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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212D5961999-09-15015 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee IPEEE Process.Plant Has Met Intent of Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 ML20211A7641999-08-11011 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 190 & 195 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20196J4251999-06-30030 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternatives Described in Relief Requests VRR-01,ROJ-16,PRR-01 & VRR-02 ML20206A5031999-04-23023 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 189 & 194 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20207L3471999-03-0202 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 187 & 192 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20207K2751999-03-0202 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 188 & 193 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20207D5691999-03-0101 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 186 & 191 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20207D6751999-02-22022 February 1999 Assessment of Design Info on Piping Restraints for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.Staff Concludes That Licensee Unable to Retrieve Original Analyses That May Have Been Performed to Justify Removal of Shim Collars ML20206R9001999-01-13013 January 1999 SER Accepting Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Changes for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198C7671998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME BPV Code,1986 Edition,Section XI Requirement IWA-2232, to Use Performance Demonstration Initiative Program During RPV Third 10-yr ISI for Plant,Unit 2 ML20236U7201998-07-21021 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-27 ML20236T1761998-07-17017 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 185 & 189 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20236S0161998-07-13013 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 184 & 188 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20236Q3161998-07-10010 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code Requirements PTP-3-01 & PTP-3-02 ML20236L6061998-07-0808 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Relief RR-2-23,from Performing ASME Code,Section XI Volumetric Coverage Requirements for SG nozzle-to-safe End Welds & Associated Safe end-to-pipe Welds During Third 10-yr ISI Interval ML20236L6771998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Wepco Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Point Beach NPP Units 1 & 2 ML20217F3131998-04-17017 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of Nonstructural Seal Welds,For Plant, Unit 1 ML20217K4721998-03-24024 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 183 & 187 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20217A8501998-03-19019 March 1998 SER Accepting Proposed Changes Submitted on 980226 by Wiep to Pbnp Final SAR Section 1.8 Which Will Impact Commitments Made in Pbnp QA Program Description.Changes Concern Approval Authority for Procedures & Interviewing Authority ML20248L8641998-03-17017 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 182 & 186 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20216J0101998-03-17017 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Third 10-yr Inservice Insp Interval Relief Request RR-1-18 for Plant ML20198L1151998-01-0808 January 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198L4671998-01-0202 January 1998 SER Approving Request for Relief VRR-4B to Inservice Testing Program Wisconsin Electric Power Co,Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20197J9341997-12-12012 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from Performing Inservice Volmetric Exam of Inaccessible Portions of RPV Lower Shell to Lower Head Ring Weld During 10-yr ISI Interval of Plant,Unit 2 ML20210S9821997-09-0404 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 179 & 183 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20216G5781997-09-0303 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 178 & 182 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20210Q0231997-08-25025 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 177 & 181 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20198F0261997-08-0606 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 176 & 180 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20217H4241997-08-0606 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 175 & 179 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20217N3741997-07-0909 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 174 & 178 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20137U4991997-04-10010 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternatives Contained in Requests for Relief RR-1-17 & RR-2-21 ML20133G3111997-01-0808 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170 & 174 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20129G6901996-10-0303 October 1996 SER Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for ASME Code Class Three Piping at Plant ML20101E1851996-03-20020 March 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 168 & 172 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20094P3741995-11-22022 November 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 