IR 05000255/1998021

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Insp Rept 50-255/98-21 on 981130-1204.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Performance During Plant Biennial Exercise of Emergency Plan
ML18066A362
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/29/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML18066A361 List:
References
50-255-98-21, NUDOCS 9901060213
Download: ML18066A362 (16)
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Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket Nos:

License Nos:

Report No:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates:*

Inspectors:

Approved by:

~~ 1060213 981229 a

ADOCK 05000255 PDR REGION 111 50-255 DPR-20 50-255/98021 (DRS)

Consumers Energy Company Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 49043-9530 November 30 - December 4, 1998 R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst J. Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst D. Funk, Emergency Preparedness Analyst P. Milligan, Emergency Preparedness Specialist J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

  • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Palisades Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-255/98021 This inspection consisted of evaluation of the licensee's performance during the plant's biennial exercise of the Emergency Plan. It was conducted by three regional emergency preparedness inspectors, a Headquarters emergency preparedness specialist, and a resident inspector. No violations of NRC requirements were identifie Plant Support

Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise was very good and demonstrated that emergency plan implementation activities met regulatory requirements. (Section P4.1.c}.

Overall performance in the Simulator Control Room was good. Proper assessments of plant conditions were made by the crew. The transfer of command and control to the Technical Support Center's (TSC} Site Emergency Director (SEO} was orderly and rapid. Communications between the control room crew and other emergency response staff were frequent and detailed. (Section P4.1.c}

A problem with the autodialer delayed event notification from the Simulator Control Room to the State of Michigan. Later, problems with the autodialer phone line and extensions made the line inoperable. (Section P4.1.c}

A problem was identified in the Simulator Control Room regarding the timeliness of the initial Alert notification to the offsite agencies. (Section P4.1.c}

The Technical Support Center (TSC} staff's performance was excellent. The SED's command and control and the TSC staff's communications in the facility and to staffs of other facilities were effective. Status _boards were very informative and changing plant conditions were proactively monitored to ensure the emergency classification was correct. (Section P4.1.c}

The actual shift supervisor provided excellent response to a real time failure of the TSC's missile door and ensured safety of the plant personnel assembled in the control room/TSC area. (Section P4.1.c}

Staff performance in the Operations Support Center (OSC} was excellent with rapid facility activation, well utilized status boards, efficient team briefing and dispatch, and effective response to the scenario's loss of power to the OSC's lighting and dose

---tracking-system. _(SectionJ~4.t.c)_ _ _ _ ____________ ----------~-- _ _________

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The OSC lacked any emergency lighting which was further evidenced by the pre-staging of a battery powered emergency light. (Section P4.1.c}

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Overall performance of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) responders was very competent. The EOF staff performed their duties in an orderly and efficient manne Transfer of command and control to the EOF Director was smooth and effective. The Health Physics team was very effective in their assessment of the offsite impact of the radiological release and their related communications to the EOF Director. (Section P4.1.c)

A post-exercise demonstration of the recovery procedure was very good. (Section P4.1.c)

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Initial critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough and self-critica *

Exercise controllers effectively solicited verbal and written inputs from exercise participants. (Section P4.1.c)

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Report Details IV. Plant Support

The inspectors reviewed the 1998 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that they would acceptably test major elements of the licensee's onsite emergency pla The scenario provided a challenging framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan, as indicated in Section P4.1. The scenario included a radiological release and several equipment failure P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P Evaluated Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection Scope (82301)

On December 1, 1998, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving full participation by the State of Michigan and the counties of Allegan, Berrien, and Van Buren. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response organizations and emergency response facilities were activate The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities: * *

Simulator Control Room (SCR)

Technical Support Center (TSC)

Operations Support Center (OSC)

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations (PAR), command-and-control, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between managers in different facilities, communications, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspecfors attended the post-exercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of exercise performanc Emergency Response Facility Observations and Findings

