IR 05000255/1996014

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-255/96-14 on 961019-1123.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support
ML18066A845
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/22/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18066A843 List:
References
50-255-96-14, NUDOCS 9701280359
Download: ML18066A845 (21)
v • d • e


Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II I Docket No.:

License No.:

Report No.:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates.:

Inspectors:

Approved by:

9701280359 970122 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G

PDR 50-255 DPR-20 50-255/96014(DRP)

Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530 October 19 through November 23, 1996 M. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector P. Prescott, Resident Inspector P. Louden, Radiation Specialist J. Maynen, Resident Inspector 8. Fuller, Resident Inspector W. Reckley, Project Manager, NRR L. F. Miller, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-255/96014 This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering and plant suppor The report covers a 5-week period of resident inspection. This report also includes a special inspection of Palisades'

procedure for unloading Dry Storage Cask Operations

During preparations for removal of the reactor vessel head, the on duty Shift Supervisor directed that a reactor trip signal be inserted into the reactor protection system without first verifying that all prerequisite work had been performe The inspectors characterized this event as an example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. (Section 01.2).

  • AC instrument bus Y-01 was inadvertently de-energized when Automatic Transfer Switch Y-50 was returned to service because the operating crew used a Standard Operating Procedure without the work specific instructions contained in the work order and the periodic and predetermined activity control (PPAC) instruction. Failure to follow the work specific instructions was characterized as an example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8, Criterion (Section 01.3).
  • The inspectors identified that an Auxiliary Operator and a Shift Supervisor opened and inspected the cubicle for the Service Water Pump P7-A hand start switch after that pump had failed to start during a surveillance test. This investigative effort, performed without expert technical review and participation, could have affected the ability of plant staff to identify the root cause of the pump start proble (Section 01.4).
  • The licensee discovered indications of potentia*l defects in a loaded dry cask storage container. The inspectors and the licensee reviewed the plant procedure for unloading a sealed storage container. Several procedural weaknesses were identified, and corrected, prior to use of the procedur (Section 03.1)

Maintenance

Licensee management recognized that* performance problems experienced during the first two weeks of the fall 1996 refuel outage were indicative of a problem with the coordination and control of work activities. The licensee initiated a work stand-down and other corrective actions. The inspectors observed improved performance fo 11 owing the licensee's stand-down~

___...... _~~

-- ~--~o-.-=-

problems were identified. (Section Ml.3)~

Engineering

The licensee performed a temporary modification (TM) to the containment polar crane's trolley brake mechanis The work instructions for the TM did not contain adequate detail to ensure proper installation of an additional solenoid. Licensee staff installed the additional solenoid with ntie-wrapsn and duct tape. A fire subsequently occurred in the modified electrical syste The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. (Section El.I).

  • The longstanding lack of a PM program for the Fuel Handling System (FHS)

led to its poor material condition, and the need for extensive repair The extensive scope of required repairs, and the high dose rates in which work was performed, resulted in high accumulated personnel exposure (Section El.2).

  • The inspectors identified that some specific wording in the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (CRHVAC) TS did not accurately reflect plant condittons. The inspectors considered this to be a minor, administrative, proble The licensee and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation were informed of the inspector's finding Plant Supoort

The inspectors observed the removal of a temporary pump and filter skid used for pre-processing of highly radioactive liquids from the tilt pi Workers were observed to use good radiological work practices. A one gallon spill resulted from the operation of a pump which had not received post maintenance testing. (Section Rl.2).

  • The chemistry department performed a Hydrogen Peroxide flush of the primary coolant system following plant shutdow The flush was closely monitored by plant staff, and the procedure appeared to be well coordinated with the operations departmen (Section Rl.3).

Report Details 4t Summary of Plant Status

The unit operated at full power until November 1, 1996, at 6:58 pm, when a power reduction was conunenced in preparation for the planned 51 day refueling outag The main turbine was tripped at 10:50 pm. on November 1, 199 I. Operations

Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments C71707l Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent

.reviews of ongoing plant operations. Early in the refuel outage (refout), weaknesses were noted in the process for controlling plant activities. Similar weaknesses had also occurred in the 1995 refou Additionally, there were indications of inadequate licensee oversight of contractor activities. The licensee implemented significant and timely corrective actions to ensure adequate control of licensed activitie Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed belo.2 Inadvertent Drop of Control Rod Prive Mechanism Racks Following Initiation of a Reactor Trip Signal Inspection Scope (71707)

