IR 05000255/1999009
| ML18066A641 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18066A640 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-99-09, NUDOCS 9909100188 | |
| Download: ML18066A641 (14) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No:
License No:
Report No:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
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PDR ADOCK 05000255 G
PDR REGION 111 50-255 DPR-20 50-255/99009(DRP)
Consumers Energy Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Ml 49201 Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043-9530 May 22 through August 11, 1999 J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector R. Krsek, Resident Inspector R. Mendez, Reactor Engineer, DRS T. Tella, Reactor Engineer, DRS Anton Vegel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
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- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-255/99009(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection activitie,.
Operations
The inspectors identified that the controlled copy of an emergency plan implementing procedure in the control room was not the current revision. Upon discovery, the licensee took immediate actions to update the control room procedure and initiate development of an improved process for informing on-shift operations staff of procedure*
revisions. (Section 03.1)
Maintenance
During performance of the High Pressure Safety Injection System surveillance, procedures were adhered to, self-checking practices were used, and control room
. responsibilities were clearly defined. (Section M1)
Inspectors identified that a maintenance activity to clean and inspect a shutdown cooling spool piece flange was performed on the incorrect flange. (Section E2.1)
Engineering
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The Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program was ineffectively implemented as evide.nced by the number of discrepancies that were identified by the inspectors. A lack of ownership contributed to the program's ineffectiveness. Also, engineering personnel were not pro-active in resolving problems for components that were included in the progra (Section E2.1)
Plant Support
The inspectors identified two separate instances when the same radiological posting for.
a contaminated area in the Spent Fuel Pool Fan Room fell on the floor from its designated position. The Chemical and Radiological Staff secured the posting with the proper fasteners to prevent reoccurrence. The licensee subsequently decontaminated the area, eliminating the need for the posting. (Section R1.1)
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- Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at full power for the duration of the inspection perio I. Operations
Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the plant was operated in a conservative and deliberate manner throughout the inspection perio Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 0 Engineered Safeguards System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible. portions of the High Pressure Safety Injection System. Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were adequate in all cases. Minor discrepancies were identified with respect to boric acid leaks in engineered safeguards systems and corresponding entries into the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Checklist Log (see Section E2.1 ). No substantive concerns were identified by the inspectors as a result of the walkdown Operations Procedures and Documentation 0 Update of Emergency Classification Procedure in Control Room Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed selected emergency plan implementing procedures located in the control room that would be used by the operations staf Observations and Findings On July 26, 1999, the inspectors noted that at the Operations Planning Meeting, the shift supervisor indicated that Service Water Pump "pit level" readings taken over the weekend were 1/4 inch away from an Unusual Event emergency classification for abnormally low lake water levels. The shift supervisor acknowledged that Procedure El-1, "Emergency Classification and Actions," was in revision to change the pit level reading, but that the procedure revision needed to be assigned high priority du_e ____ _
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Procedure El-1, Revision 30, stated, in part, that a Service Water Pump "pit level" reading of 140 inches below the Intake Structure floor level constituted an Unusual Event for the natural phenomenon of an abnormally low lake water leve During follow-up with the Shift Engineer, the inspectors noted that the control room controlled copy of Procedure El-1 was Revision 30. After reviewing a copy of Procedure El-1 obtained from the site Document Control Center, the inspectors noted that Revision 31, issued July 23, 1999, was the most current revision. Revision 31 changed the criteria for a low lake level Unusual Event emergency classification to a Service Water Pump "pit leveln reading of 192 inches below the Intake Structure floor level. The inspectors immediately.notified the Shift Engineer that the most current revision of Procedure El-1 was not in the control room. The revised procedure was obtained and placed in the control room. In addition, plant staff initiated Condition Report C-PAL-99-1141 to document the discrepanc