ML20137W567
| ML20137W567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1986 |
| From: | Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Murphy W VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8602200224 | |
| Download: ML20137W567 (2) | |
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FEB 121986 Docket No. 50-271 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation ATTN: Mr. Warren P. Murphy Vice President and Manager RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Gentlemen:
Subject:
FEMA Report on the Vermont Yankee April 17, 1985 Emergency Exercise and the June 6, 1985 Remedial Exercise This letter transmits the Federal Emergency Management Agency report of the Vermont Yankee April 17, 1985 emergency exercise, and the subsequent remedial exercise of June 6,1985 which was conducted to resolve Category A deficiencies identified during the April exercise. ,
FEMA's report identifies three Category A deficiencies observed during the April 17, 1985 exercise involving (1) slow transfer of accident assessment information between New Hampshire DPH and the New Hampshire state E0C, (2) failure to follow communication procedures between the states and the utility, and (3) dissemination of misleading / inaccurate public information. All three of these deficiencies were found to be remedied during the June 6, 1985 remedial exercise.
If you have any questions concerning this matter please contact me at (215) 337-5208.
Sincerely, 0: 2 -1 'al N rv ' ' -
Terry L. Harpster, Chief Erergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Attachments: As Stated cc w/ encl:
Mr. R. W. Capstick, Licensing Engineer Mr. W. F. Conway, President and Chief Executive Officer Mr. J. P. Pelletier, Plant Manager Mr. Donald Hunter, Vice President Mr. Cort Richardson, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
Public Document Room (PDR) local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident inspector
! State of New Hampshire 8602200224 860212 ADOCK O 1
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State of Vermont hDR E. Thomas, FEMA RI 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY l l M6 3 i
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 2 Corporation bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
DRP Section Chief M. McBride, RI, Pilgrim H. Eichenholz, SRI, Yankee V. Rooney, LPM, NRR RI:DRSS Lazaru Harpster 2//r/86 2/ spM6 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
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1 Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 Jul 23 MB MDORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear a Cannission mw/
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs SUBJECr: Exercise Report of the April 17, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant and a Report on the June 6, 1985, Remedial Exercise Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report of the April 17, 1985, Exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Vernon, Vermont. B is was a joint full par-ticipation exercise for the States of Vermont, Massachusetts and New Hanpshire and the localities within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ). The report dated August 19, 1985, was prepared by Region I of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Also included is a report on the June 6, 1985, remedial exercise which was prepared by FEMA Region I and transmitted to this office on August 15, 1985.
There were three Category A deficiencies observed at the April exercise by the Region.
(1) The Region cited the State of New Hangshire for a Category A deficiency because the exchange of information anong the Department of Public Health (DPH) accident assessment liaison staff at the utility's emergency operating facility (EOF), and between representatives of DPH management and civil defense operations management at the State emergency operating center (EOC),
did not result in rapid enough cm munication of accident assessment data frcan the plant and the field for the Governor to make apprtpriate protective action decisions. .
(2) The Region also cited the utility's EOF for a Category A deficiency for failure to follow cmmunication procedures between the States and the utility as given in their respective plans for the General Dnergency
. classification. This failure to follow planned procedures caused serious i
delays in official notification of state and local governments.
, (3) The utility was also cited for a Category A deficiency for disseminat-ing misleading and inaccurate public information, including protective
' action reconnendations that could have conflicted with those reccmnended k' by State authorities. In a real incident, this would have confused the 6- public.
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'. (' l Federal Emergency Management Agency f Region 1 J.W. NicCormack Post Office and Court House
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August 15, 1985 MPORANDUM ECR: Samuel W. Speck Associate Director State and Iocal Programs and Support Directorate F10M: '
Edward A. Romas Division Chief *
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Natural and W logical Hazards ,,
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SUBJECT:
g Report on the Remedial Exercise fo .e Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, June , 1985 Attached is the above referenced report for your information.
We conclude that the remedial exercise success fully demonstrated correction of the " Category A" deficiencies notM in the exercise.
If there are any questions on this matter, please call Rebecca Womson at ETS 223-1197.
Enclosure l
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a s l mile FEMA does not routinely cite the utility for deficiencies, other than to note such a fault to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, these deficiencies in offsite preparedness were significant enough to require pronpt corrective actions on the part of the utility.
Also the licensee was expected to cooperate in the early correction of these deficiencies.
As described in the attached report on the June 6,1985, renedial exercise, the three Category A deficiencies were remedied as follows:
1 (1) The two-hour remedial drill at the New Hampshire EOC successfully tested a new high speed telefax which rapidly transmitted preformatted hard copy data fran the New Hapshire DEH liaison staff at the EOF to the State EX)C. Such transmissions were rapidly distributed to the State EOC !
staff through the imediate reproduction of materials. H e hard copy was supported by rapid delivery of messages by telephone, especially changes
, in the energency classification levels, so that the appropriate decisions could be prongtly made mong the DPH staff and between the DPH management, the Civil Defense decision makers and the Governor's office.
(2) he drill remedied the comunication deficiency at the EOF because the conmunication procedures between the utility and the States were followed for the General Bnergency classification as given in their respective plans. Also, with the support of the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) and the high speed facsimile machines, detailed data was transrritted rapidly and accurately.
(3) Finally the drill renedied the dissenination of misleading and in-accurate information to the public by the utility. Here was a dramatic
. improvement by the utility through the media center in the clarity, accuracy, timeliness and frequency of news releases. In addition the utility appropriately deferred to the States the responsibility of issuing protective action re w .eadations to the public. Further, the NAS and the high speed facsimile machines were a major support in the improvenent noted in the dissemination of information by the utility.
Bere were other inadequacies identified requiring corrective actions; however, they did not detract from the overall demonstrated cabability to 1
protect the health and safety of the public. Se States have received a draft copy of the exercise report and will be preparing schedules of corrective actions. Men they are received and analyzed, we will send you copies.
l If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Oilef, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.
Attachnents As Stated
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.. s REPORT ON THE REMEDIAL EXERCISE FOR THE VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION JUNE 6 2 1985 h ELL 4, O ~'
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION I John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Building l [ Boston, Massachusetts 02109 4
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k TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
SUMMARY
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- 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A. Category A Deficiencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 B. Obj e ct i v e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 C. Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 II. Exercise Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 A. EOF........................ 8
- 8. M ed i a C en t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 C. New H amp s h i re E 0C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 D. Vermont EOC ...................10 E. Massachusetts EOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 III. Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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SUl94ARY J
On June 6,1985 a remedial exercise was held to correct the three
" Category A" deficiencies identified in the draf t report (and listed below) for the April 17 Vennont Yankee Exercise. A two hour drill was held, involving the following locations: the utility's EOF, the Media Center, the New Hampshire State EOC, and the communications rooms of the Vermont and Massachusetts State EOCs. Tested at this remedial exercise were: consistent means of notifying the state decision makers of all changes in emergency classification levels from the E0F, the ability of the utility's Media Center to develop timely and accurate news releases and properly coordinate them in advance with the states, and the ability of tne New Hampshire accident assessment and decision maker staffs to communicate internally, in a timely manner, so as to make appropriate protective action recommendations and decisions based on current plant and field conditions. The remedial drill corrected the " Category A" deficiencies observed at the April 17, 1985 exe rci se.
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k I. INTRODUCTION A. " Category A" Deficiencies of April 17, 1985 Exercise The three " Category A" deficiencies observed at the April 17, 1985 exercise were as follows:
NEW HAMPSHIRE (1)
Description:
Exchange of information among the Department of Public Health accident assessnent staff and between represent-atives of DPH management and civil defense operations manage ment, did not result in rapid enough connunication of accident assessment data from the plant and the field for the Governor to make appropriate protective action decisions. [F EM A-R E P-1, Rev.1, Planning Standard A (Organizational Control), Planning Standard F (Prompt Communications among Principal Response Organizations)]. (CATEGORY A DEFICIENCY)
Recommendation: The Department of Public Health and Civil Defense management teams must be informed immediately of all changes in plant status, meteorological conditions, field non-itoring data, and the implications of the data for protective action recommendations. Therefore, the plan procedures should be reviewed and changed, as necessary, so that the information flow will become more rapid and comprehensive. All staff con-nected with the energency operations should then be trained to recognize the implications of key data, and in the new reporting procedures.
EOF (2)
Description:
Communication procedures between the states and tne utility as given in their respective plans were not followed for the General Emergency classification, which caused serious delays in official notification of state and local governments.
(FD1A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.1). (CATEGORY A DEFICIENCY)
Recommendation: Review, revise, and coordinate plans among all parties to develop a better system for notification of state decision makers of changes in emergency classification levels.
(3)
Description:
The utility disseminated misleading and inacurrate public ir. formation, including protective action reconmendations that could have conflicted with those recommended by State author-ties. In a real incident, this would have confused the public.
l- (FEMA-REP-1,ilev. 1 II, G.14). (CATEGORY A DEFICIENCY)
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Recommendation: The utility should revise its method of develop-ing and issuing news releases to ensure accuracy of content. It should reconsider its policy of making public its protective action recommendations before the states have been notified and have had the opportunity to consider the recommendations and take appropriate action.
B. Objectives for the Remedial Drill The objectives for the drill held on June 6,1985 to show correction of the three " Category A" deficiencies were as follows:
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWIR STATION
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to notify the appropriate state decision makers of changes in emergency classification levels in a timely manner.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to develop and desseminate timely accurate news releases.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to cr rdinate news releases with State Public Information rep _ entatives.
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
- 1. Demonstrate the ability for internal conmunications within the DPH.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability for internal conmunications between DPH and NHCDA in a timely manner.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to integrate plant data with protective action recommendations in a timely manner, I
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C. Scenario for the Renedial Drill Initial Conditions Initial Conditions
- 1. Unusual Event was declared at 8:30 a.m. June 6, 1985, by the shift supervisor. Unusual Event status was declared because of an indication of unidentified primary coolant leakage greater than 5 gpm evidenced by high containment sump flow.
- 2. The operations crew began to reduce power and the reactor
. is at 60" power at this time.
- 3. The High Pressure Coolant Injection System is out of service for maintenance. All check-outs of the back-up ECCS Systems were completed.
4 The operational conditions associated with the start of the exercise are provided on Table I.
- 5. The radiological conditions associated with the start of the exercise are provided on Table II.
- 6. Meteorological forecast:
-A backdoor cold front is expected to arrive in the area before noon. The Vernon area will be experiencing some light showers during tne morning hours. The winds are expected to remain from the southwest for the next 6 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ultimately shifting to south in the evening.
Today's high is expected in the low 60's tonight, and near 70 tomorrow. Precipitation probability is 30 percent through tomorrow.-
- 7. The following weather conditions exist at 10:00 a.m.:
Wind Direction (from) 210 Wind Speed 4 Delta Temperature -2.0, mph Ambient Temperature 65, FF
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- SCENARIO Scenario Clock Time )) nut, O Min 1000 Sta rt. Initial conditions are presented to players. Failure of cirewater Recirculation Gate occurs causing recirculation to the intake to be completely shut off.
2 Min 1002 Turbine trips and MSIV Group I isolation occurs due to low condenser vacuum. Circulation water pumps tripped due to low intake level causing a reactor scram. Drywell pressure is 2 Min 1002 2.15 psig. High drywell floor drain sump alarm is received in control room.
5 Min 1005 Both drywell floor drain sump pumps were running for approximately three minutes indicating that primary coolant leakage is greater than 50gpm.
- ALERT IS DECLARED **
A.P. 3125 Coolant Inventory: Coolsnt leakage within the primary containment greater than 50gpm
- as indicated by continuous sump pumping.
10 Min 1010 ECCS initiates on high drywell pressure. Drywell floor drain pumps trip on Group II isolation.
Standby gas treatment system is automatically initiated upon Group III isolation.
15 Min 1015 Efforts to maintain adequate flow int 0 the RCS from auxiliary sources are started.
20 Min 1020 Control room investigating the cause of RCS leakage and discussing the possibility of de-inerting the containment to make drywell inspection.
25 Min 1025 Continue efforts to investigate the source of the RCS leakage and maintain adequate flow into the RCS. ,
30 Min 1030 "A" Recirculation Suction Line breaks off at the suction valve. Rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel occurs. Reactor water level de-creases significantly. Drywell pressure is at 35 psig. Containment radiation levels have in-creased significantly. ECCS initiates to re-flood the reactor vessel .
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35 Min 1035 ECCS make-up capability is unable to maintain reactor water level above -48 inches.
- SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARE 0**
A.P. 3125 Fuel Damage: Inability to maintain reactor water level above -48 inches with indication of potential significant in-core fuel damage.
45 Min 1045 Core has been re-flooded to two-thirds core height using the ECCS make-up capability. Reactor water level is being maintained above -48 inches. Drywell pressure has leveled of f at 25 psig containment radiation levels have stabilized at 380 R/hr.
50 Min 1050 Control Room Operators have shutdown Core Spray pumps and the "B" Loop LPCI pumps to prevent core flooding.
Operators are controlling vessel water at two-thirds core height with one RHR pump.
Drywell pressure is continuing to decrease.
Containment Radiation levels are starting to decrease.
55 Min 1055 Make-up Demineralizers have been started to ensure a demineralized water supply for core flooding purposes and proposed recovery planning of flooding the Contaimnent up to the break.
60 min 1100 Control Rod Drive System Failure occurs which ejects 27 Control Rods from the north section of the core.
Reactor goes prompt critical causing coremelt in the affected region of core.
Coincident with tr.1 Control Rod Drive Failure, status lights on the Control Room Board indicate the drywell main vent value has backed off the fully closed position.
Containment Radiatign Levels have increased to greater than 1 X 17 R/hr.
Primary Vent Stack Monitors indicate release of radioactivity to environment.
Drywell pressure is decreasing more rapidly than expected.
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t Scenario Clock
- Time Time 60 Min 1100 ** GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED **
A.P. 3125 FUEL DAMAGE: Plant conditions indicating loss of two out of three fission product barriers with the potential loss of third.
65 Min 1105 Control Room personnel inject highly concentrated borated water into core to control any further reactivity excursions and core damage (Stand-by Liquid Control System).
70 Min 1110 Team investigating the problem associated with drywell main vent valve report that 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> will be required to check the valve logic.
80 Min 1120 Containment Radiation levels have decreased to 5,000 R/hr.
100 Min 1140 Orywell main vent valve is sealed off and the valve is de-activated to prevent further use. ,
Releases to the environment from the Primary Vent Stack are decreasing rapidly.
110 Min 1150 Primary Vent Stack Monitors indicate background levels. Release to environment has stopped.
120 Min 1200 Drill Terminated.
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8-I II. EXERCISE EVALUATIONS The remedial drill of June 6,1985 to demonstrate correction of the
" Category A" deficiencies observed during the April 17, 1985 f ull-scal e exercise of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant included activation of the utilities' Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in Vernon, Vermont; the State of New Hampshire Emergency Operations Center (E0C) in Concord, New Hampshire; the State of Vermont E0C in Waterbury, Vermont; and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts EOC in Framingham, Massachusetts. Reports of observations in each location follow.
A. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was fully staffed by 9:55 a.m. when the first briefing on the pre-drill conditions was given to the representatives of the three states (MA, NH, and VT) by the Recovery Manager. Subsequent briefings on changes in plant status were given at regular, frequent intervals.
Reports on prepared data forms were distributed at each briefing.
Upon the conclusion of each one, the state representatives telefaxed the reports over new, high speed facsimile machines that had been provided for each state. They also gave an oral summary to their EOCs over dedicated landline telephones.
In addition, at each change in emergency classification level, the Recovery Manager followed his briefing of the state representative at i' the EOF with an oral briefing to the states over the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) (" orange phone"), a microwave wave telephone system with conference capability.
In this way, communication of changes in plant status were nearly instantaneous, and detailed data were disseminated rapidly and accurately, facilitating accident assessment and protective action recomendations at the State EOCs. The " Category A" deficiency was corrected at the EOF.
B. Media Center There was a dramatic improvement in the conditions and operations of the Media Center during the remedial exercise. Clear, accurate, and timely news releases were issued by the utility on a frequent basis. In each case, the utility spokesperson conferred with the State PI0s to review the content of the news releases for possible changes or additions before they were issued. The utility appropriately deferred to the states the responsibility of issuing protective action recommendations to the public.
A new high speed facsimile machine was used to receive comprehensive plant status reports from the E0F. These reports were copied and distributed to each of the State PI0s affording them thorough briefings on the
- current status of the plant.
Media briefings were equally thorough and accurate. The utility provided a comprehensive array of charts, displays, and status boards which were
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[ used effectively by the utility spokessun and the technical expert on .
- hand to participate in the briefings. The State P10s participated fully in each briefing, presenting the status of emergency conditions in their
- respective states.
i The overall result was that the public would have received clear, accurate, j coordinated, and tirely information from the Media Center if this had been a real incident.
C. New Hampshire EOC The two-hour renedial drill tested the new method of rapid transmisson of hard copy data directly from the New Hampshire DPH liaison staff at the E0F to the State E0C. The high speed telefax machine functioned well.
Sixty-one pages with considerable, detailed data was transmitted in this fashion. There were four distinct formats in which messages were trans-
, mitted to the E0C from the EOF. They were: plant status messages, of f-site and site boundary radiological values and plant and reactor system l! values, and general messages. All but the general message forms were
- i. prefo rmatted . The preformatting of technical information in hard copy form, followed immediately by xeroxing and distribution at the State l EOC, provided rapid transfer of information among all parties. In i addition, the recovery manager at the EOF contacted New Hampshire l (and the other States and the Media Center) over the NAS telephone as
- . soon as there was any change in emergency classification level.
At 10:13 a.m., the New Hampshire DPH was notified from the EOF that an Alert was declared at 10:10 a.m. The Civil Defense Director and Governor's representative were informed within two minutes. Site Area Emergency was declared at 10:35 a.m. with hard copy " faxed" information reaching DPH at the State EOC at 10:43 a.m.
At 10:44 a.m., the Civil Defense Director received confirmation of this over the NAS telephone. At 11:11 a.m., DPH received notification from the EOF that a General Emergency was declared at 11:10. Notification was also received by Civil Defense over the NAS telephone.
During the Alert, Site Area, and General Emergency phases, there was good coordination between the activities at the Media Center and the
- State E0C. The Media Center coordinated in advance with the State EOC regarding their news briefing and press releases, and, similarly, New
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Hampshire coordinated in advance with the Media Center (and all other locations) their press releases, EBS messages, and protective action deci sions.
{ During this exercise, the DPH accident assessment staff decided to accept l the dose projection and protective action recommendation provided by the
'- utility without performing their own separate calculations. The accident assessment staff kept the accident manager fully informed of the most current situations and their implications, and frequent technical briefings were held by the accident assessment staff with the operations and decision making personnel to keep them informed.
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. i in accepting the utility's recommended protective action (evacuation of ,
Hinsdale, sheltering in Winchester), DPH accident assessment team properly considered such factors as duration of the release as reported and the implications of the weather (incoming cold front).
Throughout the exercise, New Hampshire EOC operations staff simulated performing the many notifications and actions called for in their checklists at the various classification levels.
The June 6,1985 remedial exercise provided an adequate demonstration of New Hampshire's ability to communicate accident assessment data in a timely fashion, both with the D?i accident assessment staff and between DPH management and the decision making staff in Civil Defense and the Governor's Of fice. This provided an adequate basis upon which to make protective action recommendations and decisions. FEMA strongly recommends that the utility and states retain the system of hard copy message transfer, and modify their planning accordingly.
D. Vermont E0C The " Category A" deficiencies noted during the Vermont Nuclear Power Plant Exercise did not involve Vermont. However, the Vermont State EOC was manned by the Deputy State Emergency Management Director and other necessary staff during the remedial exercise.
( First, emergency action levels were transmitted to the State EOC over the NAS telephone by the recovery manager at the EOF. Then, in each instance, the individual representing Vermont at the E0F, called the State Director at the EOC to confirm and provide additional information.
Finally, a high speed f acsimile machine was used to send hard copies of an extensive amount of plant, radiological, meteorological, and plume plotting data to the E0C from the recovery manager at the EOF.
These three methods of transmitting information provided adequate data flow to the E0C for staff analysis and decision making.
E. Massachusetts EOC The " Category A" deficiencies noted during the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Exercise of April 17, 1985 did not involve Massachusetts, however, the MCDA participated in the remedial drill in order to assist the States of Vermont and New Hampshire in demonstrating their ability to notify Massachusetts of changes in plant status in a timely and accurate manner, and to demonstrate their ability to develop and dis-seminate messages / news releases rapidly and accurately.
Messages from the Vermont EOF and Vermont CD via the facsimile machine were clear and entirely legible. Sixteen messages were received in all. The time difference between telephone message over the NAS tele-t
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s phone and receipt of the FAX pessage was minimal, depending on the number of pages to be dispatched. Telephone messages received from and sent to the other states and the EOF via the NAS telephone were clear and timely, therefore, the objectives of the drill were met.
III CONCLUSIONS The three " Category A" deficiencies observed in the exercise of the radio-logical emergency response plan for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in Vernon, Vermont on April 17, 1985 have been addressed and corrected.
Communications and information dissemination procedures have been much
< improved. In conclusion, there is reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site in the event of a radiological emergency to adequately protect the public health and safety.
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FINAL EXERCISE ASSESSMENT JOINT STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE FOR THE VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT VERNON, VERMONT
', APRIL 17,1985
- FEDE R AL E M E RG ENC Y M A N AG E M ENT AG EN C Y REGION I John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Boston, Massachusetts 02109
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSEE: Yankee Atomic Electric Company LOCATION: Vernon, Vermont DATE OF REPORT: August 19,1985 DATE OF EXERCISE: April 17,1985 .
PARTICIPANTS:
- State of Vermont State of New Hampshire State of Massachusetts Brattleboro, Vt. Chesterfield, N.H. Bernardston, Mass.
Dummerston, Vt. Hinsdale, N.H. Gill, Mass.
Guilford, Vt. Richmond, N.H. Greenfleid Mass.
Vernon, Vt. Swanzey, N.H. Leyden, Mass.
Bellows Falls, Vt.* Winchester, N.H. Northfield, Mass.
Keene, N.H.* Warwick, Mass.
NONPARTICIPANTS:
Colrain, Mass.; Halifax, Vt. (exempt because of recent participation in exercise for Yankee Rowe Atomic Power Plant) 1
- Relocation Center Community.
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. CONTENTS
SUMMARY
............................................................... ix 1 INT R O D U CTIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Exercise Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Federal Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3 Exercise Objec tives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3.1 Vermont Objec tives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3.2 New Hampshire Objec tives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3.3 Massachusetts Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4 Exerc ise Sc enario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
. 1.5 Evaluation Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2 EXE R CISE EV ALU ATIO NS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1 Vermont State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1.1 Vermont State E OC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1.2 Vermont State Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
- 2.1.3 Incident Field Offlee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.1.4 Vermont Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.5 Bellows Falls Relocation Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.1.6 Vermont Local EOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.1.6.1 Brattleboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.1.6.2 . Du m m ers ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.1.6.3 G uilford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
- 2.1.6.4 Vernon........................................... 41 2.2 New Hampshire State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.2.1 New Hampshire State EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.2.2 New Hampshire State Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 e 2.2.3 K ee ne IF O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 2.2.4 New Hampshire Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 2.2.5 Keene State College Relocation Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2.2.6 New Ham pshire Local EOCr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 2.2.6.1 C hes t e rfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 1
2.2.4.2 H insdale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 2.2.6.3 R i c hm ond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 2.2.6.4 S w anz e y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
, 2.2.6.5 W inchest er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 2.3 Massachusetts State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2.3.1 Massachusetts State EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 h 2.3.2 Are a IV EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
, 2.3.3 Massachusetts Local EOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
'- 2.3.3.1 Bernardston ...................................... 74 2.3.3.2 Gill............................................. 76 i
2.3.3.3 G ree nfi e ld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 2.3.3.4 Le yd e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 2.3.3.5 No rt hi l e id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 2.3.3.6 W arw i c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 2.4 Utility and State Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 2.4.1 Emergency Operating Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 i 2.4.2 Media Center, Dale m's Chalet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 i
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CONTENTS (Cont'd) -
3
SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
, FIGURES '
e 1 Plume EPZ of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 TABLES 1 Sequence of Selected Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant -
April 17, 19 8 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 3 Deficiency Tracking Table - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station . . . . . . . . . . 124 4 Status of Objectives - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 0 .
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ABBREVIATIONS ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Services CAP Civil Air Patrol CDNAVS Civil Defense National Voice System ,
DOC U.S. Department of Commerce l
. DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone .
, FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency ,
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services IFO Incident Field Office IRAP Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan KI Potassium lodide MCDA Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency MDPH Massachusetts Department of Public Health NAWAS National Warning System NHCDA New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .
PAG Protective Action Guide RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RADEF Radiological Defense RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan TLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture I
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1
SUMMARY
l On Wednesday, April 17, 1985 the Federal Emergency Management Agency j
-(FEMA) observed an exercise of the plans and preparedness for off-site radiological emergency response for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant located !n Vernon,
. Vermont. Following the exercise, a preliminary evaluation was made by a 39-member federal observer team, and briefings for exercise participants and the general public were held on Thursday, April 18, 1985 at the Vernon Elementary School. This document provides overviews, deficiencies, areas for improvement and recommendations for each ,
of the jurisdictions and field activities tested in the exercise. .
Each deficiency and a corresponding recommendation for corrective action is described by jurisdiction in Section 2 of this report. Areas for improvement, which are not considered defielencies, also are described in Section 2. Section 3 provides a -
summary listing of the April 17, 1985 (1) defleiencies that would lead to a negative finding, and (2) other deficiencies, including those meriting priority attention. The summary is in a tabular format and includes space for the states and local jurisdictions to respond to the deficiencies.
- Section 3 of this report also includes a Deficiency Tracking Table and a tabulated Status of Objectives. The Deficiency Tracking Table is a compilation of deficiencies identified at the April 17,1985, September 21,1983, and February 18,1982 exercises and lists the current status of each deficiency. The Status of Objectives table lists the status
! of the FEMA 35 Core Objectives for each State and local jurisdiction by exercise year.
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- Vermont 4.
The facilities at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Waterbury generally were good. Sufficient space was available for each of the organizations
_ present; however, the staff tended to congregate in the operations room which became crowded and blocked the view of the wall maps and displays. Activation and staffing was
- performed adequately. The new radio paging system was used to notify EOC staff members for the first time. This system worked well with only minor problems. The EOC staff performed its assignments competently and displayed adequate training and knowledge. Management of the emergency operations generally was good.. The Governor was present at the EOC for tne entire exercise and was observed to be the primary ~
decision maker. The Incident Director, delegated the responsibility of managing the EOC operations by the Governor, performed this function in a competent manner. However, some delays were observed during protective action decision making as the Governor, the ;
Incident Director, and staff members conferred for extended periods prior to reaching a decision and in formulating the wording of protective action messages. Communications with the local EOCs using the radio telephone were improved over previous exercises.
However, except for the Alert notification, communications regarding changes in the emergency condition did not come from the utility via the dedicated Nuclear Alert System (WESCOM SS-4A) as anticipated. Message handling within the EOC was good.
Tri-State coordination with New Hampshire and Massachusetts also was good. The l-i ix l'
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ability to alert the public in a timely manner was demonstrated by actual and simulated EBS messages. However, EBS messages should have contained more detailed instructions to the public. Prior to issuing EBS messages, adequate coordination with the local EOCs was observed.
The Vermont State Radiological Laboratory in Montpeller is a small facility, adequate for routine environmental monitoring. However, the laboratory is not adequately equipped and the staff is not adequately prepared for the kind and number of samples which would result from a significant incident at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. Additional facilities and training are required.
The Brattleboro EO was activated and staffed for the exercise. However, not all agencies participated. The staff present were not fully familiar with emergency
- management concepts, and no effective centralized management or control of operations at the EO were observed. The facilities at the EO generally were good. However, as noted in previous exercises, the Brattleboro IFO is not habitable and is wi'.hin the 10 mile EPZ and potentially would be required to evacuate to the al*ernate EO in an actual emergency. Communications at the EO were good, an improvement over previous i exercises. Field monitoring teams were dispatched from the IFO and field readings were reported regularly. Implementation of procedures for traffic control and transportation were adequately demonstrated by IFO staff. However, both EO staff and emergency workers dispatched from the EO require additional training in radiological exposure control techniques. EO staff were uncertain about evacuation bus route assignments and authorization for the dispatch of buses; additional training should take care of this problem.
The Vermont field monitoring teams had adequate equipment for exposure rate monitoring; however, some deficiencies were observed. Some key components could only be run on internal battery power; only one of the two teams had instrumentation for
! detecting radiolodine, an air pump adapter was missing; the instrument for counting radiolodine samples was inoperative due to failure of the electronic readout; and some of the instruments did not show a calibration date. Adequate equipment for taking milk and water samples was present. The need for additional training for the monitoring teams was apparent since there were some weak areas observed in the technical operations.
Radio communications with the EOC were good; however, the plan indicates that, normally, communleations are to be through the IFO. Because it worked 'vell, consideration should be given to modifying the plan to indicate the desirability of direct communications with the state EOC. The field teams had adequate self reading
- dosimeters, KI, and knowledge of their use. However, only one team had a permanent record dosimeter. As noted in previous exercises, the low dose limits n'lowable for Vermont field teams renders them incapable of providing adequate Information on plume boundary and field verification of dose projections.
The Bellows Falls relocation center was quickly and efficiently activated and staffed. The facilities are good, with separate areas for reception, monitoring /
decontamination, and mass care. There was some initial misunderstanding among the staff as to where the monitoring / decontamination was to take place. The mass care center can accommodate up to 800 persons. The staff generally was well trained and i
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i performed their duties in a professional manner. Some improvement can be made in use of registration forms and identification tags at the faellity.
Four local EOCs participated in the exercise: Brattleboro, Dummerston, Guilford, and Vernon. The facilities at these EOCs generally were adequate; however, backup power and facilities for extended operations (kitchen, bunks, showers) were lacking in the Dummerston EOC. Improved air circulation also is required in the Brattleboro EOC. Activation and staffing was adequately demonstrated at all EOCs except for Vernon where the staff were prepositioned. Emergency staffs generally performed well. Management of EOC operations was good overall. The Brattleboro staff, however, need training in assessing accident information provided to them. At the Vernon EOC the staff did not have a clear understanding of what decisions were to be made by the state and which were to be made locally. In addition, the Director and the Vernon EOC should delegate the routine tasks to other staff members. The communi- ' '
cations systems at the EOCs generally were adequate. However, similar to the previous exercise, occasional problems with the primary radio-telephone system were observed at -
all of the EOCs except Vernon. Public alerting was demonstrated at the EOCs by l l activdies such as simulated dispatching of alerting vehicles and simulated EBS message with siren sounding. All EOCs need additional training in radiological exposure control procedures. The existing procedures demonstrated either were weak or inconsistent.
Permanent record dosimeters were not available at any of the EOCs.
New Nampshhg The layout and space in the new State EOC is much improved over that of their previous facility. Appropriate maps were either posted or available in other formats.
The emergency classification level was posted, although the status board was not kept current because of Internal communications problems. Alerting and mobill:ation of staff i
went well. Operations management was adeqrately demonstrated overall. The Civil Defense Director was in charge and held frequent briefings; however, because of internal communication problems, the Information was not always current. Staff were involved in i decision making to the extent thait the fast moving scenario' allowed. The governor's
! representative displayed a good knowledge of New Hampshire's radiological emergency J response planning.
Message hanMrw was improved over the last exercise. Hard copy forms were used, and the Operations officer had full time assistance in handling message distribution within the EOC. The Civil Defense Radio Network functioned better this time than in ~
the previous exercise. However, reception between the State EOC and IFO was still poor, and the field monitoring teams operating in the Hinsdale area still experienced some blind spots. The Nuclear Alert System (NAS) dedicated telephones which connected the EOF, and the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont State EOCs provided a 1 very effective means for interstate coordination.
- There were problems in the protective action recommendation and decision I making processes which resulted in the Governor being supplied with insufficient information to cake a fully informed protective action decision. Internal communications within the DPH accident assessment staff, and coordination between i
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. however, that the poor control of information at the EOF by the utility, particularly in the area of weather forecasting, exacerbated this problem. .
At the Keene IFO, activation and staffing proceeded well. Communications were improved over last year with the local communities however, the Civil Defense radio system still needs some improvements for communication with the State EOC and field j teams in valley areas. Field monitoring teams were deployed from the IFO. They are better equipped then previously noted. However, considering the problems they i 1
exper!enced in valley areas with the Civil Defense radios, they need a more convenient
- and readily available back-up communications ystem than commerelal telephone. The field teams would benefit, both in terms of timelines and effectiveness, from being deployed directly from the EOF. Similarly, most of the Civil Defense functions assigned
- - to the IFO are duplicative of those being performed at the State EOC. Other than maintaining a back-up communications capability in Keene, there does not seem to be any reason for retaining the IFO structure in New Hampshire.
There were no major difficulties noted at the five local New Hampshire EOCs.
- u W tts By prior agreement the scenario and stated objectives limited involvement of the State and Area IV EOCs. Participation nevertheless was good, and staffing was complete. Activation and staffing ce.i.d promptly. Operations were managed well and the ability to coordinate activities with Vermont and New Hampshire were demonstrated. Communications continue to improve; problems that did occur were isolated and minor and attributable to limited experience with new equipment.
, Six local EOCs, staffed entirely by volunteers, participated. Activation, staffing, management and communleations capabilities were demonstrated at most
! locations. Permanent record dosimeters still were not available and displays could have i been better and more effectively used. Many local communities are sparsely populated, some having as few as 500 people, and are severely limited in personnel resources.
Massachusetts plans call for the State to provide technical assistance to the local EOCs as needed. Although some of the local EOCs were short staffed and could have, in some instances, provided a better response during the exercise, this was not done. In one
- lastance State arsistance was provided, but not as a part of the planned responses the person provided by the State was supposed to have acted as a controller.
Utility and State Coordination The EOF was adequately staffed by health department representativn of all ,
three states., Radiological Health information flow from the Recovery Managn to the states was basically timelyt however, internal flow of utility generated information to the Recovery Manager was not consistent.
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I The communication of changes in emergency classification levels by the utility to the states was not done in accordance with the plans. This caused important information (for example, the declaration of a General Emergency) to be delayed in reaching state decision makers.
The Media center in Dalem's Chalet experienced serious coordination problems throughout this exercise. Utility generated releases were not fully coordinated in advance with state PIO representatives at the Media Center. Furthermore, some of the l
releases contained erroneous information, which, if it had been a real situation, would
! have caused confusion among the public.
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g 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACEGROUND
- On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Planning include
e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
i e Determining whether the plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises conducted by emergency response jurisdictions.
e Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved federal agencies such as: I Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
- Representatives of most of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Emergency plans for the Vermont Yank'ee Nuclear Power Plant in Vernon, Vermont, were formally submitted to the RAC by the States of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire and involved local jurisdictions. The submission of the plans was followed closely by the exercising (in 1982), critiquing, and evaluation of the plans. A public meeting was held to acquaint the public with contents of the plans, answer questions about them, and receive suggestions on the plans.
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The second and third radiological emergency exercises were conducted on September 21, 1983, and April 17, 1985 to reassess the adequacy of the State and local emergency preparedness organizations and their capability to protect the public in a ,
radiological emergency involving the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Figure 1 shows the communities within and surrounding the Vermont Yankee 10-mile plume ,
emergency planning zone (EPZ).
- An observer team consisting of FEMA personnel, RAC members, and support personnel from federal and State agencies evaluated the April 17, 1985 exercise. A total of 39 observers were assigned to evaluate State, local, and field activities. Observers
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3 were trained in radiological emergency planning concepts and given evaluation kits containing information on the exercise objectives, exercise scenario, previously identified defleiencies, and other pertinent data. Team leaders coordinated the evalua-tion of team operations and consolidated the findings.
After the exercise, the federal observers met to review their observations. The intent of this meeting was to present site-specific observations and develop the preliminpry findings that are detailed in this final exercise report. A public critique of the exercise for the exercise participants and general public was held at 2:00 p.m. on April 18,1985, at the Vernon Elementary School.
The findings presented in this report were reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region I. FEMA suggests that state and local jurisdictions take remedial actions in response to each of the deficiencies indicated in this report and that the states submit
, a schedule for addressing the identified deficiencies. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washlagton, D.C., that any deficiencies observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.
l 1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Thirty-nine federal observers were located at off-site emergency response functions. These individuals, their agencies, and their exercise location (s) are given below.
Observer Agency Location Edward A. Thomas, FEMA General Observation RAC Chairman Lawrence Robertson, JEMA Vermont State EOC b Team Leader Robert Rospenda FEMAc Vermont State EOC Joseph H. Keller INELk Vermont State EOC Bruce J. Swiren, FEMA New Hampshire State EOC Team Leader Frederick Oleson FEMA New Hampshire State EOC ,
Thomas Baldwin FEMA C New Hampshire State EOGN -
Floyd Davis FEMA C Massachusetts State EOC Team Leader Ellen Rooney FEMA Massachusetts State EOC .
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Kenneth L. Horak FEMA Dalem's Chalet Media Center EPA h Emergency Operations Facility Byron Keene Sue Ann Curt'.s FEMAC Incident Field Offlee, Anthony Foltman FEMA C Brattleboro, Vermont Rudolph Zantopp BNLd Vermont Field Monitoring Rochelle Honkus INELk Vermont Field Monitoring William Gasper FEMp' Incident Field Office,
. Neil Gaeta FDA Keene, New Hampshire Craig Gordon NRCI New Hampshire Field Monitoring FDA f New Hampshire Field Monitoring
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Richard Liberace Donald Connors ARC I 'Keene State College, New Hampshire, Relocation .
Center
- Jeffrey Dexter ARC I Relocation Center, Bellows Falls, Vermont
. George Hatch FEMA Area IV EOC, Belchertown, Massachusetts Lt. James Smith USCG' ' Access Control Rebecca S. Thomson, FEMA EOC, Brattleboro, Vermont Team Leader William Vinikour FEMA' EOC, Brattleboro, Vermont Elizabeth Dionne - FEMA EOC, Dummerston, Vermont James Nagle FEMA' EOC, Guilford, Vermont Robert Sonnichson FEMA EOC, Vernon, Vermont
. Carolyn Herzenberg FEMAC EOC, Chesterfleid, New Hampshire
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Jack Dolan, FEMA EOC, Hinsdale, New Hampshire Team Leader Anna Hart USDA I EOC, Richmond, New Hampshire Frank Kay FEMA C EOC, Swanzey, New Hampshire Richard Quinn FEMA EOC, Winchester, New Hampshire Kevin Merli, FEMA EOC, Northfield, Massachusetts Team Leader
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I William Knoerzer FEMA' EOC, Bernardston, Massachusetts Kenneth Lerner FEMA' EOC, Gill, Massachusetts 3 Kim Suchy FEMA' EOC, Greenfield, Massachusetts Ann Volpe FEMA EOC, Leyden, Massachusetts Michael Goetz FEMA EOC, Warwick, Massachusetts ARAC = Regional Assistance Committee bEOC = Emergency Operations Center
" Contract Employee from Argonne National Laborato..j, U.S. Department of Energy .
d BNL = Brookhaven National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy
'USCG = U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Transportation I = U.S. Food and Drug Administration
,, FDA .
INRC = Nuclear Regulatory Commission h EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1 -
[American DOA = U.S.,Rad DepartmentCrossof Representative Agriculture INEL = Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 3
. USDA = U.S. Department of Agriculture 1.3 WTunCISE OBJECTIVES The exercisa objectives of the states and local communities were to demonstrate that their emergency response plans, operations, and capability for mobilizing and coordinating needed resources are adequate to cope with an emergency at the Vermont i Yankee Nuclear Power Plant.
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i 1.3.1 Vermont Objectives Specific objectives of the State of Vermont were to:
- 1. Demonstrate the efficiency of emergency faellity and staff operations.
- 2. Demonstrate the effectiveness of field communications. ,
- 3. Demonstrate the field team mobilization and sampling techniques.
- 4. Demonstrate radiation exposure projection techniques.
l-l' 5. , Demonstrate initial public alerting and not'.fication.
- 6. Demonstrate the ability to disseminate protective action messages to the public.
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- 7. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and allocate resources for an orderly evacuation. ,
- 8. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 9. Demonstrate the coordination of and appropriateness of informa-tion released to the media. ,
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- 10. Demonstrate the adequacy of relocation center facilities and l procedures.
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- 11. Demonstrate the ability to determine the need for and to request federal assistance.
- 12. Demonstrate interstate coordination.
't i 1.3.2 New Hampshire Objectives
. Speelfic objectives of the State of New Hampshire were as follows:
- 1. Notification Methods and Procedures
- To test the procedures i established to notify and mobilize the State and local emergency
- response organizations in New Hampshire. Specifleally to test the ability of State and local emergency response organizations to mobilize, staff, and operate the State EOC, local EOCs, the IFO, EOF, media center, reception center and support facilities, and to
. maintain appropriate staffing for those facilities for 24-hour operations.
l 2. Emergency Communication: To test the communications systems l linking Vermont Yankee, New Hampshire, Vermont, and l Massachusetts emergency response agencies as well as communi-cations between State and local organizations within the New Hampshire plume exposure EPZ and test the ability of field monitoring teams to communicate with the 170, State EOC, and
.' EOF as appropriate.
- 3. Direction and Control: To exercise the ability of key personnel '
.~ within the principal State and local emergency response organiza-
'i tions to implement and coordinate the functions for which they l
are responsible. Specifically to coordinate emergency activities, -
and to organize resources necessary to implement an evacuation of all or part of the plume exposure EPZ. Organize and coordi-nate resources necessary to support an evacuation in the event of adverse weather or traffic obstructions and coordinate and imple-ment evacuation of the elderly, school children, and the mobility ,
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j 7 impaired. To organize the resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
- 4. Public Information: To test the ability of New Hampshire to disseminate information to the public and to the news media, in conjunction with Vermont, Massachusetts, and the utility. Speci-fleally to test the ability to provide coordination of information l prior to release to the media, to brief the media in a clear, accu-rate and timely manner, and to provide rumor control.
l
- 5. Accident Assessment: To test the State's ability to assess avall-able radiological data supplied by the utility, to estimate the consequences of the scenario and to recommend protective actions necessary to maintain public health and safety. Test the ability to deploy field monitoring teams. Test monitoring team procedures and ability to effectively use field monitoring equip-ment for determining ambient radiation levels to include proce-dures for the measurement of radiolodine. To project exposure to the public via plume travel projections and field data and to determine appropriate protective actions based on PAGs.
- 6. Protective Response: To test the ability to initiate and imple-ment protective response actions for the plume exposure EPZ based upon accident assessment. Demonstrate the ability to esti-mate population exposure. To test the ability to determine when the use of KI is necessary. To evaluate the ability of the State to distribute KI as necessary. To test the ability of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, etc.
- 7. Emergency Facilities: To evaluate State and local Emergency Operations Centers. Specifically to identify the adequacy of
! facilities and displays to support Emergency Operations. It should be noted that New Hampshire Civil Defense has moved to a new l building and that this exercise will be the first exercise held in I
this faellity.
- 8. Emergency Response Support: To evaluate the ability of the State to mobilize logistical support services including reception l -
facilities, medical facilities, and transportation services. To test the ability of State and Local Decontamination of Emergency Workers, etc. To evaluate the State's ability to request Federal
! assistance.
I
- 9. Emergency Public Notification / Emergency Public Information:
To assess the ability to notify the public within plume exposure
- EPZ, and disseminate initial Instructions. To formulate and coor-dinate with Massachusetts and Vermont emergency public infor-mation, and to disseminate it to the public throughout the emer- .
gency situation.
4
S .
- 10. Recovery and Re-Entry: To determine and implement measures for a controlled recovery from a radiological emergency within -
I the State.
1.3J Ma===ah==tts Objectives A. CivD Defense Agency Objectives
- 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
- 2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
~
- 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emer-gency activities.
1 4. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate loca-tions, organizations, and field personnel.
5., Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 i minutes.
. 6. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
- 7. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a
- coordinated fashion.
- 8. Demonstrate interstate coordination , between Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.
i
! 9. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
l
- 10. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated srw.
- 11. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to .
effect an orderly evacuation of mobility impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.
B. Radiation Control Agency Obioetives
- 1. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and coordinate emergency activities.
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. 9 1
- 2. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. -
J 3. Demonstrate ability to communicate with . all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
\
4 4. Demonstrate ability to project doses to the public via plume
. exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine d' appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs, available 1
i shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate
- factors.
s
- 5. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control l emergency worker exposure. .