On November 7, 1996, the control rod drive mechanism (CROM) racks dropped into the vessel on initiation of a reactor trip signal. The CROM racks were supposed to be mechanically locked in the withdrawn position, and should not have dropped into the vessel. The residents reviewed the circumstances associated with this even b. Observations and Findings On November 7, 1996, the primary coolant system (PCS) was drained down to just below the CROM tool access flanges in preparation for uncoupling the control rods from the rod extensions per the licensee's refueling procedure. All control rods had been fully inserted into the cor Contract workers successfully uncoupled all of the individual rods from their respective CROMs, and operators in the control room attempted to withdraw the CROM racks using nonnal rod control circuitry. All CROM racks were successfully withdrawn, with the exception of CROM 33, which would not withdraw past the "8 inchesn positio The licensee elected to remain flooded up to just below the tool access flanges while troubleshooting the CROM 3 Two licensee electricians assigned to troubleshoot the problem were successful at locally withdrawing CROM 33 utilizing the test stand attached to CROM 3 They mechanically locked the CROM rack in the fully withdrawn position using the installed locking device, and reported to the control room that CROM

..

33 was fully withdrawn and mechanically locke However, only CROM 33 was mechanically locked in the withdrawn position. The refueling procedure did not allow locking of the racks until all of the CROMs were~*:.==:::;==

fully withdrawn; therefore, the contract workers had not locked any of the other racks in the withdrawn positio The Shift Supervisor (SS), under the assumption that all CROMs racks had been mechanically latched, ordered the control operators to insert a reactor trip in preparation for electrically disconnecting the CROMs per the refueling procedur When the reactor trip signal was inserted, all CROM racks except for CROM 33 dropped to the reactor upper guide structur No actual reactivity changes occurred because all of the control rods were uncoupled and fully inserted into the reactor cor The licensee's preliminary evaluation of the unexpected drop of the CROM racks concluded that no damage was expected because the CROM racks were not coupled to the control rods, and that the CROM rack extension dash pots dampened the insertion rate and prevented any damag All dropped CROM racks were successfully withdrawn using normal control rod circuitry and mechanically locked in the withdrawn positio In reviewing the event, the inspectors noted that the operating authority was not aware of the actual status of the CROMs, and had not been utilizing the refueling procedure CPAL-RFM-002, Section 9.2.11,

"Uncouple CROMs and Raise Rack Extensions" to follow the disassembly wor This procedure provided the specific steps for the CROM disassembly and the necessary steps to be performed prior to inserting a reactor trip signa The inspectors concluded that inadequate coordination and communication between the different work groups, and among the operating crews, ~ed to the on duty operating shift initiating a reactor trip signal prior to completion of all required prerequisite steps in the procedure. This was considered to be an example of a violation (50-255/96014-0la(DRP))

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion c. Conclusions On November 7, 1996, during preparations for removal of the reactor vessel head, the on duty Shift Supervisor directed that a reactor trip signal be inserted into the reactor protection system without first verifying that all prerequisite work had been performe The CROM racks had not been mechanically locked in the withdrawn position, as required by procedure, and therefore fell into the vessel when the trip was inserte No reactivity change was created because all control rods were already in the core. The inspectors characterized this event as a violation of procedures caused by inadequate coordination and communication between licensee work group *

01.3 Deenerqization of Instrument Bys Y-01 During Return of Automatic Transfer Switch Y-50 to Service Insoectjon Scooe C71707l The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the loss of power to instrument bus Y-01 on November 17, 199 Observations and Findings On November 17, 1996, the outage work control center informed the control room that AC instrument-bus Y-01 Automatic Transfer Switch Y-50, could be restored to service. Y-50 had been removed form service for performance of preventative maintenanc The Lead Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO) and an Auxiliary Operator (AO)

attempted to return Y-50 to service by utilizing Standard Operating Procedure SOP-30, "Station Power," section 7.6.3, "To Restore Y-01 to Automatic Operation." The LSRO and AO failed to review the work order and periodic and predetermined activity control (PPAC) for this return to service. A complete loss of power to instrument bus Y-01 occurred when Y-50 was returned to service utilizing section 7.6.3 of the SOP rather than the instructions contained in the PPAC *. The LSRO immediately recognized the loss of Y-01, and informed the control roo Licensee operators restored instrument bus Y-01 by placing the Y-50 bypass handle to the "normal" positio Instrument bus Y-01 supplied power to Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger

