ML18065B249
| ML18065B249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18065B247 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-98-04, 50-255-98-4, NUDOCS 9805220407 | |
| Download: ML18065B249 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1998004
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No:
License No:
Report No:
- Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
9805220407 980~55
ADOCK 050 pDR
G
REGION Ill
50-255
DPR-20 .
50-255/98004(DRS)
Consumers Energy Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, Ml 49201
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
Covert, Ml 49043-9530
March 25 through April 1, 1998
M. Bielby, Reactor Engineer
J. Larizza, Reactor EngineE!r
Melvyn Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
NRC Inspection Report 50-255/98004
This inspection report contains the findings and conclusions from the inspection of the licensed
reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) requalification training programs. The
inspection included a review of training administrative proeedures, written and operating
examination material; observation and evaluation of operator performance and licensee
evaluators during a requalification operating examination; an assessment of simulator fidelity;
an evaluation of program controls to assure a systems approach to training; and a review of
requalification training records. In addition, the inspectors observed a period of control room
operations. The inspectors used the guidance in inspection procedures (IP) 71001 and 71707.
Operations
The control room had a quiet, business like environment in which operators could
conduct control room operations. The control room operators were professional and
maintained the appropriate focus on plant evolutions in progress. The large number of
control room panel caution tags could potentially have a detrimental effect on efficient
plant operations. (Section 01.1)
- Operator performance during the annual requalification examination -defooristrated a
lack of commitment in complying with the facility's conduct of operations procedures.
Communications activities during crew briefs and routine operations did not consistently
meet the licensee's expectations. Operators and training staff tolerated poorly written
procedures and failed to identify those procedures for revision. (Section 01.1)
Operator error related events were not directly attributable to inadequate or ineffective
training, but rather due to a lack of application of training on the part of the operators.
(Section 05.1)
The quality of the Category B examination questions was poor and resulted in a Level IV
violation. The operating examinations (Job Performance Measures (JPM)and dynamic
simulator scenarios) were generally at the appropriate level of difficulty to distinguish
between competent and non-competent operators. The quality of the dynamic simulator
scenario cou_ld be improved by consistently providing expected operator actions to
evaluators and developing challenging technical specification problems. (Section 05.2)
The licensee administered the operating examination in accordance with their program
guidance, and regulatory requirements. The licensee displayed several attention to
detail weaknesses and a failure to apply a rigorous standard during performance
evaluations. The licensee's JPM validation process failed to identify poorly written
_ __
_ ____ .. _____ Q.roqed_Yf_es t:>~fQ[~th.~y_we_r~_ act.minister~d qurir:ig tile annljal_reqy~lifi~tipn e.xaminaJion ..
The licensee had an effective operating examination security program. (Section 05.3)
2
""'.
Mechanisms for feedback of performance weaknesses to the operators and training
staff existed. The training program feedback process appeared to be satisfactorily
implemented. (Section 05.4)
The remediation program was being implemented in accordance with the licensee's
program and regulatory requirements. (Section 05.5).
Operator license conditions were in conformance with program guidance and regulatory
requirements. (Section 05.6)
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REPORT DETAILS
I. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1
Control Room and Operator Observations
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
b.
The inspectors observed routine control room activities during full power operation and
observed a shift briefing after completion of individual shift turnovers. The inspectors
performed a walkdown of the primary control panel; reviewed caution tags, and
questioned operators about plant and equipment status.
The inspectors observed administration of the annual operating (Job Performance
Measure (JPM) and dynamic simulator scenario) requalification examination to an
operating crew.
Observations and Findings
Operators U$ed clear and concise three-part communications to direct qperations in. and
out of the oontrol room. *Access to the *control room was contrOi!ed In the *woi'k*eenter** *
supervisor office, reducing the number of plant staff personnel in the control room to a
minimum. Control room operators were attentive during the shift brief and continued to
methodically monitor control room indications after the brief. When questioned by the
inspectors, the control room operators were knowledgeable of plant and equipment
status.
There were a large number of cardboard and yellow plaeard caution tags on the primary
plant control panels. When questioned, the control room operators were knowledgeable
of the information on the cards and did not feel the large number of cards was a
distraction from good plant operations.
