IR 05000255/1997009

Insp Rept 50-255/97-09 on 970708-0827.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Engineering

ML18067A727
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	10/14/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18067A726	List: IR 05000255/1997009 ML18067A725
References
50-255-97-09, 50-255-97-9, NUDOCS 9710280055
Download: ML18067A727 (16)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No.:

License No.:

Report No.:

Licensee:,

Facility:

Location:

Dates:

Inspectors:

Approved by:

9710280055 971014 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G

PDR REGION Ill 50-255 DPR-20 50-255/97009(DRP)

Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Ml 49201 Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043-9530 July 8 through August 27, 1997 M. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector P. Prescott, Resident Inspector B. Fuller, Resident Inspector, D. C. Cook J. Maynen, Resident Inspector, D. C. Cook Bruce L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 I

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• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Report No. 50-255/97009 This inspection reviewed aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering and plant support. The report covers a 7-week period of resident inspectio *

Operations

Operators missed several opportunities to notify plant management of a step change in main turbine vibration (Section 01.2).

• The inspectors concluded that although the Consumers Energy load distribution center and the Michigan Electric Power Coordination Center are an integral part of the Consumers Energy system, these organizations exert minimal influence on the Palisades facility. The Palisades facility is unique in that personnel maintain control of the Palisades switchyard to ensure additional reliability (Section 01.3).

Maintenance

The licensee initially treated the turbine.vibration sensitivity testing as a routine maintenance activity. Based on unexpected test results, the licensee determined that a more thorough procedure and pre-job briefing was needed. The second testing evolution was performed in an orderly manner with appropriate controls in place (Section M 1.1 ).

Engineering

The specific root cause for the "C" channel thermal margin monitor failures could not be conclusively identified. However, the licensee's final evaluation appeared adequate. The licensee missed several opportunities to address "C" channel failures in early 1997 and was slow to focus adequate resources to solve the problem (Section E 1.1).

• The inspectors identified the potential for a shortage of available lubricating oil to supply the emergency diesel generator in the event of a design basis accident. In response, the licensee took prompt action and procured a sufficient amount.of oil. Administrative controls were implemented to ensure a sufficient quantity of lubricating oil would be maintained (Section E1.2).

Licensee response was prompt and thorough to the step change increase in main turbine vibration (Section E1.3).

• The inspectors concluded that the. new perspective used by system engineers to perform system health assessments resulted in identification of system performance problems that would not have been identified by using only the maintenance preventable functional*

failure criteria specified in the maintenance rule. Looking beyond the required maintenance rule indicators to determine system performance and incorporating support system performance, showed a willingness of system engineers to be critical of their respective systems. (Section E1.4).

Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at essentially full power for the entire inspection period. August 27, 1997, marked the 1 a9th day of continuous power operation. This was the second longest continuous power run for Palisade I. Operations

Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. The conduct of operations was considered by the inspectors to be good; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed belo.2 Step Increase in Turbine Vibration Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed event.s concerning the step increase iri turbine vibration. Control room logs and recorder data were reviewed and discussions were held with operations management. Operations procedure revisions, performed in response to the event, were also reviewe Observations and Findings

. At approximately midnight on the morning of July 8, 1997, main turbine and generator vibration took a step change increase on several bearings. Concurrently, lake temperature was also rapidly changing resulting in changes to the main turbine seal oil temperature and condenser vacuum. Both conditions can affect bearing vibration. The vibration monitor for low pressure (LP) turbine bearing number three indicated the greatest step change (approximately three mil). However, the monitor for all main turbine and generator bearings indicated changes for each bearing. The "A" shift nuclear control operator (NCO) noted the changes, but did not consider the changes significant because bearing vibrations were less than the normal maximum of six mil and the bearing high vibration alarm occurs at seven mil. The NCO did not notify the control room supervisor nor log the main turbine bearing vibration increase in the log book. The control room supervisor had observed vibration trends throughout the shift, but did not recognize the step change increase in vibration. The "B" shift oncoming NCOs were also aware of the increase in bearing vibration, but accepted the "A" shift NCO's explanation of changing lake conditions. Another opportunity to identify the increase in bearing vibration was missed when the problem was not discussed at the "B" shift turnover meeting. -