166 & 170 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20093H7051995-10-12012 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 164 & 168 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20080R4731995-03-0606 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 161 & 165 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20078C2571995-01-18018 January 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 160 & 164 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20080C8201994-12-12012 December 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 158 & 162 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20076M5621994-11-0101 November 1994 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee 940203 Request for Relief from Successive Insps of Flaws Detected in secondary- Side SG Shell Weld ML20024J4621994-10-0505 October 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Approval to Implement Alternative Rules of ASME Section XI Code Case N-524 ML20073K0431994-09-29029 September 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 155 & 159 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20073E2221994-09-23023 September 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 152 & 156 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20073E2011994-09-23023 September 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Issuance of Amends 153 & 157 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20072G3691994-08-16016 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 149 & 153 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20029E7971994-05-11011 May 1994 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 147 & 151 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20059L1961994-01-27027 January 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 145 & 149 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20058K9981993-12-0606 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 143 & 147 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20062J4991993-10-28028 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting IST Relief Requests Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) & 10CFR50.55a(f)(4)(iv) ML20056H4401993-09-0707 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 141 & 145 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively 1999-09-15
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARNPL-99-0569, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with 05000266/LER-1999-007, :on 990831,cable Tray Fire Stops Do Not Meet App R Exemption Requirements Occurred.Caused by Improper Installation of Approved Plant Mod.New Mod Has Been Initiated to Provide Three H Rated Fire Barrier1999-09-30030 September 1999
- on 990831,cable Tray Fire Stops Do Not Meet App R Exemption Requirements Occurred.Caused by Improper Installation of Approved Plant Mod.New Mod Has Been Initiated to Provide Three H Rated Fire Barrier
ML20212D5961999-09-15015 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee IPEEE Process.Plant Has Met Intent of Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 05000266/LER-1999-004, :on 990420,fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cable in AFW Pump Room Was Noted Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Error in Design of New Fuel Oil Transfer Sys.Condition Rept CR 99-1140 Was Initiated1999-09-0202 September 1999
- on 990420,fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cable in AFW Pump Room Was Noted Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Error in Design of New Fuel Oil Transfer Sys.Condition Rept CR 99-1140 Was Initiated
NPL-99-0051, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211A7641999-08-11011 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 190 & 195 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively NPL-99-0449, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20196J4251999-06-30030 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternatives Described in Relief Requests VRR-01,ROJ-16,PRR-01 & VRR-02 ML20209D2691999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2 ML20196F3341999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation for Implementation of 422V+ Fuel Assemblies at Pbnp Units 1 & 2 ML20195F9781999-06-10010 June 1999 Unit 2 Refueling 23 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Form NIS-1 NPL-99-0328, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20209D2751999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised MORs for May 1999 for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2 05000301/LER-1999-003-01, :on 990505,licensee Personnel Discovered That Refueling Interval Surveillance of Emergency Lighting Required by TS 15.4.6.A.3 Was Not Conducted.Cause Unknown. Task Sheet call-ups for Both Procedures Have Been Created1999-05-28028 May 1999
- on 990505,licensee Personnel Discovered That Refueling Interval Surveillance of Emergency Lighting Required by TS 15.4.6.A.3 Was Not Conducted.Cause Unknown. Task Sheet call-ups for Both Procedures Have Been Created
05000266/LER-1999-004, :on 990420,discovered That Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cable in AFW Pump Room Outside App R Design Basis. Caused by Cable Routing Discrepancy.Fire Rounds Increased & Procedures Being Developed to Facilitate Using G-05 EDG1999-05-20020 May 1999