Overall performance in the SCR was good. Appropriate procedures, including emergency operating procedures, technical specifications, and off normal procedures, were effectively used. During this rapidly moving exercise scenario, SCR personnel

properly diagnosed reactor events for the Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) and Alert emergency classifications. The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) made a conservative decision to enter the Off Normal Procedure 23.1, "Primary Coolant System Leak", due to changes in charging pump speed and high indications on radiation alarm monitor number 181 Event notification forms and verbal notifications to State, county, and NRC officials were completed in a detailed manner; however, timeliness of the initial notifications was marginal. Notifications to the State of Michigan for the NUE took 17 minutes and 18 minutes for the Alert. Both of these times were outside the 15 minute notification goa A contributing factor to the delayed notifications was the failure of the telephone autodialer system to function properly. Upon discovering the failure, the communicator used another phone line and located the backup numbers for the State, counties, and NR Inspection of autodialer phone lines in the TSC and actual control room on December 3, 1998, identified that the autodialer phone lines were not functional. A work request to correct the problem with the autodialer phone line had been issued on December 2, 1998, and a telephone repairman was present on December 3 during inspectors'

subsequent checks on this phone line.. The problem with the autodialer phone lines on December 2 and 3, was due to the line being left open, which resulted in the phone line being "off hook." This failure would prevent use of the primary notification line to notify offsite authorities in case of an actual emergency. Correction of problems with the autodialer phone lines will be tracked ~s an Inspection Followup Item (IFI 50-255/98021-01).

During the exercise, an Alert was declared as the oncall communicator arrived to take over notification responsibilities and the onshift communicator was busy on the phone with the NRC. The oncall communicator was given the Alert Emergency Notification Form to make the required notifications, but was delayed 8 minutes starting the notifications while trying to get the attention of the onshift communicator who was still on the phone with the NRC. Emergency implementing procedures indicated that notifications shall be performed within 15 minutes of emergency classifications. The oncall communicator tasked with making the initial Alert notifications used approximately 18 minutes to initiate the Alert notifications. The oncall communicator displayed no sense of urgency and had no other conflicting responsibilities. Evaluation of the process for initial notification from the control room to the State and counties within 15 minutes of emergency declarations will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (IFI 50-255/98021-02).

.At 8:46 a.m. the onshift communicator was on the phone with simulated NRC officials

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briefing them on the NUE. The Alert was declared at 8:40 a.m. and could have been

  • --*------ -- -*-* ----Communicated-or-mentioned-to-the-NRC.. during-this NUE-notification.-lnstead-the--------

communicator stated that he needed to put the phone down so he could niake notifications to the State and counties of the upgrade, but didn't mention to the NRC that the emergency had been upgraded to an Alert. The onshift communicator then made State and county Alert notifications and called the NRC back at 9:05 a.m. to advise them of the Alert declaration. Also, during this time, the Site Area Emergency (SAE) was

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declared. On this occasion, the communicator appropriately notified the NRC that the emergency classification had been again upgraded to a SA Communications between the SCR crew, through the use of a dedicated Technical Information Facilitator (TIF), and other licensee emergency response facilities staffs, were frequent and detailed. The TIF was effective in keeping TSC and OSC counterparts informed of changing plant conditions and actions taken by the SCR cre The TIF was weli versed in plant operations and consistently passed on information to the CRS. Plant public address (PA) announcements made in the TSC could be clearly heard in the SCR and were informativ Transfer of command and control from.the SCR senior responder to the TSC Site Emergency Director (SEO) was orderly and accomplished rapidly. However, communications among CRS personnel were poor. CRS crew briefings were few and usually lacked clear information regarding station or SCR priorities. The inspectors observed one example when the CRS did not clearly delineate the priorities. Also, during a period of high activity, numerous alarms came in and an NCO responded by saying "we had a number of alarms" rather than being specific regarding what type or which alarms were alarmin Technical Support Center CTSC)

