IR 05000255/1997012

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Insp Rept 50-255/97-12 on 970922-26.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Radiological Effluents & Radiological Environ Monitoring Programs
ML18067A749
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Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/25/1997
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NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
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ML18067A748 List:
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50-255-97-12, NUDOCS 9710300196
Download: ML18067A749 (15)
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Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No:

License No:

Report No:

Licensee:.

Facility:

Location:

Dates:

Inspector:

Approved by 50-255 DPR-20 REGION Ill 50-255/97012(DRS)

Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530 September 22-26, 1997 R. Glinski, Radiation Specialist Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-255/97012 This inspection was conducted to review the implementation of the radiological effluents and radiological environmental monitoring programs (REMP) at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant. The inspection also included a review of the plant staff's corrective actions for a radwaste system violation, the response to a recent abnormal release of radioactive gas into the auxiliary building, and the operation and repair of the waste gas system. The following conclusions were reached:

The REMP was well implemented in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and data showed that plant operations did not have a discernible radiological impact on the environment. Recent maintenance initiatives, coupled with a new type of charcoal cartridge, improved air sampling pump oper~bility. Minor errors in REMP procedures indicated a lack of attention to detail by Chemical and Radiological Services (C&RS) staff (Section R1.1 ).

The radiological effluents program was well managed and implemented in accordance with the Technical Specifications {TS) and ODCM. Staff utilized appropriate sample collection and analysis methodology, and the licensee's dose assessment calculations demonstrated that offsite radiation dose to the public was well below regulatory limit However, several procedures referenced an outdated TS amendment which indicated a lack of attention to detail by C&RS staff (Section R1.2).

  • Engineering staff effectively identified and addressed a variety of problems regarding the waste gas system (WGS) operation and materiel condition which had caused operator workarounds and personnel contaminations. However, numerous problems remain with WGS material condition and due to concerns in this area Region Ill staff will continue to review licensee actions to minimize operator work arounds and radiological incidents (Sectipns R2.1 and R4.1 ).

The corrective actions for an inadequate procedure violation pertaining to handling solid radwaste were completed and plant personnel effectively implemented these actions during a recent spent resin sluice. Additionally, the licensee's solid radwaste system design review and improvement plan identified significant component and process issues which were being addressed by plant staff (Section R3.1 ).

The C&RS staff response to the abnormal gaseous release from the waste gas surge tank was appropriate, and the effluent dose calculations were accurate. In addition, the assessment of the total effective dose equivalent of the workers in the area of the release was thorough and comprehensive (Section R4.1 ).

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  • Report Details IV. Plant Support R1 Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Implementation of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMPl Inspection Scope (IP 84750)

The inspector reviewed the 1996 Annual REMP report, the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), the Technical Specifications (TS), the 1996 Land Use Census, and REMP sampling procedures. In addition, the inspector observed air sampling and interviewed Chemical and Radiological Services (C&RS) staff regarding the REMP progra Observations and Findings The inspector observed that the air sample collection technique ensured sample integrity and that the samples were appropriately labeled and packaged for shipment. Review of the air collection worksheet revealed that staff correctly calculated the total air sample volume. Plant staff also used two separate methods to verify that there were no air leaks within the* sampling apparatus which could have invalidated the volume calculatio The inspector did not identify any concerns regarding the materiel condition of the air sampling equipment. Plant staff indicated that the operability of this equipment was excellent and that a January 1997 cleaning/rinsing of the pumps conducted to address 1996 operability problems would be continued as an annual prev~ntative maintenanc In addition, the change to a new type of charcoal cartridge had eliminated a previous problem associated with the accumulation of "fines" downstream within the pum Records for 1996 and 1997 demonstrated that all of the flow meters were within the current calibration perio Plant personnel conducted. the REMP sampling, analyses, and reporting in accordance with the ODCM. In particular, the inspector noted that the plant exceeded the ODCM sampling requirements and that the vendor laboratory analyzed the samples to detection limits which were below the required values. The land use census was conducted as required, and staff properly determined that the critical receptor for the meat pathway had changed for 199 The 1996 annual REMP report was submitted in a timely mariner and contained all the data and descriptions of deviations required by the TS and the ODCM. The 1996 REMP data indicated that there was no discernable radiological i'mpact on the environment from plant operations and that all the sampling sites were as described in the ODCM. The inspector identified minor errors and references to the former TS in some of the REMP procedures, indicating inattention to detail by C&RS staff. However, there were no

procedural compliance issues as a result of these minor procedural errors. The inspector