During execution of the JPM portion of the annual operating examination the inspectors
noted the following actions that involved operator performance issues:
The operators used good self-checking techniques during performance of the
JPM portion of the operating examination.
Two operators performed system operating procedure SOP-12, Attachment 2,
Revision 28, two different ways while performing JPM ASLD-01A, "Reset
Alternate Eeedwater Actuation System (AEAS).n One operator reset all the
AF.AS modules (tripped and non-tripped), while the.other operator only reset the -
tripped modules. The procedure did not specify which method to use, but was
written such that all modules would be reset. The operators did not question
which method was correct, nor did they identify the procedure weakness .
4
System operating procedure SOP-1, Revision 38, directed operators to start
either the AC or DC oil lift pump while executing the procedure. No guidance is
provided concerning which pump is preferred and operators performing JPM
ASED-02, "Primary Coolant Pump (PCP) Shutdown," did not question the
proeedure weakness.
SOP-1, Revision 38, (noted above) eventually required the PCP and both oil lift
pumps to be tripped, which caused two annunciators to alarm. Operators did not
identify the expected alarms ahead of time, or reference the associated alarm
response procedure after the annunciators alarmed while performing the JPM.
While executing SOP-37, Revision 9, Step 7.4.3.b.7, during a ~PM, an operator
stated the step was vague concerning which alarms should have annunciated.
The operator then placed an "N/A" in the step and continued. The inspector
observed that no anticipated alarm energized. The operator failed to initiate a
procedure change to correct the procedure.
Dunng execution of the.dynamic simulator scenario portion of the annual operating
examination the inspectors noted the following actions that involved operator
performance issues: .
The operators did not oonsisteritly u$e good self-checking t~Chniques when
responding to events.
Communications were inconsistent and sometimes did not meet the licensee's
standard for three-part communications. * Some operators failed to repeatback
or acknowledge orders. On one occasion, one of the Nuclear Shift Operators
(NSOs) opened three containment isolation valves to re-establish containment
cooling water (CCW) to the containment coolers without informing the second
NSO. The second NSO had been carefully monitoring service water (SW).
pressure due to a loss of power to two of three SW pumps. The first NSO was.
unaware that the 2nd NSO was monitoring the SW system. The added heat
load to the CCW heat exchangers caused a significant decrease in SW pressure
which could have resulted in a loss of SW and complicated plant recovery.
Overall Control Room Supervisor (CRS) briefings were inconsistent and poor .
Sometimes the opening or closing statement was missing. The past, present,
and future status was not always clear and concise. The crew members only
acknowledged "ready" once during two scenarios that contained multiple
briefings. In every briefing the CRS asked crew members if there were any
questions or concerns. The inspectors identified only one briefing during the two
scenarios that contained all of the elements of a good brief .
. **--------
Operator acknowledgment of expected and unexpected alarms was inconsistent
and sometimes did not meet the licensee~s standard, Procedure No 4.00,
Attachment 10, Revision 20, "Alarm Response Standard."
5
c .
Conclusions
The control room had a quiet, business like environment in which operators could
conduct control room operations. The control room operators were professional and
maintained the appropriate focus on plant evolutions in progress. The large number of
control room panel caution tags could potentially have a detrimental effect on efficient
plant operations.
Operator performance during the annual requalification examination demonstrated a
lack of commitment in complying with the facility's conduct of operations procedures.
Communications activities during crew briefs and routine operations did not consistently
meet the licensee's expectations. Operators tolerated poorly written procedures and
failed to identify those procedures for revision.
05 *
Operator Training and Quallflcatlon
05.1
Operating History
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the plant's operating history from January 1997 to March 1998
to determine if any operator errors occurred that could be attributed to ineffective or
- ***, ** * '*inadequate training. That review included the following:
- * *
, ' * *
- .
. NRC inspection reports
.
.
Most recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP-14) report
- *
Selected Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors noted several events related to personnel error. One significant event
for failure to recognize that all control rods were taken out of service to perform
maintenance while at power was a programmatic breakdown in conduct of operations
activities and included poor knowledge of, and failure to follow technical specifications.