Administrative Procedure 10.43, "Document Distribution and Control,n did not specify a prioritization scheme or time frequency for the distribution of controlled copy procedures to the control room. Also, the inspectors noted that there was no established mechanism to identify to the on-shift operations crew that a revised procedure was issued. Operations and Document Control management were actively addressing corrective actions to improve the process for informing operations staff of procedure revision Conclusions The inspectors identified that the controlled copy of an emergency plan implementing procedure in the control room was not the current revision. Upon discovery, the licensee took immediate actions to update the control room procedure and initiate development of an improved process for informing on-shift operations staff of procedure revision Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901}
0 (Closed) Violation 50-255/97014-01 CEA 97-567. EA 97-569): "All Control Rods Deenergized While In Power Operations To Conduct Maintenance On A Single Controi Rod Drive Mechanism.*
Details of this item were documented in Inspection Report 50-255/97014. A violation and civil penalty (EA 97-567; EA 97-569} were issued as documented in a letter, dated April 2, 1998, from the NRC to the licensee. Also, this item was the subject of a voluntary Licensee Event Report (LER}, 50-255/97-01 The violation and civil penalty resulted from the licensee's failure, on six occurrences, to follow administrative and maintenance procedures that covered an emergent maintenance activity on Control Rod Drive Mechanism No. 3 The corrective actions to prevent recurrence were documented in the licensee's reply to the violation dated May 4, 1998, and in LER 50-255/97-012. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and concluded _th~t_ they w.er_e reasonably.thorough.and noted that- -- -. ----
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- oo Plant management reviewed the event and suspended the "A" shift licensed operators from licensed duties until remedial activities were completed and documente *
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Plant management clarified and communicated fundamental standards in the areas of: {1) procedure use and compliance; {2) pre-job preparation and briefings; {3) communications; {4) control of work scope; {5) documentation of work; {6) response to unexpected and unanticipated conditions; and
{7) Technical Specification knowledg *
Plant management directed that the outage management organization remain in place following an outage to support emergent work. The organization would remain until the normal 13-week schedule activities resume The inspectors have not identified any similar instances. This item is close.2 (Closed} Inspection Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-255/98012-05: Licensee to Evaluate Weakness Identified in Off-Normal Procedure 23.3, "Loss of Refueling Water Accident."
The intent was to use the procedure only for refueling water losses due to a reactor
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cavity seal failure or a steam generator nozzle dam failure. However, the procedure appeared to cover refueling. water level losses due to any cause. In certain scenarios this may have resulted in additional refueling water losse The licensee revised Off-Normal Procedure 23.3 to clarify that the procedure was applicable to a loss of refueling water accident due to a refueling cavity reactor flange seal failure or a steam generator nozzle dam failure. In addition, caution statements were added to the procedure to highlight to the operators that alignments of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System, when a system piping breach exists, may result in additional inventory loss. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions were reasonable. This item is closed, II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Malntena'nce Inspection Srope (61726. 62707. 71707)
The inspectors observed all aspects of the Q0-1, "High Pressure Safety Injection;"
surveillance test, including test preparation, pre-job briefings with operations staff, and actual work performance. Also, the inspectors reviewed all or portions of the below listed maintenance work orders and surveillance activities, and reviewed Technical Specifications and the Final Safety Analysis Report when applicabl Work Order No.:
24910581 Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-67 A Suction Valve
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24813970 24813974 Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-67 A Suction Valve Operator Static Test Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-67 A Suction Valve Breaker Preventative Maintenance
24910284 Surveillance No.:
Ml-6
Q0-1 Clean Boric Acid Accumulation From Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Discharge Flange MV-ES3214 and Inspect Bolting Area Monitor Operational Check Safety Injection System Observations and Findings During performance of Surveillance Test Q0-1, the inspectors noted that procedures were adhered to and that self-checking practices were used. Operators performing the surveillance used three-way communications. The responsibilities of the on-shift nuclear control operators versus the surveillance test nuclear control operators were
- clearly defined. The inspectors noted that when unexpected annunciators alarmed.