- on 990420,discovered That Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cable in AFW Pump Room Outside App R Design Basis. Caused by Cable Routing Discrepancy.Fire Rounds Increased & Procedures Being Developed to Facilitate Using G-05 EDG
05000266/LER-1999-003, :on 990406,TS SR for ECCS & Containment Spray Was Not Fully Implemented.Caused by Conservative Interpretation of Valve Impact.Revised Procedures.With1999-05-0606 May 1999
- on 990406,TS SR for ECCS & Containment Spray Was Not Fully Implemented.Caused by Conservative Interpretation of Valve Impact.Revised Procedures.With
NPL-99-0273, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196F3521999-04-30030 April 1999 Non-proprietary WCAP-14788, W Revised Thermal Design Procedure Instrument Uncertainty Methodology for Wepc Point Beach Units 1 & 2 (Fuel Upgrade & Uprate to 1656 Mwt - NSSS Power) ML20206A5031999-04-23023 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 189 & 194 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively 05000301/LER-1999-002-01, :on 990323,discovered That Red Channel of SG Pressure Indication Passes Through Fire Zone.Caused by 1983 Modification Oversight.Twice Per Shift Fire Round Has Been Established for Fire Zone Pending Cable Routing Correction1999-04-16016 April 1999
- on 990323,discovered That Red Channel of SG Pressure Indication Passes Through Fire Zone.Caused by 1983 Modification Oversight.Twice Per Shift Fire Round Has Been Established for Fire Zone Pending Cable Routing Correction
NPL-99-0193, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with 05000301/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990211,EDG Output Breaker Failed to Remain Closed During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Breaker Control Switch Failing to React Quickly.Modified Closing Circuit for EDG Output1999-03-10010 March 1999
- on 990211,EDG Output Breaker Failed to Remain Closed During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Breaker Control Switch Failing to React Quickly.Modified Closing Circuit for EDG Output
ML20207L3471999-03-0202 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 187 & 192 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20207K2751999-03-0202 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 188 & 193 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20207D5691999-03-0101 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 186 & 191 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively NPL-99-0134, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20207D6751999-02-22022 February 1999 Assessment of Design Info on Piping Restraints for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.Staff Concludes That Licensee Unable to Retrieve Original Analyses That May Have Been Performed to Justify Removal of Shim Collars ML20206R9001999-01-13013 January 1999 SER Accepting Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Changes for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 NPL-99-0091, 1998 Annual Results & Data Rept for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Results & Data Rept for Pbnps,Units 1 & 2. with NPL-99-0008, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Pbnp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20198C7671998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME BPV Code,1986 Edition,Section XI Requirement IWA-2232, to Use Performance Demonstration Initiative Program During RPV Third 10-yr ISI for Plant,Unit 2 NPL-98-1006, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195J5101998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Revs to Section 1.3 of FSAR for Pbnp QA Program ML20198J5941998-11-0303 November 1998 1998 Graded Exercise,Conducted on 981103 NPL-98-0948, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With NPL-98-0880, Special Rept:On 980913,fire Alarm Control Panels Inoperable for More That Fourteen Days.Troubleshooting of D-401 Panel Following Installation of Replacement Batteries Revealed No Apparent Cause for Spurious Alarms.Panel D-401 Restored1998-10-21021 October 1998 Special Rept:On 980913,fire Alarm Control Panels Inoperable for More That Fourteen Days.Troubleshooting of D-401 Panel Following Installation of Replacement Batteries Revealed No Apparent Cause for Spurious Alarms.Panel D-401 Restored ML20154L6751998-10-14014 October 1998 Unit 1 Refueling 24 ISI Summary Rept for Form NIS-1 ML20154M9121998-10-14014 October 1998 Unit 1 Refueling 24 Repair/Replacement Summary Rept for Form NIS-2 NPL-98-0826, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20151W3851998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Pbnp Units 1 & 2 ML20151W4471998-07-31031 July 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for July 1998 for Pbnp Unit 2 NPL-98-0653, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20151W4541998-07-31031 July 1998 Corrected Page to MOR for July 1998 for Pbnp Unit 1 ML20236U7201998-07-21021 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License DPR-27 ML20236T1761998-07-17017 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 185 & 189 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively 05000266/LER-1998-015, :on 980420,containment Fan Cooler Test Results Were Noted Outside Acceptance Criteria.Cause Is Under Evaluation.Pressure Washing of Air Side of Cooling Coils for All Four Unit 1 CFCs Has Been Completed1998-07-17017 July 1998
- on 980420,containment Fan Cooler Test Results Were Noted Outside Acceptance Criteria.Cause Is Under Evaluation.Pressure Washing of Air Side of Cooling Coils for All Four Unit 1 CFCs Has Been Completed
