IR 05000255/2021003
| ML21305A943 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/2021 |
| From: | Billy Dickson NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | Corbin D Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2021003 | |
| Download: ML21305A943 (21) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000255/2021003
Dear Mr. Corbin:
On September 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Palisades Nuclear Plant. On October 21, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Palisades Nuclear Plant.
November 3, 2021 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000255 License No. DPR-20
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000255
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2021-003-0102
Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Palisades Nuclear Plant
Location:
Covert, MI
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2021 to September 30, 2021
Inspectors:
G. Hansen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
P. Laflamme, Senior Resident Inspector
C. St. Peters, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Palisades Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Properly Classify Steam Dump Control Relay Caused Atmospheric Dump Valves to be Rendered Inoperable Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000255/2021003-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 A finding of green significance was self-revealed on June 16, 2021, for the licensee's failure to properly classify the steam dump control relay (SDCR). Specifically, the licensee did not classify the SDCR in 2005 in accordance with fleet procedure FP-E-SE-02 "Component Classification," and as a result, the SDCR exceeded the vendor recommended service life without an evaluation. This led to the SDCR's failure, which rendered the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) inoperable.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000255/2021-001-00 LER 2021-001-00 for Palisades Nuclear Plant,
Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves Inoperable Due to Relay Failure 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
The plant began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 28, 2021, the plant was down powered to 23 percent for condensate pump maintenance. The plant was returned to full power on July 31, 2021. On August 10, 2021, the plant was down powered to 88 percent for heater drain pump discharge header maintenance. The plant was returned to full power on August 11, 2021 and remained at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on-site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their on-site activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP
===71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, observed risk significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Right train component cooling water on July 26, 2021 (2)1-1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air system on September 7, 2021
- (3) Service water screen system on September 23, 2021
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the left train containment spray system on August 23, 2021.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Area 4: 1C 2.4kV switchgear room on July 14, 2021
- (2) Fire Area 16: Component cooling pump room, elevation 590' on July 20, 2021
- (3) Fire Area 13B: Charging pump room on July 27, 2021
- (4) Fire Area 12: 12 Battery Room; elevation 607' on September 21, 2021
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated PLSEG-OPS-21C-02 Multi-Department Event and PLSEG-LOR-21C-07 Secondary Malfunctions on August 12, 2021.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Chemical volume and control system on September 23, 2021
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Fire protection system on July 1, 2021
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Emergent work activities associated with water intrusion into 2B, condensate pump, motor thrust bearing, and subsequent power reduction for repair on July 28, 2021
- (2) Emergent work activities associated with P-10A, heater drain pump discharge header inspection, and subsequent power reduction for repair on August 10, 2021
- (3) Emergent work activities associated with the 1-2 EDG #7L cylinder sleeve replacement on August 17, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (2) Pressurizer vapor phase sample line evaluation on July 27, 2021
- (3) EDG 1-1 governor evaluation on August 2, 2021
- (4) Volume control system evaluation on September 3, 2021
- (5) CV-0826 valve performance evaluation on September 13, 2021
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Charging pump P-55A packing and O-ring replacement and testing on July 19, 2021
- (2) Hydrogen monitoring system maintenance and testing on July 26, 2021 (3)2B condensate pump oil cooler replacement and testing on July 29, 2021 (4)1-2 EDG cylinder 7L sleeve replacement and testing on August 23, 2021
- (5) P-10A heater drain pump maintenance and testing on August 11, 2021 (6)1-1 EDG Governor replacement and testing on August 30, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) QO-16 P-54B; Containment Spray Pump Test on August 4, 2021
- (2) QO-21B; P-8B Steam Driven AFW Pump Test on August 10, 2021
- (3) QO-5; Service Water Valve Stroke Test on August 24, 2021
- (4) QO-20B; P-67B Inservice Inspection Low Pressure Safety Injection Test, on September 7, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) QO-19A; P-66A High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Surveillance, on July 7, 2021
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
