ML20247N505

Forwards FEMA Rept of 871202-03 Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans.State of Offsite Emergency Preparedness Not Adequate to Assure Protection of Public Health & Safety

ML20247N505
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	07/25/1989
From:	Knapp M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Murphy W VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8908030029
Download: ML20247N505 (3)

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( ic JUL 2 51989 Docket No. 50-271. License No. DPR-28 Vermont- Yankee Nuclear Power' Corporation ATTN: Mr. Warren .P. Murphy Vice President and Manager of Operations

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Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Gentlemen:-

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Subject:

Final Exercise Report of the December 2-3,-1987, Exercise of Off-site Radiological Emergency Preparedness' Plans for the Vermont .i' Yankee Nuclear Power Station

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This letter transmits the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) raport of the December 2-3, 1987 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station full participation emergency exercise.

The report' indicates that four deficiencies were identified. The Vermont Emergency Operations Center was issued deficiencies for a general inability to prepare instructional messages for the public and for releasing protective action decisions-to the public prior to consideration of all aspects of these decisions. The first deficiency was corrected at the. Yankee Atomic exercise in April, 1988. Correction of the second deficiency will be demonstrated at the August, 1989 exercise. A third deficiency was issued with respect to Brattleboro, regarding an incorrectly transcribed evacuation message.

Correction of this deficiency will be demonstrated at the August, 1989 exercise. .The fourth deficiency was issued concerning the location of the Media Center in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone. The Media Center has been relocated and this deficiency was corrected on August 12, j 1988.

The two uncorrected deficiencies described above have resulted in a FEMA finding that the state of off-site emergency preparedness at the Vermont Yankee Nucle r Power Station is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance

.that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the L public. . A. schedule of corrective actions is included in the exercise report L for the current areas requiring corrective action. If these actions or the schedule are not correct, please inform us immediately.

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s 4 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 2 JUL 2 51989 Corporation If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. Craig Conklin of my staff at (215) 337-5342.

Sincerely, oristne.1 signed B71 Jesses H.. Jomor Malcolm R. Knapp, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

As stated

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4 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 3 Corporation JUL 2 51989 cc: w/ encl:

J. Weigand, President and Chief Executive Officer J. Pelletier, Plant Manager J. DeVincentis, Vice President, Yankee Atomic Electric Company R. Capstick, Licensing Engineer, Yankee Atomic Electric Company J. Gilroy, Director, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc.

G. Sterzinger, Counissioner, Vermont Department of Public Service P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector State of New Hampshire State of Vermont Commonwealth of Massachusetts bec: w/ encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

D. Haverkamp, DRP L. Doerflein DRP J. Wiggins, DRP G. Grant, SRI - Vermont Yankee J. Macdonald, SRI - Yankee M. - Fairtile, NRR J. Dyer, ED0 E. Fox, RI B. Lazarus, RI i

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Mr. Frank J. Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection and i Emergency Preparedness office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

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Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the Final Exercise Assessment for the December 2-3, 1987, full-participation, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response (REP) plans for the .

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (NPS), the States of Vermont, New Hampshire and Massachusetts and local communities in the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ). The report, dated June 23, 1989, was prepared by Region I of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and transmitted to FEMA Headquarters on June 27, 1989.

Four deficiencies are identified in the exercise report. Two of the deficiencies have been assigned to the State of Vermont, one to the plume EPZ community of Brattleboro, Vermont, and one' to the Media Center located at the time of the exercise at Dalem's Chalet in West Brattleboro, Vermont.

One deficiency was cited for the Vermont Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for a general inability to prepare appropriate, accurate and coordinated instructional messages for public response. The Vermont EOC was activated for a full partici-pation REP exercise for the Yankee Rows NPS exercise on  :

April 26-27, 1988. Vermont requested that their performance demonstrated during the Yankee Rowe exercise be considered as sufficient remedial action to correct the deficiency identified' during the Vermont Yankee exercise. FEMA considers the Vermont EOC's improved performance during the Yankee Rowe exercise as adequate remedial action to correct the previously cited Vermont Yankes deficiency.  ;

A second deficiency was cited for the Vermont EOC for releasing protective action decisions to the public prior to consideration of all aspects of these decisions. An example of this was the release for EBS broadcast (simulated) of a draft public shelter-ing message with instructions different from the final sheltering decision. Later, an evacuation message was released (simulated) without consideration as to the readiness of the appropriate v

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relocation centers. This deficiency was assigned to Vermont subsequent to FEMA's transmittal of the Summary Deficiency Report i

to the State on May 18, 1988. Since Vermont has not yet had l adequate opportunity to correct it, we anticipate its correction at the upcoming exercise to be held on August 23, 1989.

The third deficiency was cited for the Brattleboro EOC. The EOC incorrectly transcribed the evacuation message from the State EOC and did not clearly understand the message or verify the message content. Consequently, the Brattleboro EOC was not aware of the need to implement evacuation recommendations for nearly an hour. The State informed FEMA on June 27, 1988, that steps had been taken to assure that such events will not recur and stated that the system in place provides for continuous contact between the State EOC and the Brattleboro EOC. The State's corrective action will be reviewed and evaluated during the next Vermont Yankee exercise scheduled for August 23, 1989.

The final deficiency was assigned to the Media Center due to its location within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The order to evacuate Brattleboro, in which the Media Center was located, effectively negated the Media Center's ability to provide public information at precisely the time when information was most needed. The Media center was officially moved from Dalem's Chalet in West Brattleboro to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation's Emergency Operations Facility in Brattleboro, Vermont on August 12, 1988, thereby correcting this deficiency.

Since corrective actions concerning two deficiencies remain incomplete pending a successful demonstration in the August 1989 exercise, we must withhold a finding of reasonable assurance until the results of that exercise can be evaluated.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871.

Sincerely, Dennis H. wiatkowski g('~ Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Enclosure

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FINAL EXERCISE ASSESSMENT JOINT STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE FOR THE VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION VERNON, VERMONT December 2-3,1987 1

Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I l l

John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Boston, Massachusetts 02109

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LICENSEE: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation LOC ATION - Vernon, Vermont l s

DATE OF REPORT: June 23,1989 DATE OF EXERCISE: December 2-3,1987 )

. PARTICIPANTS:

State of Vermont State of New Hampshire Commonwealth of Massachusetts Brattleboro, Vt. Chesterfleid, N.H. Bernardston, Mass. ,

Dummerston, Vt. Hinsdale, N.H. Gill, Mass. 1 Outlford, Vt. Keene, N.H. Greenfield, Mass.

Vernon, Vt. Richmond, N.H. Leyden, Mass. j Swanzey, N.H. Northfield, Mass. -

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Winchester, N.H. Warwick, Mass (

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1 NONPARTICIPANT:

Colrain, Mass.; Halifax, Vt. (participated in June 1986 exercise for Yankee Rowe Atomic Power Plant) l, i

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CONTENTS v

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND AC RONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SUMMARY

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1 I NT R O D U CTI O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1 Exe rcise Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.2 Fede ral Ev alua tors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3 Ex ercise Obj ectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3.1 Verm ont O bj e c tiv es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3.2 Ne w Hampshire Obj ectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.3.3 ' Massachusetts Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1. 4 Ex e rc is e Sc e n ario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

1. 5 Ev aluation C ri t eria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 EXE R CISE EVALU ATIO N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.1 Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 '

2.1.1 Vermont State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.1.1.1 Ve r m on t EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.1.1.2 Dummerston Incident Field Of fice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.1.1.3 Vermont Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.1.1.4 Verm ont Local EOC s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.1.1.4.1 Brattleboro EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.1.1.4.2 Du m m ers ton EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.1.1.4.3 G uilf ord EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.1.1.4.4 Vernon EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.1.2 New Hampshire State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.1.2.1 N e w Ha mpshire EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.1.2.2 Keene Incident Field Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 2.1.2.3 New Hampshire Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 2.1.2.4 New Hampshire Local EOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 2.1.2.4.1 Chesterfield EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 2.1.2.4.2 Hinsdale EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2.1.2.4.3 K e e ne EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 2.1.2.4.4 Ric hm ond EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 2.1.2.4.5 Swanze y EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . " 7 0 2.1.2.4.6 Winchester EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 2.1.3 Massachusetts State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2.1.3.1 M assac huse tts EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 2.1.3.2 Belchertown Area IV EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 2.1.3.3 Massachusetts Field Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 2.1.3.4 Massachusetts Local EOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 2.1.3.4.1 Be rnardston EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 2.1.3.4.2 Gill EOC . . .......... .................... 85 2.1.3.4.3 Greenfield EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. 89 2.1.3.4.4 Le y d e n EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 2.1.3.4.5 Northfield EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v . . . . . . . . . 95 ~

2.1.3.4.6 W arw i c k E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 iii

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• CONTENTS (Cont'd)-

2.1.4 Utility and State Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 2.1.4.1 . Emegency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

. 2.1.4.2 - M edia Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,101 2.2 Ingestion Exposure Pathway Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 2.2.1 J Vermont State Op2 rations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 2.2.1.1 Vermont State EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 2.2.1.2 Vermont State Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 2.2.1.3 Dummerston Incident Field Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 2.2.1.4 Vermont Field Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

'2.2.2 New Hampshire State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 '

2.2.2.1 ~ Ne w Hampshire EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 2.2.2.2 Few Hampshire State Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 2.2.2.3 Keene Incident Field Offlee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 2.2.7.4 New Hampshire Field Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 0

'2.2.3 Mr.ssachusetts State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4

,- 2.2.3.1 Massachur a tts EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4 2.2.3.2 Massachusetts State Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 1.2.3.3 Belchertown Area IV EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 -

2.2.3.4 Massachusetts Field Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8 2.2.4 Utility and State Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 0 2.2.4.1 Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 0 2.2.4.2 Media Cent er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING COR RECTIVE ACTMN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 '

TABLES 1 Sequence of Selected Off-Sits Events and Observed Times for the Vermont Yankee Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise, December 2,1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2 ' Remedial Actions for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

. 3 Defielencies and Areas Requirinqr Cfirrective Action - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station . .~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6 f _

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'4 Status of Objectives - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station........ . . .... . 240 m ,

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LIFT OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ALARA as low as reasonably achievable ANL Argonne Nstional Laboratory BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory CAP Civil Air Patrol efm cubic feet per minute CPCS common program control station CPR Center for Planning and Research DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOI U.S. Department of the Interior DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DPHS Division of Public Health Servues EAL emergency actiori level EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL emergency classification level -

EEM Exercise Evaluation Methodology EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FNAVS Federal National Voice System HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services IFO incident field office INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory KI potassium iodide MCDA Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency MDPH Massachusetts Department of Public Health mR milliroentgen mR/hr milliroentgen per hour MSIV main steam isolation valve MSL main steam line NAS Nuclear Alerting System NAWAS National Warning System NHOEM New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (Criteria for Preparatim and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants)

OEC Operations Support Center .

PAG protective action guide PAR protective action recommendation PIO public information officer V

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R roentgen l RAC Regional Assistance Committee {

RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service Rad radiation absorbed dose RADEF radiological defense l

Rem roentgen equivalent man RERP. Radiological Emergency Response Plan TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter TSC Technical Support Center USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture i VYNPP Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) 9 4

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SUMMARY

l The States of Vermont and New Hampshire, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the communities within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont; and the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (VYNPP) participated in an exercise of the plans and preparedness for off-site radiological emergency response on December 2 and 3,1987. The date and time of the exercise were unannounced. All that was revealed to the players was a one-week ,

t window during which the exercise would take place. The exercise was evaluated by a team of 48 Federal evaluators. Following the conclusion of the two-day exercise, which consisted of both plume exposure and ingestion exposure pathway exercises, evaluators presented preliminary findings based on observations at their respective assigned locations. On December 7,1987, briefings for the exercise participants and the general public were held at the Town Hall in Vernon, Vermont.

Section 2 of this report presents the full evaluation and listings by jurisdiction of deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action, with the respective recommendations for corrective action, as well as areas recommended for improvement, which do not -

require corrective action. Section 3 summarizes in tabular form the deficiencies aind areas re:;uiring corrective action and provides a suggested format for the States and local jurisdictions to use in responding to the recommended corrective actions.

PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXERCISE 8 tate of Vermont Operations The State of Vermont operations involved the Vermont Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Dummerston Incident Field Office (IFO), and Vermont field monitoring teams. The State demonstrated a generally adequate level of readiness for dealing with a radiological emergency, although it had difficulty preparing appropriate, accurate, and coordinated instructional messages for public response. Lack of coordination with the other participating states was observed for some messages; the local EOCs were not told to activate sirens before some EBS messages were broadcast (simulated); the activation .

of the strens and tone-alert radios was not adequately coordinated; the information in released messages was not always consistent with the decisions made; and some released messages did not contain all of the necessary information.

The Vermont EOC in Waterbury was well equipped; however, it lacked adequate space for both the operations and communications sections. Staff members generally knew their responsibilities, and operations were effectively managed by the Accident Director, who is the Commissioner of Public Safety. The Lieutenant Governor, who was present throughout the exercise, was the primary decision maker. Staffing of the facility was accomplished in a timely manner. .-

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Communication resources and channels to other participating states and organizations were good. Both primary and backup systems were available, and they were used in accordance with the State plan. )

i The Health Department demonstrated good use of field teams in defining the j plume and determining radiolodine levels. METPAC software was effectively used during the initial stages of the exercise to define the plume and project doses.

Effective accident assessment was impeded by inefficient use of personnel and coordination problems because the Health Department coordinator was performing too many functions and not delegating responsibilities to other personnel. The coordinator should concentrate on coordinating activities and managing.

The nuclear engineers from VYNPP tended to draw erroneou.s conclusions concerning plant status, based on information received from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). This situation resulted in some confusion within the accident assessment group at the Vermont EOC and led to underestimation of the seriousness of the emergency. However, the misinformation did not adversely affect the actual protective action recommendations (PARS) made by the State. Nonetheless, the PARS issued by the Vermont EOC reflected a more conservative approach.

The IFO in Dummerston was promptly activated and staffed in a timely manner.

The IFO Director effectively managed and controlled its operations and activities. The new building was well equipped, having excellent resources and facilities.

The communication systems at the Dummerston IFO were good. However,two out of three dedicated telephone lines were nonoperational during most of the exercise, and backup communications systems had to be used during the exercise. The Dummerston IFO was able to maintain contact with Vermont field monitoring teams even though the teams' primary contact was with the Vermont EOC.

Dummerston IFO staff adequately demonstrated their ability to implement -

procedures for traffic control and local transportation needs during the exercise.

Discussions were held regarding the possible need to transport mobility-impaired or institutionalized individuals.

. The State of Vermont deployed two field monitoring teams from Montpeller.

Well supplied with equipment, the teams adequately demonstrated their ability to detect radiolodines in the plume. However, additional training should be provided in decontamination procedures and contamination control while handling air samples.

Team members were knowledgeable and knew how to set up and operate their equipment, which included respirators. One team wore respirators while in the plume and was still able to operate its radio efficiently.

Adequate supplies of KI were available and distributed to the teams. Team members were provided with dosimetry equipment; however, one team was not supplied with low-range (0-200mR) direct-reading dosimeters. -

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l There is an inconsistency between the Vermont State Plan that requires (page 20.1, paragraph a) each emergency worker to have a thermoluminescent permanent record dosimeter (TLD) and a direct-reading dosimeter; and the local plans (ref: EOC equipment) that require direct-reading dosimeters, but do not call for a TLD.

Emergency workers should be provided with dosimetry which meets the  !

evaluation guidance contained in the evaluation form for Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise l Evaluation Methodology (EEM), i.e., direct-reading dosimeters which meet one of the {

following conditions, should be provided to emergency workers: (1)if two direct-reading i dosimeters are provided to each emergency worker, one dosimeter should be able to  !

measure as low as 1 roentgen (R) and up to at least SR, but no more than 20R. The second dosimeter should be able to measure exposure from SR and up to at least 100R; or (2) If one direct-reading dosimeter is to be provided to each emergsney worker, it should be able to measure exposure as low as 0.5R and up to at least 20R. In addition, each emergency worker who enters the plume EPZ should have a permanent-record dosimeter, either a TLD or a film badge.

Vermont Local Operations The Vermont communities of Brattleboro, Dummerston, Guilford, and Vernet; participated in the plume exposure pathway exercise. Operating facilities and resources were adequate at all local EOCs. The local EOCs were promptly activated and staffed largely by knowledgeable, enthusiastic, and dedicated volunteers.

Communications equipment, both primary and backup, was adequate at the local EOCs. Messages and telephone calls were logged. The Brattleboro EOC did not implement the Governor's recommendation to evacuate the town because of a poor".-/

transcribed message and the misunderstanding of the transcription by the EOC staff.

The communications person receiving messages needs additional training to insure that each message received is verified with the originator. Additionally, operations personnel receiving messages should request clarification of obviously incomplete or garbled messages.

Public notification was accomplished by activating sirens (simulated) and either simulated or actual route alerting in those areas where 'he rirens might not be heard.

Simulated EBS messages were not formulated at the local EOCs during the exercise.

Evacuation of the public was simulated in the three affected communities. Staff members at the local EOCs were knowledgeable about evacuation procedures and traffic control points and had sufficient resources to handle potential problems occurring during evacuation.

Knowledge of radiological exposure control procedures at the local EOCs was adequate. Dosimetry equipment and K1 were available; however, permanent-record

{ dosimeters were not available at Brattleboro, Dummerston, and Vernon. See above paragraphs one and two regarding inconsistencies in planning provislo'ns and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended ,

emergency worker dosimetry systems.

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State of New Hampshire Operations The State of New Hampshire operations involved the New Hampshire EOC at Concord, Keene IFO, and New Hampshire field monitoring teams. The State demon- 1 strated an adequate level of readiness for dealing' with a radiological emergency. l However, the New Hampshire Governor's declaration of a State of Emergency was not communicated to the State of Vermont before being released to the public.

The New Hampshire EOC was well equipped, with adequate resources and a facilities. The staff was knowledgeable and actively participated in the exercise. The I New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management (NHOEM) Director was effectively in charge of EOC operations and was forceful in directing and controlling the EOC. A representative from the Governor's office was present during the exercise and contributed to decision making. The EOC was fully staffed in a timely manner.

Communications resources and channels to other participating States and organizations were good. Primary and backup systems were available and used during the exercise. The communications equipment was very modern and normally allowed for conference calls to the other States. For a short time, however, some difficulty was experienced, but it was overcome through use of backup communications.

The New Hampshire EOC dose assessment staff performed their functions in a very professional, knowledgeable manner. Continuous contact was maintained with the EOF and IFO; however, some confusion arose when the EOF indicated wind directions that were different from those given to the New Hampshire EOC during a conversation.

1 Doses were projected using two separate computer software models. In addition, hand calculations using nomograms were demonstrated as a means of projecting whole-body exposures based on in-plant monitoring data.

l The accident assessment group provided timely updates on off-site projections during the exercise. The updated projections were used in determining appropriate PARS '

for the public to follow. The PARS issued included in-place sheltering in Hinsdale, Chesterfield, and Winchester.

The Eeene IFO was activated after the Alert notification was received and was operational one hour and a half later after personnel arrived from Concord. The IFO Controller effectively managed and controlled operations at the Keene IFO and held periodic briefings with all staff members.

• r y Communications resources at the Keene IFO were adequate. The IFO was able to maintain contact with the New Hampshire field monitoring teams and the EOF during the exercise, although communication with the field teams was minimal. The Keene IFO did not instruct teams to sample the plume and demonstrate New Hampshire's ability to detect radiolocine in the presence of noble gases. The Division of Public Health Services (DPHS) staff at Ge Keene IFO lacked sufficient training in its responsibilities and duties, which resulted in an insufficient flow of information to the field teams as well as inadequate field team coordination.

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i New Hampshire deployed two field monitoring teams from Concord for this cxercise. The teams were well supplied with equipment; however, the teams should be provided with additional training on radiological field monitoring and exposure control.

The teams demonstrated excellent radio communications procedures and were enthusiastic in performing their duties. Dosimetry equipment and KI were issued to all team members before their departure from the Keene IFO. The reference in the New Hampshire State Plan (Part 2.7, Radiological Exposure Control) and the Locals Plans (Annex J Radiological Exposure Control) pertaining to dosimetry requirements for Gmergency workers are consistent with each other.

New Hampshim Local Operations The New Hampshire communities of Chesterfield, Hinsdale, Keene, Richmond, Swanzey, and Winchester participated in the plume exposure pathway exercise.

Operating facilities and resources were adequate at alllocal EOCs, which were activated and staffed in a timely manner. The staffs were generally knowledgeable and enthusiastic. _

Communications equipment, both primary and backup, were adequate at most local EOCs, except in Hinsdale where the Civil Defense radio worked sporadically because of the town's location in a valley. The Winchester EOC also experienced difficulties with its Civil Defense radio in communicating with the Keene IFO. This problem was attributed to the excessive radio traffic caused by the New Hampshire field teams operating on the same frequency as the other local EOCs.

Public notification was accomplished by stren activation (simulated), telephone calls, and dispatch of route alerting teams to areas where the sirens could not be heard.

Several local EOCs also simulated establishment of traffic and access control points should evacuation of the!r communities have become necessary.

Knowledge of radiological exposure control procedures was adequate at the local EOCs. Dosimetry equipment and K! were available; however, the Keene EOC lacked dosimetry and the Swanzey EOC lacked mid-range (0-20R) direct-reading dosimeters for its emergency workers and staff,. -

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Commonwealth of Massachusetts Operations The Commonwealth of Massachusetts operations involved the Massachusetts EOC, Belchertown Area IV EOC, and Massachusetts field monitoring teams.

Massachusetts, although only minimally involved in the exercise because of the scenario, demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for dealing with a radiological emergency.

s, ,

The Massachusetts EOC at' Framingham was well equipped, with' excellent resources and facilities. The staff was extremely competent and fully understood the assignments and procedures. The Director of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency.

(MCDA) was clearly in charge of the Massachusetts EOC. Staffing of the facility was

- accomplished in a timely manner.

The numerous communleations systems at the Massachusetts EOC were excellent.

and able to reach all participating states and organizations. Primary and multiple backup systems were available .md used during the exercise.

Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) staff at the EOF relayed dose projections, based on plant and field data, to its - representatives at the Massachusetts EOC. When the Massachusetts EOC was informed that the release could reach the State because of divergent wind conditions, the public was advised to shelter in place. The minimal doses projected for Massachusetts did not justify further protective actions.

The Belchertown Area IV EOC was activated and staffed in a timely manner.

The Area IV Director managed emergency operations effectively and was supported by an enthusiastle and professional staff.

Communications resources at the Belchertown Area IV EOC were capable of reaching all appropriate locations and organizations. The communleations staff handled messages efficiently; however, some incoming messages from the Massachusetts EOC were vaguely worded as to intent.

Although the only protective action prescribed for the Belchertown Area IV EOC population was to shelter in place, traffic control was established, traffic volumes were discussed, and preparations were made to receive evacuees from Vermont at the one large reception center in Greenfield.

Massachusetts deployed two field monitoring teams during the exercise. The teams brought their own equipment; however, new field monitoring equipment had been repositioned at the Greenfield EOC, along with personal protective kits. Some problems arose because of lack of familiarity with the equipment brought, and one team was missing permanent-record dosimeters.

l _

l There is inconsistency between the Massachusetts " State - Plan 'requirEniient '

(Attachment B.3.1, Emergency Workers Exposure Control Procedures) ~ for f each!

l emergency worker to have a- CDV-138 (0-200mR) or CDV-730 (0-20R) direct-feeding l pocket dosimeter and a thermoluminescent permanent record dosimeter (TLD) or film l badge; and the requirement of local plans (Dosimetry /KI procedures, page 2) for a CDV-742 (0-200R), a CDV-730 (0-20R) or a DCA-622 (0-20R), a CDV-138 (0-200mR) if available, and a TLD.

Emergency workers should be provided with the dosimetry which meets the evaluation guidance contained in the evaluation form for Objective 6 of FEMA's EEM, i.e., direct reading dosimeters, which meet one of the following coiGitions, should be provided to emergency workers: (1) if two direct reading dosimeters are provided to each emergency worker, one dosimeter should be able to meast e as low as 1 roentgen nii t__ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ ._.

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._ _ _ = _ _ _ . . _

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(R) and up to at least SR, but' no more than 20R. The second dosimeter should be able to

measure exposure from SR and up to at least 100R; or (2) if one direct reading dosimeter is to be provided to each emergency worker, it should be able to measure exposure as low as 0.5R and up to at least 20R. In addition, each emergency worker who enters the plume EPZ should have a permanent-record dosimeter, either a TLD or a film badge.

One team demonstrated its ability to collect an air sample and detect radiolodine 3 in the presence of noble gases. However, when waist-level radiation readings were to be demonstrated, one team was not familiar with the proper procedure. ^!

Massachusetts Local Operations-The Massachusetts communities. of Bernardston, Gill, Greenfield, Leyden, Northfield, and Warwick participated in the plume exposure pathway exercise. Operating facilities and resources were adequate at the local EOCs, except for Gill and Leyden, where a status board was either unavailable or not used during the exercise. The local

- EOCs were 'promptly activated and staffed largely by knowledgeable and dedicated =

volunteers. In Leyden, however, the three people who participated had only recently .

been assigned staff positions. Therefore, they and any other new staff should receive training in radiological emergency response and exposure control.

Communleations equipment, both the primary and backup systems, was adequate at the local EOCs; it worked well throughout the exercise.

Both the G111'and Greenfield EOCs simulated establishment of traffic control points during the exercise because of the pending evacuation of three communities within -

- the State of- Vermont. Greenfield also simulated activation of the reception center located at the community college.

Dosimetry equipment and K! were available at the local EOCs; however, mid-range (0-20R) direct-reading dosimeters were not available in the Warwick EOC for distribution to emergency workers and staff. See paragraphs on pages xil and zill regarding ineonsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to -

dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended ememency worker-dosimetry systems. , ,,

Emegency Operations Facility The EOF at Brattleboro, Vermont, was located in a new faellity. The EOF was well equipped, with adequate resources and facilities. The staff was knowledgeable and participated actively in the exercise.

Communleations resources were good and worked well throughout the exercise.

Representatives from the States of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts were

' kept informed of all activities by VYNPP personnel, and information wartransmitted to the three State EOCs in a timely manner.

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The doses estimated by VYNPP and the PARS were evaluated at the EOF by representatives from Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. Upon concurrence, l

the information was transmitted to their respective EOCs. The State staffs used the l

VYNPP dose assessment data to verify their own field team information. Tomographic I methods were used by the States for cross-checking the VYNPP predictions of off-site 'j radiation doses.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts actually directed its field teams from the )

EOF during the exercise. Massachusetts placed its field teams in proper position for monitoring a release if the prevailing winds were to change direction and cause the plume to move in its direction.

Media Center ,

The Media Center at West Brattleboro, Vermont, is still located within the 10-mile EPZ. Confusion was caused when the Lieutenant Governor of Vermont ordered the evacuation of Brattleboro at the time the first public protective actions were being issued. A decision was finally reached to simulate relocation of the Media Center to the Dummerston IFO, which is outside the plume EPZ. If evacuation were ever necessary, the several hours required to complete such a relocation should be viewed in terms of public safety.

The facilities and resources at the Medira Center were insufficient. The only space where the PIOS for Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and VYNPP could confer in their working area was a narrow and crowded corridor. Only one telefacsimile machine was available for use by the four PIOS, which caused significant delays in receiving and transmitting messages. In fact, hard copies of the simulated EBS messages prepared in the Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts EOCs were unavailable.

Not only was the work space crowded and small, but a fire safety risk was posed by the numerous extension cords present for electrical equipment, including electric space ,

heaters.

The primary and backup communications systems at the Media Center were adequate and functioned well. However, only one telefacsimile machine was available.