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noted that C&RS staff conducted the required annual audit of the REMP and an audit of the TLD processing laboratory and regularly updated the monthly sample collection/

analysis checklist Conclusions The REMP was well implemented in accordance with the ODCM, and data showed that plant operations did not have a discernible radiological impact on the environment. The recent maintenance initiatives on air sampling pumps and the change to another type of charcoal cartridge improved vacuum pump operability. Minor errors in REMP procedures indicated a lack of attention to detail by C&RS staf R1.2 Implementation of the Gaseous and Liquid Effluents Program Inspection Scope (84750)

The inspector reviewed the liquid and gaseous effluent program, including the TS requirements, 1997 effluent data, procedures, the ODCM requirements, the 1995 and 1996 Annual Radioactive Effluent and Waste Disposal (AREWD) Reports, and a Nuclear Performance Assessment Department (NPAD) audit. In addition, the inspector observed effluent sampling and interviewed C&RS staff regarding the effluent progra Observations and Findings The methodology for determining the radioactivity content of the gaseous effluents from the site stack utilized a radioactive gas effluent monitor (RGEM) to obtain composite air samples for particulate-iodine-noble gas analysis. The inspector observed that the stack effluent RGEM sample col,lection methodology ensured sample representativeness and integrity. Analyses and quantification of stack releases were conducted in accordance with procedures. The iodine isotopes and* particulates present in the stack effluents were quantified by gamma spectrometry, and ttie noble gas content was calculated from the calibration curve of the RGEM noble gas detector. Monthly composites of the air filters were analyzed by a contract laboratory for strontium-89/90, gross alpha, and plutonium-239. The stack air volume was determined from the weekly average flow of the ventilation system and the time duration of the release. The inspector did not identify any material condition concerns with the sampling equipment or analysis methodolog Gaseous batch releases were quantified by analysis of grab samples collected prior to stack release. The release pathways included waste gas decay tank releases, steam generator steam dumps, condenser off-gas releases, and containment purges. The inspector observed that. waste decay tank samples were collected, analyzed, and quantified according to procedure. The iodine isotopes, noble gases, and particulates were determined by gamma spectrometry of grab samples collected prior to.each batch release. For the tritium content of steam generator steam dumps and condenser off-gas, samples were collected prior to release and analyzed by liquid scintillation counting. The inspector also noted that the tritium release from reactor cavity and spent fuel pool evaporation were conducted in accordance to the ODCM and station procedure. *

