IR 05000255/2020004
| ML21043A019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/2021 |
| From: | Billy Dickson NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | Corbin D Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2020004 | |
| Download: ML21043A019 (25) | |
Text
February 11, 2021
SUBJECT:
PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2020004
Dear Mr. Corbin:
On December 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Palisades Nuclear Plant. On January 21, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palisades.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palisades. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000255 License No. DPR-20
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000255
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-004-0030
Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Palisades Nuclear Plant
Location:
Covert, MI
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2020 to December 31, 2020
Inspectors:
E. Fernandez, Reactor Inspector
G. Hansen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
P. Laflamme, Senior Resident Inspector
V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist
C. St. Peters, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Palisades, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Follow Procedure Results in an Arc to Ground and Entry into Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 36 "Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)" Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000255/2020004-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71152 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred on September 9, 2020, when the licensee failed to follow plant procedure EN-MA-101, "Conduct of Maintenance." Specifically, the licensee's failure to correctly implement step 5.3.2c of procedure EN-MA-101 resulted in the supervisor getting involved in the hands-on work. This resulted in an arc to ground of safety-related DC breaker 72-118, subsequent unanticipated opening of valve CV-0910 "CCW Supply to Containment" and valve CV-0911 "CCW from Containment" due to a loss of power, standby CCW pump start, and consequential tank T-3, "Component Cooling Water Surge Tank," level drop requiring entry into AOP-36, "Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)."
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000255/2020-002-00 LER 2020-002-00 for Palisades Nuclear Plant,
Indications Identified in Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Nozzle Penetrations 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
The plant began the inspection period shutdown in mode 6 for a refueling outage. On October 20, 2020, the plant was taken critical and successfully synced to the grid on October 21, 2020. The plant achieved rated thermal power on October 27, 2020, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed onsite portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and onsite. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems on December 1, 2020
- Spent fuel pool
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Component cooling water (CCW) on November 9, 2020
- (2) Left train auxiliary feedwater (AFW) on November 17, 2020 (3)7B service water pump system on November 24, 2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the 1D 2.4KV electrical bus system on December 11, 2020.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Station Battery Room, Fire Area 11, on November 16, 2020
- (2) Station Battery Room, Fire Area 12, on November 16, 2020
- (3) Mechanical Equipment Rooms, Fire Area 30, on November 23, 2020
- (4) Mechanical Equipment Rooms, Fire Area 31, on November 23, 2020
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an annual fire drill on December 3, 2020.
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) 1C Switchgear Room on December 22, 2020
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) VHX027A Engineering Safeguards Room cooling coil on December 4, 2020
===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) The inspectors documented a partial completion of this inspection procedure in inspection report 05000255/2020003. During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensees actions to address a flaw which was below recordable threshold during the last outage. The licensee reexamined the nozzle, identified the flaw had grown, and repaired the nozzle.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during vacuum fill on October 15, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated SER-406, Revision 2 on November 23, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Radiation monitoring system during the week of December 14, 2020
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
(1)125 VDC vital power system during the week of November 23, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated risk during planned maintenance on battery charger #2 and right train AFW flow control valve testing on October 26, 2020.
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Technical specification sodium tetraborate basket weight evaluation on October 7, 2020
- (2) CV-0826 past operability evaluation on October 9, 2020
- (3) Core exit thermocouple cabling evaluation on October 21, 2020
- (4) Service water to containment air cooling system evaluation on November 20, 2020
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 84697: Thermal margin monitor system channel D display replacement modification on December 17, 2020.