Additional events represented a lack of questioning attitude:
LER 97-001 identified that while* synchronizing the Main Generator to the grid on
January 1, 1997, TAve dropped below the minimum temperature (525 ° F)
required for criticality as specified in technical specifications. Again during .
shutdown, TAVE also dropped below minimum criticality temperature. The event
occurred because the control rod withdrawal rate to increase power was not
sufficient to match the increase in steam demand. The operators over-relied on
the simulator and Technical Data book to exactly model actual plant response.
- - ---- - - -- - -
Inspection report, 97013, documented the use of an inadequate procedure on
October 12, 1997. The report identified that system operating procedure
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(SOP-1), "Primary Coolant System," allowed the operator to start a primary
coolant pump while the steam generator secondary temperature was greater
than the cold leg temperature. This lack of questioning attitude was also related
to another event in inspection report 97008 for exceeding the rated reactor
thermal power.
The following events represented poor self-checking:
Inspection report, 97011, documented that operators failed to ensure service
water drain valves were closed on September 2, 1997. As a result, the
component cooling water system could have potentially been drained in an *
Appendix R design bases fire.
Inspection report, 97018, documented a mispositioned N2 isolation valve was .
found on a nitrogen bottle at nitrogen station 3B during perfonnance of
surveillance M0-29, "Engineered Safety.System Alignment."
lnsJ?ection report 98002, identified a failure to properly secure a watertight d.oor .
Training designed to prevent the i_dentifi.ed operator errors and deficiencies had been
presented to the operators prior to events. Additional training was provided to address
. * the operator knowledge weaknesses and performance deficiencies after the events
. oceurted at the facility.
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c.
. Conclusions
The operator error related events reviewed by the inspectors were notdirectly
attributable to inadequate or ineffective training, but rather, due to a lack of application
of .training on the part of the operators.
05.2
Reqyalification Examination Material
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the training department's licensed operator requalification
training sample plan, and compared that with the annual written examinations and
operating tests administered. A selected review* of the written and operating
- examinations administered to different operating crews during the previous weeks was
also done to verify compliance with program guidance. The following documents were
also reviewed:
-- - ---
1997 - 1998 Palisades Licensed Operator Sample Plan *
AP 4.05, "Operator Training," Revision 14
Palisades Nuclear Training Procedure (PNT) 2.0, "Preparation of Training and
Evaluation-Guides, "-Revision 4
- ** * - - *
PNT 7.0, "Simulator Training," Revision3
NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,"
7
NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards fqr Power Reactors,"
Revision 8, January 1997
The set of 6 JPMs used during Week 5 of the operating examinations
The set of two dynamic simulator scenarios used during Week 5 of the operating
examinations
Two annual written examinations, the first of which was administered on January
21, 1998, and the second on January 28, 1998
b.
Observations and Findings
Each written examination consisted of a Category A, (static simulator) examination and
a Category B, (classroom) examination. The Category A written examination made
good use of the plant specific simulator. The Category B written examination required a
broad spectrum of plant procedures to answer the questions. The licensee's program
allowed examination authors to use up to 75% of the questions on ari examination on
any subsequent examination. The licensee's guidance was consid~red non- . . .. . .
conservative because of the minimal 5% of new knowledge that would be required to
pass the second examination with a score of 80%. In actuality, ~e second examination
reviewed by inspectors duplicated approximately 55% of the questions.from the first
reviewed examination and was, therefore, within the licensee's guidelines. The
inspectors determined that althoug.h an excessive amount of question overlap exi!;ted
between the two written examinations they reviewed, they did notJdentify any breach of
'written examination integrity.
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.
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i:tie Category B written examination was of poor quality with a low level of difficulty and
was improperly constructed. Training procedure, PNT 2.0, Section 6.3.5, s~ted that the
licensee would followNUREG-1021 to develop evaluation guides*(written examinations).