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In 1996, the plant conducted 31 gaseous batch releases, and there was also one abnormal release. The inspector reviewed 1997 release packages for a variety of releases and verified the radiological calculations were accurate. The total gaseous activity released in 1996 was 68.48 curies. of which nearly 85% was noble gases and 15% was tritium. The Pu-239 analyses, conducted in response to the 1993 fuel failure, were all below the detection limit. The 1996 gaseous effluent activity was well below the 177 curies released in 1995. The site practice of generally storing radioactive gas in waste gas tanks for at least 60 days to facilitate decay enabled the plant to maintain gaseous releases significantly below the FSAR source term Calculations for the gaseous offsite dose were conducted in accordance with the ODCM methodology. Plant staff utilized the NRC computer code GASPAR (which employs dose calculations from NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 - RG 1.109) for the offsite dose calculations. The gaseous radionuclide concentrations and the offsite doses were well below both ODCM and TS limits. The calculated offsite gaseous effluent dose was also below the FSAR calculated maximum dose Plant staff conducted five liquid batch releases from storage* tanks in 1996. Samples were collected and analyzed for tritium and gamma emitting radionuclides prior to tank release to ensure the effluent concentrations would be below the 10 CFR 20, Appendix B limits. The inspector observed that the collection and composting of turbine sump, lake in, service,.lake out, and condenser pump discharge water samples w~re conducted in accordance with procedure. Samples for liquid releases were analyzed for gross alpha, strontium-89/90, and plutonium-239 by a vendor laborator The radiological content of the 1996 liquid releases was just over 205 curies and was almost entirely tritium. This liquid release activity was 60% greater than the 1995 value, which was attributed to the release of the clean water tank T-90. The water from T-90 was normally reused within the plant, but due to high silica levels this water was discharged to the lake. Although this activity was greater than 1995 levels, the activity was within the regulatory and station limits. As with the gaseous radwaste system, the C&RS staff effectively utilized the liquid radwaste system to maintain the liquid effluents ALARA by the effective l,JSe of filter demineralizer Calculations for the liquid offsite public dose were conducted in accordance with the ODCM methodology. Plant staff utilized the NRC computer code LADTOP (RG 1.109 methodology) for these offsite dose calculations. The liquid radionuclide concentrations (including entrained or dissolved gases) and the offsite doses were well below both regulatory limits and the FSAR calculated maximum dose The inspector noted that plutonium~239 was detected in one liquid release sample, while gross alpha was detected in three samples, and there was no offsite dose calculation regarding this.radioactivity. Due to the high dose per curie factor associated with alpha emitters and the amount of spent fuel dispersed within the primary coolant system in 1993, the inspector asked whether the C&RS staff had confirmed that the transuranic liquid effluent dose was insignificant and was, therefore, not required to be assesse The NRC RG 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 1 O CFR Part 5 Appendix I (Revision 1 ), states that a pathway is considered significant if a conservative evaluation yields an additional dose increment equ;:il to or greater than 10% of the total from all pathways. In response, C&RS staff calculated from the 10 CFR Part 61 scaling factors that the transuranic dose would be less than 0.5% of the total liquid effluent dos The inspector verified this calculation and determined that the methodology was appropriate. Staff conducted monthly, quarterly, and year-to-date assessments of effluent dose in the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS) logbook in accordance with procedural, TS, and regulatory requirement The ODCM was revised in May 1996 in accordance with the TS, primarily due to land use census changes. The 1996 AREWD report was submitted in a timely manner. The inspector identified several effluent procedures which contained references to an outdated TS, indicating a lack of attention to detail by C&RS staff. An NPAD audit of the effluents program also identified an incorrect TS reference. The reference to the outdated TS did not affect the validity of the procedure Conclusions The effluents program was well managed and effectively implemented in accordance with the site TS and ODCM. Staff utilized appropriate sample collection and analysis methodology, and the dose assessment calculations demonstrated that offsite radiation dose to the public was well below regulatory and TS limits. However, several procedures referenced an incorrect TS amendment which indicated a lack of attention to detail by C&RS.staf R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Operation and Materiel Condition of the Waste Gas System (WGS) Inspection Scope (IP 84750)

The inspector interviewed cognizant engineering staff and reviewed the FSAR and 1997 system assessments regarding the operation and maintenance of the waste gas system (WGS). Observations and Findings Engineering staff noted that the WGS had experienced numerous occasions where potentially flammable mixtures were present within waste gas decay tanks and that there had been several operator work arounds, primarily pertaining to tank level control. In the past, gaseous leaks and releases within the plant, which resulted in personnel

  • contaminations, were attributed to a combination of WGS materiel condition and operational problems. The licensee precluded explosions in the WGS via ignition source
  • elimination (diaphragm valves and compressors, electrical grounding) in accordance with the ODC..
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In early 1997, plant personnel determined that the following practices contributed to the potentially flammable mixtures: (1) sluicing resins caused the movement of oxygen into the WGS from the vacuum de-gasifier and the venting of demineralizer tanks to the waste gas surge tank (WGST); (2) hydrogen was passed to the gas decay tank when gases were trapped in WGS piping; and (3) air in-leakage through a sight glass with an incorrect gasket. Further review showed that the equipment drain tank (T-80) gas over:-pressure control, dirty waste drain tank (T-60) relief valve operation, inadequate purging in plant evolutions, and the WGST (T-67) operating pressure and isolation valve operation also contributed to the WGS problems. During system walkdowns, staff identified five leaks in the WGS and the need to repair waste gas compressor discharge check valves. In particular, the waste gas compressor C-50A discharge check valve had multiple failures (stuck in the open position) which may have caused gas to recirculate into the WGST and subsequently, resulted in decreased compressor performance and the continued worker contamination concerns (See Section R4.1 ). In addition, the low-level vent gas header continues to be plugged periodically by spent resi In particular, station personnel have encountered the following problems regarding the operation of WGS components and the WGST. Recently, plant staff determined that there was approximately 25 gallons of.contaminated water in the WGST, which was not observed because this amount of liquid was below the level of the sight glass. After plant personnel discovered and drained this liquid from the WGST, the radiation levels dropped from 400 milliroentgens per hour (mR/h) to 15 mR/h, indicating the presence of a significant source term. Site engineering staff determined that the sources of this water were resin sluicing activities and inappropriate operation of the vacuum de-gassifie During sluices of primary resins, the demineralizer tanks were vented to the WGST, and the venting was considered complete when water was detected in the vented air (this vented air was humid). In addition, the vacuum de~gassifier pump was constantly in recirculation, and the resultant pump heat vaporized humid air into the gas space, which was then transferred to the WGST. The humid air from these sources subsequently rusted the carbon steel check valves of the WGST. Plant personnel have properly addressed these concerns through changes in operating procedures and WGST repairs.