Informational functions were performed adequately, and five timely media briefings were conducted during the exercise. o - -

Hard-copy news releases tended to be sketchy and limited in content as regards public precautionary measures. This was especially the case for Vermont; the Governor's Press Secretary and the Vermont PIO at the Media Center need to be provided with clearer procedures for developing and transmitting news releases.

The concept of an integrated rumor control system at the Media Center is good.

However, personnel were not always briefed in a timely manner as to the status of activities, which caused erroneous information to be released to the public. Also, only two rumor contrcl telephones were available for State personnel at the, Media Center.

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4

. INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXERCISE i' _ On. December 3,1987, a test of the ingestion exposure pathway (50-mile) EPZ

. was conducted for all three States. The Dummerston and Keene IFOs participated only L

minimally, along .with the EOF. The Belchertown Area IV EOC was not activated. Also, the Media Center and all previously participating local EOCs remained inactive during this portion of the exercise.

State EOC Operations The Vermont,' New Hampshire, and Massachusetts EOCs participated and were adequately staffed with sufficient knowledgeable representatives from various State departments and agencies. The Massachusetts EOC participated to a lesser degree because the scenario for the Ingestion exposure pathway exercise did not call for radiological deposition in Massachusetts.

1 Protective action decisions were generally based on laboratory results of field.

samples taken during the initial phase of this exercise. Recommendations were. ,

coordinated between Vermont and New Hampshire, the two affected States. FDA tables were used in deelslon making concerning protective actions, and samples that exceeded the emergency ?AGs were condemned.

The Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts EOCs had adequate informa-tion available about farmers and agribusinesses within their jurisdictions. They were also able to identify additional commodities that might be at risk if the exercise were to be conducted during a different season.

Press releases were developed at the Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts EOCs because the Media Center was not activated. The substance of the press releases was discussed among the states to ensure coordination of information.

Overall, the Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts EOCs adequately demonstrated their ability to conduct ingestion exposure pathway activities.

State Laboratories .; <

The State laboratories in Vermont and New Hampshire, and Commonwealth of

- Massachusetts were observed during the exercise. The New Hampshire State laboratory in Concord, the Vermont State laboratory in Burlington, and the Massachusetts _8 tate .

laboratory in Jamaica Plain had adequate facilities and resources. The staffs were-generally knowledgeable and participated enthusiastically in the exercise.  ;-

Adequate procedures for operating equipment were generally available except at the' Massachusetts State laboratory. Samples were analyzed on the radiological counting equipment, which was adequate. However, the Vermont State laboratoq does not have the ability to analyze for strontium.

EV

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Although the Vermont State laboratory has adequate operating procedures, personnel should receive additional training on contamination control procedures. Also, the procedures for handling samples that are contaminated above a predetermined limit need to be revised so that they are more clearly defined.

State Field Sampling Four Vermont field sampling teams were deployed from the Dummerston IFO.

The teams, which were provided with sufficient equipment, demonstrated proper techniques for performing soll, vegetation, water, and milk sampling. However, team l

members were not familiar with contamination control procedures, and samples were not double-bagged.

Radio communications were maintained with the Vermont EOC, with radio-pagers used as a backup system.

The Vermont teams were provided with personal protective equipment, ir.eMing gloves and tongs. High-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters were distributed to team members, but not mid-range (0-20R) dosimeters. See page 1x, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. - In addition, one team was lacking permanent-record dosimeters.

Six New Hampshire field sampling teams were dispatched from the Eeene IFO.

Prior to departure, the teams were briefed on plant status, meteorological conditions, and sample location assignments. However, the briefing did not cover the issue of where gro:tnd depos: tion could be expected and the type of contamination resulting from the accident.

New Hampshire teams were provided with sampling kits that in some cases ,

lacked large bags for double-bagging samples, a shovel for taking soll samples, rope for  !

gathering a water sample, and appropriate labels that would adhere to the sample containers. Various samples were taken by the teams; however, the teams should receive additional training in proper procedures for sampling, contamination control, and radiologicalinstrumentation and exposure control. One team's samples were flown to the I New Hampshire State laboratory in Concord. m - -

.m i , ,

Communication with the Eeene IFO was maintained by commerelal telephone because several vehicles did not have radios. The teams were instructed to call the Keene IFO af ter completing their assignments. i Personal protective kits were issued to each New Hampshire team. In addition, 4 adequate dosimetry and XI were distributed to each team member.

Two Massachusetts field sampling teams were dispatched into the field from the Greenfield EOC. Prior to deployment, the teams were given an excelle,nt briefing on the status of activities. -

The Massachusetts teams checked their equipment prior to departure and noted missing items, such as large bags for double-begging samples, labels that would adhere to xvi

sample containers, and appropriate sampling procedures. Various types of samples were gathered, and they were eventually transported to the Massachusetts laboratory for onalysis.

Radio communication between the Greenfield EOC and the Massachusetts field sampling teams was difficult until a relay vehicle was positioned on the top of a high hill. Even so, one Massachusetts team experienced sporadic problems with both its primary and backup radio systems.

Personal protective kits were distributed to the Massachusetts teams. Adequate dosimetry equipment was supplied to each team; however, one team lacked permanent-record dosimeters. See. paragraphs on pages xit and zill regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as:

information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker donimetry systems.

4, Pe>

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..... 1 l 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE'8ACKGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site planning for ace! dents at commercial nuclear power plants. FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Planning include

• Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government radiological emergency response plans (REL*s) for adequacy.

• Determining whether the plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises conducted by emergency response jurisdictions.

• Coordinating the act!v! ties of volunteer organizations and other -

involved Federal agencies such as:

- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)

- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Servlees (HHS)

- U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)

- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. - . . _

Emergency plans for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (VYNPP) in Vernon, Vermont, were formally submitted to FEMA by the States of Vermont,P Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, and involved local jurisdictions. Submission of the #

plans was followed closely by the exercising (February 18, 1982), eritiquing, and evaluating of the plans. A public meeting was held to acquaint the public with the contents of the plans, answer questions about them, and receive suggestions on the plans.

Additional radiological emergency exercises were conducted on September 21, 1983, April 17,1985, and December 2-3, 1987, to reassess the adequacy of the State and local emergency preparedness organizations and their ability to protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the VYNPP.

An evaluator team consisting of FEMA personnel, RAC membeb, and support personnel from Federal agencies and contractors evaluated the December 2-3,1987, exercise. Forty-eight evaluators were assigned to evaluate State, local, and field

2 l*

• activities. The evaluators are trained in radiological emergency response and exercise evaluation. They were given evaluation kits containing information on the exercise objectives, exercise scenario, previously identified deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action, and other pertiner:t data. Team leaders coordinated evaluator activities and consolidated the findings.

After the exercise, the Federal evaluators met to review their observations. The intent of this meeting was to present site-specific observations and develop the preliminary findings that are detailed in this final exercise report. A public critique of the exercise for the exercise participants and general public was held at Vernon, Vermont, on December 7,1987, at the Town Hall.

The findings presented in this report were derived from the Federal evaluators' reports and reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region I, and the Radiological Emergency Planning Task Force. FEMA requests that State and local jurisdictions take  ;

remedial actions in response to each of the deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action indicated in this report. To that end, the States should submit a schedule for addressing the identified deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action withir thirty calendar days of receiving the report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any defielencies and areas requiring corrective action observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local RERPs, as appropriate.

O 1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Forty-eight Federal evaluators participated in evaluating the exercise. These individuals, their affiliations, and their observation locations are given below:

Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise ,

December 2,1987 Evaluator Agency Location Jack Dolan . FEMA8 Ceneral Observations Bruce Swiren, Team Leader FEMA Vermont EOCb Warren Church FDAc Vermont EOC Dorothy Nevitt USDA d Vermont EOC Joseph Keller INEL' Vermont EOC Albert Lookabaugh, ANL I Vermont IFO,8 Dummerston Team Leader Michael Leal FDA Vermont IFO, Dummerston

• 3 Plume Exposure Pathway Exarcise December 2,1987 , Cont'd)

(' Location

} Evaluator Agency h Vermont Field Monitoring Alan Kuehner, Team Leader BNL Casper Sun BNL Vermont Field Monitoring George Coforth CPR I Brattleboro, Vermont, EOC Russ Peters FEMA Brattleboro, Vermont, EOC Raj Sekar ANL Dummerston, Vermont, EOC Paul White FEMA Guilford, Vermont, EOC

' Michael Coetz, Team Leader FEMA Vernon, Vermont. EOC Donald Newsom, Team Leader ANL New Hampshire EOC John Quinlan FEMA Wes dampshire EOC Brad Salmonson INEL New Hampshire EOC Joshua Moore ANL New Hampshire EOC William Knoerzer ANL New Hampshire EOC Paul Lutz. Team Leader DOT 3 New Hampshire IF0, Keene Frederick Oleson CPR New Hampshire IFO, Keene John Simonin, Team Leader ANL New Hampshire Field Monitoring Thomas Baldwin ANL New Hampshire Field Monitoring Samuel Nelson, Team Leader ANL Chesterfield, New Hampshire, EOC Elizabeth Dionr.e FEMA Hinsdale, New Hampshire, EOC ,

Kenneth Lerner ANL Keene, New Hampshire, EOC Nicholas Ditullo CPR Richmond, New Hampshire, EOC Thomas Carroll ANL Swanzey, New Hampshire, EOC Jerry Staroba ANL Winchester, New Hampshire, EOC Kevin Merli, Team Leader FEMA Massachusetts EOC l Frederick Carlson ANL Massachusetts EOC 1

4 ..

Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise December 2,1987 (Cont'd)

Evaluator Agency Location Philip Kier ANL Massachusetts EOC Edwin Hakala, Team Leader ANL Massachusetts Area IV EOC, Belchertown Neil Gaeta, Team Leader ANL Massachusetts Field Monitoring Anthony Kirkwood NRC k Massachusetts Field Monitoring Daniel Carroll FEMA Bernardsten, Massachusetts, EOC Arvind Teotia, Team Leader ANL Gill, Masse.husetts, EOC Martha Willis CPR Greenfield, Massachusetts, EOC Robert Neisius ANL Leyden, Massachusetts, EOC Lester Conley ANL Northfield, Massachusetts, EOC William Small CPR Warwick, Massachusetts, EOC Byron Keene, Team Leader EPA 1 EOF" James Sutch CPR EOF Craig Conklin NRC EOF Kenneth Horak, Team Leader FEMA Media Center Paula Fairfield FDA Media Center ,

Stacey Cerard FEMA Media Center Ingestion R&_=e Pathway Exercise December 3,1987 Evaluator Agency Location _

Bruce Swiren, Team Leader FEMA Vermont EOC Wstren Church FDA Vermont EOC Dorothy Nevitt USDA Vermont EOC Joseph Keller INEL Vermont State Laboratory, Burlington Albert Lookabaugh, ANL Vermont IFO, Dummerston' -

Team Leader l

d 4 f ,

Ingestion Exposure Pathway Exercise December 3,1987 (Cont'd)

' Evaluator _ Agency Location 1

Michael Leal FDA Vermont IF0, Dummerston Alan Kuehner, Team Leader BNL Vermont Field Sampling Casper Sun BNL Vermont Field Sampling George Coforth CPR Vermont Field Sampling Raj Sekar ANL Vermont Field Sampling Donald Newsom, Team Leader ANL New Hampshire EOC Brad Salmonson 'INEL New Hampshire EOC Joshua Moore ANL New Hampshire EOC John Quinlan FEMA New Hampshire EOC William Knoerzer ANL New Hampshirs State Laboratory, Concord Paul Lutz, Team Leader DOT New Hampshire IF0, Keene Frederick Oleson CPR New Hampshire IF0, Keene John Simonin, Team Lesder ANL New Hampshire Field Sampling Thomas Baldwin ANL New Hampshire Field Sampling Thomas Carroll ANL New Hampshire Field Sampling Jerry Staroba ANL New Hampshire Field Sampling Kevin Merli, Team Leader FEMA Massachusetts EOC

' Frederick Carlson .ANL Massachusetts EOC 4 s y 4 Philip Kier ANL Massachusetts EOC Edward Barretta FDA Massachusetts State Laboratory,~

Jamaica Plain ,

Edwin Hakala, Team Leader ANL Massachusetts Area IV EOC, Belchertown Neil Caeta, Team Leader ANL Massachusetts Field Sampling Anthony Kirkwood NRC Massachusetts Field Samplig Byron Keene. Team Leader EPA EOF

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1 6

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• Ingestion Exposure Pathway Exercise -

l. December 3,1987 (Cont'd) l Evaluator- . Agency Location l.

James Sutch CPR EOF Craig Conklin NRC EOF Kenneth Horak, Team Leader FEMA Media Center Paula Fairfield FDA Media Center Stacey Cerard FEMA. Media Center

" FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

D EOC: Emergency Operations Center.

=cFDA: U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

d U.S. Department of Agriculture.

USDA:

'INEL: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

f ANL Argonne National Laboratory.

EIFO: Incident Field Office.

h BNL: Brookhaven National Laboratory.

i CPR: Center for Plaaning and Research (contract employee).

3 DOT: U.S. Department of Transportation.

kNRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

1 EPA: U.S. Environment'i Protection Agency.

" EOF: Emergency Operations Facility.

1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES During the exercise, emergency response was evaluated for both the 10-mile plume exposure pathway and the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway. The objectives listed below indicate the specific capabilities that were to be demogtrated during the exercise by the indicated State or local jurisdiction. -

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...- 7 1.3.1 Vermont Objectives The State of Vermont objectives for the Vermont Yankee exercise were based on the draft FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 (dated 7/16/87). In addition to the stated objectives, this exercise satisfied the NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, requirement for an unannounced and off-hours exercise (6 p.m. to 4 a.m.) for Vermont State and local governments.

NOTD Throtghout this report the FEMA objective numbers operative at the time of this exercise have been used. They are noted la parenthesis ( ) following each objective statement.

State of Local Group A Vermont Jurisdictions

1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and yes yes activate f acilities promptly. (FEMA Objective 1) -

(This objective includes Vermont EOC, EOF, IFO, Media Center, and all local EOCs [i.e.,

Brattleooro, Vernon, Dummerston, and Guilford].)

2. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and yes yes to coordinate emergency activities. (FEMA objective 3)

3. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and yes yes displays to support emergency operations.

(FEMA Objective 4)

4. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with yes yes all appropriate locations, organizations, and "

field personnel. (FEMA Objective 5) '

5. Demonstrate the ability to project field data yes no and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on protective action guides (PACS), available shelter, evacuation time

. estimates, and all other appropriate factors.

(FEMA Objective 10)

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State of Locci Croup A Vermont Jurisdictions

6. Demonstrate the ability to implement pro- yes yes tective actions for plume pathway hazards.

(FEMA Objectives 15 and 18)

(This objective includes simulated sheltering and evacuation of total town jurisdictions.)

7. Demonstrate the ability to alert the public yes yes within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes. (FEMA objective 13)

8. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and yes no distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion. (FEMA Objective 14)

9. Demonstrate the organizational ability and yes yes resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, including weather or traffic obstructions. (FEMA Objective 16)

10. Demonstrate the ability to continuously yes yes monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

(FEMA Objective 20) ,

11. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in yes no a clear, accurate, and timely manner. (FEMA Objective 24)

12. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance :yes no coordination of information released. (FEMA objective 25)

13. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, yes no based on predetermined criteria, to supply and administer potas-ium iodide (KI) to emer-gency workers. (FEMA objectives 21 and 22)

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9 State of Local L Croup B Vermont Jurisdictions

14. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, yes, no based on predetermined criteria, whether to partial issue KI to the general population, and to supply and administer KI once the decision has been made to do so. (FEMA Objectives 21 and 22)

(Vermont will not issue KI to the public.

Vermont will demonstrate the decision making and identify sources and methods of supplying.)

15. Demonstrate the ability to supply.and admin- no no ister KI once the decision nas been made to do so. (FEMA Objective 22) -

16. Demonstrate the ability to establish and yes no operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion. (FEMA Objective 26)

17. Demonstrate the ability to fully staff yes yes facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. (FEMA Objective 2)

(All staffed facilities will demonstrate rosters for two-shift capability.)

18. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and yes no deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. (FEKA Objective 6)

(Two Division of Public Health Services

[DPHS] field teams will be mobilized ,,.

(additional teams in reserve).) ,

19. ' Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro- yes no cedures for determining ambient radiation ~ '

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levels. (FEMA Objective 7)

20. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro- yes no ceoures for measurement of airborne radio-iodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/ec "'

in the presence of noble gases. (FEMA Objective 8)

10 State of Local ,

Croup B Vermont Jurisdictions l

l 21.* Demonstrate appropriate equipment and pro- yes no l cedures for collection, transport, and I

analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk. (FEMA Objective 9) l .(Vermont will demonstrate collection, trans-portation, and testing as part of the inges-tion objective, by an actua'. one-time demonstration.)

22.* Demonstrate appropriate laboratory operation yes no functions for measuring and analyzing all types of samples. (FEMA Objective 9)

(The Vermont testing will include analysis of soil, water, vegetation, milk, and snow

[as appropriate) during the Ingestion Pathway Drill.)

23.* Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to yes no the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on plant and field data, and to deter-mine appropriate protective measures, based on PACS and other relevant factors as part of the Ingestion Pathway Drill. (FEMA Objective 11)

(Vermont determinations of PACS will be based primarily on Vermont I? oratory test results.)

24.* Demonstrate the ability to implement pro- yes no tective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.

(FEMA Objective 12) ~ -, -

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25. Demonstrate the organizational ability and no no resources necessary to control access to an , ,

evacuated area. (FEMA Objective 17) i

26. Demonstrate the organizational ability and no no resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation within the plume EPZ of the foi-lowing groups: transit-dependent, special needs, and institutionalized. "-

(FEMA .

Objective 18) 4 l

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. State of Local j Group B Vermont Jurisdictions

27. Demonstrate the organizational ability and no no resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.

(FEMA Objective 19)  !

28. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for no no the registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees. (FEMA Objective 27)

29. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for no no mass care of evacuees. (FEMA Objective 28)

30. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures no no for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles. (FEMA Objective 29)

31. Demonstrate the adequacy of ambulance facil- no no ities and procedures for handling contami-nated, injured, and exposed individuals.

(FEMA Objective 30)

32. Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital facil- no no ities and procedures for handling contami-cated, injured, and exposed individuals.

(FEMA Objective 31)

33. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need yes no for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

(FEMA Objective 32) 34.* Demonstrate the ability to estimate total yes no population exposure. (FEMA Objective 34) ,y

35. Demonstrate the ability to determine and no no implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry. (FEMA Objective 35)

• Indicates the objectives to be demonstrated during the ingestion exposure pathway part of the exercise.

l 12 1.3.2 New Hampshire Objectives

• l The State of New Hampshire objectives for the Vermont Yankee exercise were based on the draft FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 (dated 7/16/87). In addition to the stated objectives, this exercise satisfied the NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, requirement for an unannounced and off-hours exercise (6 p.m. to 4 a.m.) for New Hampshire State and local governments.

NOTE: Throughout this report the FEMA objective numbers operative at the time of this exercise have been used. They are noted in parenthesis ( ) following each objective statement.

State of Local Croup A New Hampshire Jurisdictions

1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff yes yes and activate facilities promptly. (FEMA objective 1)

(New Hampshire will mobilize State and local emergency response personnel and facilities. The New Hampshire EOC, EOF, IF0, Media Center, and all local EOCs will be activated according to existing procedures.)

2. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions yes yes and to coordinate emergency activities.

(FEMA Objective 3) ,

3. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities yes yes and displays to support emergency operations. (FEMA Objective 4)

4. Demonstrate the ability to consnunicate yes yes with all appropriate locations, organi-zations, and field personnel. (FEMA Objective 5)

5. Demonstrate the ability to alert the partial partial public within the 10-mile EpZ and dis- (simulated) (simulated) seminate an initial instructional w ssage within 15 minutes. (FEMA objective 13)

. 4+

13 State of Local Group A New Hampshire Jurisdictions

5. (cont'd)  !

(New Hampshire will demonstrate decisions and procedures for activating sirens and the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).

The EBS radio station will be contacted and provided with the appropriate message.

The radio station will only be asked to demonstrate receipt and acknowledgment of the message. No actual radio messages will be broadcast. Activation times will be coordinated with local EOCs.)

(The audible alert and S system will be tested separately from the exercise.)

6. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and yes NA*

distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion. (FEMA Objective 14)

(New Hampshire will formulate appropriate messages. The radio station will not be contacted. Broadcast of messages will be simulated.)

7. Demonstrate the organizational ability yes yes and resour:es necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, including weather or traffic obstructions. (FEMA Objective 16)

(Demonstration of the ability will in-volve dispatch of a special purpose vehicle to a simulated traffic impedi-ment area. The vehicle dispatched may be either a local or State vehicle.) ,

8. Demonstrate the ability to continuously yes yes monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (FEMA Objective 20)

(Desimetry will be issued to emergency

workers at both the State and local levels. The ability to issue, monitor, 4 I

and control emergency worker exposure will be tested).

1

)

14 ..

State of Local Croup A New Hampshire Jurisdictions

9. Demonstrate the ability to brief the yes NA media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner. (FEMA Objective 24)

Croup B

10. Demonstrate the ability to provide yes NA advance coordination of information released. (FEKA Objective 25)

(A New Hampshire representative will be present in the Media Center to coordi-nate with State personnel in other locations and with utility personnel.)

11. Demonstrate the ability to make the yes NA decision, based on predetermined cri-teria, to supply and administer KI to emergency workers. (FEMA Objective 21)

12. Demonstrate the ability to make the no NA decision, based on predetermined cri-teria, whether to issue KI to the general popuistion, and to supply and administer KI once the decision has been made to do so. (FEKA Objectives 21 and 22)

(New Hampshire will not issue KI to the general population.)

13. Demonstrate the ability to supply and yes yes administer KI once t'he decision has been made to do so. (FEKA Objective 22) .

(KI will be available for amergency teams at local EOCs and the IFO. New Hampshire will not administer KI to the general public.)

14. Demonstrate the ability to establish and yes NA operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion. (FEKA Objective 26) l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i

' j'j'. [ - i L.

w< .-

15

~

. State of Local-Group B New Hampshire Jurisdiction,ss

, 15.- Demonstrate the ability to fully staff yes yes facilities.and maintain staffing around the clock. (FEMA Objective'2)

(Key State and local personnel will be L mobilised for emergency facilities.

Second-shift capability will be demon-strated by roster.)

16.- Demonstrate'the ability to mobilize and yes NA deploy field monitoring. teams in a timely fashion. (FEMA Objective 6)

(Two DPHS field teams will be mobilized.)

'17. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and yes- NA procedures for determining ambient radiatian levels. (FEMA Objective 7)

18. Demonstrate appropriate equipment'and yes NA

procedures for measurement of ' airbtrne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10'I pCL/cc in the presence of noble gases. (FEP.!. Objective 8) 19.* Twonstrate-appropriate equipment and . yes NA

$tacedures for collection, transport, and awlysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, cnd milk. (FEMA Objective 9)

(This objective will be demonstrated as part of the Ingestion Pathway Drill the day after the esercise. Actual. samples -

o ~ ep " e collected will depend on weather condi-tions at the time of the drill. Cap-abilities for samples not collected will be demonstrated through discussions.)

20.* Demonstrate opptopriate laboratory yes NA operation functions for measuring and analyzini all types of s n;,les. (FEMA Objective 9)

21. Demonstrate the organizational ability no no and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation within the plume EPZ 1

16 .-

e State of Local

• Group B New Hampshire Jurisdictions

21. (Cont'd) of the following groups: transit-dependent, special needs, and institu-tionalized. (FEMA Objective 18)

(This capability has been adequately demonstrated at Vermont Yankee in the past and will be demonstrated at the next Seabrook exercise.)

22. Demonstrate the organizational ability no no and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ. (FEMA Ubjective 19)

(Because of the off-hours nature of this exercise, the objective will not be demonstrated this year.)

23. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures no no for the registration and radiological moni-toring of evacuees. (FEMA Objective 27)

24. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities no no for mass care of evacuees. (FEMA Objective 28)

25. Demonstrate adequate equipment and pro- no no cedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles. (FEMA Objective 29)

26. Demonstrate the adequacy of ambulance no no

. facilities and procedures for handling contaminated, injured, and exposed indi-viduals. (FEMA Objective 30)

27. Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital no no facilities and procedures fo: handling contaminated, injured, and exposed indi-

'q iuals. (FEMA Objective 31)

28. Demonstrate the ability to identify the yes - NA need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance. (FEMA Objective 32) l

• -L * *^ -

a. 77 State of Local Group B New Haupshire Jurisdictions 29.$ Demonstrate the ability to estimate total yes NA population exposure. (FEMA Objective 34)

30. Demonstrate the ability to determine and no no implement appropriate measures fer con-trolled recovery and reentry. (FDIA Objective 35)

$NA: not applicable.

• Indicates the objectives to be demonstrated during the ingestion exposure pathway part of the exercise.

1.3.3 Massachusetts Objectives The Commonwealth of Massachusetts objectives for the Vermont Yankee cxercise were based on the draft FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 (dated 7/16/87). In cddition to the stated objectives, this exercise satisfied the NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, requirement for an unannounced and off-hours exercise (6 p.m. to 4 a.m.) for Massachusetts State and local governments.

NOTE: Throughout this report the FEMA objective numbers operative at the time of this exercise have been used. They are noted in parenthesis ( ) following each objective statement.

1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. (FEMA Objective 1)

2. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. (FEMA Objective 3)

3. Demonstrate the adequacy of racilities and displays to support emergency opera-l tions. (FEMA Objective 4)

4. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organiza-tions, and field personnel. (FEMA Object:ye 5)

5. Demonstrate the ability to project field data and to determine appropriate pro-tective measures, based on PAGs, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate f actors. (FEMA Objective 10) l

6. Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for plume pathway hazards. (FEMA Objectives 15 and 18). I t

_ ___ _______________ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1

18 ..

7. Demonstrate the ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes. (FEMA Objective 13)

8. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion. (FEMA Objective 14)

9. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, including weather or traffic obstructions. (FEMA Objective 16)

10. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (FEMA Objective 20)

11. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner. (FEMA Objective 24)

12. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

(FEMA Objective 25)

13. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, to supply and administer K1 to emergency workers. (FEMA Objectives 21 and 22)

14. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on predetet mined criteria, whether to issue El to the general population, and to supply and adrainister KI once the decision has been made to do so. (FEMA Objectives 21 and 22)

15. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI once the decision has been made to do so. (FEMA Objective 22)

16. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion. (FEMA Objective 26)

17. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. (FEMA Objective 6)

18. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels. (FE!WA Objective 7)

19. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and radiolodine concentrations as low as 10' procedures uCi/cc for mertsurement in the presence of noble gases.of airborne (FEMA Objective 8) 20.* Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk. (FEMA Objective 9)  ;

21.* Dernonstrate appropriate labc.atory operation functions for measuring and I analyzing all types of samples. (FEMA Objective 9) l l

e __ _ __ _ _-_____

n.. .

F i; .; ;o .. ,

... e-

..- 't 19

2. Demonstrate. the ability. to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure,' based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs and other relevant factors. - (FEMA Objective 11) 23.C Demonstrate the ab!11ty to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (FEMA Objective 12) 24.* Demonstrate the ability. to identify the need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance. (FEMA Objective 32) 25.* Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure. (FEMA Objective 34) 1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO The exercise scenario was to begin at 4:30 p.m., with the simulator reactor running at approximately 100% power. Initial plant and reactor system parameters were

' to be normal. 'However, a slight increase in reactor coolant lodine concentration was to have been observed during the previous two weeks.

