IR 05000255/1998017

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Insp Rept 50-255/98-17 on 980821-1007.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support
ML18068A490
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/05/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
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ML18068A489 List:
References
50-255-98-17, NUDOCS 9811100224
Download: ML18068A490 (19)
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No:

License No:

Report No:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates:

Inspectors:

Approved by:

9811100224 981105

~DR ADOCK 05000255 PDR REGION Ill 50-255

. DPR-20 50-255/98017(DRP)

Consumers Energy Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Ml 49201 Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043-9530 August 21, 1998, through October 7, 1998 J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector J. Maynen, D.C. Cook Resident Inspector E. Schweibinz, Project Engineer B. L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-255/98017 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a 7-week period of resident inspection activitie Operations

Conduct of operations was professional with a focus on safety. Senior Reactor Operators' command and control of control room activities had improved from previous inspection periods and was generally good with one noted exception. Control room operators demonstrated a questioning attitude regarding scheduled activities on a more frequent basis. (Section 01.1)

. The operating crew demonstrated a good questioning attitude regarding a potential condition that could render both trains of control room ventilation inoperabl *(Section 01.2)

The control room crew declared an unusual event and exercised the emergency plan implementing procedures as required for seismic activity onsite.. The seismic activity was low leveland did not cause any damage onsite. (Section 01.3)

The operators demonstrated good self checking and procedure adherence during performance of the safety injection quarterly surveillance. However, the Control Room Supervisor did not demonstrate positive command and control following receipt of an unexpected annunciator. Augmenting the on-shift crew with operators responsible for performing the surveillance test emphasized safe conduct of operations. (Section 04.1)

Maintenance

Procedures were adhered to, three way communications and self checking practices were utilized, and good as low as reasonably achievable practices were demonstrated during the observed surveillance tests. (Section M1.1)

A non-cited violation resulted when licensee personnel identified that a temporary modification should have been utilized when a relief valve was removed that resulted in an alteratiqn to the Waste Gas Surge Tank while it was operable. The licensee's evaluation of this event was thorough and the corrective actions appeared adequate to prevent recurrence. (Section M1.2)

Engineering

The inspectors concluded that the new computer points added to the plant computer by nuclear engineering could be used effectively to monitor steady state reactor power on a real time basis to ensure that the license power level would not be exceeded. Also, maintaining steady state reactor power based on a 4-hour average was considered conservative. (Section E 1.1)

Engineering personnel provided an operability reassessment to operations regarding the control room ventilation system in a timely manner. The reassessment was thorough in that it provided operations personnel the information that was necessary to make an operability determination. (Section E2.1)

Plant Support

Repairs conducted to plug tube leaks in the main condenser were effective as evidenced by improved steam generator chemistry. (Section R1.1)

Management attention to improperly stored fire gear was warranted. The deficiencies did not result in any actual adverse consequences; however, they could delay the fire brigades response time. (Section F2.1)

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant ran well and was operated at full power during most of the inspection period. Plant power was reduced to 44 percent on September 26, 1998, to conduct scheduled repairs to the main condenser. The plant was returned to full power 2 days later. Steady state full power was*

raised from the administratively limited 99.6 percent to 99.9 percent on September 28, 1998, after a new parameter for monitoring steady state power was developed by Nuclear Engineering personnel and added to the plant computer. The plant then remained at full power

.for the duration of the inspection perio.1 I. Operations Conduct of Operations General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations using Inspection Procedure 71707. In general, the conduct of operations was professional with a focus on safety.. The control room was free of unnecessary activities and distraction Turnovers conducted by control room operators were thorough and the shift meetings effectively identified plant status and scheduled activities. Senior Reactor Operators'

command and control of control room activities had improved from previous inspection periods and was generally good with one exception. In particular, the inspectors noted that the control room operators demonstrated a questioning attitude regarding scheduled activities on a more frequent basis. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo.2 Operating Crew Questioning Attitude (71707)