  • Bypass Valve CV-3006 and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Discharge Valve CV-302 Shutdown cooling was not lost as both CV-3006 and -3025 had been pinned in the manual position earlier that day to support unrelated work activitie While reviewing the circumstances surrounding the return of Y-50 to service, the licensee determined that Y-50 had also been removed from service using selected sections of SOP-3 Thi"s was another example of the failure to utilize the job specific work order and PPA The inspectors determined that the work.order and PPAC provided specific steps for the operators to perform, which would have allowed the return of Y-50 to service without a l-0ss of the instrument AC bus Y-0 The return to service of Automatic Transfer Switch Y-50 without use of the applicable work order and PPAC instructions was considered an example of a violation (50~255/96014-0lb(DRP)) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion c. Conclusions AC instrument bus Y-01 was inadvertently de-energized when Automatic Transfer Switch Y-50 was returned to service because the operating crew
  • used a Standard Operating Procedure without the work specific instructions contained in the work order and the periodic and predetermined activity control instruction. The operating crew had also--:==-~

removed Y-50 from service without using the work specific instruction Fortuitously, no safety related services were lost. Failure to follow the work specific instructions was characterized as an example of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8, Criterion.4 Service Water CSWl Pump Failure To Start Inspection Scope (37551 and 71707)

On October 30, 1996, during performance of Q0-14, "Inservice Test Procedure - Service Water Pumps," SW pump P-7A failed to start. The inspectors held discussions with the system engineer and with Operation b. Observations and Findings While performing Surveillance Q0-14 at the P7-A breaker, an Auxiliary Operator (AO) tried taking the control switch to the close position twic The pump did not start either time the switch was close The AO then informed the Shift Supervisor (SS) of the proble The AO and SS opened and inspected the switch cubicle. Nothing unusual was foun The AO closed the cubicle and attempted to start the pump again. This time the pump starte Operations notified the electrical system engineer of the problem with the pump switc The system engineer took out a work order number and developed an action plan. During troubleshooting, the cover of the switch cubicle was remove The breaker hand switch was a two cam switch, with a set of rotating and a set of stationary contact One of the two stationary contacts was found stuck in the actuated positio This condition could have caused a contact misalignment when the switch was actuate The switch stuck two more times when operate The switch was mechanically adjusted and the breaker racked to the test position. The switch operated satisfactorily. A test start was performed from the control room with no problems note The inspectors were concerned that an AO manipulated the P7-A start switch twice before notifying operations managemen The cubicle was then opened and the switch operated under management supervision before expert technical review of the as-found condition could be performe c. Conclusions The inspectors identified that an Auxiliary Operator and a Shift Supervisor opened and inspected the cubicle for the Service Water Pump P7-A hand start switch after that pump had failed to start during a surveillance test. This investigative effort, performed without expert technical review and participation, could have effected the ability of plant staff to identify the root cause of the pump start proble *

Operations Procedures and Documentation Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for unloading a sealed dry storage cask containing spent fue Observations and Findings In July 1994, the licensee discovered indications of possible defects in the radiographs for a weld in multi-assembly sealed basket (MSB) No. The licensee subsequently decided to unload MSB No. 4 to support additional inspections and evaluations related to its future use and informed the NRC of this decision in August 199 In preparation for the unloading of MSB No. 4, the licensee initiated a detailed review of the unloading procedure and identified several technical issues associated with the unloading proces In a document dated November 11, 1994, the licensee listed the significant issues to be resolved prior to initiating the unloading of MSB No. 4 as: (a) the MSB cooling skid design, (b) thermal hydraulic modeling of the MSB during the cooling process, (c) maximum allowable MSB pressurization during the cooling process, (d) fuel integrity during the cooling process, (e) fuel heat-up after transfer of the MSB from the ventilated concrete cask (VCC) to the MSB transfer cask (HTC), (f) MSB lid removal method, (g) criticality prevention during the unloading process, (h) broken pipe accident causing release of potentially failed fuel, (i) rigging modifications for the unloading process, (j) helium sampling method during initial breach of the MSB boundary, and (k) procedure revision A revision of the unloading procedure was subsequently developed (Revision 1 issued in June 1995) to resolve the identified technical issues. Engineering evaluations and other supporting documentation related to the unloading procedure and the thermal-hydraulic modeling of the cask unloading process have been reviewed in support of the staff's inspection of the licensee's unloading procedure and resolution of issues raised in a related petition filed on September 19, 1995, by Don't Waste Michigan and Lake Michigan Federation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. Additional information related to the NRC reviews will be provided in the Director's Decision associated with the petition. The inspector's review of the original unloading procedure and subsequent engineering evaluations prepared by the licensee confirmed the licensee's finding that there were many weaknesses in the original unloading procedur An administrative limit in the original unloading procedure restricted the internal pressure to less.than 10 psig during the cooling and refilling of the MSB. The inspectors determined that this administrative limit would have prevented the licensee from establishing a continuous cooling cycle because the internal cask pressure would have been too low to force steam to the outlet of the discharge piping at the bottom of the spent fuel pool. Other weaknesses in the original unloading procedure that would have hampered cask unloading included a restrictive venting capacity due to reliance on a small vent line with an installed

