IR 05000255/1997006

Insp Rept 50-255/97-06 on 970412-0523.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML18067A641
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/09/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18067A640	List: IR 05000255/1997006 ML18067A639
References
50-255-97-06, 50-255-97-6, NUDOCS 9707180248
Download: ML18067A641 (17)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No.:

License No.:

Report No.:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates:

Inspector:

Approved by:

9707180248 970709 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G

PDR REGION Ill 50-255 DPR-20 50-255/97006(DRP)

Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Ml 49201'

Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043-9530 April 12 through May 23, 1997 P. Prescott, Resident Inspector Bruce L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-255/97006 This inspection reviewed aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspectio Operations

The inspectors determined that communications between operations and the work groups to be good. An area for improvement noted was communications between operations and system engineering. (Section 01.2).

• During closeout of a licensee event report (LER), the inspectors identified two non-cited violations (NCVs) for procedure inadequacies. One NCV involved inadequate procedural detail for proper operation of the containment spray pumps'

light/pushbutton. The other NCV was for lack of procedural guidance for determining reportability of a single component actuation (Section 08.1).

Maintenance

The inspectors identified operations/er:igineering interdepartment communication and post maintenance testing problems during the P-55A charging pump maintenance outage (Section M1.2).

Engineering

The inspectors identified possible generic implications to fluid hoses in other systems important to safety after the failure of the P-2A condensate pump discharge vent line hose (Section E1.1 ).

The inspectors found the 125 VDC vital power system engineer was proactive in encouraging the licensee to test and obtain a new nonintrusive ground detection system, which should improve safe operation of the plant (Section E1.2).

• The inspectors identified a lack of thorough understanding of system design by system engineering during review of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater system surveillance data. The inspectors noted that this problem appeared to be a trend (Section E1.3).

Plant Support

The inspectors noted during daily plant walkdowns and observations of maintenance activities that radiological worker practices were adequate. However, the inspectors identified that catch basins, which have become more prevalent in the plant, were not being controlled by the licensee. This was indicative of degrading plant material condition (Section R 1.1 ).

• REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status The unit operated at essentially 99.6 percent power for the entire inspection report perio May 23, 1997, marked the 93rd day of the current power production ru I. Operations

Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71 707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. The conduct of operations was considered by the inspectors to be good; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed belo.2 Observations of lnterdepartment Communications Inspection Scope (71707, 61726, 62707 and *37551)

The inspectors observed operations in daily interactions with other department The focus was on communications during maintenance and surveillance activitie Observations and Findings The inspectors concentrated on interdepartment communication during observance*

of maintenance and surveillance activities. No significant issues between the maintenance work groups and operations were identified. The inspectors noted that during performance of surveillances, instrumentation and control technicians communicated to operations the potential alarms that may come in prior to actuation of the alarms. Following maintenance on the emergency diesel generator 1-::2, operations responded promptly to return diesel fluid levels to normal and remove the diesel fluid barrels when finished. This had been a concern identified in a previous inspection report. The inspectors noted that operations was safety conscious when supporting testing after maintenance and promptly returned equipment back to service. *

The inspectors found communications between engineering and operations was sometimes deficient. This was particularly evident during the P-55A charging pump wor~._ WhE!Jl ~he_ Vl/Qr_ls. §GOpe changed, system engineering did not inform.- -- -- - ---

operations in a timely fashion. Details of this can be found in Section M1.2 of this inspection report.

• During performance of turbine auxiliary feedwater pump testing, engineering did not promptly communicate to operations personnel performing governor speed adjustments, thus resulting in poor control over monitoring governor speed adjustment However, good communication of testing expectations was noted during performance of special generator volt-amperage reactive (VAR) _test T-35 Conclusions The inspectors found communication between operations and the appropriate groups to be good. An area that required improvement was communications between operations and systein engineering. Operations did not stress to various departments the expectation that information concerning plant systems status is expected to be conveyed in a timely manne Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92700)

0 !Closed) LER 50-255/94-002: Inadvertent containment spray (CS) pump actuation during performance of Technical Specification (TS) surveillance 00-1, "Safety Injection System."