At 4:35 p.m., an earthquake was to be sensed on site and was to be felt at various locations around the plant. Shortly after, operators were to realize that the Emergency Action Level (EAL) for an Unusual Event was to have been reached for a natural-phenomenon (AP-3125). In conjunction with the appropriate emergency response notification and coordination actions, the Shift Supervisor was to initiate inspections to determine the extent of damage caused by the earthquake.

At 5:55 p.m., another earthquake was to be felt, and it was to be more intense

' than the first. Within 10 minutes, the operators were to determine that several plant systems had been damaged, including one train of the standby gas treatment system, the train that was being worked on.- An Alert was to be declared at approximately 6:10 p.m.,

based on the earthquake having damaged plant systems or structures. The Shift Supervisor was to begin a controlled power reduction, a controlled plant shutdown, or a ,

manual scram. (Manual scram of the reactor was to be controlled at this time.) Exact plant conditions were to vary, depending on operator actions on the simulatoe. , ggw ;

The Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and EOF were to be activated and staffed between 8:30 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. The States, NRC, and Yankee Nuclear Servlees Division ware to be notified.

At 7:30 p.m., the power reduction was to be interrupted by an automatic reactor scram. A high-main-steam-line (-MSL) radiation alarm was to cause a Group 1 isolation, and a number of rods were to fall to insert at reactor scram. Also, coincident with the partial reactor scram, more fuel was to be damaged, and the inboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV) on MSL B was to indicate "open." Drywell radiation lev'els were to aindicates the objectives to be demonstrated during the ingestion exposure pathway part of the exercise.

20 ..

! alightly' increase as a result of high coolant activity. A Site Area Emergency was to be

• declared at approximately 7:45 p.m. because of failure of the reactor protection system to accomplish the required scram.

By 7:40 p.m., plant personnel were to have been requested to investigate the reason for the partial reactor scram.

At 8:45 p.m.,' a break was to occur between the inboard MSIV on MSL B and the outboard MSIV outside the primary containment in the steam tunnel. Steam tunnel temperatures and radiation levels were to increase significantly. Area radiation monitors in the reactor building were also to increase significantly.

By 8:50 p.m., stack-gas monitors on the plant vent stack were to have indicated a release of radioactivity to the environment.

By 9:05 p.m., the activity from concentrations of lodine and noble gases off site were to have been measurable at two miles downwind.

A General Emergency was to be declared at approximately 9:50 p.m., based on plant conditions producing projected or actual site-boundary whole-body dose rates greater than 1 R/hr.

At 10:50 p.m., control room Indications were to show that the inboard MSIV on MSL B had closed. The plant we, to be stabilized, and the release of radioactivity to the environment was to have decreased significantly.

The exercise was to end at approximately 11:15 p.m.

At 8:30 a.m. on December 3,1987 (Day 2), conditions at the plant were to be stable, and no additional release of radioactive materials was to be anticipated. All State emergency response centers were to be simulated as having been manned on a 24-hour basis since the accident at the plant. Several local EOCs were to be simulated as ,

being staffed to support some limited local activities. No actual staffing of EOCs was to be considered necessary at this time.

Field survey teams were to report to their respective predetermined locations.

The teams were to be briefed by the team coordinator or controller on the types and locations of samples requested. The teams were then to be dispatched with an evaluator and observer. A field team from each State was to be selected to rendezvous with another group to transport samples to their respective laboratories.

The laboratory analysis groups were to have been provided with selected environmental samples and were to be asked to demonstrate certain measuring and analytical teahniques. The Winchester Engineering and Analytical Center Laboratory at Winchester, Massachusetts, was to have been assisting under the Letter of Agreement with the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH). Selected samples were to have been sent to the Federallaboratory.

By 11:30 a.m., all State facilities were to have been activated, and personnel l participating in the ingestion exposure pathway exercise were to have been briefed. The I l

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ . _ _ - - _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ ___-_________-______________-________-_~__D

e . .. ,

21 samples collected and analyzed during the morning were to have been integrated into the initial conditions for the start of the ingestion exercise.

I By 1:00 p.m., the three States were to have been informed of present conditions off site (60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> after the release), and the decision-making portion of the exercise was to begin. The latest field survey data available were to indicate a downward trend. The radiological conditions within the northwest to northeast sectors out to 25 miles from the plant were to be of sufficient magnitude in certain locations to warrant additional monitoring and possible interdiction of milk. Field survey data and environmental samples were to be available from Day 1 - day of the release; Day 2 - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; Day 3

- 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />; and Day 4 - data from morning and real time.

At 1:10 p.m., the State laboratory results for Vermont and New Hampshire we're to be communicated to the respective EOCs. Sample results were to indicate several preventive and emergency PAGs being reached 10-20 miles from the plant to the northwest, north-northwest, and northeast. Previous samples for the same dairy farms were to have indicated only background levels.

At 1:45 p.m., Vermont and New Hampshire were to determine the radiological consequences from the ingestion pathway.

By 2:30 p.m., an EBS message was tu iave been developed and discussed with the appropriate State agencies for Vermont and New Hampshire. Some coordination was to have been expected between the States.

At 2:45 p.m., broadcast of the EBS message was to be simulated, a long-term environmental sampling program was to be discussed, and overall radiological consequences were to be evaluated. The total population exposure was to be estimated from potential ingestion exposure and any other pathway.

At approximately 3:15 p.m., the exercise was to terminate.

Table a gives the sequence of selected off-site events, showing the times the evence occurred at all observed locations during the plume exposure pathway portion (Pay 1) of the exercise.

1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sec. II of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov. 1980). Following the narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, deficiencies, areas requiring corrective action, and areas recommended for improvement are presented with recommendations.

Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable i assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protechhe health and I safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficieneles on emergency f

o; . .:

2a

• preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial .

actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions.

Areas requiring corrective action are demonstrated and observed inadequaeles of State and local government performances, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.

Areas recommended for improvement also are listed, as appropriate, for each jurisdiction or activity. These are problem areas observed during the exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. Although not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency prep,aredness.

l l .

1 1 ,

1

[~?~ .

~*

23

. TABLE 1 Sequence of Selected Off-Site Events and Observed Times (p.m.) for the Vermont Yankee Plume Rwre Pathway Exercise, December 2,1987 l

l Vermont Media State Event EOF Center EOC IFO Brattleboro Dummerston Unusual Event 4:35 4:35 4:39 5:00 4:48 4:45 Alert 6:17 6:15 6:16 6:35 6:32 6:25 EOC Activated 7:00 6:45 6:30 6:35 6:45 6:25 EOC operational 7:30 7:45 7:03 7:00 6:50 6:30 Site Area Emergency 7:25 7:46 7:28 7:45 7:40 7:54 General Emergency 8:50 8:58 8:57 8:58 9:15 9:17 Public Alerting -

9:23 9:13 -

9:13 -

Ebs Messages 9:15 9:23 7:07 - - -

7:50 9:15 9:40 10:10 10:35 Shelter -

9:06 9:03 9:15 9:14 9:05 Evacuation 9:35 9:30 9:31 9:32 - -

10:07 MA-8:55 MA-8:55 State of NH-9:15 NH-8:27 8:55 9:15 9:15 -

Emergency VT-9:15 VT-9:00 Exercise Terminated 11:18 11:10 11:15 11:15 11:06 11:11 L_____._..__._____________

.d . s

24. ,

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

I Vermont New Hampshire State Chester-Event Guilford Vernon EOC IFO field Hinsdale Keene Unusual Event 4:50 4:45 4:46 -

4:50 4:46 -

Alert 6:25 6:24 6:23 6:20 6:25 6:25 6:25 EOC Activated 5:30 4:45 6:24 6:42 7:36 6:35 7:40 EOC Ope.stional 6:10 6:00 6:42 8:10 8:01 6:44 8:30 Site Area Emergency 7:35 7:35 7:28 7:33 7:36 7:36 7:37 General Emergency 8:59 8:57 8:55 8:53 8:57 9:05 9:00 Public Alerting 9:10 9 13 7:40 _

7:40 - -

9:12 9:17 9:17 7:45 9:15 7:45 9:15 -

EBS Messages 9:42 9:15 e l Shelter 9:10 9:12 9:15 9:10 9:15 9:12 -

Evacuation 9:30 9:38 - - - - -

State of Emergency 9:10 9:12 8:40 8:40 8:53 8:54 -

l Exercise Terminated 11:07 11:10 11:09 11:09 11:13 11:20 10:00 I

~

- - _ . = =- =U

~. e 25

' TABI.E 1 (Cont'd) l Massachusetts New Hampshire State Area IV Event Richmond Swanzey Winchester EOC- EOC Bernardston Unusual Event 4:49 - - 4:48 4:53 4:54 Alert 6:26 6:25 6:18 6:25 6:28 6:27 EOC Activated 6:28 6:30 7:37 4:50 6:28 6:37 EOC Operational 7:56 7:00 7:52 7:30 7:38 7:40 Site Area Emergency 7:37 7:40 7:37 7:28 7:28 7:46 General Emergency 8:57 8:59 8:57 8:55 8:57 9:06 Public-Alerting 7:45 8:59 7:40 -

7:47 -

EBS Messages - - 7:45 7:45 -

7:59 TL'! ter - -

9:12 9:05 9:04 9:10 g* untion - - - - - -

. State of Emergency 8:54 8:53 8:53 8:56 8:57 9:06

~ - !

Exercise -

Terminated 11:09 11:11 11:09 11:02 11:05 11:05

26 '

l

~

TABLE 1 (Cont'd) .

Massachusetts l

Event Gill Creenfield Leyden Northfield Warwick Unusual Event 4:50 -

4:55 5:01 4:45 Alert . 6:28 6:28 - 6:28 6:30 6:21 EOC Activated 6:30 6:30 6:50 6:30 6:26 EOC Operational 6:45 6:38 6:55 6:48 6:56 Site Area Emergency 7:41 7:43 7:40 7:37 7:34 Ceneral Emergency 9:08 9:10 9:07 9:05 8:58 Public Alerting 9:16 8:00 - - -

l EBS Messages -

7:45 - - -

Shelter 9:08 9:08 9:09 9:06 9:08-Evacuation - - - - -

State of Emergency 9:08 9:08 8:55 9:05 9:08 Exercise Terminated 11:14 11:02 11:12 11:12 11:12 e 9 Y

O

• h

1 #; V rmont EOC -

+.

2 EXERCISE EVALUATIONS 3.1. PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXERCISE 2.1.1 Vermont State Operations 2.1.1.1 Vermont EOC The State of Vermont adequately demonstrated the ability to activate and staff the State EOC in Waterbury. The State Police duty officer notified all key personnel on the call list via radio-pager, or via commercial telephone if there was no response from the radio-pager system. Notification was done during both the Unusual Event and Alert emergency classification levels (ECLs).

The Vermont EOC was activated at 6:30 p.m. and fully operational by 7:03 p.m.

At this point, the responsibility for providing notifications was transferred to the Vermont EOC from the Vermont State Police State Warning Point at Waterbury, Vermont. With the exception of the representative from the Public Service Department, who arrived about 8:40 p.m., the Vermont EOC was fully staffed by about 7:30 p.m.

Staffing at the Vermont EOC included representatives from the following organizations or agencies: Governor's Office, Civil Defense, Public Service Department, Nathnal Guard, Red Cross, Transportation Department, State Pollee, Health Department, Emergency Medical Services, and Natural Resources.

Management of emergency operations at the Vermont EOC was conducted by the Accident Director (Commissioner of Public Safety). The Lieutenant Governor was present throughout the execise and was the primary decision maker. The Accident Director conducted numerous briefings and kept the Vermont EOC staff wellinformed of events as they occurred.

Although overall management of the Vermont EOC was good, several problem areas were observed. Message handling is one of these. All messages were logged, recorded, and distributed; however, the flow of messages from the Vermont EOC to theV local EOCs was at times too slow. Messages were relayed to the local EOCs without much thought being given to prioritizing them relative to their importance. The Manager -

at the Vermont EOC should prioritize the messages to be given to the local EOCs before turning them over to the local EOC communications officer. .

• y More attention should also be given to considering all aspects of a protective cetion decision within the Vermont EOC before releasing it to the public. For instance, in an apparent rush to release the first protective action message to the public for j sheltering, a draft of the decision was simulated to have been released over EBS. This draft was in fact different from the final protective action deelslon. ~

Varm:nt EOC, ,

l 28 ,

Leter in the exercise, in an apparent rush to release an evacuation message, ,

consideration was not given to readiness of relocation centers until after the simulated l

message was released. The decision-making process should provide for input from all EOC representatives from responsible agencies before the decision is finalized and the message released to the public.

A computerized projection system was used most effectively as a status board.

It was kept current, and a computer printout recorded each "page" of status information.

Scale maps of the plume and ingestion zones were also projected on the screen. The Vermont EOC had all the necessary maps and displays to support operations.

The Wescom SS-4A microwave radio-telephone linkage was used as the primary linkage between local EOCs and the Vermont EOC. The microwave radio system allows conferencing with three organizations. This conferencing system can also be used on the landl!ne radio system. The system worked well. A problem did occur with the town of Vernon, but was corrected by Vernon through installation of a second microwave radio.

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the EOF were contacted through the Wescom SS-4A radio-telephone. The dedicated red line phone to the EOF was not operational during the exercise. Some overloading on the Wescom SS-4A radio-telephone system did occur, but {

was not a problem. EBS radio stations were contacted on the Vermont Common Program j Control Station (CPCS-1), which 's the primary area EBS station system. No problems occurred. Commercial telephone and a hard-copy telefacsimile machine were used for contacts with the Media Center. The landline radio was used for contacting field monitoring teams, and no problems were encountered.

The Health Department demonstrated good use of field teams in defining the plume and determining levels of I-131 in the plume. The METPAC computer system sof tware was effectively utilized during the initial stages of release to define the plume and make dose projections. METPAC was largely ignored, however, during the later stages of the exercise.

Effective acciderit assessment was impeded by inefficient use of personnel and coordination problems. The Health Department coordinator was performing too many functions (e.g., directing field teams, advising the Health Director, and communicating with the EOF). The persec in this position should perform more of a coordination and management role. Direction of field teams and communication with the EOF should be delegated to other personnel. .

g~

Prior to the General Emergency ECL, confusion and underestimation of t$e seriousness of the situation was caused by misinformation on plant status which, in several instances, was provided to decision makers and to Vermont EOC staff at briefings. The VYNPP nuclear engineers tended to make erroneous conclusions based on information coming from the EOF (e.g., sotmee of the high radiation levels in the containment building, meaning of the steam-line valve failure, and reasons for radioactive releases from the plant). This misinformation did not adversely affect the actual protective action decisions.

The Vermont EOC is responsible for preparing EBS messages, arranging for broadcast by the EBS station (Vermont CPCS-1), arranging for activation of the tone-

. . .. ~

• Varmont EOC

,l 29 alert radios by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and informing ,

the local jurisdictions of the times when the strens should be activated. Six Vermont EBS  !'

messages were prepared during the exercise. The capability for remote pick-up of live broadcasts exists between the Vermont EOC and the EBS station, All EBS messages were broadcast (simulated) within 15 minutes of the final decision by the Lieutenant Governor.

Several problems were observed concerning the process of issuing appropriate instructions to the public. The first EBS message, alred (simulated) at 7:07 p.m., was not coordinated prior to airing with the other two states, nor were the local jurisdictions notified to activate their sirens. The NOAA tone-alert radios were, however, activated (simulated) for this message. The Site Area Emergency notice was received in the EOC at 7:28 p.m. The Vermont EOC Director agreed during a Nuclear Alerting System (NAS) telephone call (7:37 p.m.) to a coordinated release by the three States of a second EBS message (simulated) to take place at 7:45 p.m. The Vermont Incident Director and the Lieutenant Governor were not convinced that the wording of the agreed-upon message was aweptable (i.e., Site Area Emergency, no protective actions). Af ter a discussion and review of additional plant status information, Vermont decided at 7:44 p.m. to concur with the other two states on the message content. The Vermont EBS message was alred (simulated) at 7:50 p.m., again without the local EOCs being informed to activate their sirens. The third EBS message (i.e., General Emergency, Vermont emergency declaration, and shelter) was aired (simulated) at 9:15 p.m., as agreed in a three-State NAS conference call at 9:07 p.m. The agreed-upon siren activation time of 9:12 p.m. was not passed to the local EOCs until 9:13 p.m. because of delays in getting the message to the radio operator for transmission to the local EOCs. The notification concerning the NOAA tone-alert radios was properly coordinated. The EBS message content, however, was not consistent with the final Vermont decision. The EBS message stated that people within five miles of the plant should seek shelter, but did not specify familiar landmarks or give town designations. The final Vermont decision was for sheltering of people living in Vernon, Guilford, and Brattleboro. These three towns extend well beyond the five-mile limit specified in the actual message. The fourth EBS message (simulated)

(i.e., evacuation of three towns) contah:ed instructions on the direction that residents should take during evacuation. The locations of available relocation centers were not included in this message, nor was other information specified in the plan. The evacuation directions and designation of available relocation centers were included in the fifth EBS message; however, this message was not aired (simulated) until 10:10 p.m., which was j 30 minutes after the evacuation order. The sixth EBS message (simulated) was an update

~

on the status of the incident and left the evacuation order in place.

The entrance to the Vermont EOC was provided with a sign that directed media I personnel to the media briefing room. The media briefing room was set up with a map of the 10-mile EPZ, a podium, and good seating arrangements. No briefings were held during the plume exposure pathway exercise; however, the resources and personnel were J available, if needed. ]

Deficiencies i i

1.

Description:

Appropriate, accurate, and cooro.nated instructional messages for public response were not always prepared at the 1

- - )

Vcrm:nt E00 .' ,

30 ..

Vermont EOC. Problems included (1) lack of three-state

• coordination for some messages, (2) failure to inform local ~ EOCs to activate sirens prior to broadcasting EBS messages for some messages, (3) lack of coordination of strens and tone-alert radios for some messages, (4) inconsistency between information and decisions for some messages, and (5) lack of some necessary information for some messages. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.6, E.7)

Recommendation Public alert and notification procedures for the Vermont EOC should be revised. A checklist should be prepared with appropriate sign-offs to ensure that each step of the procedure is completed in proper sequence for each instance of alert and notification. Familiar landmark descriptions should be included in all PARS.

2.

Description:

Protective action decisions from the Vermont EOC were released to the public before all aspects of the decisions had been considered. For example, a draft of a public-sheltering message was released for EBS broadcast (simulated) that was different from the final sheltering decision. Later, relocation centers were not activated until several minutes after an evacuation message was released (simulated). (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.7, J.10.h)

Recommendation: All aspects of a protective action deelslon, including inputs from all EOC representatives of responsible agencies, should be considered before the decision is finalized and the message released (simulated) to the public.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Misinformation on plant status from VYNPP nuclear engineers to decision makers and Vermont EOC staff led to under-estimation of the seriousness of the situation before the General ,~~ ,. '

Emergency declaration. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revi 17 II, '

O.4.j) ., , , . [

Recommendation: To ensure correct interpretatidf Training '" e -

should be provided to persons responsible for Interpreting technical j information about plant status.

2. Description The METPAC system was largely ignored by the Vermont EOC staff during the later stages of the exercise.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.10,1.11) .

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_ _ _ _ - --- )

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~

V;rmont EOC 31 Recommendation: The METPAC system should be constantly accessed and used in decision making, and for defining the plume and making dose projections.

Areas Recommended forImprovement

1.

Description:

The flow of messages from the Vermont EOC to the local EOCs was at times too slow because messages were not prioritized before being relayed.

Recommendation: The Vermont EOC Accident Director should prioritize messages for the local EOCs before turning them over to the local EOC communications offleer.

2.

Description:

The Vermont Health Department coordinator was performing too many functions, which impeded effective accident assessment.

Recommendation: The Health Department coordinator should perform a coordination and management role. Direction of field teams and communication with the EOF should be delegated to other personnel.

4 7%

DuanerstenIncidantFialdOffic(*

• 32 ,

(

1.1.1.2 Dummerston Incident Field Office .

Activation of the Dummerston IFO was initiated at 6:35 p.m., and the facility was operational by 7:00 p.m. All agencies participated except Social Welfare and Social and Rehabilitation Services. All staff members appeared to be knowledgeable about their assignments and displayed professionalism in carrying out their responsibilities and duties. Around-the-clock staffing of the IFO was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.

Very effective management and control of the operations and activities at the Dummerston IFO were demonstrated by the IFO Director, thereby correcting a previous inadequacy (#85-6). Periodle briefings were held with staff members involved in decision making. Copies of the IFO's plan were available, checklists were used by the staff, and message logs were kept.

The IFO is located in a new' facility at the Agency of Transportation, District 2 Faellity, on Route 5 in Dummerston. The facility is approximately 10.1 miles from the VYNPP. There were adequate furniture, space, lighting, and telephone equipment. All agencies are now located in the same area so that interaction can readily take place.

The new facility and location corrects previous inadequacies (#82-16 and 85-7). Maps and a status board, which was kept current, were clearly posted.

The primary communications systems at the Dummerston IFO consisted of dedicated telephone lines, with radios and commercial telephone lines available as backups. During the exercise, two out of the three dedicated lines were down because of telephone company problems; however, adequate communications were still available at the IFO. One dedicated line was fixed and tested by 10:20 p.m. A microwave system is being installed at the IFO and should be operational by January 1,1988, which will improve the already adequate communications capability at the IFO. Communication with the two State field monitoring teams was adequate; however, the teams' primary contact was with the Vermont EOC. l The Windham County Police maintained a supply of low-range (0-200mR) and high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters. Transportation and police personnel were issued either a low-range or high-range direct-reading dosimeter, depending on duty  !

station, but no permanent-record dosimeters were issued, causing continuation of previous inadequacies (#85-8 and 85-10). See page is, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsistencies in p1==atar provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. The low-range dosimeters were issued to personnel assigned to duties requiring them to leave the IFO and move in a northerly direction, whereas the high-range dosimeters were issued to personnel assigned to duties southward toward the plant.

Vermont Health Department personnel brought adequate supplies of direct-reading dosimeters, which were issued to each of the State field monitoring team members. The State also supplied all IFO personnel with thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). Although the plume did not reach the IFO, it was headed 4eward the facility.

The IFO Director instructed personnel to prepare for relocation by determining what items and materials needed to be moved; personnel were briefed on the relocation site and facilities available there.

a . ..

.; Dummersten Incid nt Fiold Offica -

- 33 The Dummerston IFO is not responsible for public alerting and instruction; however, vehicles and equipment available at the IFO can be used to assist in this function whenever necessary, and such services were offered to the local EOCs.

Dummerston IFO staff demonstrated their decision-making ability to implement procedures for traffic control and transportation. These decisions, along with the interaction between agencies to anticipate what wee needed and where, were very impressive; however, erection of barricades was only simulated. Personnel advised that resources were adequate to cover all traffic and access control functions. Although not an objective of the exercise, discussions were held and arrangements were made for evacuees who were either mobility-impaired or institutionalized. Additional discussions were held concerning buses that may have been needed for evacuation of the area; these buses were offered to the local EOCs and were placed on standby for dispatch per request ' r e.ssistance. The IFO staff appeared very knowledgeable about proper

~

procedurt a for dispatching the buses over appropriate routes. This activity eliminates a previous inadequacy (# 85-9).

! Deficiencies None.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

Description:

Agency of Transportation and police officers dispatched fromthe Dummerston IFO were issued either a high-range (0-200R) or low-range (0-200mR) direct-reading dosimeter, depending on their duty station, but no permanent-record dosimeters were issued. See page lx, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, E.3.a)

Recommendation: All Dummerston IFO emergency workers should be provided with dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

Area Recommended forImprervement

Description:

Because of a telephone company problem, two out of the three dedicated telephone lines at the Dummerston IFO were down during the exercise.

Recommendation: The dedicated line system at the Dummerstos IFO should be inspected to locate the cause of the down lines, and the cause should be corrected or eliminated. The lines should be tested regularly.

Vermont Field M:nitoring*', ,

l 34 1 ..

2.1.1.3 Vermont Field Monitoring l Two radiological field monitoring teams, each consisting of two members, were mobilized from Montpeller, arriving at the Dummerston IFO by h45 p.m. Actual mobilization procedures were not observed during this exercise. An adequate mobilization system that provides for the use of radio-pagers, a calllist, and procedures for backup personnel was described by the team members.

The Vermont field monitoring teams brought their monitoring equipment with them. The teams checked the!r equipment prior to departure from Montpeller to ensure that all necessary equipment was in the kits and operational. The teams were well supplied with equipment, including a single-channel sodium iodide scintillation counter, and air , soil , water , and vegetation-sampling equipment.

The field monitoring teams were provided with procedures for setup and operation of their equipment. Team members were familiar with the operation of the equipment, which corrects an inadequacy (#85-11) noted during a past exercise. Both ground and air readings were efficiently demonstrated, thereby correcting an inadequacy

(#85-12) noted during a past exercise. The teams demonstrated their ability to measure radiolodide levels in the air using their single-channel sodium lodide scintillation counter, which corrects inadequacies (#82-9 and 85-13) noted during past exercises. However, the teams could use additional training on contamination control for handling air samples and personnel decontamination procedures.

The field monitoring teams were familiar with the region being monitored. All teams were provided with maps that adequately identified field monitoring locations with a numbering system, thereby correcting an inadequacy (#85-15) noted during a past -

exercise. The teams were instructed to take samples within the plume and to make plume centerline measurements, thereby correcting an inadequacy (#85-3) noted during a past exercise.

Radio communication was maintained with the Vermont EOC throughout the exercise, and the Dummerston IFO was able to monitor the teams' communications, which corrected an inadequacy (#85-16) noted during a past exercise. However, one team did not use proper communications procedures and did not use its radios effectively. This team could ust additional training on proper communication procedures and effective use of its radfo. One team wore respirators while in the plume and were still able to operate their radio efficiently.

The field monitoring teams were provided with personti protective eq lhment, including respirators; however, one team's members had not been trained or fit-tested for respirator use in several years, which caused some difficulty in getting a good fit and seal. All team members were provided with permanent-record TLD badges, thereby correcting inadequacies (#83-5 and 85-14) noted during past exercises. Team members were provided with direct-reading dosimeters; however, one team had only high-range (0-200R) dosimeters, whereas the other had both low-range (0-200mR) and high-range (0-200R) dosimeters. See page lx, paragraphs one and two regardingJnconsisteneles in ,

planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry,' as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. The l

1

V rmont Fiold MInitoring -

35 teams were familiar with how often to read their dosimeters and radioed the results to the Vermont EOC. Adequate supplies of K! were available for emergency workers and were distributed to all personnel. The teams were familiar with how and when to use El.

Defielencies None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Tne Vermont field monitoring teams were not familiar with contamination control for handling air samples and personnel decontamination procedures. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, K.5.b) l Recommendation: The Vermont field monitoring teams should receive additional training on radiological procedures associated with contamination control and personnel decontamination.

2.

Description:

One Vermont field monitoring team was not provided with low-range (0-200mR) direct-reading dosimeters. See page 1x, paragrapts one and two regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systema. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, REV.1, II, K.3.a)

Recommendation: All Vermont field monitoring teams should be provided with dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

Areas Recommended forImprovement

1.

Description:

One Vermont field monitoring team did not follow proper communication procedures and did not use the radios effectively.

Recommendation All Vermont field monitoring team members should receive appropriate training in communication procedures and effective use of radios.

2.

Description:

One Vermont field monitoring team experfeceed difficulty in getting a proper fit for the respirators worn while they were in the plume.

e Varmont riald Manitering.~,-

' ~

I 36 Recommendattom All Vermont field monitoring team members should receive proper training and should be fit-tested for respirator use.