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Control rod testing on October 28, 2020
- (2) Control rod number 2 maintenance and testing on October 29, 2020
- (3) Battery charger number 2 testing on November 18, 2020
- (4) P-52C CCW pump maintenance and testing on December 16, 2020
- (5) P-55C charging pump maintenance and testing on December 22, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R27 activities from August 30 to October 27, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Quarterly 7C service water pump test on November 19, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Local leak rate testing on November 12, 2020
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors completed an evaluation of submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes on December 10, 2020. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Evaluated exercise on October 27, 2020
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Tabletop exercise on November 10,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's characterization of the following radioactive waste shipments:
(1)2020-RW-003; Clean Radwaste Filters (2)2020-RW-004; Primary Purification Filter (3)2020-RW-006; Primary Purification Resin
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
(1)2020-RW-003; Clean Radwaste Filters Shipped as LSA-II (2)2020-RW-004; Primary Purification Filter Shipped as Type B (3)2020-RW-006; Primary Purification Resin Shipped as Type B
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2019-September 30, 2020
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2019-September 30, 2020
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in equipment reliability that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on December 10, 2020.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)1-2 EDG starting air system leak evaluation as documented in CR-PLP-2020-00239 on December 21, 2020
- (2) Electrical maintenance near miss arc fault evaluation as documented in CR-PLP-2020-3261 on November 24, 2020
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000255/2020-002-00, Indications Identified in Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Nozzle Penetrations (ADAMS Accession No. ML20314A143). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER and therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Follow Procedure Results in an Arc to Ground and Entry into Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 36 "Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)"
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000255/2020004-01 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71152 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1a occurred on September 9, 2020, when the licensee failed to follow plant procedure EN-MA-101, "Conduct of Maintenance." Specifically, the licensee's failure to correctly implement step 5.3.2c of procedure EN-MA-101 resulted in the supervisor getting involved in the hands-on work. This resulted in an arc to ground of safety-related DC breaker 72-118, subsequent unanticipated opening of valve CV-0910 "CCW Supply to Containment" and valve CV-0911 "CCW from Containment" due to a loss of power, standby CCW pump start, and consequential tank T-3, "Component Cooling Water Surge Tank," level drop requiring entry into AOP-36, "Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)."
Description:
On September 9, 2020, with the unit shutdown in mode 6, the site attempted to remove a temporary modification that powered up selected ED-11-2, 125 VDC Panel, breaker loads. In preparation to remove the jumper on 13-TV4 terminal 120 from a lug, a supervisor observing the work asked to take a closer look to help gather more information. As the supervisor looked, he accidentally touched a wire which contacted an energized component and caused an arc to ground. In their review, the inspectors noted that the supervisor helping to gather more information by getting involved in the hands-on work was contrary to step 5.3.2c of procedure EN-MA-101, which states, "ensure that the oversight role of the supervisor is maintained and not compromised by getting involved with the hands-on work." As a result, the arc to ground resulted in safety-related direct current (DC) breaker 72-118 tripping open.
The breaker opening resulted in the loss of the 125V DC power supplied to CCW containment isolation valves CV-0910 and CV-0911, which immediately opened per design.
This configuration change allowed the CCW system to fill a previously drained portion of CCW piping inside containment. The unanticipated CCW inventory movement resulted in CCW standby pump autostart, subsequent tank T-3 level drop to 2 percent, resultant low-level alarm in Control Room, and actuation of the autofill system per design. In response, the site entered AOP-36, "Loss of CCW," for tank T-3 low-level alarm and verified autofill system restored T-3 inventory to the normal level.
The inspectors reviewed the associated apparent cause analysis for the event, maintenance rule evaluation, control room logs, and interviewed operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel. In their review, the inspectors noted that CCW supply header pressure and temperature remained constant during the CCW system inventory movement and the autofill system functioned as designed. The inspectors also noted that the licensee determined the movement of CCW inventory to be a maintenance rule functional failure because the autofill system is not safety-related and could not be relied upon to mitigate the unanticipated movement of inventory. Specifically, the T-3 inventory capacity was significantly less than the volume of drained CCW piping inside containment, and the autofill system was not a credited makeup source. As a result, if the autofill system had failed to actuate, a loss of CCW net positive suction head to the CCW pumps would have likely occurred. Therefore, the inspectors concluded, the loss of DC and resultant movement of CCW inventory presented a potential challenge to the CCW system operability that could upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered AOP-36 "Loss of CCW," ensured water level was restored to tank T-3, and performed an apparent cause analysis (ACA) for the event. In addition, the licensee conducted a stand down with all electrical maintenance supervisors to discuss and reinforce supervisor roles and responsibilities.