During step 5.2.9, the control room operator verifies that the white standby lights were illuminated for CS pumps P-548 and P-54C, indicating that the safety injection actuation system signal is initiated for the CS pumps to start. While performing self-checking to verify that the white standby light had illuminated, the operator placed his finger on the white light. The operator inadvertently depressed the white light/pushbutton, which resulted in P-548 starting. The operator observed the red (running) light for a P-548 start and immediately stopped the pump. Problems that were identified and the corrective actions taken were:.

There was no precaution in procedure 00-1 notifying the operators that the CS pumps will start if the white light/push-button is depressed when the light is illuminate The following step was added to 00-1 Section 4.3, Equipment/Plant Safety Limit, "Upon initiation of Safety Injection Signal (SIS), the white standby light/push-button(s) for the CS pump(sJ will illuminate. Depressing the white standby light/push-button when illuminated will result in a pump start." The inspectors considered the licensee identified and corrected violation for an inadequate surveillance procedure a Non-Cited Violation (50-255/97006-01 ),

consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors found that operators were aware of the white light/push-button

_______.. dual functions. Additionally, the inspectors found that operators were-given---

training on the function of the white light/push-button.

• 0 *

The inadvertent pump start was not reported as a four hour reportable engineered safety feature (ESF) actuatio Administrative procedure 4.0, "Operations Organization, Responsibilities, and Conduct," step 5.5.2c.2, was revised to include reporting single component actuations, such as the CS pump start. The inspectors considered this licensee identified and corrected violation a Non-Cited Violation 50-255/97006-02, consistent with Section Vll.B. 1 of the NRC Enforcefl'.'lent Policy. The licensee reported the event within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> This item is close (Closed) LEA 50-255/94-014: Potential sump blockage from signs, adhesive labels and tape. On April 28, 1994, with the plant in cold shutdown, signs, adhesive labels and tape, which have the potential to block the containment sump were identified to be throughout containment. The initial operability evaluation assumed, in a worse case scenario, that if these items became loose, then an unacceptable flow blockage for recirculation of the containment sump water could occur. Root causes for this issue included a lack of controls of material used to attach signs, labels or other material that could have an impact on post accident containment sump water recirculation ff ow and a fess than adequate containment cleanliness verification proces The licensee performed an immediate extensive cleanup and re-labeling effort. In parallel with the cleanup and relabeling effort, an engineering analysis was performed. Identified recirculation water flow paths were cleared of potential debris. The cleaning and re-labeling effort encompassed the entire containment building. The inspectors reviewed the current checklist, CL 1.4,"Containment Closeout Walk-Through," for adequacy in addressing this issue and found the procedure to be thorough. The inspectors also performed an independent wafkdown of containment subsequent to the 1996 refueling outage. Cleanliness of the containment was found to be good. The inspectors also observed that operators performed an independent containment closeout waf kdown using CL 1. No deficiencies were note Administrative procedure 1.01, "Material Condition St~ndards And Housekeeping Responsibilities," was revised designating operations

• as the lead department responsible for containment cf eanf iness and giving guidelines for controlling signs, tags and labels. Additionally, administrative procedure 9.03, "Facility Change," design input checklist was revised to apprise the responsible engineer of the considerations when installing anything in containmen This item is close.3 (Closed) LEA 50-255/95-010: Engineered safety feature (ESFl actuation - manual

___ reactor trip following isolation of a primary coolant system (PCS) leak. -On August--

15, 1995, the plant was in hot standby when the control room received a containment interior instrument smoke alarm. Simultaneously, a '8' channel reactor protection system (RPS) trip was received and differential pressure (DP) indicators DPl-011288 and DPl-112A8 indicated low PCS flow. Subsequently, a report was received from instrumentation and control technicians informing the control room of