Although the WGS was capable of fulfilling its intended function to store and vent waste gas, plant personnel decided to monitor the WGS in accordance with 1 O CFR 50.65 (a)(1 ), due to the overall poor performance of the system. To date, site staff have taken the following actions to improve the performance and materiel condition of the WGS:

(1) the sight glass leak was repaired which doubled the compressor cycle time; (2)

vacuum degasifier recirculation time was reduced to decrease the humidity; (3) waste gas compressor leaks were repaired; (4) the WGST is currently operated at a positive pressure - as the system was designed; (5) full venting of the dirty waste tank to the stack; and (6) several WGS purging procedures have been changed. In addition, a site team was assembled to address WGS issues; plant staff contacted other nuclear facilities

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~regarding their WGS operation; progress was made toward an upgrade of the equipment

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  • drain tank gas pressure operation; and the WGS maintenance work order backlog decreased from 28 in the 1997 first quarter to 18 in the second quarte Due to the current and past history of poor WGS materiel condition, operational, and maintenance problems, and the operator work arounds and radiological incidents associated with these problems, Region Ill staff will continue to review the licensee's actions regarding the WGS issues as an Inspection Followup Item (IFI 50-255/97012-01 ). Conclusions The inspector noted that engineering staff effectively identified a variety of problems regarding WGS operation and materiel condition which had resulted in operator work arounds and radiological incidents. Plant.personnel have also recently expedited numerous improvements in WGS materiel condition, operational procedures, and system maintenance. Regional staff will continue to review the WGS performance regarding the minimization of operator work arounds and personnel contamination R3 RP&C Procedures and Documentation R3.1 Corrective Actions to Address an Inadequate Procedure Violation Inspection Scope (IP 92904)

The inspector interviewed cognizant engineering staff and reviewed the procedural and process changes implemented to correct deficiencies associated with the handling of spent resins. The inspector also reviewed the radwaste system improvement plan and design revie Observations and Findings On December 23, 1996, plant personnel sluiced spent resin from a demineralizer tank to a spent resin storage tank. However, spent resin traveled through a degraded retention screen and was distributed throughout the equipment drain system, which changed radiological conditions within the plant. The NRC identified that the procedures which governed the handling of solid radwaste were inadequate (VIO 50-255/97004-01 ). The licensee's response stated that procedures and processes would be revised and that a plan for improving. the solid radwaste system would be develope The inspector verified that several plant procedures pertaining to resin sluicing evolutions were revised to include requirements for pre-and post-job briefs, sluicing precautions and limitations, indications for the loss of resin control, pre-and post-job radiation surveys, the proper method to monitor the radwaste system re~in inventory, administrative limits for resin volumes in tanks, and the responsibility of the Radioactive Waste System Engineer

- -*-:------tCJproper1y*maintain the Radioactive Waste System Notebook. The applicable

procedures also contained detailed checklists to ensure that the required tests and steps are performed and that authorized personnel have approved the actions. In addition to an accounting for resin inventory, procedures require the use of radiation surveys and a