Corrective Action References: CR-PLP-2020-3261, CR-PLP-2020-3262
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to ensure a supervisor stay in role and not get involved in the hands-on work of gathering information on a jumper the workers were attempting to remove in accordance with EN-MA-101 step 5.3.2c was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix G, Shutdown Safety SDP. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 2, the inspectors screened the finding as Green because it did not increase the likelihood of a shutdown initiating event, did not result in a loss of coolant or inventory, did not involve a loss of offsite power, did not involve a loss of residual heat removal or level control, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire, flood, or other external event.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the licensee did not stop work when they were unable to remove the jumper from the temporary modification. This resulted in the licensee supervisor performing hands-on data gathering which caused an energized component to make contact with a grounded component and the DC breaker tripping open.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February,1978. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 1 addresses Administrative Procedures. The licensee established Procedure EN-MA-101, Revision 33 to address conduct of maintenance while performing work on safety-related equipment, including jumpers.
Contrary to the above, on September 9, 2020, the licensee failed to implement step 5.3.2c of EN-MA-101. Specifically, the licensee supervisor got involved in hands-on work which resulted in an arc to ground and DC breaker 72-118 tripping open. DC breaker 72-118 tripping open then opened two containment isolation valves, CV-0910 and CV-0911, which allowed water to fill a previously drained portion of CCW, T-3 low-level alarm, and entry into AOP-36.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: 1-2 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System Leak Causal Evaluation Review 71152 The inspectors reviewed the associated causal evaluation, extent of condition review, and corrective actions taken associated with an air leak identified on PCV-1490, "1-2 EDG 'B' Starting Air Pressure Control Valve." The inspectors noted the direct cause was improper diaphragm seating resulting from improper manufacturing/assembly at the manufacturer. In their review, the inspectors concluded that the air leak identification, causal evaluation, extent of condition, and subsequent valve replacement were all completed in a timely and effective manner commensurate with safety significance. No issues of significance were identified.
Observation: Semiannual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors' review focused on equipment reliability and considered the results of daily inspector Corrective Action Program (CAP) item screening and licensee trending efforts. The inspectors' review nominally considered the six months of July 2020 through December 2020, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when warranted by the trend's scope.
The inspectors reviewed condition reports, trend reports, and engineering calculations addressing human performance and equipment reliability at the site. During the inspection period, the NRC inspectors noted a few challenges to equipment reliability. Specifically, the inspectors observed and reviewed activities associated with the "B" primary coolant pump (PCP) seal degradation, elevated control rod drive (CRD) leakage trends and temperatures leading into the refueling outage, and "B" main feed pump (MFP) thrust bearing spurious elevated vibration alarms.
The inspectors noted that the licensee identified and monitored the PCP seal degradation.