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Brettisboro Eoc

- 37 2.1.1.4 Vermont Local EOCs 2.1.1.4.1 Brattleboro EOC. _ The Brattleboro EOC is adequate both in size and facilities to meet the needs of its staff. The communications area was enclosed by partitions and large glass windows to reduce noise and distractions, and access was limited to communications personnel. In response to a recommendation from the preceding exercise, a fan was provided to increase air circulation. Appropriate maps and

l. displays were posted and kept current.

p Activation of the Brattleboro EOC took place at 6:45 p.m. after receipt of the l Alert notification at 6:32 p.m. from the State Police in Rockingham and also from transmissions from the other two participating States. With use of a call list and beepers, mobilization was effielent, and the EOC was fully operational at 6:50 p.m. As a I budget hearing was being held in the same building concurrently with the exercise, several department heads were represented by backup personnel. Around-the-clock staffing of the EOC was demonstrated by a shift change during the exercise.

The Emergency Director effectively managed operations, although l responsibilities were intermittently delegated to the Assistant Director when the Director was in the budget hearings. Periodic briefings were given, and close working relationships among the staff ensured that all were aware of current conditions. State end local plans were available and referred to.

The primary communleations system was radio, with telephones available as the backup. The communications room was fully staffed by trained fire and police dispatchers, who were proficient with the equipment. Messages and telephone calls were logged with information on the times they were received, the organizations originating the calls or messages, and the dispatchers receiving the calls. The messages were handwritten when received and later transcribed on a three-part form for distribution.

The full content of at least one important message received via dedicated telephone was not fully or accurately transcribed. The message from the Vermost EOC to evacuate was transcribed as "Bratt to North or West" and was misunderstood by Brattleboro EOC staff so that Brattleboro did not evacuate when ordered to do so. A standard operating procedure should be established to require the local Civil Defense Director to call the originating organization to verify the meaning of protective-action and other high-priority messages.

The Brattleboro EOC was instructed to simulate sounding of the siren system at 9:12 p.m. alerting the public within the EPZ to turn on their radios. In accordance with the local plan the dispatch of notifier teams to those areas not completely covered by the sirens was simulated.

At 9:14 p.m., the EOC was advised by the State that the plant was now at General Emergency and at 9:34 p.m. was further advised by the State that evacuation information would be forthcoming in three to five minutes. At 9:37 p.ma, the message was received from the State announcing the decision by the Governor to~ evacuate Brattleboro, Guilford, and Vernon. This message from the State provided specific instructions as to the direction by which each town was to evacuate. The Brattleboro

E ,

I Bratt1choro EOC.* , . I L 38 ,.

~

. EOC incorrectly transcribed the evacuation message from the State EOC and did not clearly understand the message or verify the message content. Consequently, the Brattleboro EOC was not aware of the need to implement evacuation recommendations

- for nearly an hour. (NOTE: The State simultaneously directed the EBS stations to i simulate the sending of this message to the general public. Since the simulation of the siren sounding took place at 9:12 p.m., the public received the information regarding the decision to evacuate Brattleboro, Guilford, and Vernon.)

However, following the 9:14 p.m. General Emergency declaration and in anticipation of the evacuation order, activation of traffic control points was ordered by - 1 the Chief of Police and implemented (simulated). The police, fire, and highway departments had sufficient resources both in personnel and equipment to keep evacuation routes clear and to establish alternate routes.

Adequate radiological exposure control procedures and equipment were demonstrated except for an absence of permanent-record dosimeters. Supplies of direct-reading dosimeters and survey meters were more than adequate for Brattleboro EOC staff and field emergency workers. El is not stored at the Brattleboro EOC. The supplies at the nearby IFO could be transported to the EOC quickly. The RADEF offleer was generally knowledgeable and knew about the use of KI, which corrects a previous inadequacy (#82-26). Direct-reading dosimeters were read and the readings recorded; however, because of the absence of permanent-record dosimeters, two inadequacies

(#83-8 and 85-19) persist. See page Ex, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systema.

Dose assessment and preparation of protective action recommendations were not the responsibility of the Brattleboro EOC. The Radiological Defense (RADEF) Officer expressed interest in obtaining training in evaluating radiological field data, but has not been able to obtain it. During this exercise, only one radiological field ineasurement was relayed to Brattleboro; it was excessively high (6.8 Rad over an eight-hour period),

indleating that prior messages should have been sent. Prior inadequaeles (#82-25 and 85-17) related to evaluating accident assessment information continue.

. Deficiency .

Description:

The Brattleboro EOC did not im lement' the Governor's ,

recommendation to evacuate the town because of a poorly transcribed message and the misunderstanding of the transcription by the EOC ctaff. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.1) - # 4 '

Recommendation: The communications person receiving messages needs additional training to insure that each message received is verified with the originator. Additionally, operations personnel receiving messages should request clarification of obviously incomplete or garbled messages. -

~

.l Bratticbero EOC 39

~

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Description Radiological exposure control at the Brattleboro EOC was greatly improved over the preceding exercise. Direct-reading dosimeters were periodically read and the readings recorded, and the RADEF officer was kno'wledgeable. However, permanent-record dosimeters were still lacking. See page ir, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a)

Recommendation: The Brattleboro EOC should acquire dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

2. Description Emergency personnel in the Brattleboro EOC were unable to properly assess the one accident assenment information message that was received. The RADEF officer has expressed interest in obtaining training in evaluation of radiological field data, but such efforts have been in vain. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5, E.7)

Recommendation Additional training should be provided for Brattleboro EOC staff to enhance their ability to assess accident assessment information. Also, more accident assessment information should be transmitted to the Brattleboro EOC.

Areas Recommended forImprovement None.

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1 .

Dummersten EOC ** '-

• 40

• 3.1.1.4.2 Dummerston EOC. The Dummerston EOC, located in the Town Center .

outside of the plume EPZ, contained appropriate maps and a status board, but lacked a clock within the operations area of the facility. The Emegency Director received the Unusual Event notification while at home and arrived at the EOC shortly before the Alert notification was received at 6:25 p.m. The Dummerston EOC was functional with four persons at 6:30 p.m. and was fully staffed by 8:00 p.m. The Emergency Director had a call list at his home for mobilizing emergency workers, which he used, but there was no calllist in the EOC.

The Emergency Director was effectively in chage and appropriately delegated duties to the Radiological Control Officer and others. Personnel at the Dummerston EOC generally were adequately trained. Although the scenario did not require much activity at this EOC, staff members were enthusiastic and showed keen interest in the scenario as it unfolded. Capability for around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. Message handling and log keeping were good. However, access to the EOC was not controlled.

The communleations system at the Dummerston EOC was adequate. The primary system is the radio-telephone Civil Defense network that links. local EOCs, the Vermont EOC, and the utility. This system provides conferencing capabilities. A commercial telephone was recently installed in the EOC to provide a backup capability that had been lacking. In addition, the EOC has a mutual-aid radio. In prior exercises, periodic problems arose with the radio-telephone receiver. During this exercise, the radio-telephone receiver operated without problems, which corrects previous inadequacies

(#83-9 and 85-20).

Dummerston was not included in any protective action recommendations (PARS) from the Vermont EOC. However, a telephone message from the IFO ordering sheltering in place included Dummerston. The Emergency Director, while attempting to verify the Dummerston IFO message, simulated procedures for instructing those residents within the plume EPZ to take appropriate protective action. Only a smallpart of the town was within the plume EPZ, and the Dummerston EOC staff was fully informed of the location of those residents and their special needs, if any.

The ability to implement a radiological exposure control program was demonstrated by the presence of a knowledgeable Radiological Control Officer and adequate direct-reading dosimetry supplies, which corrects previous inadequacies (#83-10 and 85-21). However, the Dummerston EOC did not have any permanent-record dosimeters for distribution to staff and field emergency workers. See page it, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systema. In addition, K1 was not available for distribution to field emergency workers. The Radiological Control Officer was aware of proper procedures concerning its use. Also, the EOC staff was not aware of decontamination procedures or when and where to go for decontamination.

" ),'f Dummersten EOC -

b1

+ 41.

. Deficiencies i None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The Dummerston EOC lacked a calllist of emergency -

workers. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,11, E.2) l- Rooommendation: A call list of emergency workers should be maintained at the Dummerston EOC as well as at the Emegency Director's home so that should the Emergency Director be unavailable the EOC can still be expeditiously activated.

2.

Description:

The Dummerston EOC did not have any permanent-record dosimeters available for staff and field emergency workers.

See page lx, paragraphs one and two regarding laaaaalateneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,~ Rev.1, .

II, K.3.a)

Recommendation:' The Dummerston EOC should acquire dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

3.

Description:

The Dummerston EOC did not have any KI available for field emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,' J.10.e)

Recommendation: The Dummerston EOC should acquire KI for distribution to field emergency workers.

4.

Description:

The Dummerston EOC staff was not aware of

. decontamination procedures or . when and where to go for ~

decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles. '(NUREG " ,

0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.5.a K.5.b) ,

Recommendation: The EOC staff should receive training in - -

decontamination procedures.

Areas Recommended forImprwvement 4

1.

Description:

The Dummerston EOC lacked a clock within the operations area of the facility.

Dummersten EOC d ..

42 ..

. l.

Rooommendation: The Dummerston' EOC should be provided with ~

a clock within the operations area of the faellity.

1 2.

Description:

- Access to.the Dummerston EOC was not controlled i during the exercise.

Emeommendation: Provision should be made for controlling access to the Dummerston EOC.

l l

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• 1 .

+.

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~~ Cuilford EOC ,

~l 43

. 3.1.1.4.3 Guilford FOC. The Guilford EOC, located in the Fire Station, was quite adequate, having a kitchen and sleeping space, and could easily accommodate around-the-clock operation. Appropriate maps and display were either clearly visible or readily available. The posting of a map showing evacuation routes and available relocation centers corrects a previous inadequacy (#82-29). However, the main operations room was quite crowded and noisy when more than 10 persons were present.

Activation of the Guilford EOC was initiated at 4:50 p.m., when notice of the Unusual Event was received from the Vermont EOC. Activation was quick and efficient, with Fire Department personnel arriving first to activate communications equipment and prepare the facility. The EOC was fully staffed by 6:10 p.m. The EOC was managed efficiently by a Selectman. All participants were briefed frequently and participated in decision making, as appropria.te. Messages were correctly logged and disseminated quickly to participant.?. A copy of the local plan was available, which corrects a previous inadequacy (#85-22). The plan shows that the responsibility for activating the EBS stations in Guilford rests with either the Vermont EOC or the Guilford Selectmen may activate them to broadcast messages of immediate concern to the local population. This provision in the local plan corrects a previous inadequacy (#83-12).

The primary communications system at the Guilford EOC was the radio-telephone Civil Defense network. Problems experienced with this system during previous exercises (#82-6, 83-11, and 85-23) were corrected through realignment and adjustment of antenna equipment. The communications system worked properly during this exercise. Town radio, Fire Department radio, and commercial telephones served as adequL kekup systems, which corrects a previous inadequacy (#82-28).

The Guilford EOC demonstrated its ability to alert the public. Within minutes of receipt of the notice of the Site Area Emergency at 7:35 p.m., four vehicles were dispatched to remote parts of the town to disseminate the message to shelter la place.

These vehicles returned to the EOC within 30 minutes. Further, a simulated sounding of sfwns occurred later in the exercise without difficulty. The town had adequate vehicles au trained personnel for access control and for evacuating special-needs individuals whose location and needs were known to EOC staff. Initiative and ciecisiveness were shown when it was decided to simulate the relocation of the EOC to the town offices to avoid exposure from the plume.

l The Guilford EOC was stocked with adequate supplies of the requisite personal -

docimetry. See page is, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsisteneles in planning I provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systema. The Radiological Control Officer, who had r2eently completed a training course, demonstrated pecper use of this equipment. The EOC fully demonstrated its ability to implement a radiological exposure control program, which corrects prMous inadequacies (#82-30,83-13, and 85-24).

l Deficiencies

~

Nons.

m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _

Cuilferd EOC* L . .

44

• Areas Requiring C auve Action ,

None.

Area Recommended forImprovement Description The main operations room of the Guilford EOC, which contains the communications equipment, became quite crowded and noisy when more than 10 persons were present.

Recommendattom Efforts should be made to control the number of persons and/or the noise level in the main operations room of the Guilford EOC.

4- 1 i- a s

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_ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )

Vorn:n EOC -

[

45

- 2.1.1.4.4 Vernon EOC. The Vernon EOC, located in the basement of the town's Fire Station, consisted of two rooms - an perations room and a communications room.

Its facilities were adequate; space, lightfug, furniture, and heat were sufficient to support the emergency operations activities. Also, the EOC had bunks, showers, and a kitchen to support extended 24-hour operations. A propane-powered generator was available to provide emergency backup power. Displays in the EOC were adequate. A status board was kept up to date as to significant events and was clearly visible. Maps showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access and traffic control points, and population statistics by evacuation area were posted.

Activation had begun upon notification of an Unusual Event by the Southwest Mutual Aid Fire radio network at approximately 4:45 p.m. Vernon EOC staff members were essentially in place at the facility at 6:00 p.m., and the EOC was operational at 6:15 p.m. Staff areas represented included the Board of Selectmen, Civil Defense, radiological defense, pollee, fire, communications, transportation, and public works. A public information officer (PIO) was also present. An up-to-date call list for staff mobilization was available. Around-the clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster and by double-staffing for a number of positions. The staff in general displayed adequate training and knowledge.

The Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of operations at the Vernon EOC. He was extremely familiar with the local plan and was confident and effective in carrying out his leadership role. He discussed situations with other staff members before making decisions. Also, as appropriate, he briefed the staff throughout the exercise.

Moreover, the Director allowed other staff to complete their responsibilities while he concentrated on overall management of emergency activities. Message logs were maintained. Whenever needed, the messages were reproduced and distributed, which resulted in efficient handling of information. Also, two issues noted in earlier exercises

(#85-25 and 85-26) were shown to be corrected in this exercise. First, based on an -

earlier recommendation, the communications officer was directly responsible for the routine tasks of monitoring incoming radio transmissions and preparing message logs.

The Civil Defense Director was thereby freed for decision making, his primary '

responsibility. Second, the EOC staff appeared to have a good understanding of both local and State responsibilities. The EOC staff was therefore aware of which emergency '

decisions were to be made locally.

The Vernon EOC communications system worked well. The primary communica- W tions system was radio-telephone, with commercial telephones aerving as a backup. A minor problem occurred when the main radio-telephone system broke down. A backup unit available at the EOC was installed, and the EOC communications system was back in service in about five minutes. -

Public alerting proceeded smoothly at " ' Vernon EOC. When instructed by the State to sound the sirens at 9:12 p.m., the acton was promptly simulated. The Civil Defense Director explained that the three sirens covered most of the town. Residents of l areas where the sirens cannot be heard have tone-alert radios activated by the State. l Both the sirens and the tone-alert radios were activated (simulatec) promptly at i 9:13 p.m. Following this event, the State issued a shelter order (simulated) over EBS at 9:17 p.m. Unlike the last exercise (#85-27), the coorriination between siren sounding and l

l l

l

P Vernon E00* , . .

46 .

_. EBS messages was adequate. The Civil Defense Director also issued instructions to the ,

staff at the EOC on such items as shutting doors and windows and turning off ventilation systems.

The Police Chief indicated that, unlike in previous exercises, he had sufficient personnel and equipment to staff the established traffic control points. He also stated that fire and public works staff and equipment could be used to augment police staff and equipment. Moreover, if extended operations were necessary, he stated that he could get support from the State Police or County Sheriff. In fact, during the exercise, on at least two occasions, the County Sheriff contacted the Vernon EOC to see if additional assistance were required. The corrective action taken is considered to be complete with regard to the earlier recommendation (#85-28).

With the issuance of the evacuation order by the Vermont EOC at 9:38 p.m., the Vernon EOC promptly followed instructions for ensuring that the evacuation was to the south to reception centers in Greenfield, Massachusetts. The Civil Defense Director issued instructions to the trar.sportation officers to secure the necessary buses, vans, and ambulances to evacuate persons with special needs and those who are mobility-impaired.

The EOC was aware of and kept lists of those special-needs persons residing outside nursing homes. The Transportation Officer promptly simulated telephone calls to activate the required transportation. Finally, compared with the last exercise, no problem was observed with regard to the evacuation of the town to the proper relocation center (# 85-29).

The RADEF Officer did an extremely good job of providing adeq'.iate radiological exposure control. An adequate supply of mid-range (0-20R) and high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters was available. These dosimeters were properly zeroed and issued to all Vernon EOC staff as well as the police and fire personnel who responded to the drill. Instructions were issued on reading the dosimeters, and initial and final readings from the dosimeters were recorded on record-keeping cards for each individual. However, as in earlier exercises, permanent-record dos! meters were not available at the EOC (#83-14 and 85-30). See page 1x, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadegumeles related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. An adequate supply of KI was available at the EOC and was kept under lock and

. key. The Civil Defense Director explained that E! would not be issued unless he was specifically instructed to do so by the State. The State is also to specify the necessary KI dosage. This knowledge on the part of the Director about proper procedures for the use of El is considered to be sufficient to correct an earlier inadequacy (#85-31). -The Vernen EOC Director also indicated that the RADEF offleers will be receiving additional '

training that willinclude the use of KI. .

Deficiencies None.

Varn:n Eoc -

47

• Area Requiring Corrective Action

Description:

Vernen had no supply of low-range (0-200mR) direct-reading dosimeters as ez ecified in its plan. In addition, permanent-record dosimeters were not available in the Vernon EOC. See page ix, paragraphs one and two regarding ineo.asistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.3.a)

Recommendation: Vernon should acquire dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

Areas Recommended forImprovement None.

Yh

Naw Hampshirs EOC' 48 l

2.1.2 New Hampshire State Operations 2.1.2.1 New Hampshire EOC The New Hampshire EOC is in the New Hempshire Office of Emergency Manage-ment (NHOEM) Headquarters, which is located in State Office Park South in Concord. ,

The EOC was notified at 6:23 p.m. of the Alert, at 7:28 p.m. of the Site Area Emergency, J and at 8:55 p.m. of the General Emergency. NHOEM staff demonstrated a very timely and thorough ability to notify and alert State agencies and volunteer groups by using alerting checklists. The initial call to the New Hampshire EOC was made through a direct link with VYNPP at 5:10 p.m. This call, as well as each plant status call, was I verified. Representatives from key State agencies were in place during the Site Area Emergency, and the EOC was fully staffed at 8:30 p.m. Eighteen agencies and departments were represented during the course of the exercise; 59 individuals signed in at the EOC.

l '

Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated as each individual signed in by indicating his or her replacement on a roster. An NHOEM staff member was dispatched to the EOF at 7:00 p.m. with a duty assignment to act as Italson. This action meant that the New Hampshire EOC Director and operations officer could be in direct contact with a member of their staff at the EOF, which proved very helpful. A representative from VYNPP might reasonably have been assigned to tha New Hampshire EOC to serve in a similar liaison capacity.

During the exercise, the operations room was organized well, containing adequate working room and having a functional layout. The lighting was direct and plentiful. The acoustical design, involving both the floor and ceiling, helped to produce a well-modulated noise level.

Each agency representative and the NHOEM operations manager had a separate ,

telephone and a supply of forms, "in" and "out" trays, and working utensils. Directly above the functional station for each agency was a sign hanging from the ceiling that designated the assigned space.

The two " Emergency Classification Level Boards" - one at each end of the room

- were kept current. Also, a large " Manning Table" on the rail listed all participating state, agencies in accordance with the State pan. Each position was filled; some positions had two designees, and some agencies (e.t. public health) had several. Beside this table was the " State Emergency Management h'anning Table," which also had all positions filled. -

MC ' '

A large (10 ft = 7 ft), illuminated " Emergency Log" was in a prominent place in the room and was f equently updated. A " State Agencies Resource Board" was present and was updated as resources were identified. An " Evacuation-Shelter Assistance Board" displayed protective actions for towns in the EPZ. A local "EOC Status Board" and

" Communications Status Board" we"e also present. Finally, a " Meteorological Status Board" was frequently updated, and the prevailing wind directio'n on the " Plume indicator" was frequently adjusted. All appropriate maps were either posted or otherwise ayallable.

L________ __

= . .-

N2w Hampshire EOC -

49

+ The telephone public address system, by which the Director frequently elicited verbal reports from participants and gave verbal status reports, was acoustically adequate.

The NHOEM Director was in charge of New Hamps'are EOC operations and was strong and forceful in managing the EOC. Also present in the EOC was a representative from the New Hampshire Governor's Office, who was very knowledgeable about amergency management and contributed to the decision making. Timely briefings were held by the Director and eact of the agencies and departments. The representatives of the agencies present were asked for a situation report at each briefing. This procedure enabled all involved to be aware of actions at alllevels. These actions satisfy remedial cetion #85-32.

The efforts to coordinate New Hampshire actions with those of the States of Vermont and Massachusetts were good. However, the New Hampshire Governor's declaration of the State of Emergency was released to the public before it had been communicated to Vermont.

The staff used checklists at all ECLs. Message logs were kept; and hard copies were distributed to all present. Access to the New Hampshire EOC was controlled by security personnel, and all in attendance were logged in.

No Federal assistance was requested; however, FEMA and NRC were notified of the emergency. The general decorum was professional, measured, and disciplined throughout the exercise.

The communications room was adequate ir size and well equipped. It h located near the operations room, whleh allows for quick message handling and adequate noise control. The communleations equipment is very modern. Two consoles mirror one cnother to provide adequate communication with various emergencylocations. A backup console with key communleations frequencies, a Civil Air Patrol (CAP) station, and an cmateur radio station equipped with computerized equipment are available as backup systems. During this exercise, the CAP and amateur radio stations were on the air. To support heightened communication during an emergency, the New Hampshire State Police and New Hampshire Air National Guard supply operators to staff the consoles, while the regular communications offleer handles messages passing through the State communications room. Although not activated for this exercise, a mobile van with a .

communications equipment is parked outside the New Hampshire EOC. For this exercise,'

EOC staff generally used telephone lines to communleate in and out of the ROC.' The *'

telephone system functioned well throughout the evening. For communleations between the State EOCs, the NAS telephone was used. For a short time, the State had some ~

difficulty in contacting both the Massachusetts and Vermont EOCs at the same time via NAS, but this difficulty was overcome by using backup communleations systems.

The New Hampshire EOC dose assessment staff did an excellent job. The dose assessment area was well equipped, and staff members were very knowledgeable and well trained concerning the use and limitations of the equipment and calculational methods.

The dese assessment function was divided between two rooms. One room was designa:ed for accident assessment and contained two computer systems, three programmable head-t l

l O New Hampshira EOC., . .

50 ,

held calculators, nomograms, and plu:ne overlays for use in projecting dose and plume -

location. The second room was designated for communications and contained speaker-phones and map displays for plotting the_ plume projection. Continuous contact was maintained with the IFO and EOF via the speakerphones. A telefacsimile (fax) machine for receiving hard-copy data from the EOF was located in the hallway between the two

rooms. Initially, problems arose with either the EOC telefacsimile receiving unit or the l

EOF transmitting unit. These problems were rectified approximately one hour into the exercise. In the meantime, data from the EOF were relayed over the speakerphone.

l Communication between the EOF and the dose assessment group was complete and accurate; however, the EOC operations staff experienced some confusion early in the exercise when, of the nearly opposite upper- and lower-level wind directions, first one, and then the other, was given in conversation as "the" wind direction.

Dose projections were based on plant release data and field team measurements.

(As discussed in Sec. 2.1.2.3, the New Hampshire EOC relied on utility field data,) One computer system (IBM personal computer) uses METPAC software and essentially duplicates the EOF projection model. This computer system also has a graphics capability, which allows a visual display of the projected plu'me and a hard-copy printout of the visual display. The other computer system (Sperry) uses NRC's IRDAM dose projection model. This system was used to verify the other computational methods.

Hand calculations using nomograms were demonstrated as a means of projecting whole-body exposures based on data from in-plant monitors. These actions satisfy two remedial 1 actions (#82-34 and 85-34).

The accident assessment communicator gave directions to the IFO for field team deployment to monitoring locations. The monitoring locations and routes were based on the projected plume location. Field team measurement data were relayed from the IFO to the New Hampshire EOC via speakerphone. (As discussed in Sec. 2.1.2.3, the New Hampshire EOC relied on utility field data.) Although the accident assessment communicator knew where the field team measurements had been made, tracking of the -

field monitoring data could be enhanced by plotting the field team measurement data on the plume map using viewgraph-type pens, so that the data can be washed off and updated as necessary.

Conc mication betw' en e the accident assessment staff, the New Hampshire EOC emergency maagement staff, and the Governor's representatives was very good. The accident assessment group provided timely updates on off-site projections. Those making the protective action decisions for in-place sheltering in Hinsdale, Chesterfield, and Winchester took the following aspects into considerattom (1) plant constions,(2) utility recommendations, (3) meteorological conditions and weather forecasts, (4) time of day (most residents were already sheltered in their homes), and (5) dose projections and field measurements. Protective action decisions with respect to administration of K1 to emergency workers were based on available information concerning the presence of radioiodine. Off-site field measurements and utility data were used in this decision-making process. These actions correct a previous inadequacy (#85-33) ,

The State twice initiated (simulated) the public alerting process, first for the Site Area Emergency and again for the General Emergency with PARS. The first alert

• N:w Hrpshira EOC -  !

l. .

n l

• was triggered automatically upon the State's receipt of the Site Area Emergency j declaration at 7:28 p.m. In coordination with Vermont and Massachusetts, sirens were j scheduled to sound at 7:40 p.m., with issuance of the first EBS message at 7:45 p.m.

Following receipt by the State of the General Emergency declaration at 8:55 p.m.,

l New Hampshire EOC staff considered and discussed appropriate protective actions.

After deciding on protective actions at 9:07 p.m., sirens were scheduled to sound at 9:12 p.m., and the second EBS message was scheduled for issuance at 9:15 p.m., again in coordination with the other States.

)

The emergency public instructions formulated at the New Hampshire EOC for j broadcast (simulated) via EBS and other news media wer e based on prescripted messages I with details appropriate to the situation. Protective actions were defined for designated towns; hence, the town boundaries constituted familiar areas. Instructions for sheltering included appropriate details, such as closing doors and windows tightly and tu ning off ventilation systems.

The New Hampshire EOC demonstrated its evacuation and access control functions by discussing the numbers and locations of affected population. Although no at:.as were evacuated, precautionary traffic acced;t control points were established to prevent any transients from entering areas where in-place sheltering was in effect.

Adequate resources appeared to be available to cover all expected traffic and access control functions. Road and water traffic routes were discussed in the event that road or water traffic had to be halted.

Reception centers were not used during the exercise; however, they were put on standby in case activation were necessary. Members of the New Hampshire EOC staff (i.e., Red Cross and emergency medical services personnel) discussed the arrangements that might have been required for evacuation of molality-lepaired and other special-needs persons. Arrangements for bus and ambulance services were discussed. The EOC stafi had written lists that identified the mobility-impaired and special-needs populations. Schools were not open during the exercise; however,6eussions took place regarding whether schools should be allowed to open in the morning.

Ingestion exposure pathway protective actions were implemented during the plume exposure phase. This protective action consisted of sheltering livestock in the potentially affected areas. The towns of Hinsdale. Chesterfield, and Winchester were requested to shelter livesteck at 9:15 p.m., and the remainder of the EPZ was requested to shelter livestock at 9:49 p.m.

The New Hampshire EOC had current information and detailed maps showing the location of dairy farms, food-processing plants, and community water supplies. The Agriculture Department had distributed to all farmers a brochure that provides basic information on radiation effects and precautionary measures that should be taken to help prevent contamination of tutir livestock. The EOC staff indicated that they would have sufficient trained personnel to implement the ingestion exposure pathway protective actions.