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periodic opening of the spent resin storage tank manway for visual confirmation of the inventor The resident inspection staff observed the most recent sluice of spent resin from the spent fuel pool demineralizer tank T-50, through the intermedi(3te sluice tank T-69, to the T-100 spent resin storage tank. The resident staff noted that the sluice was well controlled [See Inspection Report 50-255/97011 (DRP)]. During this sluice, the clean waste filters were again plugged by the presence of sludge/resin from past plant operations. Site staff stopped the work, replaced the filters, and then successfully completed the sluice. The regional inspector noted that radiation protection staff conducted the appropriate post-job radiation surveys on system tanks and pumps, and the 4.2 roentgen per hour reading from the survey of T-69 indicated that residual spent resin remained in this storage tank. The radwaste system engineer recorded the sluice information in accordance with the revised procedure. The inspector determined that plant personnel effectively implemented the revised procedures and properly controlled the sluicing activitie The radwaste engineering staff conducted a design review and developed a plan to improve the solid radwaste system. Contacts with other nuclear facilities indicated that level indicators for these systems were largely unreliable, required high radiation dose for maintenance, and the data was generally inaccurate. Therefore, the licensee decided that a modification to add tank level indication was not justified. Plant staff also reviewed past maintenance history and determined that the T-100 retention elements, relief valve, and vent screens were the only components that contributed to resin sluice problems. In response, the staff implemented a process to periodically replace these components ar;id the initial replacement occurred in April 1997. This improvement plan also addresses the maintenance backlog, the feasibility of bypassing one resin storage tank (T-69) and one transfer pump (P-107), and the issue of high levels of silica in the spent fuel pool. The inspector noted that the radwaste system design review and improvement plan were comprehensive and identified significant issues which were being addressed by plant staf The inspector also reviewed the 1996 videotape of the*dirty waste drain tank room and discussed with engineering staff that there appeared to be a pipe support that was sawed in two, with the top portion remaining suspended and the bottom portion remained in place: The system engineer conducted a walkdown and determined that this support was part of the original system that was not installed. Plant staff indicated that this support would be removed. The inspector discussed with station management that NRC regional inspection staff would conduct a comprehensive review of the actions taken by the various station departments to address the issues identified by plant personnel in the videotapes of.the radwaste system. * Conclusions The inspector concluded that the spent resin handling corrective actions were appropriate and that plant personnel effectively implemented these actions during a recent spent

resin sluice. Additionally, the solid radwaste system design review and improvement plan identified significant component and process issue R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C R4.1 Staff Response to an Abnormal Gaseous Effluent Release Inspection Scope (IP 84750).

The inspector reviewed the C&RS staff response to an abnormal gaseous effluent release within the auxiliary building. This review encompassed radiological data, dose assessments, and interviews with C&RS staf Observations and Findings The NRC assessment of the related maintenance activities is presented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-255/97011 (DRP). On August 6, 1997, maintenance staff incorrectly isolated a relief valve (RV-1114) with a fluted tap instead of a screw during a leak test of the waste gas compressor C-50A. In response to the problems identified, maintenance workers conducted repairs on the C-50A on August 12, 1997. At this time, chemistry personnel initiated routine sampling of the Volume Control Tank (VCT). These sampling actions purged the fresh VCT gas into the Waste Gas Surge Tank (WGST) as was expected. However, this purge subsequently pressurized the relief valve, and the radioactive gas from the WGST leaked by the fluted tap into the room which was occupied by the crew of five maintenance personnel working on C-50A. After a short *

time, operations staff noted an upward trend on the stack monitor (RIA-2326) and an area radiation monitor {RIA-1809) alarmed soon thereafter. The stack monitor reading reached 1300 counts per minute (cpm), which was well below the 16,000 cpm alert alarm set point for declaring an Unusual Even. When the area radiation monitor alarmed, the auxiliary building ventilation tripped as designed. Operations staff instructed chemistry staff to cea~e sampling, and the auxiliary building was evacuated. Upon egress from the auxiliary building, the five workers alarmed the personnel monitors (PCM-1 Bs). The PCM-1 B data indicated that the alarms were from diffuse contamination, possibly due to noble gas. The workers waited for approximately 45 minutes to allow for radionuclide decay, but four workers could still not clear the PCM-1 Bs. Since the PCM-1 Bs are sensitive to beta and gamma radiation, C&RS staff conducted whole body frisks with hand held instruments to ensure that the contamination was not due to particles. All frisker results were less than 100 cpm an C&RS sent the maintenance crew for whole body counts (WBC). The electronic dosimeter data showed a maximum dose of 0.3 millirem (mrem) and a maximum dose rate of 4 mrem per hour for the crew. The inspector noted that C&RS staff effectively