The inspectors attended the Corrective Action Review Board meetings and reviewed the applicable condition report. On September 3, 1998, the operating crew identified a condition that could potentially render both trains of the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system inoperable. Specifically, a potential bypass mechanism was postulated that could preclude the control room HVAC system's ability to maintain the required 0.125-inch of water positive pressure while operating in the emergency mode. Condition Report C-PAL-98-1610 was generated due to the operating crew's questions. As a contingency, the potential bypass path was manually isolated until engineering personnel could assess the issue. The inspectors concluded that the operating crew demonstrated a good questioning attitude and that the

_ _c.o_nti_nge_nGy actions were appropriat.3 Declared Unusual Event Due To Seismic Activity Inspection Scope (93702)

The inspectors responded to the site regarding an unusual event that the licensee reported because of seismic activity. Applicable emergency plan procedures and control room logs were reviewed. Also, the inspectors discussed the event and the actions that were taken in response to the event with the control room operator Observations and Findings On September 25, 1998, the licensee declared an unusual event because of onsite seismic activity. Plant personnel located in the switchyard and support building noted ground movement and called the control room regarding a possible seismic even Personnel located in the control room and auxiliary building indicated that they did not feel any movement. The control room operators suspected a low level seismic event, called the National Earthquake Information Center in Denver Colorado, and received confirmation that an earthquake in the five Richter scale range had occurred in the Midwest. The earthquake's epicenter was located approximately 25 miles north-northeast of Youngstown, Ohio. The Shift Supervisor entered Emergency Implementing Procedure (El) - 1, "Site Emergency Plan Classification," and declared an unusual event. The inspectors verified that the appropriate Emergency Action Level and event classification specified in. El-1 were reference Notifications to offsite officials and the NRC were completed in a timely manner. Plant and site tours were completed as required by engineering and operations personne No seismic-related damage was identified. _Instrument and Control technicians dispatched by the control room crew reported that the strong motion accelerometer located in the switchyard did not actuate." This confirmed that the seismic activity onsite was low level in that it was below the threshold of actuating monitoring equipment. The inspectors noted that the strong motion accelerometer had performed satisfactorily during the last periodic functional test that was performed in August 199 Subsequently, the crew exited the unusual event and initiated Condition Report C-PAL-98-167 Conclusions The control room crew declared an unusual event and exercised the emergency plan implementing procedures as required for a seismic activity. The seismic activity was low level and did not cause any damage onsit *~ *~ **..... *-*.--~--::-~;*-~**- --

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Operator Knowledge and Performance 0 Surveillance Testing Inspection Scope (71707. 61726)

The inspectors observed the control room operating crew perform quarterly surveillance test in accordance with procedure Q0-1, "Safety Injection System" on September 11, 1998. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the applicable condition reports that were generated following the surveillance tes Observations and Findings Two additional nuclear control operators and one senior reactor operator augmented the normal shift manning during performance of the surveillance test. The additional senior reactor operator was responsible for test oversight while the two additional nuclear control operators performed the test. An Instrument and Control Supervisor and Technician were also called in and available onsite during the test to support the test as needed. The augmented shift manning emphasized safe conduct of operations in that it allowed the on-shift crew members to concentrate on their normal shift duties and responsibilities. The operators demonstrated good self-checking, independent verification, and procedure adherence during the test. Also, there was appropriate senior operator oversight during the tes Two minor equipment problems emerged during test performance that the crew addressed appropriately: In the first instance, annunciator "Component Cooling Pumps Discharge Low Pressure," energized unexpectedly. The inspectors noted that the Control Room Supervisor did not take positive control of control room activities following receipt of the unexpected annunciator. Consequently, the on-shift nuclear control operators and the operators who were performing the test appeared uncertain as to who should respond to the annunciator. This momentarily delayed the operators respons However, all the appropriate actions were subsequently accomplished and no adverse consequences resulted from momentary delay. The crew referenced the annunciator response procedure and correctly performed the actions necessary to diagnose that the pressure indicator had failed. The pressure indicator did not have any safety-related f~nctions and did not affect completion of the tes In addition, the control room supervi~or did not designate specific duties for the individual operators while investigating the unexpected alarm. Consequently, for a brief moment, all the nuclear control operators and the senior operator in charge of the surveillance test congregated in the center of the control room to look at the applicable piping and instrument drawing. This again demonstrated a lack of positive control over control room activities by the Control Room Superviso In the second instance, the breaker for containment Air Cooler Fan V-38 tripped instead of the fan stopping following receipt of the safety injection signal during the test. The crew could not definitively determine whether the fan was stopped by the safety injection signal or if the breaker trip caused the fan to stop. The crew notified the system

