the following Unit 2 tests:

Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Pressurizer Pressure Calibration-Steam. Generator Eddy Current ~ Testing and Tube Pluggin tubes in the "A" Steam Generator and 58 tubes in the:

"B" Steam Generator were plugge Reactor Vessel Inspection-ORT 3: Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of AC

.No violations or deviations were. identifie . Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)

. , A new method of . failed fuel rod detection was performed during the

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outage. This method uses an. ultrasonic probe which can determine

' which fuel.rodlet.or rodlets in a fuel assembly have through wall

' defects based on the principle that-a-failed fuel rodlet will have

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water-in it and the water inside will produce a different return signal.than a gas filled rodlet. By using this method the licensee found one failed rodlet in assembly F-54 which.was internal to'the

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fuel assembly would not have been detected by visual. inspectio .Another procedure used for the first time at. Point Beach consisted of the removal of a failed rodlet by drilling through the top nozzle-o f the fuel assembly and extracting the failed rodlet intact, there i

by allowing the assembly to be reused. The licensee is in the process

.of evaluating the possibility of utilizing these methods during-future

, refuelings.

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No. violations or deviations were identified.

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, IE Bulletin Followup (92703)

For the IE Bulletin listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, included the information required to be reported, included adequate corrective action canmitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that management forwarded copies of the written response to the onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written respons Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-0perated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification LER Closeout 266/86-003-00 Unit 1 Runback Due'to The Loss of The White Instrument Bus 301/68-003-00 Unit 2 Runback Due to The Loss of The White Instrument Bus 266/86-004-01 Unit 1 Misaligned Rod Indication During Power Escalation to Greater Than 75%

301/86-004-00 Unit 2 Failure of Main Steam Isolation Valves to Close 301/86-005-00 ' Unit 2 Containment Isolation Valves Leak Rate in Excess of Technical Specification Limits 301/86-006-00 Unit 2 Reactor Trip Signals Due to Work Activities During Refueling Outage

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No violations or. deviations were identifie . ,

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-1 Open' Items Open items are. matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

.will'be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some actico on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph thre . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. . The inspectors also-discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did.not identify.any such documents / processes as proprietary.

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