during the test, the surveillance test operators terminated further test activities, until the on-shift operators completed the necessary.alarm response action The inspectors determined, during the observed maintenance activities, that maintenance technicians were knowledgeable of tasks being performed and that radiation dose reduction techniques were demonstrated in radiologically-controlled work areas. Work packages and procedures were at the job site and actively being use Maintenance technicians effectively coordinated with operations department personnel during activities in the control room. Also, maintenance technicians demonstrated self-checking techniques and three-way communications with some noted exception Conclusions The inspectors concluded that, during performance of the High Pressure Safety Injection System surveillance, procedures were adhered to, self-checking practices were*
used, and control room responsibilities were clearly define Ill. Engineering
- E2 Engineering Support of Faclllties and Equipment E Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program Inspection Scope (37551)
During plant tours, the inspectors noted that several plant components contained boric acid residue. The inspectors reviewed Engineering PJQ~dure_EM-26, -~Boric-Acid-teak ___.c....-----
____l!l~pe_ction, ".applicable condition reports;tlie-"Bonc Acid Leak Inspection Checklist Log,"
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and several "Boric Acid Leak Inspection Checklists." In addition, the inspectors walked dow'n plant components and discussed the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program with engineering and operations department personne Observations and Findings The licensee's Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program included a "Boric Acid Leak Inspection Checklist Log." This was a database to track components with boric acid residue. Also, Engineering Procedure EM-26, "Boric Acid Leak Inspection," described the process to identify, evaluate, track, and correct boric acid leakag The log contained several hundred components, indicating that plant personnel were identifying boric acid leaks and entering them into the program. However, it was indeterminate whether a component that had boric acid residue had been previously entered into the log. Auxiliary Operators could access the database to review the log, but until recently access was not "user-friendly," which could have been a potential detriment to the program's effectivenes The inspectors identified several plant components that had boric acid residue that were not included on the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Checklist Log. Plant systems where boric acid residue existed and components not logged included safety injection, spent fuel pool cooling, and containment spray systems. This indicated that the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program was not being effectively implemente Failure to include components that contained boric acid residue in the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program, as required by Procedure EM-26, constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to formal enforcement actio Also, the inspectors identified that the.actual plant status of several components did not match the status as documented in the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Checklist Log. For example, a bolted flange on a spool piece that allowed use of the shutdown cooling
. system to cool the spent fuel pool contained a significant amount of boric acid residu This was indicative of an active leak. The status, however, as documented in the Checklist Log, was "housekeeping: This implied that only occasional deaning of the flange was required. The actual status of components being tracked not matching the logged status was another indication that the program was not being effectively implemented, and that there was an apparent lack of ownership of the progra The inspectors questioned if the spool piece flange was connected using carbon steel bolting, which would be susceptible to degradation from the boric acid deposit Engineering personnel did not immediately know if the bolting material was carbon steel or stainless steel. The inspectors noted that a work order was generated in October 1997, to clean the flange and inspect the bolting for degradation. However, the work order was not implemented until September 1998, which indicated a lack of timely resolution for boric acid deposits. In addition, the work performed in September 1998 *
was on the incorrect flang.
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In addition, engineering personnel suspected, based on a review of the documentation in the work order, that the incorrect flange was cleaned_:_J:1QIN~'{ef, e.ngioe_er:sJailedto--
generate a condition reporror res-olve the issue.*-AlsO, engineering personnel's failure to pursue a suspicion that the incorrect component was cleaned indicated the lack of a pro-active approach to resolving problems.