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.engineer and electrical maintenance, and generated a work request. Electrical maintenance personnel identified that an auxiliary contactor in the breaker was not opening up properly which resulted in the breaker tripping. Condition Report C-PAL-98-628 was generated and the fan was appropriately declared inoperable pending repairs to the breake * Conclusions The operators demonstrated good self checking and procedure adherence during performance of the safety injection quarterly surveillance. However, the Control Room Supervisor did not demonstrate positive command and control following receipt of an unexpected annunciator. Augmenting the on-shift crew with operators responsible for performing the surveillance test emphasized safe conduct of operation Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901, 92700)

0 (Closed) Licensee Event Report CLER) 50-255/97012: Control Rods De-energized While in Power Operation. On October 17, 1997, power was removed from all control rods to perform maintenance on a single control rod drive. This event was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-255/97014 and was the subject of Enforcement Actions97-567 and 97-569. The corrective actions will be tracked by escalated enforcement item (EEi)97-567. Therefore, this LER is close.2 (Closed) LER 50-255/98001-00: Large Leak of Component Cooling Water During Power Operation. On January 1, 1998, a previously identified leak from the component cooling water (CCW) system on the "A" radwaste evaporator distillate cooler head gasket flange rapidly increased and exceeded the makeup capability of the CCW surge tank. This event was discussed in detail ih Inspection Report 50-255/97018. The inspectors reviewed the LER and the inspection report and concluded that the corrective actions documented in the LER appeared adequate to prevent recurrence. This LER is close.3 (Closed) LER 50-255/98003-00: Watertight Door Improperly Latched. On January 13, 1998, Watertight Door 59, between the east and west safeguards rooms, was found improperly secured. This event was documented in detail in Inspection Report 50-255/98002. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions documented in LER 50-255/98003-00 and concluded that they appeared adequate to pn~vent recurrence. This item is close.4

{Closed) Violation NIO) 50-255/98002-01: Failure to Ensure Watertight Door Was Properly Secured. This violation was documented in Inspection Report 50-255/98002 and was the subject of LER 50-255/98003-00. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions documented in LER 50-255/98003-00 and concluded that they appeared adequate to prevent recurrence. Also, the inspectors verified that the corrective actions.

have been completed. Therefore, this item is close.5 (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item CIFI) 50-255/94014-07: Reviews of Surveillance Test Results Received Cursory Reviews. This Diagnostic Evaluati.on Team finding was part of an overall weakness regarding poor on-shift supervisory oversight and directio Examples of inadequate Shift Supervisors' reviews of surveillance results were used to support the supervisory oversight issue. Licensee management addressed on-shift supervisory oversight weaknesses through actions assigned in the Operations Department Master Plan. Several initiatives that included improving communications, strengthening department teamwork, and clarifying management expectations were undertaken. Improvements in these areas were accomplished through training, management oversight and coaching exercises of on-shift activitie To address the specific weakness regarding cursory review~ of surveillance test results, the inspectors observed recent surveillances and reviewed recent condition reports. No similar problems were identified. Therefore, this item is close II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (61726 and 62707)

Portions of the following maintenance work orders and surveillance activities were observed or reviewed by the inspectors:

Surveillanee No:

Ml-3

RPS-1-7

Q0-1

M0-7A-2

Q0-19 Work Order No:

24810857

24813300 Reactor Protection Matrix Logic Tests *

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (A TWS)

Calibration/Functional Test I..