Overall, the TSC's staff's performance was excellent. The staff performed professionally and retained focus on response to the scenario throughout the exercis The staff started arriving within minutes of the Alert announcement, signed in on the staffing status board, and proceeded to their stations where they opened their response procedures and activated communications and ~ata information equipment. Activation of the facility was aided by the early arrival of the Site Vice President. The Site Vice President arrived six minutes after the Unusual Event was announced, obtained plant conditions, and provided phone briefings to the Vice President Nuclear prior to the arrival of the SEO. The SEO declared the facility operational and himself to be in command and control approximately 14 minutes of the Alert declaratio Plant personnel accountability was appropriately completed within approximately 26 minutes of the announcement to have personnel report to their assembly area Accountability identified that two persons were not accounted for initially. The 26 minutes was within the 30 minute guidance identified for accountabilit Command and control by the SEO was effective. Periodic TSC staff briefings included opportunities for the group leaders to provide their comments and details. Frequently changing priorities were discussed and clearly identified during these briefings. The

___________________ briefings_were_appropriately timed _and.included detailed.information about.the ________ _

emergency conditions and plant priorities. A microphone system was effectively passed around to the group leaders and used by the SEO for these briefings, which could be heard clearly throughout the TSC. Command and control turnovers to and from the

  • SEO were concise and seamless. A turnover briefing checklist efficiently verified the readiness for accepting emergency command and control responsibilit TSC staff who needed plant radiation data were able to obtain the information from the Health Physics (HP) group, who aggressively reviewed the plant radiation monitoring system data and proactively maintained radiation monitor list printouts. Dose assessment calculations were continuously provided and adjusted when changes occurred to meteorological and stack monitoring readings. Appropriate habitability surveys were frequently verified by the HP group personnel. Survey instruments were activated and on the appropriate scale Communications in the TSC, to staffs in other facilities, and to offsite agencies appeared effective. A continuous communications line was appropriately maintained with the NRC and was used for updates as conditions changed. The various departmental groups in the TSC frequently conducted small discussions which were clearly presented to the rest of the staff during the facility briefings. No mis-communications or uncorrected errors were observed by the inspectors. Plant PA announcements were excellent. These announcements were very informative and appropriately provided emergency classification and plant condition change Facility status boards were very informative, well maintained, and continuously updated during the simulated emergency response. Plant equipment problems, OSC response team information, meteorological data, and other emergency issues were efficiently trac~ed on the facility status board Emergency Action Levels (EALs) were proactively monitored. Good discussions were observed regarding emergency classification upgrades, potential radiation release paths, and emergency response priorities. TSC staff maintained tight focus on plant priorities. Activities that were not immediately dispositioned were neither overlooked nor forgotten, such as attempting to locate and isolate the radiation release poin An additional, unplanned challenge occurred in the TSC in which the staff provided excellent response to a real-time failure that occurred to the missile door (second entrance to the facility) when the door failed to open and the faint odor of smoke was detected. Response was rapid and appropriate. The actual shift supervisor responded to the scene and showed excellent concerned for the 60 - 70 persons in the TSC/control room area. -His-concern included the need for personnel to be able to immediately evacuate the area, if needed, and having only one access available. When the door was eventually opened, the Shift Supervisor ensured it was not closed until it could be opened agai Operations Support Center (OSC)

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Overall OSC staff pe-rformance-was-excellent. The facility was rapidly activated and status boards were well utilized. Early in the scenario, a nonessential electrical bus was de-energized, and it was simulated that the OSC lost power for lighting and dose tracking. An excellent decision was made not to hang status boards over the OSC windows to allow sunlight into the OS *

An emergency light was prestaged by maintenance personnel in the OSC prior to the exercise. Apparently, the light was brought in to the facility because a loss of OSC power had been used in a previous drill and someone thought it maybe needed. The OSC was not equipped with emergency lighting. Evaluation of the need for emergency lighting in the OSC will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (IFI 50-255/98021-03).