Nine of the 23 questions on the Category B written examination were considered direct
look-up questions, primarily because they only required an operator to recall the
procedure in which to find the answer. Ten of the 23 questions were considered simple
knowledge level questions because they required simple recognition, or recall of facts or
specifics, rather than demonstration of understanding by using the knowledge to
address a problem. NUREG-1021, Section ES-602, Attachment 1 prohibits the use of
direct look-up or memory knowledge level questions on open-reference examinations.
As a result of administering the Category B open-reference examination with 19 of 23
questions in a direct look-up or memory format, the annual written examination was not
considered a comprehensive examination. This was considered a violation of 10 CER
55.59(c).
(VI0)(50-255/98004-01 (DRS)).
The previous licensed operator requalification training program inspection conducted the
week of May 1, 1996 also identified direct look-up and memory knowledge level
questions on the Category B written examination. During that inspection the inspectors
identified the improper questions prior to examination administration. aod_ the training ______ _
... department corrected the'identifiecfdeficiencies prior to examination administration .
8
A set of six different JPMs was used each week. None of the JPMs was repeated from
week to week during the annual operating examination. One JPM was appropriately
designated as "SRO only." One JPM, ASLD-01A, "Reset AFAS," was designated as an
alternate path JPM because it required the operator to identify a system fault to the shift
supervisor. The inspectors determined it did not meet the attributes of an alternate path
JPM because after identification of the fault it did not require completion of the assigned
task using an alternate method found in approved procedures.
Each scenario inspected contained sufficient safety significant tasks to evaluate the
operating crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and
emergency conditions. The major transients and malfunctions after Emergency
Operating Procedure (EOP) entry increased the level of difficulty and provided a good
evaluation of EOP usage. Some of the events leading up to the major transient were .
less challenging because they did not require significant operator analysis to diagnose
the event, or required minimal operator action to mitigate the event. The major .
expected operator actions were not always provided in the scenario guides, which
increased the possibility of inconsistent evaluations. Entries into Technical
Specifications were obvious and not a good tool for evaluation of operator competency
at using Technical Specifications.
c.
Conclusions
The quality of the Category B examination questions was poor and resulted In a Level IV
violation. The operating examinations (JPMs and dynamic simulator scenarios) were
generally at the appropriate level of difficulty to distinguish between competent and non-
competent operators. The quality of the dynamic simulator scenario could be improved
by consistently providing expected operator actions to evaluators and developing
challenging technical specification problems.
05.3
Regualification Examination Administration and Operator Pertormance
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors performed the following to assess the licensee's practices regarding
requalification examination administration, security, and operator performance fidelity:
Observed requalification operating examination administration and evaluation
Observed operator performance during the requalification operating examination
Interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, training management,
and evaluators)
Reviewed the licensee's administrative procedures
Reviewed PNT-12.0, "Licensed Operator Examination Security," Revision 0,
Dated 2/4/98
Reviewed CR No. _9~:94.Q.3.. "Potential Loss of Control-of Licensed Operator-
- - *--
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- - - *---Annual Exam Material"
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9
b .
Observations and Findings
The inspectors observed the licensee administer five JPMs (three on the plant specific
simulator, two in the plant) to each operator. The licensee stated they had incorporated
a Mzero tolerance" program in which any action that was procedurally directed, including
an action that simply verified an expected status or parameter, was considered Mcritical"
and must be completed to receive a satisfactory grade. The inspectors agreed with the
licensee's overall pass/fail decisions. The evaluators demonstrated a lack of attention to
details as demonstrated by the following JPM administration and evaluation process
observations:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Prior to commencing each JPM, the evaluator informed the operator of the
expected time limit to perform the task. NU REG 1021, Appendix E,
Part D - Walk-through Test Guidelines, step 4, allows evaluators to inform
the operator of time critical JPMs, but not of time limits associated with other
JPMs.*
During JPM ASLD-01A, MReset AFAS," an inspector observed two operators
perform the system operating procedure SOP-12, Attachment 2, Revision 28,
two different ways. One operator reset all the AEAS modules (tripped and
non-tripped), while another operator only reset the tripped modules. The
procedure did not specify which method to use, but was written S!JCh that all
modules would be reset. The evaluator accepted both mettiOdsas c:Orrect.--The
evaluator failed to identify and correct the procedure weakness.