Safety Injection System Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 lnservice Test Procedure - HPSI Pumps and ESS Check Valve Operability Test

Control room air filter unit, VF-268, Inlet and outlet humidity indicators: Perform functional check and calibration of humidity indicators Diesel Generator 1-2 K-68 Fuel Oil Booster

The inspectors noted that procedures were adhered to and that self checking practices were employed during surveillance testing. Instrument and Control Technicians who completed surveillance tests in the control room utilized three-way communications and kept the on-shift operators informed of testing activities. The technicians were knowledgeable of the test procedures and plant equipment, and completed the observed surveillance tests without incident Surveillance testing conducted in the plant was controlled and coordinated by the control room operators. Procedures were at the job site and auxiliary operators performing testing in radiation areas demonstrated good as fow as reasonably achievable (ALARA) practices by waiting in low dose areas at every opportunity. The inspectors concluded that procedures were adhered to, three *

way communications and self checking practices were utilized, and good ALARA practices were demonstrated during the observed surveillance test M1.2 Equipment Drain Tank Relief Valve Maintenance Inspection Scope (92902)

The inspectors reviewed a licensee finding of improperly performed maintenance on the equipment drain tank. The inspection included a review of Administrative Procedure (AP) 9.31, "Temporary Modification Control," Work. Order 24712153, and the *

evaluation of Condition Report C-PAL-98-141 * Observations and Findings Scheduled maintenance on July 22, 1998, removed Equipment Drain Tank relief valve RV-1008 from the system. This created an unisolated path for waste gas from the Waste Gas s*urge Tank because RV-1008 discharged into the Waste Gas Surge Tan Maintenance and engineering personnel considered the. Waste Gas Surge Tank out-of-service to allow the relief valve to be removed. Duct tape was placed over the open piping ends after the relief valve was removed for cleanliness controls. Subsequently, the plant tripped because of a main feed water pump trip and gases from the Volume Control Tank were.vented to the Waste Gas Surge Tank. Consequently, the cleanliness barrier (duct tape) was also acting as a pressure boundary for the Waste Gas Surge Tank.* The Operations scheduler requested a meeting to determine what impact the plant trip had on maintenance activities in progress. Information at that meeting identified that the duct tape used for cleanliness control for the RV-1008 maintenance activity was also effectively being utilized as a pressure boundary for the Waste Gas Surge Tan Administrative Procedure 9.31, "Temporary Modification Control," Revision 16, required that a temporary modification be processed for temporary alterations on operable plant equipment. The procedure contained a set of criteria that excluded activities from the requirements of temporary modification control which included temporary alterations on inoperable equipment. Maintenance planning personnel incorrectly concluded that a temporary modification was not needed since the Waste Gas Surge Tank was effectively out-of-service and that the operators had taken steps to maintain it at a minimal pressure. However, the Waste Gas Surge Tank could not be completely isolated and therefore was not inoperable. Consequently, a temporary modification

should have been utilized for removing RV-1008 because that activity altered the Waste Gas Surge Tank while it was operabl The inspectq.rs noted that the licensee's review of the event as documented in the evaluation of Condition Report C-PAL-98-1419 was thorough. The appropriate root cause and contributors to the root cause were identified. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence appeared adequate. In addition, although the inadvertent use of duct tape

~s a pressure boundary for the Waste Gas Surge Tank had the potential to result in an inadvertent release of waste gas to the auxiliary building, the inspectors verified that no release actually occurred. (This is documented further in Palisades Inspection Report 50-255/98015). Therefore, there were no actual safety consequences during the

  • Conclusions An NCV resulted when licensee personnel identified that a temporary modification should have been utilized when a relief valve was removed that resulted in an alteration to the Waste Gas Surge Tank while it was operable. The licensee's evaluation of this event was thorough and the corrective actions appeared adequate to prevent recurrenc MS Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902)

M (Closed) IFI 50-255/96010-04:* Maintenance Activities on Fuel Transfer Carriag Corrective maintenance activities were completed on the fuel transfer carriage to restore it to its original design tolerances. The maintenance included removing the east *

transition rail and installing a new one, and installing a complete new set of carriag wheels and thrust washers. The fuel transfer equipment performed reliably following the maintenance during the 1996 refueling outage and also during the 1998 refueling outage. Therefore, this item is close * *.-::.......