. Swagelok fitting, scant guidance for personnel performing tasks such as

  • *

drawing a gas sample from the MSB to check for damaged fuel, and several examples of references to the wrong step within the procedur Such deficiencies and weaknesses would have required the licensee to suspend activities at one or more times during the unloading process in order to evaluate the problems encountered (e.g., the inability to establish a continuous cooling cycle) and implement necessary revisions to the procedure. However, the inspectors determined that the deficiencies in the procedure would not have resulted in a challenge to either cask or fuel integrity, and that the licensee would have been able to safely unload an MSB after making appropriate changes to the unloading procedur Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 of the Certificate of Compliance for the VSC-24 cask system required the licensee to have an unloading procedure, and to conduct activities, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR SO, Appendix The fact that the original procedure would have required revision in order to complete the unloading process is a violation of requirements set forth in Criterion V of Appendix B pertaining to having procedures appropriate to the circumstances, and Criterion VI of Appendix B pertaining to assuring procedures are reviewed for adequac This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (50-255/96014-02(NRR)), consistent with Sectio VII.B.l of the NRC Enforcement Polic (

An issue related to the generation of hydrogen gas due to chemical interactions between borated water and zinc coatings used on the MSB internals was identified following an event during the loading of a VSC-24 cask at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. Confirmatory action letter (CAL)

No. RIII-96-0006 was issued to the licensee on June 3, 1996, and supplemented on June 27, 199 The CAL documented the licensee's

  • commitment neither to load or unload VSC-24 casks until the NRC staff had reviewed applicable responses to Bulletin 96-04, "Chemical, Galvanic, or Other Reactions in Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks," and verified corrective actions taken by the licensee. The review of the licensee's corrective actions related to the bulletin is

. an Inspection Follow-up Item (50-255/96014-03(DNMS).

Conclusions The licensee discovered indications of potential defects in a loaded dry cask storage container. The inspectors and the licensee reviewed the plant procedure for unloading a sealed storage container. Several procedural weaknesses were identified, and corrected, prior to use of the procedure.

  • II. Maintenance Ml Conduct of Maintenance MI.I General Comments Inspection Scope (62703 and 6I726l The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities:
  • *

246I3255:

I5200120:

15200120:

Repair Of Upender Hydraulic Cylinders And Transfer Carriage Fuel Shuffle Disassembly/Inspection Of Fuel Bundle N-53 Surveillance Activities

T-216 "Service Water Flow Verification"

RT-850 "Inplace HEPA and Charcoal Filter Testing Control Room Ventilation"

Special Refuel Outage Hydrogen Peroxide Flush Observations and Findings Specific observations are detailed in the sections which follo Ml.2 Overview Of Licensee Control Of Refuel Outage Activities Inspection Scope (62703 and 71707)

The inspectors noted, through discussions with the licensee and contractors, direct observations, and review of condition reports and other documents, that several problems had impacted refuel outage (refout) related work. Concurrently, and independently, licensee management identified these same problems in performance, and took action to address the developing negative tren The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken, and evaluated subsequent licensee performanc Observations and Findings Several performance problems occurred during the first two weeks of the refou Examples of these performance problems are discussed in Sections 01.2, 01.3; and El.I of this report. Early on the morning of November 18, 1996, contract personnel working in containment inadvertently severed an airline which supplied air to the inflatable seals on one of the installed steam generator nozzle dam A back-up nitrogen system maintained seal pressure while the severed air line was

replaced. Although not a violation of NRC regulations, the damage to the airline. was another example of a performance problem, and was of concern to the inspectors and to licensee managemen Licensee management initiated a work stand-down on November 18, 1996, following the damage to the airline. During this work stand-down, licensee management met with plant and contractor personnel to discuss the recent performance problems and to emphasize the importance of nuclear, radiological, and personnel safety. The licensee also established a Containment Coordinator who was assigned the task.of controlling contractor activities in containmen The licensee also initiated a new progress meeting, held each afternoon, to ensure that work status was clearly conununicated to the on-coming evening operations and maintenance staff c. Conclusions Licensee management recognized that performance problems experienced during the first two weeks of the refuel outage were indicative of a problem with the coordination and control of work activities. The licensee initiated a work stand-down, and held meetings with plant and contractor staff to stress the importance of maintaining nuclear, radiological, and personnel safety. The licensee also established a Containment Coordinator to improve control of work in the containment, and initiated an afternoon work status meeting to improve coordination between shifts. The inspectors observed improved performance following the licensee's stand-dow M Review of Maintenance Department Programs Inspection Scope C62700 and 40500)

The inspectors reviewed the status of various maintenance department program Some of the issues reviewed were; status of the fix-it-now (FIN) team, status of work order backlog, and trending of various. data related to the maintenance department and work plannin The inspectors also reviewed major modifications scheduled for this outage which were intended to improve material condition, reliability and safet Observations and Findings The inspectors have followed the progress of the FIN team since its implementation (IR 50-255/96003).