_evaluated externa!_~_xp_os1:1res for toe~e R~rsonr:ie All the maintenance work crew subsequently Cleared the PM-7 exit monitors (which are sensitive only to gamma radiation) and the WBCs indicated the presence of the noble gasses xenon-135/138 at less than 50 nanocuries. The total dose estimate was less than

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  • 1 mrem and the workers left the site. The following day, these workers successfully cleared the PCM-1 B In addition to evaluating worker exposure, C&RS staff restricted access to the auxiliary building and conducted various radiological surveys. The staff noted increased readings on auxiliary building friskers and continuous air monitors (CAMs). collected an air sample, and performed contamination surveys. The air sample showed the presence of seven noble gasses at a concentration of 4.24 derived air concentrations (DACs), but no iodines or particulates were detected. Because the airborne concentration was fess than 10 DACs and the worker exposure was less than 100 DAG-hours, a skin dose assessment from the noble gas exposure was not required. The inspector noted that the C&RS radiological surveys and skin dose assessment were appropriat Approximately 90 minutes after the initial area radiation monitor alarm, contamination surveys of the auxiliary building were all fess than 100 cpm and the area monitor readings returned to normal. The estimated volume of released VCT gas was 1700 milliliters and C&RS staff estimated a total release of approximately 734 millicuries of noble gas to the environment. Subsequent staff calculations based on the noble gas mix demonstrated that the release was 0.14% of the 10 CFR Part 20 effluent concentration limit. The C&RS staff considered this event an abnormal gaseous effluent release and planned to include a description of this event in the 1997 annual effluent repor Conclusions The inspector determined that the C&RS response to the abnormal gaseous release from the WGST was appropriate and the effluent dose calculations were accurate. In addition, the staffs actions to assess the total effective dose equivalent of the workers in the area of the release was thorough and comprehensiv RB Miscellaneous RP&C Issues R8.1 {Closed) VIO 50-255/97004-01: Inadequate procedures for handling and logging spent resin in the solid radwaste system. On December 23, 1996, plant personnel sluiced spent resin from a demineralizer tank to a spent resin storage tank. However, spent resin traveled through a degraded retention screen and was distributed throughout the equipment drain system, which changed radiological conditions within the plant. The corrective actio.ns included procedural and process revisions, and the development of a radwaste system improvement plan. The inspector determined that the procedural revisions pertaining to resin sluicing activities and the revised resin inventory process were appropriate, and the resident inspection staff observed that a recent sluice was conducted in accordance with the new procedures. The inspector also noted that the improvement plan identified significant issues (See Section R3.1 ). This item is close X1 * ExifMeeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection findings to members of licensee management during an exit meeting on September 26, 1997. Plant personnel did not indicate that any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietar *

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee M. Banks, C&RS, Manager J. Beer, Technical Support Supervisor E. Bowen, System Engineer W. Doolittle, Duty Health Physicist Supervisor M. Grogan, REMP/RETS Analyst C. Kozup, Licensing Engineer M. Menucci, C&RS Assessment T. Neal, Environmental Supervisor T. Palmisano, Site Vice President and General Manager L. Phillips, System Engineer C. Plach.ta, Health Physics Operations Supervisor D. Rogers, Operations Manager R. Simonsen, System Engineer

  • G. Szazotka, NPAD Manager M. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector, Palisades P. *Prescott, Resident Inspector, Palisades INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 84750, "Radioactive *waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring" IP 92904, "Followup - Plant Support" LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-255/97012-01 IFI Continued operator workarounds and radiological concerns regarding the waste gas system Closed 50-255/97004-01 VIO Inadequate procedures for handling and logging spent resin in the solid waste system Discussed 50-255/97010-01 IFI Evidence of equipment leaks and poor housekeeping in radwaste treatment rooms

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  • Annual Radioactive Effluent and Disposal Continuous Air Monitor Chemical and Radiological Services counts per minute Derived Air Concentration Final Safety Analysis Report High Efficiency Particulate Air Nuclear Performance Assessment Department Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Radioactive Effluents Technical Specifications Regulatory Guide Radioactive Gas Effluent Monitor Thermoluminescent Dosimetry Technical Specifications Volume Control Tank Whole Body Count Waste G.as System Waste Gas Storage Tank

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LISTING OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Final Safety Analysis Report Sections: 11.1 - Source Terms, 11.2 - Liquid Radioactive Waste System, 11.3 - Gaseous Radioactive Waste System,.11.5.3 - Effluent Sampling and Monitoring Technical Specifications Sections: 6.5 - Program Manuals and 6.6 - Reporting Requirements Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) Health Physics Procedure No. HP 10.10, Revision 5, "Palisades Radiological Environmental Program Sample Collection and Shipment".