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Ill. Engineering

    • E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Steady State Reactor Core Power Raised to 99.9 Percent. Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors discussed the computer points that the operators would use to monitor steady state reactor power with nuclear engineering personnel. Also, the inspector reviewed applicable procedure changes, attended the Plant Review Committee meeting, reviewed the brief provided to operating crews, and discussed plant operations at 99.9 percent power with licensed operator Observations and Findings Nuclear Engineering personnel added two new computer points to the plant computer that the licensed operators could use to monitor reactor power. This was accomplished as part of an effort to raise reactor power from the previous administratively limited 99.6 percent to 99.9 percent. Nuclear engineering personnel contacted several other nuclear plants to gain an understanding of current industry practices for maintaining and monitoring steady state power. Nuclear Engineering personnel decided to maintain steady state reactor power at 99.9 percent based on a 4-hour average, vice an 8-hour or shiftly average. The inspectors considered the 4-hour average as conservativ One new computer point, heat balance power steady state reactor. core power limit (HB PWR SSRCPL), was the 4-hour average of reactor power that would be monitored to maintain reactor power at 99.9 percent during steady state operations. The second new computer point, heat balance power 4,;,hour limit (HB PWR 4TH HR LIMIT),

indicated what power was limited to over the next hour, on a real time basis, to ensure that the 4-hour average would not exceed licensed power level. When questioned by the inspectors, the operators were knowledgeable of the new computer points, and their purposes and limitation The inspectors noted that the applicable procedures were revised to provide the appropriate guidance regarding use of the new computer points for monitoring reactor power. Also, Nuclear Engineering personnel provided training and briefings to all on-.

shift crews before the new computer points were implemented. The proposed plan for raising steady state reactor power to 99.9 percent was presented to and approved by the Plant Review Committee. The plan was conservative in that power was raised from 99.6 percent to 99.8 percent and stabilized there for a couple of weeks which allowed all on-shift crews to become more familiar with the new computer points. Subsequently, reactor power was raised to 99.9 percent on September 28, 199 Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the new computer points added to the plant computer by nuclear engineering could be used effectively to monitor steady state reactor power on a

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real time basis to ensure that the license power level would not be exceeded. Also, maintaining steady state reactor power based on a 4-hour average was considered conservativ E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Control Room Ventilation Operability Assessment (37551) Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors attended the Corrective Action Review Board meetings and reviewed the applicable condition repor Observations and Findings Operations personnel identified a condition that-could potentially render both trains of the control room HVAC system inoperable. Specifically, a potential bypass mechanism for recirculated control room air to the fresh air makeup line was postulated that could preclude the control room HVAC system's ability to maintain the required 0.125-inch of water positive pressure while operating in the emergency mode. Condition Report C-PAL-98-1610 was generated to address the operating crew's question Engineering personnel addressed this issue in a timely manner and provided operations an operability reassessment. In the reassessment, engineering personnel noted that the potential bypass mechanism would be mitigated by Tornado Dampers TD-4 and TD-5 which would close because of reverse flow. Engineering personnel's conclusion that the tornado dampers would close on reverse flow was based on the fact that the dampers' counterweights are adjusted such that the dampers "float" open with no air flow across the damper. Therefore, any kind of significant reverse flow would cause the dampers to close. However, no specific information was found in plant records that would indicate the specific differential pressure required to close the tornado damper Also, the inspectors noted that actual testing of the tornado dampers ability to close if reverse flow occurred did not exist. When questioned regarding testing, licensee personnel indicated that the tornado dampers were checked annually to ensure that they moved freely and that the counterweights were properly adjuste Also, engineering personnel noted that an evaluation of past control room habitability issues determined that approximately one-half of the air normally supplied by the fresh air makeup line could be replaced by recirculated air and the required positive pressure in the control room would be maintained. Therefore, the reassessment concluded that.

the control room HVAC system was operable in the past and continued to be operable in the normal and emergency mode. Engineering's assessment of this issue was thoroughly documented in the evaluation of Condition Report C-PAL-98-1610. The evaluation provided operations personnel with the information that was necessary to.