Operations scheduling staff were told of the changes by the "A" shift NCO. Operations scheduling personnel brought the vibration issue to plant management's attentio Licensee management quickly utilized system engineering and main turbine vendor personnel to analyze the significance of the step change increase in main turbine vibration. The licensee subsequently determined a piece of shroud from a stage of the LP

turbine was the cause of the increase in vibration. Details of the licensee's root cause analysis of this event are discussed in Section E1.3 of this inspection repor Previously; control room operations personnel had no guidance to address a step change in main turbine vibration. Operations support personnel initiated action to revise procedure SOP 8, "Main Turbine and Generating Systems," to provide specific guidance for a two mil or greater step increase in turbine vibration. The annunciator response procedure was also placed in the revision process to provide specific direction to plant operators any time turbine vibrations increase. Interim guidance was provided by system engineering and turbine vendor personnel pending approval of plant procedure change Conclusions Specific procedural guidance for responding to changes in main turbine vibration did not exist prior to July 8, 1997. Operators missed several opportunities to notify plant managemen.3 Michigan Electric Power Coordination Center Visit Inspection Scope The inspectors toured Consumers Energy' load distribution center and the Michigan Electric Power Coordination Center (MEPCC). The purpose of this tour was to establish appropriate contacts with licensee personnel and to achieve a better understanding of regional grid reliability issues and the relationship between the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions and the interconnected networks that comprise the U.S. bulk power system.. Observations and Findings On August 14, 1997, the inspectors toured the Consumers Energy load distribution center and the Michigan Electric Power Coordination Center (MEPCC). The Consumers Energy load distribution center personnel control the Consumers Energy transmission network and overall switching and tagging for the transmission system, including the Palisades switchyar *

The MEPCC is a joint venture between Consumers Energy and the Detroit Edison Company. The MEPCC is used to coordinate planning and operation of the two companys' systems. The M~PCC is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan and is used for a combined generation dispatch and for controlling interchanges with utilities outside Michiga Through the MEPCC, Consumers Energy and Detroit Edison, joined 26 other electric'

utilities and five coordination centers in forming a regional group called the East Central Area Reliability Coordination Group (ECAR) for the purpose of achieving more economical and reliable electric service. The center is used to coordinate the interchange of power between Consumers Energy and Detroit Edison, as well as the interchange of power with adjacent utilitie *

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The center is used to control all power plants operated by both companies, estimating daily load requirements, regulating energy sales between the members and other systems, and accounting for all interconnected sale Conclusions Based on a tour of the load distribution center and the MEPCC, the inspectors determined that both facilities are an integral part of the Consumers Energy syste However, the load distribution center and the MEPCC exert minimal influence on the Palisades nuclear facility. Load distribution center personnel typically control plant switchyards along. with the transmission network; however, the Palisades facility is unique in that Palisades personnel maintain control of the switchyard to ensure reliabilit.

Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92701 and 92701)

0 (Closed) Unresolved Item 96002-01: Exceeding thermal power limit. On February 7, 1996, operations started a one hour delithiation in accordance with plant procedure The procedures allowed exceeding the maximum licensed steady-state thermal reactor power of 2530 MW. This event was discussed in detail in Inspection Reports No. 50-255/96002 and 50-255/97008, and resulted in a violation (50-255/97008-01). The corrective actions for this item will be tracked under the violation; therefore, this item is close.2 (Closed) LER 96006-00-01: Average reactor power level exceeded license limit. On February 7, 1996, operations started a one hour delithiation in accordance with plant procedures. The procedures resulted in exceeding the maximum licensed thermal reactor power of 2530 MW. This event was discussed in detail in Inspection Reports No. 50-255/96002 and 50-255/97008, and resulted in a violation (50-255/97008-01). The corrective actions documented in the LER will be tracked under the violation; theref9re, this LER is close.3 (Closed) LER 97001-01: Tave less than 525° F when reactor critical. On January 6, 1997, on two occasions, Tave dropped below 525° F while the reactor was critical. These events were discussed in detail in Inspection Report 50-255/96017, and resulted in a violation (50-255/96017-01). The corrective actions documented in the LER will be tracked under the violation; therefore, this LER is close II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Inspection Scope (62707 and 61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:

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Work Order No:

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24713094:

24713286:

Surveillance Activities

Q0-17:

DWT-12:

Ml-4:

Q0-1:

R0-128-2:

Q0-15:

"C" Temp. Margin Mqnitor: Error 75 troubleshooting Waste Gas Compressor, C-50A: Troubleshooting and repair Thermal Margin Monitor Constant Checks "C" Channel Monitoring Reactor Parameter Pressurizer Low Pressure Safety Injection System Initiate and Pressurizer High Level Alarm Safety Injection System Diesel Generator 1-2 24-Hour Load Runs lnservice Test Procedure - Component Cooling Water Pumps* Observations and Findings The inspectors observed work in progress and determined that the work was performed in a professional and thorough manner. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Work packages for observed work activities were.

reviewed by the inspectors for thoroughness and were found to be comprehensive with respect to the mandated tasks and appropriately specified post-maintenance testing requirements. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring work. When applicable, work was done with the appropriate radiation control measures in plac Conclusions Overall, the inspectors observed good procedure adherence and maintenance and radiation worker practices. Specific observations are detailed belo M1.2 Turbine Generator Vibration Sensitivity Testing

. Inspection Scope (62707)

On July 23 and 25, 1997, system engineering and turbine vendor personnel conducted testing on the turbine generator to determine the sensitivity of turbine vibration in response to variations of the load placed on the turbine jacking bolts. The testing was conducted in response to an increase in turbine vibration that the licensee suspected was caused by a loss of a section of turbine shroud, which was detailed in Section 01.2 of this inspection report. Based on the results of the sensitivity testing, the licensee planned to make adjustments to decrease vibration levels to allow continued operation of the turbine generator until the next refueling outage. The inspectors observed portions of the pre-job briefs and testing. The work order, surveillance procedure and obtained data were reviewed and discussed with system engineers involved with the testing: Observations and Findings The licensee initially treated the turbine vibration sensitivity testing as a routine maintenance activity. Consequently, the vibration sensitivity test was at first performed in

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• accordance with a vendor procedure that was part of a work order package, rather than the more stringent guidelines normally used during the performance of a surveillanc Torque was first applied to the jack bolts at the south end of the generator. The objective was to verify that the foundation of the generator was not degraded. The licensee expected that vibrations would decrease or remain constant during the testin A pretest brief was held with the nuclear control operators (NCOs) prior to the testing. A jack bolt on the southeast corner of the main generator was initially torqued to 400 ft-lbs, with a 70.3 mil rise in vibration observed, then to 1000 ft-lbs. The procedure allowed torquing the jack b.olts in sequence to 1650 ft-lbs and proceeding to a maximum torque value of 3300 ft-lbs. Upon reaching the torque value of 1000 ft-lbs, vibration in the number eight generator bearing rose from 5. 7 to 7.0 mil, as registered on the control room recorder. The turbine vibration increase was contrary to the NCOs' expectatio The NCOs stopped the test and the jack bolts were returned to the pretest positio Initially, the vendor test proceoure had no limits on turbine vibratio Licensee management was apprised of the test results and the testing methodolog Subsequently, management provided specific testing guidelines to the turbine test team, advising the team that all contingencies, including an increase in turbine bearing vibration, should be considered and proceduralized before further testing continued. The system engineer and vendor revised the test procedure. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure and attended the second pre-test briefing. The procedure was revised to require that the jack bolts be torqued in increments of 100 ft-lbs and included limits on bearing vibration. The test team conducted a thorough pretest brief with involvement of the shift engineer, ensuring that all personnel were aware of their responsibilities during the testin Testing was resumed and conducted in a more carefully controlled manner using the smaller increments to increase jacking bolt torque (100 ft-lbs). The smaller increments allowed data gathering for.later analysis by the licensee and the vendor's vibration analysts. Following testing, all jack bolts were returned to their original positio Conclusions The licensee initially treated the turbine vibration sensitivity testing as a routine maintenance activity. The licensee's observation of unexpected test results revealed the ne.ed for a more thorough procedure and pre-job briefing for the mechanics and control operators. The second testing evolution was performed in an orderly manner with appropriate controls in plac M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)

