05000266/LER-1985-002, Forwards LER 85-002-01 Re Details of Fuel Damage Found on Fuel Assembly H14,which Spent Last Cycle in Core Position D12.Rept Suppls Original Rept

Forwards LER 85-002-01 Re Details of Fuel Damage Found on Fuel Assembly H14,which Spent Last Cycle in Core Position D12.Rept Suppls Original Rept

ML20198E637
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/19/1986
From:	Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20198D711	List: 05000266/LER-1985-002, Forwards LER 85-002-01 Re Details of Fuel Damage Found on Fuel Assembly H14,which Spent Last Cycle in Core Position D12.Rept Suppls Original Rept
References
CON-NRC-86-45 LER-85-402, VPNPD-86-223, NUDOCS 8605280129
Download: ML20198E637 (1)

LER-2085-002, Forwards LER 85-002-01 Re Details of Fuel Damage Found on Fuel Assembly H14,which Spent Last Cycle in Core Position D12.Rept Suppls Original Rept

Event date:
Report date:
2662085002R00 - NRC Website

text

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0771 h WISCONSIN Electnc row cwwr 231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046 MILWAUME, Wi M?M VPNPD-86-223 NRC-86-45 May 19, 1986 1

Mr. J. G. Keppier, Regional Administrator i

Of fice of In.3pection and Enforcentent Reglon III U. L. NUCLEM REG *JLATORY COMMISSION 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IllinolB 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKf.T 50-266:

LICENSEE EVENT _NEPORT 85-_002--01 FAILCD FUEL ROD IN ASSEMBLY E14 POINT' BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT,[ UNIT._1 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 85-002-01 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This report is a supplement to LER 85-002-00 dated June 11, 1985.

This report details the fuel damage found on Fuel Assembly H14, which spent the last cycle in Core Position D12. This is the same core position occupied by damaged Assembly H09 during the last cycle. Both assemblies exhibited the same type of damagc.

LER 85-002-00 was filed under the reporting requirement of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)tii), "Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded."

Very truly yours,

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Vice Preside Nuclear Power 2nclosure Copies to NRC Document Control. Desk Washington, DC (with original)

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On April 27, 1986, during the inspection of discharged fuel which had been located in core position next to core baffle joints at Unit 1 of Point Beach Nuclear Plant, have failed cladding in one fuel rod. fuel assembly H14 was found to The fuel rod cladding appears to have failed due to vibration of the rod against the grid and grid springs.

water impingement through a slightly widened core baffle plate bu joint next to core locaticn D12. The fuel cladding was failed to the extent that fuel pellets could be seen through the hole in the clad. However, no pellets escaped from the rod.

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q1 g2 or 6 0l Operating Conditions Before the Event:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, operated from June, 1985, until April, 1986, power level decreases for various tests.with few interruptions other than minor lo Status of Structures, Components, or Systems That Were Inoperable at the Start of the Event and That Contributed to the Event:

At Cycle the13, end of Cycle 12 in 1985 and prior to the beginning of the core baffle plate at core location D12 was inspected.

The baffle joint was found to have a possible 4 to 7 mil gap between the rows of cap screws (see LER 85-002-00). This gap is in a location H14.

assembly which is opposite the location of the fuel damage on fuel Dates and Approximate Times of Occurrences:

The level of dose equivalent I-131 had shown no evidence of fuel failure above that expected normally until the second week of March, 1986.

At that point, levels did increase slightly until a level shut down 0.1 just above for micro-curies /cc was measured just before the annual refueling. (See the attached chart of dose equivalent I-131 versus time.)

PBNP Technical Specifications.This level is 10 percent of that allowed by An inspection was made of fuel assembly H14 on April 27, 1986.

NOTE:

ALL INDICATIONS WERE ON THE WEST FACE OF THETHE ASSEMBLY.

SEVEN GRIDS ARE NUMBERED FROM TOP TO BOTTOM.

Grid 1:

Shiny marks visible on rod Nos.

against the grid. 13 and 14 due to vibration of rod Grid 2:

Rod No. 14 was completely severed at Grid 2.

dence of fuel pellet fragments behind Grid 2. There was some evi-

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Rod No. 14 (the rod immediately adjacent to the baffle joint) was severed immediately behind the third grid from the top of the fuel assembly. The fuel inside the rod was visible. No pellets appeared to have escaped from the fuel rod. Some small fragments were visible and lodged behind Grid 3 preventing the rod from wiggling.

Rod No. 13 shows a grid-shaped gouge apparently due to rod vibration against Grid 3.

Grids 4 and 5:

Gouges appear on Rod No. 14 below the grid. Rod No. 13 shows gouges behind the grids.

Grids 6 and 7:

There is a shiny appearance behind the grids on Rod No. 13.