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> * Conclusions Engineering personnel provided an operability reassessment to operations regarding the control room ventilation system in a timely manner. The reassessment was thorough in that it provided operations personnel the information that was necessary to make an operability determinatio *

EB Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)

E (Closed) Deviation 50-255/98003-08: Deviation From a Regulatory Guide Commitment. This item was a subject of Inspection Report 50-255/98-003(DRS). A letter from the NRC dated August 3, 1998, to the licensee rescinded this deviatio Therefore, this item is close E {Closed) Violation 50-255/98003-07b: Failure to Correctly Install Instrument Tubing for the HPSI and LPSI Flow Transmitters With the Correct Slope. This item was a subject of Inspection Report 50-255/98-003(DRS). A letter from the NRC dated August 3, 1998, to the licensee rescinded this violation. Therefore, this item is close * E {Closed) Escalated Enforcement Item CEEll 50-255/94017-01: Failure to Perform Peak Load Testing. This item resulted in escalated enforcement action (EA-:94-22) and issuance of a violation as documented in a letter dated December 13, 1994, from the NRC to the licensee. The corrective actions will be tracked with the violatio Therefore, this item is close E (Closed) EEi 50-255/94017-03: Failure to Perform An Adequate Safety Evaluatio This item resulted in Escalated Enforcement Action (EA-94-22) and issuance of a violation as documented in a letter dated December 13, 1994, from the NRC to the li~nsee. The corrective actions will be tracked with the violation. Therefore, this item is close E {Closed) Escalated Violation E 94-222 NIO) 01013: Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Maintenance: Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing. A violation and civil penalty (E 94-222) were issued for this item as documented in a letter dated December 13, 1994, from the NRC to the licensee. This issue was also the subject of LER 50-255/94-017. The violation resulted from the licensee's failure to perform adequate post-maintenance testing following governor linkage adjustments and other-maintenance activities on the EOG. The post-maintenance testing was required to verify that the EOG remained capable of supplying the required maximum design basis accident load The licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence appeared adequate. These actions were documented in a letter dated January 11, 1995, titled "Palisades Plant Response To Notice Of Violation - Failure to Prevent Degraded Performance of Emergency Diesel Generators," to the NRC, and in LER 50-255/94-017. The corrective actions included: 1) Technical Specification monthly surveillance test procedures were revised to perform peak load testing; 2) performance of a detailed assessment of safety system testing to ensure plant design basis requirements are being properly verified;

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and 3) establish administrative controls to ensure that changes made to the plant design basis that occur through analysis are properly controlled and evaluated for potential verification testing. Therefore, this item is close E (Closed) Escalated Violation E 94-222 NIO) 01033: EDG Load Profiles Changed Without Safety Evaluation. A violation and civil penalty (E 94-222) were issued for this item as documented in a letter, dated December 13, 1994, from the NRC to the licensee. This issue was also the subject of LER 50-255/94-017. The violation resulted from the licensee's failure to perform safety evaluations regarding changes that the licensee made to EDG load profiles that increased required peak accident loads for EDGs 1-1 and 1-2. The safety evaluations were required to provide the bases that the load profile changes did not constitute an unreviewed safety questio The licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence appeared adequate. These

  • actions were documented in a letter dated January 11, 1995, titled. "Palisades Plant Response To Notice Of Violation - Failure to Prevent Degraded Performance of Emergency Diesel Generators," to the NRC, and in LER 50-255/94-017. The corrective actions included: 1) a s*afety evaluation regarding the load profile changes to the EDGs was completed and determined that an unreviewed safety question did not exist; and 2)
  • the applicable administrative procedure was revised to clarify the requirement to process a safety review for all engineering analysis that affect the plant's design basi Therefore, this item is close *

IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R Secondary Chemistry The inspectors reviewed steam generator chemistry data. The inspectors noted that sulfate and sodium concentrations improved in that they d'3creased following the repairs that were conducted on September 26 through 27, 1998, to plug tube leaks in the main condenser. Sodium concentrations decreased below 1 part per billion and sulfate concentrations decreased below 2 parts per billion for the first time since returning to power following the refueling outage that was completed in June 1998. As a result, these concentrations of sodium and sulfate in the steam generators were relatively consistent with the industry medians for sodium and sulfate concentrations of 0.8 parts per billion and 1. 7 parts per billion respectively. The inspectors concluded that the repairs conducted to plug tube leaks in the main condenser were effective as evidenced by improved steam generator chemistr.. *...... -::;-.-,..** --~-

