ML18068A474
| ML18068A474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18068A475 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-98-15, NUDOCS 9810290174 | |
| Download: ML18068A474 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1998015
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION
Docket No:
License No:
R~port No:
Licensee:
Facility,:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
~~~0290174 980918
a
ADOCK 05000255
REGION Ill
50-255
50-255/98015(DRP)
Consumers Energy Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, Ml 49201
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
Covert, Ml 49043-9530
July 2 through August 21 .. 1998. *
J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Prescott, Resident Inspector*
E. Schweibinz, Project Engineer
- B. L. Burgess, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Palisades Nuclear Power Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-255/98015
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and
plant support. The report covers a 7-week period of resident inspection activities.
Operations
The inspectors concluded that poor job planning by operations personnel led to the
performance of a surveillance on the auxiliary feedwater system in conjunction with
maintenance on a hotwell reject valve and caused an unnecessary main feedwater
system upset. (Section 01)
A "mixed" crew of oncoming and offgoing senior reactor operators and reactor
operators demonstrated good teamwork and appropriately responded to an
inadvertent trip of 1A main feedwater pump. The Control Room Supervisor
demonstrated positive command and control during implementation of the
- emergency operating procedures. (Section 04)
Maintenance
The inspectors concluded that the observed maintenance and surveillance activities
were accomplished in accordance with plant procedures, and appropriately
documented. However, the work control process did not adjust to account for a
change in work scope during the installation of a new relief valve on the equipment
drain tank. Immediate corrective actions implemented by licensee personnel were
considered appropriate. (Section M1)
The inspectors concluded that the troubleshooting plan for the 1 A main feedwater
pump trip was timely and thorough and that the main feedwater system was being
. monitored against established performance criteria within the scope of the
maintenance rule. The licensee determined that the Main Feedwater Pump 1A main
lube oil coupling failure was considered a maintenance preventable functional failure.
(Section M2)
Engineering
Engineering support for the main feedwater pump trip troubleshooting plan and
maintenance activities was timely and effective. The licensee's root cause analysis
for the Main Feedwater Pump 1A trip was thorough. (Section E2)
2
..
Plant Support
The inspectors concluded that the fire brigade responded to a minor electrical fire
wearing the appropriate safety gear in a timely manner and that the post-fire critique
was effective. A plant wide generic communication and a procedure change request
appropriately addressed the licensee identified deficiency regarding individual
responsibilities for plant personnel during a fire. (Section F4) .
3
Report Details
Summary. of Plant Status
The plant was at full power at the beginning of the inspection period. On July 21, 1998, the *
1A main feedwater pump tripped due to failure of the shaft driven main lube oil pump.
Consequently, the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures. The
reactor trip was uncomplicated in that all systems responded as designed. The reactor was
taken critical on July 23, 1998, and operated at 72 percent power for 3 days with a single
main feedwater pump in service. Following repairs to the 1A main feedwater pump, the
plant was returned to full power on July 27, 1998. The plant remained at full power for the
remainder of the inspection period.
I. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
b.
The inspectors observed the control room operators, reviewed applicable condition
reports including C-PAL-98-1439, and discussed with operations personnel the
evolution of performing an auxiliary feedwater system surveillance in parallel with
maintenance on the condenser hotwell reject valve .
Observations and Findings
Control room operators conducted a quarterly surveillance test which required
injecting 165 gpm of feedwater to each steam generator from the auxiliary feedwater
system. The plant was at approximately 90 percent power. Concurrently, the main
condenser hotwell reject valve was isolated and removed from service for
maintenance. Consequently, the main condenser hotWell level increased. The
control room operators were monitoring hotwell level and identified the need to un-
isolate the reject valve due to the. high condenser level. At the sanie time,
maintenance personnel completed the calibration on the condenser reject valve and
operations personnel immediately un-isolated the reject valve.. The reject valve
opened fully because of the high condenser level. This resulted in a rapid drop in
condenser hotwell level and a subsequent drop in main feedwater pump suction *
pressure.
. .