Annual siren inspection and maintenance records for the period from August 2019 to August 2021
Monthly alert notification system (siren) tests for the period from August 2019 to August 2021
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) An emergency preparedness (EP) drill on September 22,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06)===
- (1) July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 01, 2020 through June 30, 2021 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 01, 2020 through June 30, 2021 EP03: Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 01, 2020 through June 30, 2021
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Safety injection and refueling water tank roof inspection evaluation on September 27, 2021
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000255/2021-001-00, Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves Inoperable Due to Relay Failure (ADAMS Accession No. ML21226A001). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in the Inspection Results Section of this report.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: SIRW Tank Roof Inspection Evaluation 71152 The inspectors reviewed the associated causal evaluation, failure mode analysis, culpability model, performance analysis, and corrective actions associated with the SIRW tank roof inspections, water collection, and subsequent chemistry samples performed on June 17, 2021. The inspectors selected this issue to review because the initial chemistry results did not match the expected results. Specifically, one of the initial isotopes identified during the filtration sample analysis was CO-58, a short-lived isotope not expected to be found on the SIRW roof. The inspectors noted that the licensee immediately performed an additional review and subsequent analysis to validate the initial results. In response, the licensee investigated the original test methodology and discovered that a chemistry technician used a contaminated filtration apparatus typically used for primary coolant analysis during the sample preparation to analyze the original sample resulting in contaminating the sample with CO-58. In their review, the inspectors inspected the SIRW tank roof area and interviewed chemistry personnel. The inspectors collaborated with a regional inspector with a background in chemistry who reviewed the spectrum chemistry analysis and associated white paper. A review of the spectrum analysis from the water sample obtained on the SIRW tank roof and samples utilizing the same filtration rig, like the one used for the analysis of the roof water indicated that the water found on the SIRW tank roof did not originate from the SIRW tank. For corrective actions, the licensee generated several condition reports. These condition reports, including efforts to enhance field presence by supervisors, managers, and quality assurance personal, along with a read and sign document specifying that filtration of non-routine samples is not permitted per EN-CY-110, Chemistry Gamma Spectroscopy System Operation.
Failure to Properly Classify Steam Dump Control Relay Caused Atmospheric Dump Valves to be Rendered Inoperable Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000255/2021003-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71153 A finding of green significance was self-revealed on June 16, 2021, for the licensee's failure to properly classify the steam dump control relay (SDCR). Specifically, the licensee did not classify the SDCR in 2005 in accordance with fleet procedure FP-E-SE-02 "Component Classification," and as a result, the SDCR exceeded the vendor recommended service life without an evaluation. This led to the SDCR's failure, which rendered the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) inoperable.
Description:
In 2005, the licensee performed a classification verification of all systems, structures, and components (SSCs) using external resources. During this effort, the SDCR, a non-safety related relay, was not properly classified in accordance with fleet procedure FP-E-SE-02, "Component Classification" Rev. 0, Section 5.1.5, "Determine Duty Cycle and Service Condition" step 2, which says "Duty Cycle - There are two primary choices for Duty Cycle:
high or low. The selected duty cycle will be applied to each component and the result recorded in the spreadsheet/ database. The primary question is: Does the component operate continuously or cycle repeatedly? It is considered 'high' if 'yes'. The SDCR was classified as critical, low duty cycle, mid service condition (CLM) instead of critical, high duty cycle, mid service condition (CHM). The SDCR duty cycle should have been "HIGH" due to the normally energized state of the relay. A high duty cycle classification of the relay would have resulted in a replacement PM interval of 18 years. During the same time frame of 2005, the site documented in condition report CR-PLP-2005-00222 that the SDCR relay was subject to the same failure mode documented in NRC Bulletin No. 84-02 but was never replaced with a new relay. This was due to the model number being confused with a non-HFA relay. CR-PLP-2005-00222 recommended replacing the SDCR relay with a newer Century Series coil design relay and directed adding the replacement to the scope of CR-PLP-2004-02235-CA-4. There were no changes made to the evaluation scope of CR-PLP-2004-02235-CA-4, and the relay was never replaced. In 2018, a fleet-wide effort to review all critical components was performed by Rolls Royce, and the SDCR was included in the review, but no changes to the classification were suggested.