The inspectors noted that the OSC was very crowded during the site accountability and initial activation of the OSC. This presented some challenges to the emergency response personnel's efforts during set-up and activation of the OSC. The OSC Director appropriately directed non-essential personnel who had been accounted for to exit the OSC and assemble in the hallway outside the OSC until further instructions were provided. These actions allowed the emergency response personnel to set-up the OSC in a timely manner. The OSC was operational approximately 20 minutes after the Alert was declared. Generally, emergency response personnel in the OSC conducted themselves in a professional manner; however, unnecessary background noise within the OSC became excessive at times. The OSC Director took action immediately to reduce the unnecessary noise when it occurre The personnel resource status board was exceptionally well utilized. Once it was recognized that insufficient electricians were available, additional electricians were requested to report to the OSC. lnplant response teams were well briefed and rapidly dispatched. Communications with the teams via site cellular telephones were goo Returning teams were appropriately debriefed and the task completion status was clearly tracked on the status board The inspectors noted that the OSC Director demonstrated effective command and control. As soon as the OSC was operational, the OSC Director announced the status of the facility to the OSC emergency response team members and the OSC management team. Emergency response personnel were directed to pick up dosimetry to ensure they were ready to be dispatched when needed. Status of the emergency and plant priorities were frequently provided in sufficient detail to the emergency response personnel in the OSC. The OSC Director was proactive in requesting information from other emergency facility counterparts to ensure the OSC staff was aware of the status of the emergency and plant prioritie Response teams dispatched from the OSC were provided sufficiently detailed briefings prior to leaving the OSC. A radiation protection technician (RPT) accompanied each team that was dispatched. The status of teams that had been dispatched was continuously displayed and immediately updated when teams returned to the OSC. The response teams were competent in locating plant equipment in a timely manner and utilizing and following procedures to complete their assigned tasks. Communications

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Communications among the emergency response personnel in the OSC were effective, with a couple of exceptions. The OSC Director announced that three-way

communications were to be used in the OSC and, generally, they were. The inspectors observed that the emergency response personnel were aware of the expectation to_ use

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three-way communications and, when it was not used, it was either self-corrected cir corrected by a pee Two exceptions to effective staff communications in the OSC included: (1) TSC management had requested the OSC management to dispatch a RPT to take radiation surveys at the remote shutdown panel room in the turbine building. However, the original request was never acted on and the TSC had to call the OSC to repeat the request. This unnecessarily delayed the requested entry into the remote shutdown panel room by operations personnel; and (2) a health physics (HP) communicator received and logged a report that the site evacuation was completed; however, the OSC Director was not informed of that information. Approximately 20 minutes later, the OSC Director requested the TIF to determine the status of the site evacuation from the TSC communicator. The OSC Director was ttien informed that the site evacuation had already been completed. Completion of the site evacuation was a priority that was being tracked. The OSC Director needed to be informed of the evacuation status immediately upon receiving the report that it had been complete Emergency Operations Facility CEOFl Overall performance in the *EOF was very competent. EOF staff successfully performed required functions while in command and control of the licensee's event respons Transfer of command and control from the SEO to the EOF Director was smooth and effectiv EOF staff performed their duties in an orderly and efficient manner. The EOF was activated within 52 minutes of the Alert declaration. The EOF Director adequately briefed all team leads prior to activation of the facility. Status boards, message forms, and facility briefings were effectively used to keep EOF staff well informed of changing plant conditions, emergency response actions, and decision The scenario time line was controlled so that the EOF Director would not declare a General Emergency until 10:30 a.m. The EOF Director was prepared to declare a General Emergency at 9:40a.m. but the controller intervened and prevented this declaration. At 10:30 a.m., the EOF Director promptly declared the General Emergency and notifications to the State and NRC were made promptly. The initial PAR was appropriate and communicated promptly to State officials. The initial PAR w~s appropriately revised as plant, radiological, and meteorological conditions change These changes were communicated to State of Michigan officials in a timely manne The EOF Director briefed the staff each time the PAR was updated. The staff remained well aware of the protective actions chosen for implementation by State officials. The PAR status board was updated regularly; however, the status board was hidden behind

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------ -a*personal-~omputer!s-display monitor-and-not-easilyvisibleto-the EOF.staff. ______________________ _

Communications between the EOF Manager and his State counterpart were timely and provided valuable supplements to the message forms which were transmitted to State officials approximately every 15 minutes. These message forms updated State officials on the class of the emergency, the plant status, meteorological data, radiological