The team was instituted to streamline the work process and achieve a reduction in the backlog of corrective maintenance (CM) work orders. The inspectors found the FIN team had a positive impact on the CM work order backlo The CM work order backlog dropped by approximately 200 work orders from the beginning of 1996, to a total of 234 at the completion of the inspection period. Th inspectors found that the FIN team figured positively in reducing the number of outstanding control room deficiencies. There were approximately 13 outstanding control room deficiencies at the start of the current refuel outag The licensee initiated the use of the FIN

  • team to address emergent work items during the current refueling outag The FIN team was enlarged for round the clock outage coverag The inspectors sampled two licensee trending activities. The inspectors reviewed rework and personnel injuries. Trending of rework was f-0und to be a lagging indicator. The inspectors noted that all condition reports (CRs) that identified rework were not necessarily marked "rework." The maintenance analysts sorted through all CRs to determine if a rework issue existed. The inspectors noted that the licensee did not have specific key words to identify rework issues on CRs, and that this appeared to complicate accurate identification and tracking of rework issue Rework was slightly over the licensee's goal of two percent of completed wor The inspectors determined that the licensee's trending analysis of personnel injuries was based on closed CR This was another e~~mple of the use of lagging indicators. The inspectors identified two CRs involving personnel injuries, one that was 50 percent complete and another that was 100 percent complete, that were not on the licensee's trend repor Overall, the inspectors found the results of the licensee's trending efforts to accurately reflect the plant conditions described in the CRs that the inspectors reviewe However, the inspectors considered the use of lagging indicators, especially during refuel outages, to be of concern because of the potential impact on the licensee's ability to identify negative trends at an early stage in their developmen * The inspectors reviewed the 13 week planning schedule, and its implementation was found to be effective. The licensee was trending the percentage of emergent work to better plan resource loading at week 1 In the licensee's program, resource assignments were expected to be at 100 percent or greater for near-term work weeks, and 80-90 percent for latter weeks to allow for the addition of emergent wor No online work was scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1996 due to the refuel outage; therefore, the online CM backlog was expected to go u The trending data was found to be extensive for all aspects of maintenance plannin There were several long term plant material condition issues being addressed this refuel outag Work started on the following safety related systems:*

An engine overhaul was performed on emergency diesel generator 1-A new throttling governor valve was installed on the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump to stop the longstanding issue of continuous turbine spin and governor hunting during operatio New valve seats were installed on the atmospheric dump valves to address leakage issues.

The Vectra RVR-200 radwaste volume reduction skid mounted system was put into service in July 19*95 for a trial period of operation.

The RVR-200 was intended to reduce radwaste shipment volumes and to improve maintenance needs relative to the existing asphalt extruder system, which had the highest number of outstanding work requests of ariy plant syste c. Conclusions The inspectors reviewed several of the licensee's maintenance programs prior to the fall 1996 refueling outage and end of the current Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) cycl No significant problems were identified. The inspectors concluded that the FIN team had been instrumental in lowering the corrective maintenance backlog. The inspectors noted that the licensee had demonstrated a low threshold for writing CR Maintenance issues were being adequately trended; however, rework and personnel injuries were found to be lagging indicators, which could hinder prompt identification of negative trend The licensee had taken action to address several l-0ngstanding plant material condition issue The licensee was taking steps to address emergent work and its impact on the 13 week and refuel outage schedule III. Engineering El Conduct of Engineering El.I Fire in Containment Polar Crane Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a fire on the containment polar crane on November 10, 199 Observations and Findings On November 10, 1996, during use of the containment polar crane, a fire was observed on the overhead crane trolley. The crane operator inunediately informed health physics and the control roo The control room inunediately dispatched the fire brigade to the scene. A rigger/electrician in the containment took immediate action to remove power from the crane by opening the supply breake The fire was observed to self extinguish following the opening of the breake The fire lasted approximately seven minutes and was extinguished without the assistance of the fire brigade. The fire did not effect control of the crane hoist motor or brak The fire did not cause damage to any reactor plant systems, structures, or components, other than the polar crane itsel The fire was found to have been caused by a temporally installed solenoid in the crane trolley brake moto The solenoid had been installed by temporary modification (TM 96-050).