The State had procured an ample supply of KI for emergency wo kers'. Four to five thousand units are stockpiled at Concord. Additional units had been distributed to

- - _ _ - _ =

N w Hampshirs E00 '- '

52 .

. each town in the -EPZ and to the IFO for distribution to staff and field emergency ,

workers. This action satisfies three remedial actions (#82-35, 83-39, and 85-35).

Media briefings were not actually given at the New Hampshire EOC, although 7 press releases were prepared there. Except for the instance noted above of the

~

Governor's declaration of a State of Emergency, the press releases were generally telefaxed to Vermont and Massachusetts to facilitate coordination of the information released.

The exercise scenario was adequate to test the State's objectives, including areas previously requiring' corrective action. Ample activity was provided for all New Hanashire EOC staff.

l L

l- Deficiencies 1

! None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The Governor's declaration of the State of Emergency was released to the public by the New Hampshire EOC before it was communicated to the State of Vermont. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.b)

Recommendation: The New Hampshire EOC should ensure that all significant statements are communleated to the State of Vermont before they are released to the public.

2.

Description:

The EOC operations staff experienced some .

confusion early in the exercise when, of the nearly opposite upper-and lower-level wind directions, first one, and then the other, was given in conversation as "the" wind direction. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.10, I.11)

Recommendation: - Care should be taken to' ensure .that . data -

communicated from the E0 1 to the New Hampshire EOC operations staff are technically accurate and clear. -

r-

< ,;, e:

At w Recommended forimprovement l ,

Description:

Field team measurement data were not plotted on the plume map display at the New Hampshire EOC.

Recommendation: To enhance data tracking, field monitoring team measurement data should be plotted on the plume map display at the EOC.

J l

Krns Incid:nt Fiold Office ,

53

. 2.1.2.2 Keene Incident Field Offlee The Keene IFO was activated 22 minutes after the Alert notification was received at 6:20 p.m. and was considered operational approximately one hour and a half later. In view of the travel time involved from Concord to the IFO site, this manning of the center can be regarded as prompt.

The IFO, located in the Keene Fire Station, has adequate furniture, space, lighting, and telephones. The facility is secure; can support extended operations; and has backup power, although this capability was not demonstrated. A readily visible status board, the " Emergency Ing" flip chart, was kept current as far as significant events. The ECL was posted as the situation evolved. Maps available or posted incided those showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocatior centers, access and traffic control points, radiological-monitoring points, and population information by evacuation area.

The noise level was high because of the large open room and the absence of acoustical tiles on the high ceiling. Especially noteworthy was the " Emergency Log" visual whose use would be enhanced if each of the flip chart sheets was openly and sequentially displayed. However, the use of this display resolves an inadequacy (#83-23) from a previous exercise.

All required staff were at the IFO except the State Police and Department of Welfare representatives, who operated from their own headquarters; however, constant communications were maintained without detriment to the overall operation. The IFO staff displayed adequate training and knowledge; a shift change was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. Throughout the exercise, the entire staff functioned well.

The irdividual in charge, called the IFO Controller, was knowledgeable about his leadership responsibilities and periodically held thorough briefings. The staff was involved in planning and decision making, as appropriate. A copy of the facility plan was available for reference, and written procedures or checklists guided the staff. Messages were logged, reproduced, and distributed appropriately and efficiently. The IFO Controller worked well with the DPHS representatives from the State Department of Health and Welfare, who provided direction and control to the field teams. The IFO Controller also ensured continuous exchange of information between the Keene IFO and New Hampshire EOC. This resolves an inadequacy (#83-22) from a previous exercise.

The primary communications system at the Keene IFO consisted of a dedicated telephone line, with amateur and Civil Defense radios, a telefacsimile unit, and ample commercial telephone lines available as backups. Conferencing was available with the New Htmpshire EOC and the EOF. In addition, the Southwest Fire Mutual Aid Radio Center, which is located within the building, has extensive telephone and radio capabilities that could be used by the IFO. The ample commercial telephone lines at the IFO corrects a previous inadequacy (#85-40). Because all communications systems funettoned properly, previous inadequacies (#85-38 and 85-39) are also corrected. The EBS radio stations were rmnitored with an AM/FM radio during the exercise, whleb l

corrects a pr'.vious inadequacy (# 85-41).

Osmmunications from the EOF to the Keene IFO were inadequate n that the IFO needed additional inform .bn, such as the METPAC depiction of the plume. This l

)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ]

Ksans Incid2nt Field Offics. '

54 ,

Information would have allowed placing field teams within the plume to verliy the extent ,

of the plume in New Hampshire. This information could have been sent from the EOF to the IFO over the facsimile telephone line.

DPHS's radiological health staff at the IFO were responsible for deploying plume exposure end/or ingestion exposure pathway monitoring teams. They were also responsible for issuir dosimeters to other State agency personnel involveG with field activities in the EPT However, a field monitoring team deployed into the plume was instructed to retrea to an area with background radiation levels because of lack of training in the respor.sibilities and duties of DPHS staff at the IFO. Also, the IFO did not instruct the field monitoring teams, after they were ready and in pos! tion, to take air samples to demonstrate the State's ability to detect radiolodine in the presence of noble gases. In addition, the State plan is not specific as to the authority delegated to DPHS staff at the IFO. Such authority should be similar in scope to that identified in the New Hampshire plan for the Seabrcok Nuclear Power Station.

In the matter of radiological exposure control, dosimeters, che.T. ers, record cards, instructions, and permanent-record dosimeters were available in adequate  !

quantities. Also available was an adequate supply of KI and staff who were aware of proper procedures concerning its use. Staff members were also aware of the maximum dosages permitted without authorization and of decontamination procedures.

Improvements are needed to ensure radiological exposure control for State emergency personnel operating in the EPZ or in re;eption centers. New members of DPHS need training in this phase of their responsibilities. Additional staff is apparently needed so that the DPHS representatives at the IFO can handle the radiological and communications workload when the plume affected the New Hampshire EPZ and afterwards.

Deficiencies None.

Areca Requiring Corr.ective Action

1.

Description:

Communications from the EOF to the Keene IFO were limited fr. that the IFO needed a copy of the METPAC depiction of the plume in order to properly position field teamn (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, L11)

Recommendation: The METPAC depiction of the plurr1 should be periodically telefaxed from the EOF to the Keene IFO.

2.

Description:

A field team deployed into the plume was instructed to leave the area because of leek of training in the responsibilities and duties of DPHS personnel at the Keene IFO. (NUREG-0654/ FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8, 0.1)

.. - s .-

+ K3sn3 Incid2nt Fiold Office.

n 55 Recommendation: DPHS stafh members should receive additional training in their responsibilities and duties at the Keene IFO.

3.

Description:

' The State plan is not specific as to the authority and responsibility delegated to - DPHS staff at the Keene IFO.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.2.a)

Recommendation: The State plan should be' revised so the speelfle authority is delegated to DPHS staff at the Keene IFO.

This authority should be similar in scope to that in the plan for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.

4.

Description:

. The State.of New Hampshire did not demonstrate during the exercise its ability to detect radiolodine in the presence _

of noble gases. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.9)

Recommendation: During future exercises, the State of New Hampshire should demonstrate its ability to detect radiolodine in the presence of noble gases and to ensure that its field monitoring teams have been appropriately instructed and take the proper air st.mples and personal protective actions.

Areas Recommended forImprovement

1.

Description:

The noise level in the Keene IFO operations center was excessive because of its location in a large open room, Recommendation: Acoustical tile and/or carpet should be installed in the Keene IFO operations center to lower the noise level. In addition, consideration should be given to placing movable

-partitions between the working areas of the various agencies and organizations represented at the Keene IFO.

2.

Description:

The " Emergency Log" flip chart at the Keene IFO was an excellent display, but only showed info.'mation on th, latest?

C situation. - , ,.

Recommendation: All sheets of the " Emergency Log" at the Keene IFO should be posted so that a quick visual review can be made of past events.

3.

Description:

Additional Keene IFO personnel should be acquired and trained to ensure proper radiological exposure control for State emergency personnel working in the EPZ or in reception

centerm -

-m_m__m_. . . _ . - - _ _ _ = _ _ _ - . .

Krne Incid:nt Fiold offica . '. . .

56 .,.

Recommendation: A minimum of three DPHS representatives "

should be assigned to the Keene IFO, and all new members of DPHS assigned to the Keene IFO should receive radiologleal training.

I 1

1 L r ,

5 i

l C____----_.____ _ _ - -

N w. 2.

.. ,. N2w ilampshire Fiold Manitoring- -

.- 57 m ,,.

-' 2.1.2.3 New Hampshire Flaid Monitoring Two radiological field monitoring teams, each consisting of two members, were mobilized from Concord. They arrived at the Eeene IFO by 8:15 p.m. According to team members, notification was received at their homes at the Unusual Event ECL, instead of ' -i

. at. the normal Alert ECL. New Hampshire DPHS procedures were followed, whleh

.specify using a eall list, but such use was not observed during this exercise. Prior to deployment to the field from the Keene IFO, dosimeters were issued by t*ie' field team coordinator, and members were briefad as to the status of activities an ihoir monitoring

- locations.

The field teams brought their equipment, which was adequate, with them, The emerTency procedures, which included an inventory of equipment and supplies contained

~

in the radiation-monitoring and personal protective kits, were used by each team.

The radiation-monitoring instruments used included an ionization chamber ratemeter (RO-2) and a radiation monitor (E-140N) with a pancake-type (HP-210) shielded probe. Air-sampling equipment included a portable air sampler, which operated cn power supplied from the vehicle, along with appropriate eartridges for sampling lodine and noble gases and filter paper for sampling particulate matter. Equipment for sampling soll and vegetation was available, except for a shovel, along with equipment for taking water and allk samples. The most recent calibration date and associated reports

were not available for the radiation-monitoring instruments. The air-sampling pump had a label placed over an existing calibration stleker. The top sticker stated that the pump had been calibrated at 2.5 cuble feet per minute (efm); according to the pump manufacturer, this rate is not possible when using a silver soollte eartridge along with filter paper. The bottom sticker indicated a flow rate of 1.5 efm. Additional equipment '

for confirming meteorological conditions included an anemometer, a sling psychrometer, cneroid barometer, and lensatie compass. The field team discovered both the enemometer and lensatic compass were broken when attempting to use them.

Emergency peccedures were established for field operations, and standard cperating procedures were followed by the field teams; however, off-site radiologleal monitoring was not demonstrated. The field teams need additional training in radiological field monitoring procedures. One team indicated that it had been more than - '

a year since it last received training and the team frequently referred to written procedures throughout the exercise. The teams operated thelr E-140N endiation-M%

monitoring ' instruments continually from departure from the Keene IFO until they w returned. Despite the radioactive release that occurred about $11 p.m., neither team ' * '

collected air samples nor monitored ground-level or air readings. The IFO had instructed, them not to perform these functions; therefore, the New Hampshire EOC relied on utility field monitoring data. One team did experience problems with its RO-2 lastrument, w whleh indicated an actual reading of 0.8 mR/hr. One team, while in the fringe area of the plume (48 mR/hr), was instructed by the IFO to move immediately out of the plume. ,

to reduce exposure and to wait for further instructions. The radiological exposure guidelines used for the field teams were not consistent with the EPA PAGs and the decision making was much more conservative than the as low as reason 1bly achievable (ALARA) guidelines that would allow the teams to receive some exposure in order to obtain necessary field data. The other team was instructed to take an air sample in an

o Ew Hampshiro Field Monitorists

• 58 *

~ '

area where only background readings were expected. The team was then instructed by

' the IFO to wait for further instructions, but it was not contacted again until the exercise was over. For air samples taken in the plume, the team members had been instructed by the field teap coordinator before leaving.the IFO to take two-minute samples. The resulting 3-ft sample is far snpler than the minimum sample volume required in FEMA - q REP-2, Rev.1, and the ' 20-ft dsample mentioned 1 Therefore, radiolodine concentrations as low as 10'p the in vC1/cc New the_Hampshire presence ofState noble plan.

1 j

gases could not have been detected in the two-minute sample taken. The field teams I

were generally knowledgeable and enthusiastic in performing their duties. . Maps. were -  !

provided, and team members were generally familiar with the area and monitoring-points; however, one team became lost because of an unmarked intersection.

Radio communications were maintained with the Keene IFO throughout the exercise; however, the information from the IFO was cursory, and the teams were not informed of the release occurring at the VYNPP. This failure to communicate necessttry ]3 information caused continuation of an inadequacy (#85-44) noted during a pst exercise.

Backup communications were available through the multichannel radio as well .as commercial telephone. The: teams demonstrated excellent radio - communleations procedures, and all messages transmitted were clear and concise.

The teams were provided with personal protective equipment, but respirators were not available. Dosimetry provided to the teams included permanent-record TLDs and low-range (0-200mR) and mid-range (0-20R) direct-reading dosimeters. KI was issued, and team members were familiar with how, why, and when to administer it, which corrects an inadequacy (#85-43) noted during a past exercise. The teams knew what to do if they received an excess dose; however, one team's members did not read their direct-reading dosimeters at 15-minute intervals.

Deficiencies None.

. Areas Requiring Corr.ective Action sm e s , g,-.,.. -.

1.

Description:

No calibration stickers were on the radiation-monitoring instruments or the air-sampling pumps provided to New '

Hampshire field monitoring teams. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.10) '

Recommendation: Radiation-monitoring instruments and air-sampling pumps should be provided with calibration stickers that state at least the latest calibration date, the name of the calibrator, and the date when the next calibration is to be performed. '

l

I N:w Hampshira Fiold M:nitoring

'a4 ;

'L . 59

• 2.

Description:

The air-sampli:q pump provided to one New Hampshire field monitoring team had a label that indleated an erroneous flow rate of 2.5 efm. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.10)

Boeommendation: Air-sampling pumps - should be properly calibrated, and copies of the calibration reports should be given to the teams or be otherwise available for review. In addition, eccles of the calibration reports for the various radiation-monitoring instruments should also be given to the teams or be otherwise available for review.

3.

Description:

' The New Hampshire field monitoring teams'had to refer to standard operating procedures throughout the exercise.

One team even indicated that it had been more than a year since it last received training. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.8)

Recommendation: The field monitoring teams should receive annual training in radiologleal field monitoring procedures.

4.

Description:

The RO-2 radiation-monitoring instrument used by one New Hampshire field monitoring team was defective in that erroneous readings were indicated. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, B,1.8)

Recomer;ndation: The RO-2 should be either repaired or replaced.

5. Description The N,ew Hampshire field monitoring teams were instructed by the fle'id team coordinator before leaving the Eeene IFO to take two-minute air samples. This conflicts with State

.standaM operating procedures,'which call for a twenty cuble foot air sample. The small sample would no pass through the filters to detect 10'gconcentrations vC1/cc allow for sufficient of air to radioiodine. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8)

Recommendation: "The field monitoring teams should receive Of[Nhfb

' ~

additional training in air-sampling procedures. Also, the field ,

, y,

l. team coordinator should receive additional training in air-sampling e ' " *

• I procedures in order to properly brief the monitoring teams. g;pp ; ,

6.

Description:

One New Hampshire field monitoring team's members u i did not read their direct-reading dos! meters at 15-minute intervals as speelfied in the procedures. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.b)

Recommendation: Field monitoring team members shou'Id be-trained to read their dosimeters at 15-minute intervals as specified in the procedures.

l

N2:s Hampshirs Fiold M:nitorisk *.

• 60 .

7.

Description:

Information released from the Keene IFO to the New Hampshire fleid monitoring teams was cursory, and the teams were '

not informed of the release occurring at the VYNPP. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8)

Recommendation: The Eeene IFO should periodically provide all i pertinent information such as plant and meteorologleal conditions to the field monitoring teams.

8.

Description:

The New-Hampshire fleid monitoring teams did not demonstrate their ability to monitor ground-level and air readings because of instructions received from the Eeene IFO. (NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev: 1, D,1.9).

Recommendation: The field monitoring teams should demonstrate their radiological monitoring abilities within the plume during the ,

next exercise.

9.

Description:

Radiological exposure guidelines used for the New Hampshire field monitoring teams were not consistent with the EPA PAGs and. were more conservative than the ALARA guidelines. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 U,' E.4).

Recommendation: The State should consider revising their PAGs in accordance with the EPA PAGs. The radiation dose allowed for field monitoring teams should allow the teams to receive some exposure in order to obtain necessary field data.

Areas Recommended for!g_ ..zent ,

1.

Description:

The radiation-monitoring kits supplied to the New Hampshire field monitoring teams were those for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station site and not those described in the State plan for the VYNPP site.

a m%g;sn,, y -

7-Recommendation: Vermont Yankee field kits should be used during future exercises, or the State plan should be revised to indleate that similar equipment is to be used for both sites., ,, - , .y . , . , . .

2.

Description:

One New Hampshire field monitoring team's meteorology ':lt, used to confirm meteorology conditions, was discovered b have a broken anemometer and lensatic compass.

Recommendation: The two defective instruments in the meteorology kit should be repaired or the kits should tWddeted from the list of equipment provided to field monitoring teams.

. .: J. N;w Hampshira Fiold M;nitoring .

.,- 61

. 3. Description The personal protective equ!pment kits provided to New Hampshire field monitoring team members did not contain respirators in accordance with the State plan, Volume 4a, Appendix G, page G-2.

Recommendation Respirators should be provided to all field monitoring team members or be readily available, who should receive training in their proper use, in the event that the plume must be entered.

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Ch2storfiold EOC

• 1 **

62 '.'

2.1.2.4 New Hampshire Local EOCs .

2.1.2.4.1 Chesterfield EOC. The Chesterfield EOC is located in the Town Office Building. The . facility was comfortable and well lighted, with kitchen faellities and sufficient space, furnishings, and telephones. Provisions have been made to bring in a portable generator whenever necessary. The status board, which was kept current, and maps showing the EPZ, evacuation routes, access control points, and population deta were prominently displayed. The EOC was quite noisy at times because of the presence of commur.! cation systems in the same room.

The Chesterfield EOC was activated at 7:36 p.m., after receipt and verification of the Site Area Emergency message over the Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio system.

The EOC uas fully staffed at 8:15 p.m. and operational at 8:01 p.m., with all members present except for the Road Agent. The Road Agent was at the Town Garage preparing equipment in case of need. He was in communication with the EOC on the police radio and came there when all the equipment was in woreing order. Elected officials participated actively in the operation of the EOC. All staff members displayed adequate knowledge of their responsibilities and training in performing their dulles. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.

The Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of the EOC under the authority of the First Selectman. Briefings were held whenever conditions changed, and staff members were consulted frequently. Copies of the local plan, which includes written checklists and procedures, were available. A message log was kept. Message reproduction and distribution were prompt and efficient. Access to the EOC was controlled by !ocking the front door and answering when anyone knocked. This system worked except when tne Road Agent entered through a side door that was supposed to have been locked. No one had heard his knock on the front door.

The Civil Defense radio was the primary system for communication with the IFO, ,

with other radios and commercial telephones available as backups. An AM/FM radio was also available for monitoring EBS broadcasts. All communication systems worked well.

The Communications Officer performed admirably in notifying one of the State radiological field monitoring teams that it had taken the wrong road and being able to direct it back to where it was supposed to be. ,

Public alerting and instruction were accomplished (simulated) by siren and tone-alert radio. These activities and EBS broadcasts were originated by New Ha'mpshire in coordination with Vermont and Massachusetts.

Activation of traffic control points was promptly ordered when plant status reached a Genatal Emergency ECL. An extensive discussion of traffic volume and control took place. It was decided that a backroad to Keene would be controlled for use by emergency vehicles. There were sufficient resources available to cover all traffie-related functions. The Chesterfield EOC staff had a written list of mobility-impaired individuals, including their particular needs. There was no need to evacuate during this exercise.

i l

j

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ l

• Ch0storfield EOC -

L

, 63 An adequate supply of direct-reading dosimeters, TLDs, survey meters, l permanent-record exposure cards, and K! was available, correcting a previous inadequacy l - (# t 5-45). Dosimetry equipment was distributed, and instructions were given to those unfamiliar with proper procedures. The Radiation Safety. Officer was extremely knowledgeable and thorough. All Ches;erfield EOC personnel and volunteers at the three fire stations were ordered to take shelter immediately upon receipt of the order from the New Hampshire EOC. Radiation dosimeters were read at 15-minute intervals for reporting back to the IFO. More dosimetry equipment has been ordered to ensure an adequate supply at each volunteer assembly point so that equipment does not need to be shifted around.

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.

Areas Recommended forimprovement

1.

Description:

Access to the Chesterfield EOC was controlled by locking the front door and answering when someone knocked.

When no one heard the Road Agent knock, he entered a side door that was supposed to have been locked.

Recommendation: The front door of the Chesterfield EOC should remain open, and an individual should be stationed there to control access. All other doors to the building should remain locked.

2.

Description:

The Chesterfield EOC was quite noisy at times because of the presence in the same room of a Civil Defense radio, telephones, broadcasts.. police radios, and a . radio for . monitoring ,..E88pp , , ,,

v.ssl.xv.m, d t,, x w Recommendation: The Chesterfield EOC communication systems should be Laoved to an adjacent room, such as the former polleeE^^ '

headquarters. In addition, the monitoring of EBS brososasts could be performed by the entrance guard.

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. an.

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Hinsdale EOC.?, . , .

64 ,.

~

3.1.1.4.2 Hinsdale' EOC. . The Hinsdale EOC, located in the Fire Station, has "

adequate space, lighting, furniture, and bathroom and- kitchen facilities. Sleeping

facilities were not available, but cots could have been requested from the New Hampshire EOC. Backup power was available. A status board was prominently displayed and kept current as to all significant events. An EPZ map with plume sections, evacuation routes, and access and control points was posted.

The Fire Chief was notified of the Alert classification at 6:15 p.m. He arrived at the Hinsdale EOC at 6:25 p.m. to activate the EOC, and the remaining EOC staff arrived promptly, once summoned by the Fire Chief. The EOC was fully staffed and operational at 6:44 p.m. All staff members live nearby. Continuous staffing and operation of the EOC was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.

The Hinsdale EOC was effleiently managed by the Civil Defense Director, who was clearly in charge of operations. The Director was competently assisted by the Fire Chief and the Deputy Civil Defense Director. The entire staff was dedicated, knowledgeable about its duties, and involved in the decision-making process. Copies of l the local plan and checklists were available and were referred to frequently. Messages were checked, logged, and relayed verbally to the EOC staff. Access to the EOC was controlled. A roster sign-in sheet was maintained for all persons entering the EOC, and

each entrant was scanned for contamination.

l The communications system had improved somewhat since the last exercise. The Civil Defense radio has been moved twice, but communleation is still seriously hampered by the town's location in a valley. Thus, two previous inadequacies (#83-28 and 85-46) continue. The New Hampshire Civil Defense Office is working with town officials to correct this problem. Backup communleations systems such as the Southwest New Hampshire Fire Mutual Aid radio worked well. The Hinsdale EOC was also equipped with two commercial telephone lines, and the Civil Defense Director has requested additional lines. Also, an amateur radio operator provided additional communleations capability. :

' Public alerting was initiated when the Site Area Emergency was declared, with the dispatch of a staff member to warn two deaf families. When the order to shelter was received at 9:12 p.m., three two-man route alerting teams equipped with public-address systems were sent out. When the General Emergency was declared, the Civil Defense Director called the Hinsdale Racetrack to simulate a request that the track be closed to help keep the main highways clear should an evacuation take. place.. .The racetrack manager agreed to this request. Public alerting is by sirens, tone-alert radios,"public '

address systems, EBS, route alerting teams, and telephones. Sirens were sounded (simulated) during this exercise. No calls were made to either the high school or the elementary school, as they were not in session during the esereise. >

~6

• Two access and control points were established quickly and effielently by the Acting Chief of Police and volunteers. These control points covered the two State highways that run through the town. Blocking all roads would require State assistance.

Hinsdale EOC staff were aware of the location of mobility-impaired individuals and their

. special needs. This information was in written form. .,

^l [,

• Hinsdalo EOC 65

• An adequate supply of dosimetry equipment was available at the Hinsdale EOC, including low-range (0-200mR) and mid-range (0-20R) dosimeters, TLDs, survey meters, chargers, and exposure record-keeping logs. The dosimeters were zeroed and distributed to emergency workers. Bacirground readings inside and outside the EOC were periodically taken, and dosimeter readings were also checked. Because the Radiological Officer was out of town, the Civil Defense Director and Deputy Director took care of this function. Both are trained and knowledgeable about radiological exposure control procedures as well as decontamination procedures.

Deficiencies .

None.

Area Requiring Corrective Action h

Description:

The Civil Defense radio was not functioning well at the Hinsdale EOC. Receipt of messages was sporadic. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b)

Recommendation: The base station for the Civil Defense radio at the Hinsdale EOC has been moved twice to try to correct this problem; placing the antenna on a higher hill should be tried.

Areas Recommended forImprovement None.

I.

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KunsEOC*1 ,*

66 .,-

o S.1.S.4.3 Keene EOC. The Keene EOC is located in the muntelpal building. .

which houses the Pollee Department, Fire Department, Southwest Fire Mutual Aid, and the New Hampshire IFO. The EOC room appeared to have adequate space, telephones, and furnishings for the five or six staff members called for in the local plan. However, the town's low-level of participation in the exercise prevented a full test of the faellity. .

Copies' of the Keene plan were available. The plan contains a page-sized map showing evacuation routes from the EPZ and the locations of reception points, shelters, and traffie cont ol points.

The Eeene EOC was activated by the Civil Defense Director, who had arrived prior to the Alert notification. Following notification of the Site Area Emergency, a written call list was used to telephone the town emeygency offleials. The notification F process took less than an hour to complete. The Civil Defense Director, Keene Area Radio Emergency Service Coordinator, and Pollee Chief were present for most of the plume portion of the exercise. The Fire Chief, City Manager, and School. District Maintenance Supervisor all visited for short periods, but did not participate extensively in the exercise. The state college director and other EOC staff personnel as designated in the local plan were contacted, but were not asked to come in.

The Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of the Eeene EOC. Eee e is located 'outside the plume EPZ and is a designated host community. Because evnene reception and care was not an objective for this exercise, Keene's activities were limited. A review of roles and procedures demonstrated that EOC staff were aware of the town's duties and what resources and procedures would be required to implement them. However, they did not follow the progress of exercise events other than to note when the different ECIA were declared. No effort was made to follow plant status, release status, or wind direction, or to find out what PARS had been made.

The communleations systems available were five telephone lines, Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio, National Warning System (NAWAS), Fire Department radio, Pollee radio, State Police radio, and Eeene Area Radio Emergency Service. In addition, the State Civil Defense radio across the hall could be used. An AM/FM radio was also available for monitoring EBS broadcasts. For the exercise, only two telephone lines and the Fire Department radio were actually used. They functkined properly. - ,

Because Eeene is not.in the plume EPZ, public alerting was not required. Traffic control actions were also not required-because no New Hampshire conimunities were m evacuated. Local resources were adequate to perform these functions and to keep roads

' ' ~ "D clear. ' <

The town has no dosimetry equipment or KI. "According to' town Offletals,3he' NHOEM is responsible for controlling the exposure of Keene workers and plans to provide State workers with dosimeters at all the places Eeene workers will be. Nevertheless, desirr.etry should be available for Eeene emergency workers and training provided on its use.

_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ * - , _ . . *As:

Reena Eoc 67

. l Deficiencies

) None.