• a steam leak in the containment air room. Auxiliary operators were dispatched to containment to identify and isolate the steam leaks. In the process of isolating the leaks, low flow pretrip alarms were received on RPS channels 'A' and 'C' and the shift supervisor ordered a manual reactor tri Subsequent to the manual reactor trip, it was determined that the PCS root valves supplying DP transmitters DPT-0112A8 and DPT-011288, were incorrectly labele As a result, additional root valves were closed. Initial closure of the incorrect root valves isolated DP transmitters associated with the 'A' and 'C' RPS channels, which resulted in the low flow pretrips received on these channels..

The leak was subsequently determined to be caused by a sensing line separating from a swagelock fitting at the high pressure inlet side of DPT-011 288. The leak rate was estimated at 11-14 gpm which was within the capacity of the charging pumps and thus was not considered to be a small break loss of coolant acciden The licensee took the following corrective actions:

The failed swagelock fitting and associated tubing was replaced using plant guidelines for installation of compression fittings. Components located in the general area of the leak were inspected for damage and were wiped down to remove boric acid residu *

The DP transmitters were restored to service by opening the affected PCS root valves. Checks of the readings of the DP indicators and at the RPS input were taken to confirm that the transmitter output indicated to expected value *

Approximately 1 00 swagelock connections inside containment were inspected. No deficiencies were identifie *

In the 1996 refueling outage, all DP transmitter root valves were verified as appropriately labele Th.is item is close ~-----~-

--*---~- --

-*

• II. Maintenance M 1 Conduct of Maintenance M 1. 1 General Comments Inspection Scope (62707 and 61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:

Work Order No:

24710551:

042297DK01:

Perform fuel bundle inspections using eddy current testing with Siemens on bundle N-53 and M-18 Open/Inspect condensate tank and demister on

24612503J:

24711503:

24711598:

24711052:

24712096:

24710551:

24712088:

rad waste volume reduction* system P-55A charging pump couple and align Primary Coolant Pump P-50C breaker 252-104 replace 251 X relay due to intermittent ground Temporary leak repair for P-2A condensate pump discharge vent line flexible hose Remove and replace breaker 72-226 annunciators to panel C-11 VC-11 CRHVAC-high suction pressure open and inspect Inspect fretting on fuel bundles L-59 and M-25 from fuel cycle 9 Clean and adjust automatic voltage regulator on EDG 1-1 Surveillance Activities

00-21:

Rl-99:

T-357:

M0-33:

Auxiliary Feedwater System Valves lnservice Test Left Channel Nuclear Instrumentation Calibrations Generator Reactive Test Control Room Ventilation Emergency Operation b. Observations and Findings The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Work packages were comprehensive for the task and post maintenance testing requirements were adequate. The inspectors frequently

• observed supervisors. and system engineers monitoring work practices.- When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in place.

c. *

Conclusions In general, the inspectors observed good procedure adherence and maintenance practices. However, the inspectors noted several problems during performance of the P-55A charging pump maintenance outage. See the specific observations detailed belo *

. M1.2 P-55A Charging Pump Maintenance Outage

• Inspection Scope (62707 and 37551)

The inspectors obser.ved portions of the maintenance for the P-55A charging pump including post maintenance testing and the licensee's actions to determine pump operabilit Observations and Findings The inspectors identified operations/engineering interdepartment communication and post maintenance testing (PMT) problems during the replacement of the M-55A fluid drive for the P-55A charging pump. Operations was under the impression that the out of service time for P-55A pump would be approximately 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br />. Actual time expended was 5 days and 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />. One of the emergent issues was the bolting for the enlarged P-55A pump motor base. Engineering Increased the motor hold down bolts from 5/8 inch to 3/4 inch. Unlike the P-56A boric acid transfer pump, which had the same modification, engineering planned ahead and had the engineering analysis prepared in case the motor base bolt holes had to be increased in size to accommodate alignment. However; operations was unaware that this might mean an additional delay in return to service of the charging pum Additionally, during the post maintenance testing, flow indication gauge Fl-0212A delayed the return to service of P-55A because of an outstanding work request to*