05000266/LER-1998-019, :on 980615,discovered That Containment Hydrogen Monitors Lacked Environmentally Qualified Coating on Terminal Strips.Caused by Terminal Strips Being Disturbed W/O Subsequent Reapplication of Coating.Replaced Coating1998-07-14014 July 1998
- on 980615,discovered That Containment Hydrogen Monitors Lacked Environmentally Qualified Coating on Terminal Strips.Caused by Terminal Strips Being Disturbed W/O Subsequent Reapplication of Coating.Replaced Coating
ML20236S0161998-07-13013 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 184 & 188 to Licenses DPR-24 & DPR-27,respectively ML20236Q3161998-07-10010 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code Requirements PTP-3-01 & PTP-3-02 ML20236L6061998-07-0808 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Relief RR-2-23,from Performing ASME Code,Section XI Volumetric Coverage Requirements for SG nozzle-to-safe End Welds & Associated Safe end-to-pipe Welds During Third 10-yr ISI Interval 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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i UNITED STATES g-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS810N o,
WAsHfMGToN, D.C. 30e06 0001 4*e***-
t SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCI I:AR REACTOR REGULATION REVIEW OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE ASME CODE FOR INSERVICE PRESSURE TESTING WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCI I:AR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 mri 50-301
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Technical Specifications for the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, state that the inservice inspection (ISI) of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1,2, and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g),
except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i). Section 50.55a(a)(3) of 10 CFR states that attematives to the requirements of paragraph (c) may be used when authorized by the NRC if (i) the proposed altamatives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety, or (ii) compliance with the specified requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the ' level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components (including supports) shall meet the requirements, except the design and access provisions and the preservice examination requirements, set forth in the ASME Code,Section XI, " Rules for Inservice inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components. The regulations require that inservice examination of components and system pressure tests conducted during the first 10-year interval and subsequent intervals comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) 12 months prior to the start of the 120-month interval, subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein. The applicable ASME Code,Section XI, for the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant third 10-year ISI interval is the 1986 Edition, no addenda.
l The components (including supports) may meet the requirements set forth in subsequent editions and addenda of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) l subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein and subject to Commission approval.
i l
' Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5), if the licensee determines that conformance with an
. examination requirement of Section XI of the ASME Code is not practical for its facility, information shall be submitted to the Commission in support of that determination and a request made for relief from the ASME Code requirement.' After evaluation of the determination, ENCLOSURE
)y 9907200167 9907iO PDR ADOCK 05000266 p
PM a
L l~~ l pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), the Commission may grant relief and may impose attemative requirements that are determined to be authorized by law, will not endanger life, property, or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest, giving due consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could result if the requirements were imposed Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(s)(3)(i), proposed attematives to the requirements of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) of 10 CFR 50.55a may be used when authorized by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the applicant can demonstrate that the proposed altematives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety.
By letters dated December 16,1997, and June 17 and July 2,1998, Wisconsin Electric (WE or the licensee) Power Company requested relief for pressure testing containment penetration piping and components associated with non-ASME classed systems for Units 1 and 2.
The staff has reviewed and evaluated the licensee's request and supporting information on the proposed attemative to the Code requirements for Point Beach Unit 2, pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i).
2.0 DISCUSSION OF REllEF REQUEST PTP-3-02 2.1 Comoonent Description Pressure testing of containment penetration piping - Request for approval to use Code Case N-522
(
l The following penetrations will be tested using Code Case N-522:
l Penetration Line Number Desenption l
1CPP-V1 U1C pipe penetration purge e' haust x
1CPP-V2 U1C pipe penetration purge supply i
l 1CPP-X1.