Also, the inspectors noted that the licensee performed a weekly trend analysis of the seal pressures. Regarding the CRD leakage trends and temperatures leading into the refueling outage, the licensee monitored the parameters and then performed maintenance during the outage on the CRDs. The inspectors also noted for the B MFP thrust bearing vibration alarms that the licensee performed an engineering calculation and then a temporary modification to address the issue. Although these issues illustrated a challenge to equipment reliability, the inspectors did not identify an adverse trend during this assessment period.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 21, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. D. Corbin, Site Vice President Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 19, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Mr. D. Lucy, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 10, 2020, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection results to Mr. D. Malone, Emergency Planning Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
04621
Notification from the National Weather Service of a High
Wind Warning for Van Buren County
11/14/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04749
Cold Weather Checklist-1 (SOP-23, Attachment 8) was
Submitted for the Official Record with Missing Signatures
11/30/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04851
During Rounds, NPO noticed V-32B, Screen House Roof
Vent Fan, Making Excessive Noise
2/11/2020
Procedures
SOP-23
Plant Heating System
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
03646
EX-02, Station Power Transformer No. 1-2
09/19/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
03981
Received Alarm EK-0547, 125 Volt DC Bus Ground,
Unexpectedly
10/04/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
03983
South End Ball of E-54A Surface Corrosion
10/04/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04389
CRD-18 (Control Rod Drive Mechanism) Seal Leak Off
Temperature
10/27/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04390
Primary Coolant Gas Vent System
10/27/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04430
V-24D, Diesel Generator Room Supply Fan
10/29/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-PLP-2020-
04912
NRC Identified Some Wads of Insulation on Top of a Cable
Tray in "C" Switchgear Room
2/17/2020
Procedures
SOP-12
Auxiliary Feedwater System Checklist
SOP-15
Service Water System Checklist
SOP-16
Component Cooling System Checklist
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
04801
During the Combined Fire and EP Medical Drill on
December 3rd, Objective Element L.2.1 was Rated Not
Observed
2/03/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04861
P-9B, Diesel Driven Fire Pump
2/11/2020
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan Fire
Battery Rooms Elevation 607' 6"
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Area 11 & 12
Pre-Fire Plan Fire
Area 30 & 31
Mechanical Equipment Rooms
Miscellaneous
PLDRL-FBT-Fire
drill
4th Quarter 2020 Fire Brigade Drill (Unannounced) Shift #1
2/03/2020
PLDRL-FBT-Fire
drill
4th Quarter 2020 Fire Brigade Drill (Announced) Shift #2
11/29/2020
Engineering
Evaluations
EA-C-PAL-95-
26-01
Palisades Nuclear Plant Analysis Continuation Sheet
3a
EA-C-PAL-95-
26-01
Palisades Nuclear Plant Analysis Continuation Sheet
Miscellaneous
DBD-7.08
Plant Protection Against Flooding
Procedures
SOP-17C
Non-Radioactive Waste
Work Orders
2856590 01
Bus 1C; Inspection and Pump Out of Manholes
04/08/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
03509
Unable to Isolate Service Water to VHX-27A
09/15/2020
Work Orders
2860413
VHX027A Engineering Safeguards Room Cooling Coil
09/15/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
03380
Ultrasonic Data Analysis of a Relevant Indication on
Penetration 34 on the Reactor Vessel Head
09/11/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
03427
Ultrasonic Data Analysis of a Relevant Indication on
Penetration 17 on the Reactor Vessel Head
09/13/2020
Miscellaneous
51-9318377-000
Palisades Steam Generator Condition Monitoring for 1R27
and Preliminary Operational Assessment for Cycle 28
PAL1R27 ETSS
- 1
Examination Technique Specification Sheet
PAL1R27 ETSS
- 2
Examination Technique Specification Sheet
PAL1R27 ETSS
- 3
Examination Technique Specification Sheet
PAL1R27 ETSS
- 4
Examination Technique Specification Sheet
PLP-RPT-18-
00027
1R26 Palisades Steam Generator Degradation Assessment
PLP-RPT-19-
Palisades Steam Generator Condition Monitoring for 1R26
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
00020
and Final Operational Assessment for Cycle 27