Areas Requirite Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The progress of the exercise was not followed Oh sely enough for the Keene EOC to fully anticipate needed actions u a

) host community. No effort was made to follow plant status, release status, or wind direction, or to find out what PARS had been made. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,11, A.1.b, A.2.a)

Recommendation: The Keene EOC should maintain better communications with the New Hampshire EOC and local EOCs. By keeping abreast of information about plant status, release status, wind direction, and PARS, the town would be in a better position to anticipate needs and prepare for executing its role as a host community. Fcr example, knowing whether the release contains iodine and particulate matter, and the timing of the evacuation order, could help in predicting whether evacuees will pose significant contamination problems. Such information might affect desired staffing levels at reception centers and decontamination stations, as well as the need for medical assistance. To this end, the town might also consider adding a technical liaison to its emergency staff (e.g., a Yankee Atomic employee) to help explain and interpret the available technical information.

2.

Description:

The Keene EOC does not have any dosimetry equipment available for emergency workers. (NUREG-m +-

0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a)

Recommendation: The Keene EOC should procure dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology and should provide radiological W WCT**N exposure control training for emergency workers.

~

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Areas Recommended forImprovement None.

.~

Richmond EOC ' y

• 68 P t

3.1.3.4.4 Richmond EOC. The Richmond EOC is located in a building adjacent .

to the Fire Station. This building was modified in September 1987 for use as an EOC.

This exercise was the first one conducted in this facility. The EOC was welllighted and had sufficient space and furnishings, along with emergency power. Displays included a elearly visible status board, which was kept current, and an EPZ map with the sectors marked. Information on evacuation routes, access control points, monitoring points, and populations was available, but not displayed on the maps. Limited kitchen facilities were available, and continuous operations could be sustained.

The Richmond EOC was activated by the Civil Defense Director at 6:26 p.m.,

upon receipt and verification of the Alert notification. The notification was received via the Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio network. Upon activation of the EOC, the Fire Chief used a written call list for the staff call-up. The town's fire siren was sounded (simulated) concurrently. The EOC was fully operational by 7:56 p.m. Staff participation was excellent, and a Selectman was present throughout ,the exercise.

Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by double-staffing of positions.

- Emergency operations were well managed by the Civil Defense Director. The Richmond EOC staff was kept informed through periodic briefings and were involved in decision making. Copies of the local plan, which contains checklists, were available.

Messages were properly logged and distributed as appropriate.

Communication modes available included the New Hampshire Civil Defense radio network, the Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio network, NOAA weather radio network, and commercial telephones. The Civil Defense radio was the principal means of communleation, with the Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio and commercial telephones serving as backups. All systems worked well, Richmond has five means of alerting the public: NOAA tone-alert radios, the town fire siren, telephone calls to residents, street-to-street route alerting, 'and EBS.

Upon receipt of the Site Area Emergency notification, Richmond alerted the public by ,

sounding the fire siren (simulated), making telephone calls, and sending out route alerting teams. Although tone-alert radios are provided to all residents and no protective actions were ordered for Richmond, route alerting and telephone notification were demonstrated. Activation of traffic control points was simulated during the exercise.

Local resources were adequate to cover these and all access control functions. There were suffielent resources to keep evaeustion routes clear. The location of mobility .

Impaired individuals and their partleular needs were known and kept current in written form.

All necessary dosimetry equipment was on hand and distributed to EOC staff and those involved in public alerting. El was also issued to all involved individuals in the event its use was ordered by the State Department of Public Health. Receads of exposure were kept to control the radiation doses received by emergency personnel.

Deficiencies -

None.

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• • .- Richmond EOC e.. .

69 Areas RequiririgF Corrective Action None.

l l

l Areas Recommended forImprovement None.

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2.1.2.4.5 Swanzey EOC. The Swanzey EOC is located in the Fire Station, which is in the basement of the Town Hall. Adequate space, furniture, kitchen facilities, and backup power were available. There was only one telephone, which is shared with the Fire Department. The Fire Chief stated they were lucky to have the one telephone and did not have immediate plans for additional telephones. The status board was posted and

. kept up to date. All necessary maps were readily available.

The alternate Civil Defense Director arrived at the Swanzey EOC at 8:30 p.m.,

about five minutes after receiving the Alert notification. The Fire Chief arrived 10 minutes latet. A call list was used to notify key personnel to stand by for possible EOC activation. The EOC was activated at 8:30 p.m. and was operational by 7:00 p.m., which corrects a previous inadequacy (#85-47). The Selectmen were meeting upstairs and participated as much as possible while continuing their meeting. Upon termination of their meeting, the Selectmen participated fully in the operation of the EOC. Staff members displayed adequate training and knowledge of responsibilities and should be commended for their participation. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster.

The alternate Civil Defense Director served as the Swanzey EOC manager >

because the Civil Defense Director was out of town. This succession was in accordance with the local plan. Although this exercise was his first, he did a commendable job in designating responsibilities to staff, holding periodic briefings, and following the procedures stated in the local plan. Copies of this plan were available, and written checklists from the plan were used by the staff.

The Civil Defense and Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio networks, along with the single telephone mentioned earlier, constituted the communleation espebilities. The radios were monitored throughout the exercise, and a message log was kept. The Chairman of the Board of Selectmen stated that continuous 24-hour monitoring of the radio could be provided if necessary.

Public alerting and instruction were simulated at 8:59 p.m. by activating the siren system prior to broadcasting the EBS message. No additional protective actions were called for in the scenario, so none were taken. The Swanzey EOC staff was aware of the location of mobility-impaired individuals and their particular needs, and had made '

arrangements for them. A. written list of names, locations, and partleular needs was not

. ~

available because only a few individuals were affected. >Y"" * '

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,' y y A w3l} ; y yp Direct-reading dosimeters, TLDs, and survey meters were available.' ~However,"

only low-range (0-200mR) direct-reading dostmeters were available for emergeney.

workers. Dosimeters were charged, and their usage was explained as they were distributed. Periodic readings were taken, and keeping of exposure records was simul-ted.

Deficiencies ,_

None.

Swonzoy Eoc -

~

7A

• Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descript'on: The Swanzey EOC did not have any mid-range (0-  ;

20R) direct-reading dosimeters for emergency workers. (NUREG- l 0654/ FEMA-REF-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a) l l

Recommendattom The temt of Swanzey should provide dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

2. Description A written list of mobility-impaired Individuals, along with their locatbns and particular needs, was unavailable at the '

Swanzey EOC.

Recommendattom A written list of mobil'ty-impaired individuals, along with their locations and particular needs, should be developed, kept current, and maintained at the Swanzey EOC.

(NUREG-0854/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 II, J 10.d)

Area Recommended forImprovement Description The Ewanzey EOC had only one commercial telephone for handling incoming and outgoing calls.

3bcommendattom An additional telephone should be provided at the Swanzey EOC.

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Winch 3 ster EOD*

• 72 ,

1.1.2.4.6 Wincheeter EOC. The Winchester EOC is located in the buildirt next to the Town Hall, which houses the police, civil defense, and fire and ambulance functions. The facility was roomy and welllaid out and has all the resources required for extended operations, including backup power. However, it lacks a clocl in the decision-making room. The communications center was in an adjacent room, and dosimetry and other functions were each allocated its own room. Proper charts and displays showing all necessary information were posted, and a single-entry status board was kept up to date.

However, a different type of status board should be used so that old information can be retained along with current messages.

Partial activation of the Winchester EOC occurred after the Alert notification was received at 6:18 p.m. The EOC was fully activated at 7:37 p.m., upon receipt of the Site Area Emergency notification over the Southwest Fire Mutual Aid radio system. Full staffing was reached by 7:52 p.m., with 30 persons present. All Selectmen and staff members were very enthusiastic and qua'ified and demonstrated considerable knowledge of their functions. Continuous staffing of the EOC was demonstrated by a posted, up-to-date roster. A new local plan, dated September 1987, had just gone into effect. Copies of the new plan were available, and the checklists from it were used. All activation and staffing objectives were accomplished in a timely fashion.

The Civil Defense Director managed operations at the Winchester EOC very capably. The staff was frequently briefed and consulted. A very effective atmosphere to manage emergency operations was achieved by the decision-making room being separate from, but adjacent to, other work areas. Plans, checklists, and written procedures were readily available for each department head or staff member. All parts of the local plan were tested during the exercise, which corrects a previous inadequacy

(# 82-54). Messages were logged properly, and many staff members compiled their own individual message logs. The Winchester EOC staff demonstrated that effective, continuous emergency operations for its areas of responsibility could be carried out.

The Civil Defense radio was the primary method of communleation, followed by commercial telephone. The three available telephones were supplemented by additional phones in the adjacent Police Communication Center. The police and ambulance radio nets can also be used. Portable radios were also available for emergency workers.

During the exercise, occasional problems occurred with the Civil Defense radio when attempting to contact the Keene IFO, which continues previous inadequacies (#82-46, 83-33, and 85-48). The problem was not a technical one; it was caused by a lack of tiet' control on this frequency (e.g., State field monitoring teams and local EOCs). This occurred to a lesser degree during this exercise than in the past; however, separate

[ frequencies should be considered. Overall, the communication system was demonstrated to be adequate.

Ths Winchester EOC had only a limited role in public alerting and instruction.

Upon siren activation (simulated) by the State, five route alerting teams were prepared for dispatch. After being dispatched at 8:05 p.m., they returned by 8:40 p.m. Their mission was to provide a backup to the siren system and the EBS broadcasts. No instructions were drafted at the EOC; the route alerting teams Eed a prescripted message to voice over the vehicles' public-address system speakers. The team members all knew their assignments and routes.

*' Winch 2 star E0C -

• 73

.. . I

- No protective action was necessary for Winchester. The EOC staff was aware of mobility-impaired individuals and their special needs, school evacuation routes, and procedures for establishing access and traffic control points. All these areas were J discussed, and possible problems and their solutions were explored.

Many emergency workers and Winchester EOC staff had recently received training in radiological control procedures. An additional *8tht-hour State training course was scheduled for January. The supply of dosimeters, including TLDs, KI, for.ns, cnd instructions was adequate. The staff and field workers were familiar with the maxirnum radiation dose levels, exposure record-keeping techniques, decontamination procedures, and decontamination center locations. Workers were monitored for contamination at the entrance to the EOC. The overall knowledge and attention to radiological exposure control procedures and techniques were exceptional for the entire staff. i Deficiencies None.

Area Requiring Corrective Action {

Description:

The Civil Defense radio did not work well in all instances. The Winchester EOC could not always reach the Keene IFO.

The EOC staff diagnosed the problem as excessive radio traffic from New Hampshire field monitoring teams and other local EOCs, which resulted in occasional overload of the system. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b)

Recommendattom A separate radio frequency should be obtained for New Hampshire fleid monitoring teams and other emerrency units to reduce this overload.

Areas Recommended forimprovement ,

y

1. Description No clock was available in the decision-making room of the Winchester EOC.

Recommendation: A clock should be obtained for the deelslon-making room in the EOC.

2. Description The current status board in the Winchester EOC was of the single-entry type, meaning that old information is erased and replaced by new information. This arrangement makes it i

harder to brief new staff members on all that has happened and may result in loss of some useful information.

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Winch 2 ster E00 .

. 74- .

V Recommendation:' A new status board should be acquired so that

' all prior status information is retained along with current messages received at the EOC.

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[.' Masscchusstts EOC -

. 75

• 2.1.3 Massachusetts State Operations 2.1.3.1 Massachusetts EOC I

The Massachusetts EOC, located in the hardened underground Civil Defense Headquarters in Framingham, has all the necessary faellities for sustained operation. Its emphitheatre layout facilitated effective communication among the staff and viewing of the various maps and displays. Generally, the maps and displays were of high quality and were kept current; however, a few aspects of their use could be improved. Displayed weather conditions were not always consistent with the information ptesented at briefings, and the plotting of the radiological plume could have been more timely.

Receipt of the notification of an Unusual Event ECL occurred during working ,

hours at 4:48 p.m., whereupon the Civil Defense Director activated the Massachusetts EOC with a skeleton staff in case the situation worsened. Upon receipt of the Alert i notification at 6:25 p.m., a call list was used to mobilize the full staff. At approximately 7:30 p.m., staffing of the EOC was complete. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by double-staffing most positions. The EOC staff members were extremely competent and well trained. They fully understad their assignments and procedures, usually without recourse to checklists. They responded to the situations presented by the exercise with intelligence and insight.

The Director of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (MCDA) was clearly in control of the EOC. He gave timely briefings. Early in the exercise, the content of these briefings was appropriate; however, it would have been useful for briefings for second-shift staff and late arrivals to include a short recapitulation of events to put overything in proper perspective. Message handling was efficient, and care was given to preserving legible documentation. Mwe protocols (e.g., each message began and anded with a notice that it was part of a drill) were strictly adhered to initially, but cdherence became more relaxed as the exercise proceeded.

The Massachusetts EOC has excellent and numerous communications systems that provide conferencing capabilities. The primary system and the multiple backup systems can reach all necessary locations. These systems functioned without any breakdowns during the exercise. The General Emergency notification was received through the proper channel, thereby correcting a prior inadequacy (#85-49). The systems were used to advantage by the MCDA Director to communicate with and coordinate protective actions (e.g., activation of the EBS system and evacuation of two Vermont towns to Greenfield Community College) with his counterparts in Vermont and New Hampshire.

Pub!!c alerting and instruction were adequately demonstrated.' The' Site irea Emergency notice was received at 7:28 p.m. At 7:38 p.m., the Civil Defense directors of the three affected states decided the.t the EBS system should be activated at 7:45 p.m.

At 7:43 p.m., the Massachusetts EOC ordered that the sounding of sirens be simulated.

At 7:45 p.m., an appropriate prescribed EBS message was being dictaud to the EBS station. Within a few minutes of notification of the General Emergency at 8:55 p.m., the MCDA Director ordered sheltering in place and, pursuant to author'ty celegated by the

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• l Massachusetts EOC -

76

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Governor, declared a State of Emergency. Within five minutes of the sheltering order, an appropriate prescribed message was being dictated to the EBS station.

Because the scenario had the plume drifting northward, the exercise did not fully test Massachusetts ability to respond to eleveted radiation levels within its boundaries; however, appropriate actions were taken for the circumstances. Massachusetts Department of Public Health staff at the EOF relayed dose projections to department representatives at the EOC. There was an unusual situation, in that stack-level and ground-level winds were in opposite directions so that a ground release could possibly have reached Massachusetts. Therefore, when the' health department representatives were informed of an actual release, they decided to shelter in place.- The minimal doses projected for Massachusetts did not justify further protective actions.

Deficiencies None.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

Description:

Adherence to message and communications protocols (e.g., identifying messages as part of a drill) at the Massachusetts EOC was not sustained throughout the exercise. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b)

Recommendation: The Massachusetts EOC staff members initiating messages or communications that could reach the public should be reminded as to message and communications protocols.

Areas Recommended forImprovement

1.

Description:

Weather conditions displayed at the Massachusetts EOC were inconsistent with the information presented at briefings, and the plotting of the plume could have been more timely. , ,. ,

Recommendation: Massachusetts EOC staff members with responsibilities for maintaining maps and displays should receive further training.

2.

Description:

Well into the exercise, all briefings at the Massachusetts EOC were restricted to current conditions.

Recommendation: Periodic briefings at the Massachusetts EOC should also recapitulate the course of events to give sac.ond-shift staff and other latecomers a better perspective on the statu's of events and current conditions.

Balch2rtown Arca IV EOC .- ..

77

• 2.1.3.2 Belchertown Area IV EOC The MCDA Area IV EOC at Belchertown is an excellent, secure fecility responsible for coordinating emergency response activities for the State and local EOCs in the Area IV jurisdiction. It readily supported emergency operations through sophisticated communications systems and effective maps and displays.

The Belchertown EOC was activated when the Alert emergency notification was received at 6:28 p.m. and was fully operational approximately one hour later. The Area IV Director effectively managed emergency operations, while enthusiastically supported by a professional staff. The excellent Area IV operations plan is a thorough document, complete with various standard operating procedures covering appropriate areas of emergency operations.

Activation and staffing were in accordance with the plan. Written, up-to-date call lists were used. Although the initial ECL notification occurred before the Director ended his normal work day, it was evident that a later call would have activated personnel pagers, even at night.

The Belchertown Area IV EOC was fully staffed, as prescribed in the plan, with representatives from State Police, Public Works, Red Cross, and National Guard. In addition to regular Area IV personnel, a Radiological Defense Officer reported from the maintenance and calibration facility at Fort Devens. All personnel were very knowledgeable about their duties and displayed adequate training. The Director held regular staff briefings, circulated messages, and generally provided dynamic leadership.

The Belchertown Area IV EOC had sufficient space, furniture, lighting, telephones, and office support equipment, and remained relativdy quiet. The facility can support extended operations; the availability of backup power was demonstrated.

The ECL was posted on the clearly visible status board, which was kept current as to significant events. The wall-mounted maps showed the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation center, traffic control points, and population data by evacuation area.

The communications systems were capable of readily reaching all appropriate locations and organizations. Available were the MCDA radio net, the Massachusetts Department of Public Works radio net, the State Police radio net, the amateur radio net, NAS, and a variety of dedicated or commercial telephone lines. The MCDA radio net - ~

a command and control system - was available as a communications link between the~

Massachusetts EOC, the Belchertown Area IV EOC, the EOF, and local EOCs. A previous exercise had indicated an inadequacy (#85-50) relative to local EOC radio operator training; this inadequacy has been satisfactorily resolved. The communications staff did an excellent job of receiving and retransmitting messages received over the radio.

However, the process used to accomplish this was quite time consuming. The numbering of messages was often difficult to follow, and some incoming messages were vaguely worded (e.g., " simulating siren sounding," a message received from the Massachusetts State EOC). The Area IV communications capability would be enhanced by acquisition of hard-copy facsimile transmitter / receiver units by the local EOCs. Noteworthy was the use of an amateur radio computer system named " Packet Radio." This system was set up to link the Belchertown Area IV EOC with the reception center at Greenfield Community

B21chartcwn Arca IV EOC -

78

. College and provides a list of persons registering at the center, assuring continuing data in an evacuation situation of long duration.

Dose assessment and PARS are not a function of the Belchertown Area IV EOC.

However, the staff Radiological Defense Officer was very knowledgeable about all aspects of this activity, including the use of dosimetry and KI.

The Massachusetts State plan calls for the MCDA to inform the Belchertown Area IV EOC of public alerting and instruction decisions, for relay to the local EOCs.

The NOAA tone-alert radios are to be simultaneously activated by the National Weather Service. MCDA is to provide the EBS instructional message directly to the appropriate broadcasting facilities. The requirement for the Belchertown Area IV EOC to receive and relay the public alerting information to local EOCs appears too time consuming in view of the 15-minute dissemination requirement. Although the NOAA tone-alert radios are the primary alerting method, and the public was indeed alerted within the 15-minute period, the 13-minute interval experienced for verbal relay of the message may be too great, especially if the message were longer. The Belchertown Area IV EOC and the local EOCs should possibly receive the alerting information simultaneously. In the final analysis, however, public safety was assured through the tone-alert radios and EBS actions.

Although the only protective action prescribed for the Belchertown Area IV EOC population was for sheltering in place, traffic control was established, traffic volumes were discussed, knd preparations were made to receive evacuees from Vermont and New Hampshire. The resources to deal with impediments to evacuation activities were reviewed, and the one large reception center was activated in a timely fashion.

Although the Belchertown Area IV EOC was not located within the 10-mile EPZ, an adequate supply of dosimetry equipment and K! was available for use by emergency personnel. The Radiological Defense Officer was very knowledgeable about the use of dosimetry equipment and decontamination procedures. ,

Deficiencies None.

Area Requidng Corrective Action I

Descriptbn Some messages received and retransmitted at the  ;

Belchertown Area IV EOC were vaguely worded, such as the " simulating i f

siren sounding" message recMved from the Massachusetts State EOC, creating doubt as to what had been intended. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F, E.5)

Recommendation: The Massachusetts EOC, the Belchertown-Area IV l EOC, and local EOCs should review message-writing practices to ensure accuracy, clear intent, and proper meaning of transmitted messages.

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B21ch2rtcwn Aras IV DOC .,

79 ." . ..

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Areas Recommended forimprovemernt l 1. Description Fcr reference purposes, the numbering of messages I at the Belchertown Area IV EOC was inconsistent. MCDA messages were normally relayed to the local EOCs verbatim. .

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'Recommendattom The State's message number should remain the identifier for all messages passing through the Belchertown Area IV EOC to local EOCs, and the local EOCs should use this identifier for such messages as they receive them.

2. Description The process used at the Belchertown Area IV EOC to accomplish receiving and ntransmittirig of messages consumed too much time.

Reccamendatiom A hard-copy message transmission capability should be developed for the Massachusetts EOC, the Belchertown Area IV EOC, and the local EOCs.

3. Description The requirement that populations within the 10-mile EPZ be alerted by means of an initial instructional message within 15 minutes is difficult to meet when the decision, made at the Massachusetts EOC, must be transmitted to the Belchertown Area IV EOC and then individually retransmitted to the six or seven local EOCs.

Recommendation: A communications system should be developed that permits the Massachusetts EOC to advise the Belchertown Area IV EOC and the local EOCs simultaneously of all alerting and f subsequent EBS instructional messages.

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.. .. M;ss:chussets Fiold M:nitoring -

. 80

. 2.1.3.3 Massachusetts Field Monitoring Two radiological field monitoring teams, each consisting of two members, were mobilized, one from Springfield and one from Boston. One team arrived at the i Greenfield EOC by 7:30 p.m. The other went directly to a predesignated location to pick )

up monitoring equipment. Actual mobilization procedures were not observed during this  !

exercise. l The field teams brought their own monitoring equipment with them, or they l borrowed equipment from another utility. However, neither team picked up the new field monitoring equipment kits and personal protective kits repositioned at the Greenfield EOC. The teams eventually had an adequate supply of equipment following a rendezvous during which an air-sampling pump was brought. However, neither team had a radioactive check source with it, such as a gas lantern mantle previously treated with naturally occurring radioactive thorium for checking whether their radiation-monitoring instruments operated properly. In addition, operating procedures for the equipment were not provided to one team, which caused some difficulty in proper operation of the radiological monitoring equipment borrowed from another utility.

One team collected an air sample following adequate procedures. The teams demonstrated their ability to monitor ground-level and air readings; however, one team's air readings were taken from above the head to waist level and no ground-level readings were demonstrated.

The teams were familiar with the region being monitored. The maps provided designated the monitoring points. Radio communications were maintained throughout the exercise with the Brattleboro EOF. Good radio procedures were followed throughout the exercise.

The teams were provided with personal protective equipment. Each team used Civil Defense low-range (0-20mR) and high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters stored in the trunk of the vehicle; however, one team hed difficulty zeroing the dosimeters and did not have permanent-record dosimeters because they were stored at the Greenfield EOC. See paragraphs on pages ril and zill regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. Each team knew how often to read the dosimeters; however, one team used a scratch sheet for recording this information, misplteed it, and later on found the sheet. One team did not know the maximum radiation dose allowed without authorization. Each team was supplied with El and knew when and how to use it.

Deficiencies None.

Massachusetts Field Monitoring **

81 '.*

Areas Requiring Corrective Action' .

1.

Description:

The Massachusetts radiological fleid monitoring teams did not pick up their radiation-monitoring equipment kits and personal protective kits from the Greenfield EOC before going into the field. Radioactive check sources for checking that the radiation-monitoring instruments were operational were not included in the Massachusetts field monitoring kits which were brought to the teams in the field. In addition, operating procedures along with permanent-record dosimeters were not available in one radiation-monitoring kit used by one Massachusetts field monitoring team. See paragraphs on pages xil and zill regarding inconsisteneles in planning _ provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systema. (NUREG-0654/FF.MA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.3.a, H.11,1.8)

Recommendation: Field monitoring teams should have all necessary equipment before going into the field to monitor the radioactive plume. Radioactive check sources, such as certain types of gas lantern mantles, should be provided with each radiation-monitoring instrument kit. Operating procedures should be provided with each radiation-monitoring kit, in addition, field monitoring teams should receive treining on the operation of the various types of radiation-monitoring instruments used.

Massachusetts field monitoring ter".a should be provided with dosimetry to meet the evalm %n guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

2.

Description:

One Massachusetts radiological field monitering team was unfamiliar with proper procedures for performing air level readings. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.8)

Recommendation: Field monitoring team personnel should be properly trained in radiological monitoring procedures.

^' '

3.

Description:

One Massachusetts field monitoring team did not know the maximum radiation dose allowed without authorization.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.S.a)

Recommen3ation: Additional training should be provided to field monitoring teams in the maximum dose allowed without authoriza-tion.

e

Masscchusatts Field M:nitoring i .

• B2

- Area Recommended forImpnmiment

Description:

One Massachusetts field monitoring team had difficulty in zeroing its direct-reading dosimeters and then misplaced the sheet used to record dosimeter dose readings.

Recommendation: Fleid monitoring team members should be instructed in the proper use of direct-reading dosimeters and the proper forms to be completed in recording dosimeter dose readings.

N

B2rnardsten EOC -

83 1.1.3.4 unmanchusetts Local EOCs 2.1.3.4.1 Bernardston EOC. The Bernardston EOC, located in the Bernardston Fire Station, was equipped with adequate lighting and furniture. Though small in size, it was able to accommodate EOC staff activities. However, the availability of only one telephone could cause problems during an actual emergency. A portable generator was available for backup power. A clearly visible status board was kept up to date as to significant events. Also posted were maps showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, and access and traffic control points. Also available, but not posted, were maps showing radiological-monitoring points and population data by evacuation area, which corrects a previous inadequacy (#85-52). Current use of geographical sector designations on evacuation maps corrects a previous inadequacy (#82-58).

Activation and staffing of the Bernardston EOC were accomplished promptly.

The Civil Defense Director was notified by the Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio network at 4:54 p.m. that an Unusual Event had been declared by the utility. Activation of the EOC occurred at 6:27 p.m. after the Civil Defense Director received and verified the Alert notification. Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated. A written calllist was available and used for contacting EOC staff. The EOC was operational and fully staffed at 7:40 p.m.

The Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of operations. As appropriate, he involved the staff in deelslon making and kept them briefed. Message logs were kept. Messages were posted on the status board for all personnel to view.

Several copies of the Bernardston plan were available and used by the staff. This version of the plan also had the PAG table which had been missing in the earlier version of the plan. This action corrects an inadequacy (#82-55) etted in an earlier exercise.

The primary means of communication was the Civil Defense radio network, which was backed up by an amateur radio network and a commercial telephone. All ,

communications systems worked well during the exercise.

Public alerting and instruction were accomplished by (1) an EBS shelter-related messna originated by the State and broadcast (simulated) over local radio stations, (2) simulated sounding of the siren, and (3) route alerting from vehicles. The Bernardston EOC had six siren-mounted vehicles at its disposal for route alerting. Upon sounding of the strens (simulated) at 7:58 p.m., vehicles were dispatched for route alerting. The EOC Director stated that informat!on concerning the difference between the fire and radiological alert sirens had been published in the local newspaper, which corrects a previous inadequacy (#82-59). The public information brochure published by the utility was available at the EOC, which corrects a previous inadequacy (#85-51). The public is to refer to this brochure whenever the radiological alert siren system is activated.

The Bernardston EOC makes no PARS, but is responsible for implementing the recommendations passed to it from the State. Sheltering in place was recommended as a protective action and was adequately handled. Activation of traffic control points for the benefit of evacuees from other areas was promptly ordered, and estimates of expected traffle volume were discussed. According to the Civil Defense Director,

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B2rntrdsten EOC -

84

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• necessary resources were available to keep evacuation routes clear of hazards. The EOC staff had access to an up-to-date listing of individuals needing special assistance and their individual needs.

l An adeauste supply of low-range (0-200mR), mid-range (0-20R), and high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dos! meters, chargers, and permanent-record dosimeters was available, which corrects the earlier problem of unavailability of permanent-record dosimeters (#85-53). See paragraphs on pages xii and zill regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker doalmetry systerr.z. KI was available in sufficient quantity for all potential emergency workers. The Chairman of the Board of Health, an EOC staff member, was fully knowledgeable about procedures concerning the use of radiological eaufpment and Kl. In the previous exercise, no one present was aware of the maximura exposure allowed without authorization or of procedures for authorizing emergency workers to ince caposures exceeding the EPA PAGs. The Chairman of the Board of Health briefed the staff on the maximum allowable exposure and procedures to be used if the need for exceeding it occurred. An earlier inadequacy (#85-54) is thereby corrected.