The main feedwater pump low suction pressure annunciator energized as suction
pressure dropped from 375 psig to 305 psig where it stabilized before recovering.
The main feedwater pl.imp low suction pressure trip setting was approximately 250
psig. The crew responded appropriately to the annunciator. However, the
perf9rmance of the auxiliary feedwater surveillance in conjunction with maintenance
on the hotwell reject valve Was not well planned or coordinated in that it resulted in a
main feedwater system upset, and could have resulted in a reactor trip if the main
feedwater pump had tripped on low suction pressure .
4
..
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that poor job planning by operations personnel led to the
performance of a surveillance on the auxiliary feedwater system in conjunction with
maintenance on a hotwell reject valve and caused an unnecessary main feedwater
system upset.
04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
b.
The inspectors observed operator performance in the control room during the
response to the inadvertent trip of 1 A main feedwater pump trip and resultant reactor
trip on July 21, 1998. Also, the inspectors discussed plant and system response
with operations personnel.
Observations and Findings
The nuclear control operators had just completed shift turnover and the on-coming
nuclear control operators had assumed the duty; however, the on-coming and off-
going senior reactor operators had not yet .conducted a shift turnover. Annunciator
"1A FEEOWATER PUMP OIL SYSTEM TROUBLE" actuated, immediately followed
by the "1A FEEOWATER PUMP TRIP" annunciator. The "mixed" crew consisting of
oncoming nuclear control room operators and off going senior reactor operators
demonstrated good teamwork while responding to the annunciators. The Control
Room Supervisor directed the nuclear control operator to* manually trip the reactor as
required by Off-Normal Procedure (ONP) - 3, "Loss of Main Feedwater," for a loss of
one main feedwater pump with reactor power at 99.6 percent. The trip was
uncomplicated in that all systems responded as designed. The Control Room
Supervisor appropriately entered and implemented the emergency operating
procedures and effectively conducted a crew brief that demonstrated positive
command and control. After the plant was stable and the emergency operating
procedures were exited, the senior reactor operators conducted shift turnover.
The* inspectors identified during a control board walkdown following the trip that
Primary Coolant Pump P-500 seal leakoff flowrate recorder trace indicated differently
than the recorders for the other three primary coolant pumps. Three primary coolant
pump seal leakoff recorder traces indicated a momentary decrease in the seal
leakoff flowrate which coincided with the momentary drop in primary coolant system
pressure following the reactor trip. The seal leakoff flowrate recorder trace for
Primary Coolant Pump P-500 did not indicate the momentary drop. The inspectors
questioned the crew regarding the identified parameters and noted that the crew was
-* unaware- of the differences. This indicated a minor lapse in the -operator's control -
panel monitoring. Following the inspectors questions, a work request was generated
to troubleshoot P-500 seal leakoff flowrate recorder. The licensee subsequently
determined that the recorder*was working properly.
5
..
c.
Conclusions
The "mixed" crew of senior reactor operators and reactor operators demonstrated
good teamwork and appropriately responded to the inadvertent trip of 1 A main
feedwater pump. The Control Room Supervisor demonstrated positive command
- and control during implementation of the emergency operating procedures.
II. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M 1.1
General Comments .
a.
Inspection Scope (61726 and 62707)
Portions of the following maintenance work order f.YVO) and surveillance activities
were observed or reviewed by the inspectors:
Surveillance No:
Ml-42
Work Order No:
24812316
24712513
24812714
b.
Observations and Findings
Containment Hydrogen Monitors Calibration
Rebuild actuators on service water system header
cross-tie valves (CV-0857 and CV-0846)
Equipment drain tank relief
Troubleshoot 1A main feedwater pump turbine trip
The inspectors noted that, in general, the work packages and appropriate
procedures were utilized during the observed maintenance and surveillance
activities. System cleanliness controls were effectively utilized during observed
activities. The inspectors also noted that supervisors actively observed ongoing
maintenance activities and that the maintenance performed was thoroughly
documented. In addition, see the specific discussions of maintenance observed
under M1.2.