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release data, calculated off-site doses, measured dose rates, protective action recommendations, and additional informatio The EOF Director effectively interfaced with the Health Physics Team Leader to discuss plant radiologi~I conditions, PAR development, off-site dose measurements in support of discussions with State officials and his TSC counterpart. The EOF Director also effectively interfaced with the Engineering Team Leader to understand plant conditions

_in support of his discussions with State officials and his TSC counterpar The HP team was very effective in their assessment of the offsite impact of the radiological release. The changing meteorological conditions and its impact on the plume and offsite doses were well discussed and understood. The use of off-site field teams was excellent. The field teams were aggressive in plume search. Air samples were taken and results were communicated quickly to the HP Leade As the radiological release started, the HP Team Leader and EOF Director asked why the field team survey results and the dose projection values did not agree. The HP Team Leader did not appear to understand the limitations of the dose projection mode As a result, he did not appear to understand why the dose projections could be a factor of 10 or even 100 greater than field team results and still be vali The Engineering Group was very proactive in their efforts to determine the release path. -

Pressurized thermal shock issues were also reviewed by this grou Nine press releases were developed by personnel in the Joint Public Information Cente These releases were appropriately communicated to the EOF and reviewed by the EOF Directo Habitability surveys were slow and infrequent. In one instance, the Health Physics Team Leader directed one of his team members to perform a habitability survey. It was 25 minutes before the survey was performed. - Recovery Demonstration Following the exercise, there was a demonstration in the TSC of activities related to recovery planning. Procedure El 5._1, "Recovery,* dated September 9, 1998, and its attachments were well utilized by the participating personnel. Individuals were selected for recovery organization positions. Issues which would be of immediate or long term concern were listed and discusse The group properly determined that it would not have been appropriate to enter the recovery phase while a release path remained open and there was some risk of further

--- ---------------radioactive releases. earticipantsJndicated _tbeir_pr:_o_c_e_duraliz~g IJ~~g_l_Q COl'!lm_uni~ate __

and discuss recovery issues with the NRC and other offsite authoritie Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors assessed the challenge of the scenario and evaluated the licensee's control of the exercise. The scenario was challenging, and exercised the majority of the licensee's emergency response capabilities. The scenario was appropriate to test emergency capabilities and to demonstrate the licensee's exercise objective The_ scenario was fast paced. It was also challenging to the participants when the General Emergency declaration was delayed until 10:30 a.m. to accommodate the needs of the off-site agencie b. 7 Licensee Critiques The inspectors attended the licensee's critiques in the SCR, TSC, and EOF which occurred immediately after.the exercise. Exercise controllers soiicited verbal and written inputs from the participants in addition to providing the participants with the controllers'

initial assessments of personnel performance. The inspectors concluded that these initial critiques were thorough and in close agreement with the majority of inspectors'

observation Overall Conclusions The exercise was a competent demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan and procedure *

Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise was very good and demonstrated that emergency plan implementation activities met regulatory requirements. (Section P4.1.b).

Overall performance in the SCR was good. Proper assessments of plant conditions were made by the crew. The transfer of command and control to the SEO was orderly and rapid. Communications between the control room crew

and other emergency response staff were frequent and detailed. (Section

P4.1.b.1)

A problem with the autodialer delayed event notification from the SCR to the State of Michigan. Later, problems with the autodialer phone line and extensions made the line inoperable. (Section P4.1.b.1) *

A problem was identified in the simulator control room regarding the timeliness of the initial Alert notification to the offsite agencies. (Section P4.1.b.1)

-- -- - --- * --- *---*--T-he*l=SG-staff's-performance was.excellenL_The_SED.'s_ c_ornmgJ1d. ~IJ9 g_()nJ~~

and staff's communications in the facility and to staffs of other facilities were

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effective. Status boards were very informative and changing plant conditions were proactively monitored to ensure the emergency classification was correc (Section P4.1.b.2)

  • The actual shift supervisor provided excellent response to a real time failure of the TSC's missile door and ensured safety of the plant personnel assembled in the control room!TSC area. (Section P4.1.b.2)