M (Closed) LER 97005-00: Operation of the plant outside the design basis due to an unacceptable repair. On December 20, 1996, both main steam isolation valves were found to be leaking steam from the plugged west stuffing box leakoff points; however, the subsequent valve repairs were not performed in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Section XI as required. This event was discussed in detail in

• Inspection Reports 50-255/96017 and 50-255/97005, and resulted in three violations (50-255/97005-01, -02, and -03). The corrective actions documented in the LER will be tracked under the violations; therefore, this LER is close Ill. Engineering E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Thermal Margin Monitor (TMM) Reliability Problem Inspection Scope (37551 and 61726)

The inspectors observed portions of licensee testing, troubleshooting and root cause analysis of the "C" channel of the thermal margin monitor (TMM) due to a suspected video card reliability problem. Applicable work orders and surveillance procedures were examine *

. Observations and Findings On June 7, 1997, the "C" channel TMM failed. The licensee suspected that the failure was caused by a bad video card based on the error message received on the video display of this solid state device. The "C" channel card that failed was a reconditioned card. The "C" channel TMM thermal margin/low pressure (TM/LP) and variable high power (VHP) trips were actuated. The card was replaced with another reconditioned card, tested and declared operable. Subsequent to the. failure, plant management was informed by system engineering personnel of similar failures occurring on another video card installed in a spare TMM chassis. The spare TMM chassis was bench tested from February through May 1997 with a newly received reconditioned video card. The bench testing on the spare chassis resulted in similar failures of the video card, as determined by the display of an error signal message. This type of failure occurred on the bench tested card approximately dail On June 8 and June 16, the same error code was again received on the "C" channel TMM. The "C" TMM was declared inoperable, tested and declared operable. System engineers initiated discussions with the vendor on the problem. On July 9,.the "C" channel TM/LP and VHP trip units were placed in bypass and declared inoperable due to reliability concerns. The licensee took this action, but believed that a valid trip signal would have been received on the "C" channel TMM if it had been left in operation. This placed the plant in a Technical Specification (TS) sevAn-day action statemen Troubleshooting by the licensee and vendor identified a potential problem with the 12 Vdc power supply. When the voltage was lowered on the spare bench unit, the same error code was received. The inspectors observed the testing and questioned the testing methodology. During the bench test, the inspectors noticed that power supply voltage was lowered too quickly. Incremental voltage adjustments could have provided greate_r ___.... --~-

assurance that low voltage from the power supply was the problem. The licensee exited the seven-day TS action statement on July 11, in the belief that low voltage from the 12 Vdc power supply was the cause for the TMM failures.