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The inspectors discussed this issue with engineering supervision. Subsequently, a new work order was generated and executed to clean the spool piece flange and inspect the
bolting. Engineering personnel concluded that the leak was inactive based on the presence of hard boric acid deposits and the lack of moisture. Inspection of the bolts identified that some minimal rust existed on the bolting surfaces, which would be
- indicative of carbon steel material. However, there was no significant degradation to the bolting material and the flange was considered operabl Engineering personnel had taken some corrective actions in response to the inspectors observations which included:
Correcting the checklist for the components that the inspectors identified which did not match the documented status;
Adding the components that the inspectors identified which were not included on the checklist log;
Generating a Level 2, significant condition adverse to quality, Condition Report, C-PAL-99-1237, to evaluate the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program deficiencies and* other engineering programs that may be subject to similar root causes;
Establishing a single point of contact within the Engineering Programs Department for the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program; and
Establishing a "Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program - Watch Usr to highlight components with boric acid leakage that required specific actions in accordance with engineering procedure The corrective actions that have been implemented were recently initiated and therefore effectiveness could not be assessed. Consequently, assessing the effectiveness of the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program will be an IFI 50-255/99009-01 and will be reviewed during a later inspectio *
- Conclusions ES E *--*---*
The inspectors concluded that the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program was ineffective as evidenced by the number of discrepancies that were identified by the inspectors. A lack of ownership contributed to the program's ineffectiveness. In addition, the inspectors identified that a maintenance activity to clean and inspect a shutdown cooling system spool piece flange was performed on the incorrect flange. Also, engineering personnel were riot pro-active in resolving problems for components included in the Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program. This issue will be an Inspection Follow-up Item 50-255/99009-0.
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92700, 92903)
(Closed) LER 50-255/98002-00:.. "eotentiaLChallenge--To-Ghannel-Separation;"- -- -=--- --- -------
temporary modification 96-053 installed a data logger during the 1996 refueling outage to allow core monitoring during fuel movement. This temporary modification resulted in a configuration challenging the channel separation for the source/wide range nuclear instrumentation. Licensee Event Report 98002-00 was issued prior to the 1998 refueling outag **
The licensee determined that the causes for the event were an inadequate review of the temporary modification and a lack of specific knowledge of the configuration of the data logger. The licensee took corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Specific controls for temporary configuration alterations were incorporated into plant procedures. Ample time would be provided for design review by subject matter experts and vendors if needed; and a review would be performed by the plant safety and design review grou The licensee's design engineering group had been briefed on the lessons learned from this event. This LER is close *
E8.2. (Closed) IFI 50-255/97201-15: "Cable Degradation." The licensee's cable ampacity sizing evaluation, per AIR-A-PAL-97-062, did not include the effects of cable degradation due to the close proximity of hot piping systems. The licensee's response included a walkdown of the cable trays in the plant, except for the.trays inside the containment, during September 1998. The licensee identified five heat sources adjacent to the cable trays; however, the licensee determined that the heat sources would not have had. any adverse impact on cable ampacity. The inspector did not identify any concerns regarding this evaluatio When asked regarding any heat sources inside the containment, the licensee stated that an Environment Qualification Engineer had conducted a walkdown of the eontainment during the 1996 refueling outage and identified three cable trays that were close to local heat sources. The licensee stated that these trays were lightly loaded and therefore were not considered a cable ampacity issue. The inspectors agreed and considered this item close E (Closed) IFI 50-255/97201-17: "Documentation of Design Basis." This IFI was issued because no system analysis existed to show that all the Class 1 E 120-volt alternating current {ac) loads were supplied by adequate voltages. The licensee issued Condition Report C-PAL-97-1621 to resolve this concer Bounding Calculation EA-C-CAL-1621A-01, "Develop a Bounding Calculation That Provides Worst Case Voltage Levels at Preferred AC Loads," Revision 0, was issued on April 9, 1998. This calculation concluded that Class 1 E loads had adequate voltages *
available. The inspector reviewed this calculation and found it to be acceptable. This item is close E (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-255/97201-19: "Agastat Relays." This URI was issued because of the vendor's recommendation that Agastat E-7000 series relays be replaced after 1 O years. The licensee had not implemented this recommendation. The licensee issued Condition Report C-PAL-97-1663 on November 11, 1997, to address this concern. The licensee disagreed with the vendor's recommendation and contended that the vendor's recommendation was based on relay use in a harsh environment. The licensee's Architect Engineer contractor performed a review pf_tt)~ materials used in-- -
___ Agastat-E-1000-series-relays~and-*concluaed-tliat all eomponents used in these relays were capable of lasting for greater than 40 years at a maximum temperature of 104°F without significant degradation. These relays were used in zones where the maximum temperatures were not expected to exceed 104 °F.