I 6. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
1
- 7. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure. ,
- 8. Demonstrate interstate coordination between Vermont and
1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO
( Because of elevated coolant activity conditions at the plant, a controlled shutdown for refueling was planned to commence at 4:00 p.m. on April 17,1985. The meteorological conditions were unsettled and a backdoor cold front arrived in the area before noon. The Vernon area experienced thunderstorm activity with periods of moderate to heavy rainfall during the morning hours. Increasing coolant activity levels j at the plant caused theJhift Supervisor to request that more frequent samp!!ng be 4
conducted. As a result, ehemistry personnel drew a coolant sample and determined the results. ,
i The exercise events at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant began at about 5:30 a.m. when the Shift Supervkor was notified that the results of the 96 hour0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> coolant
- sample indicated Iodine concentrations of 1.1 uCI/g Dose equivalent 1-131. Since this l level is at the Technical Specification limiting conditions for roeration, the Shift '
l~ . Supervisor reviewed this condition against the Emergency Action Levels and declared an Unusual Event. Between 5:30 and 5:45 a.m. both the State Pollee and the NRC were
- notifled of the plant status and the proposed corrective measures in accordance with . ,
l established procedures.
l At approximately 6:15 a.m. the plant operators commenced shutdown at a rate of i % power level per minute. Between 8:15 and 6:45 a.m. the State Health Department representatives responded to the initial notification and questioned plant status. At this i
time all data Indicated a normal shutdown condition under elevated coolant activity l
l l
10 i
i levels. Between 7:15 and 8:00 a.m., as the 50% power level was reached, the plant operators initiated control rod insertion. At 8:00 a.m. lightening struck the stack. A power surge created by the lightening strike caused some panel alarms to become Inoperable and some to be alarming spuriously. Several monitoring systems were lost because of the lightening strike.
, At 8:10 a.m. both the EOF and TSC Coordinators were contacted and consulted I concerning escalation of the emergency class from Unusual Event to an Alert. At 8:15 a.m. an Alert was declared based on the following EAL: " Severe lightening which disables
]
a safety system or safety system function." At this time the operational and radiological J
data reflected a degraded system response condition caused by the lightening strike and elevated coolant conditions. The State Po!!ce of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire were notified between 8:15 and 8:45 a.m. In addition, the NRC was notified ,
via the ENS communication link. The Engineering Support Center was activated.
Between 8:15 and 8:45 a.m. the Technical Support Center determined that an Auxiliary Operator was missing. A Search and Rescue team discovered that the Auxiliary Operator had fallen off a ladder and was injured. Off-site medical attention was required for this
! Individual. Between 8:45 and 9:00 a.m. all emergency centers were to be fully activated i and State response personnel reported to the EOF.
At 9:10 a.m. lightening struck the plant a second time causing a Group I isolation
} and the plant was to scram. Between 9:10 and 9:30 a.m. the plant Emergency Director declared a Site Area Emergency upon recognition of the following. condition: " Loss of all i CR panel alarms during a plan,t transient". The States were notified of the escalation to a Site Area Emergency. Unknown to the plant.at the time, there was a massive fuel assembly failure caused by pellet-clad stress and the mechanical shock of the setam.
The reactor coolant activity levels increased from a total noble gas concentration of 1.2
! uCi/g to 13.5u Cl/g and a totallodine concentration of 1.5 uCl/g to 22.0 uCl/g.
Operational and radiological details associated with this time frame reflected additional instrumentation lost coincident with a rising in-plant radiological condition.
l Between 9:30 and 10:15 a.m. a release was in progress and the EOF was requested to evaluate the off-site dose conditions. Based on ~ estimates of the off-site dose projections, the plant and EOF staff determined that a General Emergency should be declared. The states were then notified of the escalation to the General Emergency condition. The EOF Coordinator directed the taking of a site boundary survey in the '
downwind direction. Between 9:30 and 10:15 a.m., protective action recommendations were formulated. The survey team reported radiation levels. At this time, state response personnel arrived at the EOF and began interacting with the Vermont Yankee Emergency Response Organization. The EOF expedited additional off-site monitoring in downwind directions. Between 10:15 and 10:45 a.m. the off-site monitoring teams reported the measured radiation levels. Thyroid dose projections using field data are performed. At this time, the off-site protective action recommendations were reviewed based on the recognized lodine levels and exposure duration. The release terminated at 10:30 a.m. Plume tracking continued at downwind locations. The staff at the Media Center considered the possibility of relocation based on dose projections.
Between 10:15 and 10:45 a.m. the plume front continued moving up-river and precipitation continued. At the plant, at 10:45 n.m. the radiation monitoring system.
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11 t
previously lost as a result of the lightening strike, was restored and returned to service.
Between 10:45 and 11:15 a.m. the rain decreased. Between 11:45 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.,
plant data indicated elevated plant radiation levels caused by the plume passing over the plant site.
Discussions concerning de-escalation began between 12:15 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.
because of improving plant conditions. At 1:00 p.m. the plume entered Massachusetts.
However, the maximum dose rate decreased to less than 60 mR/hr. De-escalation to Alert because of the reduction in observed dose rates occurred at 1:00 p.m.
At 1:00 p.m. State and plant teams determined that Iodine deposition levels in Vermont were relatively high. Recovery planning was discussed, including the environmental sampling of milk, vegetables, and water.
The exercise terminated between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. .
l 1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA 1
The exercise evaluations presented in Section 2 are tused on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria sat forth in Section " d . tJREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980). Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, defleiencies and areas for improvement are presented with accompanying recommenda- l tions. Deficiencies can be presented in two categories. The first (" Category A") lists only those deficiencies that caused a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was .
not adequate to provide. assurance that appropriate measures can and.will be taken to i protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in a
- radiological emergency. These are deficiencies that lead to a negative finding. A l negative finding must be based on at least one deficiency of this type. Three
! deficiencies in this category were observed. -
l l
The second category (" Category B") includes deficiencies where demonstrated performance during the exercise was considered faulty, and corrective actions are considered necessary. Those deficiencies identified by an asterisk (*) in this category merit priority attention. t Areas for improvement also are listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or activity. These items are not deficiencies; rather, they are suggestions for improved performance.
l 1
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s TABLE 1 NEW HAMPIRflRE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - OFF-StrE Page 3 of 4 i
i e
ROC SITE 888 STATE Donal- TEmil-UtIU5WAL SOC OPER- ASEA CEN. FUSLIC NESCS. Of 300. CEADE NATICII svtwT Al2af ACTIT'O ATN'L IBGEBC. BetaC Al2ET SENT SNLTE EVAC. DECIARED TO AIART OF EE.
SOIEDULED SCENAato flHE 6:15 em 8:15 em 8:15 em 8:45 as 9:10 em 10:00 se - - - - -
4:00 pm 2:30 pm UTILITT tot -
8:23 8:23 9:15 9:14 10:00 m/A N/A 10:05 18:47 N/0 2:47 2:47 s-tal 80t 6:11 8:34 8:42 9:07 9:25 10:17 10:00 10:05 m/A 10:45 10:45 2:32 2:50 laCAL SOCe Chesterfteld 6:20 8:43 9:34 9:50 9:34 10:28 9:55 - -
10:48 - - -
utmodele 6:15 8:37 6:15 7:30 9:34 10:28 10:08 - -
10:45 - -
2:42 alchemed 6:21 8:40 9:00 9:50 9:32 10:30 10:15 9:55 - --
10:30 -
2:47 sweesey 6:15 8:45 8:45 10:12 9:27 10:36 10:55 - - - - -
2:44 Winchester 6:15 8:40 7:30 9:45 9:31 10:26 10:20 - - - - -
2:45 1
s 4
l l
l
., .. r. >i. . .e.,, TABLE 14 o .. v r v; i MAIBACHUSETFS j' SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - 0FF-StrE I Page 4 of 4 l
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, a0C Sifs Eas STATS souu- TaleIn-numsessas 30C OPER- Atta N91.lC CEN. IIESCS. OF 300. CSADs NAftosi svaart AIAst ACTIV'D ATN'L 30880. BIERG ALERT SEIrr SIILTR EV4C. SECIARES TO AIJaf of EE.
I i
SCE84RIO Tises 6:15 em 8:45 em 8:15 es 8:45 em 9:10 en 10:00 en - - - - - lio:: ,,a 2:30 pm i
IrtILITY Bot - 8:23 8:23 9:15 9:14 10:00 m/A N/A 10:05 11:47 N/0 2:47 2:47 12:41 IIA BOC 6:17 8:41 0:45 8:50 9:29 10:20 10:00 10:05 " 12:47 -
10:45 2:30 2:50 C lAcat. 30ce
^
Bernardetee -
8:30 8:50 9:00 9:30 !0:38 9:53 -
12:45 -
10:55 2:45 2:50 Call -
8:48 7:4S 10:00 9:33 10:43 9:54 -
12:57 -
Itall 2:45 3:00 i Greenfield 6:15 8:38 8:38 9:00 9:23 10:32 - -- -
18:11 2:47 2:50 i
l Leydee -
4:50 7:30 9:45 9:3S 10:43 - - - -
11:03 2:45 2:57 i
uorthfield -
8:40 . 8:50 9:00 9:33 10:47 12:45 -
12:45 -
11:06 2:45 2:53 Warwick -
8:42 8:45 -
9:37 10:47 9:53 - - -
Italt 2:45 2:55 O
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16 V rmont Secto EOC 2 EXERCISE EVALUATIONS 2.1 VERMONT STATE OPERATIONS The State of Vermont activated and tested the State EOC in Waterbury, Vermont; the Brattleboro incident Field Office (IFO); two radiological field monitoring teams; the Bellows Falls Relocation Center; and four local EOCs. The Media Center located at Dalem's Chalet *In Brattleboro, Vermont, was also activated, and the overview is included in Section 2.4.2.
j
~
The Vermont State EOC is located in Waterbury on the grounds of the Vermont State Hospital. The facilities were generally good and are considered adequate.
Separate rooms are available for all the key organizations present, providing adequate working space for staff members. However, during the exercise, due to the relatively fast-moving events during the morning, the staff tended to congregate in the Operations Room, which became crowded and somewhat noisy.
Since the EOC is located at the State Hospital, there would be adequate eating S
and sleeping facilities for extended operations. Maps and displays were mounted on the walls in the Operations Room. However, due to the large number of staff members who congregated there during the exercise, many of these displays were partially obscured, and this diminished their usefulness. One of the status boards was also not fully updated during the exercise. However, the map Illustrating the plume location was especially good and was readily visible to all. Other maps and displays 111ustrated the locations of relocation centers, traffic control points, plume EPZ by sectors, and chronological summaries of key messages and emergency action levels. An overhead projector was also used to project the message communicating the most recent change in plant status.
However, due to the large number of people congregating in the Operations Room, this projected message was often blocked from view.
The State of Vermont adequately demonstrated its ability to activate and staff the EOC in Waterbury. Additional radio-pagers were obtained for use by State officials and were used for the first time to notify EOC staff members for this exercise. The radio-pagers were used to notify these individuals of both the Unusual Event and the J extended notification list for Alert. The use of the radio-pagers generally worked well and corrected a previous defielency (#2). Only minor problems were observed in the use
. of the radio-paging and call-back system. Although the EOC is normally activated at the
, " Alert" stage, some staff members arrived during the " Unusual Event" stage. The call declaring the " Unusual Event" was received from the Vermont Yankee plant at 6:03 a.m.
and was verified at 6:06 a.m. by the State Po!!ce warning point in Waterbury. Radio-paging of State officials and EOC staff took place from 6:08 a.m. through 6:12 a.m. In three cases, Individuals could not be reached by the radlo-pagers, either because they had their pagers turned off or because the pagers malfunctioned. These three Individuals were notified by commercial phone. This was completed by 6:28 a.m. By this time, all other staff members had phoned in to receive the message Indicating the Unusual Event.
i
l 17 Vcrmont Stato EOC l I .
Another problem developed when the Governor tried to call back in to the EOC -
l radio operator after being paged and could not get through. This problem was quickly identified and remedied by the EOC staff, who switched incoming calls back to the j master telephone console rather than the auto-dialer, whleh did not have call-stacking [
espability. At 8:26 a.m., the warning point received the call from the Vermont Yankee i j plant notifying it of the escalation of " Alert" status. At 8:28 a.m., the radio-paging was 4 sgain initiated to notify staff members to mobilize to the EOC. At 8:31 a.m. the radio j dispatcher notified the incident director in the EOC of the escalation to Alert Status.
The EOC was considered operational at about 8:40 a.m. and was fully staffed at about l
9t30 a.m. (with the exception of the meteorologist, who arrived at 9:50 a.m.).
Staffing at the Vermont State EOC included representatives from the following
- organizations or agencies
- the Governor's Offics, Civil Defense, Public Service
- i Department, Vermont National Guard, Human Services, American Red Cross, Amate'ur j Radio Emergency Services (ARES), Publie Information, Transportation Department, l' "
Vermont State Pollee, Health Department, Agriculture Department, Fish and Game *
! Department, and Civil Air Patrol. The EOC staff competently performed its assignments
- and displayed adequate training and knowledge of their responsibilities.
I i Communications at the Vermont State EOC were improved over the previous exercises. The State EOC had good primary and backup communleations systems. The i sdio telephone linking the State EOC with the local EOCs worked consistently well, thus l correcting a previous defleiency (#3). However, it was observed that the Gullford EOC i was not able to transmit over this system, although it could receive the messages. State
- EOC personnel adequately haaldled this problem by verifying message reception by j Guilford by use of the backup land-line telephone.
1 l . Although the WESCOM microwave telephone linking Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and the utility (plant site and EOF) worked well, the Vermont State EOC staff and incident Director were continuously disadvantaged by the lack of direct formal
! communications from the utility. The Vermont State plan stipulates that the utility will
! notify State warning points of changes in plant status by means of the Nuclear Alert l System (WESCOM SS-4A)? This procedure was followed for the Unusual Event and the l Alert emergency classifleation levels (ECLa): however, it was not followed for the Site Area Emergency and the General Emergency ECLs. At the escalation to Site Area Emergency, the utility notified the Vermont State EOC by means of commerelal tele- t phone at 9:23 a.m. Although commerelal telephone is an acceptable backup system when the primary system !s not operable, a delay resulted because the Incident Director at the EOC had to have the message verifled by a call-back to the utility (9:25 a.m.). For the escalation to General Emergency, the Nuclear Alert System also was not used by the utility to notify Vermont. The information was received Indirectly via the Vermont
i l was confirmed at 10:10 a.m. by a call to the EOF by the Vermont Incident Director.
l Other communlestion systems at the Vermont State EOC consisted ofs dedicated l
j SS-4 telephone line to the EOF Civil Defense radios Transportation Department radios i State Pollee radios and National Warning System (NAWAS). Additional radio support was also available from ARES (Amateur Radlo Emergency Services) and the Civ!! Air Patrol (CAP). Tri-state coordination with New Hampshire and Massachusetts was observed to t
--r-,---n ,__~~.----__.,_,,n.--n- n, m.,.n_,_-n-
I *
- 18 Vcrwont Stato EOC 4
j be adequate, thereby correcting a previous deficiency (#67). The equipment and pro-I cedures are both available to allow Vermont to coordinate with the other two states. .
! Management of emergency operations at the Vermont State EOC was good. The j Governor was present at the EOC for the entire exerelse and was the primary decision l maker. She consulted with appropriate offielais in reaching deelslons and questioned !
others to more clearly understar.d the situation and the effect it would have on the .
residents in the area. The incident Director (Director of Emergency Management) was '
delegated by the Governor with the responsibility for managing EOC operations. The '
!aeldent Director was knowledgeable of his responsibilities and performed them in a l
! thorough and professional manner. At key times during the exercise, he conducted ,
briefings of all the EOC staff to update them on plant status, protective setions, or other key events or decisions. Message handling at the EOC was generally good. Messages i
- were recorded on a proprinted form and channeled to a message controller, who made i copies and distributed them to all appropriate staff members. However, it would be
- f. ,,
helpful for the message eontroller to assign a speelfle number to each message in order j
i to ensure an accurate inventory of all messages.
j Although overall management of the EOC was good, some opportunities for !
! leprovement were observed. Because of the recent change in administration, some of the EOC staff members were inexperienced in radiological emergency-preparedness l
! esereises. As a result, some of the deelslon m31ng was carried out in a strained ,
atmosphere, and some delays resulted when the Governor and other members of her l offlee requested detailed information prior to approving a course of action. For l
i example, the precautionary evacuation deelslon was delayed while the deelston makers tried to determine whleh areas to evaeuste. Determining the wording of proteettve f action messages also caused delays, since prescripted messages were not used.
l l
Nevertheless, the attitude displayed by a'l key EOC staff during the exercise was
. positive and helped make it a constructive experience. Because of this, it la expected .
that informed deelston making will be expedited in future exercises. l 1
The dose projection funetton was performed at the EOF. Personnel at the EOC j
had the espability to maker these projections using a programmable calculator. .
> Information on plant status and dose projections were relayed to the EOC by either the !
radiological health llatson or the Public Servlee nuclear engineer. This Information was l l '
relayed via commercial telephone to the respective operations desks in the EOC. There was a complete lack of weather foreenst Information, and areal-time" meteorologica! [
data, wind speed, and wind direction, etc., often was available only after considerable iI delays. This Inhibited understanding of movement of the plume.
j ~
The radiological health personnel formulated a protective action recommenda- '
tion for sheltering out to 2 miles, 5 miles downwind, and 10 miles for dairy animals at the
[ first indlestion of a release. This recommendation was reviewed by the Commissioner of p
j Health and passed to the Governor, who implemented the protective action recom-mendation in a timely manner. Because the wind at this time was directed into New Hampshire, this recommendation was precautionary for Vermont. Later in the exercise, i when there was a potential for a second release, the radiological health personnel and the t l
Commissioner of Health formulated a second protective action recommendation for a l t I general evacuation of Vernon and for selective eveeuation (children and pregnant women) i
- _ - _ _ . - _ _ - . . - - - _ - _ - . - _ _ _ - _ . _ - _ _ _ = - - - - _ _ - . _ _ _ - . _ _
19 Varmont Stato EOC -
)
for Brattleboro. This recommendation was finally adopted after being discussed at great ,
length by the Governor and her advisors because of the lack of definitive plant-status l i information. The Nuclear ' Regulatory Commission, upon being consulted, supported the ;
! recommendation, which, again, was precautionary and based on the potential of a ,
[ release.
4 Even though the Vermont field-monitoring team had been predeployed prior to
}
the esereise, the EOC was unable to contact these teams until well after Site Area Emergeney. Plume definition and tracking in the EOC was based solely on projection l data obtained from the EOF. Essentially, no field-monitoring data were available in the l EOC. This is at least partly the result of Vermont's polley to not allow their emergency ,
j workers to reeelve any esposure to radiation above background levels. l 1
i The Vermont State EOC effectively demonstrated its ability to alert the public -
and issue an instructional message in a timely manner. This was done in conjunction with -
l
! , the escalation to Site Area Emergency. At 9:25 a.m., the call from the utility notifying l' the State EOC of the escalation to Site Area Emergency was vertfled. Verification was required since the call from the utility came by commercial telephone. At 9:41 a.m., the i State deelded to issue a sheltering recommendation. State-representatives wanted to j have the EB8 message alred before 10:00 a.m., but the radio station would not air it until !
- 10:05 a.m. At 10:00 a.m., NOAA tone-alert radios were activated. At 10:05 a.m., the !
Governor read a prepared test EB8 message. Although detailed' instructions to the public i were not ineluded la this message, it did demonstrate the coordination required to air a
! message in a timely manner. Prior to this EB8 test message, the local EOCs were
} notifled of the sheltering recommendation at 10:02 a.m. Subsequent EB8 messages were only simulated. For esample, at 11:40 a.m. the state deelded to issue a selective evacuation message. At 11:45 a.m., the EOC not! fled the Brattleboro and Vernon EOCs '
of the eveeustion recommendations, which were to be effective at 12:15 p.m.; the EOC [
staff ladiented that this recommendation would have been given to the public via an EBS l message at 12:15 p.m.
l- ~ In both esses involving protective setton recommendations, the State EOC .
i notified Brattleboro and other local EOCs prior to the actual er shnulated release of the EBS messages. This corrects a previous defielency (#87). - !
{
Protective action supporting setivities (e.g., the establishment of access control i and traffle control points and activation of the reception center), took place during the l 3 esereise. These settvities were ecordinated by EOC staff. The detailed descriptions of ,
- l. these activities are provided in Sections 2.1.3, 2.1.5, and 2.1.8. ,
1 -
l Several press briefings were held by the Governor and her spokesman in the EOC ';
!, building during the esereise. Since these briefings were not scheduled or announced, l' none of the briefings were observed by federal observers. Most exercise press briefings -
j were held at the offlela! Media Center at Dalem's Chalet. l l Recovery and reentry was not an objective of this exercise. However, at the de- f 3:
j esealation of the eserelse, the state demonstrated its appreciation for problems !
j assoolated with safe reentry. The State of Vermont conferred on the WESCOM phone i l
with New Hampshire and Massachusetts to coordinate deelslon making on de-escalating I >
=> b
- - m- . ,,,3wp_ ,=-+,,-.------,-~.y - ,-w -.~ .- .---,- - - - - - *--e--r
. . . - = _ . - .
j 20 Vormont Stato EOC i .
) and recovery / reentry. At 2:30 p.m., the three states agreed to de-escalate but not to j enneel the evacuation order. At 2:38 p.m., the states agreed to reenter after the '
i radiological health data were reviewed and Indicated readings within limits. Th'e Governor was advised of this, and at 2:43 p.m., a message was transmitted to the local j EOCs indlesting that due to the improved situation at the plant and " safe entry levels", '
l the emergency sta:us was being de-escalated to the Alert condition and the evacuation 4 order was being lifted. The message further advised that the citizens could reenter the l area and return to their homes. ,
[
la general, the scenario was adequate to evaluate the espabilities of the State of j Vermont at the EOC relative to the exercise objectives. !
l Defleieneles and Recommendations
] 1. Deseription: Deelslon making at the EOC was sometimes delayed .
- due to the relative inexperience of some EOC staff members in I l'
radiologieel emergencip,. redness eneroises. Beesume of this, ;
the comples lateraction of staff members required for deelsion making was not always effielent (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 !!, 0.1,
,. 0.5). ,
i - Resoamendations EOC staff and deelslon makers should :
partleipate in future training drills and esereises to improve the L offieleney of deelslon making.
J 2. Desselytions Some diffleulty was observed in formulating j ,
., protective setton messages, whleh resulted in delays in getting (
j ,
these messages to the local EOCs (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, L7). '
- Recommendation
- Prescripted messages should be used whenever possible to eliminate delays eaused by deeldingf on wording of i messages. ;
) 3. Descriptions Even though the fleid monitoring teams performed l their duties as preseribed in the Vermont State plan, the low dose limits preclude the Identifloation of the plume boundary and field
! verifloation of dose projections. Furthermore, the RAC believes
[ ,
that the low allowable dose !!mits renders the Vermont fleid- i j monitoring teams inespable of providing noeurate field verifi-
. estion. Thus, Vermont would be dependent on utility field-
{.. monitoring data and would not be able to verify the dose pro- -
l l jections Independently (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, !!, l.9,1.11).
n Recommendations It la suggested that Vermont make better I i
arrangements to locate and track the aleborne radiosetive plume.
I This may include changing state guidelines and fleid procedures to <
allow for the entry of field-monitoring teams into areas suspected f i i
j :
i l 3
21 Vcrmont Stato EdC to be in the plume. This co~uld be done without exceeding EPA exposure limits and would allow the state to obtain radiatt 2n
- measurements.
Areas for Improvement and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
During EOC staff activation, three people could not be contacted with the radio pagers, since they either had their pagers turned off or the pagers were inoperative (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, II, F.1.e).
Recommendation: The radio-pagers should be checked to ensure they are in working order and the procedures reviewed to ensure that the radio-pagers are not turned off. -
Description:
During the notification of EOC staff pelor to EOC 2.
activation, the Governor temporarily could not get through to the radio operator at the State Police warning point to receive the message. Thla was due to one of the radio operators transferring incoming telephone calls .to a supplementary auto dialer console that did not have call-stacking capabilities (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, II, F.1.e).
. Recommendation Procedures should be reviewed and expanded, if ,
necessary, to ensure that staff members calling in for their message are able to be connected to the radio operator in a timely manner.
- 3.
Description:
Facilities at the Vermont State EOC are generally good with the exception that the Operations Room la relatively small. During the exercise, the staff tended to congregate in the Operations Room, which became overcrowded. The number of
! people standing around in the room also blocked most of the maps and displays, reducing their usefulness (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, !!,
H.3).
Recommendations An attempt should be made to see if access to the Operations Room can be controlled without reducing the effectiveness of required personnelInteraction.
i
- 4. Descriptions Maps and displays at the Vermont State EOC were generally adequate, with the exception that one of the status boards was not kept fully updated (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, !!, H.3).
Recommendations All Information shown on status boards should be updated in a timely manner to avoid misinterpretation of plant status and other actions and events.
i
22 V rmo:t Secto EOC
- 5.
Description:
Other than time of message, no identification numbers were assigned to written messages on the message forms (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, U, F.1).
Recommendation: An identification number should be' assigned to each message by the message controller prior to copying and distribution.
I 4
e e
l e
9 e
5 e
}
k 6
. me . .
.-r---.-- - - - - - - - - + ,,,e--. - ,_-
9_ - . yp,._y,,- ---v---,-,-%,---e---,-,.--------.,----y-- - , - - - - - _ - _ , - - - , _ * - - - - - - - - - - , , - - - , - - - - , - - w--
23 Vcemont Stato Laboratory 2.1.2 Vermont State Laboratory The Vermont radiologicallaboratory is a small facility that contains the counting .
equipment listed in the plan. One piece of equipment, the !! quid scintillation counter, was not operational and had not been for some time. While the laboratory may be adequate for routine environmental monitoring, the facilities are marginal for use in the event of a significant incident at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. Additional hood espacity would be needed. Waste handling should also be upgraded. A GM ratemaker was available to screen incoming samples for the presence of elevated levels of radioactivity. The State has agreements with the University of Vermont and the New England compact states for backup counting assistance if needed.
Based on an interview with the lab operator, additional training is needed to assure an adequate response to a nuclear power-station incident. The operator presented a listing of radionuclides that was used in the automated gamma spectrum analysis. The
- listing presented is not adequate for the analysis of emergency samples. In subsequent interviews with other radiological health personnel, it was stated that the listing presented was not correct and that in fact a more complete, and current, radionuclide list is available. At_a minimum, the lab operator requires additional training. The sample logging procedures are probably adequate for routine samples; a large number of emergency samples from widely scattered sampling locations could be a problem.
Additional training also is needed to assure that samples containing elevated levels of radioactivity (above some preselected level) are not admitted to the laboratory. The lab operator was not aware of what this level would be.
Defleieneles and Recommendations
~
- 1. Deseription The State Laboratory is not adequately equipped to handle the number of samples and radioactive waste resulting from a significant incident at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, Hil2, I.8). ,
Recommendatiom Upgrade the facilities at the state laboratory, l Includingt (1) additional hood capacity and (2) improved waste handling.
l i
l ,
- 2. Descriptiom The laboratory personnel were not adequately j prepared to handle the kind and number of samples resulting from j
~
a significant incident at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II,0.4.c).
l i .
Recommendatiom Provide additional training and new record-keeping procedures for the State Laboratory personnel.
l
i 24 Incid:nt Fiold Office f 5.1J Incident Field Offlee (IFO)
\
! For this exercise the emergency response capabilities of the EO in Brattleboro were demonstrated.
Activation of the EO was initiated by a call at 8:48 a.m. from the Incident l Director at the State EOC in Waterbury at the " Alert" ECL. Activation and staffing of the 20 was generally adequate, although not all agencies participated. Only the i activation and staffing of the Agency of Transportation was fully observed. Its staff l notifleation was good, with the exception that an inaccuracy in the call list was j observed. Although not fully observed, no problems were apparent in the staffing of the other agencies that participated in the exercise. Although the staff representatives at
! the 20 were knowledgeable in terms of their normal agency missions, they were not I - intimately familiar with emergency-manage:nent-plan concepts. The staff members j ,
demonstrated professionalism in carrying out their assignments and were willing to consider procedures that could increase the effectiveness of IFO operations.
No effective centralized management and control of the operations and activities at the 20 were observed during the exercise. .There was no effective emergency-management structure operating in the IFO. Each agency that participated operated with little or no interaction with other agencies to implement local protective actions. Communication of critical Information into and within the 20 was inadequate as a result of the lack of an effective central operations manager.
The 20 is located at the Agency of Transportation District 2 facility on Route 5 in Brattleboro. As noted as a def!ciency (#16) in previous exercises, the IFO in Brattleboro would be inadequate to handle actual emergency operations. This remains as an uncorrected deficiency. This faellity is currently located within the 10-mile plume esposure EPZ. The facility should be relocated at a greater distance from the plant or 1 tyrdened to provide habitability in the event that protective actions become necessary.
j The Health Department is presently located in the basement of the 20 and la physically 1 separated from the other agency representatives at the facility. It is suggested that the
! Health Department representatives be physleally located with the other agencies.
Moreover, the current floor plan, with physical barriers separating agencies, inhibits effective communications.
l l The primary communications systems aval'.able to most agencies represented at i the NO were radios supplemented by land lines. The State Police and Civil Defense i
radios were in place, as was the Agency of Transportation radio phone. Dedicated lines to Civil Defense and land lines served as multiple backup to all agencies. The Emergency l Medical Service, National Guard, and Sheriff brought portable radlos. In addition, an i . Intereom was utilized to connect the Health Department, which was in the basement, j with the other participating ageneles. The quality of the communications transmissions
- at the IFO was clear, and the various systems operated effectively. Improvements in the
- internal communleations equipment corrected a previously reported deficiency (#88).
f The IFO has no responsibility for dose assessment but is involved with field l monitoring. Two field teams were dispatched from the Brattleboro IFO. Field readings j were reported regularly and communication was good, although the teams spoke directly l
l l
1 -
i
-_ . _ _ - . _ . _ ~ . - _ . . _ - . _ _ _ - - - -. -. ..
Incid:nt Fiold Offico l 25 j
~
to the State EOC instead of the IFO, which was not according to plan. The teams were
- not adequately equipped or trained. These problems are further described in Section
! 2.1.4. ,
- The IFO has no responsibility for public alerting and instruction. However,
- vehicles and equipment available at the IFO could be used to assist on this function if necessary.
The IFO staff demonstrated its ability to implement procedures for traffic j eentrol and transportation. Traffic control points were promptly ordered and staffed.
j This activity involved the Highway Department, State Police, and County Sheriff. Crew assignments had been developed for each location and were identified on a map.
Information on the crews and the traffic control points was readily available to each of
]
- the participating agencies. Two of the traffic control points were observed during the
- exercise (Control Points #5 and #3/3A). Both control points were staffed by Agency of i - Transportation personnel. Control Point #5 la located at exit #5 on Interstate Highway I-91 and was staffed by a Vermont Agency of Transportation employee and truck. The
.I observation took place at 10:55 a.m. The agency employee was familiar with his traffic 1 l control assignment but was unaware of procedures for worker exposure control and had )
! not been issued radiological measuring instruments. He had communleations capabilities l with his agency and with the Vermont State Police dispatcher. Control Point #3/3A is j' located at exit #3 on Interstate Highway 1-91 and was also staffed by a Vermont Agency
- of_ Transportation employee. Tais individual had been issued protective rain gear and i
dosimeters and was familiar with his traff!c control responsibilities. Neither of the l Individuals who staffed the traffte control points were aware of the locations of
^
j reception / congregate care centers. -
! Efflelent and timely implementation of protective action was inhibited by lack of partielpation and coordination among the IFO agencies. A potential problem may exist in !
! the timing and dispatching of evacuation buses that may be sent lato the local area. IFO j staff arranged for a bus staging area but were unclear on route assignments for the buses or the agency contact for ordering the beginning of the routes. In addition, while the l transportation staff was involved in planning for evacuation by bus, the pollee, sheriff, I and National Guard were completely aware of this effort. All relevant agencies should !
( be involved in these major decisions.
Radiological exposure control for IFO workers and emergency workers dispatched '
from the IFO was inadequate. Agency personnel were unaware of appropriate procedures for lasuing and using dosimeters. There was no overall control of dosimeter issuance and record keeping. IFO personnel were unfamiliar with good exposure control policies and practices. Doelmeters were not lasued to emergency personnel until the " General Emergency," even though the IFO la only 5 to 4 miles from the plant site. IFO personne! ,
i stated that they would not issue dosimetry equipment to emergency workers in the field until a release had occurred. In many Instanees, this would be too late and an inefficient use of personnel needed elsewhere in a " General Emergency." Additional training of emergency personnel in radiological exposure control equipment and procedures is !
required.
There was no media activity at the IFO, and no press briefings were conducted l from that location. i i
1 L-- 1
-. -- __ =. _ _ - - . -- . _ _ . -- . ._ -. . __-
j 26 Incid:nc Fiold Offico i
The scenario was adequate for exercising the emergency response capabilities of the IFO, although there were periods of inactivity. The kinds of problems that the staff j was required to solve were suited to the identification of both strong and weak aspects of i the organization. The staff participated in evacuation activities of the immediate area. l However, the scenario did not provide for discussion of the logistles of recovery and reentry of the evacuated areas.
4 Defielemeles and Recommendations
- 1. Desertption No effective centralized management and integrated
- - control of the operations and activities at the Vermont IFO (Brattleboro) were evident during the exercise (FEMA-REP-1, 1 REV.1, II, A.I.b; A.1.d).
1 . ,
Recome'endation: The organizational responsibilities and staff li assignments at the IFO should be reviewed and modifleations j tmplemented, if necessary, in order to ensure the effectiveness of j integrated management and control at the faellity.
f 2. Deseription: The Vermont IFO in Brattleboro is inadequate to handle setual emergency operations, since the facility is within the i 10-mile EPZ and la presently unhardened. This would require j evacuation la the event that protective actions became necessary -
- . -(FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, !!, H.3).
j Recommendations The IFO should either be relocated at a greater i j distance from the plant or hardened to provide habitability in the 3 e event of an actual redlological emergeney.
1
} 3.
Description:
One of the Vermont Agency of Transportation j employees was unaware of procedures for radiological exposure
- , control and had not been Issued any radiological measuring i lastruments (FEML-REP-1, REY.1, II, K.3.as K.3.b). l l
Recommendation All emergency workers assigned to duties in the EPZ should be trained in proper radiological exposure contro!
- I t techniques and should be lasued proper dosimetry equipment as l i ,
appropriate. *
\ ,
- 4. Deseription Although Vermont IFO staff arranged for evacuation buses and a staging arta for the buses, staff members were unclear on bus route assignments and an egency contact for ordering the
- commencement of bus eveeustion (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1 !!, A.1.b l J.10.g: 0.1).
l Recommendation: Additional training of IFO staff Involved in the
! coordination of bus evacuation is required to ensure that they are
! t
27 Incid:nt Fiold Offico
- familiar with bus route assignments and with the Individual who authorizes the dispatching of the buses for evacuation.
9
- 5. Deseription: Radiological exposure control for Vermont IFO workers and emergency workers dispatched from the IFO was Inadequate, including knowledge of proper procedures and Issuance
- and use of dostmeters (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, II, E.3.a; K.3.b; O.1).
i Recommendation Additional training of IFO emergency personnel la radiological exposure control equipment and procedures is required.
e Areas for Improvement 1.
Description:
An inaccuracy in the call list of the Agency of Transportation was observed (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, E.2).
Recommendation: The calllist used for notifying emergency per-
- sonnel should be periodically reviewed and updated to ensure its accuracy.
P
- 2. Deseription: The Health Department representatives at the Vermont IFO in Brattleboro are situated in the basement of the IFO building and are physically separated from other agency representatives and decision makers, who are located on the first floor (FEM A-REP-1, REY.1, !!, H.3 A.1.b).
Recommendations It is suggested that the Health Department representatives be relocated up to the first floor in order to expedite more effective Interaction with other agency representatives.
- 3. Deseription: Neither of the Vermont Agency of Transportation employees who staffed the two traffic control points observed during the exercise were aware of the locations of reception / congregate care centers (FEMA-REP-1, REY. 1, !!,
J.10.hs O.1).
Recommendations Emergency workers assigned to traffle control
- points should be trained to know locations of emergency facilities, such as reception centers, eongregate care eenters, and decontamination faellities.
28 Varsort Fiold M:nitoring 2.1.4 Vermont Fland Monitoring Two radiological monitoring teams, consisting of two members per team, were sent out into the field from the Brattleboro IFO in Vermont. Mobtlization procedures were not demonstrated; team members were prepositioned for this exercise. An adequate mobilization system that includes the use of radio-pagers, call lists, and procedures to replace unreachable members was described in detall.
The field monitoring teams brought their monitoring equipment with them from Waterbury. The teams should check equipment prior to departure from Waterbury to ensure that all necessary equipment la in the kit and Is operational. The dosimeters at the IFO were zerced prior to the arrival of the field teams so that there would be no delay la dispatching the teams to their sampilng locations. Handheld survey Instruments were checked prior to departure from the IFO and were left on. Communications were checked while enroute to the monitoring locations which were found quickly. However, 1 Vermont does not use a numbering system such as the one described In FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a.
The teams had adequate equipment for exposure monitoring, Including high- and ;
low-range G-M detectors, portable Na! detectors, and thin-end window G-M counters.
However, key components, such as the single channel analyzer and air pump for lodine monitoring, could only be run on Internal battery power, providing less than adequate reliability, and only one team had Instrumentation for detecting radiolodine in the fleid.
Furthermore, the air sampling pump had no adapter for attaching charcoal filters, nor did the team know what silver zoollte was or if they would use it in an emergency. They did not have any Instrumentation to count the air samples In thy fleid, and it is uncertain if a lo-llter sample would be sufficient to detect levels of 10- microcuries per cuble centi-meter. The Ludlum 2218 SCA Instruments was defective in that its LED rendout remained totally blank, a critical problem for the fleid team. Some of the Instruments did not show a callbration date.
The teams did have adequate equipment for taking milk and water samples; however, they did not have a shovel or scoop for taking soll samples.
There were some weak areas in the technical operations, Indicating a need for more frequent training to maintain a higher degree of famillarity with the radiological survey equ!pment. There was, for example, uncertainty as to what kind of information the Instrument was providing (l.a., dose equivalent rate, exposure rate, or opm), failure
." to take along the set-up procedure for the lodine monitor, and failure to take ground-level measurements w!th the G-M Counter.
Radio communications were maintained with the State EOC throughout the esereise in spite of the fact that the plan Indicates that the field teams communicate i through the IFO. However, because the communication worked so well, it Is recommended that the plan be modified to bypass the IFO.
Doelmetry was generally adequate. Team members all had suffielent self-reading doelmeters, which were zeroed before going into the fleid and were read every 20-30 minutes. However, only one team member on each team had a permanent record badge, which is not suff!clent. The teams had supplies of K! and knew when to use it.
i t
l l
~
29 Vermo:t Floid M:nitoring i
t Defleieseles and RecommerAstions
- 1. De% door The field , teams lacked familiarity with the
, 2 Instrumentation (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, L8).
j .
! : Emeommendation: Provide the field teams with more training in how to use their equipment and a better understanding of what they will be looking for la the field (i.e., noble gases and lodine, not alpha radiation).
l
! 2. Descripties: The monitoring surveys were incomplete; only closed . .
window readings were done (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1 II, !.8).
i Escommendation: Surveys should include open and closed window
, readings and measurements at ground and waist levels.
Description:
The teams did not have the capability for measuring
- 3. )
i radiolodirte in.the field (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, D, E7; !.9).
l
. Emeoemendation: Verify if air. ' sam procedure will allow detection of 10'ple punsps mierocuries perandcuble eurrent y centimeter, or consider using a higher volume pump, silver zeollte
{
~ eartridges (in an actual emergency only), and counting using a
- ' panoake probe. In addition, the procedure must be modified to Instruet teams to leave the plume to count the samples.
2 i
'i 4. Deseriptions Not all team members had permanent record doelmeters (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, !!, E.3.a).
.7
? Emeoemendation: Provide all field-monitering team members I
with permanent record doelmeters.
- - , - e
( 5.
Description:
Vermont does not have a numbering system for its a fleid-monitoring points (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, !!, J.10.a).
Recommendation: Develop a numbering system for the fleid-monitoring points.
J
- 8. Deseription: Radio communleations were from the fleid teams to
, [ the State EOC Instead of the IFO, a procedure not in accordance l ,
witu the plan (FEMA-REP-1, REY.1 !!, F.1.d). ,
Emeommendation Because this worked well, it is recommended that the plan be modified to bypass the IFO.
4 4
__-.--.4-.+-.,we - .-.-.,,.r-v"--- -.-y--.,-,-.--m..- _ - _ - , , -
.._-- -- - __ . - - _ . __ ._ ___ - = _ . .. . _ . _. ..
30 Balices Falls R31ccation'Ccntor 11.5 Ballows Falls Relocation Center i The relocation center at Bellows Falls High School was activated for the exercise. The relocation center consisted of three functional areas: reception center,
(
radiological monitoring and decontamination, and mass care. The center was quickly and j effleiently activated after a call from the EOC to the Vermont State Agency for Human
! Services representative (Reception Center Director) at 8:50 a.m. The Agency for Human i
Services representative arrived to activate the facility at 9:25 a.m.
The Agency for Human Services is responsible for coordinating the reception center. The only other agency represented at the recqption center during the exercise was the Department of Mental Health. The Reception Center Director was notified of the number of evacuees to expect by her liaison at the State EOC. Several minor 3
problems were observed. There was some confusion about registration forms. The Red j ,
Cross has a separate form for registering people coming into the mass care area;
- however, the State should have its own registration form to indicate who has checked into the reception center and where checked-in persons are going. The Reception Center Director and her staff performed their duties well and interacted well with the mass care i
and radiological monitoring / decontamination areas. Directions to" evacuees could be i improved. Additional, larger signs would be helpful in directing evacuees to proper '
, locations in order to insure that clean areas do not become contaminated.
- Relative to financial assistance, the present plan to provide assistance to those i
evacuees who meet welfare criteria does not consider the needs of those evacuees who l are only temporarily in need of funds due to inaccessibility of their own funds.
i There was some Initial confusion on where the radiological monitoring and I decontamination were to take place. The Reception Center Director thought it was to i take place at the St. Johnsbury Trucking Company facility, contrary to the l understanding of the public health workers who were to perform the monitoring and i decontamination. After'some discussion it was decided to perform the functions in the same building as the reception and mass care activities. This required roping off areas to
' ensure that unmonitored people did not enter the reception area. An identification tag l
was used to Identify people who had been processed through the monitoring and I decontamination station. However, the workers were not familiar with all of the l
Information printed on the tag. In addition, there was uncertainty as to who would l provide clothing to victims if they had to discard contaminated clothing.
Radiological monitoring of evacuees was performed by four State public health workers using Model CDV-777-1 monitoring equipment and dosimeters. Ten (10)
! monitoring Instruments were available for use. Decontamination would be performed in a bank of 8 shower stalls adjacent to the monitoring room. The monitoring /
j decontamination function was managed by a Vermont Public Health Department nurse.
i She and her team of workers performed their responsibilities in a professional manner.
l The mass care function was performed at the facility by members of the Amerlean Red Cross. The shelter manager was officially notifled to activate the facility i by a call from the State EOC at 10:16 a.m. The mass care center can accommodate up
. to 800 persons. There are designated areas in the facility for the shelter manager, health
- *- ,,g
31 B5LlewsFcllsRelocationCcnter services, registration, supplies storage, recreation, and food preparation. During the exercise only a pay telephone was available for communications; however, staff indicated that in a real emergency Red Cross radio and amateur radio would be available and positioned in the mass care shelter. There are adequate toilet and shower facilities available at the shelter. There is no emergency generator presently installed at the facility. Staffing capabilities would be sufficient to perform all duties at the shelter on
- a. multiple-shift extended schedule. The Red Cross liaison at the district headquarters could also be contacted if additional staff or supplies were needed. The shelter manager would receive updated information on the status of the nuclear accident from the Relocation Center Coordinator at the State EOC. This information would be shared with !
evacuees by posting information on the staths board or by verbal announcements. i Defleiencies and Recommendations None.
Areas for Improvement and Recommendations l [ 1.
Description:
There is no registration form for the State to use to register evacuees when they arrive at the Reception Center.
.- Presently there is only a log sheet (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, J.12).
- Recommendation
- It is recommended that the State develop its
+ own registration form for evacuees at the Reception Center, regardless of whether the evacuees subsequently go to the Red Cross mass care center.
- 2.
Description:
An Identification tag was used by State personnel in the monitoring / decontamination area. However, the workers were not familiar- with all of the information printed on the Identification tag (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, J.12). ,
Recommendation: Emergency personnel should be instructed on the meaning of all Information on the tags.