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.

Area Recommended forimprovement

Description:

Only one telephone was available in the Bernardston EOC.

Recommendation: Additional telephones should be provided at the Bernardston EOC to avoid significant delays and other communication problems during an emergency.

Cill: soc 85

• 3.1.3.4.3 Giu EOC. The' Gill EOC, located in the Gill Fire Station, was mostly -

' adequate to support emergency operations. It had sufficMt space, furniture, lighting, and telephonese Essential facilities were available so that the EOC could support -

.' extended operations. - Emergency backup power. was' demonstrated. A communications room' separate from the operations area helped in maintaining a low noise level in the EOC. Plume EPZ and access control maps were posted _and kept current. Also displayed were boards showing shift status and emergency telephone numbers of EOC staff. Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, . radiologleal-monitoring points, and population information, although available, were not posted. However, a status board showing ECLs was still lacking, causing continuation of a previous inadequacy (#85-56).

.- A copy of the Gill plan, revised in November 1987, was available. for reference.

.Specifically, this version of the plan outlines the notification procedure for Mount Herman Campus (Items 2.2.1.g and 2.2.1.h). .This corrective action with regard to an earlier inadequacy (#82-56) is considered to be adequate.

Activation and' staffing of the Gill' EOC ~ was accomplished promptly and efficiently. Activation was initiated when the Alert notification was received over the Tri-State Mutual Aid Fire radio at 6:28 p.m. Some key staff were alerted by radio-pagers activated by- the radio system. Other EOC staff were telephored, using an automatic dialing system. Eith the exception of the Health Officer, who was involved in a real-life emergency, the EOC was fully staffed by 7:50 p.m. The alternate Health

' Officer arrived at the EOC by 8:50 p.m. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. Reliefs for each EOC staff position, including the dispatcher, were identified by name. As required by the 1985 exercise (#85-57), corrective action-had been taken to train a person to relieve the dispatcher.

Under the command l sad control of Selectmen, the Civil Defense Director effectively managed the Gill EOC operations. The staff worked wen together, and activities were coordinated. Periodic briefings were held to update staff on the current situation.' Frequent referral to the Giu plan was made during the discussions among EOC staff. Access to the EOC was generally well controlled. However, certain changes in management procedures could improve the emergency response capabilities of the EOC.

Posting of maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, radiological-monitoring points, and population information by evacuation area would enhance the EOC display.-

Such postings, including the use of an appropriate status board, would correct an earlier .

Inadequacy (#85-56). Finally, duplicating equipment in the EOC is needed to improve . '* ,

message handling.

The Civil Defense radio network was the primary means for local and regional communleation. Several radio channels were available, including the Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio network, the Highway Department radio, and amateur radio on the two-l meter band. The three telephone lines were used primarily as backup. One of the telephone lines was equipped with an automatic dialing system used for the call-up of about 30 emergency staff. All of the communications equipment wori.ed well.

. Transmission of messages, including those from and to the Belchertown Area IV EOC, was clear. Backup batteries were available to sustain emergency communications in case j of a power failure. All local operators were competent. Messages werdecorded on a j preprinted form, and a message log was maintained. However, message handling and 1

, ,. m Gill EOC

,. 86

v. . j Information distribution't could be improved by using a revised form with boxed areas and i checkoff boxes for t'mes, ECL, wind direction, and other data. Also, a sufficient quantity of the forms could have avoided the out-of-stock situation faced during the last stage of the exercise, which resulta.4 in some message-handling inefficiencies. Finally, with regard to an earlier exercise inadequacy (#82-61), additional radio-pagers are still needed for the Selectmen and for Pollee wi Highway Department staff.

Public alerting was mostly carrien out by State emergency staff who activated the local EBS radio stations. The role of local EOC staffs was limited to handling certain .

i specific situsMons. For example, the local EOCs effectively participated in informing special-needs individuals of the sheltering instructions.

Local EOCs make no PARS, but are responsible for implementing the recom-mendations passed to them from the State. Sheltering - the only protective action recommended - was adequately handled by the Gill EOC. Also, the response activities included activation of several traffic control points within 20 minutes of receiving the shelter recommendation. Twenty minutes was considered an adequate response time. As per the EOC staff, adequate personnel and vehicles were available to cover all traffic and access control functions simultaneously. However, it was pointed out by the EOC staff that the Highway Department needed more barricades. With regard to the special evacuation problems, the EOC staff were aware of the location and special needs of mobility-impaired individuals. A written list of such people was available at the EOC.

Radiological exposure control procedures were demonstrated by knowledgeable personnel. The Gill EOC was equipped with an adequate number (25 sets) of dosimetry kits, which included TLDs; low-range (0-200mR), mid-range (0-20R), and high-range (0-200R) dosimeters; and record-keeping cards. See paragraphs on pages mil and zill regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dostmetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dashnetry systems. The dosimeters were properly zeroed and distributed to about 25 emergency staff. Also available in the EOC was an adequate supply of K! and the report ,

form. As per the Civil Defense Director, about 20 emergency workers had been formally trained in the use of dosimetry and KI. With these corrective actions, three earlier inadequacies (#82-62,83-35, and 85-55) are corrected. These inadequacies were related to the availability of permanent-record dosimeters and KI, and procedures concerning their use. However, formal radiological-monitoring training should be given to the remaining untrained emergency workers and any new personnel.

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

A status board with the ECLs posted mas still unavailable in the Gill EOC. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev~.1, II, J.10.a J.10.b)

4 cill EOC a' , .

• 87 ,.

Recommendation: The Gill EOC should ask for State assistance, if .

necessary, in . upgrading displays and receiving instructions concerning their use.

2.

Description:

Additional radio-pagers are still needed for Selectmen and for Police and Highway Department staff in the Gill EOC. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.2, F.1.e)

Recommendation: The Gill EOC should ensure the availability of at least the four additional radio-pagers that have already buen ordered as per the Civil Defense Director.

3.

Description:

Several of the emergency workers at the Gill EOC had not received any formal radiological-monitoring training.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a, K.4)

Recommendation: The Gill EOC should ask the State for assistance in providing appropriate radiological-monitoring training for the remaining untrained emergency workers and any new personnel.

Areas Recommended forImprovemernt

1.

Description:

Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, radiological monitoring points, and population information, even -

though available, were not posted in the Gill EOC.

Recommendation All available maps and displays should be posted in the Gill EOC to improve the EOC staff's understanding of certain emergency situations.

2.

Description:

No duplicating equipment was available in the Gill EOC.

Recommendation: The Gill EOC should ask for State assistance, if j necessary, in procuring duplicating equipment for improved l message handling.

3.

Description:

No standard message form was available in the Gill EOC.

Recommendation: The Gill EOC should develop and use a standard message form with boxed areas and checkoff boxes for times, ECL, wind direction, and other related data.

~

l

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Cill EOC -

88

~

• ' 4. Descriptions it was pointed out by the Gill EOC staff that the Highway Department needed more barricades.

Recommendation: Additional barricades should be obtained by the Highway Department at Gill.

• ' 3 ,( i g .s% 7 l.

~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ __ a . mm.m

Crx nfiold EOC **-

89 '

3.1.3.4.3 Greenfield EOC. The Greenfield EOC, located in the lower level of the .

Greenfield Fire Station, had adequate lighting, space, and furnishings. However, noise was not adequately controlled for optimal operation of the EOC. Emergency generator power was available. A kitchen and other essential facilities were available so that the EOC could support extended operations. A clearly visible status board was kept up to date as to significant events; however, only the latest status report or message was displayed. Also posted prominently on the walls were maps showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access and traffic control points, radiological-monitoring points, and population information. These dirplays were effectively used.

However, the EPZ map was in error as to the city boundard of Greenfield. The north-south boundary was shown as the railroad tracks, instead of the Fall River. The actual boundary, as agreed to in a 1793 treaty, defines Greenfield as being east of Fall River and Gill as being west of Fall River. The boundary has remained unchanged. The EPZ map should be changed to reflect correct boundaries for Gill and Greenfield.

Activation and staffing of the Greenfield EOC were accomplished efficiently.

The activation was initiated by notification of the Alert message over the Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio at 6:28 p.m. After verification, which was delayed by an actual fire call, EOC staff members were notified from written telephone lists that were up to date. Within 10 minutes of notification, all members of the EOC staff, including the Chairmar of the Board of Selectmen, were in place. A current roster showing the names of all relief personnel was presented as evidence of continuous staffing capability. All staff members demonstrated knowledge of their duties and were adequately trained.

The Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of operations. He used the staff effectively in decision-making tasks and kept them briefed. Copies of the Greenfield plan were available and used frequently as a reference. Messages were recorded on a preprinted form, and a message leg was maintained. However, message handling and information distribution could be improved by using a standard message form with boxed areas and checkoff boxes for times, ECL, wind direct on, and other data. Also, a copier should be procured to effectively reproduce and distribute messages ,

within the EOC. Notification of the Site Area Emergency was received at 7:43 p.m. and I the General Emergency at 9:10 p.m. In-place sheltering was ordered at 9:08 p.m., and a I request to activate the reception center located at Greenfield Community College was received at 9:44 p.m. .

The communications system at the Greenfield EOC was outstanding. The Civil Defense- radio system was the primary means of communication. Backup channels included the Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio network, Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) network, NAWAS, and portable radio-pagers. Also available were a dedicated land line and several commercial telephone lines. However, even though seven telephone sets were available, only two were connected, which caused several staff l members to have to wait before being able to use a telephone. The communication operators appeared to be well trained and performed excellently throughout the exercise.

All objectives concerning public alerting and instruction were met. The Greenfield EOC had a direct communications link with the local radio systrm, which kept it up to date as to emergency status and public instructional messages. Also, all homes in the 10-mile EPZ were equipped with tone-alert radios.

1

Crsanfiold Eoc ~

]

.; 90 Local EOCs make no PARS, but are responsible for implementing recommenda-

.' tions passed to them from the State. Sheltering in place was the only protective action recommended, and it was handled adequately. For example, upon notification, the Health Officer promptly notified Greenfield Community College to activate the reception center and initiate sheltering procedures. Also, when notification was received over RACES that exposed evacuees could be anticipated, the shelter manager initiated decontamination procedures.

Because the Greenfield EOC was not in the 10-mile plume EPZ, staff members j were not issued any dosimetry equipment. However, all required dosimetry equipment, including direct-reading dosimeters, permanent-record dosimeters, and KI, was on hand in sufficient quantity. See paragraphs on pages rii and zill regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. The radiological exposure control procedures were also demonstrated by knowledgeable personnel. Specifically, and unlike in the last exercise, the EOC staff was aware of allowable radiation exposure limits and procedures for obtaining permission to exceed the EPA PAGs, if necessary.

Deficiencies None.

Area Requiring Cuaa.Uve Action Description The 10-mile EPZ map in the Greenfield EOC was in error with regard to the boundary between Gill and Greenfield. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a) l Recommendation: The EPZ map in the Greenfield EOC should be changed to reflect the correct boundaries for Gill and Greenfield, which are specified in the 1793 treaty.

Areas Recommended forImprwoment

1.

Description:

Noise was not adequately controlled in the Greenfield EOC.

Recommendattom Noise-reduction procedures should be considered for optimal operation of the Greenfield EOC.

2. Description The status board in the Greenfield EOC displayed only the latest status report or message.

~

1

(

Gracnfiold EOC  ;*

p 91

• l^ , .*

L -

Recommendation: A larger stahw board, where more than one -

message can be posted, should be considered for the Greenfield EOC. EOC staff should be able to review previous events.

3.

Description:

No standard message form was available in the Greenfield EOC.

Recommendation: A standard message form should be developed and utuized, with boxed areas and checkoff boxes for times, ECL, wind direction, and other related data.

4.

Description:

No copter was available in the Greenfield EOC.

1- Recommendation: The Greenfield EOC should ask for State

assistance, if necessary, in procuring a copter to improve message i handling. I 5.

Description:

Seven telephones were availcole in the Greenfield EOC, but only two were connected. Staff experienced delays in using the available telephones.

Recommendation: To improve the efficiency of operations at the Greenfield EOC, each organization or agency represented at the EOC should be provided with a telephone.

YW

4

, i .

• L2yden EOC -

M 92

+

.. 3.1.3.4.4 Leyden' EOC. The. Leyden EOC, located in the basement of the Town l

• 2 Hall, was limited as to available space. Room for expansion is available in an adjar.ent room.. Resources,~ except for sleeping quarters, were adequate for exteded operations.

A portable generator was available for backup power. Displays were minimal. An EPZ map was posted. A status board was available, but not utilized; the ECL was not posted. Also, - maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, radiological-monitoring points, access and traffic control points, and population information, even though svallable, were not displayed for ready reference. These still-to-be-corrected

. problems were noted in the previous exercise (#85-58).

The Leyden EOC was activated by a message received at 6:28 p.m. by the Leyden Fire Department from the Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio network, stating that an Alert had been declared by the utility.- The Deputy Fire Chief notified the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen, who is the new acting Civil Defense Director. From that point on,

staffing took place, but with minimal participation. EOC operations were handled by three people - the acting Civil Defense Director, the Fire Chief, and an Administrative Secretary. ' Also present was the Leyden Police Chief, but he did not participate. An amateur radio operator was available for radio backup. According to the Leyden plan, two other Selectmen, the Health Officer, and the Highway Superintendent should have been present. With such a small staff, the EOC was not considered to be fully staffed.

Due to the resignation of the Civil Defense Director one month before the exercise, and

~

the subsequent lack of experience of the new Civil Defense Director, operational training and knowledge were lacking among the EOC staff causing continuation of a previous

. inadequacy (#85-59). The three EOC staff members were enthusiastic; therefore, more training should be given for the effleient handling of emergency response activities, and additional' staff should be recruited and trained as backups to provide for extended operation of the EOC, should an actual accident occur.

A month or so before the exercise, the Leyden Civil Defense Director resigned.

The acting Civil Defense Director has had very little training or time to learn his role in EOC operations. Written checklists and procedures and a copy of the local plan were-available for reference. Periodic briefings were held to update the staff on the situation. Notification of the Site Area Emergency was received at 7:40 p.m. and the General Emergency at 9:07 p.m. In-place sheltering was ordered at 9:09 p.m. As appropriate, the staff was involved in the deelslon-making process. A message log was kept in an efficient manner. ,A copier was also available and used. *

,y7 , ,

Communications capability was very good. The primary system was the Civil Defense radio network, which-was supplemented by RACES and commerelal telephone.

The staff was very familiar with the radio equipment and communication procedures. All important messages were verified.

Public alerting and :nstruction were carried out by State emergency staff who activated the local EBS radio stations and NOAA tone-alert radios, which are located in every home in the community. The role of local EOC staff in this area was minimal.

PARS are the State's responsibility. The local EOCs are responsible for implementing the recommendations passed to them from the State. Sheltering, the only protective action recommended, was adequately handled. Sheltering and evacuation

L2yd n EOC **

93 -

3 were thoroughly discussed at the EOC. 'For example, while discussing access control activities, it was determined that little or no traffle would go through Leyden on the way to the Greenfield Reception Center. Also, there were no mobility-impaired individuals within the community requiring special needs during evacuation. i Because the Leyden EOC was not in the 10-mile EPZ, no dosimetry equipment or KI was issued to the emergency workers. However, there was an adequate supply of low-range (0-200 m R), mid-range (0-20R), and high-range (0-20R) direct-reading dosimeters, permanent-record dosimeters, and KI. See paragraphs on pages xil and zill regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as Information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker doelmetry systems. It was quite evident tht considerable radiation-monitoring training J was needed. Most of the EOC staff were new and not completely familiar with the l equipment or radiological exposure control measures, causing continuation of a previous j inadequacy (# 83-36). ]

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions

1. Description Displays were minimal in the Leyden EOC. A status board was available, but not utilized; the ECL was not posted.

Also, maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, radiological-monitoring points, access and traffic control points, and population information, even though available, were not displayed for ready reference. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, D.3)

Recommendation The status board should be posted in the Leyden EOC in a clearly visible location and kept current as to significant events. In addition, the ECL should be posted. Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, radiological-monitoring points, access and traffic control points, and population '

information should be displayed.

2. Description The Leyden EOC was not fully staffed during the exercise. EOC operations ware handled by three people - the acting Civil Defense Director, the Fire Chief, and an Adminis-trative Secretary. Also, present was the Leyden Police Chief, but l he did not participate. An amateur radio operator was available i for radio backup. According to the Leyden plan two other Selectmen, the Health Officer, and the Highway Superintendent should have been present. (NUREG-0654/TEMA-REP-1, Rev'.7, II,-

A.2.a).

L _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Leyden EOC '-

94

,- Recommendattom The liyden EOC should be fully staffed and alternate personnel should be designated for each EOC staff position.

3. Description Due to the resignation of the Civil Defense Director one month before the exercise, and the subsequent lack of experience of the new Civil Defense Director, operational training and knowledge were lacking among the EOC staff. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.2.a) l Recommendation The new Civil Defense Director and his staff should train together to improve their effielency in handling emergency response activities.

4. Description Radiological exposure control training has not been given to the Leyden EOC staff and other emergency workers.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.3.a, E.4)

Recommendettom The State should be asked to provide appropriate radiological-monitoring training to the Leyden EOC staff and other emergency workers.

Areas Recommeruled for improvement None.

T enn

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__~__ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Northfiold EOC '

95  ?

1.1.3.4.5 Northfield EOC. The Northfield EOC was located on the main-floor .

level of the Town Hall. Space, furnishings, telephones, and lighting were adequate to support EOC operations. Noise was adequetely controlled. Backup power was available. A status board was clearly visible and showed up-to-date ECLs and significant events. Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, access and traffic control points, radiologleal-monitoring points, and population information were available, but were not posted for ready reference. However, an EPZ map with labeled sectors was displayed. An earlier inadequacy (#85-60) concerning the availability and use of some displays is considered to be corrected.

Activation and staffing of the Northfield EOC were accomplished promptly and

. efficiently The Civil Defense Director (Northfield Fire Chief) was telephone notified by Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid network at 5:01 p.m. that an Unusual Event had been declared by the utility. Because of his illness, the Civil Defense Director immediately designated other Fire Department personnel to be in charge of his responsibilities at the EOC. The designated Fire Chief reported to the Fire Station. At 6:30 p.m., the Fire Department received the Alert notification. After the call was verified by telephone, the EOC staff members, including the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen, were notified immediately by use of a telephone call list. When the Chairman arrived at the EOC, the designated Fire Chief was present to transfer charge of emergency operations management to him.

The EOC wes fully staffed by 7:44 p.m. Organizations represented included the Police Department, Fire Department, Health Department, Highway Department, and elected Selectmen. The staff in general displayed adequate training and knowledge.

The Chairman of the Board of Selectmen was in charTe of the Northfield EOC because of the illness of the Civil Defense Director. He delegated authority and coordinated the activities of the staff of eight. Staff briefings were not held, but coordination was observed among members, who continuously discussed emergency operations requirements. A copy of the local plan and written procedures and checklists were available for ready reference. Message logs were kept. Improvement over the previous exercise was observed in that messages were distributed to the staff. .

Notification of the Site Area Emergency was received at 7:37 p.m. and the General Emergency at 9:05 p.m. In-place sheltering was ordered at 9:06 p.m.

Communication capabilities consisted of the Civil Defense radio network, Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio network, RACES, dedlested land line, and commercial l telephone. All communications systems worked well and were demonstrated to be s adequate. for supporting emergency operations at the Northfield EOC. Specifically, messages were received over the Civil Defense radio system without any problem. A previous inadequacy (#85-61) in the communications area is considered to be corrected.

Public alerting and instruction are the responsibility of the State emergency staff. EBS broadcasts (simulated) originated at the Massachusetts EOC. No instructions for the public were generated in the local EOCs, and none were required because the EBS had been activated by the Massachusetts EOC.

PARS are the State's responsibility. The local EOCs are responsible for implementing the recommendations made by the State. Sheltering, the only protective action recommended, was adequately handled. Although no evacuation of Northfield was l

1

N3rthfield EOC .

. 96

- required, traffic control points were discussed, along with the additional manpower that might be needed should e.n actura emergency arise. The Northfield EOC staff was also aware of the identity, locations, and special needs of mobility-impaired individuals within the town. A written list of these individuals is maintained at the Fire Station and Town Hall.

There was a sufficient supply of low-range (0-200mR), mid-range (0-20R), and high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters, permanent-record dosimeters, and KI.

See paragraphs on pages xil and zi!! regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systema. The dosimeters were properly zeroed and distributed at the Fire Station. The Public Health Officer was present at the Fire Station to ensure proper procedures were followed concerning the use of dosimetry equipment and E!. He was also aware of the proper procedures for obtaining authorization for radiation exposures in excess of the general public PAGs.

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requirmg Corrective Action None.

Areas Recommndat for improvement

1.

Description:

Displays at the Northfield EOC did not include til necessary information for ready reference.

Recommendation: The maps shortr4 evacuation routes, relocation centers, access and traffic control points, radiological-monitoring points, and population information should also be posted at the Northfield EOC.for ready reference.

2.

Description:

Staff briefings were not held at the Northfield EOC during the exercise to update staff on the emergency situation.

Recommendation: The Northfield EOC operations director should periodically conduct staff briefings to update personnel on the {

emergency situation. 1 4

l l

l

e Warwick EOC 97 '

2.1.3.4.6 Warwick EOC. The Warwick EOC was located in the Warwick Fire .

Station. Space, furnishings, and lighting were adequate to support emergency response activities. Although the EOC does not have a kitchen or sleeping facilities, other resources were sufficient to support extended operations. Emergency backup power was available. The clearly visible status board was kept up to date as to significant events.

Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, access and traffic control points, and population information were readily available, which corrects a previous inadequacy

(#85-62). The EPZ mep with labeled sectors was displayed.

Activation and staffing of the Warwick EOC were accomplished promptly. The Civil Defense Director was notified by the Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio network at 4:45 p.m. that an Unusual Event had been declared by the utility. Following verification, the Civil Defense Director went to the EOC; at 6:21 p.m., he was notified of the Alert.

The call was immediately verified, and the EOC was activated. The EOC was fully staffed by 8:10 p.m. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of an up-to-date roster and discussions with staff members.

Since Warwick was not affected by the plume, activity at this EOC was confined to reviewing the plan and discussing actions to be taken if the situation were to change.

The Civil Defense Director, who was also the Radiological Se.fety Officer, was effectively in charge of operations. The staff was kept informed and was involved in decision making. Periodic briefings were held to update staff on the situation. However, a copier should be obtained to provide improved message and instruction handling.

The Civil Defense radio was the primary means of communication. Major backup radio channels available included the Tri-State Fire Mutual Aid radio network, the Highway Department radio, and RACES network. Commercial telephones were also available for local communications end backup. Also available were the NOAA tone-alert radio receiver and a radio receiver for EBS broadcasts. Excellent communication capabilities existed at the Warwick EOC. All communication systems worked well.

However, to improve message handling, the EOC should develop and use a stande.rd message form with boxed areas and checkoff boxes for times, ECL, wind direction, and other related data.

Public alerting and instruction were not required during the exercise. The Civil Defense Director explained that the public would have to be alerted by the utility- i provided tone-alert radios and route alerting, t.s no siren system exists. Instructions would be given through EBS broadcasts, telephone calls, and personal contact. Only 35  !

families live in the 10-mile EPZ within the Warwick jurisdiction. j PARS are the State's responsibility. The local EOCs are responsible for implementing the recommendations made by the State. Sheltering, the only protective i I

action recommended, was adequately handled. Also, with regard to special evacuation problems, the EOC staff was aware of the one mobility-impaired individual and any special needs. The town has the resources to provide for this person's transportation and other needs.  ;

All EOC staff were provided with loi'-range (0-200mR) direct-reading dosimeters and permanent-record dosimeters, thereby correcting a previous inadequacy (#83-38).  !

I

. . 4 Warwick EOC ,

_.; -98

' 'See paragraphs on pages xil and xill regardirg inconsistencies in phning provisions and

'k exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA ,

. recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. Also available was an adequate supply of E!. The EOC staff was familiar with the procedures concerning El administration.- However, the EOC should procure an adequate supply of mid-range direct-reading dosimeters.

> Deficiencies None.

Arsa Rcepiring Corrective Action

Description:

Dosimetry equipment at the Warwick EOC ciu not include mid-range (0-20R) or high-re.ge (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters.

See caragraphs on pages xil and zill regarding inconsistencies in plarndng provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a)

Recommendation: Emergency workers should be provided with dosi-metry which meets the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

Areas Recommended forimprovement L

Description:

No copier was available in the Warwick EOC.

Recommendation: The Warwick EOC should ask for State assistance, if necessary, in procuring a copier to improve message handling.

2. Description No star.;ard message form was available in the Warwick EOC.

Recommendation: The Warwick EOC should develop and use a standard messagle form with boxed areas and checkoff boxes for times, ECL, wind directwa, and cther related data.

i L-__a-_ --.--_.a -u---

Emerg;ncy Op;rcticus Fccility *- .+

99 ."-

2.1.4 Utility and State Coordination ,

f 2.1.4.1 Emergency Operations Facility The EOF has been relocated from the Governor Hunt House to the utility's corporate headquarters in Brattleboro, Vermont. This new faellity is on the periphery of (

the 10-mile EPZ. The working space is adequate and its construction permits its use even if it is in the plume, correcting an inadequacy (#82-71) noted during a past exercise.

The EOF was promptly activated at 6:30 p.m. and fully staffed by 7:30 p.m. The staff consisted of representatives from the Sutes of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, and Vermont Yankee personnel. Personnel were notified either by radio or a radio-pagcr system. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by double-staffing of positions.

More than adequate space and equipment were available for state personnel; however, because of double-staffing, there was some overcrowding and somewhat high noise levels at times. During a real emergency, there would be few if any problems becau:e only one shift would be present. Maps and charts were available, and a status board was maintained and clearly visible.

The EOF communications systems, consisting of dedicated and commercial telephones and radios, were all operational throughout the exercise. Three hard-copy telefacsimile units were functional and operational to all three State EOCs. State representatives were advised of all chstges in ECL, and the information was transmitted to the State EOCs by the utility in a timely manner, thereby correcting an inadequacy {

(#86-63) noted during a port exercise.

A rumor control telephone system was activated at the EOF and staffed by one representative from Vermont. This person was generally well prepared to answer questions and kept up to date on events.

Utility dose estimates and PARS were evaluated for reasonableness by the State representatives at the EOF. After they concurred in the information, they transmitted it )

to their respective EOCs. The utt'lty also provided meteorological data and plume movement projections fram the ME7 PAC computer modeling system every 15 minutes, which corrects an inadequc~ (885-64) noted during a past exercise. In fact, the States i used the utility's Dose Assessment Grsop data for verification of their own field team information. The States and the utility worked together as a team, and frequent briefings and updates were provided to all staff.

The State of Massachusetts actually directed its field monitoring teams from the EOF, wh:reas the other States used their State EOCs and IFOs. Massachusetts placed its l field teams in proper positions for monitoring a release should it travel in its direction.

The three States used the nomegraphic method for cross-checking the utility's predicted off-site dose. This cross-6hecking led to a lively debate between utility and State representatives on the conservatism of the predicted off-site thyroid dose to infants, which was eventually resolved by usir.g the more conservative figure.

.Emergsney Oparaticas Facility .

100

... . Deficiencies .

None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.-

Areas Recommended forImprovement None.