In addition, the vendor issued a 10 CFR Part 21 notification regarding the inability of Agastat E-7000 series relays to switch a current of more than 0.5 ampere, even though 9.
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E E these relays were initially rated for 1.0 ampere. The licensee evaluated these E-7000 (safety-related) series relays, and later 7000 (nonsafety-related) series relays. The licensee concluded that both the E-7000 and the 7000 series relays were acceptable for the application used at Palisade At the request of the inspector, the licensee performed a search for any failures of the Agastat relays both at the Palisades plant and in the industry. The licensee identified five failures of the E-7000 series relays at Palisades since 1986. The licensee did not consider these failures to be age related. Most of these failures were attributed to high vibration, because the relays were mounted directly on the control room heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system compressor skid. The licensee also stated that the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation's industry database documented a few failures of the E-7000 series relays, the majority of which were related to setpoint drift outside the required acceptance criteria, but inside the drift criteria specified by the vendo The licensee concluded that in view of the low failure rate, the vendor's 10-year replacement recommendation did not apply to Palisades. The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluations and agreed with the licensee's conclusion. The licensee also *
stated that any future failures of the Agastat relays would be monitored as per the licensee's Condition Reporting Program. This item is close {Open) IFI 50-255/97201-24: "DC Load Terminal Calculation." The IFI was issue because the licensee did not evaluate whether adequate de voltages existed at the 125-volt de load terminals. The licensee issued Condition Report No. C-PAL-97-1620 tO address these concerns. The licensee also developed Engineering Assessment N *. EA-C-PAL-97-1620A-01, "Formalize a Bounding Calculation for the 125-volt de System for Worst Case Voltage Levels at the Loads Based upon Battery Degraded Voltage During Station Blackout," Revision 0, on Octob~r 9, 1998. The inspector reviewed this calculation and noted that clarifications were needed regarding the minimum de voltages *
available at the trip coils of 4160 and 2400-volt switchgear, and the minimum operating voltages that were needed for the breaker closing coils. Also, a revised calculation-was needed for the 480-volt load centers with a charging motor current of 70 amperes, as per vendor manual, instead of the present calculation with a current of 35 amperes. The *
licensee agreed to revise the calculations. Pending further review by the NRC of the licensee's revised calculations, this issue will remain ope (Open) URI 50-255/98011-03: "Unqualified Cable Used." This issue involved the acceptability of having a non-environmentally qualified cable in containment. The non-environmentally qualified cable was connected to Solenoid Valve SV-0347 that controlled Pressure Control Valve CV-3047. In the event of a safety injection, the safety function of the valve would be to close to prevent coolant from being diverted away from the Primary Coolant System. The licensee chose not to replace the non-environmentally qualified cable with one that was environmentally qualified, but instead modified the
____ -*-- _____. ____ controLcircuit to reduceJhe_probability of spurious solenoid valve operation;- -- --------- --
1 O CFR 50.49 required that electrical equipment performing a safety function be qualified. This issue was discussed with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to determine whether it was acceptable for the cable to remain non-environmentally qualified. Pending resolution by NRR, this issue will remain ope EB. 7
{Open) URI 50-255/98011-04: "Redundant Emergency Diesel Generator Circuits Not Separated - Appendix R." This issue involved 1-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG)