evaluate indication oscillations _of the gauge. The work request tag stated that these oscillations were due to the gauge operating in the 95 percent upper limit gauge range, rather than the normal 75 percent range of the gauge. The inspectors noted that a condition report (CR) was written on problems associated with overall difficulty in adjusting the gauge within tolerance on both the high and low end of the gauge. *Calibration problems with Fl-0212A had been noted since the gauge was originally installe The inspectors inquired why gauge Fl-0212A was not included in the P-55A maintenance outage, especially since the gauge was to be used in determining operability of the charging pump. The system engineer stated that at the time, the repair of the gauge was not considered to be a priority. During vibration-testing* it- -

was identified that vibrations on the gear box had taken a significant step increase; however, no condition report was written and operations was not notified. This further impacted the return to service of the charging pump.

---

-

• c.

MS M Conclusions The inspectors noted that, compared to previous pump outages, the licensee conducted a better pre-job planning *for this charging pump maintenance outag However, the inspectors identified that there was a lack of communications between engineering and operations regarding the impact of emergent work and a lack of sensitivity for the importance of instrumentation vital to.equipment important to safet Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)

!Closed) IFI 50-255/94014-036: Numerous fundamental weaknesses regarding material control and supply of parts from the warehouse. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the warehouse, reviewed applicable procedures and held discussions with the warehouse and procurement supervisor Problems identified during the OET in the warehouse were; failure to cover exposed electronic parts, not segregating safety related from non-safety related parts, not removing from stock. parts that had exceeded their shelf-life, cleanliness of the warehouse, and failure to properly tag salvage material. The inspectors found a few minor tagging issues, but the overall material condition of the warehouse was adequate. Items were properly segregated, tagged and store Another concern identified during the _OET was the difficulty of using the licensee's databases for accurately tracking spare parts. This same databases was still in us However, one of the licensee's actions to improve tracking of parts was the institution of barcoding. The inspectors noted an improved ability to trend part Previously, much of this was accomplished by personnel maintaining handwritten documentation of where parts were in the system. Personnel received training to more efficiently utilize the databases for tracking spare part The OET identified a lack of good procedural guidance for material storage and control. The inspectors reviewed the revised procedures and found that they adequately addressed the OET's concerns. This item'"is close M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-255/96-003: Auxiliary shutdown panel inverter low voltage cut-off setting resulted in unavailability of panel. On January 15, 1996, it was discovered that during the performance of work on September 27, 1995, technicians found the low voltage cutoff for the alternate shutdown panel inverter set at 120 voe input. The Appendix R calculation for battery capacity showed that the initial battery terminal voltage would be less that 120 voe at the onset of a fire requiring use of the alternate shutdown panel, coincident with a loss of off site pow~r find batter_y chargers. Based on this* calculation, the* alternate * * -- --- *

shutdown-panel would not have operated, as the battery voltage would not have been high enough to overcome the low voltage setpoint. Fires in the electrical equipment room, 10 switch gear room, cable spreading room, and auxiliary building 590' corridor which require use of the alternate shutdown panel, also have the potential to cause a loss of the station battery charger. This would result in the

• alternate shutdown panel being powered directly from the station batteries to effect safe shutdown outside the control room. During the September 1995 work, the low voltage cutoff was reset to resolve the issue. The setpoint issue was not identified as putting the plant outside its design basis until the work order was*

reviewe One of the issues the inspectors identified was that the licensee simply made the new low voltage setpoint the minimum possible setting of 100.3 VDC. The licensee has since supplied calculations for the proper settings, taking into account capacity over a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Appendix R scenario arid other variables. The new setpoint is 105 ( + 0,-1) volts. A periodic and predetermined activity control (PPAC) was written to periodically check and adjust the voltage setpoint of the inverter power source to the shutdown panel. Also, other similar equipment had the setpoints verified. Lastly, a lessons learned presentation was given to engineering on this event. This problem was detailed in a NRC Appendix R inspection report. Potential violation issues were addressed in that report. This item is close Ill. Engineering E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Preventive Maintenance Deficiency For System Hoses Inspection Scope (37551)