U1C pipe penetration supply to RE-211 and RE-212 l
1CPP-X2 U1C pipe penetration retum from RE-211 and RE-212 1CPP-09 U1C pipe penetration reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) drain 1CPP-12C U1C pipe penetration waste gas vent header 1CPP-14B U1C pipe penetration containment pressure transmitter 1CPP-25C U1C pipe penetration post-accident containment ventilation system (PACVS) supply 1CPP-28D U1C pipe penetration deadweight tester 1CPP-31A U1C pipe penetration containment pressure transmitter 1CPP-318 U1C pipe penetration PACVS sample 1CPP-31C U1C pipe penetration PACVS exhaust 1CPP-32A U1C pipe penetration containment pressure transmitter 1CPP-33A U1C pipe penetration instrument air (IA) supply to containment 1CPP-33B U1C pipe penetration IA supply to containment 1CPP-34D U1C pipe penetration gas analyzer from RCDT 1CPP-52 U1C pipe penetration -
heating steam to containment 1CPP-53 U1C pipe penetration condensate retum from heaters 1CPP-71 U1C pipe penetration sump A to primary auxi!iary building (PAB) sump
4 3
2CPP-V1 U2C pipe penetration purge exhaust 2CPP-V2 U2C pipe penetration purge supply 2CPP-X1 U2C pipe penetration supply to RE-211 and RE-212 2CPP-X2 U2C pipe penetration retum from RE-211 and RE-212 2CPP-09 U2C pipe penetration reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) drain 2CPP-12C U2C pipe penetration waste gas vent header 2CPP-14B U2C pipe penetration containment pressure transmitter 2CPP-28D U2C pipe penetration deadweight tester 2CPP-42C U2C pipe penetration post-accident containment ventilation system (PACVS) supply 2CPP-31A U2C pipe penetration containment pressure transmitter 2CPP-31B U2C pipe penetration PACVS sample 2CPP-31C U2C pipe penetration PACVS exhaust 2CPP-32A U2C pipe penetration containment pressure transmitter 2CPP-33A U2C pipe penetration IA supply to containment 2CPP-338 U2C pipe penetration IA supply to containment 2CPP-34D U2C pipe penetration gas analyzer from RCDT 2CPP-52 U2C pipe penetration heating steam to containment 2CPP-53 U2C pipe penetration condensate retum from heaters 2CPP-71 U2C pipe penetration sump A to primary auxiliary building (PAB) sump 2.2 Code Class ASME Section XI, Class 2 2.3 ASME Examination Requirements. ASME Section XI.1986 Edition. no addenda ASME Section XI, Table IWC-2500-1 Code Examination Category, C-H; Item Number C7.10 through C7.80 Paragraph IWA-5211 TEST DESCRIPTION The pressure-retaining components within each system boundary shall be subject to the following system pressure tests under which conditions visual examination VT-2 is performed in accordance with IWA-5240 to detect leakage.
Paragraph IWC-5210 TEST (a)
The pressure-retaining components within each system boundary shall be subjected to the following system pressure tests and visually examnined by the method specified in table IWC-2500-1, Examination category C-H:
(1) a system pressure test shall be conducted during a system functional test of those [lWA 5211(b)] systems (or components) not required to operr.te during normal plant
1
' ~*
operations but for which periodic system (or components) functional tests are performed to meet the Owner's requirements; (2) a system pressure test conducted during a system inservice test [lWA 5211(c)] for those systems required to operate during normal plant operations; and (3) a system hydrostatic pressure test [lWA-5211(d)] for each system or portions of systems and for repaired or replaced components, or altered portions of systems.
(b)
The system pressure tests and visual examinations shall be conducted in accords;.,e with IWA-500 and this Article. - The contained fluid in the system shall serve as the pressurizing medium, except that in steam systems either water or air may be used. Where air is used, the test procedure shall permit the detection of through-wallieskages in components of the system tested.
2.4 Basis for Rehef (As stated) i i
This request for relief is submitted under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3). The proposed attemative to test those portions of piping systems penetrating containment in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-522 will provide an acceptable level of safety to ensure that both intemal and extemal system leakage is maintained at levels less than [that] required by the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications.