- 3.
Description:
Directional signs were too small and were .
insufficient in number to clearly direct evacuees (FEMA-REP-1, -
REV.1, II, H.4; J.10.h; J.12).
Recommendation: More and larger directional signs should be used -
. at the relocation center to assist evacuees in determining the locations of registration and monitoring stations.
- 4.
Description:
There were some observed misunderstandings among relocation-center staff members as to' where radiological monitoring and decontamination would be conducted (FEMA-REP-j 1, REV.1, II, H.4; J.10.h; J.12).
-~n,---r.-a- - --e,-v m-, e----.---,, - ~ , , ..,w,-r----- r-~ ----,,-------v- - - , - - - - - - - - - -
32 Ballows Falls R31ccation Ccntor Recommendatiom The plans and procedures should be reviewed and, if necessary, updated to ensure that the location where
- radiological monitoring and decontamination activities are to be performed is established. Emergency workers thould then be briefed to ensure that they are aware of the correct location.
- 5.
Description:
It was not clear among emergency workers at the Relocation Center as to which organization would provide clothing to victims if contaminated clothing had to be discarded (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, A.I.b; J.10.h; J.12).
Recommendation: Plans and procedures should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised to clarify and identify which organization will be responsible for providing replacement clothing to victims. If a private agency (e.g., Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists, etc.) is identified, a written agreement should be prepared.
i 6.
Description:
The present plan to provide financial assistance to those evacuees who meet welfare criteria does not consider the needs of those evacuees who are only temporarily in need of funds i due to their relocation (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, J.10.h).
Recommendation: Plans and procedures should be reviewed, and if necessary, revised to ensure that the needs of those evacuees temporarily in need of funds (due to inaccessibility of their own funds) are met.
G l
+-
33 Vermont Local EOCs Brattleboro 2.1.8 Vermont Local EOCs 1
1.1.8.1 Brattleboro
}
" The Brattleboro EOC is of sufficient size and is adequately supplied to handle the needs of the EOC staff and to provide adequate space for media. Fans or other air-circulation devices should be provided, since the EOC became warm during the exercise.
During periods of elevated radiation levels, doors could not be opened to allow air in for cooling and this would cause discomfort and hence lower work production by EOC staff.
A; status board was available and updated. Appropriate maps were posted, and the EOC staff also knew where in the EOC plan similar maps and pertinent information were contained.
The Brattleboro EOC was activated at the " Alert" stage by a call from the IFO at 8:36 a.m. Staffing was completed and the EOC was considered operational at 8:51 a.m. Activation of the Brattleboro EOC was extremely prompt, as most EOC staff work in the town offices located at or near the building within which the EOC is located.
Round-the-clock staffing is available. Backup personnel were knowledgeable and well-trained as demonstrated by the EOC being staffed by a backup shift. This situation arose
'because many primary EOC staff were out of town. A well-rounded assemblage of pirsonnel from various organizations was represented by the EOC staff members. The Brattleboro police learned of the " Unusual Event" declaration by a call from the Brattleboro Fire Department.
The EOC Director effectively managed operation at the Brattleboro EOC even though actual emergencies, such as a drinking water-contamination problem, arose.
During these periods the assistant director had to assume an acting director role; and it i
, w[as demonstrated that responsibilities could be readily handled by other personnel.
Periodic briefings were not held, but close working relations of personnel ensured that all staff were aware of conditions. Plans (local and state) were avall2ble and referred to.
Messages and telephone, calls were logged, with adequate information on times, organization making the call, and' dispatcher (or other staff) receiving the call.
Communleations equipment and personnel operated very effectively. Trained fire personnel and police dispatchers handled communications. The primary radio-telephone systems temporarily broke down, but backup systems were readily used without delays in communication. This corrected two previous defleiencies (#4 and #92).
Auxiliary communication systems were available (and used), such as EBS monitoring by a battery radio, scanners to monitor other emergencies, a second low band radio to directly talk with fire station, and CB capabilities. Considering the number of actual emergencies, such as fires, that were also being communicated, exceptional capabilities .
of both communication staff and communication equipment were demonstrated. The main communication systems were in an enclosed area of the EOC, which helped to keep extraneous noises from interfering with message reception. No hard-copy devices were available in the EOC; however, there is a hard-copy machine in police headquarters located within the same building. There appears to be some lack of proper communi-cations by others (e.g., the IFO did not contact the EOC dispatcher every hour as required to en:.ure that the radio-phone was working). The dispatchers kept a glossary of I
l
~
34 Vormont Local EOCs l Brattleboro terms in front of them to ensure that messages were understood and that unfamiliar terms were properly spelled.
Dose assessment and preparation of protective action recommendations were not the responsibility of the Brattleboro EOC. Nevertheless, emergency personnel at the EOC should be able to evaluate accident-assessment information provided to them.
However, it was observed during the exercise that emergency personnel at the Brattleboro EOC generally appeared unable to properly assess this information. This continues a previous defielency (#25).
.The Brattleboro EOCs role in public alerting was adequately performed in a timely manner according to plan. Through the EOC staff, vehicles with loudspeakers
. would be dispatched to Inform those that may not have heard the sirens and/or EBS broadcasts. Actual testing of this alerting method has been adequate in the past but could not be done during this exercise due to cost constraints. Brattleboro's g,ublic instruction, limited to simulated activation of the EBS for sheltering and evacuation, did not include a message with detailed instructions to the public on who specifically should do the sheltering and evacuation.
In order to ensure that Brattleboro received prompt notification of a potential evacuation, the Brattleboro EOC requested the State EOC to advise Brattleboro prior to a.public notification. This proved effective and was demonstrated when the Vermont State EOC notified Brattleboro of the evacuation recommendation at 11:45 a.m. but noted that the evacuation was not to be effective until 12:15 p.m. This corrects a previous deficiency (#93).
An adequate number (10) of key traffic contrcl points would be staffed by police in time of an emergency, but this was not carried out during this exercise due to cost constraints. Resources are available from police, fire, and highway departments to keep evacuation routes clear and/or to establish alternative routes. The Brattleboro EOC plan contains updated lists of mobility-impaired citizens and lists of transportation companies that are to be contacted.
i Adequate radiological exposure control procedures were not demonstrated' in a l consistent manner at the Brattleboro EOC during this exercise. Supplies of dosimeters l and radiological survey meters were more than adequate for EOC staff and for other l emergency workers that would be sent out. Dosimeters were issued to people occupying the corners of the EOC, but those having them apparently did not record levels on a regular basis. KI was not available, and personnel did not seem knowledgeable on the procedure for obtaining it from the health department and/or levels at which KI should be administered. No film badges or other permanent recorders were available. These
- are past deficiencies that have not been ecr:ected (#26 and 94).
The exercise scenario was generally adequate to test the capabilities of the Brattleboro EOC.
- = .-. . . . - - _ .
r-r----- -y -r--- -
Vormont Locci EOCs 35 Brattleboro Defieleneles and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
Emergency personnel. at the Brattleboro EOC l generally were unable to properly assess accident assessment 1 information (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, I.8, 0.1). )
i Recommendation: Additional training should be provided for Brattleboro EOC staff to enhance their ability to assess accident assessment Information.
' The simulated EBS messages on sheltering and
- 2. Descriptiom evacuation did not provide sufficiently detailed information on who specifically should shelter and evacuate (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, E.5,E.7).
Recommendation: EBS message formulation should be improved so that it is clearly understood by the public who is to shelter and/or who is to evacuate.
- 3. Descriptiom Radiological exposure control was weak at the
. Brattleboro EOC. The direct-read dosimeters were not read and
} recorded on a regular basis, and permanent record devices were not available (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a., K.3.b., 0.1).
Recommendation: The Brattleboro EOC staff should receive additional training in radiological exposure control procedures and I permanent record dosimetry should be provided.
Areas for Improvement and Recommendations
- 1. Descriptiom The Brattleboro EOC became very warm during the exercise because of poor air circulation (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, H.3).
Recommendation: Fans or other air-circulation equipment should be provided in the EOC.
I 2.
Description:
The IFO did not contact the Brattleboro EOC
. dispatcher every hour as required to ensure that the radio-
- telephone was working (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1 II, F.1.b, F.3).
- Recommendatiom Coordination with the IFO should be improved to ensure that radio-telephone contact is maintained each hour to test the system.
I 6
e
36 Vermont Iocal EOCs Dununers ton 2.1.8.2 Dommerston The Dummerston EOC is on the second floor of the town's Munfelpal Building. It
! la a large well-lighted room with sufficient furniture and equipment. A status board was i clearly visible and kept up-to-date on significant events. The appropriate maps were displayed and clearly identified. Backup power is not available, nor is the EOC capable of extended operations, because there are no facilities for kitchen, bunks, or showers.
However, the local Grange and church, which are directly across the street, could be used for these activities. Also, staff members live near by. The Emergency Director has requested cots from the Vermont Civil Defense Agency.
The Dummerston EOC was quickly activated and promptly staffed. The call initiating the activation of the EOC was received at 8:40 a.m. from the Southeast Mutual Aid. The EOC was operatio: s1 at 8:55 a.m., although staffing was not completed until 10:05 a.m. Dummerston has a new Emergency Director, who assumed this office in July when the former director retired. The EOC staff members all knew their roles and performed their EOC functions smoothly and efficiently. Despite the fact this was a working day for the volunteer staff, only one member, the RADEF officer, was not present. He was on duty at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. His duties were i carried out by the Assistant Civil Defense Chairman.
The town is capable of 24-hour staffing; this was demonstrated by presentation
] of a roster, which also was posted. The list was up-to-date and the numbers, were correct. ,
The overall management of the Dummerston EOC by' the new Emergency Director was very good. He was effectively in charge and utilized the functional capabilities of his staff efficiently. The staff promptly performed their assignments in accordance with the plan, to which they referred from time to time. Message handling was efficient, and logs were maintained by both the Director and Assistant Civil Defense Director. Periodic briefings were held to update the staff, and when appropriate the staff were involved in the decision making. Access to the EOC was controlled by the police. ,
! -The communication system of the EOC generally is adequate. The primary system is the radio-telephone. Commercial telephone is the backup system. The radio-
- telephone Civil Defense system network is linked with the local EOCs, State, utility, and other government offices. This system provides for conference calling when needed.
However, the Emergency Director had problems with the radio-telephone receiver during the exercise and stated a technician had been out twice for repairs. This continues a previous deficiency (#95). The backup commercial telephone rings primarily downstales
- in the Municipal Offices and is ignored by EOC workers as a result; the EOC needs its own line. All staff members have radio-pagers. The utility has provided isolated families (unable to hear the fire-house siren) with NOAA tone-alert weather radios. The EOC has a list of these persons. All the firefighters and police have pasrers. The acquisition and use of these radio-pagers corrects an earlier deficiency (#21).
Dummerston EOC was not involved in Public Alerting and Instructions. These actions were initiated by the State EOC and the Southwest Mutual Ald.
_._ _ _ _. _ . _ _ . . . _. .~ , ._ _
- y---- r
,-w---y--g,.ew-----TF-- --,r,..-wrw-- ' ' - - - - ' ' - - - -
37 Vermont Local EOCs Dununers ton Protective actions were not initiated at Dummerston as part of the exercise.
However, the EOC staff and resources were available, should this have been necessary.
There are no nursing homes or institutionalized Individuals in Dummerston.
However, the Emergency Director and staff are aware of the few individuals who are handicapped and are prepared to provide them special consideration.
Although the Dummerston EOC has initiated a radiological exposure control program, the activities associated with radiological exposure control were not demonstrated at this exercise by the EOC. Therefore, a previous deficiency (#96) remains uncorrected. The RADEF officer, who is responsible for this program, was on duty at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant and unavailable to participate. These duties were carried out by the Assistant Civil Defense Chairman. The EOC has a supply of high-range dosimeters, survey meters, and a dosimeter charger. The EOC Director is currently planning to provide additional radiological training for one staff member as
- backup to the RADEF officer. -
The scenario involved the Dummerston EOC more fully in this exercise, thus correcting a previous deficiency (#27).
Deficioneles and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
Periodic, problems again were encountered with the radio-telephone communication system at the Dummerston EOC (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b; F.1.d).
Recommendatiom The radio-telephone equipment at the Dummerston EOC should be evaluated and either repaired or replaced with more dependable equipment.
- 2. Descriptiom The Dummerston EOC did not fully demonstrate its capabilities to implement'a radiological exposure control program (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3; K.4).
Recommendatiom The capabilities of Dummerston EOC relative to radiological exposure control should be fully tested in a future exercise.
l, Areas for Improvement and Recommendations l
. 1. Descriptiom The backup communication system (comme clal telephone) for the EOC is primarily for the Municipal Offices,
!! although it also rings in the EOC. However, EOC workers tend to ignore it when it rings because it is assumed it is for the Municipal Office (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b; F.1.d).
~-- - - - - - - , " -
-r-- r-------g aw---vwe--- . , , - , , , , , , -e,, -
, . , , _ , , , , , , , - - , , , - , . , - ---,m,-., ,- --m,
38 Vermont L: col EOCs Dunne r s ton Recommendation: It is suggested that a new, separate telephone line be installed in the EOC.
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e I
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- -wh .-4
39 Vormont Local EOCs Cuilford 2.1.8.3 Guilford The Guilford EOC is located in the Volunteer Fire Department's station house.
The facilities were more than adequate: ample space, furniture, and lighting; a large kitchen; and a large open area for cots or bunks. There was, however, only one commercial telephone. A second line would be useful. The status board was kept up to date and included posting of the emergency classification levels. Maps of the EPZ and town were clearly posted and included access control points, roads, houses, and locations of people requiring special assistance. Maps showing evacuation routes and relocation centers were not posted but were readily available. This corrected part of a previous deficiency (#29). However, since a copy of the plan was not available at the EOC, it could not be verified if decontamination centers are described in the plan, and this part of the previous deficiency (#29) remains uncorrected.
- Activation and staffing of the Guilford EOC were performed in a timely
- manner. The call initiating the activation of the EOC was received from the Tri-State Mutual Aid at 8:44 a.m. after the declaration of " Alert." Commercial telephone was used to notify the EOC staff, with pagers also available for 10 members of the staff.
The Fire Chief, who was notified by pager at the " Unusual Event" stage, was the first to arrive at the EOC. The Guilford Civil Defense Director was unable to participate due to job requirements, but his responsibilities were assumed by the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen. The entire staff performed smoothly and acted quickly and efficiently.
The EOC was managed quite effectively with all of the participants well
- informed and active in the decision making process. Messages were logged in and available to all participants. A copy of the town plan was not available at the EOC. (It was explained by the staff that the Civil Defense Director, who was not able to participate in the exercise, had an updated copy in his possession.)
The primary communication system at the Guilford EOC was a radio-telephone.
This device worked poorly much of the exercise; thus, the commercial telephone was used as a backup, and all messages from the state were verified via commercial tele-phone. There were several other backup means of communication, including the town radio and fire department radio. Guilford has requested two mobile radios from the State, but they have not yet been procured. The malfunctioning of the radio-telephone primary communication system leaves previous defielencies (#6, #28, and #97) uncorrected.
- The Guilford EOC demonstrated its ability to play a role in alerting the pub!!c.
l This occurred at the time of the decision to shelter dairy animals. There are 10 dairy I
farms in tN Guilford area, and it was decided to alert them by dispatching repre-sentatives in two automobiles. While this action was only simulated, the decision was timely, and it was estimated that it would take each automobile 15-20 minutes to -
ll complete the pr acess. A previous deficiency (#98) regarding the clarification in the
'j Guilford plan of :he responsibility for public alerting via EBS messages could not be checked due to t'.e lack of a copy of the plan at the EOC. In regard to the need for other special protective actions, the EOC staff Indicsted that there were adequate personnel and vehicles to control traffic in the area. The homes of those needing special assistance were clearly marked on a map, and their special problems were known to the EOC staff.
40 Var:nont Lecci COCs Guilford Dosimetry equipment was not available at the EOC, but according to the EOC staff the equipment was stored at the town office. The EOC sta'f had some knowledge of the use of dosimeters but naed further training. According to EOC stafi', there were no permanent record dosimeters available. The lack of dosimeters at the EOC and the lack of suitable training continues two previous deficiencies (#30 and #99).
Defieleneles and Reemmendations
- 1.
Description:
A copy of the Guilford emergency plan was not available for reference at the EOC (FEMA-REP-1, hiv.1, II, P.5).
Recommendation: An up-to-date copy of the Guilford plan should be kept at the EOC for reference by EOC staff.
- 2.
Description:
At the Guilford EOC, the radio-telephone, which is the primary communication system, worked poorly during much of the exercise (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b; F.1.d).,
Recommendation: The radio-telephone equipment at the Guilford
.2 EOC should be evaluated and either repaired or replaced with more dependable equipment.
- 3.
Description:
The .Guilford EOC did not fully demonstrate its capabilities to implement a radiological exposure control program. Dosimeters were not observed at the EOC, permanent record dosimeters were known by the staff not to be available, and EOC staff was not suitably trained in the use of dosimeters 4 (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3, K.4, 0.1).
Recommendation: Dosimeters should be stored at the EOC facility, permanent record dosimeters should be procured, and emergency staff should be trained in radiological exposure control procedures.
_. Area for Improvement
Description:
Only one commercial telephone line was available in ,
. the Guilford EOC.
Recommendation: Provide another telephone line to the EOC. !
l n , p - , -- _ , , , , , - - -- - - - , - , .
f 41 Vermont I.ccel E0ds Vernon
- 2.1.8.4 Vernon The Vernon EOC is located in the basement of the town fire station. The EOC consists of two rooms, an operations room and a communications room. The facilities at the EOC are considered adequate. The EOC has rafficient space, furniture, heat, and lighting. A propane generator is available at the facility to provide backup power for the EOC. Bunks, showers, and a complete kitchen were all located in the firehouse building in which the EOC was located, making it suitable for extended around-the-clock op'e rations.
The Vernon EOC staff members were prepositioned at the EOC; therefore, activation and staffing procedures could not be evaluated. The call formally initiating the activation of the EOC was received from Southwest Mutual Aid at the " Alert" ECL at 8:39 a.m. The EOC was fully staffed and considered operational at 8:50 a.m.
Representatives from the following groups or organizations were present at the EOC:
Selectmen, fire department, civil defense, radiological defense, police department, and public works. A communications officer and public information officer were also present. Round-the-clock staffing capabilities were demonstrated both by the presenta-
~
tion of a roster and by double-staffing at many positions. ThelOC staff demonstrated adequate training and knowledge.
1 The Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of operations at the Vernon EOC. He managed the activities and discussed situations with his staff before decision m'aking. He also held briefings frequently during the exercise. However, some problems with emergency operations management at the Vernon EOC were observed. It was i observed that the Director was personall? involved with the incoming radio transmissions I and preparation of message logs. Because he became so busy, it was difficult for the Director to handle his primary responsibility of decision making. Responsibility for receiving incoming radio messages and logging them in should be delegated to other staff j members.
Another management problem observed was that there was some question by the EOC staff as to which decisions were to be made by the State and which were to be made locally. Additional training of the Vernon EOC management staff is needed relative to division of responsibilities between the State and local jurisdictions.
The radio-telephone communications system at the Vernon EOC worked well during the exercise, and no problems related to the communications equipment were observed. Commercial telephone was the backup system.
Dose assessment is not the responsibility of the Vernon EOC, and no dose assessments were performed there. The only involvement by the EOC staff in protective '
action decision making was the decision not to evacuate the Vernon EOC when the state t recommended evacuation of the town.
. There.was some confusion regarding public alerting at the EOC. The sirens were not sounded as directed in the plan. The Director indicated at 10:02 a.m. that he would call EBS to have a message released. He later called the State EOC to determine if the sirens should be sounded. The state confirmed that the sirens should be sounded. Vernon I
' - - . ~ _ _ _ . . - _ _ __ . . . _ , _ . . . , _ _ _ . .. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . , _
42 Vormont Local EOCs Vernon then simulated the sounding of the sirens, but this did not occur until 10:30 a.m., which was not timed properly with the EBS message. During the evacuation protective action the Vernon EOC played a role in public alerting by placing telephone calls to the nursing home and school and notifying them of the need for evacuation. ,
l i
The EOC staff indicated that the Town of Vernon does not have sufficient police to control access immediately if an evacuation is ordered. The two police officers and cars on duty would not be able to man the four access control points. Assistance would have to be requested to man these posts. However, during the exercise the EOC staff were not observed to request this additional assistance.
Even though the State recommended that evacuees be sent to Bellows Falls, it was the opinion of the Vernon EOC staff that evacuees should be relocated to Greenfleid, Massachusetts. The directions given to the school by the EOC called for evacuation to Greenfield rather than to Bellows Falls.
Radiological exposure control procedures at the Vernon EOC were somewhat weak. Dosimeters, a dosimeter charger, and record keeping cards were available, but these supplies were not issued and used. Permanent record dosimeters were not available, thereby continuing a previous defielency (#100). The EOC staff were not knowledgeable about the proper procedures for the use of KI.
There was no media contact during the exercise at the EOC. The PIO knew that
! she was to refer anything other than local operations questions to the media center.
The scenario generally was adequate to test the emergency response capabilities
, of the Vernon EOC.
Defielencies and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
The Vernon EOC Director became too personally in-volved with the routine tasks of monitoring incoming radio transmissions and preparing message logs (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!,
A.1.d).
1 Recommendation: Routine tasks should be delegated to other EOC staff members in order to free the Director for the primary
- responsibility of decision making.
- 2.
Description:
The Vernon EOC staff were observed to be unsure of i - the division of responsibility in decision making between the State and the local EOC (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.1.b).
Recommendation: Additional training of the Vernon EOC decision P ' king staff is needed in order to ensure that staff members are
.a are of which emergency deelstons are to be made locally.
- 3.
Description:
The sounding of the sirens in Vernon was not
' coordinated with the EBS message (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5).
-- - - ~ - - .. -
s,,---- -
, , - - - - - , , , ~ , , - ,n -- -, -- -n-----m- - ~ -
43 Vara nt Local EOCs Vornon Recommendation: Procedures should be reviewed and expanded, if necessary, to ensure that sounding of the sirens and the EBS ,
message are properly coordinated.
4.
Description:
The Vernon EOC staff Indicated that Vernon resources were not sufficient to staff all traffic control points; however, no staff members were observed to contact the State to request assistance (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.I.b; J.10.j).
, Recommendation: Improve coordination between the State and the j Town of Vernon to ensure that all traffic control points are manned in a timely manner.
5.
Description:
During the evacuation the Vernon EOC recommended
- to the school that relocation be to Greenfield, Massachusetts, rather than to Bellows Falls, Vermont, as has been recommended
.. by the State (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a; J.10.h).
Recommendation: Procedures on relocation should be reviewed to
, ensure that evacuees are directed to the proper relocation center.
Y
~
- 6. Dewrlption: Permanent record dosimeters were not available at the Vernon EOC (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a).
Recommendation: A sufficient number of permanent record dosimeters should be procured for distribution to emergency workers at the Vernon EOC.
K 7.
Description:
The Vernon EOC staff were not knowledgeable about
, proper procedures for the use of KI (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,
~
J.10.e; J.10.f).~ ,
Recommendation: The Vernon EOC staff should be trained in procedures for the proper use of KI.
Aleas for Improvement and Recommendations
,; y
Description:
Vernon EOC staff members were prepositioned at the j ,
EOC; therefore, the activation and staffing procedures could not .
be evaluated (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.2).
]
j Recommendation: Activation and staffing capabilities of the 1 Vernon EOC should be tested in a future exercise.
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ = - .- _ _ - . _ _
44 N2w Hampshire Stato EOC 2.2 NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE OPERATIONS The State of New Hampshire activated and tested the State EOC in Concord, the Incident Fleid Office in Keene, three field-monitoring teams, the relocation center at the Keene State College, and five local EOCs for the towns of Chesterfield, Hinsdale, Richmond, Swanzey, and Winchester.
4 2.2.1 New Hampahire State EOC The State's new EOC facility, located in the New Ilampshire Civil Defense
. Agency Headquarters, State Office Park South, Concord, is much improved over the last one in several important respects.
There was substantially more room in the operations room, where most EOC l staff worked. Each agency representative and civil defense functional area had a l
separate telephone. The communications room is adequate in size and equipment and is i located physleally near the operations room. This allows for quick message handling and noise centrol.
7 There were separate areas (rooms) for use by the Leaernor's representative and Civil Defense Director, DPH Accident Assessment. NRC and FEMA, and Public Informa-tion. There was a large meeting-room facility located on the floor above the EOC operational area for use by the press at media oriefings. .
- All appropriate maps were either posted er available. The emergency classifica-tion levels were posted, and three status boards were available. One status board dealt
! with transportation needs, a second with evacuation and shelter-related matters, and the third with logging the status of key events during an emergency. This last status board was not kept current with key information. For instance, it was never noted that a release had occurred during the exercise. This problem relates to Internal communi-cations problems, which will be discussed later. It should be noted that $500,000 worth of major renovations to the State EOC are slated to begin this June. This should add significantly to the utility of the new State EOC.
The procedures for notifying and mobilizing State emergency response personnel were well demonstrated. The New Hampshire warning point received notification of the
> " Unusual Event" (declared at 6:11 a.m.) at approximately 6:20 a.m. The State EOC was activated and staffed by key response personnel prior to the arrival of the federal observers at oroximately 8:00 a.m.
Notification of the " Alert" emergency classification level (ECL) was received via the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) telephone at approximately 8:40 a.m., about seven (7)
! minutes after it was declared by the utility. The notification of response agencies was begun promptly and was completed within 30 minutes. The State EOC was fully operational for communications, dose assessment, and deelslon making functions by approximately 8:55 a.m.
1 e
-.-e.w n. . ._ _ ._ _.
45 N:w H:=pshiro Stato EOC
- Notification of the " Site Area Emergency" ECL was received via the NAS tele-phone at approximately 9:25 a.m. All response agencies were notified, and the EOC was completely staffed by all agencies by approximately 9:45 a.m.
The New Hampshire State EOC liaison staff to the EOF was, as agreed to prior to. the exercise, prepositioned in the vicinity of the facility in Vernon, Vermont.
Emergency Operations management worked well. The Director of Civil Defense exercised a good command of his staff's activities and those of EOC personnel from other State agencies. Checklists and plans were extensively used. The Governor's repre-sentative maintained a frequent schedule of briefing the Governor, over the telephone, of tlin status on off-site activities. The Governor's representative also played a very active
[ part in the incident management and decision making processes at the EOC. His knowledge of New Hampshire's off-site planning was impressive.
Message handling was much improved over that of the previous exercise. The
! - Operations Officer, who is responsible for coordinating incoming and outgoing message -
flow, had an operations liaison who managed hard-copy message distribution.
I Emerge 3cy communications at the New Hampshire State EOC were adequate.
i Notification of the " Unusual Event" was received at the warning point prior to activation
- of the State EOC. After notification of the " Site Area Emergency," the NAS telephone
~was transferred from the EOC operations room to the command e.nd control. center.
Notification of the " General Emergency" was received at approximately 10:05 a.m. via dedicated telephone in the dose assessment room. However, this information never i reacheit operations management. This information was later received via the NAS i
~
telephone in the command center at 10:17sa.m. The NAS telephone was operational
! throughout the exercise and was effectively utilized by the New Hampshire Civil Defense l Director to coordinate actions with the Vermont and Massachusetts Directors.
The New Hampshire Civil Defense radio was operational throughout the exercise,
, but according to the communications coordinator, reception from Keene was "very l poor." The CD radio system is used to maintain communications with the field-monitoring teams, and these communications were monitored-by the operator in the communications center. It was evident that some difficulties-were encountered with field-team communications with the IFO in Keene.
In addition to the NAS telephone and the New Hampshire CD radio system, there are a number of alternate links that can be relied upon for external communications with the State EOC. These systems are redundant and include State Pollee high band and low band (not operational for this exercise), Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio, amateur 2-meter radio, NAWAS, and commerefal telephone. As speelfled in the State plan, a direct telephone line links the accident-assessment function in the EOC with the New
- Hampshire representative at the EOF. This link was operational after the " Site Ares Emergency" declaration for the receipt of technical (i.e., plant status and
, meteorological) data and integrated dose assessment information from the EOF.
I Each agency representative at the EOC had a telephone for communicating with agency personnel outside the EOC. A centrex telephone system with six (6) 2-way lines and one (1) 800 line for incoming calls was used to serve approximately twenty-five (25)
. ~. -
46 Nsw ift.mpshire Stato EOC telephones within the EOC. Although the available lines became intermittently overloaded at peak times, additional lines could be used in an actual emergency. This
- capability to open additional telephone capacity corrects a previous deficiency.
The mechanics of internal communications within the State EOC have been improved since the last exercise. Standardized mwssage forms have been introduced, and l agency representatives were familiar with the general use of these forms. The New '
Hampshire Civil Defense Agency is currently considering design of a standard State !
form, which is expected to further improve the coordination of information. In addition, internal communications within the EOC were aided by public-address-system briefings of the operations room staff. Emerge:ncy-classification information was prominently displayed in the operations room. In practice, however, internal communications still needs to be significantly improved at the EOC. Information flow between the DPH accident-assessment team and the emergency operations management and staff was a major problem in this exercise. Important information from the plant, relayed directly to DPH was not conveyed in a timely fashion to decision makers. Information about the starting and stopping of the release was relayed by DPH to the decision makers approximately 20 and 40 minutes respectively, after they knew about it. Similarly, DPH knew about the utility's declaration of a " General Emergency" about 15 minutes before
-conveying this information to EOC management. Furthermore, information ~ flow hatween the CD Director / Governor's representative, who shared an office, and the main operations room was not good. Much important information was relayed directly from the DPH accident-assessment team to the CD Director / Governor's representative.
However, much of this information never reached the operations room. The operations !
room staff were never told that there was a release, or that the release had been terminated. Consequently, this information was never reflected on the main status board, nor contained in any briefing to operations room personnel. A detailed discussion of the consequences of this follows in the protective action section.
- The initial alerting of the public was accomplished via siren system and tone-alert radios (NOAA) at 10
- 00 a.m., followed by an EBS broadcast at 10:05 a.m. through Station WKNE. This radio station was alerted to remain on standby at 8:52 a.m., af ter the " Alert" was declared. The initial EBS message was drafted by the PIO, in consultation with the CD Director and Governor's representative. Before sounding the sirens and releasing an EBS message, the CD Director had the PIO inform the Media Center, and the CD Director informed his counterparts in Vermont and Massachusetts over the NAS telephone. One reason for the apparent delay, from 9:25 a.m. to 10:00
- a.m., between " Site Area Emergency" and initial alerting of the public was that the control station in Vermont, which also activates tone-alert radios in New Hampshire, did not transmit its signal until 10:00 a.m.
Based on observer Inquiries regarding siren verifleation and provisions to monitor EBS transmissions, a radio message was dispatched to the IFO at approximately 10:01 a.m. The reply received at approximately 10:20 a.m. confirmed siren activation at 10:08 a.m. The means of monitoring EBS messages at the State EOC was described as being via radio patch and commercial telephone to the EBS broadcast station. However, this was not demonstrated during the exercise.
47 Nw Hr.npshire Stato E0'C I
Public alerting was simulated for a 10:45 a.m. siren tone-alert radio sounding and EBS message for the evacuation of Hinsdale and Chesterfield. As was done previously, this was fully coordinated in advance with the other two states' media centers and with the utility at 10:30 a.m.
j 7 New Hampshire's protective action decision to evacuate Hinsdale and Chesterfield was made with insufficient information. Between the time that the CD Director and Governor's representative, in consultation with DPH, had formulated its 1 protective action decision (10:24 a.m.) and the time that the evacuation was to go into !
effect (10:45 a.m.), the basic factor generating the decision to evacuate changed. The j release had stopped at 10:30 a.m., yet this was not told to the decision makers or the
]
senior DPH representative briefing them until 10:48 a.m., three minutes after the evacuation order went into effect. The NRC representative relayed this information, not
{ the DPH accident-assessment staff. It is very important to note, at this point, that the Information flow from the DPH liaison at the EOF to the State EOC accident-assessment ,
staff in Concord was timely, so there is no question that the information was in-house.
At a DPH briefing held for decision makers around 12:00 noon, it was learned for the first time that it had been raining off and on during the release and subsequent plume travel. The fact that two lightning strikes on the plant were reported by the utility, the second strike helping to generate the release, should have alerted Dl'II that rain and un-
- stable weather conditions usually associated with a lightning storm were prevalent in the EPZ. At no time during the critical period when the release was occurring, and shortly after it terminated, was a weather forecast pertaining to the scenario requested. It j should be noted, however, that this aspect of the exercise scenario was very poorly i
controlled by the utility. The utility had no control data developed for an accurate weather forecast, should one have been requested.
i ; The reason for the lapse in rapid communication between the New Hampshire
- Department of Public Health and the decision makers in the State EOC (the Governor j
and the CD Director in this instance) is the method of communication involving several
- significant delays in transmitting information from one individual to another. Reporting of accident-assessment information to the command and control units must be expedited l
l In order for them to make informed decisions about actions to protect the public health i and safety.
- In an attempt to resolve the previously recognized problem of slow transmission of accident data to the decision makers, the State Office of Civil Defense stationed its
~
, ohn personnel at the EOF. These individuals apparently were charged wtih keeping Civil -
Defense informed of all pertinent information originating at the EOF, however, no Information flow from them to the EOC could be observed. It is clear that there is a great need to strengthen the !!nk between Civil Defense and DPH in the protective ,
action decisionmaking process.
i
+
At 11:43 a.m., NRC recommended a 2-mile general evacuation, 5 miles for children and pregnant women. This was precautionary regarding the consequences of a potential large release from a suspected hydrogen buildup. Based on this, New ,
Hampshire decided to recommend that Winchester evacuate at 12:00 p.in. At 11:50 a.m.,
the NRC liaison Indicated that he had mistakenly reported the previous recommendation,
- - .- .- . _ - - - _ _ _ - -- ._. . = . -._ . --
48 N:w ifampshiro State EOC and that it should have read just a 2-mile evacuation. Subsequently, the decision to
{ evacuate Winchester was rescinded.
Evacuation of Hinsdale and Chesterfield was reported as completed around 12:30 l p.m. The State EOC staff tracked the simulated evacuation of schools and nursing homes, and their transportation needs, throughout the evacuation. Also tracked was a troop of six boy scouts and a scout master in the Pisgah State Forest.
+
As part of New Hampshire's protective action decision to evacuate, two access control points were physically activated for this exercise, and three were simulated. The FEMA observer was able to physically observe one location; the other was not manned when he arrived. The state trooper observed was well aware of the duties of his assignment and had written procedures. However, he had no dosimetry equipment and j .
was not familiar with the location of the reception center. At the State EOC, the state pollee liaison demonstrated his knowledge and ability to man numerous access and traffic control points.
Although media relations are to be handled primarily at the Joint Media Center, the State EOC has a facility to handle media Inquiries concerning State activities.
] Throughout this exercise, the State's PIO representative at the Media Center was not kept well informed of utility-generated press releases; consequently, neither was the
! State. It has been reported that, in several instances, the utility merely showed State (all three) representatives a copy of a news release right before releasing it. This is not in the spirit of sharing information.before release. For example, a serious case involved l
an 11:50 a.m. hard-copy news release from the media center, received near 12:30 p.m.,
I which mentioned that Vermont Yankee personnel had been evacuated from the site. This release occurred at a time when the State thought that all releases were finished and giant operations were being restored to stability. When the CD Director called the
' Media Center to clarify this information, it was learned that the news release should
- have read "...non-essential persornel...." In a real situation, an uncoordinated release of this sort could have been devastating to public confidence in the' State.
l
.The space assigned in the new State EOC for radiological health functions was somewhat crowded, but it was adequate for the players. Maps had been prepared for the l
Rad Health Assessment Operations and Governor's Consultation Rooms that showed the l
i location of predesignated monitoring points, highways, population centers, dairy farms, water supplies, parks, etc. The direction of the plume could be changed and shown as an overlay of both the EPZ and Ingestion pathway maps. A smaller version (8" x 11") of these maps was available for recording location of teams and readings for use in keeping the Governor's office advised. These smaller maps could be used for sketching the plume as it developed, progressed, or terminated from the New Hampshire areas of concern.
1 The State Radiological Health staff has made many improvements in its 1 operational procedures for dose assessment and protective action recommendations. For example, standardized data sheets had been developed for recording data from the EOF and the DPH staff member (s) assigned to the EOF; these sheets had improved their ability to obtain and transmit essential data needed for dose assessment. In addition, the i
f i
- - - ~ ,n,-._n . - -.,- -_. ..,-_,,._----- ._ -. - - - , , . . - ,. .-- ,...___..---_ -,.,_. .._-..-_,-.n , , .-- -, . -_...--- . . ,..
~
49 N:wHampshi,reStateEdC form for recording and transmitting data to the IFO was standardized. However, accident assessment was slow after the data were received, because it was done using hand calculations.
7 Use of a computer terminal at the EOC to depict the shape and size of a plume as well as its movement would greatly improve the performance of the dose-assessment protective action function. Specifically, it would assist in the deployment of off-site monitoring teams. Such a terminal is planned for installation before the next exercise, and its use for developing control data was demonstrated during this exercise at the EOF.
The DPH coordinators at the IFO followed instructions for the deployment of the monitoring teams and relayed data to the State EOC regarding their location and the
- radiological situation by radio. Most of the time their reports could be monitored by the l State EOC radio room, showing that the relay system was working successfully.
' Communication with the EOF and the State Department of Health monitoring -
teams through the IFO was improved over the last exercise. However, it seems that the i control data were released too late or not at all. For example, the EOF did not I determine that iodine was released in the plume until after 11:00 a.m. Therefore, DPH briefed the decision makers at 10:30 a.m. that there was no lodine in the release. They further informed their IFO staff of the same. However, the data in the scenario indicated detectable levels of lodine in New Hampshire. Again, poor design of control l data for field-monitoring teams by the utility contributed to this problem.
l State officials had a one-hour discussion of reentry considerations to be put into effect following the de-escalation of the exercise accident. The DPH accident-assessment staff discussed what they understood to be the radiological consequences of the accident, and the State Veterinarian and agriculture representative discussed the need to put animals on stored feed in the affected area. Similarly, milk production was discussed for the, affected area, with the recommendation being to cease milk production l
for at least 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in the area to allow for State testing. An EBS message dealing with this, along with maintaining access control during reentry (only residents allowed in) was prepared at 2:30 p.m. However, due to the fact that the exercise was terminated shortly thereafter, around 2:50 p.m., the EBS message was never used.
The scenario was substantially flawed because important meteorological Information in the form of a weather forecast regarding the expected shift in winds was
.not promptly provided to the participants. This, in combination with the quick-moving nature of the accident, put State decision makers at a considerable disadvantage.
l
[Defleiencies and Recommendations ,
. 1.
Description:
There were significant lapses in Internal com-munications between upper-level operations management and EOC operations staff. The most significant example of this is that the operations room staff was never Informed that a release was in process, or that it had subsequently been terminated. This was also reflected in the status boards in the operations room, where
50 N w Hespshiro Steto EOC ,
the release data were never recorded (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, A.2.a; F.1.d). .
l Recommendation: Operations management should take positive steps to remedy the situation by stationing itself in the operations room and conducting most of its business there. By operating out of the office of the Governor's representative and moving the NAS phone into that office, operations management moved the most valuable communications link in this exercise away from the EOC staff. All information received in the EOC should be transferred to the Operations Officer as a matter of course, regardless of
~
I - where it is initially received. Critical information should be immediately broadcast over the PA system to ensure its dispersal, thus cutting through possible administrative delays in hard-copy message handling. (In this case, however, hard-copy message handling was not the problem; it was hard-copy message generation.) ,
- 2. Descriptions. Exchange of information among the Department of ,
e Public Health accident assessment staff and between repre-4 sentatives of the DPH management and Civil Defense operations
! management, did not result in rapid enough communication of ,
accident assessment data from the plant and the field for the l Governor to make appropriate protective action decisions.
[ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Planning Standard A (Organizational Control), Planning Standard F (Prompt Ccamunications among Principle Response Organizations)]. (CATEGORY A DEFICIENCY).
Recommendatica: 'The Department of Public Health and Civil Defense management teams must be Informed immediately of all changes in plant status, meteorological conditions, field monitoring cata, and the implications of the data for protective action recommendations. Therefore, the plan procedures should be j reviewed and changed, as necessary, so that the information flow will become more rapid and comprehensive. All staff connected with the emergency operations should then be trained to recognize the implications of key data, and in the new reporting procedures, i . 3. Descriptions Accident assessment was done with hand calculations and, therefore, was slow (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, I.8).
]
l l
!~ Recommendation: Provide the Department of Public Health with a i computer terminal that can link up with the EOF's computer l system to speed up accident assessment. 1 l
- 4.
Description:
The State has not yet procured a supply of K! to be stockpiled in Concord for use by emergency workers. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.e).
~ ~
51 N;wHampshiro.StateE5C Recommendatiom Purchase sufficient quantity of KI to meet the State's needs for its emergency workers. -
Areas for Improvement and Recommendations
. 1. Descr8ptiom Although the Civil Defense radio system remained operational r.nd functioned better than in the last exercise, the State EOC experienced poor reception from Keene.
Recommendation: Additional technical upgrading is still needed to improve the utility of this primary radio channel.
- 2.
Description:
Although the means of monitoring EBS messages at
, the State EOC was described, these provisions were not .
demonstrated during the exercise.
Recommendatiom The means for monitoring ESS niessages by decision makers at the New Hampshire State EOC should be demonstrated at future exercises.
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52 Nzw Hampshire Stato Laboratory i
2.2.2 New Hampshire State Laboratory The State Laboratory's capacity for analyzing and processing samples of food, water, crops, and milk would have been overwhelmed if substantial contamination had resulted from the plume. There is no spare equipment to backup the laboratory's capability in case of equipment failure. The laboratory has a capability to perform qualitative tests on environmental samples, but as yet it cannot obtain quantitative results. Additional training 19 this area is called for.
The laboratory has a Ge(LI) detector but no Nal(TI) system. The shield for the Ge(LI) needs a cover to reduce the background. This would improve the counting statistics considerably, and it would also improve the Minimum Detectable Activity
- (MDA) value. Laboratory personnel do not count samples overnight because of concern over operating the Ge(LI) after a power failure. This could be overcome if they became familiar with equipment available for resolving this problem. The laboratory director is starting a write-up of an SOP for an entire environmental survelliance program. He has written some things on the Ge(LI) and MCA; however, he does not have the background at this time on problems associated with the electronics of the system and the calculations involved in establishing a Minimum Detectable Activity. This MDA is further complicated because the Ge(LI) detector does not have an adequate shield to reduce the background count rate. State Laboratory staff should arrange to spend time at the Winchester Engineering and Analytical Center (WEAC) in Winchester, Massachusetts with I the environmental surveillance group and the electronics section. This would assist the New Hampshire program to work towards establishing an SOP for a complete environ-mental surveillance program. Including quantitative results and evaluation of electronics problenis.
Defleiencias and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
Laboratory staff need additional training in order to
.! develop an SOP for a complete environmental surveillance i program, wiiich includes the ability to obtain quantitative results l from sample analysis and proper techniques for dealing with equipment operation characteristics (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, I.8).
! Recommendatiom Arrange to have laboratory staff receive
~
training at the Winchester Analytical and Engineering Center of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Laboratory in
- Winchester, Mass.
4 ;
- 2.
Description:
The laboratory does not have an adequate shield for its Ge(LI) detector (i.e., one with a cover) to reduce the back-ground count rate and enable lab staff to make quantitative calculations (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !.8).
Recommendation: Procure this piece of equipment and obtain f suitable training in its use at the Winchester FDA facility. !
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- . . - - . . . . . \
Kocns IFO 53 2.2.3 Keene IFO +
., The facility at the fire station in Keene is equipped adequately to suppor.t operations. The status board was utilized and maintained with current information that was available. While most necessary maps were posted, there were no maps showing evacuation routes, access control points, and radiological monitoring points. This
, Information was available in the plans, however.
. Initial notification and alerting of the Keene IFO occurs through the State Police at the " Unusual Event" state, with follow-up notification at the " Alert" ECL. State Police are notified by the utility, and in turn they radio the Southwestern Mutual Aid i Radio located in the Keene fire department's dispatch center. Keene fire-department personnel verify the incoming message by a telephone call to. the State EOC in Concord, then proceed to alert the local EOCs, as designated in the plan. Activation of the IFO occurs at the " Alert" ECL, with the notification of the staff coming from each parent
- agency represented at the IFO. In general, the alerting of staff originates from offices -
in Concord.
I Complete set-up and mobilization of the IFO waa demonstrated, with the exception of some prepositioning of personnel fro'm Concord. The set-up of the facility was rapid and efficient, and the facility was fully staffed at 11:00 a.m. (including two-hour driving time from Concord).