On June 16, 2021, with the reactor at full power, the SDCR failed, causing the four ADVs to be rendered inoperable (as reported in LER 05000255/2021-001-00, Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves Inoperable Due to Relay Failure (ADAMS Accession No. ML21226A001)). The Control Room staff smelled an acrid odor and, upon investigating, found the SDCR showing signs of overheating. Control logic power was lost, which resulted in the site entering a 24-hour shutdown action statement (LCO 3.7.4) for the loss of steam dump control function, and plant risk changed from green to orange. Due to the SDCR overheating, the relay short circuited and caused an overcurrent in the IM13 circuit and fuse FUZ/IM13-1 opening. This resulted in a loss of power to the IM13 scheme. The loss of power disabled the automatic fast-open function of the ADVs and disabled manual operation of ADVs from HIC-0780A (C-01 panel in the Control Room) and from HIC-0780B and HIC-0781B (C-33 panel in the engineered safeguards panel room). An 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)report was made to the NRC due to "an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The site sent the failed relay to United Controls International (UCI) for analysis, and it was confirmed to have failed due to overheating. The licensee performed an apparent cause analysis (ACA). The licensee assessed in the ACA that the direct cause of the SDCR relay was an internal failure of the electrical coil. The failure to correctly classify the SDCR during the preventative maintenance optimization (PMO) effort in 2005 and the failure to address the known relay coil problem for the SDCR in the corrective action program (CAP) in 2005 were also identified as causal factors. The ACA also noted there was evidence that in 1988, the site canceled a project to replace non-safety related HFA relays, such as the SDCR. The licensee reviewed the extent of condition (EOC) to identify if any other HFA relays were potentially impacted in the same manner and criteria, as described previously. One relay was identified, and the site created a work order (WO) to include replacement of the relay, 63X/HIC-0780 (Main Steam Dump Quick Open Relay), per the work order process.
The inspectors responded to the site when the site risk changed from green to orange. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's understanding of the situation, plan to replace the SDCR, and associated compensatory actions. The inspectors determined the licensee failed to properly classify the SDCR duty cycle on more than one occasion.
Corrective Actions: The licensee wrote condition report CR-PLP-2021-1591. An apparent cause analysis was performed which included an EOC to ensure that all HFA relays with outdated coil designs were identified. The site replaced the relay.
Corrective Action References: CR-PLP-2021-1591
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to properly classify the SDCR in accordance with FP-E-A-02. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Section 5.1.5, "Determine Duty Cycle and Service Condition" step 2, which says "Duty Cycle - There are two primary choices for Duty Cycle: high or low. The selected duty cycle will be applied to each component and the result recorded in the spreadsheet/ database. The primary question is: Does the component operate continuously or cycle repeatedly? It is considered 'high' if 'yes'. This led to the SDCR exceeding the vendor recommended service life without an evaluation, subsequent failure, and resultant ADV inoperability.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly classify the SDCR duty cycle. This resulted in the SDCR failing from overheating, causing the ADVs to be rendered inoperable.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the finding against the Mitigating Systems screening questions in Exhibit 2 and answered "NO" to every question. This resulted in the finding screening to green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
The inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On October 21, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. D. Corbin, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
On September 2, 2021, the inspectors presented the Emergency Preparedness inspection results to Mr. D. Corbin, Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-PLP-2021-