PNP Procedure No. HP 10.1, Revision 6, "Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Surveillance".

PNP Procedure No. HP 10.4, Revision 5, "Preparation of the Palisades Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report".

PNP Procedure No. HP 10.11, Revision 2, "Land Use Census".

PNP Procedure No. HP 10.6, Revision 2, "Execution of GASPAR Code - Palisades and Big Rock Point".

PNP Procedure No. HP 10.7, Revision 4, "Execution of GASPAR Code - Design Basis*

Quantities, Palisades and Big Rock Point".

PNP Procedure No. HP 10.8, Revision 2, "Execution of LADTOP Code - Palisades and Big Rock Point".

PNP Procedure No. HP 6.5, Revision 11, "Sampling Waste Gas Decay Tank".

PNP Procedu.re No. HP 6.6, Revision 12, "Evaluation and Release of Waste Gas Decay Tank".

PNP Procedure No. HP 6.1, Revision 4, "Radwaste Sampling".

PNP Procedure No. HP 6.4, Revision 22, "Radioactive Liquid Calculation and Release Authorization".

PNP Procedure No. HP 6.15, Revision 7, "RETS Effluent Logbook".

PNP Procedure No. HP 6.29, Revision 8, "Atmospheris Steam Dump Valve, Steam Generator Code Safeties and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Release Calculations".

PNP Procedure No. HP 6.30, Revision 6, "Gaseous Tritium Effluent".

PNP ProcedureNo.-HP 6.-51Yevision 6, "Radiological Effluent Operating *P;~c~dure".

PNP Procedure No. HP 6.14, Revision 8, "Containment Purge".

PNP Procedure No. DWR-10, Revision 18, "Stack Effluent Samples, Calculations, and Records".

PNP Administrative Procedure No. 7.08, Revision 4, "Big Rock Point and Palisades

  • Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program".

Gaseous Effluent Releases 97-001-G, 97-002-G, 97-001-SD, 97-002-SD, 97-004~G. 97-005-G, 97-007-G, 97-002-ST, 97-006-ST; 97-012-ST, 97-020-ST, 97-026-ST, 97-039-ST, 96-042-Liquid Effluent Releases 97-001-R, 97-002-R, 97-004-R, 97-006-R, 97-011-R, 97-025-R System Health Assessment - Waste Gas System, 1st Quarter 1997 System Health Assessment - Waste Gas System, 2nd Quarter 1997 Engineering Analysis; Position on Assessment of Beta Skin Dose Due to Submersion in Noble Gasses, EA-JLF-97-008, dated February 13, 199 *

Evaluation of Condition Report C-PAL-97-114 REMP Self-Assessment, "TLD Collection/Air Station Audit", dated 7/28/9 C-PAL-96-0253A, "Audit of the Teledyne Midwestern Laboratory for an Assessment of Sample Accountability".

NPAD Audit PT-'97-02, "Palisades Radiological Effluent Technical Specification and

. Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program", dated 3/13/97. *

Action Item Record A-CMT-97-069, Commitment No. 2010645, dated September 16, 199 PNP Action Plan No. 44; Radwaste System Improvement Plan, dated August 22, 199 PNP System Operating Procedure (SOP) No. SOP-17A, Revision 23, "Clean Radioactive Waste System".

PNP Procedure No. SOP-17B, Revision 26, "Dirty Radioactive Waste System".

PNP Procedure No. SOP-18B, Revision 14, "Radioactive Waste System - Solid".

PNP Procedure No. SOP-27, Revision 29, "Fuel Pool System".

PNP Procedure No. SOP-2B, Revision 14, "Chemical and Volume Control System Purification and ChernlGQI Jnje_c!lQo".________ _

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PNP Administrative Procedure No. 1.15, Revision 0, "Performance of Job Briefings".

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