TM 96-050 was

  • initiated early in the current refuel outage when the original solenoid failed and a replacement 460 VAC solenoid was not available onsit TM 96-050 involved installation of two 230 VAC solenoids, one replacing the original solenoid coil, and the second providing a dummy load to establish the proper voltage drop in the circuit. A plunger was installed in the second coil to ensure the impedance was balanced between the two coils. However, instructions were not provided in the temporary modification for securing the plunger to the solenoid coil, nor were instructions provided for securing the second solenoid coil to the polar crane trolley. Maintenance staff secured the solenoid plunger to the solenoid coil with duct tape. The second solenoid coil was tie-

. wrapped and duct taped to a support bar in close proximity to the working coil.

The licensee determined that the fire was caused by an instantaneous fault in the operating 230 VAC solenoi The licensee determined that the most probable cause of this fault was overheating of the dummy load solenoid as a result of the insulating effect of the duct tap The inspectors determined that TM 96-050 did not provide the necessary instructions for installation of the replacement solenoids, and that adequate reviews had not been performed to identify.and correct this deficiency prior to performance of wor This was considered a violation (50-255/96014-04(DRP)) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Contro c. Conclusions The licensee performed a temporary modification (TM) to the containment polar crane's trolley brake mechanis The work instructions for the TM did not contain adequate detail to ensure proper installation of an *

additional solenoid. Licensee staff installed the additional solenoid with ntie-wrapsn and duct tape. A fire subsequently occurred in modified electrical system. Operation of the crane hoist was not affected, and there was no damage to any other *structure, system, or componen The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II El.2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment - Repairs to Fuel Handling System Inspection Scope (62703 and 83750)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's performance in performing repairs to the fuel handling system transfer railing, fuel upender, and fuel transfer car Observations and Findings The licensee had not implemented a periodic or preventive maintenance (PM) program for the fuel handling system (FHS).

Only corrective

  • 1

maintenance repairs had been performed since plant construction. During the 1995 refuel outage, the licensee noted that the FHS upender responded slowly, and that the resistance load cell intermittently indicated high load spikes while the transfer cart traversed the transfer rails between the containment and the fuel buildin Following the 1995 refuel outage, the licensee developed general plans to perform repairs on the FHS, but no actions were taken to initiate work planning until January 1996, when the responsibility for the FHS was assigned to the site vendo At that time, the responsible project manager presented a repair plan for replacement of the upender hydraulic cylinders to station managemen The plan called for completion of this work prior to the fall 1996 refuel outag Management supported the initiative; however, the repairs were not started until August 7, 199 Radiological surveys performed during repair of the upender hydraulic cylinders identified a 700 rem/hr hot spot on the transfer car In an effort to reduce exposures to the workers, an ALARA plan was developed, which directed manual movement of a portion of the transfer cart into the transfer tube so that the hot spot would be shielded. Workers were unable to manually move the cart into the transfer tub Work was suspended, and a camera equipped robot was used to visually inspect the tilt pit area to determine why the cart could not be move The video survey revealed that the transfer rails were not in alignment, and that the cart wheels had become damaged through years of traversing the misaligned rails. Based upon these observations, the project manager and system engineer decided to have the cart removed from the

  • tilt pit to allow repair of both the cart and the transfer rails. The cart was transferred from the tilt pit to the cask washdown pit during a well planned evolution performed on September 18, 199 The cart and transfer rails were repaired. Cart repairs were impacted by high dose rates. The radiation safety group conducted several high pressure flushes of the cart in an effort to reduce these dose rate The flushes were relatively successful; however~ working area dose rates were still 300 to 400 mrem/hr for most of the repair period. These high dose rates resulted in the overall dose expended for the FHS repairs to be 25.277 person-re The inspectors concluded that additional reduction of dose rates in the tilt pit and on the transfer cart would have been possible if the repairs had been started farther in advance of the refuel outag c. Conclusions The licensee performed extensive repairs of the Fuel Handling System (FHS) prior to the 1996 refuel outage. The longstanding lack of a PM program led to the poor material condition of the FHS, and contributed to the need for these extensive repairs. The performance of work so close to the start of the refuel outage limited the dose reduction
  • techniques available to the ALARA staff. The extensive scope of required re.pairs, and the high dose rates in which work was. performed, resulted in high accumulated personnel exposure El.3 Technical Specification CTSl Concerning Control Room Ventilation Inspection Scope C3755ll On October 29, 1996, surveillance procedure RT-850 "Inplace HEPA And Charcoal Filter Testing Control Room Ventilation," was performe The purpose of the test was to verify charcoal filter efficiency and verify that in-leakage was not excessive. The inspectors reviewed the TS limiting conditions for operation (LCO) pertaining to the control room heating ventilation and air conditioning (CRHVAC) syste Portions of testing and troubleshooting were also observe Observations and Findings During surveillance RT-840, the n9n train's charcoal filter bed failed to meet in-leakage criteria. The "B" train of CRHVAC was declared inoperable because of this failed surveillance. The licensee believed the failure of the test was due to poor sealing around the trays