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On the morning of July 12, the "C" channel TMM experienced the same error code. The

"G' channel TMM was declared inoperable and the associated TM/LP and VHP trips placed in bypass. In response to this failure, system engineering personnel requested plant management to provide additional resources to determine the root cause of the suspected video card failure. However, the root cause determination effort was adversely affected when a calibrated video card was inadvertently sent back to the vendor for reconditioning, instead of an identified failed spare. On July 16, the TMM vendor arrived onsite with the known "good" video card. Troubleshooting indicated the problem may have been with the latest reconditioned video interface cards. The vendor noted, by use of a digital oscilloscope, differences in the data output signals between a good video card and a suspect video card. Also at this time, the licensee/vendor team identified a physical difference between the known good and suspect video cards. The input/output (1/0) communication chips had different part numbers. Visually, it could be seen that the suspect video cards had plastic coated 110 chips and the good video cards were ceramic coated. Based on this evidence, the video card was replaced with a vendor supplied ceramic 110 chip video board. Operability testing was performed and completed satisfactorily. On the afternoon of July 18, the "C" channel TMM was declared operabl Conclusions

• Although the specific root cause for the "C" channel TMM failures was not conclusively identified, the licensee's final evaluation appeared adequate. The licensee did mis opportunities to identify this problem in early 1997 during bench testing and was slow to focus adequate resources to solve the problem..

E1.2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Lubricating Oil Consumption Inspection Scope (37551 and 61726)

The inspectors observed portions of the 24-hour EOG 1-2 surveillance and reviewed surveillance data. A specific item of interest to the inspectors was the amount of lube oil (LO) consumed during the surveillance. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical Specification (TS) requirements for the EDGs were also reviewe Observations and Findings Nuclear control operators performed R0-128-2, "Diesel Generator 1-2 24-Hour Load Run," to verify requirements in the proposed Standard Technical Specifications (STS)

revisions. One revision in the proposed STS requires successful performance of a 24-hour surveillance. Part of the surveillance is run at full design bases accident load conditions. Another revision of the proposed STS requires mc;iintaining a sufficient supply of LO for the EOG at accident condition loads for seven days. For the proposed STS, the licensing group used vendor recommendations that were based on an assumption that the amount of LO consumed would be approximately 0.8-1.0 percent of fuel oil used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis for determining LO consumption. The..

analysis, using historical data of fuel oil consumed, assumed that LO consumption would be 1.04 gallons per hour (gph), which is 175 gallons over a seven day period. The amount of LO actually required to maintain the normal LO level during the EOG 1-2 surveillance was 1.38 gph, or 231 gallons over a seven-day period. Two reasons explain the higher LO consumption rate: the EOG 1-2 was overhauled in December 1996, with

• new cylinder liners installed. A 24-hour run was done, but did not include determination of LO consumption. Newly rebuilt engines tend to have an initially higher LO consumptio If the EOG oil sump was at the high level when a design accident occurred, it would have a reserve of two days before reaching the low level alarm setpoint. An additional 16 gallons of LO would be required to maintain LO above the low level alarm setpoint for five additional days. However, plant procedures do not require the operators to maintain LO level high, but allow level to be maintained within the sump high/low level band. The inspectors also verified the amount of LO maintained onsite. Only three 55 gallon drums of oil (165 gallons) were in storage. Also, only three barrels were required by the computer inventory program to be onsit The inspectors discussed with the system engineer and procurement personnel the fact that approximately 231 gallons of LO would have been consumed ovefa seven~day period at the rate of oil used during the surveillance. It was also pointed out that only 165 gallons of oil were onsite and when combined with the average level of LO maintained in the EOG sump, would constitute a quantity of LO that may be insufficient to provide lubrication to the EOG over a seven-day period. The licensee realized the potential for a shortage of LO after it was brought to their attention by the inspectors. Five more barrels of oil were procured, which arrived onsite within a few days for a total of eight barrels onsite. Four barrels were marked for emergency use only. A TS surveillance was prepared to verify monthly the number of barrels onsit The actions taken by the licensee were viewed as conservative. The present Technical Specifications in the design bases discusses fuel oil storage and supply. A day tank provides a diesel enough oil for operation for a minimum of seven days. The Technical Specifications further state that.it is expected to be possible to obtain fuel oil from several offsite sources within a 70 mile radius in less than three days under the worst weather *

conditions. The inspectors concluded the same could be done for the lubricating oi Conclusions Discussions by the inspectors with the system engineer and procurement personnel resulted in prompt action by the licensee to order additional lube oil. Administrative controls were also put in place to ensure a minimum amount of oil is maintained onsit E1.3 Response to Main Turbine Vibration Increase Inspection Scope (37551 and 61726)

The inspectors observed engineering personnel respond to the step change increase in main turbine vibration. Meetings between engineering personnel and the vendor to determine how to troubleshoot the increase in main turbine vibration were attended by the inspectors-and compensatory measures were reviewed. The operations aspect of this--

event is detailed in Section 01.2 of this inspection repor.