After leaking was identified on the condensate pump P-2A discharge vent line flexible hose, the.inspectors followed licensee actions to repair the hose and review the corrective actions taken. The inspectors were concerned with the generic implications of the hose failur Observations and Findings On April 16, 1997, a pinhole leak was discovered on the P-2A condensate pump discharge vent line flexible hose. The vent line is used to remove air during initial st.artup of the condensate pump and the flexible hose portion of the line is unisolable. The hose is a stainless steel bellows design within a steel braided jacket. *Because the hose was unisolable, the licensee had the hose evaluated by a temporary.leak repair vendor. The vendor was able to design an enclosure around the hose and fill it with a leak sealan In discussions with the system engineer, the inspectors learned that the hose was last replaced in 1989.. A review of work order history showed several failures of hose.s. on both condensate pumps. The system engineer reviewed vendor information and found that the hose had a service life of approximately five year The licensee had no licensee preventive maintenance program, known as periodic and predetermined activity control (PPAC) or procedure for periodic changeout of the flexible hose. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's stock list of hoses to see if any safety equipment or equipment important to safety may also have similar

• hoses. The emergency diesel generator (EOG) was identified as having several hoses. The system engineer was aware of a service life (five years) for the hoses on the EDGs. Procedures RM-63-1 and RM-63-2, "Diesel Generator Inspection," for the EDGs covered inspecting the hoses on a refueling periodicity. After reviewing the procedure, the system engineer concluded it would be prudent to revise the procedures to replace the flexible hoses every fourth refueling outage. Also, the hose inspections would continue. The system engineer has submitted procedure changes to replace the hoses. The inspectors provided the licensee information on other hoses found during a work order history review that had failed repeatedly in safety systems. The licensee was in the process of reviewing these hoses as potentially requiring PPACs to ensure better reliabilit Conclusions The licensee adequately addressed the inspectors' concerns on instituting PPACs for hoses in systems important to safety. The inspectors discussed with the licensee the concern that the system engineers had not picked up on the potential generic implications that this might have to other systems. This was similar to the inspectors' concerns regarding rubber expansion joints and the generic implications of not having PPACs to address them. This was detailed in inspection report 50-225/9501 E1.2 Direct Current (DC) Ground Detection System Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of a new nonintrusive DC ground detection syste Observations and Findings Due to encouragement from the system engineer for the 1 25 VDC vital DC power system, the licensee was working with a relatively new technology which detects*

DC grounds. The ground detection equipment allows, from a plant safety aspect, nonintrusive testing of DC circuitry. Palisades has a permanently installed ground detection system, which detects a ground and displays its severity in the positive or negative circuits. However, in order to pinpoint the ground, circuit breakers must then be opened until the ground detection system shows a zero milliamp differential signal between the positive and negative circuits. What the new ground detection equipment technology allows is testing of circuits without opening breakers. The obvious advantage being the elimination of tripping or actuating plant equipment unnecessaril Briefly, there are two significant pieces of equipment to this new ground detection equipment system. One unit replaces the original ground detection system. The unit, called an interrupter, is placed across the positive and negative leads and is adjusted to identify the milliamp difference between the positive and negative lead This unit then allows a ground fault to flow at six second intervals. The other unit,