Staff performance in the OSC was excellent with rapid facility activation, well utilized status boards, efficient team briefing and dispatch, and effective response to the scenario's loss of power*to the OSC's lighting and dose tracking system. (Section P4.1.b.3)

The OSC lacked any emergency lighting which was further evidenced by the pre-staging of a battery powered emergency light. (Section P4.1.b.3)

Overall performance of the EOF responders was very competent. The EOF staff performed their duties in an orderly and efficient manner. Transfer of command and control to the EOF Director was smooth and effective. The HP team was very effective in their assessment of the offsite impact of the radiological release and their related communication to the EOF Director. (Section P4. t.b.4)

A post-exercise demonstration of the recovery procedure was very goo (Section t:>4.1.b.5)

Initial critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough and self-critical. Exercise controllers effectively solicited verbal and written inputs from exercise participants. (Section P4.1.b. 7)

PS Miscellaneous EP Issues P (Closed) Inspection Follow up lterri No. 50-255/96013-01: In-plant.radiation survey information not displayed in the OSC. During this exercise, two status boards in the OSC were utilized to display inplant radiation levels. This item is close P (Open) Inspection Follow up Item No. 50-255/96016-01: Evaluation of Emergency Plan Figure 5-2, "Plant Staffing and Augmentation Guidelines." The licensee made an evaluation of their commitments versus the minimum shift staffing guidance in table B-1 of NUREG 0654, performed an analysis of tasks needed to be performed in the early stages of an emergency, and polled other licensees as to their adherance to Table B-1 of NUREG- 0654. Based on their analysis, the licensee concluded that corrective *

actions were not needed. The licensee's response will be provided to the Headqt1arters Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Emergency Preparedness group for further evaluation. This item will remain open pending NRR evaluatio *--- ---- ---- - -- --

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V. Management Meetings Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 3, 1998. Licensee personnel acknowledged the findings presented. They indicated their understanding that the overall exercise performance was very good and that additional evaluation of the shift staffing inspection followup item would be performed by Nuclear Reactor Regulation personnel. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. On December 4, 1998, an inspector summarized the inspectors' preliminary results at a public critique hosted by Federal Emergency Management Agency staf *

Licensee N. Brott, EP Planner J. Brunet, EP Planner PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED E. Chatfield, Training Manager

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B. Dotson, Licensing General Tech Analyst R. Gerling, Design Engineering Manager H. Heavin, Controller N. Haskell, Director, Licensing K. Haas, Director, Engineering M. Hebe, Business Analyst D. Malone, Manager Licensing P. Kluskowski, Quality Assurance Supervisor T. Loudenslager, EP Planner/EP Trainer R. Oroz, Outage Manager J. Pomaranski, Maintenance Manager T. Palmisano, Site Vice President and General Manager K. Penrod, EP Planner D. Rogers, General Manager Plant Operations G. Szczotka, Manager, NPAD B. Taylor, EP Support J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82301 IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors

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  • ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-255/98021-01 IFI 50-255/98021-02 IFI 50-255/98021-03 IFI Closed 50-255/96013-01 IFI Discussed 50-255/96016-01 IFI

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Function of autodialer systems in the TSC and Control Roo Initial notification process in the SC Lack of emergency lighting in the OS In-plant radiation survey information not displayed in the OS Evaluation of Emergency Plan Figure 5-2, "Plant Staffing and Augmentation Guidelines."

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CFR CRS DRP DRS EAL EOF EP EPZ EROS HP IFI IP NCO NRC NRR NUE NU REG osc PA PAR PDR RPT SAE SCR SEO TIF TSC LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Code of Federal Regulations Control Room Supervisor Division of Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Safety Emergency Action Level Emergency Operations.Facility Emergency Preparedness Emergency Planning Zone Emergency Response Data System Health Physics Inspection Follow up Item Inspection Procedure Nuclear Control Operator Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Notification of Unusual Event Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Operations Support Center Public Address Protective Action Recommendation NRC Public Document Room Radiation Protection Technician Site Area Emergency Simulator Control Room Site Emergency Director Technical Information Facilitator Technical Support Center

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