~ Observations and Findings Engineering management quickly organized resources from system engineering and the main turbine vendor to form a team to analyze the significance of the step change increase in main turbine vibration. This team determined that the root cause of the increase in vibration on the main turbine was a loss of approximately three ounces of a small piece of shrouding on one stage of the low pressure turbine* blades. The licensee developed a schedule for supplemental monitoring of critical vibration points on the main turbine and generator. Estimates of how long the main turbin~ would continue to operate were developed from the historical data gathered from other utilities that had experienced similar main turbine vibration conditions. The licensee also developed repair options should the plant experience a forced outag Conclusions Engineering personnel response to the increase in main turbine vibrations was prompt and thorough. An engineering and vendor team issued specific compensatory actions to plant operators should further increases occur in main turbine vibration. Additional vibration monitoring activities were initiated to ensure comprehensive tracking and trending of critical areas on the main turbin E1.4 High Pressure Safety Injection CHPSI) Reliability Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors described reliability problems with the HPSI pumps in Inspection Reports No. 50-255/97002 and 50-255/97005. These reliability problems included two time over-current relay breaker trips of pump P-66A and failure of the HPSI discharge cross-tie control valve (CV-3018). The inspectors reviewed portions of the HPSI system maintenance history. As part of the review, discussions were held with. the system enginee Observations and Findings The inspectors discussed with the system engineer overall HPSI system performanc The inspectors noted that the system engineer, in preparation for a system health as_sessment (SHA}, used an overall system approach to assess HPSI system performance. In the SHA, the system engineer summarizes. system performance over a quarterly period, which is then presented to management. As part of the SHA, a determination is made if the system met performance criteria established for the maintenance rule. After completion of the HPSI system assessment, the system engineer downgraded the HPSI system performance from satisfactory to marginal and requested that the system be placed in maintenance rule (a)(1) status. This was done to ensure that the appropriate level of management attention was focused on the HPSI system and*its support system The system engineer based the SHA and rating on total system performance over the past two years. On five occasions the HPSI system failed to perform as expecte However, not all failures met the criteria for consideration as a maintenance rule maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF). The maintenance rule criterion for

the HPSI system is to have less than two MPFFs in 24 months. The major components of the HPSI system have performed reliably for the past two years with the exception of an instance of unavailability due to foreign material because of a maintenance error which resulted in a yellow plastic bag clogging the P-66A pump in July 1995. A closing coil fuse for the P-668 pump failed during a surveillance in April 1996. This failure was the fourth instance in 38 months involving the breaker coil. A spare breaker was installed in June 1996. Only the bre.aker was placed in category (a)(1) of the maintenance rule. The P-66A pump motor breaker time over-current relay problems occurred in February and July 1996. The time over-current relay problems were not categorized as MPFFs due to the inconclusive findings of the root cause analysis. The success of the HPSI system health assessment was attributed by the inspectors to the new perspective used by the system engineer in determining system health by utilizing criteria more restrictive than the maintenance rule criteria used to determine MPFF Another failed component was the high pressure air system pressure control valve (CV-3018) that plugged in March 1997. The system engineer for the high pressure air system used the same approach as the HPSI system engineer to focus proper management attention on that system. At the SHA meeting for high pressure air, plant management determined that it would also classify the system as a Maintenance Rule (a)(1) system. This decision was based on the number of design concerns with the high pressure air system and because the inspection of the pressure control valves (PCVs)