which is portable, uses a magnetic sensor assembly (MSA), which is used to encircle a cable or group of cables. The MSA unit is then synchronized to the interrupter and its signal output. It has a display reading that will indicate changes of the load current added to the fault current through the MSA over one complete interrupter cycle. One interrupter cycle has a duration of 1 2 second The vendor provided onsite training to the system engineers tha_t would have involvement in detecting grounds and to electrical maintenance personnel that would assist in the process. The inspectors observed portions of the training and found it to be thorough. The inspectors found that personnel Were knowledgeable in the use of the ground detection equipment. The licensee, prior to actually applying the system in the plant, developed and issued procedure EPS-E-9, "Use Of Portable DC Ground Fault Detection System." The inspectors reviewed the procedure and found it adequate. Finally, the licensee successfully detected a ground that was pinpointed to the primary coolant pump P-50C. The ground was traced to an annunciator relay for electrical problems in the P-50C breaker. The inspectors followed the replacement of this relay. The inspectors identified a loose nut that was between a bracket and terminal connection, which was most likely the source of the groun Conclusions The inspectors found the system engineer proactive in finding and encouraging the licensee to test and obtain a new ground detection system, which should improve safe operation of the plan The licensee provided adequate training and was fully prepared prior to using the equipment in the plan E 1.3 Trend In Testing Deficiencies* Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed test data from surveillance 00-21, "lnservice Test Procedure - Auxiliary Feed water Pumps," due to a repeatability concern with governor speed. The system engineer had documented this concern in condition report C-PAL-97-0762. The inspectors discussed the potential question of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system operability. The inspectors also reviewed the recent overall trend in testing performance by system engineerin Observations and Findings Procedure 00-21 was performed on May 14, 1997 and the initial P-88 AFW pump speed was 3600 rpm. During the previous surveillance, conducted on February 13, 1997, f'.>-88 AfW pump speed was left at 3560 rpm but drifted to 3515 rpm following surveillance testing. The governor was adjusted to return pump speed to 3560 rp The inspectors were concerned with this degraded condition and requested a review of this matter to determine if this band of repeatability was within the design of the governor. The component vendor was contacted and informed the licensee that the governor should have a high degree of repeatability and should be able to stay within a Yi percent of full range and that the a 20 rpm band would be a good acceptance criteria. The P-88 governor has been in service for approximately five years and the licensee has ordered two governors and intends to replace this governor at the earliest o'pportunity. The inspectors determined. through review of previous surveillance data and performance specifications for governor speed and pump flow, that the governor would be able to perform its intended functio However, the inspectors were concerned with the lack of prior design capability taken into consideration when outlining acceptability of pump performance characteristics and prerequisites required for achieving optimum test standard One of the additional items learned through discussions with the vendor was that the pump should be allowed to operate for five minutes prior to governor adjustments and data gathering, to allow the governor oil sufficient time to warm up to normal operating conditions. Governor adjustments were made soon after the pump was started and the procedure only waits two minutes prior to taking dat On a broader scope, in several recent inspection reports, the inspectors noted problems during testing of various systems. This was evident with the P-55A charging pump, which is detailed in section M1.2 of this report. Previous examples included:

50-255/97005: The inspectors found several discrepancies in test data in the 1995 refueling outage testing of the safeguards high pressure air syste *

50-255/96018: The licensee identified inadequate testing for DC circuit breaker *

50-255/96008: The inspectors identified a lack of initial baseline testing for the containment. air coolers installed in 1995. The safeguards room coolers were also identified as having poor initial test conditions, which meant the data taken was too poor to adequately trend wit On a positive note, the inspectors observed main generator volt-ampere reactive (VAR) test T-357, which was well planned and executed. The VAR testing was performed to determine the amount of VARs in, that the main generator could safely handle. This will be important especially during the upcoming summer, when grid stability could be of concern. The procedure was thorough and operations

personnel-were well briefed.. Conclusions

The inspectors were concerned with system engineering's understanding of system design and application of this to surveillance acceptance criteria. Several recent

related examples indicated that this area requires improvement. However, the inspectors observed good testing practices during performance of the special test for main generator VAR testin *

IV. Plant Support R 1 Radiological Protection R 1. 1 Maintenance Outages and Daily Radiological Work Practices Inspection Scope (71750 and 83750)