Recognizing that the applicable piping penetration systems are designated extensions of the containment, the overall piping systems are non-safety related or classed ASME. The only basis for classification is to provide for containment isolation. Since ASME Section XI pressure testing only provides for extemal system leakage and provides indication of system integrity the importance of containment isolation is also to restrict inter-system leakage to the outside environment. To perform the redundant and less restrictive tests of ASME Section XI would not provide for any commensurate increase in safety.
2.5 Altemative Examination (As stated)
ASME Section XI pressure testing of containment penetration piping and components solely designated Class 2 for the purposes of the containment system where the balance of the system is outside the scope of ASME will be pressure tested in accordance with the provisions of ASME Section XI, Code Case N-522. As directed j
by the provisions of the Code Case, pressure testing will be conducted in accordance l
with the requirements of 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix J. If subsequent to the approval i
of this request for relief the NRC adopts Code Case N-522 in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.147 and the Commission provides additional guidance or impose [s] specific restriction, Point Beach Nuclear Plant will adopt the provisions of Regulatory l
l
5-Guide 1.147,' Inservice inspection Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section XI, Division 1," following its revision. Testing and any required examinations will be performed by certified personnelin accordance with approved plant procedures.
3.0 EVALUATION I
The system leakage test required by the Code in Examination Category C-H provides periodic verification of the leak-tight integrity of Class 2 piping syr,tems or segments once every 40 months. The pipe segments from non-Code class systems that penetrate containment are designed and examined as Class 2 piping for the sole purpose of maintaining the integrity of containment. The Appendix J pressure testing proposed by the licensee as an attemative to the VT-2 method of testing provides periodic verification by test, of the leak-tight integrity of the primary reactor containment, and of systems and components that penetrate containment. The test provides assurance that the containment pressure boundary is being maintained at an acceptable level while monitoring for deterioration of seals, valves, and piping.
The containment penetration piping along with the containment isolation valves (CIVs), are part of containment pressure boundary and are classified as Class 2. Hence, the containment isolation valves along with the connecting pipe segments must withstand the calculated peak containment intemal pressure related to the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident as specified in the Technical Specifications. Since Code Case N-522 has not specified the test pressure for containment penetration piping. the staff has determined that the pressure testing must be conducted at the peak calculated containment pressure for design-basis accident. In the acceptance criteria for the Appendix J test, the combined leakage from all penetrations and valves must be below a permissible limit, whereas the ASME Section XI Code does not allow any pressure boundary leakage during pressure testing and requires in paragraph IWC-5210(b) that when air is used as a testing medium, the test procedure must include methods for detection and location of through-wallleaks in system components. Since most Appendix J tests are conducted using air as test medium, the staff has determined that the licensee's proposed citemative of conducting the Appendix J test at peak calculated containment pressure with the provision to detect and locate pressure boundary leak would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety as that of the ASME Code,Section XI,1986 Edition for pressure testing of containment penetration piping.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has evaluated the information provided by the licent ce in support of its Code relief request to use Code Case N-522 as an attemative to pressuru testing of Class 2 components at containment penetrations in the licensee's Relief Request PTP-3-02 for the third 10-year inspection interval of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The staff concludes that implementation of Code Case N-522, subject to requirements that the test be conducted at peak calculated containment pressure and the test procedure include methods for detection and location of through-wall leakage in CIVs and pipe segments between the CIVs, would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety. The use of Code Case N-522 is for Point Beach during the third inspection interval unt,i'euch time as the Code Case is approved by reference in Regulatory Guide 1.147. At that time, if the licensee intends to continue to implement this Code Case, the licensee shrl! follow all provisions in Code Case N-522 with limitations issued in Regulatory Guide 1.147, if any. The staff, therefore, concludes that the
.' licensee's proposed attemative is authorized by law and the proposed alternatives will provide an acceptable level of quality and safety.
' Principal Contributors: P. Patniak L. Gundrum Date:
July 10,1998 l
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