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S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S Protected Area Perimeter (71750)

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the protected area perimeter including the dry fuel storage area. No discrepancies were note F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F Fire Brigade Turnout Gear Lockers Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspectors reviewed Condition Report C-PAL-98-1703 and Inspection Report 50-255/9801 Observations and Findings Operations personnel initiated Condition Report C-PAL-98-1703 following the fire brigade response to an actual fire alarm concerning the auxiliary building 590 level. The alarm resulted from a failed detector and there was no actual fire. However, the fire brigade members expressed frustration with the poor condition of the fire lockers. The condition report identified examples of improperly stored and malfunctioning fire brigade gear that included: 1) size large pants stored in locker designated for extra-large pants; 2) no flashlight in one locker; 3) two left hand gloves in one locker; 4) no gloves in one locker; 5) two pairs of gloves in one locker; and 6) two flashlights that worked initially but the batteries went dead quickly:

A weakness regarding the potential for having fire brigade members having to search for required fire fighting gear prior to responding to an actual fire was documented in Inspection Report 50-255/98013. This weakness was noted because the inspectors identified examples of fire fighting gear that was not stored correctly or missing from lockers. The inspectors noted that corrective actions for the weakness identified in Inspection Report 50-255/98013 were planned but had not been implemented because of higher priority issues. Also, the inspectors noted that the fire brigade was able to respond in a timely manner in spite of the improperly stored gear. *However, this was the second example of improperly stored gear and also included malfunctioning fire fighting gear. This deficiency could delay the fire brigades response time and hinder actual mitigation actions and therefore, management attention was warrante Conclusions Management attention to improperly stored fi~e brigade gear was warranted. These deficiencies did not result in any actual adverse consequences; however, they could -

delay the fire brigades response tim "

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V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie......... _

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee T. J. Palmisano, Site Vice President G. R. Boss, Operations Manager P. D. Fitton, Manager, System Engineering N. L. Haskell, Director, Licensing D. G. Malone, Licensing

. D. J. Malone, Acting Manager, Chemical and Radiological Services

  • R. L. Massa, Shift Operations Supervisor D. W. Rogers, General Manager, Plant Operations G. 8. Szczotka, Manager, Nuclear Performance Assessment Department R. G. Schaaf, Project Manager, NRR

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 71707:

IP 62707:

IP 61726:

IP 37551:

IP 71750:

IP 92700:

IP 92901:

IP 92902:

IP 92903:

IP 93702:

Plant Operations Maintenance Observations Surveillance Observations Onsite Engineering Plant Support Activities Licensee Event Reports Followup - Operations Followup - Engineering Followup - Maintenance Onsite Response ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-255/98017-01 Closed 50-255/98017-01 50-255/94014-07 50.:.255/96010-04 50-255/97012 50-255/98001 50-255/98002-01 50-255/98003 50-255/98003-07b 50-255/98003-08 NCV NCV IFI IFI LER LER VIO LER VIO DEV Failure to Process a Temporary Modification To Allow Removal of RV-1008 Failure to Process a Temporary Modification To Allow Removal of RV-1008 Reviews of Surveillance Test Results Maintenance Activities on Fuel Transfer Carriage Control Rods De-energized While in Power Operation Large Leak of Component Cooling Water During Power Operation Failure to Ensure Watertight Door Was Properly Secured Watertight Door Improperly Latched Failure to Correctly Install Instrument Tubing for the HPSI and LPSI Flow Transmitters With the Correct Slope Deviation From a Regulatory Guide Commitment

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. 50-255/94017-01 50-255/94017-03 E 94,.222, 01013 E 94-222, 01033 Discussed None EEi EEi VIO VIO Failure to Perform Peak Load Testing Failure to Perform An Adequate Safety Evaluation Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Emergency Diesel Generator Load Profiles Changed Without Safety Evaluation 19

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