The first-shift staff demonstrated adequate training and knowledge in their functions at the IFO. Twenty-four hour staffing at the IFO was demonstrated by the i .
presentation of a duty roster; the three field teams demonstrated a full shift change.
- Emergency Operations at the Keene IFO are twofold, in that overall management l and direction is handled by the IFO Civil Defense Director and the direction and control
- of the field-monitoring teams is the responsibility of the representative from the DPH.
These two groups functioned separately within the IFO facility. Improvements in inter-actions between these two operations would be beneficial.
The CD director, the individual in charge of the IFO operations, displayed the knowledge and training required of his position. Periodic briefings were held during the exercise; however, they were not as Informationally complete nor as effective as possible. This was due in part to the level of information transfer between the State EOC and the IFO.
- Agencies were interacting and relaying information to the CD director, but pertinent data were not always being given to the appropriate departments. This situ-ation is similar to that of the State EOC. Messages were recorded on a multiple copy
- l. " Speed Letter" form but were not effectively logged in (i.e., a running sequential log of .
Incoming / outgoing messages was not maintained). Messages were not reproduced and distributed among the agencies, excluding the verbal discussions. Therefore, message l handling was not as efficient as possible. Numerous times the CD director hand-carried i messages to the communication room, in the process vacating his desk. This did not produce a problem during the exercise, but it could potentially cause some confusion and possible loss of information. Security of the IFO room was maintained throughout the exercise.
i l
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54 Koens IFO l
The primary means of communication between the IFO, State EOC, local EOCs, and field-monitoring teams is via the Civil Defense radio, with commercial telephone-lines used as backup. Although the radio system functioned better than last time, radio dead spots in the 10-mile EPZ hindered communications with field teams. Telephone backup for field teams is not suitable. The Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio net is available to supplement the other communications systems.
Communications with the reception center were inadequate. The single tele-I phone was busy during the limited exercise activity; if 3500 people were to move through j the reception center (as predicted), the single telephone would be insufficient. There is no backup system.
EBS was not monitored at the IFO. In the area of protective actions, the IFO generally backs up local responsibilities or State responsibilities. IFO staff were knowledgeable regarding their responsibilities in this area. There was a sufficient supply of dosimeters (0-200 mR,0-20 R) available at the IFO for emergency personnel required to go into the fleid. Dosimeters were charged and issued, along with record cards and instructions, to field workers prior. to their departure. Permanent record dosimeters (TLDs) were also provided. .
. KI was available in all field operation kits. Proper instructions on its use were passed along to the emergency staff.
1 Decontamination procedures were demonstrated at the Keene High School Gymnasium. Fleid activity personnel were instructed on decontamination procedures and the location of the decontamination center. ,
The Department of Public Health arrived at the IFO at 9:00 a.m., and DPH staff
- were set up for operation by 9
- 15 a.m. The three field-monitoring teams arrived at 9:10 j p.m. and were issued TLDs by the Department of Civil Defense, which maintains the
. records. Pocket (self-reading) dosimeters were checked and logs maintained by DPH.
1 The teams departed at 9:30 a.m. to prescheduled monitoring pcInts at the Hinsdale EOC (teams A and B) and the Chesterfield EOC (team C). The teams were well briefed on i procedure by DPH before leaving.
! Radio communication remains a problem at the IFO. While the expected " blind spots" were encountered by the field teams, adequate procedures have not been developed to have commamications reestablished in a timely manner. In an attempt to contact the field monitoring teams, DPH telephoned the Chesterfield and Hinsdale EOCs,
! which did not result in timely communication and so as a result, the teams were not
' dispatched to proper monitoring locations.
Dose assessment was not done at the IFO, nor were reasons for dose assessment or reasons for using KI communicated to the field teams. The topographical map was not kept up-to-date, however, the DPH has small maps available. It is suggested that the latter map, which is available, be used and the plume be plotted as it moves. This would require additional training on the part of the radiological health staff at the IFO.
1-
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. 55 Kocno IFO
. 1 Projected meteorological data were not available in a timely manner, partly 1 because of poor communications between the EOC and IFO, and between the IFO and the l teams. As a result, the teams were not dispatched to proper locations for monitoring.
Therefore, it is recommended that the IFO be eliminated so that deployment of the teams will occur closer to the " action" (i.e., at the EOF or state EOC).
Defleieneles and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
The Civil Defense communication system did not function adequately between the IFO and field-monitoring teams.
Also, there was no backup radio system; commerefal telephones were used if they were available (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.d).
- Recommendation: Problems with the communications system
. should be identified and remedied. An appropriate backup communleation system also needs to be identified and tested.
- 2.
Description:
The communications problems were instrumental in keeping meteorological information from reaching the teams in a ,
timely manner, and as a result the teams were not dispatched to
- proper monitoring locations (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, !.8; !.11).
Recommendations Adequate procedures for communicating with the field teams should be developed.
- 3.
Description:
There were insufficient telephone lines (1) and no backup communleations system to the Relocation Center. 4 Recommendations Additional telephone !!nes and backup com-munication system to the reception center should be addressed.
- 4. Description EBS messages broadcast were not monitored.
Recommendation: All EBS broadcasts should be routinely monitored, along with checking with local communities as to the functioning of the public-alert system.
Areas for Improvement and Recommendations
- 1. Deseription Messages were not logged, and the IFO CD director was still directly involved in message distribution.
- Recommendation: A logging system should be Implemented, with
. an Individual speelfically assigned to this funetton. An Individual other than the IFO director should be responsible for message :
distribution. [
56 Kccn3 IFO
Description:
There were no maps posted showing evacuation l
- 2. ;
routes, access control points, and monitoring locations. .
Raeommendation: One or more maps covering this information should be prepared for use by IFO staff.
- 3.
Description:
The IFO N.H.C.D.A. functions parallel actions assigned either at the local level or State level.
Recommendation: Abolish the IFO in its entirety and transfer its civil defense functions back to the State EOC. The only function
- that is really necessary to maintain at Keene is that of communi-cations.
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e 9
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w meaumme r** e + , ,ge .
57 Nsw hapshiro Field Msnitorireg -
2.2.4 New Hampahire Field Monitoring
'Off-site field-team mobilization was not demonstrated. Instead, three field i
teams were propositioned at the Keene IFO at the " Alert" ECL. The standard procedure
- for mobilization involves the Division of Public Health Services (DPHS) Emergency i Planning Coordinator notifying monitoring-team personul using Appendix B to the New Hampshire Emergency Response Procedures. This 14 a call list that identifies home
! addresses and telephone numbers of field-team members and also allows staff to be notified on a 24-hour basis. Initial notifications are made via commercial telephone.
In general, field-team equipment was adequa'e. ;l'he emergency procedures l include an inventory list of equipment and supplies contained in radiation-monitoring kits i and contamination-clothing kits. Since teams were prepositioned, equipment was ,
i inventoried prior to the exercise. Vehicles are State-owned station wagons, which are adequate in size to accommodate team members .and equipment. Radiation-detection Instruments used were a portable ion chamber (PIC-6A) and a radiation monitor (RM-14). Air sampling equipment included a portable air sampler that operated on power j supplied from the vehicle. Filter eartridges and charcoal cartridges were available; j silver zeolite and silica gel were not.. Calibration of radiation- and air-monitoring l
equipment was current. Equipment for sampling ingestion pathway exposures (i.e., soil, vegetation, water, and milk) are not part of the kit makeup. Additional equipment j includes an anemometer and barometer for confirming meteorological conditions.
j Although emergency procedures are established for setting up and carrying out
- field operations, observation of personnel indleated that additional training is needed in
! the use of SOPS. When instruments were turned on, battery checks were made, but
- instrument response was not checked with a radioactive source. Team members operated i portable survey instruments only at designated control points ard not while en route to
! each location. Despite the radioactive release at 10:00 a.m., an air sample was not taken l until 2:00 p.m. At this time the wind had alresdy shifted, and radiation levels were at background level. The procedure checklist for set-up and obtain.ng an air sample was not i
used. It !s also unclear how the 10-IvClhe criterion is met for detecting field lodine
) concentrations in the presence of noble 'ges. Teams were famil!ar with the area
! geography and designated monitoring points and made efficient ase of travel time; this is i an improvement from the previous exercise.
Protective equipment for controlling radiation exposure was adequate and l Included full anti-contamination clothing (hood, gloves, shoe covers), respirstors and l
filter eartridges, remote handling devices, and KI. Procedures and criteria for j authcrizing use of KI need clarif! cation at all levels of the emergency organization.
i Pocket dosimeters of 0-200 mR and 0-20 R, and TLDs were used for maintaining l exposures. Team members did not check and record readings of dosimetry at regular *
! intervals, nor were they requested to do so by the IFO. Information was not requested by l team members nor provided by the IFO in regard to special safety considerations, where l' radioactive releases were projected, expected radionucildes contained in the plume, and l, what to do after reporting results. Direction and control given to team members on how l to track the plume was poor, since (a) it was never found, and (b) twice teams were sent to the same monitoring location for extended periods of time although the exact plume i location was several miles away.
i 58 'N:v ifra pshiro Fiold Msnitoring The unusual and dramatic wind shifts presented in the scenario made offsite fie'Id monitoring very difficult in New Hampshire and Vermont. Future scenarios should provide realistic meteorological conditions and additional time in each state for plume tracking by offsite teams.
Defleimanism and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
SOPS were not followed by field teams during offsite radiological monitoring (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.7; I.11).
- Recommendation: Train the offsite field teams to use and follow New Hampshire SOPS during radiological surveillance.
- 2.
Description:
The teams did not understand when to administer KI (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. II, J.10.e).
Baeommendation: Provide training to all organizationallevels on eriteria for authorizing KI administration to emergency workers.
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- 3. L;yC-:= Information provided to offsite teams from the IFO was cursory (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.d).
Recommendatica: Improve direction and control given to offsite ,
monitoring teams so that they.are kept apprised of any changes which could affect radiological monitoring.
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59 Kasn2 State Collsgo Raiocation Cente.r .
2.2.5 Keene State. College Relocation Center .
Keene Junior High School Mass Care Center
- - The Relocation Center at Keene State College was activated at 10
- 30 a.m., when school employees arrived and started to establish the center. At 10:45 a.m., welfare workers arrived. The center was set up in about 15 minutes, since the staff had an established floor plan and a " kit" that contains supplies and signs tailored for this type of emergency. This was good preparedness.
The Relocation Center team members were professional and knew their major i roles. There were a few new players for this exercise, and they were adequately briefed by their more experienced fellow workers.
- There was a need for more direct communications ability at the Relocation Center. There was only one telephone available. Although the Red Cross liaison staff had a radio with them, which was used to help support the staff from the school and welfare office, the real purpose of that radio was for Red Cross communications with its people in mass care centers. A mobile CD radio for communications with the IFO would be good backup to the telephone. It should be noted that the FEMA observer was informed later in the exercise by school officials that additional telephones could be l
made available, but the exercise players were not aware of this at the time.
l As in the previous exercise, no medical or first aid staff were available at the Relocation Center. A controller from Civil Defense pointed out that in an emergency, an ambulance would be nearby. The Relocation Center manager / staff should have a l written procedure on how to obtain predesignated medical help. Also, workers on the scene who have first ald/ CPR training should be identified.
Relocation Center staff need an SOP, or additional information in their plan, giving details on the specific kinds of help to evacuees they can provide. For instance, their plan authorizes the_ Relocation Center to provide financial help, but no one knew how that would be done.
As recommended from the last exercise, the State has developed a registration form for use in the relocation centers.
Although 24-hour staffing was not physically demonstrated, a staffing roster indicated a full second-shift capability.
- . The relocation center staff was not aware of any form, stamp, or tag that would
- be issued to evacuees to indicate that they had been cleared by the radiological ;
monitoring teams.
i* A Mass Care Ce.nter was activated in the Keene Junior High School. A Red q Cross shelter manager and a nurse were at this location. Although it was planned to have relocatees pass through this center, this did not occur. Thus, the volunteers did not get an opportunity to test their abilities.
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60 Kacna Stato Collego Ralocaticn Center A disaster team from the Nashua, New Hampshire Red Cross arrived at the center to assist. This allowed them to " talk through" the procedures specific to nuclear accidents.
The Red Cross had both a HAM radio operstor and a Red Cross band radio.
Communications capability was good. All backup help and supplies would be obtained in the same manner as they would for a natural disaster.
- Defleiencies and Recommendations (None)
Areas for Improvement and Recommendations
- 1. Descriptiom Existing communications equipment was minimal (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,. Planning Standard F).
Recommendatiom A mobile CD radio would provide excellent backup communications capability for the Relocation Center in case of tied-up or inadequate commercial telephone availability.
- 2.
Description:
Staff was not informed of how to deliver the full scope of services they are being tested to provide (i.e., financial services) (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.3).
Recommendation: Identify specific at n y responsibility and source of funds for providing this service.
- 3. Descriptiom No trained medical staff were available on the Relocation Center staff for this exercise.
f Recommendatiom All staff trained in first aid and CPR should be l
identified during actual operations.
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61 .N;w Hampshiro Local EOCs , ,
Chastcrfield i
2.2.8 New Hampshire Imeal EOCs 2.2.8.1 Chesterfield The EOC locat'ed in the Town Offlee Building was comfortable and well lighted eith sufficient space, furnishings, and telephones. Kitchen facilities exist, but there are no provisions for bringing in cots and a portable generator for supporting extended operations. The status board was kept up to date, and maps showing the EPZ, evacuation routes, and access control points were prominently displayed. Population data, while cv;ilable in the plan, were not marked on the map.
- Activation of the EOC began promptly after receipt of verified " Alert" messages ct 9:34 a.m. from the Southwest Mutual Fire Aid warning point and the IFO in Keene.
The EOC was, except for the Radiation Safety Officer, fully staffed by 9:50 a.m.
Thereafter, full participation was limited, because some of the volunteer staff were ,
called away from time to time to fulfill their regular job responsibilities.
Elected cfficials actively- participated. Round-the-clock staffing espability was not j demonstrated.
The Civil Defense Director was in charge of operations under the authority of the First Selectman. He held frequent informal briefings and consulted the staff when decisions had to be made. A copy of the plan and written checklists and procedures were conveniently available for reference as needed.
The Civil Defense radio was the primary system for communicating with the State EOC and the IFO, with other radio and commerelal telephone for backup.
1 Commerelal telephone was used for communicating with others, with radio as backup.
l All systems worked well. However, although they were affected by the plume, Chesterfield did not get any information about the release or the plume movement. They ,
i vae not notified of ~ the " General Emergency" until almost 30 minutes after it was declared.
Dose assessmu . ,nd protective action recommendations were generated by the '
State and are not local responsibilities.
4 Public alerting and instruction was accomplished by siren and tone-alert radio l activation. These activities and an EBS broadcast were originated by the State in coordination with Vermont and Massachusetts. , Calls were placed to schools, nursing homes, and other public institutions. Route alerting also was simulated.
A message recommending evacuation was received at 10:45 a.m., and procedures c;re promptly Instituted. All activities were simulated and included activation of '
traffic control, provisions for maintaining open evacuation routes, and provisions for transporting the mobility-impaired school children, the alcohol rehabilitation faellity residents, and other residents with special needs. The EOC also was evacuated. These wire very sketchy demonstrations, and actually obtaining bus transportation may be difficult during an incident.
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62 N w Hampshiro Lscal EOCs Chastcrfield Proper dosim,etry equipment - including TLDs, survey meters, and permanent exposure record cards - were on hand. However, there were not enough of these, they were not distributed, and no instructions were given. The Radiation Safety Officer, who participated in the last exercise, did not participate In this one. On the whole, the staff appeared to be knowledgeable about exposure control Defleieney and Recommendation Descriptions There was not enough dosimetry equipment (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, U, K.3.a).
e- Recommendations The state should provide additional radiological monitoring equipment.
Area forImprovement
Description:
Population data were not posted on maps in the EOC. This was noted as an area for improvement in the last i exercise (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, U, J.10.b).
Recommendation: Population data are available, and should be put on the map display for ready. reference.
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63 Nw Mr.mpshiro I.ocal EOCs Hinsdale 1.2.8.2 Hinarkle ,
The Hinsdale EOC located in the fire station had adequate space, furniture, and
. II@ ting, and emergency power was used for 45 minutes to operate the EOC. An EPZ map with plume sectors, evacuation routes, relocation centers, and access control points was posted, and an ingestion pathway map showing locations of farms and water supplies was displayed. A population distribution map is part of the local plan. Status boards were prominently displayed and updated frequently, and emergency classification levels were posted. Two telephone !!nes were available, but additional lines would enhance communications with local citizens. Physical resources were sufficient for sustaining extended operations. Cots could be brought in if necessary.
The Fire Chief was notified of an " Unusual Event" at 6:15 a.m. and activated the ~
EOC shortly thereafter. The remaining staff were summoned as deemed necessary.
Complete staffing by selectmen, Fire Chief, Police Chief, Civil Defense Director, CD Communicator, RADEF Officer, and Road Superintendent was accomplished prior to receipt of the " Site Area Emergency" notification at 9:30 a.m.
l Twenty-four-hour operation of the EOC is not possible unless staffing assistance
! is received from the State. Activation of the EOC is possible under any weather conditions, since most of the staff live nearby.
Emergency operations were effielently and competently managed by the Civil Defense Director. Procedures and checklists were effectively used, and message handling was fast and efficient. Information exchange among the staff members was excellent. Access control was achieved by recognition, or identification of those not recognized, and each person was logged into the EOC on a sign-in sheet.
Communications capability at the EOC was fair. The Civil Defense radio used for communicating with the IFO in Keene did not work properly, but alternate means worked well. The Southwest Mutual Aid Radio with one frequency and the telephones worked well. Although radio-pagers worked well, additional units would improve the system. Twelve pagers were, distributed as follows: Fire-10, Civil Defense-1, and selectman-1. Amateur radio operators both inside and outside the EOC location added to cornmunications ability and performance. Information flow to the EOC was infrequent,
, although the EOC was in the plume and was evacuated to Keene. Communications would h be improved if additional strategically placed repeaters were added to the Civil Defense radio, l: Public r.lerting was accomplished by using sirens, tone-alert radios, EBS messages, and, in some instances, route alerting. A vehicle was dispatched to a business establishment to alert them, and schools were alerted by telephone. ,
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Seven traffic control points were established promptly and effectively by g volunteer firemen. A fire would leave these traffic control points unmanned, in which I
case assistance would be requested from the State for their relief. The Highway Department personnel were dispatched to assist with traffic control at the school. A detailed, written list of the locations and needs of the mobility-impaired and others requiring assistance was available. Some of the persons having special needs were ll L
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64 New Hampshiro Local EOCs Hinsdcle notified of the simulated radiological emergency by dispatching a person in a vehicle to their homes for personal contact. ,
TLDs, 0-200 mR, 0-20 R dosimeters, survey meters, exposure and record cards were properly calibrated and distributed with instructions to emergemy workers. The RADEF Officer and several other persons were well-trained and knowledgeable in radiclogical exposure control. Persons were to be sent to Keene, New Hampshire for decontamination.
Recovery and reentry procedures were not exercised.
Deficiencies and Recommendations ,
Description:
The Civil Defense radio used as the primary means of communicating with the IFO in Keene did not work properly (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b).
- Recommendation
- Find and rectify the cause of malfunction. See that radio checks are made before placing equipment in service.
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65 Nsw Hampshire Local EOCs Richrond 2.2.8.3 Richmond The EOC was located in the fire station. It was welllighted and had sufficien,t
- space, furnishings, telephones, and emergen y power. A clearly visible status board and an EPZ map with sectors marked off were displayed. Information on evacuation routes, access control points, monitoring points, and populations was available close at hand but l
was not posted on maps. No kitchen or sleeping facilities are available, but extended j operations could be sustained by having food and cots brought in.
} Activation of the EOC was accomplished promptly after receiving and verifying an " Alert" message at 9:32 a.m. from the Southwestern Mutual Aid warning point. Staff call-up was then done by the Fire Chief, who placed calls to key officials. Full staffing -
was completed 20 minutes later. Participation was excellent. Elected officials were
- present throughout the exercise.
- Operations were well managed by the Civil Defense Director, who kept the staff informed and involved in making decisions. Plans, checklists, and written procedures were readily available, and messages were properly logged and distributed.
I Communications worked well. The Civil Defense radlIwas the primary means of
. communicating with the State and local EOCs. Commercial telephonas provided backup and communication with others.
! Dose assessments and protective action recommendations are State Department of Health and Civil Defense respasibilities. Richmond was never in or threatened by the plume and, therefore, received no protective action recommendations or instructions for alerting the public..
i Although Richmond was not evacuated, possible traffic volumes from other
! potential evacuation areas, a possibility of assisting other communities, access control, I and protection of the mobility-impaired were discussed a', .angth. School-bus drivers were contacted and prepared to assist with evacuation if called upon.
All necessary ' dosimetry equipment was. on hand, iroperly calibrated, and distributed with instructions. The staff was aware of exposure limits and procedures for using KI if its use had been ordered by the Department of Public Health. Record keeping and decontamination procedures were also thoroughly discussed.
Defleiencies and Recommendations None.
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66 N:v Hampshiro I.ocal. EOCs l Sw:nzay 2.2.6.4 Swansey The EOC located in the fire station had adequate space, furnishings, kitchen facilities, and backup power. However, only one telephone shared with the fire department was used. The status board was kept up to date, and map displays were excellent. All necessary information, including population densities and ingestion pathway data, was posted.
Activation was accomplished after an " Alert" was declared at 9:27 a.m. The message was received from the Southwestern Mutual Fire Aid warning point. The EOC was operational at about 10:00 a.m. However, full staffing was never accomplished, nor was continuous staffing capability demonstrated.
- The Civil Defense Director was in charge of olierations and was supported by the First Selectman, who was in command. Copies of the plans and written checklists were used. However, no briefings were held, and messages were not logged.
Communications were not well handled. Enough radio equipment was available -
Civil Defense radio, Fire Radio Network, and spare equipment in the police department
- but only one commercial telephone shared with the fire department is not enough. No one was assigned to radio monitoring, and no message log was kept. As a result, two separate announcements of the " General Emergency" and a message from the IFO were missed. These were not equipment faults, but were caused by understaffing and they did not occur during the last exercise.
Dose assessments and protective action recommendations are handled by the State and are not local responsibility. The scenario required no protective actions for Swanzey.
Public alerting and instruction were simulated by siren and tone-alert radio i ictivation at 10:07 a.m. and by EBS messages. These activities originated with the State and were coordinated with Massachusetts and Vermont. Route alerting and calls to schools were simulat,ed. No EBS messages or other instructions were generated in the EOC.
Swanzey was never in the plume.-exposure pathway. No protective actions were recommended for them, and no protective action procedures were demonstrated.
Proper dosimetry equipment, including TLDs and survey meters, was available.
Dosimeters were charged, calibrated, and distributed with instructions. Periodic readings and exposure record keeping were simulated.
Defleiencies and Recommendations 4
Defleie. 2ey: Full staffing was never achieved. The radio was not monitored and several important transmissions were missed (FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, i.e).
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67 New Hampshiro Local EOCs S:cnzay Recommendation: The tosn should see that capability exists for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day staffing of communication links. If necessary, assistance from the State should be requested.
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4 68 Nw Hampshiro Local EOCs Winch 2stor 1
2.2.6.5 Winchester The EOC in the Police / Civil Defense building is roomy and equipped with
, adequate furnishings, emergency power, and the physical resources necessary for l
sustaining extended operations. However, provisions should be made for installation of l additional phones; only one was available. Good displays showing all necessary l
information were posted, and the status board was kept updated. The staff did not, however, know how to plot the plume and wind direction.
Activation of the EOC occurred at 7:30 a.m., after the 6:15 a.m. " Unusual Event" l and before the 8:40 a.m. " Alert" messages were received from the Southwestern Mutual
' - Aid warning points. A " Site Area Emergency" message from Southwestern Mutual Aid at 9:22 a.m. was followed by another from the Keene IFO at 9:31 a.m. The EOC was operational and fully staffed by 9:40 a.m. Participation and interest by the participants, including elected officials, was excellent. Staff members were clearly well quallfled and trained. Continuous staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.
Operations were managed well by the Civil Defense Director under the authority The staff was frequently briefed and consulted. Plans, of the First Selectman.
checklists, and written procedures were readily available, and messages were logged properly. Handling of a simulated traffic accident was videotaped and played back. This activity was an impressive demonstration of the ability to handle an emergency without disrupting EOC operations.
The Civil Defense radio was the primary means of communicating with the State and local EOCs and the IFO. Additional radio nets, including one for ambulance services, and commerelal telephones provide backup communications. However, drops should be installed so that more telephor.es could be quickly installed. There was a problem with the Civil Defense radio; on numerous occasions the EOC unsuccessfully tried to contact the IFO. The field ' teams came to the Winchester EOC to transmit information to the IFO). The field teams also experienced difficulty with radio communications and finally resorted to the telephone to communicate with the IFO.
~
Local EOCs play no part in making dose assessments and protective action recommendations. This is a State responsibility. Winchester was not in the plume patn.
Public alerting and instruction were accomplished by siren activation coordinated with EBS broadcasts originated by the State, activation of tone-alert radios, route alerting, and calls placed to the schools and a factory. No instructions were drafted in 1 the EOC.
Evacuation was inappropriate and not ordered for Winchester. However, there ll .
were thorough discussions of traffic volume, possible impediments to transportation, i traffle control, protection and transportation for the mobility-impaired, and procedures for evacuating the schools.
The staff was well versed in radiological exposure control procedures. The supply of dosimeters, including TLDs, was adequate, sa.d they were distributed along with exposure record forms and instructions to emergency workers. The staff was well aware of decontamination procedures and of the decontamination-center location in Keene, e e o - + .,. , , _ , _ , , _ _
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69 N;w Hampshirs I.ccal EOCs Winchoctor Media reporters, had any appeared, would have been briefed on the local situation only by the First Selectman.
Defleiency and Recommendation t-
- 1. Description The Civil Defense radio did not work well in all e instances. The EOC and field teams could not reach the IFO
!l (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b).
d Recommendatiom The cause of malfunctions should be determined and periodic tests made to ensure that Civil Defense radio is
- reliable.
Area for Improvement
- 1. Descriptica: The staff did not understand how to plot the plume configuration or wind directions (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, 0.1.b).
.'f Recommendation: The Civil Defense Director should apply to the j, State for training.
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70 Masscchusotts Stato EOC i
2.3 MASSACHUSETTS STATE OPERATIONS 2.3.1 Mm==eahusetts State EOC The EOC, located in the hardened underground Civil Defense Headquarters in Framingham, was well arrarged and had all the necessary facilities for sustaining continuous operations. All necessary displays were of excellent quality and were prominently oosted. A special map with an overlay was used for keeping track of the plume movement and meteorological data.
I Officials from all agencies comprising the staff were present and actively i
! participated. The EOC was activated immediately upon receipt of an " Alert" notification from the State Police warning point at 8:41 a.m. and was operational and I -
fully staffed by 9:00 a.m. Staff call-up was done by using mobile car radios, by radio-pagers, and by personal contact. Many of the staff are fulltime paid employees normally stationed at the Civil Defense Headquarters. Continuous staffing capability was l demonstrated by presentation of an organization chart and roster and by double staffing of some positions. The Civil Defense Director was clearly 'In charge, held frequent briefings, and Involved the staff in decision making. ' Check lists and written procedures e EO was e ntro y St Ie pe , who required pos e iden fi at on The scenario limited activity for Massachusetts and required only sheltering as a protective action. The Civil Defense Director frequently contacted the EOF, the Vermont and New Hampshire Directors, and the Area IV .EOC. Demonstration of interstate cooperation and coordination was excellent.
l The communication system continues to improve. The Civil Defense radio had capability for direct contact with the Vermont and New Hampshire EOCs, the Area IV EOC, all Massachusetts local EOCs, the EOF, and the licensee. Extensive use was also i made of dedicated land lines, and commercial telephones and RACES were available for backup. An open line to the EOF was continuously maintained and monitored. The Director of Radiation Control, who was at the EOF, used this line for frequent contacts i with his NIAT representative and the Civil Defense Director at the EOC.
! Dose and accident assessment and protective action recommendations were made at the EOF. The rationales for their decisions were discussed with the NIAT representative, who in turn discussed them with the Civil Defense Director. The CD Director made decisions and consulted with the other State Directors.
Public alerting and instruction were accomplished by the use of sirens, radio-
- pagers, and the EBS. Activation of sirens and pagers was directed through Area IV and properly coordinated with EBS broadcasts. The EOC received notification of the " Alert" and of the escalation to a " Site Area Emergency" from the EOF . Notification of c escalation to " General Emergency" was, however, by a telephone call from the Media
! Center State representative, stating that Vermont Yankee had declared a " General Emergency" at 10:07 a.m. The Massachusetts Civil Defense Director then spent several minutes trying to verify the escalation with the EOF. This was unsuccessful, and was followed by a call from the New Hampshire Civil Defense Director, which confirmed the i
3 .. _ . _ _ . . .
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71 Massachusatts Stato EOC escalation. The local EOCs did not receive the information until after 10:30 a.m. (some as late as 10:45 a.m.). No protective actions were recommended, although Area IV advised all residents to shelter as a precautionary measure.
After expected traffic volume had been discussed, Area IV was directed to establish access and traffic control at the appropriate places in accordance with written p* 0cedures, which were at hand. Other selected access and traffic control points were also manned by local police officers, some of whom were not provided with protective clothing or radiological instruments. Neither did they appear to be trained in protective measures.
Deficioneles and Recommendations
Description:
Although the General Emergency message notification was received by the State, it did not come through NAWAS and the State Police in accordance with the communication channel shown in the plan. There was no explanation available for this incident. It could have been an EOF, EOC, State Police, or utility lapse (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.1.).
Recommendation: The cause of the deviation from the warning point system should be found, if possible, and steps taken to ensure the integrity of the warning point system. -
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, 73 AREA IV EQC ,
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2.3.2 Area IV EOC I The Area IV EOC is housed in the Area IV MCDA Headquarters in Belchertown and is well adapted for sustaining protracted continuous operations. All displays needed for supporting the State and local EOCs were prominently posted and effectively used.
l Doors to the EOC were kept locked, and admittance could be gained only by presenting
! acceptable identification. This EOC functions primarily in coordinating logistical j support for the local EOCs and as a communication link between the State and local EOCs.
- i Operations were managed well by the Area Civil Defense Director, who fully involved his staff and made good use of written check lists and operating procedures.
- Most of the staff's daily place of employment was at the Area IV Headquarters,
- so the EOC was quickly activated and fully staffed. The activating call came from the j Massachusetts State Police over the NAWAS, which is operational 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. An escalation to a " Site Area Emergency" also came over NAWAS, but for some reason the escalation to a " General Emergency" came lastead from the State EOC. However, this did not cause problems with the Massachusetts response. The last local EOC was notified at 10:47 a.m. that the plant was at a " General Emergency" declared at 10:03 a.m. Forty-four minutes is too long for notification of a change in emergency action level (see page 85, Defielency 1, EOF write-up).
4 Communications generally worked well, and the capability of'communleating with other states, the State EOC, the EOF, the Massachusetts local EOCs, and other local EOCs and communities was demonstrated. Two excellent radio systems were .
used: the only recently operable Civil Defense microwave system, and the Civil Defense RERP system, installed by the licensee, whleh used a repeater. The problems with the latter system that had surfaced as a defielency in the previous exercise have been corrected. Local Civil Defense radio, dedicated land lines, commercial telephone, and RACES were also available. There were some isolated problems at local EOCs because of inexperience at these locations. At one local EOC the microphone was left open on the CD radio, so they could not receive and alternate means of communication had to be used initially.
The radiological officer demonstrated good training and competence in using radiological Instruments, exposure record keeping, and controlling inventory. It was clear that he was capable of supporting or assisting local EOCs with exposure control if needed.
Access and traffic control were directed from Area IV and involved the use of both local and State police. These points were activated even though there was no evacuation. ,
Defleieneles and Recommendations
Description:
There were some problems (see Leyden and Warwick) early in the exercise with communications at some of the local EOCs.
73 AREA IV EOC These were traced to inexperienced operators. Although backup systems worked, the primary means did not work in every location '
100% of the time (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, F.1.b.). '
Recommendatica: In an emergency situation, especially one involving wide participation of local communities, Area IV (or the State EOC) should see that a radio check is made to be sure that all parties are in communication.
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74 Masscchusotts I. scal EOCs ;
Barncedston 2.3.3 Massachusetts Local EOCs Overview y With the exception of Greenfield (population of about 18,000) which serves as a reception center, the local communities are rural, with limited resources and populations varying from 498 in Leyden to 2,386 in Warwick. .The EOCs in all of these towns are staffed by volunteers with varying degrees of training. The State Plan provides for assisting the local staffs when necessary with State personnel and also provides for on-going training.
2.3.3.1 Bernardston
- The EOC, located in the rear of the fire station, was minimal in terms of space '
and resources needed for sustaining protracted operations. Only one telephone was available. Necessary displays were posted, but sectors, populations, and access control points were not marked .on the evacuation map. None of the public-information brochures said to have recently been reissued could be found.
Q Activation occurred at 8:50 a.m. after the Civil Defense Director received and verified an " Alert" notification from the Tri-State Warning Point. The EOC was operational at 9:00 a.m. and fully staffed at 9:30 a.m.
The Civil Defense Director kept the staff briefed, involved them inimaking decisions, and otherwise managed operations well. Good use was made of written checklists and procedures, and a message log was kept. A message from Area IV stating that the utility had declared a " General Emergency" at 10:07 a.m. was received by Bernardston at 10:38 a.m. Instructions for the public and sheltering activities were simulated. The staff appeared to have no understanding of the significance of the Governor's declaration of a " State of Emergency," but this was explained well by the
- - State exercise controller.. Introduction of free play by the controller added interest for the participants.
The primary means of communication was the new Civil Defense radio micro-wave system, which worked well. This system was supplemented by the RERP Civil Defense radio and repeater. Problems with the RERP radio at previous exercises have been corrected. RACES and a commercial telephone were also available for backup.
Dose assessments and protective action recommendations are not made locally.
l A local decision to shelter in-place was consistent with the developing tuation. There was a good discussion about this.
Public alerting and instructions were accomplished by simulated sounding of the l' siten, activating of tone-alert radios, and route alerting upon notification from Area IV.
- Also, a call was placed to the school superintendent, and an EBS message originated by the State was broadcast over radio stations WHAT, WPOE, and WRSI at 10:05 - 10:15 a.m. Additional EBS messages were simulated later.
75 Massrchusstes Local EOCs Bsensedsten All protective actions, assistance with access and traffic centrol, and requests for assistance from Area IV were simulated. The staff were aware of Individuals needing '
speelal assistance and of their special needs.
Except for permanent record exposure devices, which were not available, dosimeters in sufficient quantity were on hand, properly charged and zeroed, and distributed. However, no one present was aware of the maximum allowable exposure or of pdures to be used if the need for exceeding it occurred. ,
l Deflelencies and Recommendations
- 1. Description Updated public information brochures are said to have been distributed. However, none could be produced. This has
- been noted as a deficiency in previous exercises (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.2.).
Recommendation Samples of pub!!c information brochures should be sent to FEMA Region ! for evaluation.
- 2. Deseription
- Although evacuation maps showing population by a areas, access control points, and sector designation are in the plan, they were not shown on posted displays. This is a previous uncorrected deficiency (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a; D, J.10,h; D, J.10.j7 .
Raeommendation: On at least one of the display maps in the EOC,
> show sector markings, populations, and access control points.
- 3.
Description:
Permanent record exposure devices were not available (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. II, K.3.a.).
Recommendation: Ask the State to see that permanent record exposure devices are provided.
- 4.
Description:
No one present was aware of the maximum allowable dose or of procedures for authorizing emergency workers to incur
? exposures exceeding the EPA PAGs (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.4).
Recommendation: Provide addit!onal training for all of the EOC
. staff.
t
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__ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . e. _ _ . - _ .._ _ _. ____ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..__
76 M:ssachusotts Local Eocs
- Cill 3.3.3.2 Gill i Space and furnishings at the EOC were sufficient, and protracted operations
- could be sustained. Noise control was improved by construction of a room for communleations equipment separate from the operations area. Evacuation routes and relocation center locations were available, but were not posted for ready reference.
l Aiecess control points and populations also were not posted, and a status board with classification levels was still not available.
Activation of the EOC was initiated by an " Alert" notification by Tri-State Fire l radio at 8:41 a.m., and full staffing was completed at 10:00 a.m. Some key staff persons were alerted by radio-pagers activated by Tri-State Fire. Other personnel were called up l by telephone, using an automatie dialing system. Staffing for continuous operations was .
I demonstrated by presentation of a roster. Reliefs for each EOC staff position were
! Identified by name, except for the (bgatcher, who is a key person. Someone should be
, tralned as a relief for the dispatcher and included on the roster.
l The Selectpersons were in charge, and operations were directed by the Civil 1 Defense Director under his authority. The staff worked well.together, and activities i
were coordinated. However, some changes in management procedures would have improved emergency response capabilities. A status board should have been provided and j used to post emergency classification and key events, and periodic briefings should have been held to keep the EOC staff updated on all activities. The plume pathway should j, have been drawn on a map. During the exercise, there was a period of confusion over wind dirgetion which .might have been avoided if the plume had been continuously j plotted. Also, if well-organized check lists and written procedures had been available for t
ready reference, traffic and access control could have been implemented more promptly.
Several radio channels were available for local and regional communication, j including the Tri-State Mutual Aid Fire network, the new Civil Defense microwave j frequeneles, the RERP Civil Defense network with repeater capability, the Highway l Department radio, and amateur radio on the 2-meter band. Two telephone lines were used as backup. The equipment worked well and the local operators were competent, but communications were sometimes slowed by procedural problems; specifically, trans-mission of messages from Area IV was hampered by frequent break-up of the trans-
- mission in the morning, apparently caused by an inexperienced operator at Area IV.
l Transmissions significantly improved in the afternoon. Also, messages were laboriously copied by the communication offleers. A proprinted message multi-form with checkoff boxes for times, emergency action level, wind direction, and other data would have improved message handling, transcription accuracy, and information distribution. -
Public alerting and instruction were accomplished by tone-alert radios, EBS broadcasts, and route alerting using fire trucks equipped with PA systems. The fire - '
department also uses a boat equipped with a haller for alerting river traffic.
- j. The EOC makes no dose assessments or protective action recommendations but is responsible for implementation of the recommendations passed to it from the State.
Sheltering was the only protective action recommended and was properly handled.
Except for permanent record dosimeters, which were not available, appropriate
77 Mass chusatts I.ccci EOCs Cill dosimeters in suff!clent quantity were on hand and were properly zerced, charged, and distributed with instructions for their use. Proper use of a GM counter for checking field personnel for contamination was demonstrated. The figure quoted for maximum allowable exposure was wrong, indicating a need for some refresher training.
Defieleneles and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
No permanent exposure record devices or record m keep;ng forms were available. Little knowledge of exposure record
- keeping procedures, allowable exposure level, or procedures for
~
, getting permission to exceed PAGs was evident (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. U, K.3.a.; U, K.4.).
- Recommendatico The State should take whatever action is necessary to provide permanent exposure record devices, record keeping forms, and additional training in allowable exposure limits.
- 2.
Description:
Displays did not' contain all required information, such as population, and access and traffic control points. No
,T status board was available (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. U, J.10.a.; II, J.10.b.).
Raeommendation: Ask for State assistance, if necessary, in upgrading displays and instructions for their use.
- 3.
Description:
No one is named as a relief for the dispatcher (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 U, A.2.a.).
Recommendations Include the name of the person who will provide relief for the dispatcher and provide this person with adequate training.
a a.- --- - - - - -r-,, -- c--,.---- . - . - , _ _ - . - - - . - - -we , - - - - , . , , -, - -
d 78 Massachusotts Local EOCs I- Crocnfield i
l 2.3.3.3 Greenfield 1 The EOC had sufficient wou-lighted space in the fire station, complete with
- beekup power and other resources needed for sustaining protracted operations. A status l board (missing in previous exercises) with classification levels posted and maps showing
- a$ required information were prominently posted and effectively used. Greenfield is designated as a Reception Center, and only a small portion is within the 10-mile EPZ.
The. Reception Center located in the Greenfield Community College outside the 10-mile j EPZ was not activated for this exercise.
i
! I Activation of the EOC was initiated by a verified notification of an " Alert" i message from Tri-State Mutual Fire at 8:38 a.m. Staff cau-up was from written ,
j telephone lists. The EOC was operational at 9:00 a.m. and fully staffed at 9:45 a.m. A j roster showing the names of au relief personnel was presented as evidence of continuous j , staffing espability. The staff appeared to be competent and won trained. -
l 1 The Civil Defense Director was in charge of operations, used his staff i effectively, and kept. the.n, briefed. Checklists and written procedures were used, and
. messages were logged, reproduced, and distributed. Notification of a " Site Area l Emergency" was received from Greenfield Mutual Fire at 9:23 a.m. and of a " General l Estergency" at 10:32 a.m. from Area IV.
- n
! Y Communications were exceHent, having been improved by the fully implemented new Civil Defense microwave radio system. Operators were obviously better trained than they were for the previous exercise. Besides the new microwave radio system, the l
Civu Defense RERP radio, the- Tri-State Fire Net, a dedicated land line, RACES, teletype, and commercial telephones were available. Communication with ambulances was provided by the Franklin County Ambulance Network.
1 % Dose assessments and protective action recommendations were made at the EOF l and provided to the local communities through the State and Area IV EOCs. No i protective action recommendations were necessary or made for Greenfield. The scenario did not require Greenfield to implement public alerting and instruction. ,
i l All required dosimetry equipment was on hand in sufficient quantity, properly l calibrated, and distributed with instructions. Procedures for decontamination were well i known, but no one present was aware of the allowable exposure limit or of procedures for j obtaining permission to exceed the EPA PAGs if necessary.
I 2.
l '
Defieleneias and Recommendations i None.
i e
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79 M sscchussets I.oest EOCs l 1.syden 2.3.3.4 Leyden Leyden has a population of only 498 people, and all of the EOC staff are <
. volunteers. They also are town officials. This made it difficult for them to participate ,
! fully in an exercise held on a working day, when they had to take time away from their i government responsibilities. The Town and State are aware that in a real emergency the l Town would have to rely on the State for support. A State Controller was assigned to 4 Leyden for this exercise.
I
- The EOC, located in the basement of the town hall, was small but suitable for i i - the small staff. There is room for expansion if needed. A portable generator was available for backup power. Resources, except for sleeping quarters, are adequate for j extended operations. Cots could be brought in, but most people would simply go home.
With such a small population, continuous staffing would be more of a problem. Displays were minimal. An EPZ map was posted., A status board was available, but not fully utilized. Although all necessary information was available, it should be put on maps for i ready reference during an emergency.
The EOC was activated by a message from Tri-State Fire stating that an " Alert"
! had been declared at the utility. The message was received at the fire station by the Deputy Fire Chief at 8:50 a.m. He in turn notified the Selectmen, one of whom is the i Civil Defense Director. From this point on, staff call-up took place with minimal participation. Some town officials appeared periodically but stayed briefly. EOC operations were handled most of the day with only three people - the Civil Defense
! Director, Road Superintendent, and the Deputy Fire Chief. The EOC was never fully i staffed.'
l The First Selectman, who was the official in charge according to the plan, was unable to participate. The Civil Defense Director did not seem to have management well ip hand and was not' very famillar with the plan. Written checklists were available, but there was no activity for Leyden. The few messages directed to Leyden were not logged.
1 l
Communications capability was good. ,The primary system was the Civil Defense
! radio network, which was supplemented by RACES, and commercial telephone. The staff was not familiar with the radio equipment but was properly instructed by the Area IV I communicator; and communications worked well thereafter. The staff said the officials who normally would have participated were entirely familiar with the equipment. The i State Controller used the exercise as a training opportunity for those present and l actually injected himself into response activities. He suggested keeping a message log, j gave Instructions on radio operation and the preparation and use of dosimeters, and
} ,
explained the importance of maintaining a status board and posting information on
. maps. He also gave an informative lecture on radiation, radiation safety, protective actions, and nuclear power plants. '
i Leyden was never in the plume-exposure pathway, and no protective actions were j recommended for them by the State. The staff did, however, check the dose-rate i information they had received and were satisfied that no need for protective actions or i
public alerting was indicated. They were aware of sheltering and evacuation as
- protective actions and had a thorough discussion about them.
80 M:sscchusetts L: col EOCs .
Leyden Public alerting and instruction would have been done by using the NOAA tone-alert radios, route alerting, EBS broadcasts, and the fire station stren.