01756
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) System Was Not
Walked Down During the 2nd Quarter of 2021 in Accordance
With EN-DC-178
07/01/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
01782
Air Leak Coming From a Through Wall Wear Spot on
Copper Tubing That is Between MV-CA198A, Instrument Air
Isolation and MV-CA198, MSIV CV-0501 and CV-0510 NS
Header Vent
07/05/2021
DBD 1.01
Design Basis Document for Component Cooling Water
DBD 1.02
Design Basis Document for Service Water System
Miscellaneous
DBD 2.03
Design Basis Document for Containment Spray
DBD 5.02
Design Basis Document for Emergency Generator and
Generator Protective Systems
SOP-15
Service Water System
SOP-16
Component Cooling Water System
SOP-22
Procedures
SOP-3
Engineered Safeguards
109
Fire Area 12
Battery Room, Elevation 607'
Fire Area 13B
Charging Pump Rooms, Elevation 590'
Fire Plans
Fire Area 4
1C 2.4kV Switchgear Room, Elevation 590'
PLSEG-LOR-
Secondary Malfunctions
Miscellaneous
PLSEG-OPS-
Multi-Department Event
CR-PLP-2018-
2540
Charging Pumps P-55A, P-55B, P-55C Trip Unexpectedly
05/25/2018
CR-PLP-2021-
01962
P-55A Charging Pump, Speed and Flow Stability Are
Different From Before the Speed Reducer Was Replaced
07/26/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2110
The Condensate System (CDS-CDS) is Near Maintenance
Rule (a)(1) Status
08/06/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
2165
The Main Feedwater System Has Exceeded its Maintenance
Rule Performance Criteria of <2 Functional Failures in the
Previous 24 Months
08/12/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-PLP-2021-
209
The Maintenance Rule Evaluation Associated With MV-
FW155 R-1A Turbine Driver
08/18/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2456
Quarterly System Walkdown for CVC/CBA "Chemical and
Volume Control/Concentrated Boric Acid"
09/21/2021
PLP-RPT-12-
00026
EGAD-EP-10 Palisades Maintenance Rule Scoping
Document
Miscellaneous
PLP-RPT-12-
00026 EGAD-EP-
Palisades Maintenance Rule Scoping Document
CR-PLP-2021-
01984
Condensate Pump P-2B Thrust Bearing Temp
07/28/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01992
Temperature Element for CRD-18 Control Rod Drive
Mechanism - Rx Head Loc'n Rose From Approximately
154 Degrees F to Approximately 164 Degrees F
07/28/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2012
Condensate Pump, P-2B Change in Vibration Frequency for
the Upper Motor Bearing
07/29/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2120
Steam Leak at the Base of P-10A Heater Drain Pump
08/09/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2123
Discovered Small Leak on Cap of MV-HED160, Heater Drain
Pump P-10B Discharge Drain
08/09/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2181
The Jacket Water Supply Header for K-6B, Emergency
Diesel Generator 1-2
08/16/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2193
Phoenix Qualitative Fire Risk Safe Shutdown Path Definition
08/17/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2198
Jacket Water Outlet Elbow Brace is Cracked in Two Spots
08/18/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
2199
After Removal of Cylinder Liner an Indication Was Found On
the Block Where the Liner Sits
08/18/2021
Rapid Power Reduction
Procedures
GOP-5
Power Escalation in Mode 1
07/29/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01702
A Water Bubble Between the SIRW Roof Membrane
06/25/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
01783
Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1
07/06/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-PLP-2021-
01921
K-6B (Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2) Start On Both Air
Start Motors Slower Than Average
07/21/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01975
Boric Acid Build-Up Was Present on the Swagelok Fitting
Located Between CV-1901 (Pressurizer T-72 Vapor Phase
SX-1045) and MV-PC1045D (Vapor Phase SX-1045
CV-1901 Inlet)
07/27/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2129
The PCS Unidentified Leak Rate Appears to Have Taken a
Step Change Higher After the Downpower 07/29/2021
08/09/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
223
Diesel Generator 1-2 Local Regulator Switch, Generator
Voltage Did Not Raise As Expected
08/20/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