M1 .2
Equipment Drain Tank Relief
a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report C-PAL-98-1419 regarding an
inappropriate pressure boundary for the waste gas surge tank. Also, the inspectors
discussed the
6
"-
' *
b.
waste gas system maintenance outage activities with engineering and operations
personnel and reviewed the immediate corrective actions .
Observations and Findings
A scheduled waste gas system maintenance outage was in progress on July 22,
1998. Operations personnel pumped down the waste gas surge tank for the
scheduled maintenance and subsequently maintained the tank at a minimal
pressure. The equipment drain tank relief valve RV-1008, that discharged to the
waste gas surge tank, was removed and a new relief val.ve was to be immediately
installed; however, the replacement valve did not fit. Maintenance personnel
recognized that a new flange would be required to fit the new relief valve to the
equipment drain tank. However, instead of regrouping and deciding what actions
should be t.aken to account for the increased work scope and additional time the tank
would be left without a relief valve in place, maintenance personnel instead installed
duct tape over the opening for cleanliness control until the new valve could be
installed. Subsequently, a review of ongoing maintenance activities by engineering,
maintenance, and operations identified that the duct tape on the equipment drain
tank relief valve opening was inadvertently acting as a pressure boundary for the
waste gas surge tank. The inspectors noted that the work control process did not
appropriately adjust when the work scope was changed during installation of a new
relief valve on the equipment drain tank.
A communications problem also existed between operations and engineering and
- maintenance personnel. Engineering and maintenance personnel believed that the
waste gas surge tank and equipment drain tank would remain out of service during
the entire outage. However, the waste gas surge tank could not be totally isolated.
and removed from service. Therefore, operations personnel maintained the waste
gas surge tank in service at minimal pressure. The licensee's investigation of this
activity was ongoing and will be documented in the evaluation of Condition Report
C-PAL"".98-1419 when completed.
Appropriate immediate corrective and contingency actions were implemented to
preclude a gaseous release. The immediate actions taken included: 1) conducting
radiation surveys; 2) taking air samples; 3) checking the duct tape for leak tightness;
and 4) establishing a plan to reinstall the relief valve. The licensee determined that
a gaseous release did not occur during the time that the duct tape wa~ acting as the
pressure boundary. This conclusion was based on the radiation surveys taken in the
vicinity . of the was gas surge tank and surrounding areas that indicated normal
background radiation levels. Also, a local area radiation monitor in the vicinity near
the waste gas surge tank did not alarm during the period the duct tape was installed
as a pressure boundary for the waste gas system. The relief valve was successfully
reinstalled approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the condition was discovered. . No personnel
contaminations actually occurred .
7
...
'
M1 .3
Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance
The inspectors concluded that the observed maintenance and surveillance activities
were accomplished in accordance with plant procedures, and appropriately
documented. However, the work control process did not adjust to account for a
change in work scope during the installation of a new relief valve on the equipment
drain tank. Immediate corrective actions implemented by licensee personnel were
considered appropriate.
M2
Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
a.
Inspection Scope (93702)
The inspectors reviewed the main feedpump 1A recovery plan, the evaluation for
Condition Report 98-1409, "Manual Reactor Trip Due to Loss of 1A Main Feedwater
Pump," and verified applicable maintenance rule requirements with engineering
personnel. Licensee Event Report (LER)98-010, "Reactor Trip Due To Failure of
the Main Feedwater Pump," was also reviewed.
b.
Observations and Findings
Main feedwater pump 1A inadvertently tripped on July 23, 1998, which resulted in
the operators manually tripping the reactor in accordance with the loss of feedwater
procedure. The licensee determined that the root cause for the trip was failure of the
main lube oil pump coupling. Extensive troubleshooting and recovery plans were
developed in a timely manner. Main feedwater pump 1A was returned to service on
July 27, 1998, following successful post maintenance testing.