, The stren is not effective in itself as a warning to all of the population. It canno't be differentiated from a fire alarm.
d-Defieleneles and Recommendations 4
- 1.
Description:
Displays, such as a status board and maps, while
). available, were not used. This defielency was also noted in g previous exercises (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, J.10.1; II, J.10.b.).
Recommendation: Improve the quality of displays and include such things as populations, access control points, relocation centers, and
- evacuation routes on them, and train the EOC workers in their use. *
- 2.
Description:
Because of the inadequate training of the EOC staff, the controller performed emergency response functions (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, N.1).
^l '
Recommendation Controllars should be instructed not to assist or prompt players. The State should follow its own procedures to provide assistance to communities that are not adequately staffed.
e
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l l
l . . ..
! 81 Masscchusstes I,occi EOCs N2rthfiold i
i j 2.3.3.5 Northfleid i The space in the EOC was somewhat limited. It was set up at the fire station
! Instead of at its normallocation in the Town Hall. This caused some problems with using i the new Civil Defense microwave equipment, which was left installed in the Town Hall.
Resources for extended operations were available. A status board was available but was not kept eurrent, and displays did not show evacuation routes, relocation centers, or populations by evacuation areas. However, they did plot the plume.
i l .
Activation of the EOC occurred at 8:40 a.m. with receipt of an " Alert" message from the Tri-State Fire warning point in Greenfleid. The EOC was fully staffed by 8:50 l a.m. Continuous staffing espability was demonstrated by presentation of a coster.
! Participation by this small community of,only 2,386 persons was outstanding. Up to 15 j
volunteers were present on a normal working day throughout the exercise.
- ~
The Civil Defense Director is also an elected selectman and was clearly in 8
charge. He delegated authority and coordinated activities. However, his job would have been easier and handled better if the status board had been kept up to date and if more
- laformative displays had been used. Message logs were kept but not distributed.
1 However, periodic briefings were held to keep the staff informed. Location of the new j
) Civil Defense radio system away from the EOC and lack of message forms hampered
{ message handling.
i l Communleation capabilities - consisting of two Civil Defense radio networks, i Tri-State Fire network, RACES, dedicated land line, and commercial telephone - were
} -
excellent. However, the effectiveness of the new Civil Defense radio was diminished because it was not located in the EOC used for this exercise. 3 Dose assessments and protective action recommendations are responsibilities of j the utility, EOF, and State EOC. Sheltering in-place was instituted after the wind shifted and blew to the south.
l Pub!!c alerting and instruction were Initiated by a call from Area IV at 12:40 p.m. Calls were placed to schools at 12:45 p.m., and siren activation and route alerting began at 12:48 p.m. Simulated EBS broadcasts were originated by the State EOC. These messages included guidance for the public in taking shelter. No instructions for the .
public were generated in the Northfleid EOC, and none were required (because of the !
State EBS messages). Evacuation was not recommended as a protective action, but the l ,. staff was aware of the identity of and the locations and special needs of the mobility-4 Impaired, and agreements are in place for transportation of school children. Access and
! traffle control would have been maintained by local police, it was not clear as to who or
- / what agency is responsible for halting rail traffle.
1
[ A suffielent supply of doelmeters was on hand. They were properly calibrated.
[ eharged, and distributed, and readings were recorded. A good knowledge of dosimetry
! was demonstrated.
- There was no media activity. Had media persons appeared, they would have been j briefed on only the local situation by the selectman and directed to the Media Center for i l other inquiries.
i
82 - Mass:chus;tts Local EOCs .
NorthficLd Defleleneles and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
The status board was not kept up to date, and ,
displays lacked complete leformation (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. !!,
5 J.10.a.: !!, J.10.b).
Recommendation: The status board should be used in future 4' exercises and the Information on displays improved.
I
- 2. Deseription: Effectiveness of the new Civil Defense radio
(}
V mierowave system was diminished because of its location away from the EOC (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, F.1.b.).
p e Recommendation A permanent location for the EOC should be established so that communications equipment can be permanently '
installed therein.
B 4
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83 M:sseihusctts Local EOCs Warwick 2.3.3.6 Warwick The EOC was located on the second floor of the fire station. Space, furnishings, and lighting were ample. Back-up power capability was demonstrated by putting the EOC on emergency power during the exercise. Noise, attributable to RACES operations In the EOC operating area, was a problem that will be resolved by relocating the equipment and/or equipping the operator with a headset. Although no kitchen or sleeping facilities exist, other resources appear sufficient to support extended operations. The status board was kept up to date and was used effectively, but it could have been more conveniently located. Information about evacuation routes, relocation centers, and population was available but was not displayed for ready reference. However, an EPZ map with clearly labeled sectors and access control points was displayed.
- Activation of the EOC occurred when the Civil Defense Director was notified by Tri-State Fire at 8:42 a.m. that an " Alert" had been declared by the ut!!!ty at 8:30 a.m.
The call was verifled, and the EOC was fully staffed by 9:30 a.m. Round-the-clock .
staffing capability was demonstrated by presenting a roster and by discussions with the staff.
Warwick was not in the plume exposure pathway and was required to take no protective actions, so activity at this EOC was minimal. The staff was, however, able to demonstrate a capability in response activitles and famillarity with the plans. The Civil Defense Director, who was also the radiation safety officer, was in charge and saw that the staff was kept Informed.
Communicating capabl!!ty is excellent. The EOC is equipped with the new Civil Defense microwave radio and has the older Civil Defense RERP system. RACES was also in place and operating. Commercial telephones were used for other alternate and backup communications. Communications worked well. However, early in the exercise the Civil Defense radio was not set up properly, the result being that the EOC could transmit but could not receive. The pecblem was rectifled when brought to the EOC Director's attention. .
Dose assessments and protective action recommendations are State and utility responsibilities. No protective action recommendations were made for Warwick, which was never in the plume.
Public alerting and Instruction were not required in this exercise. However, the Civil Defense Director explained that the pubtle would be alerted by tone-alert radios and route alerting. Instruction would be given by personal contact, radlo and telephone messages, and EBS broadcasts. There are only 32 familles in the 10-mile EPZ.
No protective actions were required for Warwick. However, the one mobility-Impaired Individual is known, and the town has the resources to provide for this person's transportatlon and other needs.
84 Mass:chusetts Lccol E0'Cs Warwick Defieleneles and Recommendations
- 1. Deseription: Displays did not include all necessary Information for '
ready reference (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. II, J.10.a; II, J.10.b.; II).
, e, Recommendation: Although the total population of Warwick is 4 only 603, the maps containing population distribution, relocation
- eenters, and evacuation routes should be clearly posted. Space
- should be provided in the EOC for this purpose.
i
, Area for Improvement .
- 1. Deseription: The primary Civil Defense radio system was inoperative during part of the exerelse because of improper set up caused by confusing Instructions accompanying new equipment.
(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b.).
Recommendation: The State should provide means of hand!!ng a radio check when going into an area-wide emergency operation.
t l -
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j 85 Utility sad Stato Cscedinntien .
Emergancy Opsrcting Fccility i
2.4 UTILITY AND W!' ATE COORDINATION l 2.4.1 Emergeoey Operstlag Yaellity The Emergency Operating Facility (EOF)>is currently located on-site in the Governor Hunt House. As noted in previous exercise reports, this location does not offer ,
enough protection for the emergency workers in the event of a release of redloactive i materials. The utt11ty la eurrently constructing a new EOF approximately eight miles
- f. away from the plant, which should solve this problem.
The state representatives at the EOF were professional and conferred with each l
j other during the exercise. The recovery manager and/or his assistant briefed the state representative frequently, but meteorological data and plume-movement projections did not reach the recovery manager in a timely manner, whleh delayed the receipt of this l ,
i information by the state representatives. The state representatives promptly trans-mitted Information about the status of the plant and'other data to the State EOCs. The
) Civil Defense representatives from Hampshire did not appear to have any clearly defined i
t ~ duties, and therefore their communloations
- with the State EOC in Concord appeared to i be sporedle.
i l .
Utility dose estimates and protective action recommendations were evaluated for reasonableness by the state representatives at the EOF. After they concurred in the information, they transmitted it to their respective EOCs. The utility utillnes a
' computer model that uses a video display to project the plume path as an overlay on a j map of the area. [
l The plume projection had to be translated by the state representative at the EOF l before this Information could be passed over the telephone' to the State EOC this comp!!eation caused some delays. l J
The States of Vermont, New Hampshi e, and Massachusetts were not offletally l
notifled by the uttllty of the change in status from a " Site Area Emergency" to a
] " General Emergency." This procedural failure caused serious delays in the notification of j state and local governments. Massachusetts spent approximately 15 minutes trying to j verify the change in status, whleh in turn caused delays of from half art hour to almost an hour for notifloation of toeal offlelais. Similar, although not as severe, problems
- . oecurred in New Hampshire.
j .
Defleleneles and Reeemmendations
- 1. Deseriptions Communleation procedures between the states and j utility as given in their respeettve plans were not followed fo* the General Emergency Classiftention, whleh caused serious delays in l
offlela! notification of state and local governments (f EMA-REP-1, Rev.1. !!, E.1).
(CATEGORY A DEFICIENCT).
! ~ ._ . . . , ._ ,
86 Utility cnd Stato Coord.icatica Emergency Operating Facility Recommendation: Review, revise, and coordinate plans among all 4 parties to develop a better system for notification of state -
. decision makers of changes in emergency classification levels.
O t 2.
Description:
The utility did not provide states with meteorological
's
~
data and plume-movement projections in a timely manner (FEMA-
. REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8).
e.
[ Recommendation: Revise procedures so that meteorological and other pertinent data are provided to the states in a timely j manner. Consider installing terminals in all state EOCs so that
- they can receive the computer-generated output.
Area for Improvement
Description:
State of Ne'w Hampshire Civil . Defense repre-sentatives"did not have clearly defined duties. - -
! Recommendations Revise procedures to more clearly define the
. duties of New Hampshire Civil Defense representatives at the EOF. .
s 889 1
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l 87 M2dia Cantor l
2.4.2 Media Center The Media Center for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant is at Dalem's Chalet in Brattleboro, Vermont. Facilities were adequate, with obvious improvements made since the last exercise, including a backup power generator and an increased number of telephone lines for media use. Supplies and facilities for PIOS were excellent, but those for media were minimal. There is a need for additionallighting in the media working area, since the location is in a rather poorly lighted dining area and could present a problem during non-daylight hours. Also lacking was the availability of charts and displays for demonstration purposes.
- Activation and staffing were generally good. Pre-exercise positioning of staff l
and supplies at the Media Center was kept to a minimum. Staff members began to arrive with equipment around 8:30 am, setting up the Media Center and Installing telephone lines for reporters. This was a much more realistic approach than that taken in past years. Organizations represented included: Vermont Yankee, the Governor of Vermont, the Governor of New Hampshire, New Hampshire Civil Defense, and Massachusetts Civil Defense. The NRC had two player responders in the center. All participants appeared knowledgeable and can be notified and mobilized on a 24-hour bas _is.
4 While the utility had suffielent clerical support staff, the State P!Os did not.
A variety of communication links were available and demonstrated, including commercial phone lines, ring-down phones, computers, radios, walkie-talkies, and telecopters. As a result, there was sufficient communication backup when the utility and the NRC computers went down; one telecopier malfunctioned; and one state P!O tele-phone line went dead.
Information Lu.ations at the Media Center were disturbingly uneven. This year's
, performance contrasted markedly with the outstanding one during the 1983 exercise. -
The number of briefings (4) was adequate, but they were not nearly as thorough or complete' as they should have ,been. State PIOS were not kept well-informed about the status of the plant or the nature of the release. Only two small charts were available, and only one (the, EPZ chart) was referred to by the utility spokesperson. State PIOS conferred continually. However, formal written news releases from the utility, while available promptly, were written and approved at the EOF and shown by the utility PIO to State P!Os with no opportunity for them to review or make possible changes. As a result, several news releases were issued containing factual errors or discrepancies:
~
I t
(1) At a 9:35 a.m.. briefing, while the plant was in a " Site Area Emergency" status, the first utility news release of the exercise
- stated that the reactor had been operating at 47% power just prior to the incident, wen.t to 0% power immediately following the incident and was now at 0% power. However, at the 10:23 a.m. briefing, when the plant status went to " General Emergency," a second utility news release stated that the reactor had been at 0% power prior to the incident.
, . . --,,m- - , . . _ _ . _ , , , . --- - , - _ - . . - - --- w g=
88 M:dia Ccntor (2) The second utility news release issued at the 10:23 a.m. briefing contained a shelter recommendation for residents of North ,
.,. Hinsdale, New Hampshire. In fact, however; that recom-
.= mandation should have been made to New Hampshire State Authorities, not directly to the residents of North Hinsdale.
j When confronted by the State PIOS on this matter, the utility spokesperson simply stated that it is the prerogative of the utility to make public its protective action recommendation:. This
.y . raises a serious issue as to whether a utility should make public y it's protective action recommendations before the states have had J the opportunity to consider the recommendations and take .
appropriate action. Had this been an actual accident, the confused and conflicting protective action information conveyed to the public could have had serious consequences.
(3) The same utillt'y news release also stated that the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant had been evacuated. This factual '
error was corrected during-the question and answer period of a subsequent media briefing when the utility PIO stated that only
- j
^
non-essential personnel had been evacuated from the plant.
l However, the news release itself was never retracted and -
corrected in written form, and it was still available for distribution.
i
. Furthermore,' the misinformation that the plant was completely
, evacuated was perpetuated in the 11:50 a.m. utility media '
I release, which again stated that Vermont Yankee personnel had I been evacuated from the site. This allowed the erroneous
, impression of a completely abandoned plant to be conveyed to the c_ public. Moreover this media release was sent by telefacsimile to
- the .New Hampshire State EOC, which created additional l confusion for State decision makers. , '
The utility spokesperson did not keep State PIOS adequately Informed on a timely
, basis of changes in plant status and other relevant information. For example, the Massachusetts P!O questioned the utility PIO on the nature of the radioactive release during the question and answer period of the first media briefing. This was the only opportunity he had at that point in the exercise to get the information from the utility PIO.
l
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!l In a past exercise, the fact that the Media Center is located within the 10-mile lj EPZ was listed as a deficioney. All three states have since responded that it is the -
!j responsibility of the utility to designate the location of the Media Center. The Media Center is still within the EPZ.
l- The subject of the media center location was raised by a partleipating reporter l during a media briefing and :esulted in a misleading response. In answer to a question on l} whether the Media Center was safe, the utility PIO said the, location was approximately 1
1:
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- . . .- . , , - . , , , , - e.-.- _ - . . . . - - , - _ - -. - , , . . - - , - -
89 . Mndia C:ntor 10 miles from the plant and that those Inside were safe. The Media Center is actually 7 1/4 miles from the plant and would have to have been evacuated if the plume had headet;i in its direction .In a. post-exercise debriefing, the utility PIO indicated that the br.ekup Media Center is the Quality Inn in Brattleboro. This is also inside the 10-mile EPZ.
Defielencies and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
The utility disseminated misleading and inaccurate public information, including protective action recommMdations that could have conflicted with those recommeMM n State autho:ities. In a real incident, this would have evniused the public (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, G.4) (CATEGORY A DEFICIENCY).
- Recommendation: The utility should revise its method of developing and issuing news releases to ensure accuracy of content. It should reconsider its policy of making public its protective action recommendations before the States have been notified and have had the opportunity to consider the recom-
+
mandations and take appropriate action.
L
- 2. -
Description:
There was a lack of genuine coordination and cooperation between the utility and State P!Os. Utility news releases were issued without giving State PIOS the opportunity to
. review them for possible changes and comments. The utility PIO failed to keep State PIOS sufficiently briefed on a timely basis regarding plant status and the changing situation.
( Recommendation: The utility spokesperson should coordinate information flow with State PIOS, allowing them to review news releases for possible changes. The utility spokesperson should also brief State PIOS on a timely basis.
- 3.
Description:
The Media Center is still located in the EPZ, as is the designated backup Media Center.
. Recommendation: The Media Center and backup should be
. located outside of the EPZ.
- Areas for Improvement and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
Inadequate availability of charts, maps, and other visual displays.
Recommendation: The Utility should increase the use and improve the quality of charts, maps, and other visual displays to serve as illustrations during briefings.
- ~ - e
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. 90 M:dia Ccntor
- 2.
Description:
Lighting in the media working area was dim. This could present a problem during non-daylight hours. - -
E- Recommendations The utility should see that adequate lighting is t provided in the media working area.
l
- 3.
Description:
Clerical support staff was available for the utility, but not for State PIOS. *
- r 7f Recommendation: The utility should provide clerical backup for t- State PIOS.
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SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies with recommendations noted t; the federal evaluators of this exercise. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evalulation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (November,1980), exercise objectives, and the evaluation criteria provided in +
Sec.1.5 of this report.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Asscelate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any
. deficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
. FEMA requests that the states and local jurisdictions submit the measures they
- ' have taken or intend to take to correct defielencies. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including projected and actual dates of completion for implementing corrective actions, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately. ,
Deficiencies fallinto two categories: ,
A. Deficiencies that cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public.
B. Def!clencies were identified where demonstrated (and observed) performance during the exercise was considered faulty.
Corrective actions are considered necessary, but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that, in the event of a real radiological emergency, appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public.
Three deficiencies in category A were Identified in this exercise. Both category A and category B deficiencies identified in this exercise are summarized in Table 2.
Table 3 is a compilation of the current status of deficiencies identified in the February 1982, September 1983, and April 1985 exercises. Table 4 lists the status of
'. each of the 35 FEMA Core Objectives for each state and local jurisdiction by exercise year.
l
- , , - - - - - ._ , - . _ , - - . - , _ _ - ~ . - - __ , , - . - . . - , _ - - , ~ _ - - ,. - . - - -- _ __
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TA812 2 semedial Actions for Vermont Yankee leuclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985) Page ! of 32
. Proposed Actual FtllA-SEP-1, Completion State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State end I.ocal Response Date Element .FroposedC,orrective Act.one Date for Corrective Action Vermont state Eoc e
N
- 1. De scriptions Deciolon making at the 0.I,0.5 EOC was sometimes delayed due to the relative inesperience of some ROC etaff membere in radiological emer-gency preparednese esercises. Because of this, the compten interaction of staff members resguired for deciolon making was not always efficient.
Itecommendat ion _: EOC staff and ,
decision makers should pa.ticipate in future training drills and esercises to improve the ef ficiency of decialen making. ..
De script ions Some difficulty was B.7 2.
ubserved in formulating Protective action messages, which resulted in delays in setting these messages to the local EOCs. '
Recommenda t ion s Prescripted messages .
should be used denever possible to eliminate delays caused by deciding on wording of messages.
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i TAtl2 2 Benedial Actions for Vermont Yankee leuclear Power Plant I
(April 17, 1985) Page 2 of 32 i
j proposed Actual FSNA-REF-1, FEseA Evaluation of completion .
State (S) and 14 cal (L) Complet ion Rev. 1 Date State and Local Beepense Dat e Deficiencies and BAC Recommendation Element Proposed Corrective Actions for Corrective Action 1
De sc ri pt ions Even though the field 1.9,1,11 1.
monitorias tease adequately performed their duties prescribed in the Vermont $
State plan, the low dose limite pre- .
cluded the identification of the plume boundary and field verification of does projections. Furthermore, the i l RAC believes that the low allowebl e-does limite render the Vermont field-
~
monitoring tease incapable of provid- .
f ins accurate field verification. .
Thus, Vermont would be dependent on ut ilit y field-monitorina data and would not be able to verify the does projectione independently.
- Recoesmendations it is suggested that vermont make better arrangemente to locate and track the airborne radio-active plume. This may include changing state guidelines and field
- procedures to allow for the entry of field-monitoring teams into areae suspected to be in the pl ume. This coul d be done without escoeding epa esposure limite and would allow the st at e to obtain radiation measure-mente.
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7Atl2 2 Remedial Actione for Verment Yankee Iluclear Power Plent (April 17, 1985)
Page 3 of 32 i
PENA-EEP-3, Proposed Actual State (S) and local (L) Completion PENA Evaluation of Completion Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Bew. 1, Dati Proposed Corrective Actione Date State and Local Response I for Corrective Action Element V*rmont State taboratory
- 1. De sc ript ions The' State Laboratory is H.12,I.8 e
not adequately agasipped to handle the ,
number of semples and radioactive
- waste resulting free a significant Incident at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
Recommendatient Upgrade the facili-ties at the State laboratory, includ-ings (1) additional heed capacity, and ,
(2) leproved waste handling.
- 2. De sc ript ions The laboratory personnel O.4.c were not adequately prepared to handle the kind and number of samples result-ing from a significen* incident at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
Recommendations Provide additional training and new record keeping proca-dures for the State Laboratory personnel.
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TABl2 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Tankee lluclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985) Page 4 of 32 Propeeed Actual FEMA-REP-1 Completion PEllA Evaluation of Completion Rev. 1, State (3) and local (L) State and Local Response Date Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Proposed corrective Actions Pete for Corrective Action Element Incident Field Office (IFO)
- w La
- 1. De sc ri pt ion t no effective centralised A.I.b.
management and integrated control of A.I.d the operatione and activities at the .
Vermont IFO (Brattleboro) were evident during the esercise.
Recommandations The organlaational responsibilities and staff assignments
- at the IFO should be reviewed and modifications implemented, if neces-sary, in order to en su re the effec-tlweness of integrated management and cont rol at the f acility.
- 2. De sc ri pt ion The Vermont IFO la 88 . 3 trattleboro is inadequat e to handle actual emergency operations, since the facility is within the 10-mile EFZ and la presently unhardened. This would require evacuation in the event that protective actions became necessary.
RecoasnenJation The IPO should either be relocated at a greater distance from the plant or hardened to provide habitability in the event of an actual radiological emergency.
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TAtt.E 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont tankee liuclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985)
Page 6 of,32 Proposed Actual Pasta-stP-1 pelta Evaluation of Completion Rev. 1, St ate (S) and local (L) Complet ion Deficiencies and RAC tecommendation Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed corrective Actions De sc ri pt ions Radiolesical esposure K.3.e, 5.
control for Vermont IPO worker s and K.3.b. e i
emergency workere dispatched f rom the 0.1 . N IFO was inadequate with regard to -
knowledge of proper procedures and issuance and use of desiasters.
Recosamendat i on s Additional training of IFO emergency personnel la radio-logical esposure-control equipment and procedures is required.
Vermont Field stonitoring
- 1. De sc ri pt ions The field tease lacked 1.8 I familiarity with the instrumentation.
Recoassendations Provide the field teams with more training in how to use their equipment and a better understanding of what they will be louking for in the field (i.e., noble
- gases and lodine, not alpha radiation).
The monitoring surveye 1.8
- 2. De sc ript ient were incompletes only closed window readings were done.
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TAtl.E 2 Remedial Actions for Verment Yankee lluclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985)
Page 7 of 32 i .
< i PR8GA-REP-l . Propeeed Actual Rev. 1 State (S) and incel (L) Completion PEsta Evaluation of Completion.
l l Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation State and I.ocal Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date l for Corrective Action i
l ll Becommendatient Surveys should in- .
, clude open- and closed-window readings and measurements at ground and waist ,
I co levels.
- 3. Desc ript ions Teams did not have the 11.7,l.9 ,
ca pabili ty for measuring radiolodine in the field.
Secommendations Verify if air-sample 7 pumps and current g ocedure will allow microcuries per detection of le cubic centimeter, or consider usins a '
higher-volume pump, ellver soollte cartridges (la en actual emergency .
only), and counting using a pancake probe. In addition, the procedure mu st be modified to instruct teams to leave the plume to count the samples.
- 4. De sc ri pt ions llot all team a e had r K.3.s permanent record desimeters, secommendations Provide all field-monitoring tese members with permanent record dosimeters.
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TABLE 2 Benedial Actions for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant
. (April 17 #1945) Page 8 of 32 i
Propoted Actual FEMA-SEF-1, FEMA Evaluation of Completion State (5) and Iscal (L) Complet ion Bew. 1, State and I.ocal Response Date Deficiencies and BAC Recommendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Element De sc riptions Vermont does not have a J.10.a 5.
numbering system for its field- ,
e monitoring points. ,
secommendations Develop a n& ring for the field-monitoring system points.
De sc ri pt ioet Radio communications F.1.4 4.
were f rom the field teams to the State EOC instead of to the IF0, a procedure not in acc.ardance with the plan.
- Eccremendations Because this worked well, it 16 recommended that the plan be modified se bypass the IFO.
Brettieboro De sc ri pt ient Emergency personnel at 1.8,0.1 1.
the trattleboro EOC generally were unable to properly assess accident-assessment informaties.
Secomm.ndations Additional training should be provided for trattleboro E0C staff to enhance their ability to assess accident-essessment informa-tion.
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TABLE 2 Remedial Actione for Vermont Yankee Ihsclear Power Plant P
' (April 17, 1981)
Page 9 of 32 fella-BEF-1, Freposed Actual d Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Deficiencies and RAC Receamandation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) 1; for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Beepense Date l
- 2. Desc ript ions The einstated BBS E.S.E.7 messages on sheltering and evacuation s did not provide sufficiently detailed 8 Information on who specifically should
, shelter and evacuate.
Bec m dations ESS message formu-lation should be improved so that it l
is clearly understood by the public
! d o is to shelter and evacuate.
t
- 1. Descriptions mediological espesure E.3.e. ,
control wee week at the Brattleboro K.3.b, EOC. The direct-read doelmeters were 0.1 not read and recorded on a regular basis, and permanent record devices were not available.
Recommendations The Brattleboro EOC staff should receive additional train-ing in radiological espesura control procedures and permanent record deale-et ry should be provided.
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i; TAtts 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee Huclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985) Page le of 32 Fregesed Actual FEMA-REP-1, Completion Completion FEMA Evaluetten of Rev. I, State (5) and Local (L) State and Local Response Date Deficiencies and SAC Recommendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date Element for Corrective Action Name r et on ,
F.1.b. o
- 1. Desc ri pt ion: Periodic probleme again F.I.d were encountered with the radio-telephone commmanicatina ayeten at the Duaneraton EOC.
secommendation The radio-telephone i
equipment at the Dummerston EOC should
' be evaluated and either repaired or replaced with more dependable equip- .
ment. -
l De sc ri pt ions The bemer st on EOC did K.3,K.4
- 2.
! not fully demonstrate it s capabilities
! to implement a radiological espusure ,
control program.
l Re commenda t ion s The capabilities of Dumumerston 20C relative to radio-logical esposure control should be ,
fully tested in a tuture esercles.
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e TABLE 2 Reesdial Actions for Vermont Yankee lluclear Power Plant (April 17, 1945)
Fase 11 of 32 t
Proposed Actual PEsu-REP-1 Completion Stata (3) and local (L) Completion Passa Evaluation of Deficiencies and RAC tecensendation Bev. 3 state and Local seepense Date Element Proposed Corrective Actlene Data for Corrective Action Cullferd .
I. Desc ri pt ione A copy of the Cullford
- N emergency plan wee not available for reference at the 50C. .
Rece-=da t i en t An up-to-date copy of
- 2. Desc ript ions At the Cullford OOC, the F.I.b.
radio-telephone, idnich is the primary F.I.d ,
coanunication system, verbod poorly
- during much of the esercise.
Recommendations the radio-t elephone equipment at the Cullford 50C should I.e evolueted and either repaired or repl aced with more dependable equip-ment.
De sc ri pt ion The Cullferd EOC did not E.3,E.4, 3.
fully demonstrate its capabilities to 0.1 implement a radiological esposure cont rol program. Dosimeters were not observed at the E0C, permanent record doelmeters were known by the staff not to be available, and EOC staff were not suitably trained in the use of dosimeters.
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! TASW 2 g,,,gg8I Actions for Vermont Yankee elect **' Fonser Plant
) (April IF, 1935) Page 12 of 32 Proposed Actual PEMA-BEP-1 Completion PEleA Evaluation of Completion sev. 1, State (5) and local (L) State and Local Response Date Deficiencies and RAC Recosusendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Element Recosamenda ti on s Deelmetere should be stored at the ROC f acility, permanent record doelasters should be procured, $
u and eastgency stalf should be trained in radiological esposure-control procedures.
6eenon De sc ri pt long he Vernon EOC Director A.I.d 1.
becess too personally involved uith the routine teoks of monitoring incoming radio traneelesions and preparing message lege.
Secomunenda t ion s Soutine tambe should
- l,e delegated to other EOC staff members in order to free the Director for the primary rceponalbility of decialen asking.
- 2. Desc ri pt ions he Vernon EOC staff A.l.b uere observed to be unsure of the divleion of responsibility in decision making betueen the State and the local t.0C.
) 4 i.
E
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TABl.E 2 Semedial Actione for Vereent Yankee lluclear Power Plant 1
(April 17, 19s5)
- Fase 13 of 32 Proposed Actual FEMA-REF-l. FEstA Evaluation of Completion state (S) and local (L) Completion Deficiencies and SAC seceanendettoe Rev. le Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions secommandations Additional training of the Vermen EOC decielen-making staff le needed in order to ensure 5 e
that staf f members are suere of which emergency deciolone are to be made .
locally.
- 3. De sc ri pt ions The neundins of the E.5
- eirene in Vernen wee not coordinated with the Ett mesesse.
, secosamendat ion s Procedures should be reviewed and espanded, if necessary, to ensure that sounding of the altene and the EBS message are property coordinated.
- 4. De sc ript ions De Vernen BOC staff A.I.b.
indicated that Vernen resources were J.IS.]
not sufficient to staff all traffic control pointel however, ne staff mem-bers were observed to cont act the State to request assistance.
Recommendations Improve coordination between the State and the Town of Vernon to ensure that all traffic cont rol point e are manned in a timely manner.
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i l TAtl.E 2 Seendial Actions for Vermont Yankee leuclear Power Plant
+ '
(April 17, 1985) Pase 14 of 32 Proposed Actual FEMA-BEF-1, FEMA Evaluatloa of Completion
)
sev. I, State (5) and I.ocal (L) Completion beficiencies and RAC Recommendation Date State end B.ocal Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actione for Corrective Action S. De sc ript ions During the evacuation J.it.a.
J.lt.h -
the Vernom EOC recommended to the O school that relocation he to .
g Creenfield, Nessachusette, rather than to Bellows Falle, Vermeat, as recoer-mended by the State.
Procedures en Secomunenda t ion s relocation should be revleued to ensure that evacueen are directed to .
the proper relocation center.
De sc ript ions Perennent record E.3.s
- 6.
- dosimeters were not avallable at the
- 1. vernon soc.
accommendations A omfficient number of 6.manent record doelmsters should
- be procured for distribution to emerg-ency workers at the Vermen 50C.
J.lt.e,
- 7. De sc ri ptions The Vernen E0C staff were not knowledgeable aAmt proper J.lt.f procedures for the use of KI.
Recommendations The Vernon EOC staff should be tralped in procedures for the proper use of KI.
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TA31.E 2 Beendial Actions for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant
' (April 17, 1985) f Page 15 of 32 Frepened Actual FEMA-REP-1, Completion
! Completion PRIGA Evaluation of
?
Deficiencies and BAC Recommendation sev.1 State (5) and local (L) State and I.acal Response Date Element Propeeed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action I
New itempshire State MC
- 1. De sc ri pt ions There were significant A.2.a.
- O l lapses in laternal caemunications F.I.d between upper-level operations manage-nent and EOC operatione staff. The .
em ot elsnificant esemple of this le that the operations room etsif was never informed that a release was in process, er that it had subsequently been terminated. This was eleo re- "
a flected in the st at us boarde in the operatione room, where the relea se data were never recorded.
Recosamenda t ion s Operatione management should take positive steps to reesdy the situation by stationing itself in the ope rations room and conducting most of its business there. By oper-ating out of the office of the Covernor's representattwo, and moving the 1845 phone into that of fice, opera-tiene management moved the most valu- .
at.le communications link in this eser-cies away from the EOC staff. All informasion received in the BOC enould be transferred to the Operations I officer as a matter of course, J
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TABLE 2 Remedial Actione for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Pouer Plant i (April 17, 1945) Page 16 of 32 I
i r i ' Proposed Actual FEMA-REF-1, FEMA Evaluation of Completion State (S) and Local (L) Completion Rev. 1 State and I.ocal Response Date
- Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Proposed corrective Actione Date Element for Corrective Action regardless of uhere it le faltlally received. Critical information should o be immediately broadcast over the FA "
sy st em to ensure its Jiepersal, thue cutting through poselble administra-tlwe delays in hard-copy message i handling. (la this cose, ho wver, -
hard-copy message handling use not the probleal it use hard-copy seenage generation.)
Desc ri pt ion: Eschange of information Planning
- 2. Standards among the Department of Public Health A and F accident as se ssment staf f and betueen and representatives of DPN management .
civil Defense operatione management, .
did not result in rapid enough com-munication of accident aseeeoment data from the plant and field for the Covernor to make oppropriat e pre-tactive action decisione. (CATECORY A
~
tdFICIENCY)
Becommendet ont The Department of Public Health and Civil Defense men-asement tease must be informed immedi-ately of all changes in plant status, ,
meteorological conditione, field moni-toring dat e, and the implications of .
the data f or protective action recom-menJetions. Therefore, the plan
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! TAst2 2 Remedial Actione for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (Aprl! 17. 1945) r 17 d 32 Propeeed Actual FSMA-EEP-1, Completion Bew. 1, state (5) and 14 cal (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Deficiencies and RAC secommendation Date State and f.ecal Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actione i procedures should be reviewed and w changed, se necessary, so that the information flow will became more O rapid and comprehensive. All staff.
connected with the emergency ope r-stione should them he trained to recognise the laylications of key data, and in the new reporting procedures. .
- 3. Desc ri pt ient Accident assessment was 1.8 done with hand calculations and, ,
therefore, vee slow.
SecommenJatient Provide the Depart-ment of Public 16ealth with a computer terminal that can link up with the EOF's computer eyeten to speed up accident assessment.
- 4. De sc ri pt ions The State has not yet J.10.e f
procured a supply of KI to be st ock-piled in Concord for use by emergency workere.
Recommendations Purchase sufficient .
quantity of El to meet state's neede for it s emergency workere.
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' TABl2 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee lluclear Feuer Flant i
I (April 17, 1985) Pese it of 32 i Actual Proposed I PENA-REP-1 Completion FEMA twelmation of completten Rev. I, State (8) and Iscal (L) state and Local Response Date
- oeficiencies and SAC Becommendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Element seew slampshire State Emboratory
- w 1.8 o
- 1. De sc ri pt ions I.aboratory staff need
- additional trainin6 in order to develop an SOP for a complete environ-mental ouveillance program, which includes the ability to obtain quan-titative results from sample analysis and proper techniques for dealing with equipment operation characteristico.
Secommmendations Arrange to have laboratory staff receive training at
- the Winchester Analytical and
^
Engineering Center of the U.S. Food and Drug Adunimistration (FDA) 1.aburetory in Winchester, Nase.
De sc ri pt ions the laboratory does not I.8 2.
have an adequate shield for its Ce(LI) detector (i.e., one with a cover) to redere the background count rate and enable lab staf f to mehe quantitative cal c ul at ions .
SecosamenJat ion s Procure tble piece of equipment and obtain suitable training in it s use at the Winchester FDA facility.
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' TAtl2 2 Benedial Actione for Vermont Yankee Ihscles - Power plant (April 17, 1985) Page 19 of 32 i
I troposed Actual rena-are-1, Completion tav. I, State (S) and 14 cal (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Deficiencies and RAC tecommendation Date State and Local Response Dato for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Koene IPO e-a y
- 1. De sc ri pt ien t The Civil Defense F.I.d o communication system did not function adequately between the IPO and field-monitorios teams. Aloe, there was no backup radio systeel commercial tele-phones were eased if they were evall-able.
Recommendatlens Problems with the '
commus.icatione eyeten eheuld be identified and remedied. An appro-priate backup communicatten system also needs to be identified and tested.
- 2. De sc ri pt ion s the communications 1.8 l.11 problems were instrumental in keeping meteorological information from reach-ing the teams in a timely manner, and the teams were not dispatched to proper monitoring locations as a result.
Recommendationes Adequate procedures for communicating with the field teams should be developed.
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TAtlE 2 Remedial Actions for Verment Tankee thsclear Power Plant f (April 17, 1985) Page 24 of 32 i
Actual Proposed PEstA-REP-l , PEIGA Evaluatloa of Completion State (5) and I.acal (L) Completion Date Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Sev. l. Date State and 1.acal Response Element Proposed Corrective Actiene for corrective Action .
De sc r ipt ions There were insuf ficient P.I.d 3.
telephone lines (1) and no backup com-munications system to the Reception ea Center.
Recommendatleast Additlemal telephone
- lines and backup commanication system to the Receptima Center should be addressed.
EBS assoages broadcast E.1
- 4. De sc ri pt ions were not maaltered.
Recommendaties: All EDS breedcaste should be routinely maaitored, along with checking with local c emensai ti es as to the f unctioning of the public- .
alert system.
IIew Itampshire Field Itoaltering I.7,I.Il
- 1. De sc ri pt ions 3DPs were met followed ley field tease durlag of f eite radie-logical emaitorias.
Secommendatient Train the offeite ~
field teams to use end follow 18ew llampehlte 50Pe during radiological surveillance.
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TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Verment Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (April 17, 1945)
Page 21 of 32 Pen &-SEP-1, Propeoed Actual Complet ion PENA Evaluation of Completion Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Bew. 1, State (S) and lacal (L) Date Element Preposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Besposee for Corrective Action
- 2. Desc ript ions The tease did not under- J.10.e stand when to administer Kl.
Sec Jation Provide training to e-.
all oraanisational levels en criteria y for authorising KI administration to i emergency workers.
- 3. De sc ri pt ions Inforestion provided to P.I.d MTeite teams from the IPO was cursory.
Recommendations lepreve Alrection and control given to offsite monitoring
- teams se that they are kept apprised of any changes which could affact radiological sonitoring.
Chesterfield
- 1. De sc ri pt ion There was not enough K.3.a ~
dosimetry equipment.
Becuamendations The state should provide additional radiological moni-toring equipment.
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TABtX 2 Remedial Actions far Vermont Yankee lheclear Power Plant
( April 17,1985) Page 22 of 32
- Actual Proposed Completion PENA-BEP-1, Complet ion FEseA Evaluation of Rev. 1, State (5) and Imal (L) Date State and Local keeponse Date Deficiencies and RAC Recommandation Element Proposed Corrective Actions for Corrective Action Ninedale e-*
~
Descrip leet The Civil Befense radio F.I.h La8 3.
used as the primary means of communi-cating with the IFO in geene did not work properly.
Find and rectif y the Recoassendat ion _
cause of malfunction. See that radio checks are made bef ore placing equip-sent in service.
Euanaey f.e I. Deficiency: Full staf fing was never achieved 3 notably, radio was not moni- '
tored and several leportant trans- .
missions were missed.
Recommendations The town eheuld see that capability esiste for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per '
day stalling of commanication links. ~
i l
Il necessary, sosistance from the ,.
State should be requested. -
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d (O TASLE 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee lheclear Power Plant
! (Apr!I IF, 1945) i Fase 23 of 32 propeeed Actual PSNA-5EP-1, Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Deficiencies and RAC Recommeadption Bew. 1 State (5) and 14 cal (L) Data
-! Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Imcal Seeposee j for Corrective Action Element ii i rinche st er
- 1. Desc ri pt lent he Civil Defense radio F.1.b . g
, did not work well in all instances. .
The EOC and field tease could not reach the IFO.
Recommendatient The cause of mal-4 functione should be determined and periodic teste made to ensure that Civil Defense radio is reliable.
Nassachusett e State ROC
- 3. De sc ri pt los s Although the "Ceneral E.1 Emergenc y" message notification was received by the State, it did not come through NAldAS and the State Police in accordance with the communication channel shown in the plan. Dere was no esplanation available for this incident. It could have been am EOF, EOC, State Police, or utility lapse.
secommendations The cause of the deviation from the warning point systen should be found, if possible, and steps taken to ensure the inte-grit y of the warning-point system. .
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t TABLE 2 Remediel Actions for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Pow r Plant (April 17, 1985) Page 24 of 32
~
Proposed Actual PENA-REP-1, i Completion State (5) and local (L) Completion PENA Evaluellen of Sew. 1, State and Local Response Date Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Proposed correctlwa Actione Date l
for Cor4 L twe Actlen Element Area IV Pg r
- 1. De sc ri pt lent %o e ess a aeme problems F.I.b y (see Leyden 4% ...m* 7 aarly in the esercise with cessnanicatione et sees of the local BOCs. These were traced to inesperienced operators. Although backup systems worked, the primary meane did not de so in every location
- 100% of the time.
Recommendations In an emergency
- situation, especially one involving wide participation of local cow nities, Area IV (or the St ate EOC) should see that a radio check le made to be sure that all parties are in ,
communication.
Bernardoson De sc ri pt ient Updated public infor- C.2 1.
mation brochures are said to have been distributed. However, none could be
- pr od uc ed . This hee been noted as a deficiency in previous esercises.
secommendations Samples of public information brochures should be sent to Ft:MA Region I f or ewelustion. .
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TASt.E 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985) i I Page 25 of 32 l
FE8EA-REP-1, Proposed Actual l Completion ptNA Evaluation of Completion Deficiencies and BAC Recommendation Rev. 1 State (5) and Local (L) State and 1.ocal Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actione Date
- for Corrective Action
- 2. Descript lost Although evacuation nope J.10.a.
obouing population by areas, accese J.10.h.
- control points, and sector designation J.18.] g are in the plan, they were met shown .
on posted displays. This le a pre-vlees uncorrected deficiency.
Reconnendations On at least one of the display maps in the ROC, obow sector maskings, populattene, and ,
access control pointe. ,
- 3. Desc ri pt ion Permanent record espa- K.3.s sure devices were not available.
Recomunenda t i on t Ask the State to see that permanent record esposure devices are provided. .
De sc ri pt ions IIe one present was aware K.4 4.
of the mesismo allowebla does or of procedures for authorising emergency workers to incur espesures escoeding the EPA PACS.
Recomunendat ion s provide additional training for all of the EOC staff. .
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nh nv S at r
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sge ee l u t cuc s pr r to t ml a enl c o ra t c s a ru o
, d i pow rop o hy o o i o f n n ,f w f n en mo t e n nek ,no s aref r e ss su gi n d io ad nf is n
mi ek n gel ss i
t i rr ,
o ot cc ad e n v a ec o pi n d t a
t a o
k yi sr eA mrli ei t S esp sy rmdb A a t
R e, rot p ect e l m r ne eg n s ucr Cv p ei e rLk ep hs e e en ki a o a su lp f s
e t Ai n n s ce s Rt c
e H r ug .Ti t r i s i s ta e t ni n
de nr o .droinssnt nnd o e ot t r a rs . i D c s c
s n f ar s e opt en in de a o id o elb c std o t a c e i m s o i ,na sC e
s ic a ee eii n r gvt cmr r i n r ,N t a e o vli ea a e ll o in ir co i e er d p
,ne a i uo qi d
n c
ns t d a el osn r t p et . e ay nf e p v rbf ae e s or r l as t a i i d a ua s us wm m e v eiu, ct s i
r t .mum sl c r r c oeooeso t eiio c l pi uneo ip .
i aJ vd p s l c s s e f s cr pl rC c e l oob e si s e e eesl uA e hi ed s D appap ad u D D r weadPR wvd ae l
l .
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TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee thsclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985) Page 27 of 32
, f l
1 Proposed Actual FEMA-SEP-1, Completion i
Rev. 1 -a te (5) and incal (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Date State an# Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions
- 3. De sc ri pt ient so one le named as a A.2.a relief for the dispatcher.
Recosamendation s Include the name of C the person who will provide relief for CD the dispatcher and provide this person with adequate training.
layden i.
siripti.nl .ie,ia,e, euci, se a d.i....
- status heard sad nepe idille available, J.it.h ,
I were not used. This deficiency was also noted in previous esercises.
Recosusendatlant leprove the quality of displays and include such things as populations, access control pointe, relocation centers, and evacuation routes on thee, and trala the EOC ,
i workers in their use. .
De sc ri pt ient Because of the M.I 2.
inadequate training of the ROC staf f, the controller performed eastgency response functione.
9 9
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4 i
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e TASLE 2 semedial Actions for Vermont Ysabee Iluclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985) Pese 28 of 32 l
Actual
! Proposed Completion PENA-REP-1, Completion PENA Evaluation of ,
, sev. I, State (5) and local (L) Date State and Local Resposee Date Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Element Proposed Corrective Actisno I
for Corrective Action Recosamendatloa t Controllers should be inst ructed not to seeist or prompt y players. The State should follow its
- g own procedures to provide assistance to communities that are not adequately .
staffed.
efort hf ield De sc ri pt iont the statue board was not J.10.a.