Bottom Nozzle:

Rod Nos. 13 and 14 are on the bottom. All other rods are 1/2 inch off the bottom. Rod No. 13, not held by grids, wiggles at the bottom.

General:

Rod No. 12 wiggles near the center due to apparent lack of grid support.

This assembly had no other indications.

Other Assemblies:

Assembly Q17 was inspected on April 24, 1986. This assembly was in  :

core location number E2 during Cycle 13. A dark blotch was found on the east face of Grids 3 and 4. The mark had a sharp edge to the l north. No other indications were found. '

Fuel Assembly M17 was also inspected on April 27, 1986, because of its location next to the baffle and, therefore, its potential for baf fle jetting damage. Small gray marks were found on Grids 2, 3, 4, and 5 opposite Rod No. 12 on the east face of the assembly. This assembly had no other indications. The assembly was in core location B4 during Cycle 13.

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. _2 ,wc w m m,7, 0l0)2 0 l1 0 [4 or O6 f The following fuel assemblies were inspected in detail for similar indications.

Cycle 13. No indications were found.These assemblies had been next to baffle Fuel Assembly No.

Core Location for Cycle 13 H05 LOS J2 Kll I L15 '

L19 C11 L22 C3 M12 K3 M13 H1 M14 F1 M15 F13 M20 B10 M25 L4 M27 A6 M28 M8 M29 M6 M31 A8 N01 H13 NO3 D2 N04 L10 QO3 J12 Q04 B5 Q07 L9 Q13 I2 Q15 E12 Q22 L5 Q25 B9 112 Summary of Fuel Assembly H14 Operating History:

Fuel assembly identification: H14 nozzle (standard fuel assem!;1y).Prepressurized low parasitic om desig FabricatedbyWestinghouse1{uclearFuelsDivision, Columbia Carolina. , Sguth Date received on site: September 30, 1976.

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Point Beach Nuclear Plant rurre- . 2., = we, w,,nn o ls [o lo [o l2 [6 l6 8j 5 0j 0l 2 0; 1 0l 5 or 0l 6 Initial inspection revealed no abnormalities.

Loaded thimble plug into Unit device.1 Cycle 5 at core position M7. Insert was a Burnup during Cycle 5 was 7,768 MWD /MTU.

Loaded into Unit 1 C thimble plug device.ycle 6 at core position D7. Insert was a Burnup during Cycle 6 was 10,907 MWD /MTU.

Loaded plug thimble into Unit 1 Cycle 7 at core position F11.

device. Insert was a Burnup during Cycle 7 was 10,562 MWD /MTU.

Loaded plug thimble into Unit 1 Cycle 13 at core position D12.

device. Insert was a Burnup during Cycle 13 was 4,219 MWD /MTU.

Total burnup: 33,465 MWD /MTU.

There was October 25, no evidence 1979, and May of 2, abnormalities during inspections of 1985.

Fuel cladding damage was found as noted above on April 27 , 1986.

Corrective Action:

No tionchangeswill be madein configuration during Cycleof14. the vessel internals or flow direc-in the attached chart show the level of coolant activi~ty duriThe ng chemistry re i type of activity trend are expected.

activity will be trended to monitor it and Technical Specifications allow M fuel failure shown during Cycle 13.

equipment to modify the flow direction i has been issued. The Public Service

.so being consulted for fiscal author-

ion.

i The modification will modify the 1

flow outside the core baffle as the flow through the core. plate e the cross baffle plate pressure This

>w in the flow through the core baffle the control rod to vibrate.

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'0l 10 l6 or 0l 6 Previous Similar Events:

There in the has past. been similar damage found at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant LERs 50-266/75-18 and 85-002-00,The details of such damage can be found in U and Unit 2 LER 85-004-00. The damage found LER supplemental report. during these events was similar to that found in this similar. The mechanism for the damage was also Safety Evaluation:

The following safety concerns have been evaluated: (1) tial for locations other further fuel failure by the same mechanism in the same orThe poten-activit and (2) the effect of increased primary system public.y on the health and safety of plant personnel and the general There is a potential for failure of fuel rods in the same location.

However, this failure does not appear to happen quickly.

Monitoring of primary coolant activity during startup and subsequent operation any other core willposition.

provide indication of any failure of fuel at this or supply system vendor, Westinghouse,After consultation with the nuclear steam to modify any fuel assemblies to mitigate baffle jetting effectsthe decision ha .

Unit 1 Cycle 14 core is not considered to pose a hazard to health and safety of the plant personnel or the public. The fuel assemblies in those areas which have been identified as potential locations after the completionfor this type of situation of Cycle 14. will be thoroughly inspected h3 DOEen 364a

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