Procedures
54-ISI-400-023
Multi-Frequency Eddy Current Examination of Tubing
54-ISI-400-023
NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
Multi-Frequency Eddy Current Examination of SG Tubing
2/12/2018
54-ISI-619-000
Automated Ultrasonic Examination of Open Tube RPV
Closure Head Penetrations-Palisades Specific
07/30/2020
CEP-NDE-0955
Visual Examination (VE) of Bare-Metal Surfaces
307
LMT-10-PAUT-
007
Fully Encoded Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of
Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds
SEP-BAC-PLP-
001
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Engineering Nuclear
Programs Applicable Sites
71111.11Q Procedures
SES-406
As Found Scenario
SOP-1C
Primary Coolant System - Heatup
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
04092
The Main Feedwater System in Maintenance Rule Near
(a)(1)
10/10/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04185
25V DC Bus Ground, Unexpectedly on DC Bus #1
10/16/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
224
DC Bus #1
10/18/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
232
CRD-41 (Control Rod Drive Mechanism) Seal Leakoff
Temperature Indication
10/18/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04455
Exceeded Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria on
PCS/PZR for Reliability Events
10/30/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04697
25 Volt DC Bus Ground, #1 DC Bus
11/20/2020
Engineering
Changes
ED-01 and ED-02: Evaluate Station Battery Remaining Life
Capacity Relative to Ambient Temperature
2/21/2019
Miscellaneous
Q1-2020 System
Health Report
RIA - Radiation Monitoring System
2/29/2020
Q2-2020 System
Health Report
RIA - Radiation Monitoring System
2/29/2020
Q2-2020 System
Health Report
EDC - 125V Vital DC Power
11/20/2020
Q4-2020 System
RIA - Radiation Monitoring System
2/29/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Health Report
Procedures
PLP-1-2020-0024
Risk Assessment, Station Battery Debris, Cracks
QE-35B
ED-02 Battery Checks - Quarterly
Work Orders
5411188 01
2-15A ED-15 Charger Outlet Breaker Adjustable Trip
Setting
03/18/2020
Procedures
4.11
Safety Function Determination Program
RE-134
Performance Test - Battery Charger No 2 (ED-16)
Calculations
1R27 NaTB-
Analysis
Sodium Tetraborate Basket Weight Calculation Analysis
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
03608
While Installing Incore Detectors Under Work Order 287985-28 Three Incore Detectors were Unable to be
Installed
09/18/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
03882
Crack in the Outer Sheathing of the Cable for CET #32
09/29/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
03895
Sodium Tetraborate Basket Weights
09/30/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04060
Breaker 52-187, Boric Acid Gravity Feed MO-2170
10/08/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04076
Engineering Safeguards Room Cooling System
10/09/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04505
Traveling Screen's Falk Drive a Severity Level 2 Oil Leak
was Noted
11/04/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04746
P-50B Lower (First) Seal Stage has a Lowering Trend
11/30/2020
Engineering
Changes
1R27 Results from RM-124 Sodium Tetraborate Basket
Weights
Evaluation of Leakage Past E-50A Feed Reg Bypass Valve
CV-0735
Miscellaneous
Adverse
Condition
Monitoring and
Contingency Plan
Primary Coolant Pump, P-50B, Rising Seal Pressure
11/04/2020
Procedures
RC-123
Sodium Tetraborate Decahydrate Buffering Tests
RM-124
Sodium Tetraborate Basket Weights
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
2871120 01
RC-123 - Sodium Tetraborate Decahydrate Buffering Test
09/08/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
00017
Thermal Margin Monitor (TMM) PY-0102C Repeat
Functional Failure
01/10/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
00716
B Thermal Margin Monitor (TMM) Screen has Gone Blank
03/31/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
00752
TMM Channel 'A' Screen Degraded
03/09/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
01320
Thermal Margin Monitor (TMM) PY-0102C Repeat
Functional Failure
04/30/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04892
PY-0102B, B Channel Thermal Margin Monitor/Flux Delta T
Power Comparator
2/15/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04898
Isolate MV-CD146, T-2 Cond Return from Boilers & B/D
Demins
2/16/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04973
EK-0604D Nuclear-OT Power Deviation/T-Inlet Off-
Normal/Calculator Trouble Channel B Unexpectedly
2/30/2020
Engineering
Changes
PY-0102D: TMM D Channel - Change Drawer CRT Video
Display Monitor to a New LCD Video Display Monitor