- 1. J.10.b kept up-dated, and displays lacked complete information.
accommendations he st at us board ,
j ehould be used la future esercises and the information on displays improved.
F.I.b
- 2. De sc ri pt ion s Effectiveness of the new Civil Defense radio microwave system was diminished because of its location away from the EOC.
SecommenJetion_t A permanent location "
for the EOC should be established so .
that c omsmanicat ione equipment can be permanetly installed therein.
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1 TARLE 2 Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee lluclear Power Plant i ! (April 17, 1985) Page 29 of 32 i Propeeed Actual FEMA-REF-1, Completion Rev. I, State (8) and 14 cal (L) Completion FEMA featuation of Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Date State and 1.ocal Beeponse Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions for Corrective Action I
Warwick
- 1. De sc ri pt ions Displays did not include J.10.a. y all necessary information for ready J.10.b. o reference.
Recosamendations Although the total population of Warwick is only* 683, the .
maps containing population distribu-Lion, relocation centers, and evacus-tion routes should be clearly posted.
- Space should be provided in the EOC for this purpose.
Emeraency Operatina Facility (50F)
De sc ri pt ions Csamsunication procedures E.1 1.
between the states and utility as .
given in their respective plans were not followed f or the Ceneral Emergency Classification, which caused serious delays in official notification of state and local governmente.
(CATECORY A DEFICIENCY). .
. 9
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I TAtt E 2 Benedial Actlene for Vermont Yankee thaclear Power Plant (April 17, 1985) Page 30 of 32 Propeeed Actual FEMA-REP-1, Complet ies fella Evaluation of Completion Bew. 1 State (S) and tacal (L) State and Local Response Date Deficiencies and RAC Recommendation Proposed Corrective Actione Date Element for Corrective Action
.l
- Recoassee. Jet ien t Review, revise, and '
coordinate plane among all parties to ,
develop a better system for notiff- h cation of state declaien nahere of >=
changes in emergency claeolfication levels.
De sc ript ions The utility did not 1.8 2.
provide states with meteorological ,
data and plume w vement projections in a sleely manner.
Secommendations Sovies procedures so that meteorological and other perti-j nent d at a are provided to the statee in a timely manner. Consider install-j' ing terminale in all state 90Ce so that they can receive the computer- ,
generated output.
Media Center De sc ri pt ions The utility dieseminated C.4 I.
misleading and inaccurate public information, including protective
! action recommendations that could have conflicted with those recommended by State aut hori ties . In a real inc i dent , this would have confused the public. .
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I TAOLE 2 Reesdial Actions for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant f (April 17, 1985) Page 32 of 32 Actual Proposed Complettos FEMA-REP-1, Completles FEMA Evaluattom of Rev. 1 State (5) and lacal (L) Date State and 1.ocal Response Date Deficiencies and BAC Recommendation Element Proposed Corrective Actione
< > for Corrective Actica Descriptions the Media Center is C.3.s 3.
etill located la the EP1, as le the . 'y'*
designated backup Media Center. bs f Becommendations The Media Center and
! - backup should be located outelde of a
the EPZ. .
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TheLa 3s estlCisect itaCEluG TattA Wassent TamEsa mer'm 90 Met STATION
!' ee.e i .f Si i i i .
ohjeestee
.i sahee-
- ugeeS-4614 quently Cetteettee Freelemely retA-SSF-8 feeted Acates teetstee Idemettled FBea Bearcise Bee. I (searcise vertiled cergest ehjective Objectlee Reference Justodictles Actles Tehee Sete) (i.e., see lte) statue lesee geocrtpates tot e losee 4 - 5.1 Weremet Selecettee of $4ete geC free fee Bologettee of SBC C I 1. The werktes space for ese- 2/10/02 m/A
-Itamatpeller te Unterbery. 9/28/83 festitty wee effeestee .
l emed and centret operettoes to taprestes emergency Letter free Weremet (10/10/82) l I et the state soc to tende* otettag that the pleas to respeace scal,ttles.
geste and slee reguttee e relecote Bec are flee and better phyeleet toyeet se state should provide a fleer l'
facilitate toternal ses- plea to FW84.
meetcettees. (3.4.5.5) see C H
- 2. It te sesseeted that edel- 2/18/82 m/& I i F.3.e termeet PJ ttesel redte pegere er 9/28/01 V ather eenperable egulpenet 4/87/85 Additiesel redte he obteleed to accelerate pegere more ehtelmed the elettleg and the mobil- med used to alert BoC taattee et state ottictate . etaff for the 8905 and 80C etaff. ( 4.2. l .3 )
- esercles. Wateg thee i
erotem, the etersing wee perfereed te a
{ steely seener.
2 termont Bedte telephaese testelled to Tee Bedte telephees unched C
- 3. sedicated telepheese with 2/14/82 m/a F.l.d sessenetcete with local soc. 9/28/03 tecenoteteesty.
bache, eyetees are needed to terreve the flee of 4/tF/SS The redte telephone ttternettee f ree the state ,
operetten et the state to the local tece eed SOC une leproved der-j embeece the eseegesset of tag the 8901 esercise
! seergency operettees. and to ceasidered (4.2.t.4) te.co.
)'
Tee Sedte telepheme did C 2 trettlehore sodio telephaese testelled to
- 4. Dedicated telephemme with 2/88/02 m/& S F.l.d bechop opeteen ore needed seamenteete with State 90C. 9/28/01 set work, hockey eye-tee une mood.
to taprove the flew of to-fumet tee f ree the state to
- 4/1F/81 The redte telepheme the local 80Ce end enhoece operettee een taproved the essagement of emergency dettag the 190S eser
- operettene. ( 4. 2. 3.4 ) stee. Derlag ese toeperary sellemetten!
correcatee acties see I
takes. ,
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} T&SLS St BSFICIAIICT TRACEEIIG T&SLS V5aleoIff Tagtgg nearn eas peafta STATieII FeSe 2 of 13 j
a a
eblesttwe 4 Sehee-
' geently certeettee
- usens-e6S4
- Teeted Acatee fata-esp-l Vertised Cearest Freetamely (Emercise poe4 8sercise Bew. 4 Actlee Takes hote) (8.e.. Soestte) states Seerstes teenttiled Objective 8bjecties Reference Jestedicates leese Beeceipttee Sete losee Tee Radio sel / ' C teamersten nedte telephemes testelled to worked onll.
n/a S 2 F.l.d sessenteete with State tec. 9/28/03 S. Dedicated telephones with 3/t4/83 backey eyeteen are needed to taprove the flee of tolereettee from the state to the locet acce med ee-hence the sneagement et onereeery oper et tees.
(4.2.I.4) Tee Bee syetee selfeec- I Gottferd Sedte telephence testelled to backup via 2 F.l.d 9/33/83 tiemed. e-.
i 2/t8/03 5/4 S conoselcate with State soc. enemmettet phone llee,
- 6. Sedtceted telepheese with N backey eyeteen are needed
- to leprove the ties of to- 4/17/43 Dortet the 1989 eser-fossettee free the state to clee the redte sete-yheen only sorted the local sace med enhance ecceelemetty. The the menesemoet of emorteocy operettees. (4.3.l.4) back op commerstat pheme Iise see need ,
ehes neceeeery.
Sedte telepheme sorted C Sedte telephemes testelled to Tee 2 F.B.4 Werese 9/14/03 sett.
Dedicated telephemes with 2/10/83 m/& S commenteste with State sec.
7.
backey systees are aseded to lapsees the flee of ,
totoseettee free the state to the local 00Ce med on-heece the eseegeenet et eessgency ope ret teme.
(4.3.l.4) 4/17/09 set se eserstee I S J.9 vermeet objective and set med/or plee 2/t8/03 m/& 9.44 deseestrated.
- 8. Tretelet thengea ese eaggested to tersese the disticettles eith the esseeseemet of a sere detectable level et redtelegtcel coeteesmettee et benee and esteet feeds.
(4.2.1.9)
I > 1 i
TheLa 3e eartclamCT Teaalm3 Tael.a i vset0NT T m en m m retNS STafices 1 Fece 3 et 13 i
t i
ehjective Sehee-
' INS 4 geently Corrective Freelemely Fel&-SSF-4 Tested Actlee Beerstee Ideettfled Fees Beerstee Bee. 4 (Emerstee Testited Currest Isees Descripttee Sete lesee objecatee Objecatee Reference Jettedicates Actlee Tekee Sete) (i.e.. aseelse) states l
- 9. Portehle tedine semplete 2/88/82 n/a e S 8.9 Wereses See 3 should he considered for 9/28/83 the taproveeeet of the state's redselosteel field 4/87/05 enly one of the too meettestag cepehtitty. field meetterlag teams (4.2.l.82) for the 1981 eseresse had t eat rument at tes for detecttee of radiotodine.
- n. C td.r-l.a .hoeid be ui.i.2 w. . - ..i .e-t i-eti- of .t.te e t. e T.. .ffective 8. i.,revie. C E st ee to relecettag the more ade9eate facility. 9/28/03 Soc operettoes.
geste Boc to a facility eith et least see large seen. where the tectdeet i
director's office could be lecesed to e side rose .
teeleted free the sec entreece and the estee of the redte esteork eyetee.
( 4.3. t .6) ll. & oteedby generater to 2/14/82 m/& S 2 f.2 Teremet Tee hock-up diesel generatore me - The it to apperest that i edelsed to preelde hockey are es steedby et the toc. mee of the back up generatere power sepply for the cem-the gee- emeld be oef fisteet la esetcottene egulpasst la erstere the evoet of a power ese et the Wiedhee Camely use met blechest.
Shertif'e etfice. desse-( 4.2. t . 80 )
strated.
9/21/e3 j
4/87/05 The wiedham Ceest y Shettif's office did met participate to the 1981 eseretee.
1 II. sep dteplore sheetes seec* 2/14/82 s/4 4 -
J to.e vermeet me t settee restee. relecettee 9/21/83 coeters. med shelter stees eheeld be developed for 4/87/01 The gelddleses and ese et the utdelesee med sech t eghes S t ate -
Sechteghee St at e Pellce Police usedgeesters .
ReeJgeerters. (4.2.1.88) did met participate to the 1985 esercise.
- . ..~ . _ . .
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l teals 1: BSFICIOuCT TEACEING T48tA i' vesseltf fesulas ar1m rouRE STAT 80N Page 4 of 31
! .62ective Sebee-ImeeG-e654 ,
geently Corrective i feeted acties 4
Freelemely reta-SSF-8 Wertised
, see. 3 (seerstes correst s orels. Ideettised rota sarcies
& cates Tahoe Sete) (i.e.. Beestte) Statue teees tescatettes Sete lesee objective Objective Refersece Jettedictles pereset Vee The leberatory report C 2/88/82 5/4 7.20 - 8.8 form for semples con-
- 83. It to eaggested that me- 4/17/01 certelaty factere be telee a notettee for applied to the redte- " * ** **I*"I** *# "
- cheetcet emelysee to '
tapreee the state's es- essentammet.
peeere centret capebit-Islee. (4.2.t.44)
Tee toeleiene unto made C 2/30/s2 m/& 88.l4 3 S.4 9 ernest Trateles une est eheerved. M
- 64. Testates of the Bec staff 9/3t/01 acceretely, ef feettwo.
to sesseeted to emeure - ly. and te a timely U thet doctetene ende et the '*
etete levet ste timely.
j eccerete. eed beeed se rettable dato and edwice 4
free seatelegical health edeleere et the 80f and I the Iro. (4.2.5.53)
- u.3 Tereset Scenerte une estates to Tee Tuo seecuesteme were i
- 81. It la esagosted that 2/88/$2 m/s 29.13 provide more foncties for 9/16/01 ordered. eccese coe. ,
{ 5.5 f fetere acesertes should emergency perosenet. trol une employed and ellee for a more adegeese there see generetty i eserstee of recovery and more acties for emer=
reentry, med opptteetten j et eeecesttee and doces- covery and reentry and teateettee precederee to a decentamtmattee prece-tekee et practice greep of ** * ~
reetdeets. (4.3.8.11) etrated.
4/87/81 asce,ery/ reentry and decentesteettee were met objectIese of the .
1985 eserstee and were
. eet demseetrated.
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Testa 1s esFICIENCE Teamtm TaaLE 1
VSas0NT TeaIEEE em peessa Stafl0It j ' page S of 11 l
l Shjecties i ' Sebee-Eumm-4454 quentty CorrectIse Freeteesty FBIA-RSF-8 Tested action i Seercise Ideettised pean Beerstee Bew. 8 (Searclee Vertfled Corrent leese Deeceipales Bote leone objective Objectlee Reference Jertedletten actice Tehee Sete) (i.e., pesette) state, I
a i
3.2 Termeet Tee tre to stigt located j 16. m Incident Field office 3/88/82 11/ 4 4 - as acties has been tekee. 1
' ' (trol to trattlebete to
- Free e letter free Veremet 9/21/01 to Brestlebore withis seedegeets to hendte (IS/38/82): Freetates for as the IG-elle syt.
acteel emergeecy opere- etternate Ife to already a
, t tiene. This f acility le part of Termeet's Flee. hr 4/87/SS 100 to esitt teceted i presently located withis are seestateg the feasibiltty to Stettlebore withlm of relecettag the primary 190 the to-ette art.
the to-elle art and asede free a letter to Termeet to be relecoted at a 3-eee er deotence frm the (82/28/82): 7914 le plassed 8"*
e pre
- to leere that there era pleae ptset er h.s . 'd
.ide habitehti , and to releceae the tre estelde the t#-ette 8FE.
et teleste the seed for eescuettee le the evoet that prer* ttee settoes beceae weseery. er pre-i eletees need to be mode for se alternate IFO.
(3.l.8.6)
If. A direct telepheme time to 2/88/02 m/t S 2 F.t.d 'Terment Tee The edettles of a ded- C .
[
- 9/28/03 Iceted telepheme itse i meeded to terrese the use not eheerved, bee-Steelleees med Stee of ever commenteettene l teforeettee hetenee the
- tro sed the gor. (4.3.1.5) with the State SCC i
were effective.
IB. Trateles. egelpeset (le 3/88/82 m/& IG F J.lt.d Brattlebore trattlebore ples opdated. Tee updated ples tactedes. C 4 the fore of dedicated 9/28/01 list of eebility-eekt clee), and endtfice-tapetred pereses med spectiles'ventclos to i tiene to the Stettletete i tecet eastgency respeese moetet is se eescoe-ples are needed to leprove stas.
eethode for protecting i .
eebility-lapetted peresee.
(4.2.2.3)
{
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Te8LE 3: SOFICESIICT TRACEls5 T&4LE vemeuert Vaserse assCIAas ronIES 81478018 Fege 6 ef 53 Objectlee Sehee-f IsleeG-46S4 geently Correettee Tested Acates Presse ely Pete-SEF-8 Westfled Correst Eserstee See. 8 (toerstee Beerstee Ideettiled FWit Acaten Tehoe este) (i.e., see ite) state.
toene meeceipales Date loose objecatee objecties Seference Justodicates Tee Free e letter to C R/A 2 2 A.I.e Summerstem L8et of staff rester to
- 19. Addittooet peroommel are t
2/18/02 coastees a 24-heer roepense 9/23/03 verment free pela moeded et the emmeerstem ese pested to the 80C. (12/21/82): the cepe-SOC to tesere the capabil- bility to provide e
, lay for 24-heer coettaesee Free a Teremet letter 24-heer operettee se
' emergency operettene, to- (88/88/02)s the capabittsy see a corrected deft-cledlag 24-heer stafftag for 24-heer staffteg of the cleecy.
et comeneteettees Itate. cemenetcealem's link dettes se emergency eposettee le aesti- There are es preet-(1.1.2.8) 24-heer ta able. etees for operettees evettable. 50 The mee of the back-up
- emergency staff mee met desseetrated.
- J.lG.e, Summerstee Itape ehesteg esecesttee reesee fee Svecastfee rentee med C 2/18/02 N/A 4 populettes
- 20. Isepe sheetag evecostles J.lt.h and populetten dietttheatee 9/21/81 distribe-routee. relecettee coe- centere were aestlehle et the Stee date were aestl=
ters, and papelottee RAC.
able for gesch refer-distributtee need to be .
tel.
developed for mee to the Seemeresse goc. (t.2.2.80)
Ceemselset tees used C F.I.e, h eetse me actise hee been takes. Tea It. addttle el redte pegere er 2/' /s2 m/& 8 i F.3 medte pegere er other commes- 9/21/01 for alerties med ether egespeset are emeded teettee eyetene are met soott- embtiteettee of emer-et the Demeerstes seC to able to oestet the primary gency peresenet and back up the lead-Itse mobile medical seppert telepheme linee.
telephemes, ehtch are facilittee le withest preeensty the eely seems a hech-up system.
of lettlelly eterates the emergency toeposee perece- 4/tF/Pa todte pegere base been met end to cemenetcase empptted to all BBC eith enbtle medical sup- perecemet and to port tect tistes. (4.2.2.4)
- eelmeteer fireese.
These more need for the 3965 emerstee.
...~ .- . -
1 I
t i-i l TheLa 3s aspICISACT TSACElm3 fast.s WSteoWT T&amas usern ean p0MER ST4 Ties
' peSe F of $3 i
l Objecatee
. w Sebee-
! WMBAS-0654 quently Corrective i
previaeely ~ pW84-ssp-l Tested actlee Seerstee Ideettfled pW84 Sseretse . too. 8 (Seerstee Westfled Corrent leese Beectlpalen Dat e lesee Objective objectlee Beforence Jettedtettee actlee Tehen Dete) (i.e.. Sesette) Statue i.
' ' 22. Trelates, addittemet per- 2/88/02 Ela 41.14 4 J.50.e IIertbere Teen of Itertbere hee been as I soneet, and ples endift- relleved of emerSoncy repense 9/28/83 i i cettees are needed at regelsemeste. State stil 4/87/05 merlbers to proetde ac- cover Marlbore se e ,eet of ceptable esene for slett* ec&ideet. Toen deee met les the tremeteet papele- petticipate.
stem med pereene estelde or seey tree sees alert i
l redtee. (5.8.2.8) **
!* 21. Acatees te . protect the 3/IS/02 m/s 82.15 6 J.2 Nortbere Teen of Inertbere hee been re- em 8 o pubite are met testeded se 87.88 J.9 -
4teved of emerSeecy roeposee 9/28/4) i
' part of the nortbere local 89 J.to. regeltenemas. State will 4/87/0S j ples. Sech a preSree J.83 cover Marlbore la evoet of i eteeld be developed, med accident. Teen deee est l 4 staff used to be treteed perticipate.
I le the eartene especte of -
i
[ public protecates.
i l (3.8.3.9)
- 24. selecettee Ceetere need to 2/88/82 m/& 27.18 F J.88.e Marlbere Team of Nottbere hoe beee go g he ideastised to the nort- J.88.h retteeed of emerSeacy respeese 9/28/03 bere emergency resposee regelseasete. State will 4/17/05 ples. (4.3.2.88) cover IIer there la evoet of accident. Teen does met perticipate.
- 25. Trateles le the techetcal 2/IS/82 m/a 7.8.9 5 8.8 trestlehere Wee SeerSeacy peroommel g evaleottee of sceteeet 9/28/81 are est eeificiently seeeeeeeet tafermettee et treteed to acceretely the Brattlebore BOC to evaleete eccedest adoleed te lesere septe seeeeemset taferee-i eseeeeeest of the eeSet-
- 49ee.
! tede end lecettee of redseleS t eel besorde to 4/87/0S Observet tene et 8981 the public. ( 4.2. 2.2 ) eserstes tedicate
- emerseery pereeeeel are estil lee fft-steetly treteed to evelease occidest seeeeeeest inter-metlee. ,
f e
e #
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r Thes.s h OEFICIEECT TRACElleC TASLR TEmpeusfT TAIELF.E seHCt.AAA P01888 STATION Page 8 of 53 Objectlee Sebee-IluesG-06% gesetty Corrective Prestowely FW44-REF-8 Tested Actice Eseretee Identitled retA Eserctee tee. 1 (Emeretse Vertfled Cerrest
{ acttee Takee Date) (i.e.. Roselle) Statue losee Desertyttee Date lease objective objecttee Reference Jettedicates j
- 26. Treteleg to the ese of El 2/lG/82 N/A 28 6 J.10.e Brattlebore Peteestem tedlde la oestlebte les Peteestae tedtde le I for emergency sortere end E.S.b to sac emergency pereennel. 9/28/S) evellable but use met eethettsed for use 2
[-
In perseemet decenteetee- dettag thte esercise.
1 sten to edelse for the esattlebere soc. (4.2.2.1) 4/1F/05 Peteestem ledtde see
' met evellette destes
' 190% eseretee end emergency unrkere were
' met kneeledgeable abset Sto see. C.
p.
- N.I.e termeet/ There use little taproveemet Tee The emerstee occastle C
- 27. Petere eserttee eccentles 2/14/02 m/4 -
'
- Demmerates to the oceserte. 9/28/03 wee still testfecates should be desteed to more at edegestely teettag adequately test osergeocy the emergency capabil-toepense capabitttlee et tttee of the ROC.
the Deemeraten BoC.
( 4. 2. 2.1) 4/17/05 The Bec ese more levoteed to the 394) eseretee thee la i
preeteos eserstees.
Cettferd testattettoe of redte tate- Tee mettescatentag redte I ft. Sect op redte co m metce- 2/10/82 N/A l.1 5,2 F.I.e phone to provide pet. .ty 9/28/03 telepheese were backed tiene egetposes te ses- ep by commercial phees seated to compleeeet the seemuelcettee.
lines, lead-Itse telephones.
ehtc h are currently the redte 4/17/05 The prteory sely meses of settfyteg spetse agete did met the h !!ferd EDC staff. functies well for the 8941 esercise. Back-op systee one used.
- 29. mape ehestes eveemetten 2/10/82 N/A 4 - J.00.e cettferd tescoastes restes and access Tee evecesttee restes med I routee and relecettee J.le.h contret potete were added to 9/28/03 accese coettet pelate teen esp. are e,ettebte for
- centere sheeld be devel- getch referret. seape
) eyed for ese to the Cettferd BOC. Deces- sheetag relecettee costare were not poet-1 teeteetten centere stee ed. Traffic coeges-need to be ideettfled te I.
the Cettferd emergency ates med decentestea-reopenee ples. 44.2.2.4 stee centere are ettet emeddressed to plee.
l end 4.2.2.80)
I i
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Teett 3: DEFICIENCY MACEING thele WERNDNT TANKEE Muct. EAR ptof ER STATIUM
- Pese 9 ef 53
?
Objective sobee-NUABC-0654 geestty Corrective
- Freetously FEMA-REP-8 Tested Actles i Eseresse Ideettfled FEMA Eseretoe Rev. I (Esercise Vertfled Current Issue Descripttee Date lease Objeettre Objective Beforence Jettedicaten acttee Taken Dete) (i.e.. gesette) States f
i s
4/87/85 scope shevig retece-Stee costere were evettobte for the 1985 eseretee, asuever.
the Cultford plea ese set evettobte et the 30C and it comtd met be deterateed if ahe ylee presently addree-ese tref f te eengeestes >=
eed decentesteettee
- coaters.
- 30. Oe-the-job trelates to the 2/10/02 m/4 20 6 E.3.s Cellford Tee SDC staff were est t
, care end use of destosters 9/28/03 properly treteed to to advised to taprove the the ese of desteatry 24-hour espebility to equipeset and lected deteretee the desee re- beestedge of aesteus cet M by emergency per- deses.
eemaet at the cettferd toc. ( 4.2.2.8 ) 4/1F/85 Observettees ende dur-tog the 1985 eseretse tedleste BDC staff esitt tecto suf fleteet tratolog.
- 38. Frewteless for ocetdeet 2/10/02 n/a F.s S u.7 seertbere Tove of Nortbere bee been se C esseeemset are met to- sette,ed of emergency reopease 9/21/03 etoded to the Iterthere regattemente. state will 4/17/05 ptse. Tretates and pies esver Nortbere la event of restem are suggested. accideas. Tove does met
( 4.2.2.9 ) pe t t ICipa t e.
32, seepe ehestes ewecuestee 2/88/82 m/4 4 -
J.to.a. seertbere Teve of peertbere hee been Tee C restes and retetettee coe- J.to.h retteeed of emergency resposee 9/23/S) tere need to be developed regetromente. State ulti 4/37/05 for ese to the Iterthere rever peertbere la event of EOC. Betecettee cent ere ace t eest . Teve does set else need to be Ideettfled pe r t t elpet e.
to the Isertbere emerseecy respence ples. (4.2.2.80)
O e a
. e
. 133 I: u - =
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i ThaLE in DEftCIENCT TaACKluG TASLE 4Em00NT TAeKEE sopranas puuta STATION page it of 53 ebjecttee Suboe-li gesetty Certsettre numeG-0414 Tested Artise F9eA-stp-l (Seercise verified C rrent presteesty Statue pSe4 Emeregee see. I Actles Tekee sete) (f.e., aseette)
Esoretse Identitled objectlee Objectlee Deference Jettedictlee Date teeme a
tesee Beecstyttes 4/17/01 Seelestry egolpenet ettl be reflected to the 3837 and empplies of El med to the emergency respeees asettobte to sore procederee for each egency. seergency seekere et Changes to plane and preced- the IPO detteg the eres allt be acteepeated by 8905 esercles. Nebste rotated trelates. (tatter medical support tease free N.II. 9/28/82.) were met ebeerved g dertog thle esercise. u k
Tee The effleteery to C
. 3.) nee asapektre appropetete espe and displaye 9/2t/03 betettag the Govereer N/A 4 have geen poeted.
E nep diepteye is the opere , 2/tS/82 d.to.e hee been terreved.
' tiene rose et the state eeC i eeed te he taproved and more pronteently displayed gar use le brielles the Govereer abset the direc-stem med centret of oest-gency respesos fonctlees. C ,
(4.3.8.2) se 2 E. see neepehire 2/88/82 m/A 3.) pro-
- 37. Tretatas to seesseted to 4/t7/05 Tertiteettee cedores more edegeere
- terreve the *ertittell** ef dertog the 4901 e se r-esseesee recetoed by eed seet f ree the Mme anspektre cleo. Alt estelde 4 State EOC. (4.1.t.3) cette recateed as een-eecere chameets were vertfled.
> > p.t.d - N- htr- ,/M.,
,.. ,,.let 1. .d.t d t. ut.m .i.
4/87/0) emed seemseteettees tesere that docteleas for copsbiltttee eith the takteg emergency acties are Ipe and eith mootter-beoed directly se comeset* tag teses enre desse-etrated dettag the cettese receleed fece the tre and redtetegtcet mont- 1901 eseretee.
' tortog teens. (4.1.t.4) i i
t l
i i
a j e .
. _ _ . _. _ . _ m__ _ _ . ._ . . _
4 .
j . . .
i festa 3: esetCtencT Teacales Testa i
UEWeemt TheEEE muCLEAR retits Statten i
shjectise
- f Sehee-
- l uneAG-46S4 gesetty serrecatee i i Freetamely Pet &*BSP-8 Tested Actise
] i (Emercise vertiled Correst Seerstee Identified FWe4 Emerstee Bee. I lease eb}ecstee objecatee Seference Justodictlee Actlee Taken tote) (i.e.,Beestte) statue loose esecstyttee Sete
?
seu amapohlte Tee addttleast seppites of I 3/88/93 m/A Il 6 J.lt.e 5 39. Camelderettee sheeld be
- 9/3t/83 El are.needed.
i -
stoes to etechettles potee-
' I stem todade (ES) to elet- 4/87/85 Serleg the 1981 eser-mise the poteettel need to stee, it see learned i
i herree free the levoeterles that altheegh the of seschhorses states. state eau ptees to i
(4.3.l.6) stockpile 2000 desee i of Et le Careerd, it 4
still has ao dettette schedste for ettetetag
[
vi Ste suo sepply of El.
l
- 40. seelth, modtcel. sed espo- 3/88/83 m/4 87.38 6.7 J.lt.) Chesterfteld Boelmstry and teleted record- Tee Bedeelegical espeeere C j E.3.h keeples for emergency morbere platten centrol preceducee nete centret meeseres more 39 E.4 free seat of the teuse utthis were adegestely domme-j week at the Cheeterfield B.S.e the BPE are betag apareded. ettsted. saast eggs.
Soc. Formal and on-the-jeh lasel emergency morbete will cet see very heeir-E.5.h asetetes, steeg with a re- be effered testalag to espe- ledgeehte. Verbet med 4
etee of ples centeet, emeld sete centret omsoeree. urtsten teatractlene .
) taprove coattet of accese (letter fsee e.g. 9/30/03.) were seemed to sees.
to eseceeted stees, ade- gency workere %
geecy and fregeoecy of they recetoed deel.
eessgency uncher destester estere end recorde seedtage, sed esteam sere kept.
j, et espeeere recorde. &
5 restem medfor madatteettee
, of toe oentgency reopease I pleae weeld tapreso the cepehtittlee for espeeere ,
centret med to deterates if i decent eet eet tee to needed for emesseecy werbete.
(1.2.3.l3) i
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TheLS 3: OsttCleIICT TSACKlus Theta f Wassaulff Taamuls merg ene Potsee Stef tell 1 Page 83 of $3 i
1 a
1 Objecatee '
j Sebee-i Wass-0654 guestly Corrective FWee-REF-l Tested Actles l Freetamely Wortfled Cetteet Fett Seetcase Bew. 4 (Emerstee geerstee Ideettfled
! Sh}ecatee Objective Reference Jettedicates Actles Tahoe Sete) (i.e.,seeelse) states i lee e esecetyttee Sete losee 3 F.B.h Bachemed Itape med dieptere are posted Tee restleses espe and C l
OI. seerseecy operettees fe- 2/88/82 II/A 4.3 as regelred. A ese Clett 9/21/83 displaye e,a evettobte F.l.d i etttales and reeeerces et m.3 tefense redte see testelled et for esey reference.
the etchemed seC sere see- J.10.e the 80C. Physteel factittles. Ceemmescottees mere a eldered seek. theshing pteblem threeghest the J.le.b toternet e - Etattees and space, emoottlee, and necestty remoteed enchanged. esercles beconoe the laternal commetcettees *as piece have been made to Civil Defense redte meed to be leproved. Cee- upgrade the Bachemed Bec did met functies prey-emelcettene needs to be Steelt. The toen hoe es egly, ,
sopreved with redte oces- etternate facility it can ta mese end formal med on- 4/87/01 Festittles, espe, die- m
,' ceneider.* (t.etter free m.m.
the-job tratalog of sec 9/24/03.) plays, med ceammetce-poseeeeel to aposete 48ees more ett etr-redtes. (3.3.3.83) soewed to be adege'ete dettag the 1985 eser-i cles. A ese CD redte i had been testelled and appropstete treteleg
,i presided to several itse med reeces egeed pereommel.
I Itape and displaye are posted Toa pertieset espe and C O2. Emergency speesttese fe- 3/10/S3 m/A 4 - 3.3 eneseep displaya ese aestlebte J.le.e se regelred. A ese Clett 9/28/03 cittstes and seeeerces et Defeese redte see testelled at for eeep reference. A J. I S.b Seensey Rec more seek. the Soc. Phyettet factittlee, papelotten distribe-Westtag space , emnettlee, laterest commentcettene eed stee esp to stilt toternal ceasenteettees. secestty reenleed eschenged. steelag. Comanette-med oecertty esed to be Stone more a problee taproved. A esp sheetat threaghest the eser-the dietstbettee of pepe- stee becesse the Ctest lli lettee by evecesttee atos Befosse sadte did eet I neede to be fonction properly, j sectose
. .else
.. .,e . ii. .r.it) 4/8F/05 The emergency facitt-1 i Sles more taproved let the 1945 esercles. A papeletSee nep use asettable end the Clett Defesee sedte fonetened edegentely.
1 N
i i
1 I
i i e g
l i .
I Ta88.E 3 asstClosect 1tacaleIG Tatt.4 f WSmeGeff Teamus meCLaan penfEE STAT 80il
, Paes 84 of 53 i I l I Objectlee 1 f Sebee-1 M S4 geently Corrects ,e Fes&-asp-8 Tested Actlee I
presteemly (seerstee veelsted correst
- seerstes ideetifled rei& seerstes see. t (i.e.. Seeelse) statue '
1 objective Objecatee teleseece Jettedtettee Astles Tekee Bete)
- Isome Bootstettes Date lesee f
Semesey Be acttmes more sheerved. Tee The Clell Defemme C
- 03. soors*ecy operettees ese- 2/88/42 afa 3,4 3 4.l.4 9/38/03
, 3.3 seenver, there had ebeteesty detector une effee-1 esement at the seessey seC B.4 been sees trelatog of the geC tively to charge of moede taprovemeet. & the 30C operettee and perseeeel.
spectits todtvidual neede received edegeste sep-to be to charge of the free a letter tres N.E. port free e bemeledge-E0C4 the ese med feesttee (9/30/03)s m State tsar le able staff.
et the emergency steeelft- betag resteed. the teen ylees settee system use met selt eed the emergency roeposee p kneens med adequate arts- presadores are beleg teeteemd t.s
, N see psecederee that pse- med reetoed as neceeeery.
wide for eserseeep actlene .
to be tekee eht.% are see-eleteet with actless I seceameeded by the state need to be septemoeted.
I ( 3. 2.2.13) m/& 4 - 4.3.e theeterfteld Adelstem of espe and dteploye. Tee Chesterfield had ett C
- 44. Emerseecy operettene 3/88/92 & Civil Defeese redte eretse 9/11/03 displays and espe es-5.3 f eelittlee and reeeercee J.tS.e ese testelled. BBC Besettees sept papelattes die-l et the Chesteettend sec J.it.b eere changed to Cheeterfield. tribettee. The Clett esed taprovosest to F.8 tefense redte ese to-i secessay ceammateettene. operettee. Fectittlee f l.h
! meshtes space. and espe et Chesterfteld are sheetes popelettee dio- edegnete. Secerity ss8betIse ed eseceetien eseeeses seenteed as l' restes. ( 4.3.3.1) le the peevlees eser-I etee.
u I. 4/87/01 restltttee and re-eserces more teproved for the 1985 eseresse
- and are cemeldered edegnete. Several redendent redte eye-seen were evettable med pseelded see-tie =eme redte conse-etcettene.
- . _ . . ..~.-..._.._ . . . . . . . . , - . . -
i I
b i
- , .sqg/,
TaatA 16 OSFIClauCT 1aACEtWB T408.8 Te m 1Assas - - pausa 81411eu Page IS of 93 eblostise
, Sehee-Inges-46S4 gesetty Cetteettee Freetamely FWi&-SEP-8 Teeted Actlee Benectee Ideettited peak Essestae see. I (Emerstee vertsted Corrent losee geocetysten tote teeme objecateo ebjecties tafetenee Justodicatee Asttee Tekee Sete) (8.e.. aseette) statue
- 41. Emmagency operettees fastl- 3fts/s2 m/a 4 - A.S.e atendete addettee of aspe and dieptere. See mioodele had ett die- C Rales med tesserces et the 5.3 A Clett Defense redte erstes 9/28/83 ptere and mape eacept steedete asC esed taprece- J.te.e eso lootetted. papelottee diettIbe-eset to secestty, seassent-
- J.te.b ties. The Clett settene unchlag space, and F.8 Safense redte see empo sheetag pepotettee I.I.b toepetettee. SGC dieteibetles and eeecenttem ies!IIaSee seenemed enchanged. Secestty sentes. (4.3.2. 5 ) messesee reesteed as to presteme eesselee.
[
4/47/0S Seeurity and aerbles space esse adegeese fee the 1981 emeretee.
. Depetettes elettibe-stes esp to post of the Steedete pies and see seettobte to the SSC. Sedte teammet-setten to doecstbed to
- teams teocr8 pales #884 (3.3.S.I.t).
- 44. Bestseecy operettees fe- 3/84/03 m/& 4 - A.2.e Winchester addittee of espe and displete. Tee Wiesheeter had ett g attistee and seenerces et 8.3 & Civil telease tedte erotee 9441/81 regelted dieptope med the Winchooter Sec emed J.lG.e see testelled. espe. The Clett tapreeemmet to escority. J.le.b Sefense redte see le-mostleg F.8 eparettee. The Wie-seamenicottees. theetet SAC f acitt48ee apace. and erpe shouteg F.t.b repelottes distribetten seestead secteeged.
and e ecentlee restee. Sesettty asseuree re-eetmed as to the pree-(4.3.2.5) teme esercles.
ofII/01 fte feeittatee and seeeeley et the asC more comeldered ade-geese for the 8981 eseestee, aseseer, the Clett Defsees redte seetle ed to be se megetlebte seems of seemseicestee. .
o 9
i:. . .
h l
Tasta 3a entlCteuCT teacstas Taman gemeest fasmet uuttaAA reuBR STatten .
Page 16 of $3 ebjectlee set e-uumas4614 gesetty Correettee peen-est-l Tested kties Presteesty see. 3 (Seerstes Wettised Correet ,
Saeestee Ideettited FWes tearstes
&attee Tahoe Sote) (8.e.,tesette) States
! teeen geesttytten Sete tesee Objectlee ehjective Seierence Jettadicties Richemed Tee there see me ehenge C 34-host 2/88/82 RfA 8.2 3 A.I.e 47 Capetittty tes 4.4 9/21/03 eboerved for a 24-beer tettlet and esetteesee tattlet et eestlemet emeegency roepease for roepease et the Rich-elettles and anbilleettee need BGC.
I et eittstele med etett et the etchemed geC emeld he 4/87/85 At the 1981 eseresse tapteved with addittemet the staff edegnetely es-the-jeb tretetes eed doeseibed hee eeteeded
! ogetposes. (4.3.2.1) 34-heet operettees sa emeld be tupleaseted. e kesdale Wee theoreere ested that C 2/88/82 m/& S 2 f.l.a
- 48. Co - esteettee egolpenet F.I.e 9/21/83 comenettettes peace
- emeld tapreee prompt acat- estee were adequate eettee et the steedele F.2 Sec. The ability to eme- opense for activetten.
eastcote with Steed and Seergoesy poseeeeel eentle medical empoort Stoo relotteely clase testatstes meeld be to- se OSC se metif testles ,
preeed at the steedste OSC wee es peeblem. It with estabtlehenes et pee-codesee le the lacet ytes. the ability to _
tsete with mediest support fectt8ttoo bee been added to the plan.
4/88/es eartes the less eser-clos it use estab-tiebed that the SAC ese semanessete each
' 88eed and mobste endtset seppert fectt-
' lates testedtes the Rosal embeteece eer-etce, the Besat tebere.
9eremet asepitet, see the Des ees of Seer
- gency stedtsel Seselsee sa the State Iro.
(see pp. 2-4 et stee-dele pleest 82/11/64 restates).
~ ' ' " ^ ~ ~ -
- - - - - - . _ 2L:~- ^
I.
t
\
e 4-Tests 3: SOFICleIICT TeeCEles T408A gemmW 5esag -saa ynget M4Tien fogo B7 ef $3 ebjecatee Setee-Wings-thS4 games 8y Corresttoo psesteesty M-SEP-3 Tested estten Smarcies ideestfled feet Saeectes ,too. 3 (Saetetes teettled Cettees teses menestytten ante lease objeccles thjecates asterence Jettedicaten estsee Taken este) (i.e.,aseette) statue 3/84/83 m/a 5.8 Semesey See These see es shooree- C
- 49. adotateeet poteemmet mente 4 3
.teprese steely and efft- 5.3 9/38/03 Etee ested senseretag edettleest poteameet steet actieetsee of the et the Sneeeey geC.
Sweesey sec. (4.3.2.3) 4/87/0S Sertog the 198S eser-eles the Senseep Sec decometrated the abit-Say to preepsty scat-oote the get le se >=
effleteet amesee. g 3/84/e3 ala 3 3 a.s.d utesheetoe at see est effletetty ab- see the set see effeetto - C so. at the estechooter seC. so seeeed. het appeeemsty trete- 9/alles esmaged by the tedtendast needs to be F. 3, yteced to chesse of esse- leg of the Bec direesee Ctett Defense director eccorred. and the postse Chief.
gency roepease eserettees.
a sostee of the seesgeosy a restem of the emer-goesy eteestiteetten elemetticetten erstem et opeten see met ab-the elechester soc to seg-geoted. ( 4.3.3.3) served.
4/87/e5 mortes the 3985 eseectee the 50C wee eheeeead to be very ef fectieely ammaged.
St. Ceeedteetten of the ut 3/84/s3 ala 3 3 4.8.4 chasseettete ihm direeter held beteilege toe The operetten et C staff et Chesteetteld F.B and diesmesed preposed actless 9/38/03 Chesterftete see seeie he tapeseed threm@ weab the stati. offeetIse and off8-be nef tege and staf f meet- stems with the eddl-stem of esoff mostlege lege. (4.3.3.1) and brieftege.
E.3.e steedele adottles of poeusenet-reseed. See soffsetent destantere C S2. new deotestees and fermet 3/B4/83 ala le 4 and on-the-job staletes E.3.b lee, ete- and high-tenes 9/31/03 ere meettable stese ese needed et the standete doelestees, teatracties and with teatrecates to get to deteretse desages tag aheets, ese and eederetead teceleed by seesgency them.
eesters. (4.3.3.4) ,
- 31. Acceedteg to steedele and 3/10/83 m/s - -
3.t.e steedete seemette arttaea to testede Dee goth Bete more actlee C Cheetestlete poeticipeats. Cheesesfield eeecoation of Cheeterftete med 9/38/03 destas the emerstem the esercleo did eet elles stemdele. :rettes eseces- ,
these goCe to dessestrate sten peeredesee.
eeeceattem cepettIa4 tee.
(6.3.3.14 a
i e
f %
Tasht la SEFICleMCT TheCates TAALS vecesut Tammeg emerimas pausa sTaf ten Pese 88 et S3 sobee-ugen:-06S4 9sently CorrectfN Freetonaly Ftne-tEP-8 Teeted Acttoe l Essectee Ideettfled PRMA Seeretse geo. 3 (Reerstes Wettfled Carrent +
1 tease geocripetse Set e leese objectlee 06]ecatee Beforence Jette(&cties Act See Tehee Sete) (t.e., meestte) States .-
- t i
I S4 utschester pettletreeto 2/B8/82 R/A - -
N.e.e *Astheeler See Porticipants in Wie- 3
~
I were est teeted en ett 9/11/03 chester were met 4
, perte of the ples. 4/87/85 tested es all perte of 14.1.2.5) the ples.
5%. The Bernardetes ples osede 2/88/82 R/A Il 6 E.1.s Bereerdotes Tee I to be modified to teclude 9/28/03 e pac table se that doce senes commeetceted free 4/17/95 tettes the B905 eser-the esote hose more mese- ctee (t see observed .
tag to the total ofit- t hat tk0 PAC table be. '
caste. (4.4.2.4) eet yet been added to ,
the sereerdotee ples. ,
54 The Clit plan, which use 2/10/92 m/A Bl.It 5.6 E.6 Clll Tee I a j te properetten at the ties 9/28/83 A 6 of the eserstee, appareet- 4/87/0S At the 1985 eseretoe **
I ly done met provide for it oss established eer seems of etersing the '
- M ahet all schoote uitb-Nouse Bereen prisete -
to Ott!'s port of the
^ "
Schmet other thee through - Ept era egetyped with the soienteer erheele the teme alert redise, representattee et the # The Gill pies does set Soc. Additteest agespeset sectede meneeres for to the tore of M4A tone. Noemt Mareset the ,
etert restas are moeded to / Meest Gernes ples to e complement the presset separate decearet.
- system, edit ch may met be 'p setlefactory to alert the s reeldene popelettee et the
- s j ecteel. ( 3.1.2.16 )
d 57 Appropriate "- :etten 2/10/92 m/4 3,5 2,1 p.4 senseechenette fee C
! et tecentag messeges f rom 4 e 9/28/85
{ the st ate Sec seeld to- 4/17/05 Correettee acties see prese tremeter of Beieree- '.
Septomasted by the 1 tlee to the tecal ECCa. Aree IT WC et the Atee, the tafermet tee Aegnet 1984 Tomtee sheeld be prospely posted Bene eseretee. f en a statue toerde.
(4.4.B.2) --
A W d
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i , -
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O I -
\
aqs.'n; }
l 1
Tasts 3 asFICIEeCT TRACKluc Theta VtmooWT TAsetzt uuCLEAa toWta STAT 8086
- Page It of 53 i
~ Objective Sebee- .