251
CV-0826 (CCW HX E-54B SW Outlet) Was Timed Stroked
Open Unsat During QO-5 Valve Test Procedure
08/24/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2333
Entered Action Level 3 Per Admin 4.19, PCS Leak Rate
Monitoring Program, For PCS Unidentified Leak Rate
Greater Than Baseline Mean by Three Standard Deviations
09/03/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2449
The Muffin Fan On the Rear of PY-0102B, "B" Thermal
Margin Monitor, Is In Distress
09/21/2021
Drawings
M-219, Sheet 1B
Process Sampling System
90753
Operability Basis Input for EDG 1-1 (Emergency Diesel
Generator) EGA Droop Potentiometer Maximum Acceptance
Range
Operability Basis Input for EDG 1-1 (Emergency Diesel
Generator) Hunting
Engineering
Changes
Operability Input for CR-PLP-2021-02251 for Stroke Time of
CV-0826
08/24/2021
EA-C-PAL-99-
Generation of Flow Rate Acceptance Criteria for Technical
Specification Test RO-216
5, Operability Evaluation Basis Form
Proc. 4.19
PCS Leakage Decision Flowchart
Procedures
SEP-PLP-IST-
101
Inservice Testing of Plant Valves
564567-01
K-6A Governor Tuning (Elect)
08/02/2021
Work Orders
564567-04
Replace Diesel Generator EGA Control Box
08/02/2021
Corrective Action
CR-PLP-2021-
P-55A, 'A' Charging Pump
07/02/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
01768
CR-PLP-2021-
01772
P-55A 'A' Charging Pump Placed in Service in Parallel With
P-55C
07/03/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01869
Inspections On M-55A (P-55A Charging Pump Fluid Drive)
07/15/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01911
EC-162 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Panel (Right)
07/21/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01913
PM of Breaker 52-2423, (P-2402 Hydrogen Sample Pump),
Per WO 52898258-02
07/21/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2000
Upper Oil Cooler Was Removed From P-2B Condensate
Pump Motor
07/29/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2180
Small Crack On Cylinder 7L
08/16/2021
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
2183
EDG 1-2 Monthly Test, Starting Air Pressure for Train A
08/16/2021
CVC-M-1
P-55A Charging Pump Frequent Maintenance
SPS-E-11
480 Volt Breaker Inspection and Repair
WI-SPS-E-02
Insulation Resistance Testing of Electrical Equipment
Procedures
WI-SPS-E-02
Megger Test Form
07/29/2021
00565778-01
EMA-2205, Condensate Pump Motor Replace Upper
Cooler - E-908B
07/29/2021
00565778-11
P-2B EMA-2205
07/29/2021
2898258-01
PM-Breaker 52-2423 (P-2402)
05/24/2021
2956357-01
P-55A, 'A' Charging Pump Maintenance
05/03/2021
Work Orders
564567-03
K-8A; RE-131 Load Reject Surveillance (I&C)
08/03/2021
CR-PLP-2-21-
2137
As Found Speed Was 3588 RPM (Band 3540-3580) as Left
Speed is 3562 RPM
08/09/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2114
Sixth Consecutive Day Above the Baseline Mean
08/07/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2117
A Confirmatory Leakrate Was Required Per Admin 4.19,
PCS Leakrate Monitor Program
08/08/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
2130
Secured P-8B Per QO-21 Direction
08/09/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
P-7C Service Water Pump Test, the Vibration Data Taken
09/20/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2437
Was Higher Than Expected
CR-PLP-2021-
2441
1-2 Diesel Generator "B" Air Start Motor Started the Engine
Outside of Acceptable Start Time
09/20/2021
QO-19A
Inservice Test Procedure - HPSI Pumps and ESS Check
Valve Operability Test
QO-20
Inservice Test Procedure - Low Pressure Safety Injection
Pumps
Procedures
QO-21
Inservice Test Procedure - Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
08/19/2021
CR-PLP-2019-
04657
11/21/2019
CR-PLP-2020-
00843
Siren Preventative Maintenance Identified Cracked Power
Pole for Siren 040
03/16/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
01388
04/30/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
01827
Siren 8 Audio Current Failure
07/10/2021
Federal Emergency Management Agency Palisades Nuclear
Plant Public ANS Approval Letter
2/20/2012
Federal Emergency Management Agency Letter; Provisions
for Backup Alert and Notification (ANS) for the Palisades
Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
2/10/2012
Palisade Nuclear Plant Public Warning System Replacement
Project Design Report
10/01/2002