Licensee maintenance personnel identified that the failed coupling had indications of
incomplete gear engagement that was attributed to improper assembly of the
coupling during the last pump overhaul conducted in 1984. Also, several parts were
found incorrectly installed or incorrectly oriented. The licensee attributed these
deficiencies to the lack of specific guidance in the vendor manual regarding post
assembly inspections. Also, there was no permanent maintenance procedure for the
main feedwater pumps which could be used as an aid to the vendor manual during
pump overhauls. Licensee personnel concluded that these deficiencies had a limited
contribution to the coupling failure. The corrective actions documented in LER 98-
010 stated, in part, that detailed work instructions were being developed to support
future inspections on the main *feedwater turbine driver internal components. These
work instructions were intended to provide specific guidance regarding main
feedwater pump inspection scope and frequency.
The inspectors verified that the main feedwater system was being monitored in
accordance with the maintenance rule. Licensee engineering personnel considered
this failure as a maintenance preventable functional failure in that appropriate
inspections would have identified the worn components and that they needed to be
replaced. Consequently, Condition Report C-PAL-98-1527 was generated because
the main feedwater system exceeded the established performance criteria in that
8
...
there have been two maintenance preventable failures within 24 months. The other
maintenance preventable failure within the 24-month monitoring period was unrelated
and involved the main feedwater regulating valve block valve. Other established
main feedwater system performance criteria included unplanned capacity loss of 4.5
percent in a 12-month period and 2 unplanned reactor trips within 7000 hours0.081 days <br />1.944 hours <br />0.0116 weeks <br />0.00266 months <br /> with
the reactor critical. The main feedwater system performance to date had not
exceeded those criteria. Engineering personnel continued to evaluate *the main
feedwater system against the maintenance rule criteria.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the troubleshooting plan for the 1 A main feedwater
pump trip was timely and thorough. The main feedwater system was being
monitored against established performance criteria within the scope of the
maintenance rule. The licensee determined that the Main Feedwater Pump 1A main
lube oil coupling failure was considered a maintenance preventable functional failure.
MB
Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92903)
M8.1
(Closed) IFI 50-255/97014-03: Reduction in management oversight of "A" (night)
E2*
a.
shift maintenance.
This issue was identified during control rod drive 38 repairs that were conducted on
"A" shift. The lead electrical repairman performing the repairs also acted as the
Assigned Supervisor which was allowed by the licensee's procedures. This
effectively removed one level of independent review of the work order and
contributed to the incident.
The licensee established a standard that the mechanical maintenance "A" shift first
line supervisor was responsible for all maintenance activities on the back shift.
Regularly scheduled field observations of back shift maintenance activities have
been conducted by the maintenance department leadership team to ensure that the
standards are being implemented. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the
documented observations and noted that it appeared the standards have been
implemented as expected. The inspectors have not identified any similar
deficiencies related to this issue. This item is closed.
Ill. Engineering
Engineering Support of Facilities_ and Equipment
- inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report 98-1409, "Manual Reactor Trip Due to
Loss of 1A Main Feedwater Pump," and the associated root cause analysis. The
inspectors also reviewed the Main Feedwater Pump 1A troubleshooting plan and
LER 98-010, "Reactor Trip Due To Failure of the Main Feedwater Pump."
9
b.
Observations and Findings
System engineering supported ttie troubleshooting plan and conducted the root
cause analysis. Engineering personnel determined that the root cause for the 1 A
main feedwater pump trip was failure of the main lube oil pump coupling due to
exceeding it's useful service life. The coupling failure resulted in an instantaneous
drop in lube oil pressure and a resultant main feedwater pump trip on low lube oil
pressure. The coupling had been in service since 1984 and was last inspected in
1991. No evidence of excessive wear was identified during the 1991 inspection.
The root cause analysis was very detailed -and also self-critical in that engineering
personnel determined that opportunities were missed to identify the pending failure.
For example, the main lube oil pump coupling was not inspected during corrective
maintenance in 1995. The corrective maintenance was unrelated to the main lube
oil pump coupling but would have allowed access to the coupling for an inspection.
Engineering personnel concluded, based on the coupling wear seen following the
failure, that the coupling would have been replaced in 1995 h.ad it been inspected.