During the JPM ASED-02, MPrimary Coolant Pump (PCP) Shutdown," the
inspectors observed that the system operating procedure SOP-1, Revision 38,
directed operators to start either the AC or DC oil lift pump. The evaluator failed
to determine which would be the preferred pump and accepted the start of either
pump. Additionally, the procedure eventually required the PCP and both oil lift
pumps ~o be tripped, which caused two annunciators to alarm. An operator
being examined did not identify the expected alarms ahead of time, nor
reference the associated alarm response procedure after the annunciators
alarmed. The evaluator did not identify the operator's failure to identify the
expected alarms or failure to reference the associated alarm response
procedure.
During the JPM ASDC-01, MSet Up Radwaste Radiation Indication/Alarm -1049- -
Module," an operator being evaluated stated that SOP-37, Revision 9, Step
7.4.3.b.7 was vague on which alarms should have annunciated. The operator
then put an MN/A" in the step and continued. The inspector observed that no
alarm came in. The evaluator failed to follow up on clarification of the procedure
step.
.
-*
. - -
- The-inspectors-observed-the licensee administer two dynamic scenarios to one
operating crew that consisted of five licensed operators in the positions of Shift
Supervisor (SS), CRS, Shift Engineer/Shift Technical Advisor (SE/STA), NSO-Reactor
10
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and NSO-Turbine. Two of the three senior reactor operators (SROs) were rotated into
the CRS position from the SE/STA position between scenarios to allow evaluation of
directing EOPs. The third SRO had previously been evaluated directing EOPs.
Immediately following each dynamic scenario termination, the evaluators asked follow-
up questions to clarify observations. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's pass/fail
decisions for the crew and individuals. Overall, the evaluators did a good job of
identifying procedural performance issues. However, the following administrative and
evaluation items were observed during the dynamic scenario examination process:
(1)
After completion of each scenario, the licensee evaluators did not caucus and
co-ordinate follow-up questions to be asked of the operators.
(2) *
The licensee inconsistently documented comments for justification of
competency ratings. All "1'sn, most of the "2'sn and some "3'sn were supported.
by comments.
The operator performance weaknesses observed by the inspectors, plus additional
d.eficiencies, were identified by the licensee evaluators and discuss~d during their crew
and individual evaluations. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's final results and
discussed aspects of the operator performance with the licensee. The inspectors
agreed with the overall pass/fail determinations of the operating crew and individual
,-_.operator performances.
-.:--- ;*: -:*:;-"'.:' ~ *,
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The licensee administered the same JPMs to a staff and operating crew. The two
groups each contained five operators. A detailed schedule was prepared for
administration of the two in-plant and three simulator JPMs. The schedule designated
three rooms in which to sequester operators with various degrees of JPM knowledge *
through the course of the JPM operating examination. The various evaluators and
JPMs they were administering were included on a time line, with additional time allotted
for transit between the plant and simulator, and lunch breaks. The inspectors did not
observe any compromise of the JPM examination during its administration.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee administered the operating examination in accordance with their program
guidance, and regulatory requirements. The licensee displayed several attention to
detail weaknesses and a failure to apply a rigorous standard during performance
evaluations. The licensee's JPM validation process failed to identify poorly written
procedures before they were administered during the annual requalification examination.
The licensee demonstrated a strong commitment to examination security.
05.4
Requalification Training Program Feedback
a.
Inspection Scope (71001) *
-- _'" ___ _. ______ _
The interviewed staff personnel and reviewed the following documents to assess the
licensee's training program feedback system effectiveness:
11
[Operations] Self Assessment Report-February, 1998
Nuclear Performance Assessment Department Training and Qualification Audit,
PA-97-13, September 8 - 19, 1997
Nuclear Performance Assessment Department Training and Qualification Audit,
PA-96-28, October 21 - December 13, 1996
b.
Observations and Findings
The operations self assessments were critical and identified appropriate items for *
improvement. The training and qualification audits were not recent, _but did identify
emerging training issues. A review committee was actively involved in the
requalification training process to address weaknesses identified during tr:aining and
evaluations.