Documentation of Public Warning System Monthly Tests
08/01/2019-
06/30/2021
Alert Notification System Maintenance Records
07/01/2019-
06/30/2019
20 Emergency Preparedness Public Information Mailer
08/19/2020
Miscellaneous
Emergency Preparedness Brochure (Internet Website
Document)
09/01/2021
Procedures
PAL PWS
Palisades Nuclear Plant Public Warning System Operating
Procedure
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
04067
ERO Shift Did Not Complete Work Task Corrective Action
10/08/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-PLP-2021-
00963
Outdated Documents in Allegan County Offsite Liaison ERO
Position Binder
04/08/2021
Palisades Nuclear Station On-Shift Staffing Analysis Final
Report
Emergency Response Organization Off-Hours,
Unannounced, Augmentation Response Test Records
08/01/2019-
06/30/2021
Emergency Response Organization Training Records
(12 samples)
08/31/2021
Miscellaneous
Current Emergency Response Organization Team Staffing
08/06/2021
EI-2.2
Emergency Staff Augmentation
Procedures
EN-EP 310
Emergency Response Organization Notification System
CR-PLP-2019-
03742
Emergency Kit 9 Inventory Issues
09/17/2019
CR-PLP-2019-
04155
Q3 2019 Vulnerability Management Assessment Discovered
EP Only CDAs Were Not Receiving Microsoft Operating
System Upgrades and Security Patches
10/16/2019
CR-PLP-2020-
252
Inform Program Would Not Connect to the Server
01/27/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
00596
Inform Program Deficiencies Related to Technical Data
Form Inputs
2/24/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
00957
Dedicated NRC Phone Lines Not Working in Control Room
03/25/2020
CR-PLP-2020-
01802
EAL Initiating Condition (IC) Use During 8 Year Cycle
06/04/2020
CR-PLP-2021-
00567
TSC Inventory - Incorrect Procedure Revisions
03/03/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01135
EP Fleet Assessment Team - Negative Observation for
ERO Drill Participation Performance Indicator
04/26/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
01469
New South Haven Hospital - Coordination of Management
Change and Radiological Emergency Response
06/28/2021
Monthly Emergency Communications Test Records
08/01/2019-
06/30/2021
Miscellaneous
Emergency Response Facilities Emergency Kits Quarterly
Inventory Records
08/01/2019-
06/30/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Emergency Response Facilities Monthly Communications
Test Records
08/01/2019-
06/30/2021
Emergency Preparedness Exercise and Drill Evaluation
Reports
08/01/2019-
08/31/2021
Emergency Preparedness Letters of Agreement (LOAs) With
Off-Site Response and Support Organizations
08/01/2019-
08/31/2021
KLD TR-1161
Palisades Power Plant 2020 Population Update Analysis
09/16/2020
LO-PLPLO-2021-
0039
Pre-NRC Emergency Planning Program Inspection
Assessment
05/19/2021
QA-7-2020-PLP-1
Quality Assurance Audit Report - Emergency Preparedness
05/11/2020
QA-7-2021-PLP-1
Quality Assurance Audit Report - Emergency Preparedness
05/11/2021
EAL Basis
Emergency Action Level Technical Bases
Palisades Nuclear Plant Site Emergency Plan
SEP Supplement
EAL Wall Charts
Procedures
SEP, Supplement
Evacuation Time Estimates
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2020-
00564
TSC Security Coordinator Laptop Missing During Emergency
Planning Drill
2/20/2020
NRC Performance Indicator High Pressure Injection
(HPSI) (MS-07)
07/02/2020 -
06/30/2021
NRC Performance Indicators Mitigating Systems
Performance Indicator Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
(MS-09)
07/02/2020 -
06/30/2021
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicators Barrier Integrity Reactor
Coolant System (BI-02)
07/02/2020 -
06/30/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01702
A Water Bubble Between the SIRW Roof Membrane
06/25/2021
CR-PLP-2021-
01735
Walkdown of the T-58 SIRW Tank Roof
07/01/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2021-
01749
Cross Contaminated Sample
07/08/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-PLP-2004-
235
Significant Event Notification 248
03/24/2004
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-PLP-2005-
222
Steam Dump Control Relay Type HFA Not Updated
01/11/2005
CR-PLP-2021-
01592
SDCR Relay (Steam Dump Control Relay) Showed Signs of
Over-Heating
06/16/2021
FP-E-SE-02
Component Classification
Procedures
FP-PE-PM-01
Preventative Maintenance Program
0