NUBEG-0454 geestly Corrective Prevleuelp FEMA-BSP-t Tested Actise FIB 44 Reercles Bew. I (Emercise Vertfied Corrent Eseretee Ideettfted pote) (t.e.,nesette) States Date leave Objectlee Objective Reference Jettedictten Actlee Takes lesee Beecetytten i
N/A 4 - J.80.e Bernardeten A sep sheetag evecoattee fee It to esclear if thle I St. The es, eheetes e,ecuatten 2/10/82 restes med pepelottee die- 9/28/81 esp tectoded etete restee and pepelotten die- tribellee use poeted. eector deetgeottene.
trlbettee et the Bereerde-tes EOC could be taproved 4/87/05 A compoette esp sher-by lectedtag the state's tag the sector deelg-alphebetteet sector doets- eetteen use met posted mettene se thte diepter. dettes the 894%
thee enditteettee weete eseretes.
4 factittete the tenerprete- d sten and lacettee of PJ redtelestcal hoserde teternettee provided by the state. (4.4.2.3) fee I
- 19. Febtle laternettee bre- 2/10/02 m/A - 4 E.4 teraardetes C.2 9/28/03 cheres eheeld be comeld. 4/87/05 At the 1985 esercise ered to teters teeteente the seC Director to-se dif fereettettee between diested that pobile the fire med redtelegical teforesties entertet .
etert functlene et the had beee teseed te ternordeten fire strees. late 3984 newever, (4.4.2.2) elece a copy see met evettable, this could met be vertfled.
Tee C Preste.ees should be ende 2/10/s2 m/h 7 S K.1.e Seteerdotes
- 40. 9/28/01 =
to seeere the seattability 4/17/0S At the 890$ emeretee et operette betterlee for it see ebeerved that vedtattee deteettee to- rechargeable bettettee struereto et the Bernards- were ese ovellable et
, see toc. (4.4.2.5) the sec.
9
+
4 g l 1
. j l
s
! a.
' T>4 3: BBrtC8sNCT 1a& Cates fast 4 VEo00NT 16aE58 m m pcMES STATt0N Pete 38 of 31 t
!' objeettee Sehee -
guaAG-e654 geestly cerrocatee Freetavely pee &-est-l Teeted actien meer tee . (searctee versited current searcise tenetteled poet see. t Actles Tekee Sete) (t.o.. tesette) States Isoes geocalption Date loses objective Objecclee Seference Jettedicties 1
5 5.2 Sitt see teckey motificetten I
- 68. Additteest redte regere 2/30/02 N/A 8 system to needed to 9/28/83 1 eheeld he meetgeed to key sempttuent the toto-Soc steif at GS8t es nelt phases.
- es to the Stret med neceed i e selectase. (4.4.2.5) 4/87/05 Series the 8905 eser-stee ta ese ebeereed that addittemet redte pesere are esitt y esaded fee the select- 3 ese and fee pettce med ta hts b y deporteset etett.
4 J.lt.e Gill see 3 I 62. 64dt.tesel pleestag med 2/88/32 m/& 28.22 9/28/01 tretetes et the Citt ESC 4/87/01 tortag the 1981 eser-weeld leprees understead- sies the emergency tag of the Isassachneette roepease etett had as peticy regardtag the El and en geldeltese teemance of 58 to euer- regardtag ste mee.
gency workere. (4.4.2.6) 4 - 1.8 oreeefseld see C
- 61. & otesse beord for beter- 2/10/82 m/&
9/21/01 tag pattee. Etre, and 4/17/85 & otates beord see other seppest service esed for the 8901 erseelsettoes to adetoed . esercleo, and ese to taprees the esorgency medated te a steely operettee esseseeses cep- esener.
obitttles et the Crose-field BOC. (4.4.2.7) 2 a.4 Greeefseld See C
- 64. Adettlesel perosenet 2/80/02 m/& 5 9/28/03 treteed to cessemelcettene. .
4/37/05 la edettlee to the to toc operettees. and to gestatted peresseet the Recet pies are needed present et the aoC to tesore coettenees 24- eartag the 890%
heer operettees et the a writtee eseretee.
Creenflate scc. (4.4.2.8) IIstleg of hect op perseemet woe evett-oble reflecties the espebelley ser com-t immeo 244eme op eret tees.
I
t a .
thele 3a 98t!ClemCT TeamteIB TASIA Vsmauert Testag -een p0MES STATical Pese Il of St chjeetIse
' Sehee-MfeAG-0654 quently Correctise
- Frevlemely FBIA-BEF-8 Tested action Beerstee Ideettfled Feen seerstee see. 8 (eseretse Westfled Cetteet Dat e losee ehjeettee Objectlee Reference Jeriodtattee Astleg Tekee Sete) (i.e.,geoutta) statee leese suecatettes g
- 65. A public teforeettee pre- 2/14/02 m/& - - E.6 toydee ene gree sheeld be desteed to G.2 9/21/83 differeettete the fire end 4/87/05 At the 8901 emerstee the SGC staff ledt-vedtelegtcet elect imac- seted that the pitet tiene of the IAydea fire se the swellebte
- eteene. (4.4.2.9) elsees coment be cheeged to differee-State betones a fire alert med a tedie- e Begical elert. &
to 4 - G.3.h poteset It le 9eremet's understanding Tee IBedte Center te esitt a
- 66. The Iseate Center 1/10/82 m/A 50-ette that providleg for e IIedt e 9/11/03 eithis the preeestly located testdo Center to a roepenethitity of SF8.
the 80-elle pines espeeere The facility esade the esitity. (free a letter 1t8.
free Tereset 10/10/02.) 4/17/05 The Isedte Center et to be relocated to e mere Deton's Chalet for the reeste tecettee or a sett-
- Free e letter free Fel4 1985 emerstee to ettit able etternate (beckey)
(82/38/03)3 FWIA still eithis the le-elle ,
f actitty needs to be pre-ausseets that 9ereent develop BP8.
vided. (3.I.l.8) Sto se erseegement eith melgteerlag states and the attttty for se alternettee endte testet.
- 67. Reproved Tri-etete cost- 2/88/01 s/4 S.3 2,3 F.I.h vermeet Wereset le setlefted that ther Tee C diesttee le needed to 4 can oeffectently coord tease 9/28/03 lesere that both cow eith the other See states. Il there to sey geestlee regard- 4/87/05 settag the 1905 eser-eteettene egetpeest and tag caerdteettee it asete met stee the Tri-State precedeses are is piece to Savelve egespeset het the reerdteettee use ob-factittate the taptemente-philosophy eith the 3 etates served to be edegeste, stee of eastgency resposee regaseleg the timellesee of both 8e Setes of ese-doctelene that are coe- meelgettees eq g peneg petthis eeong the three destolene and reeelsteg states. ( 3.1. 8.4 ) actiees. (Letter free terment eed peacederee.
10/88/02.)
e
l f taels 1: SEFICIEIICT TaeCESIIB TASLS
( vasenest 14ausa monenene poelse STATten i Page 22 et 53 ebjective Setoe-Iluess-06S4 gesetty Coeressive FWle-GSF-8 Tested ersten Frosteuely Corrent Emerstes 8 ave B (Seetelee Westfled Beetelee Ideettfled FSea
&stten Takee Date) (i.e.,seemite) states leese seestipttec Sete loses objective ohjeettre Sefersece 'Joeledtettes l C S.4.s Terment Tee
- 44. A state opekeepetese she 2/10/02 u/A IS 4 9/28/03
. ; emeld have accese to all 4/17/0S The opuheepereas rey.
1 eecessary Referentles ressettes the coveseer
! moede to be treteed to .
et the Isodle Center ett eteleg med settfyles destes the 1985 eser-Beformatten diesentested stee see sheerved to by the stility at the he melt lateseed med j stedte Center and the re- sepoble of etteletes i leese of thle Informattee and releytag selevoet to the local media.
(4.2.l.8) tafeeeettee. 7 t,n
! l I 9eremot Tee C 3/84/02 m/& S 2 F.I.b
- 69. Ceselderettee should be 9/31/03 stree to the testellettes 4/17/01 terleg the 1985 eser-et dedicated telephone esse the dedtseted times se that the Govereer escro noe pheme llee 3
of Termeet could reach the (eESCSII) ese sheetoed i i Governere of New Beepohite Se he testelled eed and Neeeechneette eithmet .
opetetteg. Thte dedt- ,
delay. (4.3.l.8) cated Stas linke ver-amet, see tempehire.
Ileseechneette.. and the ettlity.
9ermont See C
- 70. Terseet officiale should 3/88/02 s/A 4 - J.le.e 9/28/01 meet eith the utility and 4/17/01 For the 1981 eserstee elitetels of Ilow Respektre the mope evellette et med seeseecheestte to the Ser more jedged to develop esp dteploys med he edegnete for the etetes hearde for the set cetried est med IPO that are esteetly f eest, h, .0 lose. - i.
e-.,t.hio 4. eii thr. <
etetes. These 4toplaye obeeld e%c evecesttee restee. evecesttee stees, '
preselected redlelegical j
esopling esattestag potete. and retecetten eenters to heet eress med eheltet erese. (4.2.8.7) i l
i I
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l i
1 TABLE 3s OSFICESIICT TRACEles TASL5 vemeout WAmag maae POWes STATIGII
- Fece 23 et 53 ehjective Sehee-l EURAG-0654 esently Correctlee FSIA-OSF-8 Tested Aettee Beetatee, Freeleuely Ideettfled FBIA Esercles Bew. 8 (Saetetse Westiled Cortset -
lesee Beecripties pote Reseo chjecatee objective Refereece Jettedictles Actlee Takee sete) (i.e.,seestte) Statue
- 78. The got needs to be moved 2/88/03 N/A 4 -
, s.2 Wormeet Free e letter free Terment Tee The est to statt le- I to e more reeste lecettes u.1 (left4/03): It to 9esaset's 9/21/81 ested withis the SS-ette syg.
undereteadtag that the lete- There le estelde the RO-elle RF1.
- ties of the got le a toepee- mes eeffisteet eroe Alee. odelstenal eerhtag for mee by state emer-oth888ty of the stility.
space se esaded et thle gency peroommel.
factitty. (2.3.1.2)
(12/28/82)s resA feels that 4/87/05 The ser mee still to-as the ser to ahere state seted althis the 80-redtelagtcet heelsh peroommet elle seg et the steg -
eseese redtelegical Informe- emerstee. Benever, it &
O BIse portteemt to the State's le endersteed that e protective actise dectates ese Set, ob8ch will enklag, they feel it to tecue- east MC regelreenste, heat apes the state to seemme le presently
- ander the safety of their personeet. cemetracties.
N/A 2 3 A.4 Teruset Weruset hellevee that neces- Tee C
- 73. The espehtitty for coaste- 2/88/43 mee. 24-heer resposee of eery hechap people she have 9/31/83 appropriate trelateg for 24- 4/17/SS At the 1985 eseestee ,
the ser neede to be to- heer operettee era e ,ettable the avettability of proved. (3.t.t.1) et the get. (letter free addettemet troleed Tereset 90/IS/02.) peresenet use judged edeemete to seeere cepehttiey ier eastt-seene 24-heer opere-tiene.
Center 2/18/02 g/A 4 - C.S.h new sempektre tatter free Statee "The fee Nedte Center to still I
- 31. The pledte to chetce of Recettee for the 9/21/03 withis the SS-ette presently 8 seated testdo endte coeter esse ende by the art.
the 10-elle pleen espeeere The factitty esode utility. The State of Wee Ert.
tempehtte feels that it to met 4/07/85 The nedte Ceeter et to be relocated to e more oppropstete for Peta to alte Dales's Chalet for the l reeste fecettee er e sett- 8901 emettlee to esitt shte ettesente (backup) that lecettee se a eigetitcast f
f actllty needs to be pre-detteleecy for correcties by etthis the le-elle vided. (1.2.4.1) the State." (Letter free seu SPE.
Respektre 9/28/02.)
9 9
^ a ,
- r
e l
6 i
j %
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l i
' fatLA 1: OSFIClauCT TSACEINS T>A gameoert famKES NuctAAR 70MER STATICII Page 24 of 51 i
I objecatee sehee-f queesty Correcatee i NuesG-0654 Actise Tested i
provtowely feta-SSF-t Westfled Correst Rev. 8 (Seeretse Searcise Ideettfled Fesa Eseretse Dete) (i.e.,meestte) statue j objectlee Objective Beforeece Jettedictles Aetten Takee losee Beecripalee Sete leo e J
C i g/& 1 2,1 F.l.b Bee Beepohite Ideettag eith 3 states en Tea j I4. Reproved Tri-etate eser- 2/IS/02 9/84/82 to diocese lesee. 9/31/01 1.4 serlag the stes eser-i diesttee to needed to Adettlemet meettage atti be Itee 4/8F/s5 tesere that both coe- held to the future. stee the Tri-state ce.
ordtsettes ese ab-eenicottene egetpeset end Reapektre espects that pre-cedures ter leproved caerdt- setoed to be adegeese, proceJeree are in ptoce to , both to gerne et ese-f actltaata the Septemente- settee ettl reesta free ties of emergency respeese esettage to stem for the 1981 emeleettees egelpment doctetene that are com- eseretee. (t.et t e r free p.m. med precederee, y petible meseg the three s.
9/2s/s2.) -4 states. (1. 2. l .4 ) C i I new seepehire Te 25 4 s.4.s
- 75. A emete spokeeperees uhe 2/is/s2 m/h slas/s) eeeld me,e ecce . to ett 4/8F/85 Dettes the 1981 eser-eecessary Beforestles clee Neu seepshire ese ebeerved to be repre-3- neede to be treteed to moeted by a gestif ted, obteletng and vertlytag tef or est les diesenteeted teformed, and capable j erekeeperees. .
by the utility at tl.e Medte Center eed the re-Resee of thte Reforeettee to the lecen endte.
(4.1.B.7) C New Seepehlte fee I F.t.b
- 76. Ceestderettea sheeld be 2/88/82 m/& S 9/28/01 4/8F/85 austeg the 8981 e se r-alves to the testattettee telepheme etee the dedtceted et dedicated Ilmes se that the Governet phoes flee ese ob-of hee Weepehlte teeld served to be testelled and operettes. This reach the Govereers et , Itse linke see seep-vermeet and steeeecheeette etthout delay. (4.1.B.8) obtre, termeet, itseee-chseette end the esitity.
l 1
Testa It CericituCV TSACEtus Thet.E VSIssouf TauKd8 uuCLEAR FOWES STATicII Pese 25 et 11 shjective Sebee-NumeC-4614 queetly Corrective Prevlemely Fate-SSF-8 feeted actles Eseretse Identified ree4 Roerstee Rev. 5 (seerstee vertised Corrent lesee teocripttee Date loose Objecttee Objecttee Reference Jestedicties Actice Tehee Sete) (i.e.,teselse) stegee n/a 4 - J.80.e new usepektre Tee C
- 77. new usepektre offittele 3/B0/02 9/28/01 should meet alth the otti- 4/87/05 ret the l981 eserclee tty and ef fic& ale of Ter- the espe swellebte et meet and Necescheoette to the ter more judged to develop esp displeye and he ado p te for the states boerde for the EOF faectlees carried out eed 1r0 that are meteetly by 80F perseeeel.
accept able to att three states. These displays sheeld show esacesttee g
restee, evacuattee areas, g paeselected vedtelegical seeplieg med moetterles potete, sed relecettee centets le best stees med shelter etees.
(4.3.t.1) 4 3.2 See Weapehire Me acties bee been tekee to Tee The got to still I
- 70. The 50f seeds to be moved 2/88/02 5/A -
relecote the Bot. The act see 9/11/03 withis the le-elle to e more remote lecettee erreeg+e to provide more merk- seg. There te new mtelde the 80-stle art er as alternate Bor esede to leg eyea, eefficteet eroe for
- ese by state emergency be preended. Alee. oddt- *The act to e stility roepee- peresseet, stenal eerktes space to needed at thee factitty, albtitty, es indIceted te IWess... Amy defletency that 4/87/05 The Est see attll
( 3. 2. t . 2 ) any apply to the lacettee of located withis the to-the got ebeeld be addressed to etle SFE et the 8905 Vermeet Tankee, met to the eserstee. Beme,er, it state of Isew sempehire..." to sedereteed that a (free letter free new Beep- een set, ehtch wip.
shire 9/28/82.) meet NBC regelteme'am, to presently eeder ceaearectlee.
- 79. The cepehtitty f or coette- 2/10/81 m/A 2 1 A.4 new mespektre The State's star med the emer- Tea C mees It-heer roepwee of seecy reopense precedures for 9/23/03 the Eof neede to be le- the Dictates of Public mestah 4/tF/85 At the Ifd5 eseresse proved. (3.2.8.3) are betes teeteod. (i.etter the e,ettebetsty of free new Beepentre 9/20/02.) addit tees', troteed pareeeeet wee judged odegest e to eneere
- cepehtitty for coet t -
ese=a 24-beer opere-elees.
i
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l e
i,
^
1 Ta8LE St BSftClemCT TeaCEles0 T& SEA vsassout Tasmuss ennesses pousa STAT 80N g 3
i t
l I
! ebjeettee suboe-v i ' musso-06S4 quently Coeressive Tested Actles trevleuely PENA-38F-8 Carrent (Beerstee Westfled i
Seeretse Ideettiled reIA Bestates Bew. 8 star.ee
- objective objecatee Beforence Justedletten Aettee Tehoe sete) (i.e.,seemite) leese teocripates sete lease I
4 S.S.h itseeschuset te See essenate free h4 fee feedte Coster to stitt t
- 80. The Medte Center to pre- 2/18/02 5/4 -
and ff) (Nov 9/28/83 mithis the 10-stle (9ermont)
I sently laceted teelde the sempettre). Ett.
I lo-alle plume espeeere 4 ! Brt. The fectitty neede 4/87/0S The IIedte Center et i
to be telecoted to e more Delee's Chalet for the 4
remote lacettee er e sett- 1981 emerates to ottti able etteree's (baches) mithis the le-elle f acility needs to be pre- BPE.
d vided. #
1 see C e m/a S3 2.3 r.t.b steeeechusette e i 81. Improved Tst-etete eeer- 2/88/82 9/28/83 4 Dettag the 8905 emer-I diesttee to needed to to- 4/47/SS sore that both cemenet- clos the Tet-State
- l cettene egetposet and pro- seerdtsettes use ob-cederse are to place to served to be edegeste, facilitate the toplesee- both to terne of coe-tetten of emergency auntsettoes egetpeset respeese docteleet that and precedures.
are compettble eases ths three states. (3.3.t.4)
See C
- 82. A state spokeeperose she 2/28/82 g/A 25 4 S.4.s elseeschaeotte 9/28/03
+
emeld have accees to att 4/87/05 tortes the 1905 eser-
) secessary teformattee etee Naseechseette one neede to be trained to observed to be repre-
' shteteles and vertistas seated by a gealtf ted, tafermettee diesentested latermed. and cepeble t by the ettttty et the spoteeperees,
' Medte Center and the i rolesee of thia Referma-Stee to the local media.
( 4.4. t . 4)
^^ ^
tte See C
- 83. Cemeteeratten eteeld be 2/28/02 m/& S 2 F.I.h l 9/11/83 i gives to the teetalletteet 4/87/0$ sortag the 8905 eser-j el dedtested telephoea stee, the dedtseted J linee se that the Covereer phoes llee one ab-
! el Meseechessette could served to be testatted reach the Coversare of med operetteg. This Vermeet med Iles Beepehtee dedtested Stee lleke eithout delay. (4.4.1.5) seeeeechneette, ver-emet, new maapehtte, med the ettII y.
I I
i t
l .
l ; y. %-
l
! TetIA 3 martctsect featstasG TaaLS VedB00NT 1AIELEE IIWCIEAR FOMER STATICII ,
' Pese 27 ef $3 l .
Objective
+
- Sebee- !
mean-0654 gesetty Corteett,e i
treviamely FIBIA-RSP-! Tested Actlee '
Esercise Ideettiled Peta Eseretse Rev. 8 (Emerstee Westfled Cortset I Isoee peecrtettee Date loses objective Objective Seference Jertedicates actise Takee Dete) (i.e.. seeelse) statue
- 34. Keeeecheaette offtetete 2/28/82 N/& 4 - J.10.e e===aehosette Tee C obeeld meet with the util-
- 9/28/03
' 4/87/01 per the 1981 eeescleo ity offittele of Vermeet sad see Mempebire to de- the ease asettable et a the nor more judged to velop may displays and be odegeste for the states boerde ter the set feettiene carried est eed IFO that are meteelty acceptable to att three by 80F perseemet. ,
- i states. These displete ,
sheeld ehes esecentles . r ,
La e sentes. eweceeties arose. O '
, preselected redtelegical I seertleg and esattertag ,
potete. relecettee coetere
- la heet stees and ehelter crees. (4.4.t.3) .
- 05. m 80F esede to be sewed 2/20/42 m/& 4 - 3.2 Ileseechesette se actlee bee been tekee to Tee h Set te still I to e more reeste lacettes 5.3 relecote the SOF. The ter ese 9/28/03 stable the 16-otte j seg.
- estelde the 10-elle RFE. ettenged to provide more N ee to see Atee. addittemet eerbleg merkteg space. entiteleet eroe for see by state eastgency rpace to needed et thte factitty. (3.1.l.3) peroommel. !
I 4/87/05 The Bot see still le-cated etable the 10-ette BPE et the 1985 eseretee. Benever. It le onderstead that e i
ese 80F. ehich ett!
eset IIBC reptremente. ,
le presently ender ,
1 coestructies. .
- 84. N cepehtlity for coette- 2/20/03 s/A 2 3 A.4 Itseeschusette fee C eene 24-heer roepense of 9/28/81 the Eor needs to be 4/87/01 at the 1985 esercise the asettablitty of i taproved. (3.1.t.1) edettlemet treteed 4 I
poteeseet see jedged edepete to emees e ,
capeblitty for coast- ,
seeme 24-heer opete-tIsee.
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l 6 g . . . .
g ,
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1 2 1 1
e l
e i .
I d
i Theta 3: BSFIClauCT Ta&CEleG TAGEA i
TSEMONT TMee M1m F00f08 STAT 80Il Fage 28 ef 33 I
I !
4 ebjoettee sekee-f' esently Cetweettee Nunes-06S4 Tested Aesten Freelessly retA-OSF-t vertised Corrent Beerstes See. 8 . (Beerstee Beercise Identitled FWI4 Aettee Takee Dete) (t.a.,aseelte) states lesee toecripales Sete lesee objectlee Objective Seferosse JerJedictles i
as adotatesel staff eneber les Bertag the 1981 eser- C i i 9/31/03 11.45, 8 J.9 verseet
- 87. The erettlebore ESC did will act se local government 4/87/0$ etoe the State Bec not receive mettee free med factitty seerdieeter. eettfled grottlebore the State poC to oesteete to e steely esame . Thee, prior to the rolesee trattlebore's protesttee of 800 messagee.
respeese actiettles reeld ,
met be Septemented becomme l the trettlebore 50C wee metif1 4 .f the eve.nettee ever RSS et the seem tsee 4.n se the pubitc. (2.l.1.1) W tereent/tre state will rootes Seternal Tee The emelity of the C 9/31/01 S.), il F.l.d l St. laternal seemseleetlese 4 (trettlebeve) comenetcottees med phyetest 4/87/89 seellette essenetce-ogotymmet (teterces) et eseflgerettee of efflee. times egespeset use the Brettlebore tre wee met rettable med hampered " ***'*I'**
occurate teforeetten .
tremeter betrees the C4ett
- eetenee eed tapertemet of peblic uselth staffe.
(2.l.a.8) se roepease. Tee The vermeet risblic C 9/21/83 3.31 3,88 a.3.e veruset Seretse Beclear
- 89. Cenfesten besmees certict- II (309) 4/lF/SS poste and eneecesessy ties Begineer med the rep-delays to pleet recovery reeestattee of the eere caused shee the verseet Public Service secteer Eagleeer became leveleed to settere ehtch the 1985 esercise.
Vermeet Departeset el retlic asalth. (2.4.1.1) verseet We roepeace. Tee & beskap goeerster and C
- 98. De backs, power use swell- 9/31/g3 4.14 VT = 4.84 S.S.e steseecheaette 4/87/85 setttple electricet oble et the media centeel 15.56 estemetes corde more destes a power estese. IIA = 1.6 evellebte et the medte it eenenseleettees with the Cooter dettag the Stel esittty becean toeparehle. . esercles.
j med lighttog and endte egelpeset coelJ eat be ,
i esed. I1.4.2*
\ l i
4 TASLS 1e BSf tCESIICT TSACRiuS TABLE wasseouf TMIKas MIfCLEAR'pouSR STATIGII
- Page 29 of S)
Objectise Sebee-MusaG-0654 geently Corrective FatA-ssp-8 Tested & cates Freelessly Current resa Beerstee Rev. 8 (Bearcise Wertiled Seerstee identified Acttee Tebee Sete) (i.e.,Beaulte) States i , lease Descripttee Sete lease Objectlee Objective Beiersece Jettedtettee 3
i 20 182 E.3.e Vermeet unees state moede to procere fee eely ese eneber of I
- 91. All members of ese of the 9/21/03 fla's or file bedges. 4/17/05 each toen et the 1981 flate meetterlag teams did eseretee bed TLae.
met have peresseet-record desteeters. (2.5.3.8)
- 92. The redte telepheme. which 9/11/03 4.2.1.2 5 6 F.I.b trettlebore Deporteest of Pebile Safety See The redte teleptaene C bee taptemented corrective 4/17/85 operetten see taproved to the primary meses of 4.2.1.4 dettag the 1995 eser-(2/14/02) actlese.
connee tc et tee betenee the cles. Dettag ese State 90C and trattlebore, temporary selfenettee, e did met verb. (2.l.5.I.8) corrective acties wee LA N
taben.
Brattlebers addreseed ete addittemet state Tee sessag the t935 eser- C 9/28/E3 15 8 J.9
- 91. arettlebore did est re- staff eed upgradies redte- 4/17/85 ctee, the Brattlebore celes prompt sett?tcottee telepheme system. Bec regnested the free the state to avec- State 80C to provide este. ( 2. l .S. I .8 ) 45 eteste teed ties prise to esecesttee.
This see deae. ,
E.3.e trattlebere meses state needs to procure fee se film bedges er I doet- 9/28/03 20 12
- 94. Pereseent-record flae or file badges. 4/t7/01 other pereseest record essere more est eestlebte destanters were asett-at the roc. (2.t.1.1.3) able et the 30C dettag '
the 8905 r uscieo.
Demmeratee Boyetteset of Fehlte Safety Tee Problems with the I
- 91. The commenteettee meteerb 9/11/81 4.2.2.4 S 6 F.l.d opgredtes redte eyetes. 4/17/05 redte telepheme re-evettable to the h0C una (3/18/82) cetwer were evident met effective. Recepttee .
dettag the 1985 eser-wee peer, contestag tafer- clee. The heche, coe-settee wee received, and eerstel telepheme wee etteettee updates were toe teceeee'.*eet elece it letregeeet. 42.5.5.2.5) le locat es' deusetette of the ROC.
9 9 0
. g . .
- e .
i e 1 s t l
4 t
i I I '
\ 1 i
Yt9LS 1s strictamCT TeaCEleIS T&tLS VaaMoWT T& mass m ean p0WER ST4f teel page 10 of $1 ebjectIre suboe-geest3y Correcties Iluees-e6$4 peta-RSp-l Tested acties praetemely (Emercise vertiled Corrent Seercise Identified peta Eseretoe see. 8 (i.e. Reemite) Statue actice Tehec Dete) loses geocripties Date lesee objective Objecatee Reference Jettedletten Ulti be taptemented by meet Tee Althemgh asemeretoe g r
9/23/03 4.2.2.1 20 82 E.3.s summeratee 4/87/05 bee lettleted a redte-M. A reatelectcel espeeere 0.8 esercles.
costret progree to set te (2/88/68) testeet espeeere see-ptoce and doeteetere are tret progree and destantere are new met aestlebte. the (2.4.5.2.2) evettable. en-poeere centrol actie-Ettee were met desee.-
strated med the satsp officer ese s w
,r.o.et f., the i,e.t, g eseretee.
separteset of public safety Tee h pramery redle I 4.2.2.7 5 e p.t.4 entiford 4/87/01 eyetes agate did met ,
- 97. The prteney casemmice- 9/28/03 opgredtag redte eyetee.
tiene systee ALA est (3/10/42) fonettee eelt. Beckup feectise properly and eyetoa see need, only see . ceanerstel telepheme ese ovellable for backey comenetce-stone. (2.t.S.3.1) h Cutiford plea ese '
81,85 5 3.5 Cettferd State pleenere ettl rectify Tee emovellable for to-
- 96. The respeestblitty for 9/23/03 teve plee by meet esercles. 4/17/01 spection la the tot public starties ele Eas desteg the 8945 eser-seeeeges to met steerly ,
detteed to the tema plos. clee.
(2.8.S.1.2) Tee Observet tees eeJe I E.3.e Guttferd Tgetolog etti be provided by
- 99. T he 80C staff use met 9/28/03 4.2.2.8 20 82 E.3.b eest oseretos. State ettli 4/87/81 dettes the 1945 eser-(2/88/02) clee ladtente Sac property treteed to the meeds to precote peresseet etsff etitt lack use el destestry equip- receed destaatese. eeffleteet tratalog.
meet med locked hometedte el aselene desee. Also, permanent-record Jeet-essere were est evell-oble.
(I.l.%.1.1) permeneet record doet-g.1.e verses state neede to procere Teo I 100. peroemeat-recere doet- 9/33/03 to 32 peroement record desteeters. 4/17/81 meters were still set estere mere est evellebte eestgebte et the sac at the EOC. (2.l.5.4.5) for the 194% eseretee.
l
- t
< n ,
l fasta 3 estictssicT Te&CElseG T& eta f 98me0NT T&sIKEE aluCLEAR PUWER STAT 1011
, Fase 38 et 33 i
l objective
- Sebee-l 114830-0654 gesetty Corrective l rela-RSP-8 feeted Acttee Fraelovely Beercise ideastfled Feta Beerclee Sev. 1 (8sercise Verfiled Correst objectlee objectlee Beforence Jettedicatee &cstee Takee Sete) (i.e.. Rosette) Statue lesse peeceipalen Date leave 4 2 E.3 Wee la Augeot of 1944 etate EOC Tee The new state 80C une C t!I. The space med leyest of 9/28/03 tempshire moved to sov geerters, uhtch 4/87/05 used for the 8935 the state 50C wee est tecludes back op power. eseretee. The sev 50C valt owlted for of ficleet see more spectees and e,w rettene. Also, becher the leyent wee ede-power wee est evettable geste for emergency
. to oestate temmentce- epe ret t ene. Beckey Etees. peuer use evellebte but met doenestrated.
Additlesel reeevettee ,,l.
of the 30C operettemet un etees le schedeled for e June 8905.
3 2 F.I.4 IInw 13 redte meteerk wee completed Tee The CD redte worked C
!!!. Cuommelcettoes ever the 9/21/03 4/17/85 edequately fee Sempektre with modificettees elece the the Civil Defenes redte met. esercise. A ese telepheme 1985 esercles. The verk did met foncties .
eyeten see percheced and telepheme systee bee 6 g betweee the State ROC. teetalled. two-way 18eee seretag the tro, and the local approelestely 25 ,
SJCe. The backey costres pheaea. Although the telephees system wee telepheme eyetes can everleeded at key stese still be preme to and did met provide back- e*esteedtag. addittom-ep capabtitty. (2.2.l.2) el Stees are capable of hetes opened.
A.2.s see same form new betag used to Tee slott sple-copy mesesse C 101. laternet enesage flew 9/11/03 3 3 forms unre used destes between the oper et te.no F.l.d Respehlte toc and tre es to the 50f. 4/tF/4S sev 80C layeet sheeld addrene the 198S eseretee.
teos and the cosessice- esseege flee. The operettees officer stone coeter use teellec- had a backey present live becomme meeeegee for the esercise, and were met releyed as se operettene centrol-steeJerdised, hard-copy ter, who eselsted with terme. Alse. the opere- meeeege dietelbettee.
tiene efficer could met was slee present.
steelteneeeely answer phemes and coordteete laterest smeeege flow.
(2.2.l.3)
O e
- t a
i e . . .
O t
x.
i
! Test,E 1: 98ttCESIICT TRACElEG T&StA yeassosef 14sIEst e m FondEE STATiell 4
g Fece 13 of 53 1
i Objective i Sehee-IIIIssG-0614 gesetty Corrective 4 ts. teesty pena-SSP-t Tested acties Eseretse la uttled Pata Beerstes see. 8 (seercise Wettised Corrent teeee Beecrepetse Sete t r e.,e objectlee Objecclee talereece Jettedictles Actlee Tahoe Sete) (i.e.. seeelse) statue i
L y use See ebees comment. Tee The state OSC used t'be C 804. Refermettee free the ter 9/38/p) S Bempshire 4/87/05 steederd fore (ser recoteed et the See Stil F.8 fore) derlag the B945 eesseeeest roen ese met eseretse to record welttee does se forme date used for deee that more used at both ,
seeeeeeeet. Portedte j lecettees. a etendard updates free the not fore ese evellette et the este stee received at i Bef but met at the 60C. the goc.
I se occurate med tiesty M reporte more met meett-eble. Techetcet ut detee $
free the. Set more set perledicelty (et leset .
every 30 elect ee) recateed at the State ROC. (2.2.8.4) 105. The state trII t'eptooease- 9/18/83 BOC to S 5.4 use Addittemet BSF tieteen steff fee la aceerdance eith C f.l.d Beepektre base been ideettiled med 4/8F/85 prior agreemente. the stee did est erstes et tem representesteo et the ser peamptly, shoo G.4.6 treteed for able fonctice to the Dept. of Beelth. Aloe M the ser une propost-reselsteg te fasef fieleet hee hired a staff tiemed for the 1903 taferestsee fles to the C.D.&.
State 80C for metteg no- eneber for ese se se 80F tees esercles to seeere the member. Eteely flee of tech-tectlee arttom doctelees etcal tafermettee to beoed en acct.%et essees- the state sec. le se meet. (3.3.8.5) acteet emergency it to espected that entit-cleet slas atti be evettable for the See representottee to
! erstee et the aor.
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t j l 4
L+ r l
Tasts 3 esFIClanc? faacales fastJE VEmeout Temass w sene ecusa 574T8088 Fece 33 of 53 t
objecttwo subee-
' MISSG-4614 quent8y Correstise Freelenely Peta-SSF-l feeted acties Sseretse Ideettfled FSEA Beerclee Bew. t (Emeretee Tertised Corrent Bhte lesee Objective Objectlee Reference - Jettedictlee Acates Takee Dete) (i.e.,Sesette) stesse Issue toscripties i
3.2.l.6 3 A.2.s New State will tecorrerete comment not es objective of I 806. A regeset for moetetence 9/21/03 32 the 1981 esercise.
4 la emetysteg the procesa- (3/18/42) A.3 Reapehire Sete Ste precedures.
leg legeotten patheep semples did met accurate-ly spectly the type of aeetetence regelred. It see else est clear as to
'
- hoe the evellebte re-seercee seuld he Sete-grated in the total *-.
reopease effort. 'g (3.2.l.6) 807. The new Civil Defseee 9/28/03 5 2 F.I.4 ues see caemaet fec state 50C. See seed opete to the I comessicettes sysses did Beepehire Aloe, edettleeal peresseet 4/87/05 redte est readered the met fonettom edegnetely have been eastgeod to RPGs t CD redte erstem tecep-commenteettees. I clerical. able of coastseems between the tro and flete a cemmmelcettees with meetterleg teses. Atee there use as hechap tod6e field teses for the 1981 eseretee. '
ersteel commerstel tele-phomee more seed if they were evellette. (2.2.2.1) 3 Goo See eheve cemenet and that for fee Altheesh the Civil I 100. The IPO locked overall 9/11/03 3 A.I.e Beepehtte etete 50C. 4/8F/05 sofemee represseteatre management beceese the .
see met tevolved with state Civil Def seee rep-the cemenettettee recentattre la charge see the operettees for too beep werktes se e 1981 esercise, maeage-telephone commenteater. amat of the 890 opere-
{ (2.2.2.2) .
48eme see esitt a probles elece the flew of leforeettee see to-4 edequate.
e e
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Tatt.E 3: SSflCigacT TeaCElue fattA V8 stent Tamma georgsaa POWER STAT 80N rage 34 of 53
}
a ' chjectlee
' Sebee-IRfesG-4654 gesetty Corrective FWea-88P-8 Teeted actiee Freetemely (Seerclee Tertfled Corrent 3
Saaretee Identitled Fata Esercles Bew. 8 Statee j objective Objective Reference Jettadictise Astles Takes Date) (i.e.. Beestte) loses teocripeles Bote leave See reevleue commeete regard- Tee stessage leggleg med E 109. leseesse leggteg et the 9/21/01 4.3.l.2 3 3 A.I.e Ese were Beepehire tog standard ese of Sor forms 4/17/05 distributtee tro wee safere.t (eeeee- (2/10/42) et soc and tre. and addittemet ettti probleme et the stel eteneets of ceumse- etafften end ceaseetcettee 3945 esercise. Itee-Icettee were met record- 4.3.3.5 capability at IPO. segee were writtee ,
ed)8 taparteet messages (2/88/82) done het met recorded (pleet etetus, esteer- Se e segesettet moeter elegical conditteme. leg. Portedic basel-field moetterleg date. tage were taleree-etc.) were met diseest-
- tienetty lacamplete.
ested seems boy players. teforeettee and dets us ejere est beleg relayed M and as perledic brieltage were held to epdets the to appropttete agen-staff en the stesse of stee.
the emergeecy. (2.2.2.3)
Tee Commentset tene unge 2 F.I.d slow Three additteest redlee heee I I lle. Commesteettene need by 9/21/03 3 Sempebire been procured for see by 4/87/05 esitt ebeerved to be the moettertog teses were esatterlag teams. seeffecatee for the i teeffective. (2.2.3.8) 3985 esercise. '
i Bow Itsetterlag seems have 1 esbtle Tee Egelpenas for the C 9/28/05 7 5 f.8 emettertog teses for lit. 16entterlag teses are met Beepektre chargere. Iro bee becb ep 4/87/85 ogotyped with a tee level callbrated E39 700 teatre- the 1985 eseretoe wee
! Cat cemeter. Sgespesos mente. Judged to be adegoate.
presteed te seems hoe ehest bettery Ille and to i est edegeste for esteeded field mee. (2.2.3.2) lpe med meetterlag team Tee Field menttertog some C 29 3 E.1.e Bee til. Doetestere more est dio- 9/28/01 E.1.b Beepehtte passammel will recetoe 4/87/81 enehere had recoteed tribeted er reed. and IPO trelates le doetastry. tratalog prior se the pereeeeet were met 1981 esercise end had
! leellter with redte- appropriate doeteatry.
( logical esteeere control ,
ensomree. (3.t.3.1) l Tee Several tedependest C 5 2 F.l.d C.aotorfield Some se etete. i.e.. CD redte til. The new Civil Defense 9/28/83 network taproved. 4/8F/05 redte eyeteen were i redte did met work seetlebte med operet-
! offectleely. (2.2.1.I.8) tag for the 4905 eesta cloe, providles con-tinsees redte coatect med redendency.
I 5
f .
,e.,j 1
I I. Tatt.E Ss BErlCEENCT TeaCEIIIB T& ALE j USme0Nf 148IK35 mean poigga ST&TieII
! ' Fase 31 et 53 objecatee d Sehee-
! umass-e6S4 geently Cerrocatee Freelemely reIA-SSP-l fested Action
- y Beerstee identitled FBI 4 Seerstee Rev. t (Emeretse Wettfled Correet lease teocripttee Date losee objectlee Objectlee Beforence Jeeledtetten Aetten Takes tote) (i.e.. Seoulte) Statue 184. Comanetcottees b tenee 9/23/03 4.1.2.2 S 2 F.I.b steedele e Sees se above. fee Sertag the 1905 emer- I l the steedele geC and all (2/10/82) F.l.d e Additiesel pegere have bees 4/17/01 else the telephaese, other emergency roepenee ordered. the Southuset testeet e Eleadete Fire Bapt. redte Fire redte eyesen, and ergeelsettene med emer- the easteer redte seccy v.there to the erstem hee a new hi-band to low band estce repeater operatore and egesp.
field mere tendogaste. ,
e ao estemetes telepheme llee most more edegeste.
The new Civit Defense free the team's pubite nouseer, the Civil
, redte ens teeffective ,
merke dept. Seetalled to Defense redte coett-(seeeegee unre brehoe end emed to west sely e-a teve Soc.
coeld set be copled)I the backey telephase unos teterstatently, des-pite seen leprovemente y
dead and costd met he ende by the state.
used meet of the dayg the Seethmeet Ileteel Fire Aid redte hee eely one fre-geency and could est headle the large message teeds esd the postable seateer redte, diegetched .
by the state, use to-effecatee beceese recep-Stee wee peer teside the
- Boc. (2.2.5.2.5)
I I E.2 Steedele ~ See ebeve. Tee The addettemet pegers C IIS. The ability to eter. and 9/21/03 4/87/95 were evellebte for the nettfy .mergency aceposee F.I.e W.4 1985 esercise. These pereeeeel to severely re- pegere have been used stricted becesse redle- regaterly for fires pegere de met work ustt and other emergeactee le thte area. 18eet pera med merk unti.
seenet had to ha metitled by telephone, eelch he-rene a prehtee whee es.ss staff seabora could met he located. (2.2.%.2.2)
e . *
- 4
\
e T&sts 3: tericleaCT TeaCates TeatA Usesecut Vasagg messaa young ST&Tieu Fece 36 of $3 1 Chjoctise
- seb.e-
! ptly Cortestive WBAS-GhS4 I
! F884-888-5 feeted Attlee Prestemely (seercise Westfled Correet l
5eerstee identified Feet Seerstes See. 3
{ chjecatee objective Reference Jertedtetten acttee Tehoe Dete) (i.e.. Roselse) states toose teactlptise Sete lesee I Richesed State hoe taproved (a redte. Tee Bertag the RMS eser- C S 2 F.I.h clse the Stehneed SAC
} lie. Seth commeetcottee e7e- 9/28/83 F.I.d 4/87/01 l
tees, the ese Clott demonstrated see Defenee redte and the shtitty to estatste Seethuset 30eteel Fire 4td . emergency commmetce-telepheme, more ange18- ti.no eith ei . ,,re-1'
! ehie. nee.e.ee received petete roepease essen-
, i over th redte more teettene. The Clett j hrokee med to some caeee Defense redte and the 4
j teposethte to underessed. Seethmeet statest ytre telepheme
[
e
, leformattee receteed ever aid more l adegaste for comment-
- ; the Fire 414 telepheme differed from that free settee of mesensee, ether eserces. The 80C sees themgh stette i
has geselftsteet egely- essettees made it dita meet to ceasemicate alth ficett to heer the emergency field tesee. t ensetsetone.
(2.2.5.3.t)
E.8 tschemed an esteegies lies from Select- Tee As addittemet tete- C ,
i 147. 5e* etaff te mett!!ed by 9/28/83 4 5.2 men's efflee testelled to toen 4/17/81 pheen ties see teetal-j commerstel telephone end F.4.e sec. . led to the toc. Isot t-redte pegers. Galy een ficettee of seC staff l
telepheme and foer redte for the IMS esercise pegere are e.ellehte for ese occompstehad te e thte porpose. (2.2.5.3.2) r,teely asemer.
- Defense C ta redte syeten upgraded by Tee The Clell
$ 2 F.l.4 smeneer redte use eheerved to Ilt. The een Clell telease 9/28/03 state. 4/87/01 adegeetely reJte eerhed poorly. foncties also, the soc bed only destas the RMS eser-4 ene telepheme itse. cleo.
( 2. 2.5.4. 5 )
- o Tee The Clett Defense t 5 2 F.I.h Ifterbeeter Some es eheve cemeset.
189. Fettere of the Cist! 9/28/03 4/87/05 redte still esced prehtone dettag espert-Deleese redte reselted to deleys to mesesse to- the IMS esercise.
The SAC hed perateeler cetet. me see et the toc
- prehtees le trytag to neem bee to operate the system. (2.2.5.5.8) coensetcete alth Beeee.