An inspection was not conducted as there was no specific requirement to inspect the
coupling. Also, the Main Feedwater Pump 1A turbine control major maintenance
activity was deferred from the 1998 to the 1999 refueling outage based on all
. available information at the time. The insights gained from the root cause analysis
highlighted the need for detailed work instructions to provide specific guidance
regarding main feedwater pump inspection scope and frequency. These work
instructions were being developed as part of the corrective actions documented in
LER 98-010 .
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that engineering support for the main feedwater pump trip
troubleshooting plan and maintenance activities was timely and effective. The
licensee conducted a thorough root cause analysis of the Main Feedwater Pump* 1 A
trip.
EB
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92902)
E8.1
{Closed) IFI 50-255/94014-058: Instances where a temporary modification (TM)
should have been used.
This issue was identified during the diagnostic evaluation team (DET) inspection.*
The concern related to the proper use of the TM process and was addressed
through two revisions to the TM Administrative Procedure AP-9.31, "Temporary
Modification Control," subsequent to the DET inspection. These revisions provided
greater clarity as to when a TM was required. The resident inspectors performed an. ----- _____ _
independent review of outstanding TMs that was documented in Inspection Report
50-255/95013. The inspectors identified additional concerns with the TM program
that included the following: 1) 5 of 16 TMs that were over one year old had no
proposed engineering resolution; 2) Procedure AP-9.31 stated that the expectation
for the average duration of a TM should be 90 days. * The inspectors identified 34
10
TMs over 90 days old; and 3) some TMs were not readily available for review by
operations, if needed. Some TMs were in the work packages, some TMs were
signed out to various individuals, and other TMs were not in the respective folders.
- Licensee management took prompt and thorough actions to address the inspectors'
concerns. The inspectors have done subsequent reviews of open TMs and .
additional similar problems have not been identified. This item is closed.
EB.2
(Closed) Violation 50-255/91017CDRP) EA 91-126 A: Inadequate procedures to
ensure pump operability.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response
letter, dated December 13, 1991, to be reasonable and complete. No similar
problems were identified. This item is closed.
EB.3
(Closed) Violation 50-255/91017CDRPl EA 91-126 B: Reactor operation with
inoperable containment spray pump.
The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response
letter, dated December 13, 1991, to be reasonable and complete. No similar
problems were identified. This item is closed.
EB.4
(Closed) Violation 50-255/93008-03CDRP): Failure to follow procedures during fuel
moves.
The inspector verified the .corrective actions described in the licensee's response
letter, dated June 25, 1993, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems
were identified. This item is closed.
IV. Plant Support
F4
Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance
a.
Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors observed the fire brigade response to a small electrical fire in a light
fixture in the chemistry office area located adjacent to the turbine building on
July 14, 1998. The inspectors also observed the post-fire critique.
b.
Observations and Findings
Personnel in the area reported the fire to the control room and auxiliary operators in
--- -- the area extinguished the fire immediately by de-energizing the light. The fire--- -- ----- ---
brigade arrived at the fire scene in a timely manner wearing the appropriate safety
gear. The first members of the fire brigade to arrive at the scene momentarily
discharged a carbon dioxide fire extinguisher on the light fixture as a precaution.
The inspectors rioted a procedure adherence discrepancy of minor significance in
11
q
that the control room operator sounded the fire alarm before making a plant
announcement. The fire brigade members indicated that hearing the fire alarm
before a plant announcement caused some confusion. The fire protection
implementing. procedure (FPIP-3) reqµired the control room operator to make a plant
announcement twice and then to actuate the fire alarm. Control room personnel
involved were counseled regarding this issue. This discrepancy was also identified
by operations personnel during the post-fire critique.
The inspectors obser\\led the post-fire critique and noted that it was effective. Fire
brigade members at the critique identified that several unnecessary plant personnel
arrived at the fire scene and that several plant individuals not responsible for fighting
the fire did not evacuate the fire area. Also, fire brigade members identified that
there was some confusion at the beginning of the fire as to who was the team
leader. The presence of unnecessary personnel and the lack of a clear
understanding of who is the fire brigade team leader could hinder the fire brigade's
response to a larger fire.