containing the charcoal. The inspectors reviewed the operations LCO board and noted that the licensee was in TS 3.14, which is a three and one half day LC The LCO board stated it was a seven day LC Upon review of this discrepancy, the inspectors found that the TS LCO applied if no train of CRHVAC were operable. The specific wording in the TS implied that a single train of CRHVAC existed, as had been the original system desig *

The inspectors determined that the original one train CRHVAC system was replaced in 1986 with two fully independent trains. A TS change was.

submitted to NRC to reflect this condition, but later withdrawn in 198 As an interim measure to resolve the disparity between plant configuration and the implied reference to a single CRHVAC train in the TS, the licensee incorporated administrative guidance for CRHVAC into Standing Order 54. Standing Order 54 directed that with one train of CRHVAC inoperable, the plant enter a seven day LC With both trains inoperable, the plant was required to begin an inunediate shutdown. This licensee administrative procedure was more conservative than the TS requirement, and did not conflict with, or violate, the specific TS wordin The installed CRHVAC system was more conservative than the original system, and not in direct conflict with the T The inspectors con~idered the failure to obtain a clarification update to the TS to be a minor administrative manner, but were concerned that the discrepancy had been allowed to exist for approximately 10 year The inspectors identified this issue to the licensee and to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio The issue of the difference between the CRHVAC technical specifications and the as built CRHVAC system is an unresolved item pending NRR review (50-255/96014-05(DRP)) *

  • c. Conclusions The inspectors identified that the specific wording in the CRHVAC TS did not accurately reflect plant condition The licensee and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation were informed of the inspector's finding IV. Plant Support RI Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls RI.I Maintenance Outages and Daily Radiological Worker Practices Inspection Scope C83750l The inspectors observed radiological worker activities during the various maintenance activities detailed in this inspection report, and also monitored radiological practices during daily plant tour Observations and Findings During the observed maintenance activities, radiation technicians were visible at the job sites. The technicians took appropriate actions and surveys in accordance with good ALARA practice c. Conclusion The inspectors concluded that radiological practices observed during the maintenance activities and plant daily walkdowns were adequat The inspectors had no concerns. Specific observations are detailed belo R Removal of Temporary Modificatjon Fjlter Used For Tilt Pit Decontamination Inspection Scope (83750 and 62703)

The inspectors observed the pre-job brief and work activities involved with the removal of a special filter and pump skid that was temporarily installed to handle cleanup of the tilt pit. The filter skid was disconnected because a seven rem hot particle had become lodged in the piping at the flanged inlet connectio Observations and Findings The special filter and pump skid was used to pre-process highly contaminated water generated in the spent fuel pool (SFP) tilt pit, prior to directing the processed water to the dirty waste tank via *

floor drain. The special filter and pump skid was installed where a spool piece had been removed in the normal tilt pit drainage piping running from the tilt pit to the safety injection reserve water (SIRW)

tan Reinstallation of the normal spool piece required removal of the skid connection from the pipe to the tilt pit, and removal of a blank

.. flange from the pipe going to the SIRW tan I7

The pre-job brief for the job was found to be thorough, with active participation by the personnel involve The licensee started the skid mounted pump in an effort to remove any residual water in the ski This pump had recently been reinstalled on the skid after its removal for maintenance. A gasket on one of two pump diaphragm discharge flanges failed due to improper reassembly of the discharge piping when the pump was started. Approximately one gallon of contaminated water was spilled on the floor from the flanged joint. The radwaste cleaners were able to clean up the water, and no one was contaminate The licensee informed the inspectors that it was not ordinary practice to test or operate rebuilt pumps prior to reinstallation. After the skid connection was removed from the normal drain pipe, the interior of the piping was swabbed and the hot particle was -successfully extracte The other end of the spool piece connection was the blank flanged piping

. to the SIRW tank. A large section of this pipe required draining so that the spool piece could be reinstalle To drain this pipe, it was necessary to slowly back off on the nuts of the studs holding the blank flange, and to allow the water behind the flange to drain into a catchment. This draining evolution was awkward to perform and time consumin The inspectors concluded that the task would have been simplified if a valve connection been attached to the blank flange, so that a drain line could be directly connected to tha flange without breaking the flanged joint. This simplification would reduce total dose and reduce the potential for a spill of radioactive liqui c. Conclusions The inspectors observed the removal of a temporary pump and filter sk used for pre-processing of highly radioactive liquids from the tilt pi Workers were observed to use good radiological work practices. A one gallon spill resulted from the operation of a pum The inspectors concluded that additional preplanning and the addition of a valve to the SIRW drain line would simplify this evolution and would reduce exposures if the temporary pump and filter skid was used again; Rl.3 Hydrogen Peroxide Flush Following Plant Shutdown (71707) Insoection Scope (71707)