2/03/2019
Procedures
RI-23D
Functional Testing of Thermal Margin Monitor - Channel D
2/14/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
2795
Rod Deviation Alarms Were Received
08/30/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04151
Inspection and Testing of RSPT 40 Cable
10/14/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04172
Received Alarm EK-0918, PIP Trouble, Unexpectedly
10/16/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04174
Secondary Position Indication (SPI) on the PPC is Not
Indicating Properly
10/16/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04178
CRD-32, Control Rod Drive Mechanism, Primary Indication
Processor (PIP)
10/16/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
248
Control Rod Drive (CRD) #29
10/19/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
275
Rod #2 Withdrew to 6" and Back to the Lower Electrical Limit 10/19/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
290
Matrix Light on EC-12 Associated with CRD-17 was Not
Illuminated When Expected
10/20/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-PLP-2020-
04394
Found Green Corrosion on Right Positive Post of Cell #9
10/27/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04890
Door-142 (Turbine Building Access to the 1-C Switchgear
Room)
2/15/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04942
PMT for RV-0915, Component Cooling Surge Tank T-3
Relief
2/23/2020
Procedures
CVCO-4
Periodic Test Procedure - Charging Pumps
Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (MT&E)
MSI-I-16
Permanent Maintenance Procedure; Nonintrusive Diagnostic
Check Valve Test Procedure
2/15/2020
QO-15
Inservice Test Procedure - Component Cooling Water
Pumps
2/15/2020
RO-19
Control Rod Position Verification
10/17/2020
Work Orders
2876642 01
RO-19 - Control Rod Position Verification
10/14/2020
2890314 01
RV-0915, Component Cooling Surge Tank T-3 Relief
2/23/2020
2927113 01
CK-CC944, Nonintrusive Check Valve Test: I&C Support
2/15/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
2795
Rod Deviation Alarms were Received
08/30/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
03847
Unexpected Rising Trend on the "A" Steam Generator after
Preparing to Start Condensate P-2B
09/27/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04026
Liquid Penetrant (PT) Examination of the Reactor Vessel
CROM Penetration #34 Nozzle Repair Weld
10/06/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04104
NPOs had to be Removed from Covered Work to Perform
Decontamination Activities in the Reactor Cavity
10/12/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04124
CCW hose for CRD Position 42 on the Reactor Head was
Found Frayed and Needs to be Replaced
10/13/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04137
CRD-45, Control Rod Drive Mechanism
10/14/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04180
CRD-28, Control Rod Drive Mechanism
10/16/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04195
Validation Confirmed CET 27 is Failed
10/17/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
204
Identified Exposed Insulation on "A" SIG Cold Leg
10/17/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-PLP-2020-
205
P-80B AC Lift Pump Start Permissive was Erratic
10/17/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
210
P-50B, Primary Coolant Pump, has Evidence of Prior Oil
Leakage in its Drip Trays
10/17/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
232
CRD-41 (Control Rod Drive Mechanism) Seal Leakoff
Temperature Indication
10/18/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
243
During Containment Walkdown Identified P-50D Primary
Coolant Pump Motor Upper Oil Reservoir Line Leaking
10/19/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-PLP-2020-
285
NRC Walked Down Containment
10/20/2020
Procedures
GOP-3
Mode 3 = 525°F to Mode 2
GOP-4
Mode 2 to Mode 1
10/21/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
03987
CV-0847, SW Supply to Cont (MZ-12), the Open Stroke
Time was Outside of the Acceptable Stroke Time
10/04/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04583
P-8C Initial Vibrations Taken on the Pump Inboard Bearing
Were High Out of Specifications
11/11/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04613
P-8B, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
11/13/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
04840
QO-14C Performance
2/10/2020
Procedures
QO-14
Inservice Test Procedure - Service Water Pumps
11/18/2020
RO-145
Comprehensive Pump Test Procedure Auxiliary Feedwater
Pumps P-8A, P-8B, and P-8C
11/11/2020
RO-32
LLRT - Local Leak Rate Test
11/04/2020
Work Orders
00506694 01