The inspectors observed radiological worker practices during various maintenance activities detailed in this inspection report and also monitored radiological practices during daily plant tour Observations and Findings The inspectors' observations of jobs in progress during the maintenance activities detailed above revealed that radiation technicians were visible at the job sites taking appropriate actions and surveys in accordance with good ALARA practice However, the inspectors did express concern with the number of catch basins and hot spots throughout the plant. The inspectors identified that the licensee was not trending the number of catch basins in the plant and did not have a mechanism in place to remove them once they were not needed. The licensee generated a list to trend catc!J basins and was also developing a method to remove catch basins no longer require Conclusions T_he inspectors concluded that radiological practices observed during the maintenance activities and daily walkdowns were adequate. The inspectors did identify a weakness in the control of catch basins in the plant. Additionally, little progress was made in the reduction of hot spots, which impacted on achieving good ALARA standards in the plan V. Management Meetings*

(. X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 23, 1997. No proprietary

- information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONT ACTED Licensee T. J. Palmisano, Site Vice President J. L. Hanson, Strategic Business Issues Director G. B. Szczotka, Nuclear Performance Assessment Manager R. J. Gerling, Design Engineering Manager T. C. Bordine, Licensing Manager D. W. Rogers, Plant Operations General Manager J. P. Pomeranski, Maintenance Manager D. P. Fadel, Engineering Director D. G. Malone, Shift Operations Supervisor M. P. Banks, Chemical & Radiological Services Manager K. M. Haas, Training Manager S. Y. Wawro, Maintenance & Planning Director

• B. L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 P. F. Prescott, Resident Inspector, Palisades

IP 37551:

IP 61726:

IP 62707:

IP 71707:

IP 71750:

IP 83750:

IP 92700:

IP 92902:

IP 92903:

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Surveillance Observations

. Maintenance Observation Plant Operations Plant Support Activities Occupational Radiation Exposure Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Followup - Maintenance Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED 50/255/97006-01 NCV Lack of procedural guidance in Q0-1, "Safety Injection System," notifying operators that CS pumps start if white light/push-button is depressed when lit 50-255/97006-02 NCV Lack of procedural guidance: CS pump start not reported as a four hour reportable ESF actuation ITEMS CLOSED 50-255/94-002 LER Inadvertent CS pump actuation during performance of TS surveillance 50-255/94-014 LER Potential sump blockage from signs, adhesive labels and tape 50-255/94014-36 IFI Numerous fundamental weaknesses regarding material control and supply of parts from the warehouse 50-255/95-010 LER ESF actuation - manual reactor trip following isolation of a primary coolant system (PCS) leak 50-255/96-003 LER Auxiliary shutdown panel inverter low voltage cut-off setting results in unavailability of panel 50/255/97006-01 NCV Lack of procedural guidance in Q0-1, "Safety Injection System," notifying operators that CS pumps start if white light/push-button is depr~ssed when lit 50-255/97006-02 NCV Lack of procedural guidance: CS pump start not reported as a four hour reportable ESF -ac-tua-t-i on --- -

AFW ALARA CFR CL CR CRHVAC cs DET DP DRP EDG ESF GPM IFI IP LER MSA NCV NRC PCP PCS PDR PMT PPAC RPS TS VAR VDC LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Auxiliary Feed Water As Low As Reasonably Achievable Code of Federal Regulations Check List Condition Report Control Room Heating Ventilation & Air Conditioning Containment Spray Diagnostic Evaluation Team *

Differential Pressure Division of Reactor Projects Emergency Diesel Generator Engineered Safety Feature Gallons Per Minute Inspection Followup Item Inspection Procedure Licensee Event Report Magnetic Sensor Assembly Non-Cited Violation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Primary Coolant Pump Primary Coolant System Public Document Room Post Maintenance Test Periodic & Predetermined Activity Control Reactor Protection System Technical Specification Volt-Ampere Reactiv Volts-Direct Current