The licensee added hydrogen peroxide to the primary coolant system (PCS)

in order to reduce activity in the PC The inspectors interviewed several personnel from the operations and chemistry departments and reviewed laboratory chemistry result In addition, the following procedures were reviewed:

Chemistry Operating Procedure 2, "Chemical and Volume Control System Chemistry" Chemistry Procedure 3.38, "Shutdown Chemistry Control"

  • Observations and Findings The inspectors verified that all plant conditions were met prior to adding hydrogen peroxide. The procedure was a critical path outage item which was scheduled to run for 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />, based upon an estimate of when the acceptance criteria of < 0.05 uCi/ml Co-58 PCS activity would be achieve The hydrogen peroxide treatment was secured after 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> with Co-58 activity< 0.05 uCi/m An estimated 440 Ci was removed from the PC c. Conclusions The chemistry department performed a Hydrogen Peroxide addition following plant shutdown. This treatment removed 440 Ci of Co-5 The addition was closely monitored, and the procedure appeared to be well coordinated with the operations departmen V. Management Meetings Xl Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 23, 199 The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietar No proprietary information was identified.

'*

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. A. Fenach, Vice President, Nuclear Operations T. J. Palmisano, Plant General Manager K. P. Powers, Nuclear Services General Manager G. B. Szczotka, Nuclear Performance Assessment Manager H. L. Linsinbigler, Design Engineering Manager T. C. Bordine, Licensing Manager D. W. Rogers, Operations Manager J. P. Pomeranski, Maintetiance and Construction Manager D. P. Fadel, System Engineering Manager D. G. Malone, Shift Operations Supervisor D. J. Malone, Chemical & Radiation Protection Services Manager K~ M. Haas, Training Manager S. Y. Wawro, Planning & Scheduling Manager M. E. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector, Palisades P. F. Prescott, Resident Inspector, Palisades IP 37551:

IP 40500:

IP 61726:

IP 62700:

IP 62703:

IP 71707:

. IP 83750:

IP 92702:

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Effectiveness Of Licensee Controls In Identifying, Resolving, And Preventing Problems Surveillance Observations Maintenance Implementation Maintenance Observation Plant Operations Occupational Radiation Exposure Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations ITEMS OPENED 50-255/96014-0la VIO Operations, prior to tripping the reactor, was not cognizant of status of procedure controlling CRDMs 50-255/96014-0lb VIO

. 50-255/96014-02

.NCV 50-255/96014-03 * 1FI 50-255/96014-04 VIO 50-255/96014-05 URI Operations failed to follow procedure of controlling document during restoration of instrument bus Y-01 Inadequate procedure for unloading dry storage containers Review of licensee's response to hydrogen gas in dry casks issue Inadequate design control of temporary modification to the solenoid for the polar crane trolley braking unit Review by NRR of difference between T. S. and as built CRHVAC

  • ITEMS CLOSED 50-255/96014-02 NCV Inadequate procedure for unloading dry storage containers

A LARA AC AO CFR CM CR CRS CROM CRHVAC DET DRP FHS FIN HEPA I&C IFI

.Ip IR LCO LSRO MCC NRC NRR PCS PDR PM PPAC REF OUT REM RVR SFP SIRW SS STS SW TM TS URI VIO LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

  • As Low As Reasonably Achievable Alternating Current Auxiliary Operator Code of Federal Regulations Corrective Maintenance Condition Report Control Room Supervisor Control Rod Drive Mechanism Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Diagnostic Evaluation Team Division of Reactor Projects Fuel Handling System Fix-It-Now High Efficiency Particulate Air Instrumentation & Control Inspection Followup Item Inspection Procedure

Inspection Report

Limiting Condition of Operation

Lead Senior Reactor Operator

Motor Control Center

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Primary Coolant System

Public Document Room

Preventative Maintenance

Periodic and Predetermined Activity Control

Refuel Outage

Roentgen Equivalent Man

Radwaste Volume Reduction

Spent Fuel Pool

Safety Injection Reserve Water

Shift Supervisor

Standard Technical Specifications

Service Water

Temporary Modification

Technical Specification

Un re so lYed Item

Violation

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=IR_05000255/1996014&oldid=5016847"