power and control circuits required for safe shutdown that were routed near the two intake air plenums of the redundant 1-1 EOG. In a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, fire protection engineering assessment (EA-FPP-95-047), the licensee discussed that a loss of the circuits, located in the air plenum due to a fire in the 1-1 EOG room, would disable all sources of on-site ac power. The evaluation further stated, however, that the fire loading in the 1-1 EOG room would not be of sufficient magnitude to affect the 1-2 EOG circuits. This issue was discussed with NRR to determine if the routing of the 1-1 EOG circuits was consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R requirements. Pending resolution by NRR, this issue will remain ope IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Radiological Postings Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors obs~rved radiological protection practices and reviewed radiation safety area postings during plant tour Observations and Findings During a routine plant tour on June 28, 1999, the inspectors noted that a radiologieal posting had fallen down on the floor of the Fan Room in the Spent Fuel Pool Are Health physics staff were notified and indicated that the sign would be reposte Discussion with plant staff following the June 28 observation, indicated that the contamination area sign in the Fan Room had been reposted. On July 15, 1999, during *
a plant tour, the inspectors noted that the same radiological posting had again fallen down on the floor. The inspectors notified health physics staff. The health physics staff *
documented the incident in the health physics logbook a_nd initiated Condition Report C-PAL-99-1089, "Radiological Posting on Floor." The contamination area posting was again secured, however, this time fasteners which were conducive to the high heat and humidity environment of the Fan Room were use Follow-up discussions with Chemical and Radiological Services staff indicated that the contaminated area in the Fan Room was subsequently decontaminated. Chemical and *
Radiological Services staff also indicated that not documenting the June 28 incident in the health physics logbook or a condition report was not consistent with current management expectation The failureJQ__rn_ajn_t~iriJ.!lJLCQ.ntarnioaticm_a__re_a_p_o_s_tingJo_tbe_Sp_entEuel_e.ooLEanJ~oom _______ _
in accordance with Procedure HP 2.20, "Radiation Safety Area Posting," constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to formal enforcement actio ~-:::---:i~*:::-*-..,..... *_-:.... --. --".<....----*
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- Conclusions The inspectors identified two separate instances when the same radiological posting for a contaminated area in the Spent Fuel Pool Fan Room fell on the floor from its designated position. The Chemical and Radiological Staff secured the posting with the proper fasteners to prevent reoccurrence. The licensee subsequently decontaminated the area, eliminating the need for the postin V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 11, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie *---* ----.- -----------* ---- ----- ------
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. R. Boss, Operations Manager B. E. Dotson, Licensing R. A. Gambrill, Component Engineering Supervisor R. M. Hamm, Electrical/l&C Supervisor, System Engineering N. L. Haskell, Director, Licensing D. G. Malone, Licensing R. L. Massa, Shift Operations Supervisor T. J. Palmisano, Site Vice President D. W. Rogers, General Manager, Plant Operations G. E. Schrader, Component Engineering R. G. Schaaf, Project Manager, NRR INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92901:
IP 92903:
IP 92700:
Onsite Engineering Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Follow-Up Operations Follow-Up Engineering LER Follow-Up
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Opened 50-255/99009-01 Closed 50-255/97014-01 (EA 97-567, EA 97-569)
50-255/98012-05 50-255/98002-00 50-255/97201.: 15 50-255/97201-17 50-255/97201-19 Discussed 50-255/97201-24 50-255/98011-03
' 50-255/98011-04
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED IFI Boric Acid Leak Inspection Program ineffectiveness VIO All control rods deenergized while in power operations to conduct maintenance on a single control rod drive mechanism IFI Licensee to evaluate weakness identified in Off-Normal Procedure 23,3, "Loss of Refueling Water Accident" LER Potential challenge to channel. separation IFI *
Cable degradation IFI Documentation of design basis URI. Agastat relays*
IFI DC load terminal calculation URI Unqualified cable used URI Redundant emergency diesel generator circuits no~
separated - Appendix R
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