had found dirt in the screens. The high pressure air system had high availability, but there are currently a number of maintenance work orders to clean PCVs and relocate in-line air filter Currently, management intends to have the HPSI system engineer discuss the reliability issues that were used in determining system performance and the impact of support systems at a system engineering standdown meeting. The system engineer has developed a comprehensive evaluation process to ensure the HPSI system is reliable prior to removing the system from the maintenance rule (a)(1) categor Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the new perspective used by system engineers to perform system health assessments resulted in identification of system performance problems that would not have been identified by using only the maintenance preventable functional fai.lure c*riteria specified in the maintenance rule. Looking beyond the required maintenance rule indicators to determine system performance and incorporating support system performance, showed a willingness by system engineers to be critical of their respective system..

IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection R1.1 Maintenance Activities and Daily Radiological Work Practices Inspection Scope (71750 and 83750)

The inspectors observed radiological worker activities during various maintenance activities detailed in this inspection report and also monitored radiological practices during daily plant tour Observations and Findings The inspectors' observation of jobs in progress during the maintenance activities detailed above revealed that radiation technicians were visible at the job sites. The technicians took appropriate actions and surveys in accordance with good ALARA practice Conclusions The inspectors concluded that radiological practices observed during the maintenance activities and plant daily walkdowns were adequat V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on ~ugust 27, 1997. No proprietary information was identifie...

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. A. Fenech, Senior Vice President, Nuclear, Fossil, and Hydro Operations T. J. Palmisano, Site Vice President - Palisades G. B. Szczotka, Manager, Nuclear Performance Assessment Department D. W. Rogers, General Manager, Plant Operations D. P. Fadel, Director, Engineering S. Y. Wawro, Director, Maintenance and'Planning R. J. Gerling, Manager, Design Engineering P. D. Fitton, Manager, System Engineering T. C. Sardine, Manager, Licensing J. P. Pomeranski, Manager, Maintenance D. G. Malone, Shift Operations Supervisor M. P. Banks, Manager, Chemical & Radiation Services K. M. Haas, Manager, Training M. E. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector, Palisades P. F. Prescott, Resident Inspector, Palisades B. J. Fuller, Resident Inspector, D. C. Cook J. D. Maynen, Resident Inspector, D. C. Cook l

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• IP 37551:

IP 61726:

IP 62707:

IP 71707:

IP 71750:

IP 83750:

IP 92701:

IP 92902:

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observation Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Occupational Radiation Exposure Followup Followup - Maintenance ITEMS CLOSED 50-255/96002-01 URI Exceeding thermal power limit 50-255/96-006 LER Average reactor power exceeded license limit 50-255/97-001 LER Tave less than 525° F when reactor critical 50-255/97-005 LER Operation* outside design basis due to an unacceptable repair

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A LARA ASME CFR CV DRP DWT ECAR EOG FSAR Ft-lb gph HPSI 110 IP LER LO MEPCC Ml MPFF MW NERC NRC NCO PCV PDR QO RO RPS SHA SIS SOP STS TM/LP TMM TS URI Vdc VHP LIST OF ACRONYMS USED As Low As Reasonably Achievable American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code of Federal Regulations Control Valve Division of Reactor Projects Daily Weekly Technical (procedure)

East Central Area Reliability Emergency Diesel Generator Final Safety Analysis Report Foot-Pound Gallons Per Hour High Pressure Safety Injection lnpuUOutput Inspection Procedure Licensee Event Report Lubricating Oil Michigan Energy Power Coordination Center Monthly Instrumentation & Control (procedure)

Ma.intenance Preventable Functional Failure Megawatts North American Electric Reliability Council Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Control Operator Pressure Control Valve Public Document Room Quarterly Operations (procedure)

Refueling Operations (procedure)

Reactor Protection System System Health Assessment Safety Injection System System Operating procedure Standard Technical Specifications Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Thermal Margin Monitor Technical Specification Unresolved Item Volts Direct Current Variable High Power