4
l TasLE 3 eBFICisuCT ft4CEleG Tatta VEmecert TAMEEE IRICLSAS POMSE 37478000 rege 17 et 31 i ,
objective
- Sebee-InfesG-0654 geest8y Coreest8ve Prevleeely FesA-SSP-8 Tested actlee Beercise Identitled F9th , Eseretse Sev. B (Esercise Wertfled Corrent Isoes bescription Date leone Objectlee objective Reference Jettedlettee actice Tekee Sete) (i.e.,seemits) statue B20. The meely testelled ItCat 9/23/03 1.1.I.4 5 6 F.I.b Itaaeecheestte Bow redte opetes hee been Tee The propeeed actione C escreweve redte opeten (2/88/82) E.6 revamped and stil be the art- 4/82/05 by the state have been bed severe stelpenet mary seene of eeemselcot tee tapigeseted and the problees (etes te) that for the meet teet. Once the systee to fatty ep ge-reaJered it toeperable . etete 30C and the 80F ere stesel med to feec-i early to the esercise. operettemet by leCD4 and IIDre steeleg witheet prob-This psebles wee coe- pereeemet, ett mettiteettee of te e.
peeeded by the &ree tv cheages la emergency statue steif's fattere to deter- will se to all commsettlee etae the Tri-State Isotest steetteasemelF vie the redte (b Fire aid egetpment else system with telephoses used as back up. SOF eestgee tus (2) O fetted. Talsphene calle were ende te verify commeettlee to see todtvidmet receirs of all oeersency who coeffree with the local closetiscattee esseeges governmente the receipt of eli efter the Alert states redte meeeeges. Complettee messese, het beer signale date. 2/2/84.
were ettee eeceentered and primary settfteettee beceae de t ered . These problees were identitled
- at Sereerdetes. Gill. *
, Creenfteld, tardee.
1 Iser t h t t eld, sed tierwich.
(2.1.2.5) 828. Pereseest-record devicee 9/2B/01 to II E.1.s est! State actise castlegeet spee fee roomeneet reeerd doet- I were met evettante. e feedles free Fata, t.o.. no 4/1F/05 metere were estil met (2.1.1.2.5) acties. sweliable for the 1985 esercles.
i B22. St ect-read desteeters 9/28/01 20 28 E.1.e layden e Some se above. Tee Direct-read doetestere I were eet dist ributed er E.1.b e Base 0NT testalag hee bees 4/87/0S were evettable bet met eeed, and EOC pareeeeel effered to teve and le- Jtetribeted for the wese met fee:ller with clades teatrections on stel eserstee. The*
radiological espeeere espeeere centret meseeree. Sec perseeeel were met costret enseeres. Town hee accepted ef ter of festitor with alle Pereseeet-record doet- trateles. Ceeplettee date, egelpeset er espeeere
! waere were est e,ett- October 1984. centret esseures. The able. ( 2.1.1. 4. 8 ) peresseet did met been abeet the egete trete .
tag. No pereseest ,
record dealeetere were evellable.
l l
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i . . . . , ,
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- 1 e
1 1 1
t h
a l TAGLS 1s BBFIClenCT TEACEleB Theta
{ vespeout Tasatas asuCLEAR poessa dTAT80Il Foge 38 of 53 l
objectf.e Suboe-IIMBEG-4654 geest5y Corrective Fella-SSF-8 Tested ActSee Prowlevely Carrest Beerstee identified Fee 4 Searcise Bew. 4 (seerstes vertiled l
- leone objectlee Objective Beforence Jeriodtettee Actten Takee . Data) (t.e.,seeelse) Statue le,ee toeceiptise Sete 5 6 F.l.d tservick ~ Some se ceaseet for state. Tee The redte system C 813. laterference ande mes- 9/11/83 4/87/05 unghed well for the i
sages ever the C6 ell 8.e.o te redte erstem hee bees 194S esercise, leproved. pre-seteses redte tenedible. vidles clear enemmet-
+
( 3. 3. 3.6. 8 ) cettees.
E.1.e IIerwick eestlebility of f8le bedsee Tee Peressent-raceed doet- t 324. Fernseest-record doet- 9/18/83 coettagent en feedtag by Fee 45 4/8F/0S meters were still met enters were est meetleble 8.e.. se actics. evellebte et the gaC et the sec. (8.3.3.6.2) for the 1985 esercles. w a
I 521. Docteten sekteg at the 4/87/85 3 3 0.8 9eremet soc mee meesttees delayed 0.3 di.e to the rototive le-esper tence of seen ROC etaff usebers to redte- .
logical emergency pre-paredeces eserciose.
I Secause of this the ces- .
pies seteracties of et.ft seebero reggtred for l
decIeise eekIog wee met almeye elftsteet.
(2.l.l.8) #
I 126. Sees difficulty ses ob- 4/07/01 84 3,6 E.7 vermeet served to f ormatet teg protective actlee ese-
< eages ehtch resulted in I deleye le gettleg these esseeges to the local sace. (2.5.l.2) i
?
t T&aLS 1: BeFIClasICT TRACKisIO T&4t.E VSB000ft teamag - mas pgessa STATION
. Pese 19 et 53 Objective k Seboe-IIIIes0-0634 gesetly Corrective Freetemely FBIA-BSF-8 Tested &ctles Eaerstee Ideettfled FSea Esercles Bee, t (Emercise Westfled Carrent loose teocripties Sete losee Objectlee Objectlee Beforence Jettedictise _4etten Takee Dete) (i.e. Seemite) Statue 127. Evee though the field 4/87/01 2.8.l.2 7.8.50 4.1 1.9 vermeet 3 menteestes teams ade- , (9/11/83) 8.18 quately performed their dettee prescribed la the Vermeet State plan, the les dose llette practede the ideettiteettee of the
' pleas benedary and field ,
westitcattee of dose pre-jecatees. Feathermore the RAC beltowee that the . $
pJ les allenable deee llette readere the Vermeet field meettertag teses facep-able of proeldtag acco-rete flead vestitcottee.
e Thee. Vermeet meute be dependent en ettlity field moetterlag date e.J seeld met he able to verify the Jose projec-Stees lederendently.
(2.9.8.3) 824. The state Leberatory to 4/17/05 4.9 I 5.12 vermost 3 set adequately egelpped 1.8 to headle the mueber of eseples and redteactive meste reemittag free a eigetitcent tectdent et the Vermeet weekee Iseclear Feuer Stattee.
(2.8.2.5) 829. The laboratory pereeneet Afgyjg5 9 1 0.4.c verW I more met adequately pre-pared to beadle the klede and eneber of eseples re-eelttog from a afgelft-cost tecident at the ver-meet weekee souclear remer ,
stettee. (2.4.2.2) ,
4 D
=
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t TatLE 3 SSFICIENCT TeaCEtuG TASL5
- Waaseout TasIKEL MuctA&R 70 MSS STATt0II Pase 4e of 33 chjectlee Sehee-safesG 4654 geently Corrects,e Prestemely FBIA-SEP-t Tested acties Eseretse Ber. 8 (seeresse Tertiled Corrent t
Beerstee Ideettfled reta Actice Taken Bete) (i.e., see lte) statue i fosse Beecripetse Sete leese Objective Objective Beforence Jettedicties 830. Its effective sentretised 4/87/05 3 8 A.I.b Wereset tre I senagement and tatsgrated A.t.d (Brettlebore) centret of the operettees and activities et the Tesseet tre (trettlebore)-
were evident dettag the eseretee. (2.t.1.5) 831. The Teruset Ife to 4/17/05 3.1.8.6 4,33 I a.3 Weremet Ife t e
trattlebete to tendegeste (t/88/82) (Stettlebere) ,
(>
to headle actual eser- .
W Seacy operettene elece the factitty to otthie I
the to-elle EFE and to presently embardened.
Yhte emeld regelse evece-j attee to the evoet that 4 protectlee actlene bocese
' ' seceeeary. (1.1.3.2)
(3t. One of the Termost aseecy 4/l7/85 30 8 E.1.s versons/tre et freesportettee empler- E.1.6 (Stettlebore) ese see enesere of prece-deres for reddelegscot especere centret and had met been tsomed any .
redtelegicet saaeorteg ineareasete. ( 2, 0. 3. 3 )
wereest/spo a
! B13. Antheesh vermeet tre eftpfes 3,15 1,3 A.R.h statt erseeged for avec- d.te.g (arettlebers) settee beoes and e ones- e.l .
tag stee for the huses, staff mes*ere were as-i cleet en bee route I eastgemente med en egency contact for ordesteg the sea.sencement et bem evecuattee. (2.1.1.4)
O h
i
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's TheIA 3: BBUIClauCT TeaCEles TatLE wasneert TAggg m ean pgeget St&TBom 4
rose 48 of $3 ebjecatee Sebee-6 54 ,
geent ly Corrective FBIA-SSP-t Teeted Attles l PreetamelF Correst Beeretoe Ideettfled Fata Beeretse See. t (Beerctee tertiled teeog teocripalee Bote loose Objective objective Referesse Jerledicties Asttee Takee Bete) (i.e.. Rosette) statue lle, todtelegical oepose-o 4/87/85 to O E.3.s Terment/ lee I
- costret ter Tereses trS E.3.b (Stettleboro) uorkere and es cgency G.8 ,
verkere diepesched faos the tro wee teedegeete, tecludtag kneeledge *f proper precederee, me4 teeeeece and use e8 deeinstere. (2.l.3.5) w g cm.
g 135. The field teams tached 4/47/85 7.4.9 3 3.4 vermeet festitority eith the .
Beetrusestattee.
(2.l.4.1) 1.8 vermeet 3 tie. The meettertog servere 4/87/05 7.0 3 were Secoupletet e41F cleeed ele reedtage ,
were deas. (2.t.4.2) 4/47/0$ 4.2.8.82 0 3 5.7 ,9 ernest I 117. The tesee $14 est beve 1.9 the cerebtitty for (2/88/82) eraserieg vedtetedtes la the field. (2.t.4.1) 838, met all tees anders had 4/87/05 2.l.3.5 to S E.3.s Tersont I pareseest receed doet- (9/28/01) ,
essere. (2.l.4.4)
I 139. Termeet dose "$t have a 4/17/85 F.0.9 3 J.le.e 'Vermeet seeberles eyetes, for its field meetterlag potete.
(2.l.4.58 geweses 3 4/87/g5 2 p.t.d 840. Sedte co w icettoes were 3 free the field tease to the State ROC testeed of the IFO e precedere dich to set to accardance wit =
the ples. (2.t.4. 0 .
9 6
n-. -- - - - - - - - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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l T&SIA 3: DEFICESIICT TS&CEl81G Ta8IA f Vsseuert T&amas wlm F01885 STATICII
' Fase 42 e2 53 i
e objecttoe Sebee-111f08G 4 54 gesetly Corrective Freeleesty feta-B8F-t Teetad actles Beerclee Bew. 8 (Emerates terfiled Current Beeretee Idenstfled Pete
&ctice Taken Bete) (i.e.,Besette)
,i teams Beectlpties Sete lease objective Objective Reference Jerledicates states i
848. Beerseecy pereeemet et 4/8F/05 4.2.2.2 3 i f.8 scettlebere 3 the trattlebore 50C (2/88/02) 8.8 generally were enable to properly seeees accident eseosoment Beformattee.
(2.8.6.l.8) t 842, The etantered Esa mee- 4/lF/GS 84 6.9 5.S Brettlebore i S.F g essee se abatterte6 and m eveceatles did met pre- Un vide oefficiently de-totted Beforeettee se ube apostlicelly e%eeld shelter end avecosto.
(3.I.6.l.2)
E. 3.e a l 143. Radialegteel espeeere 4/17/85 4.2.2.1 20.25 8 trattlebore centrol wee week at the (2/44/02) 22 E.3.6 trattlebete Soc. The 0.1 direct-read destantere were met read and recorded as a regeler
- beste, med permaneet recere devicae more met evellette. (2.l.6.t.3) 844. Fortedte problems were I 4/87/g5 2.3.3.3.3 5 p.1.6 Seeneratee asete encewatered with t the redte-telepheme (9/28/83) F.l.d I conneettettee system et l tbe Duaneeeaen soc. .
(2.t.6.2.8)
I 841. The beenerates Rec did 4/t2/OS 2.l.1.2.2 20.25 8 E.3 sammerstee met fully deseestrate Eta (9/28/03) 22 E.4 sepabllttlee to Baptement a redselegical esposure centrol pretree.
(2.l.6.2.2) ,
I e
TacLa 3 eartclaseCV Taactiss Testa vseMost T&IIggg an.m man ygegga gygygggg
~
- s race 41 et 33 ebjectSee Sehee-InfBAG-4654 geestIy Corrective Prestaaety FEMA-ASP-l Tested & cates seerstee Ideettfled Festa Seerstee Rev. 8 (Seerstee Wertiled Correst toe e Suecripttee Date Resee objective objective Beforeece Jettedicates Actice Tabee ante) (i.e., see tte) stesse toe. A copy et the Gottferd 4/87/85 4 8 F.S Gottferd g eeergency pies wee ed aestlebte fet reference et the 50C. (f.l.6.3.5) .
847 At the Gottferd 50C. the 4/87/81 2.t.1.3.1 5 l F.t.b Gottferd I redle-telephaes. which te (9/28/83) F.I.d the primary cessematentlee systas, earhed peerly e-a dettag each of the eeer-ci... n. 4.3.n g 4.3.2.5 E.3 g let. The Gottferd Bec did est 4/87/05 20.28 8 settferd folly desseetrate ice *
(2/14/02) 22 E.4
- cepebattelee to deptoneet 2.8.5.3.3 0.8 e redtetegical espeemse (9/28/03) costret progree. Beet-metere more met eheerved at the 30C. pereement record doelmetere mate known by the staff ee4 to be avettable, and 50C etaff wee set settably treteed to the use of desteetere. (2.l.4.1.1) 809. The versee soc Director became see pereenot t, to- 4/87/05 2.1 1 A.l.d 9ereen t selved eith the m ine toeke of meettet.eg to-coeleg redte tressete-atone and properlag eseesse lege (2.8.6.4.4).
lle. The Termen toc ereff more 4/ty/g3 3 8 A.I.h verses I observed to be meeere of the dietetes of reopenet-bility to doctelee mettag between the state eeJ the local soc (2.8.6.4.2). ,
i 4
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l T&SLS 38 98FICleNCT TRACRING TastA f UsesseK Taggas amnesmas yceses Sf4 TION Fece 45 et 53 objectlee sehee-NEEGO-06S4 gesetly Corrective Freetamely Fata-aEF-t Tested Acaten Beercise Ideettiged Feen Beerstee tee. 5 (Searcise Westfled Corrent Sete loses objective Objectlee Beforence Jertedlettee Actice Teken Date) (i.e.,seestte) States toe e Descrip48ee 156. There este signaticent 4/lF/85 3.4 3 A.2.s new seepshire i lepees te laternal cam- . F.8.4 meetcettees between apper level aperettene manage- *-
4 meet med 80C operettees staff. The meet eiget-
< itseet seample of this le
, that the operettoes reen otof f mee sever soformed that a rolesse wee le = >.
prettees, es that it had embeegesett y been teret-g acted. This use eles
, reflected to the statue bearde to the aparettees rees, ehere the reteese dete more sever record- .
ed. (2.2.l.8)
ISP. Eschenge of leformation i emmes the Departeset of 4/ti/05 3.48 3.S A.F use usepektre t j
Public Seenth accidset
. eseesemoet staff and beaseen roptseesteaiese j et etu meeeeeeeet and Clell Sefesee operettoes j
senegeoems, did est re- ,
i sett te rapid eeengh see-j meetcettee of e;cident i es.e sont date f rom the pleet med the field for the Govereer to enke appropriate protective actten doctetene.
, (2.2.t.3). ICATeceef A i estacisect).
gg meu sempektre 3 ISS. Accident seeeeeeeet see 4/37/g5 S I.8 done ettb head calce-lettene med, therefore, see slee. (2.2.l.3) ,
s
% f i
d
t 1
~.
- 1 I e ,
- 6 1
4 T&tLa 3: OSFICISNCT'Te&CEinD T&tLS i
tstecept Tasses names ene pousa ST&Titel
' Fese y of 33 I
objectlee Sebee-Huse64654 esently Cetteet tee t
1' Preetamely F9e&-RSF-8 Tested & cates h' Eserclee lesettfled F9th Beercles Bee. 8 (Seerstes Wertised Curreet lesee Objecatee Objectlee Beforence Jettedtettee Actise Takee Sete) (i.e., see ite) statue loses Beecr8ption Bot e .
859. The St at e bee est yet 4/87/05 4.1.I.6 II & J.le.e use sempehire t psecorred a emptly of El (2/88/82) j to be etectptted to Cee-cord for ese by emergency i mesters. (2.T.4.=) *
' e .
864. Leberatory staff emed 4/17/05 9 5 I.8 Itse Amapebtre 3 (State laboratory) additiesel trelates te ,
order to develop se set
- e-.
for a complete seetree-mestet servettleece $
progree, ubsch faclades the abittay to obtete +
essetttettee resette free r esepte emelyste med .,
proper techstgees for doettes with egetpaset 1
operet tee chorector-tottee. (2.2.2.5) tel. The leberatory does est 4/87/85 9 5 t.8 mee tempshire a (State Leberetary) beve se edegeste ebe eld
- for See Ce(Lt) detector ,
(i.e. ese with a cover) to reduce the backgremed
- comes sete end enable lab
- staff to make genetite-tive calculettene.
( 2. 2.2.1) let. The Civit sofesee - 4/87/35 2.2.2.8 5 2 F.I.d see sempenste I teettee. erstes did set (9/28/05) lee (seeee) teactlen edegestely be- ~ #
tesee the IFO end field emetterlag tease. Aloe, '-
~
there ese as backey redse systee; cogeerctal tete- ,
phones eats used if they '
were aestlebte. (2.2.1.8) s S
,,. /
I
' ~
~
1 t
, t i
TastA 3a BSFIClanCT TSACEle0 T&8tA l 95anout TANEEE MBCIAAS F0WER STatteu f
Pese 47 et 51 Objecatee Seboe-geestly Correcties
, S Frevsomely uumes-06S4 rela-SEP-l Teeted Acates l
Seetelee Ideettife9 FIAEA Emettles Bew. 8 (Seerstes Vertite4 Corrent hete lease Objectlee Objective Beforence Jetted 8cties Actles Takes este) (i.e.,pesette) Statee leeue Beeceiptles l
86). The comausteetts a prob- 4/17/01 5 2 Inow Beepettre 3 less were teatruseatet te f.4l 1.l I N (Reees) .
keeplag esteetelegical laternettee free reeck8eg the temen te o tiesty esaaer, med they were est dispatched to proper meetterte6 leesttene as a seemit. (2.3.3.2).
g g 3 F.I.4 use Weapehire 864. N re were seesttieteet 4f87/8S S IN (seeee) y telepheme tiene (t) and O se back-up emesselcellees ,
eyetee to the telecettee
- Center. (2.3.3.3) ame aespektre 3 161. ses messages breedcast 4/87/85 3.84 3.9 's.S were est asettered. IN (Emese)
(2.3.3.4) .
164. Sete were est fellemed by 4ftF/s3 7.g .9 $ g.F. sine asape64re 3 ,
field teams destes est- 1.88 ette redtelegical meet-testeg. (2.2.4.1) g 147. N tease did set folly 4/87/03 28.22 6 J.lt.e new anspektre enderstead how. thy, and utsee to edeleteter El.
( 2. 2.4. 3 )
164. leformelles provided to 4/87/85 5 3 F.I.4 new mespehire 3 off-ette teses free the IFO wee careery.
(2.3.4.3) 869. There wee set eseech 4/87/05 30 6' E.3.s t$eeterfield I deelestry agelpeset.
(2.2.6.8.8)
. p e
m
s- ,
? t I
i ..
)
l t'
TaeLE 1s BEFIClesCT Ta& Cetus TASLE ,
v8meoWT TANKEE uuCLaat reusa ST& TION rege es og S3
}
.hseoi.
l, Sehee-i IMBEG-46S4 geently Corteettra Teeted getten Presteesty fee &-etP-8 Bew. 8 (Bearctoe Vertiled Correns Esercise Ideettfled Fee 4 Searctos Objective objective Beforence Jestedicates Aettee Tekee Sete) (8.e.. seestte) statee
' . loose teocripeten Bote losee 4/87/05 3.2.1.2.8 S 2 F.I.b steedele i IFO. The Civit Def ee se todte esed as the prioary asene (9/24/8H of causenteettre eith the tr0 la Resee U d met merk property. (1.2.6.3.1) g 4.1.3.3 3.3.5 t t.e eneseep lit. Full stofttag use esser 4/17/05 erkleve d , metably, redte (1/88/03) ese esettered eed eer. set taperteet treme-24setene mere stooed.
(2.2.6.4.8) 9 i e-*
4/87/0$ 2.3.5.5.8 S 2 F.I.b Winchester 473. The Clutt Defense todte i did met merk mall to att (9/28/03) testances. The sec and Itold teses could met reeds the Iro.
(2.2.6.5.1). .
t e til. eithengen the General 4/17/05 3,5 A.3 8.8 seassachneette EmerSeecy esseege mett- 4.4 ficetten see received by the State it did not sees threagh 54U48 med the State retice to accord-esce eith the cesanal-cestea cheenet shows to the ples. There ese me espleesttee avettable for thle tectdent. It could
- have been se 50F, 30C.
State Felice er ettlity
- 1. pee. (3.3.8.l) i I
\
e Tests 3e esFIClauCT TaACEluG T& SEA VESMONF Tagagg neartene paget STATICII
- Fege 49 et 53 ebjactIse Sebee-IIgees-06S4 quent1y Correstise prestemely FEMA-88F-8 Tested Acaten Esercise Identified FS44 Seetelee Rev. 8 (Emercise vertiled Corteet teeee Soectipttee Sete lesee Objective Objectlee Reference Jettediction actice Tekee Sete) (i.e.,Seesite) statue 174. There more some probleme 4/17/05 S.l 4.8 F.I.h IIeseechneette 3 (see Leyden and Warwick) A.4 area IT Roc early le the esercise eith cessseet cot tene et sees et the lacet Soce.
These more traced to to-espertenced operatore.
Although back ing eretone merked, the primary meseo did met in every tecettee 1005 et the stes.
(2.3.2.5) >=
w 875. Updated pebits lefosse- 4/17/05 4.4.2.2 14 4.6 c.2 sersordeten g slee brocheroe ere sold (2/10/02) to beve been dietst-beted. useever. meme could be predeced. This bee been ested as a .
dettetency to presteme eseretees. (2.3.3.1.8) 176. anthe=sh evecoatles espe 4/tF/s3 4.4.2.s 4 .
s.1 J.te.e earmardetoe eheeleg papelotten by (2/L4/02) J.lG.h stees. accese costret J.to.)
pelate, and sector doets-settee are to the plos.
they were met sheen se posted displays. Thle le e prevleue esacerrected dettetency. (2.1.3.t.2)
IFF. Pe rmeeest record espeeere 4/17/85 20 3.S E.1.e hereerdotes I devices essre met evett-ette. (2.1.1.E.3).
I 170. se see present see seere 4pgy/85 20 B.S E.4 Bernardetes of the aestese elleeable dose or et ptocedores for mothertstag emergency workers to tecer espe- ,
seres esceedles the Era 7 Face. 2.1.1.8.4) t e
- c .. .
~
I f .
g 5 %
i
)
Tael.a se eartclescv teacsimo taal.a
' Veneout TeaEEE uuCt.EAS FouSE Stafleil i
Page 18 et 53 ebjective
. Seboe-numeG-0614 geently cerrocatee Freetamely PEM&-R$p-l fested Action l Bestatee Rev. 5 (Emerstee vertfled Cetreet Beercise Ideettiled FBIA Actice Tekee Sete) (i.e., see lte) states 4
lesse toectlptlee Oste lease objective objective Seference Jestedictlee t
g 579. me permement esposere 4/87/01 2.1.3.2.5 20 3.5 E.3.s salt (9/28/03) E.4 record devices or record
( heepteg forme more meett-able. Little beseledge e of espeeere record keep -
i 4 fag precederee, elleeable espeeere level, or prece-deres for gettleg perate-sten to escoed Fece use
- evident. (2.1.3.2.1)
I 800. Displays did met contate 4/17/95 4 B.2 J.le.e Stit ell seguired safermetten J.lt.b [
e,,a each as papelottee acceso and traffic centret potete. We states board use asettable.
(2.1.1.2.2)
E .
148. no ese to named as a re- 4/87/05 2 4.2 4.2.s Gill' lief for the deepescher.
(2.1.3.2.1) 4/87/0S 4 5.2 J.14.s laydeo I 882. Startere such as e statue J.lt.b board and espe, ubtle eestlebte, were met used.
This dettsteocy use elee seted la prestees eser-clees. (2.3.3.4.1) t.
tel. teceese of the teedegeste 4/87/0S 3 4.3 u.l layden treteleg et the 30C .
etalt. the coetteller
, perfereed emergency
- resposee faectlene.
(2.1.1.4.2) d 104. The states board one set 4/17/01 4 0.2 J.80.e Bertbiteld I l, k e pt ep-dated and die- J.80.6 playe lected couplete t a f ermet tee. (2.1.1.S.8) .
l l .
T&GLs 3 esFIClemCT TeacEleG TesLE vamouMT T w ee Iluct.Saa rotisa STATION Page St of $3 Objective Sehee-b w etly Cerrocatee IIWeaG-0454 FEMA-RSF-l Tested Acates Freolemely vertised pean Eserstee Rev. 8 (toercise Correst seercise Identitled actise Takee Sete) (i.e.. seestte) states lesee Desertytten Date leone objective objectlee Beforence Jettedicates 885. Ef fectivenese of the see 4/87/05 4.5 4.4 F.I.h northiteld 1 Clett Defenee redte 8.2 mieremove syetee use dentatohed hecesse of Ste lecettee sesy from the soc. (2.1.3.5.2) g 804. Steplays d*J een lectode 4/87/85 4 S.2 J.80.e Wereich all neceeeery teformattee J.le.b for ready reference. J.to.)
( 2. 3. 3.6. 8 )
3 807 r - Scottee precederse 4/lF/SS 3.5 ff=l E.8 (ser) 4 IEI*3 vereses .
between the states and 144=&.3 see sempebire ottlity se given to their 4.4 Necescheaette respective ylees were est fellemed for the Generet teergency Cleestilentlee, ehtch coveed sortene
- delaye la etliclet mett-ficettee et state med
- tecol govermeente.
(2.4.l.8). (CATSCORT 4 DaFIClanCV). .
I 400. The stility did met pre- 4/I7/05 3.S VT=t.4 1.8 (Sor)
- to sin *2.5 vereses vide statee etch esteer- M4 4.3 use usepehtte elegicet date med pleen Iteseechneetto d
neveneet projecttees le e 1.4.3.4 steely seener. (2.4.l.2)
I 889. The Ottltty diesentested 4/lF/S$ 3.84 VT=1.6 C.4 (Iledte Center) 25 9.82
- Termeet mieleedtes med teoccurate mee usepobIre public Infernettee. to- ask4.9 cledtes protectlee actlee MA=&.S meseechassate eacesseedetiese thet 4.6 &.O comte have coefiteted alth these recommeeded by State eetherities. In a rest tectdeet. thle weste have costseed the public. .
(2.4.2.1) 7 0
1 A
.!l
- I
, )
1 TacLa 3 esFICIsact TeacEles 14442 vannout yaenas ueCIAAA reust BTatleII Fase 13 of 13 e6lec ise Sebee-INSEG-4654 quently Corrective Tested Actlee Freelemely FEMA-BSF-8 Corrent Fasa Beerstee Bew. I (Esercise vettfled Esercise Ideet t sted Astles tekee Dete) (i.e., Rosette) Statue teeee Beectlpties Set e leese objective Objective Reference Jettedictles VT=1.9 4.l.h Osedte center) 190. There see a lack of 4/87/01 25.3 II a.6.5.7 Termeet
. genetae coordinettee end Im=4 C.4 see Deepshire j cooperettee betones the Neesecheestte utility and State Fles. Ita=4.3 Deiltay neue rolesees A.6 j
eere loseed withmet gleleg State Fles the opportuelty to restos them ter pesetble cheesee end casamete. The Ostlity FIO failed te keep State F10e oefit-
- w cleetly belsted on e M steely beste regardleg U pleet etetse and the changles etteettee.
(2.4.3.1) 4 TT=l s.1.s Osedte center) 198. The Wedte Center le ettli 4/t7/05 3.3.1.8 (3/48/41) Im=7 vermees located to the RFE. me le aos ameyshire a
the deelseated back,sp 3s4-5.3 meseectemette medte Center. (2.4.3.1)
~
\
t.
Teet.E la OEFIClasICT.TaaCalIIB T&sta VEme00ft T&sIKEE IdifCIAAA reelta STaf teII Fase 18 of 33 507858 Sof tcleecy ideettiteettee ameber ehich appears to perenthemse af ter the lease desertpstes and, abere appropriate, le the estees for presteesty feeve Identificettee Code sleeberes identtfled Reeees. The first three er teor digito refer to the report sectlen ammber le ehtch the detteleecy to presented. The test digit refers to the specific emeber of the defletency as llated to the report secties.
resa objectives Free the tiet of Fes&'s etendard 35 core objectivee.
Exercise objectives Free the llettage of state's esercise objectives se presented to sech of the poet oseretoe esseeemoet reporte.
Acaten Takees The action tekee by the state and local jertedicatees to roepense to the propeeed actises.
Objectlee Seboequently feeteda ledicates ahether er est the seeestated objectives have been tested et a embeequest eseretee. Aloe provides the eseretse date.
Correctlee actice verifieds Seacribed the resulte of the corrective acttene as e6 served dettag the eserclea.
Currest Statoes C = Complete t = lacesplete
>=
M (b
l 4
m t -
4
) i !
4
' e
+
i ! T&SLE 4 Statme'of objeettoes. Vetemet feehoe Ihneleet reser Stettee Tgt state
.e Terment $ Woe Beepobito g Isoseeebeestte ,g
] 5 5C El k 33 t
IS l
IS S IS2 3 3 3 I 3o 3 3 I "E 1 E 3 aai5 I ut, t
3 I
-t-e 3
2 5 g.t 2 e 8 g- . 3* ,,
3
- weer
.f 1.s 8 3A 8 3 3
- e. '8'2" .3 E6 .
8
- 3 ".I 2 A 5 2'Iis I -'l I ema cons eu tiv. s ee..t.. 82 .3 .2e a g a g ge a g g g a g le & & ge ge a a a a a a ge ge a ge 4 &
1 Seemmetrate ability to ambillee staff and scalvete BMI & 18 & 18 18 & & & & & & & & & &
} t. IM3 & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & 4 & & & & & & .A &
factittlee presytty.
IMS & & & & & & &
18a &a &a &g &g &a & le a 1983 la & & le & & & !* A & & la & & .18 a le a a g a g a a g & g g l 2. pseemettete obstity to fetty statt f acilitsee end este- 1983 & & & & & & & & & 4 le & 36 4 &* 4 &
tele otettleg eseemd the eleck. & & & & & !* A &
j 8985 & & & & & & &
l se a ge a a go go . l* A & & & & & & & to I Stet ge a a a a a a & & & & & & & 4 & &
d 3. Deuseetrate ability to enke doctetene ead esordtoete BM) to & 18 & & & & l* 18 & 4 & & & & & & & & & & & 4 & le
' caergency activity. 1985 & 18 18 & & 18 - I & & & & & & a 8
ge a ge a ge g a g ge ge ga le A ge ge a . le a to to ge ge ge .
& I seemsettete adegeecy of fecittelee end displays to 1982 ge a g a g a g . ge & & & & & & &
- 4. lH3 18 le ge a g g .
A & le !* A 18 1* 18 4 &
,i seppert emergener operettee. 1985 & to & & 38 & - & 4 18 & & S & - em 1* 18 to 18 to 18 le 18 & t* to & & - le & & & ga g g a a g
]
- 5. Deesestrate abitsty to eene.atsete ettb ett appropstete 1982 le to 18 to to 1* 18 18 la le & & & & & le leesttene, organisetta r , sed field peroommet. IMS & & 18 to le & & 18 & le & & I* !* & 18 & & & A le & la le 8945 & le & 1* te & & I A e e a a e u a a a 1
19ea & & a a e a & & N a e a e a a E 5 5 5 W 5 5 W WW
- 6. seammettete ability to me68ttee med depter field 4983 3 4 5 W R 5 & & & 5 N 5 E E & W W W W W 5 5 5 - -
j moettettag teses to a timely feebtem. 1985 & 18 5 5'M N 5 5 & 5 N 5 N N &
18 & 3 te e a e a e N e 18 le 18 N u a 18 88 - E e a a e N 5 g 5 e u a 3 m a l
Sommestrete apprepstete egesponet and presederes fee 1983 - It 5 N 5 5 le
- 7. 3 5 5 M 5 18 = -
deteratelag emblent sedtattaa levels. 1983 5 -
= m W u 5 18 5 18 5 W W W 5 18 N al 5 N 5 5 W N 8905 &
- - 5 5 e e u 16 & a e a e a e e a a to to 18 s e u 18 16 N N i
S. Beessetrate appteptlete egetramet med yeacweaves fee 1982 3 3 g 5 5 1 - M g g g g ge E B 5 3 5 5 5 5 - -
8903 & =
5 E 5 W 18 5 & N 5 N N N 88 5 5 W 5 5 3 5 N clog ogsboree redseledlee s-==atettese se f em me .945 & -
It' pCtfee to the presence of eeble geoes. & 5 3 5 3 g 5 S N 5 1
8902
- 18 3 5 5 to 88 - 3 5 8 N N 88 3 5 5 3 3 5 N N N N
- 9. e tgete oppgayggete egelpesos and precederee for 8903 &
I
- 3 5 5 3~5 & = 5 5 3 5 E le 3 N u u 5 3 N N - -
l collecales, teamspost med emetyste of semples el sett.
1985 u - N N ,5 NW 3 5 W 5 5 5 5 N vegeset tee, eses, ester, med efib. pfe W W 5 5 5 W N N 5 N 5 5 5 - 5 - 5 N N N N -
NW
- 10. Deemmettete ability to pteject deseSe to the petite ela 1982 1 -
- le - E N 5 N N - A = 5 3 5 N N N 1983 4 - B u N 3 I E B N E W 3 5 & W 5 5 5 N N 5 - -
! pleen espasere, bened em pleet and field date, med to 8905 & - 5 g 5 W W deterales appropriate protection meeeeeee, beoed se pace.
f evellette obelter, eveceettee time eetlemtee, and oli etbar appropriate factose. . pfg g g g g g g g a g g . g g g 3 g II. Demonstrate oblitty to project desage to the pebite vie 1981 1 18 E S 5 5 le & - E E N u 5 - & - E N N u u u a 5 1983 & - W 3 m n - W u N N N 5 N M - -
ingeettee potheer espeeere, beeed en field date. and to 1945 s - N u a u e e u a u N N N 5 deteselee approptlete protective mesessee, bened on pace
- and other relseest f actose.
1
i t
I' TABLE 4 Statue of Objectives, Termeet Teabee meclear peser stetten
- .e - t ~ ire - meett. 3 vs, . tete
! =
- Il =
Is ! Is s !Is In -
8
,=
s
- : : gIy a 5 E
$ ,s l .,. =, a a58
!, 2
. .b,-t i.
,e.
et
..r. lee r.
s.
- 38 s: .I -e .i ' J:~3 I3p. --
e sa.3 e 5 m -
z I
~
m l
3g3 s esa:
-- Id }
aaa zIL.3 i a sal 1 ta 4
iM2 & = N .... & . . ....- N ..N . . . . . .
it. E e.tres. .btilt, to 1,iesset ,s.teoise soi.e. ,- IM) & N 5 5 N N N & W E g W W W = N N N N 5* E N 5 N 5 legeetten pathmey baserde. u - u N u W u - N N 3 3 g N 3 N u 5 1945 3 - a a p 3 e A & & & & & & = & - a le & & & & & &
- 83. Deessetrate ability to etert the pubtle eights the IM2 & & & & & le -
IMI 18 - A- A Io & = & - A & & & & -
ID-elle art. and diesenteete se lef tset teettmettesel IMS & - A & & 88 - & - A & & & & = & & 4 & & & & &
l esseege within 15 eteetee. (Seperate FDea test of &/d j systee will be conducted in June, IMS.)
- A & & & & - & - A & & & & & & &
IM2 & - & a & 88 - &
It. Denometrate ability to formatete med distribete appre- te - A & & & = le - & & & & & - 18 - & & & & & & & I palate teatractione to the peblic, le a steely feebles. IM) & & & & & & & & & le i IMS & = 18 & & 14 = 18 - A & & & & =
j E NN 5 E N 5 5 & N IM2 & - A & & & - & - & & & & & =
& a
! IS. Seeenetrate the ergesteettenet ability and recentsee 88 & la A - & - A & & & & - A & & & & 4 & &
4 secessary to asease se orderly eveeeetten et all er IM) 8945 18 &
& - & & & & - E - N N N N M - N 5 5 5 E N N N - -
C e
l part et the plume set.
5 3 5 W g 3 - E E 5 N 5 5 5 - 5 e e a 3 m e e u u i
R$. Demonstrate the ergesteetienet ability and ressercee IM2 A & s e e a u N u a i
1963 & s m a a 3 - & 5 e a e e u -
sec.eeery to doel with Sepedlesets to evecostles, se e a e la - sto e/o g/o e/o u/o N/o e/o - s/o sto ato e/o e/o e/o e/o e/o - -
IMS e -
teeleaset voether er troitit ebetreettene. A s A e le & & & & = 3 5 g a e N g g
- 37. Deeenstrate the orgesteettemet ability and resources 3942 4 & & 4 & & -
5 N N N 5 N N N N N 4943 8 & 5 5 5 W - 5 5 B E E N N - N N sessenery to centset access to se evacuated eres. E - E E 5 5 - B B 5 N N N 5 - & 5 5 W N N 3 5 BMS l
5 N g N N N 5 5 & M i
BMI & & 18 & & & = & 5 & & & & & -
N N IS. Beessetsete the ergealeottenet ability and resources B 5 5 5 N N - 5 5 N 5 W W 5 - N 5 5 W N 5 N N meisesary to ef fect se orderly evecoatles of aebility- IMS N N N N 5 g 3 - A B & & & & & & - -
IMS E - 3 5 5 5 -
Supetted ledividuele utthin the piese apt.
5 g a to 3 g u 3 & 3 IM2 & = & & & & - & N & 4 & & & =
a N
- 19. Deesestrate the ergesteettemet ability and renamesee 5 N N N,W 5 E - M E N 5 W W N u
) secoseery to ef fect se orderly esecestian of scheele IM3 & - A & & & =
3 5 N e u u u 3 - -
i - )SS 5 - N 5 N N - B E N N 5 5 5 -
sithle the pi ne Ert. .
l & = & & & g & & & &
1 & & & to & & go ge ge ge & & & ge 4
lo. Deensetrate abiltty to costlemously mentter med centrol IM2 3e ge a g & & & le & - A go g go & g & &
IM3 !* 18 38 le ge ge ge & -
eastgency werker espesere. & & & & & & & le & - 18 te & & & &
1 94 , I le le le le la l*
I
& - - = = = 5 le 1* - - - - - la N - - - - - = =
II. Deensetrate the ability to enke the decletee. beoed en IMI = = - - - A N - - - - - - - N -
j IMS a - - - - - N N &
predetermined estterte, whether to tease El to emergency 3 18 - - - - - le W g g e N N 5 5 - -
workere and/or the general papelettee. IMS 3 3 e u 3 3 3 E - O le 5 5 N N & &
- 22. Seeemettete the ability to eepply eed edeleteter Et, IM2 & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & N N 3 5 5 N N 3 5 5 & W W N N N & N - N N N N N N esce the doctetes hes been ende to de se. IM3 5 N N N N N N 5 - -
3945 g N N N 5 W W & 18 5 W E E E l*
E N N N N N 5 N N N BM3 E 5 5 5 5 E N W W W u 3 E N N II. Domenetrate obtlity to ef fect se orderly evacuattee of N N N N N N N N g N N 5 E N N N N N l
es este poseensel. IM) 5 N 5 5 5 N N N N N N N 5 N *N N 5 SMS N N 5 5 5 N N 3 5 N u u u N N e e
e t
j
= , - e
! J i '
y i I.
I e .ey T&stE 4 States of objoettves. Terment Taskee thseleet peser Stetten 1
l g Terment d too Seepehire g Stoseechasette g tri state i
$ 8 2
+. $
i i ls s !!,,s yg is i is e,
^ -
- 5. ,
3 e -
3 i : 1 3
s 3
s !.: l
- s3 32 1= 2 ,s- s e 3
- s. e: . 3s 3a 3
( j $s
,g h 1
pata coes Objective et
, f so Esercise 8 g o en g hI 3a. 8sy3a g w ) y E 8 I se J $ s
& - N E 5 E E - A B E N u e N N N &
- 24. Deeseetrate abillay to brief the modse to a sleet. IM3 & - N E N N - 4 W u a u u p 5 g &
- IN3 & = N N N 5 - & - N N N N N =
eeeerste end timely asemer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - to IMS 5 s a.u s le u e u u u a N u le i
- 21. seessetrate abiltty to preesde advance seerdinetten IM2 88 - a a e s - 1* - -
A u a e u a u N a &
i 1983 & - e u a m - & - u e a a u -
- - - - - - -- - le
- et soformattee roleseed. IMS - - - - - - - - - - - - - = =
1' & = E 5 5 5 - & 5 5 N N N 3 N N &
IM2 4 - 5 N ,5 5 - 'N 3 &
- 26. Desseetrete ability to estabilob and operate rumor - N N 5 5 - & - E N N N N - A 5 N N u a e u centrol to e esordsmated f eebles. IN3 & A e a u u u N y - N IMS 5 e 5 a u u - B 8 e a u u 5 -
- A & & & & - E - 5 g N g 3 m a a
- 27. Demonstrate adegency of precedores fet regletretten IM2 & = & & & & - &
& - A & & & & & & &
I IM3 & = & & & & = & = 4 & & & & -
med redselegical oestterlag of e,ecuese. = - - - - - & - - - - - - - & - - - - = = -
3MS &
1
& - A & 4 & & - 3 - E 3 E M N N & & e
- 28. Seemmettete adequeep of feetlttteed for mese care of IM2 & = 4 4 4 & -
A - A & & & 4 & & &
IM3 & - & & & & - & - A & & & & = - = = = = = = - -
aveeuees. - - - - - - & = - - - - - - &
, i BMS & ,
f
- le & g & g - g g g 5 5 g 3 a & &
I le A & 4 4 - &
- 29. Deemmetrate adequate egelreses med precederee f or IM2 -
- N N N N N e e u a u i IM3 & - & & & & - 5 5 5 5 W 5 5 - -
I deceassetestf ee of eenagency westere, egetyneet E 5 W W W W = W/0 - - - - - - - 5 W 5 5 N N 3 5 and vehicles. BMS j g - 5 5 5 5 e a & &
SM2 & - A & & & . la - A & & & 4 - e a
' 30. temeestrate adegesey of enhalance feellittee and = W W W 5 3 = 8 - W 5 u 5 m s IN3 3 - a N 5 N - N 3 S U N N N 5 N - -
grocederee f or handling contesteated ladividmete. lHS E u u 5 5 5 - & - - - - - - -
5 - N N N N 5 N N N IM2 & - A & & & = A - A & 4 4 4 -
g N N e e N p u u
- 31. Seeemetrete edegeoey of hospitel f acittelee med 5 - S N 5 5 - E - E W $ H E - -
precederee f or headling easteateated tedivideato. IM3 3 M 3 5 5 5 N N - -
IMS E N N 5 5 g - & = - - - - - -
& - & 4 & & 4 & & &
IM2 & - A & & & - & - 4 & & & & =
- 32. teasestrate ability se 8deettfy need for, request and A & & 4 - le - A & & & & = 4 - 4 & & & & 4 obaste poderal asetetence. IM3 & -
& - - = = = = = & &
$NS & - - = = - - & = - - - - - -
!' 3 5 N N 3 E N N e W 5 - M N N N - N N a e a N s - a u
! 33. Deemmetrate ability to releeste med operate the IM2 IM3 & & e e a e - e a u s e u u - a u u u e e a e N N etternate scritoc. e a 5 8 5 5 - 5 B N 5 E N N - 5 N N N N N N N IMS f - A & & & 4 - & - A & & & & & & &
- 34. Deeenetrate ability to setteste total papelattaa BM2 & = & & 4 & - le
& - & - 4 & 4 & & & & &
IM3 & ~ & 4 & & - & = 4 & & & 5 N
' e spesur e. W W W 5 5 N - N 5 N 5 N N N - N W 5 N N 3 N N IMS l' - N N N N N 5 N N & &
IMI le & & & & & = B/0 N/9 E 5 W W u 4 &
3S. Deessetrate entlety to deteref oe and lapteenet appre- le le & & & & = & N/0 & & & & & - A & & & & & & & N N potete essessee f or centrolled recovery and seemary. BM3 p 5 N N N N lI N j
IMS S N N N N 5 = . & - - - = = - -
I .
J t
7 180 1
S en a
M.
3 -
T 3 i S o -
= . : - 3
. t :
40l
' _s
] $ 5 -
. - a g .
3 = . 3
. : . ! . 3 2 3 : : : : .
. A 3-. A 2 $ I$ I 3, 4. . . . . . -
. R. - ,
I 0
0