P-7C; Replace Packing Shaft
11/18/2020
2878522 03
RO-145C -P-8C, AFW Comprehensive Pump Test
10/21/2020
Miscellaneous
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-1, Emergency
Classification and Actions Revision 60
09/23/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-1, Emergency
Classification and Actions Revision 61
06/11/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-2.2, Emergency Staff
Augmentation Revision 22
10/07/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-2.2, Emergency Staff
Augmentation Revision 23
03/20/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-3, Communications and
Notifications Revision 36
09/23/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-3, Communications and
Notifications Revision 37
01/23/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-4.1, Technical Support
Center Activation Revision 26
10/21/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-4.1, Technical Support
Center Activation Revision 27
01/27/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-4.2, Operations Support
Center Activation Revision 27
10/21/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-4.3, Emergency
Operations Facility Activation Revision 30
01/19/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-4.3, Emergency
Operations Facility Activation Revision 31
05/14/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-5.0, Reentry Revision
07/29/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-6.0, Rapid Dose
Calculation Revision 19
2/05/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-6.0, Rapid Dose
Calculation Revision 20
04/22/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-6.1, Release Rate
Determination from Stack Gas Monitors Revision 10
2/05/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-6.9, Automated Dose
Assessment Program Revision 14
04/22/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-6.13, Protective Action
Recommendations for Offsite Populations Revision 26
2/17/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EI-16.1, Maintenance of
Emergency Equipment Revision 34
11/26/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EN-EP-604, Emergency
Classifications Revision 0
06/08/2020
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EN-EP-609 Emergency
Operations Facility (EOF) Operations Revision 6
2/18/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CFR 50.54(Q)(2) Screening - EN-EP-801, Emergency
Response Organization Revision 17
10/29/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(3) Screening - PAL PWS, Public Warning
System Operating Procedures Revision 23
08/28/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(3) Evaluation - PAL PWS, Public Warning
System Operating Procedures Revision 23
08/29/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(3) Screening -PWS Design Report, Public
Warning System Design Report Changes
08/28/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(3) Evaluation - PWS Design Report,
Public Warning System Design Report Changes
08/28/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(3) Screening -SEP, Site Emergency Plan
Revision 32
09/18/2019
CFR 50.54(Q)(3) Evaluation -SEP, Site Emergency Plan
Revision 32
09/18/2019
Procedures
Emergency Planning 10CFR50.54(q) Review Program
Site Emergency Plan
Site Emergency Plan
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
03997
EN-RW-102 Attachment 20 Incorrect Radiological Data
10/05/2020
Miscellaneous
Filter Characterization Report for F-57 Filters
06/05/2019
GEL Laboratories Part 61 Report for Primary Resin
07/13/2020
GEL Laboratories Part 61 Report for Filter 54A
11/25/2019
Shipping Records 2020-RW-003
Clean Radwaste F-57 Filters
2/11/2020
20-RW-004
Primary Purification Filter F54A
05/05/2020
20-RW-006
Primary Purification Resin
07/20/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Mitigating Systems -
Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator for Cooling Water
Support Systems
10/01/2019 -
09/30/2020
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Mitigating Systems -
Mitigating Systems Performance Index for Emergency AC
Power Systems
10/01/2019 -
09/30/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
261
Ground Fault Experienced During Removal of Jumper
09/10/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
Control Room Entered AOP-36, "Loss of Component
09/10/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
262
Cooling Water"
Engineering
Changes
84321
K-7A, K-7B, Eliminate MFW PP Trip on Turbine Axial Thrust
Position (Base EC)
Miscellaneous
ACA Arc Fault Event
10/14/2020
DPRM/APRM Report
08/2020
Primary Coolant Pump Trends
2/16/2020
Procedures
Loss of Component Cooling Water
2