The licensee's corrective actions included: 1) a plant wide generic communication
was issued to remind plant personnel of their responsibiiities during a fire; 2) the fire*
brigade team leader would be identified at the shift meeting as necessary; and 3) a
procedure change request was submitted for FPIP-2, "Fire Emergency
Responsibilities and Response," to address identified procedure enhancements
needed to clarify plant personnel's responsibilities during a fire.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the fire brigade responded to the minor electrical fire
wearing the appropriate safety gear in a timely manner and that the post-fire critique
was effective. A plant wide generic communication and a procedure change request
appropriately addressed the licensee identified deficiency regarding individual
responsibilities for plant personnel during a fire.
- F8
Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (92904)
FB.1
(Closed) IFI 50-255/94012-01 CORP): Fire main rupture and need for continuous fire
watch.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions. described in the licensee's Condition
Report C-PAL-94-0618. The licensee had initially declared some areas of the plant
as needing a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire watch vice a continuous fire watch after the fire main
rupture. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 9.6. 7 .1.2, was not clear at the
time of the event regarding the correct response. The FSAR was subsequently
revised to add two additional steps of clarifying actions. The inspector also 'lerified
that the current FSAR contains this additional clarification. This item is closed.
12
~*
RS
Miscellaneous Radiation, Protection and Chemistry Issues (92904)
R8.1
(Closed) Violation 50-255/91011-04(DRSS): Improper use of by-product material.
An NRC investigation (followup to Inspection Report 50-255/91011 (DRSS)) of a 1991
improper use of by-product material determined that a violation existed. This
violation was documented in an NRC letter to the licensee dated May 7, 1993. The
licensee's response dated June 3, 1993, documented the reason for the violation,
the corrective actions taken, the results achieved, and the corrective action to avoid
future non-compliance. The NRC reviewed the corrective actions and documented
in a *
June 14, 1993, letter to the licensee that no further questions existed. This item is
closed.*
V. Management Meetings
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
at the conclusion of the inspection on August 21, 1998. The licensee acknowledged
the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials
examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
13
. '"
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. A. Fenech, Senior Vice President, Nuclear, Fossil, and Hydro Operations
T. J. Palmisano, Site Vice President - Palisades
M. P. Banks, Manager, Chemical & Radiation Services
E. Chatfield, Manager, Training
- P. D. Fitton, Manager, System Engineering
R. J. Gerling, Manager, Design Engineering
K. M. Haas, Director, Engineering
. N. L. Haskell, Director, Licensing
R. L. Massa, Shift Operations Supervisor
J. P. Pomeranski, Manager, Maintenance
D. W. Rogers, General Manager, Plant Operations
G. B. Szczotka, Manager, Nuclear Performance Assessment Department
S. Y. Wawro, Director, Maintenance and Planning
R. G. Schaaf, Palisades Project Manager, NRR
14
t
IP 71707:
IP 62707:
IP 61726:
IP 37551:
IP 71750:
IP 92901:
IP 92902:
IP 92903:
IP 92904:
None
Closed
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Plant Operations
Maintenance Observations
Surveillance Observations
Onsite Engineering
Plant Support Activities
Followup - Operations
Followup - Engineering
Followup - Maintenance
Followup - Plant Support
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
50-255/97014-03
IFI
- Reduction in management oversight of "A" shift maintenance
50-255/94014-058
IFI
Instances where a TM should have been used
EA 91-126 A
Inadequate procedures to ensure pump operability
(50-255/91017)
EA 91-126 B
Reactor operation with inoperable containment spray pump *
(50-255/91017)
50-255/93008-02
Failure to follow procedures during fuel moves
50-255/94012-01
IFI
Fire main rupture and need for continuous fire watch
50-255/91011-04
Improper use of by-product material
Discussed
. 50-255/98-010
- LER
Manual reactor trip due.to failure .of a main feedwater pump
15
- ..
- DET
FPIP
LER
ONP
TM
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS USED
Diagnostic Evaluation Team
Fire Protection Implementing Procedure
Licensee Event Report
Off-Normal Procedure