- *
- *
c.
Conclusions
Mechanisms for feedback of performance weaknesses to the operators and training
staff existe_d. The training program feedback process ~ppeared tob~ $atisfactorily
implemented.
05.5
Remedial Training Program
. *. ~ :
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=~ a.
lnsoection *soope (71001 ).
The inspectors performed a review of the following records and procedures to assess
the licensee's remedial training program _effectiveness:
Completed remediation packages
AP 4.05, "Operator Training," Revision 14
The inspectors*reviewed three remediation packages (dated February 27, 1998; March
20, 1998; and March 23, 1998) associated with individual failures of JPMs.
b.
Observations and Findings
All three packages identified the JPM failure, the deficiency that. caused the failure,
recommended appropriate remediation to address the deficiency, and re-tested the_
individual by administering a new set of five JPMs that addressed the deficiency. The
inspectors determined that the level of detail was consistent between the remediation
packages and no evidence of an improper or inadequate level of remediation and re-
testing was apparent.
c.
Conclusions
~-*
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~--
- -
- Tneremediafion program.was being implemented in accordance with the licensee's
program and regulatory requirements.
12
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05.6
Conformance with Operator License Conditions
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the licensed operator medical and active license qualification
programs to assess licensed operator compliance with regulatory requirements and the
following licensee procedures and records:
PNT 6.0, "Operator NRC Licensing Application And Renewal Requirements,"
Revision 1
AP 4.05, "Operator Training," Revision 14
Operator proficiency watch records .
. Ten licensed operator medical records selected at random.
b.
Observations and Findings
The licensed operator medical records contained appropriate documentation to validate
operator medical qualification~ to perform licensed duties. No required physicals
exceeded the program allowed dates and no violation of regulatory requirements were
identified. Additionally, the inspectors verified that operators who were respirator
certified had eyeglass inserts for their respirators.
- The licehsee's guidance 'for maintaining operator lieenses active* ciear1y identifiec:f the
appropriate control room licensed operator positions and required on-shift time to *
maintain an active license. Further review of the licensee's watch standing proficiency
records indicated they were property crediting active license duty watch standing hours.
c.
Conclusions
Operator license conditions were in conformance with program guidance and regulatory
requirements.
V. Management Meetings
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors met with licensee representatives on April 1, 1998, to discuss the scope and
findings of the inspection. On April 13, 1998, a telephone exit was conducted to inform the
licensee that a potential violation item discussed during the exit on April 1, 1998, would become
a comment in the report. During the exit meetings, the inspectors discussed the processes
reviewed by the inspectors during the conduct of this inspection and the likely content of the
final inspection report. Licensee representatives did not identify any documents or processes
- - ___ a_~pr~priet~ry. *--- __ _
13
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
G. Boss, Operations Manager
E. Chatfield, Training Manager
8. Dotson, Licensing
R. Frigo, Operations Training
N, Haskell, Licensing Director
M. Kane, Operations
D. Malone, Operations Superintendent
- * * T. Nelson, Operations Training
C. Ober1in, Operations Training
P. Rewa, Operations Training
Q. Rogers, ~n~ral Manager Plant Operations
P.' SChmldt, Operations Training
. *HBC'*
M. Bielby, Reactor Engineer
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 71001:
- Licensed OperatorRequallficatlon Program Evaluation
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
.... *.
50-255/98004-01
Failure to administer a comprehensive licensed operator
requalification written examination
D!w reeed
~*
NONE
14
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' . . .
Attachment 1
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: Palisades
Facility Licensee Docket Nos: 50-255
Operating Tests Administered: March 25- 26, 1998
.. This form_ ls to be used only to report observations. These observations de;> not constitute audi~
or inspection findings and are not, without further verificatio_n and review, indicative of
noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certffication"or
approval of the. simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future
evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.' ~ * * *
- - * * *
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the* following Items wen:t ~ obsaryed *
(if none, so state):
~ _ * DESCRIPTION
None identified.
- -, ---~- .