I th

^

. i _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - -

M2dia cancer "- .*

101 .'

• c . ..

3.1.4.3 Media Center .

The Media Center at Dalem's Chalet in.. West Brattleboro, Vermont, was activated in a realistic fashion with a minimum of repositioning of staff and equipment.. Comniunications equipment, including multiple telephone lines, radios, a telefacsimile machine, as well as typewriters and all necessary supplies, were in place i

and well organized on three floors within one hour and 15 minutes. A full complement of utility staff, as well as spokespersons from the three States, was similarly mobilized. All staff members reported to the Media Center in a timely fashion. All individuals can be notified and activated on a 24-hour basis and can be supported by competent. replace-ments in the event of sustained operations. Overall, the spokespersons performed in a professional and competent manner throughout the exercise. The new PIOS from Vermont and New Hampshire sometimes appeared to need more training and experience, but generally performed well and undoubtedly benefited from the exercise experience.

Additional support staff are needed to distribute news releases, status reports, and

telefacsimile machine transmissions to the appropriate personnel.

The limitations of Dalem's Chalet as a Media CeMer were quite evident during '

the exercise. Although the briefing area for the media was more than adequate in terms of space and the availability of charts and displays, other espects of the facility were i

obviously lacking.~ One~ example was the poor lighting conditions in the media working area. Also, the only space where all four PIOS could confer in their working area was in a narrow corridor, which was crowded with personnel, display boards, and the

. telefacsimile machine. The Federal observers were genuinely concerned about the potential fire safety risks posed by small work rooms crowded with personnel functioning in the midst of numerous extension cords for various pieces of electrical equipment, including electric space heaters.

Also, the consequences of the Media Center being within the EPZ were dramatleally demonstrated when the Lieutenant Governor of Vermont ordered the evacuation of three communities, including Brattleboro where the Media Center is ,

located. When this announcement was made at a -Media Center briefing, genuine confusion arose about whether to physically evacuate the Media Center for purposes of the exercise. The decision was quickly made to simulate a relocation to the Dummerston IFO, which is not the official alternate site in current plans. Although the issue was resolved for purposes of the exercise, all evidence suggests that the Dummerston IFO actually could not have served as an adequate alternate site for the Media Center given %n <

the operational demands on the IFO. This situation raised the prospect of what would be entailed if the entire Media Center operation had to be disassembled, physically I

evacuated, and then reassembled and activated at a distant loestion. The hours required for such a relocation should be viewed in terms of public safety. During this exercise, the disruption of such a relocation would have occurred at a most critical time when the .

first public protective setions were being issued. The abrupt interruption of timely information flow to the public would very likely have caused widespread confusion and even panic. The Media Center should be permanently moved from its present location to

an area outside the plume exposure EPZ. Inadequacies noted during past e,xercises (#82-66, 82-73, 82-80, and 85-67) continue.

I l

t _ _ ____ __________._.. ___ --  !

,. MIdio cantar

'. 102

, Generally, the communications systems at the Media Center were adequate.

Commercial telephone lines were available to all PIOS to communicate with the State EOCs and the EOF. Backup links were available in the form of radios. The systems fuactioned well, facilitating tha timely flow of critical information. Clearly, the weak link was the presence of only one telefacsimile t achine, which was used by all four PIOS. The machine was quickly overloaded with traffic, and significant delays occurred in transmitting and receiving hard copies of status reports and news releases. Hard copies of the EBS messages were unavailable. This situation had significant negative consequences as far as communleating comprehensive information to the public, both through the Media Center and through the rumor control operation. There is a clear need for kdditional telefacsimile machines dedicated to each of the PIOS at the Media Center and for dedicated counterparts for public information functions at the EOF and the State EOCs.

The informational functions performed at the Media Center were generally adequate. Media kits containing appropriate information were available for distribution. The utility and State PIGS coordinated their respective news releases and generally shared infortnation in a timely f ashion- which corrects inadequacies (#85-65 and 85-66) noted during past exercises. Five timely media briefings were conducted durlog the exercise, with the utility and the three States involved. All area radio and television stations were monitored for EBS and news broadcasts.

There were problems involving hard copies of news releases. Whether due to the fast pace of the scenario, the existence of only one telefacsimile machine, or the cumbersome procedures for clearance, hard-copy news releases tended to be sketchy and limited in content about precautionary measures for the public to take and the effects of events on the public. This problem was especially severe in the case of Vermont. A clearer understanding or procedure must be developed for interactions between the Governor's Press Secretary in Waterbury and the PIO in the Media Center.

The excellent array of charts and displays were not used effectively, whbh '

resulted in as unclear picture of what was happening, both in terms of plant conditions and off-site activities. For example, the only time that the plume was depleted was at the last briefing just prior h the end of the exercise.

Public instructions had been prepared at the Massachusetts EOC prior to the exercise for that State's PIO. The prescripted messages were then copied onto letterhead and dated with the current date and time during the exercise. These messages, as well as those from the other States, were penerally clear and appropriate for the situation. - A mu e u., -

Utility rumor control personnel were prepared to provide information on !Aate PARS md activities, as well as on plant status. Aside from one Massachusetts news i release at 8:30 p.m., however, no hard-ropy press releases or copies of EBS messages were provided by the States to utility rw or control personnel. Verbalinformation of all f

i types was provided by two utility briefers, but it was not always timely. A caller was told by the rumor control responder at 9:29 p.m. that no release had ocFurred despite the fact that a release had occurred at 9:05 p.m. 'lhere were only two utility rumor control telephone lines available la the Media Center, which was not really adequate for the I

M2dio C2nter .

103

,c n' amber' of. calls that could' occur during an emergency. Toll free state rumor control .

telephone numbers existed at the state EOCs; however, Massachusetts did not publicize the number in its press releases, and the Vermont number could not be accessed. State rumor control telephone numbers should be more extensively publicized.

The concept of an integrated rumor control system is good. However, procedures need to be established to routinely provide the operation with all hard-copy releases.

- Visual displays are also needed. The relationship of the rumor control operation at the Media Center with the rumor control desks at the State EOCs was not clearly defined. A procedure should be established for providing feedback on trends in rumors so that Media Center management can address them at media briefings.

Deficiency

Description:

The Media Center is located within the plume exposure EPZ. The recommendation to evacuate West Brattleboro starkly revealed the unacceptability of the loce.tlon of a media center within the EPZ, since the center would have been relocating at the very moment its services were most needed in order to properly inform the public of protective action recommendations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.3.a)

Recommendation: The Media Center should be permanently moved to an area outside the plume exposure EPZ.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action ,

1.

Description:

The work rooms for the staff at the Media Center were small, and the lighting conditions were poor in the media working area. Numerous extension cords to various pieces of electrical equipment, including electric space heaters, presented a ,

fire safety risk. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.3.a)

Recommendation: The work rooms for the staff should be larger ' NW and better lighting condit: should be provided in the media working area. There should L sufficient number of slectrical cutlets, properly placed and positioned, to negate the need for- _ .

extension cords.

2.

Description:

Only one telefacsimile machine was svallable at the Media Center for the utility and three States. It was quickly overloaded with traffic, and significant delays occurred in trammitting and receiving hard copies of information. (NUREG-0654t/EMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.a) -

Recommendation: The Media Center need additional dedicated telefacsimile machines, one for each of the PIOS.

.. .. Media c:nter -

.; 104

. 3.

Description:

Hard-copy news releases from the Media Center

• tended to be sketchy and limited in content about precautionary measures and the effects of events on the public. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.3.a)

Recommendation: Hard-copy news releases should explain precautionary measures and the effects of events on the public.

4. Deserlption: The excellent array of charts and displays at the Media Center was used only during the first and last briefings during the exercise, which resulted in en unclear picture of what was happening. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. II, G.3.a)

Recommendation: Charts and displays should be used during briefings to convey a clear picture of the events taking place.

5.

Description:

Rumor control personnel at the Media Center were not provided in a timely manner with updates of events. In one instance, a caller was told that no release of radioactivity had occurred even though a release *.ad taicen place almost 30 minutes before the call. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.c)

Recommendation: Rumor control personnel should be briefed on events as soon as the Media Center receives the information. This procedure will allow the public to receive accurate information. l

6.

Description:

Only two utility rumor control telephone lines were available in the Media Center, which would not be adequate for the number of calls that would be received in av netual emergency.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.3.c)

Recommendation: Additional telephone lines should be provided in the Medfa Center for handling rumor control ca3s.

7.

Description:

The State of Massachusetts did not publicize its

. rumor control telephone number in its press releases from the Media Center, and the Vermont number could not be accessed.

(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.e)

Recommendation: Press releases should contain the State rumor control telephone numbers.

8.

Description:

Rumor control personnel in the Media Center did not provide feedback on trends in rumors, so that management could address them at media briefings. (NUREG-0654/ FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.c). '--

i

s .

• M;dia C:nter .', .-

105 .

Recommendation: Procedures should be established for rumor ',

control personnel to provide feedback on trends in rumors so that management can address them at media briefings.

9.

Description:

The relationship between the Media Center's rumor control operation and counterparts at the State EOCs was not clearly defined. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, U, G.4.c).

Recommendation: The relationship between the Media Center's rumor control operation and counterparts at the State EOCs should be clearly defined in the respective State plans.

10.

Description:

. Hard copies of EBS messages were unavailable because only one telefacsimile machine was present in the Media Center. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.b).

Recommendation: Hard copies of EBS messages should be available in the Media Center for use in communicating comprehensive information to the public.

Areas Recommended forImprovement

1.

Description:

Additional support staff were needed in the Media Center for distributing news releases, status reports, and other information to appropriate personnel.

Recommendation: Additional support staff for the Media Center ,

should be provided for distributing news releases, status reports, and other information to appropriate personnel.

2.

Description:

The new PIOS from Vermont and New Hampshire at the Media Center appeared to need additional training and experience.

Recommendation: The new PIOS from Vermont and ' New ,

Hampshire, as well as any new Media Center staff, should receive additional training in radiological emergency response duties.

~

w---_-_---_.-___._____.--_ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ . _

~*

.- Varmont EOC l I

.,, ,'. 106

^

. 2.2 INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXERCISE 2.2.1 Vermont State Operations 2.2.1.1 Vermont EOC The Vermont EOC was adequately staffed during the ingestion exposure pathway exercise to make decisions concerning PARS. At 11:30 a.m., a briefing was conducted by the Incident Director. In attendance were representatives from Emergency Management Agency, Public Safety, ~ Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Environmental Resources. The Radiological Health Advisor was the coordinator and implementor of protective actions.

Radiological health officials at the Vermont EOC successfully communicated with field teams via radio. There was a telephone link between the EOC and the Health Department Laboratory in Burlington. Results of laboratory testing were telefaxed from the Health Department laboratory to the Vermont EOC. No communications problems were observed.

Agricultural maps and address lists of farmers and agriculture-related businesses were anilable for use by the staff.

Protective action decisions were based on laboratory results of ingestion zone samples. Milk that came from farms where the 1-131 levels exceeded the FDA PAG for preventive actions was removed from the market. It was also decided that it was impractical to divert contaminated milk to processed products, in making these decisirms, Health Department officials made good use of Department of Agriculture input.

Ingestion exposure pathway recommendations were coordinated with the State of New Hampshire, whenever applicable. FDA tables were used in decision making concerning protective actions. Table-top discussions included (1) dumping of contaminated milk, (2) advising farmers to continue sheltering their animals and using stored feed and covered water, (3) continuing to sample until results proved negative, (4) notifying the public to use bottled water until reservoir water samples proved negative, (5) considering sampling of eggs and food store produce, and (6) sampling of parsnips still in the ground. Discussions were also held concerning modification of protective actions during the growing season. Topics included sampling of mushrooms, trout, and meat in slaughter houses for detection of cesium. Towns had been supplied brochures to be distributed to farmers and agribusinesses in the 50-mile EPZ.

A press release was written and presented by the Radiological Health Advisor to explain to the public the status of the emergency on the third day. The Health Department coordinator clearly and concisely described the protective actions taken to date and the reasons for taking them. Some individuals took on the rom of reporters, and a question-and-answer session followed the presentation.

... .. l V3rmont EOC - ,. .

,j 107 .

. .. l The scenario involved sufficient environmental contamination levels to test the '.

State's ability to make_ protective action decisions. The I-131 levels in milk were .)

unrealistic because all Vermont cows'would have been fed stored feed by December.

The scenario did not provide for laboratory results for the samples collected by the State. on Day 1. For example, a priority water sample was collected at Pleasant Valley Reservoir, and no laboratory results were available for this sample.

Deficiencies

None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.

Areas Recommended forimprovement None.

l l

l l

C. ' * .'

Varmont State Laboratory.~

'. 108

(. .

3

.. i 1.2.1.2 Vermont State Laboratory The Vermont radiological laboratory function has recently been transferred to the State Health Department. Laboratory in Burlington. The personnel were eager and desirous of accomplishing t.1eir assigned task. The roster showing two shifts was supplemented by a backup list of additional personnel for each position. A new set of procedures has recently been prepared and should be included in the State plan.

Laboratory personnel had done an excellent job in preplanning the lower limit of detection for emergency samples, 'thereby improving the laboratory's overall performance. The laboratory entren*ly has only gam na scan (GeLI) espability. There is also a gross alpha / beta counter but no strontium analysis capability. The ongoing quality j assurance program assures the accuracy of laboramry results. Commerelal standards, traceable to the National Bureau of Standards, were used for instrument calibration. .

Samples arriving at the laboratory were screened and a maximum dose for admission to 1 the laboratory established. Additional training is needed on contamination control f procedures during both screening and sample preparation prior to analysis. Cross- )

contamination would have occurred at the sample screening / receiving area and the sample preparation area. Also, current procedures should be revised to more clearly

' define. how samples above the screening level will be handled. The intent of the procedures is to provide speelal handling for samples above a predetermined activity limit, but current procedures are not clear on this intent.

Deficiatclas None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Cross-contamination would have occurred at the sample screening / receiving area and the sample preparation area in the Vermont State laboratory. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.8)

Recommendation: More-detailed procedures that stress cross-contamination issues, as well as training in the new procedures, should be provided.

2.

Description:

The intent of the procedures is to provide special handling for samples above a predetermined activity limit-l Current Vermont State laboratory procedures are not clear on thh intent. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,NUREG-0654, II,1.8)

Recommendation: The procedures should be clarified.

3. Description The Vermont State laboratory has no capability for strontium analysis. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.8)

'[ ' ' "

Vermont State Laboratory -

109 . .

Recommendation A capability to analyze for strontium should be provided by the Vermont State laboratory.

Areas Recommended forImprovement None.

1 I

l I

l

,.,%..,g

l,

_} Dunnersten Incidant Fiold Offics.'-

t .. 110 2.2.1.3 Dummerston Incident Field Office The Dummerston IFO did not directly participate in ingestion exposure pathway

.- exercise activities, except to dispatch field teams. The Vermont field sampilng teams I

.did report to the IFO and were briefed prior to being dispatched to their assigned sampling locations. Although communications with the field teams could be maintained at the IFO, the Vermont EOC was the primary contact for the teams.

Deficiencies None.-

Areas Requiring Corrective Action 4 None.

Areas Recommended forimprovement None.

u

V3rmont Field S =pling

• 111 2.2.1.4 Vermost Field Sampling Four ingestion exposure pathway sampling teams, each having two members, were dispatched into the field from the Dummerston IFO. Mobilization procedures were not demonstrated during this exercise. An adequate mobilization system S in place, whereby staff can be called w at any hour of any day through the use of a rostcr.

The teams checked their equipment prior to departure and had sufficient equipment for various types of sampling. Each team had at least a G-M radiation-monitoring instrument, which had been recently calibrated.

The teams were provided with equipment and sampling procedures that were referred to during the exercise. The teams w'ere familiar with the sarrpling areas and had excellent maps that clearly identified the sampling stations. Proper techniques were demonstrated for sampling soil, vegetation, water, and milk; however, if more than one sample of soll would have needed to be taken, cross-contamination could have occurred.

There was unnecessary contamination of the vehicle and equipment because team members were unfamiliar with contamination control procedures and decontamination procedures for equipment. Additional basic contamination control training should be given to all team members. In addition, samples taken by the field teams were not double-bagged to prevent cross-contamination.

Radio communications were maintained with the Verr 4ont EOC throughout the exercise.

The teams' communications backup system was the radio-pagers carried by Sam members.

The teams were provided with personal protective equipment, including gloves and tongs. Two teams performing ingestion pathway sampling were provided with only high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters, no team was provided with mid-range (0-20R) dosimeters, and one team had no permanent-record dosimeters. See page is, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsistencies in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. Team members zeroed their direct-reading )

dosimeters prior to deployment from the IFO and read them frequently.

Upon returning to the Dummerston IFO from the field, 'neither the team-;,

members nor their vehicles were monitored for contamination. However, the field teams were aware of when and where they should go for decontamination.

Deficiencies None.

i Areas Requiring Corrs etive Action 1

\

1.

Description:

If more than one sample of soil would have needed to l

be taken by a Vermont field sampling team, cross-contamination l

l

,. m ..

Varmtnt Fiold Simpiing

..u

• 112 could have occurred because team members were unfamiliar with proper procedures (e.g., cleaning shovels). (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. li !!,1.8, J.11)

Recommendations . Additional basic contamination control training should be given to all Vermont field sampling team members, with-emphasis on contamination control.

(

-2.-

Description:

Two Vermont field sampling teams performing i ingestion pathway sampling were provided with only. high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters, no team was provided. with mid-range (0-20R) doshneters, and one team had no permanent-record dosimeters. See page ix, paragraphs one and two regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as infortnation related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. (NU REG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a)

Emergency workers should be provided with l Recommendation: l dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance containedin Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

3..

Description:

The Vermont field sampling teams did not double-bag their field samples to prevent cross-contamination. (NUREG-

' 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8)

Recommendation: The Vermont field sampling teams should be trained to double-bag field samples to prevent cross-contamination.

4.

Description:

Neither the Vermont field sampling team members nor their vehicles were monitored for contamination upon return to the Dummerston IFO from the field. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,

- Rev.1 II, K.S.a). _

m:

Recommendation: Vermont fleid sampling team members and their vehicles should be monitored for contamination upon return from the field.

Areas Recommended for T.ssprovement None.

l

~

1 1

l

N2w Hampshire EOC .

113 . ..

2.2.2 New Hampchire State Operations 2.2.2.1 New Hampshire EOC For the ingestion exposure pathway exercise, all New Hampshire EOC operations were conducted in the operations room, which had been rearranged to facilitate conferencing between EOC management and technical staff. An " Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone Board," showing the locations of farms, dairies, and water supplies, was available in the EOC and was brought into play. In the absence of the State Director, direction and control of the EOC was demonstrated by the NHOEM Operations

- Officer, assisted by the Deputy Director. Both displayed appropriate knowledge and training for this assignment.

Ample staff were on hand in the New Harnpshire ECC, including seven representatives from Public Health, two from Agriculture, and one from Water Supply.

Three of the staff from Public Health and one from Agriculture actively participated in dose assessment and protective action decision making; the others were there for training purposes.

Initial PARS included not using agricultural foodstuffs until they were sampled and determined to be safe by the Department of Health Services and the Department of Agriculture. Accident assessment personnel were very familiar with the FDA guidelines for contamination levels in foodstuffs or deposition of radioactive matter on forage.

Assessment team members had formulated a preliminary ingestion monitoring plan based on a computer-projected deposition footprint and possible changes due to wind shifts and weather influences. This initial sampling plan called for six monitoring locations distributed throughout the area projected to be affected by deposition. Three of the sampling locations were dairies, and three of them were potential surface-water supplies. Soll samples were also collected at the water supply areas. ,

Assessment team- members used field measurement data (both waist-high and ground-level measurements) from the sampling locations for preliminary estimates of surface contamination. The methodology demonstrated followed the FDA guidance.

These preliminary estimates were then verified with laboratory data for the samples.

The assessment team g 3' The member laboratory data for then converted soll these were data presented to area in units concentrations of vC1/kg. t) for comparison with (uCl/m the FDA-derived response levels. A minor error was noted in this data-conversion _

process, that is, a shallower sampling depth was assumed than the sampling procedures called for. The dose assessors should review the soil-sampling procedures before making these conversions.

The Agriculture Department representative was very knowledgeable about area farming practices, the locations of farmers, and market distribution for the farm.

products.

Ingestion pathway team members readily identified those samples'that exceeded the preventive or emergency PAGs. Samples that exceeded the emergency PAGs were '

condemned, and farn:s that exceeded the PAGs were put on a daily sampling program for i

--___-_____-___._____________-_____-_..._____m. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

.*. 's .

'~

.. N.w H mpshire EOC a

.. . 114

• 4 an initial 14-day period to determine the trend in I-131 activity. It was recommended that livestock in the affected or*as be kept on stored feed until the I-131 had decayed.

The accident ' assessment team did not receive any " history" about the milk sample data. This history should provide information on feeding protocol (e.g., pasture or stored feed) and whether samples had been diluted by uncontaminated milk in the bulk-storage tanks. Such information should be provided to assure that the assessments of the milk data are accurate. The scenario did not provide for this information; nonetheless, assessment personnel should have requested it.

At the close of the exercise, the ingestion exposure pathway team was asked to respond to a number of questions that ranged from contaminating events occurring during growing seasons to the addition of significant quantitles of long-lived contaminants. The team members responded adequately to these questions with respect. to changes in protective actions and sampling protocols.

Team members were requested to discuss how they would evaluate the total population dose resulting from the ingestion and plume exposure pathways. Their discussion was adequate, which satisfies remedial action #82-35.

Emergency public instructions were drafted in the form of a news release issued by the NHOEM at 1:54 p.m. of Day 3 of the exercise. The instructions clearly informed the public that conditions at VYNPP had stabilized, but that the State of Emergency would remain in effect until the Governor was satisfied that it was no longer necessary.

The public was also informed that milk from dairy farms was being held out of the supply system, but that it was acceptable and safe for everyone to drink milk purchased at retail stores and to ingest processed foods, foods available at retail stores, and food already at home. Area drinking-water supplies were also designated as safe for consumption. Areas affected by the protective actions were clearly identified as political subdivisions (i.e., towns). The New Hampshire EOC simulated distributing this '

release via EBS and through other means. Because of the variety of information involved and the developing scenario, a customized written release was deemed more appropriate than the prescripted one. The substance of the press release was discussed by telephone with Vermont and Massachusetts to ensure coordination of information among the three states.

.q... ., ;c n ..

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requining Corrective Action None.

'-------a-_--___--_-________s._.

N:;w Hampshire EOC .

115 . , .

P Areas Recommended forImprovement

1.

Description:

A minor error was noted in the New Hampshire EOC data-conversion process for soll sample area concentrations.

Recommendatlom The dose assessors should review the soil-sampling procedure 'e.g., sampling depth) before making their calculations.

2. Description The New Hampshire EOC accident assessment team did not receive any history about the milk sample data (e.g.,

. feeding protocols and possible dilution in storage tanks).

Recommendation: This type of information should be requested by the assessment personnel, but it should also be provided for in the scenarlo.

k

s .c s .

L '. .. Niw H.mpshire State LSboratory 116 L' 2.2.2.2 New Hampshire State Laboratory The New Hampshire State laboratory ' demonstrated sufficient equipment for an.

Initial response in the event of a nuclear incident. The staff is short one personi but the position'is expected to be filled in the near future. Laboratory personnelindicated the ~

existence of a New England Radiological Health Compact with. neighboring state laboratories that provides for the New Hampshire laboratory to be supported in case of equipment failure or an overload of field samples needing analysis prior to the arrival of Federal assistance. Although extra assistance was not requested in this- exercise, procedures were adequate to complete remedial action #83-20. Calibration procedures were either discussed or demonstrated. Samples were analyzed either as-received (for the liquid cubical container) or in downsized samples (soll and vegetation).

First-shift laboratory personnel displayed adequate profielency in receiving, expediting, and analyzing incoming field samples. Procedures were adequate for routine calibration and analysis operations. The laboratory has obtained two lead sample wells with 4-in.-thick walls to' demonstrate its ability to enhance background characterize-tions.n This action' completes remedial action #85-37. The State of New Hampshire successfully transported a sample to the laboratory from the ingestion pathway area.

Standard operating procedures for various activities connected with nuclear incident samples were in place, thereby completing remedial action #85-36. The laboratory staff demonstrated knowledge of, and familiarity with, the characteristics of gamma analysis equipment.

According to New Hampshire State laboratory personnel, the vast majority of State vehicles located at State Office Park East in Concord are passenger sedans. A station wagon'or small van would enhance the laboratory's capabilities in transporting '

mobile laboratory analysis equipment to the Keene IFO or in picking up numerouw field samples.

' De ficiencias None.  ;

Areas Requiring Corrective Action .

None.

Areas Recommended forimprovement

1.

Description:

This exercise did not test New Hampshire State laboratory procedures for requesting, if necessary, either additional laboratory assistance through the New' England Radiological Health Compact or Federal assistance.

l

\

.N:w H.inpshira Stato Labsratory

_ ,." 5 117 .

Recommendation: A future exercise should test the procedures for '.

requesting of either additional laboratory assistance through the New England Radiological Health Compact or Federal assistance.

2.

Description:

Vehicles available for tra:uporting equipment 'and field samples to the New Hampshire State laboratory are mostly passenger sedans.

Recommendation: A station wagon or small van should be available, which would enhance the New Hampshire State

' laboratory's transport ' capabilities.

I :e. s

~

. K2cn2 IncidInt Field Office

. 118 2.2.2.3 Reene lacident Field Offlee During the ingestion pathway portion of the exercise, the Eeene IFO acted as the coordinating point for collecting samples. Six sample-collecting teams were briefed and i dispatched, and they later returned with samples.

The Eeene IFO was in continual contact with the New Hampshire EOC and coordinated the flying of a sample from Keene to Concord for delivery to DPHS by a i CAP plane. Collection and evaluation of samples could be enhanced by having a DPHS assistant assigned to collect and check samples at a site remote from the IFO and to check returning vehicles and field sampling team personnel for contamination, j The deployment of other New Hampshire State agency representatives to collect ingestion pathway samples was being exercised for the first time. The choice of water supplies and agriculture] product locations to be sampled by the New Hampshire field sampling teams was not made on the basis of the previous plume monitoring, but rather on the computer projections produced at the New Hampshire EOC. Consequently, most samples taken during this portion of the exercise showed only background activity.

Plume monitoring should confirm the presence and location of radioactive particuhte matter, radiolodine, and other specific fissicn products before the State Agriculture teams are assigned sampling locations.

The Eeene IFO radiological-monitoring group reported no blackouts in communications with State field sampling teams. These communications were much improved since the last exercise.

Deficiencies None. ,

Area Requiring Corrective Action Description The choice of water supplies and agricultural product locations to be sampled by the New Hampshire field sampling teams ~

was not based on previous plume monitoring, but, rather, on the basis of a computer predletion. Consequently, most samples would show only background activity. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8, J.11)

Recommendattom The choice of water supplies and agricultural product locations to be sampled should be based on the results of previous plume monitoring to confirm the presence and location of I particulate, radiolodine, and other fission products before sampling teams are assigned specific locations. Samples taken by the New Hampshire field sampling teams should be from within the plume area.

l l k l

l

= _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ -_. _ _ . -

e .*

Kun3 Incid:nt Fiold Offica '

119 ,

Arect Eecommanded forImprovement .

Description:

A DPHS representative was not assigned to collect and check the New Hampshire field samples, as well as to check returning vehicles and field team personnel for contamination.

1 Recommendation: A DPHS representative should be assigned to collect and check field samples, as well as to check the returning vehicles and field team personnel for contamination.

Y,_ i ':j ' ,

'ee

• ' ,* l

[ NIw Hampshire Field Secpling 120 2.2.2.4 New Hampshire Field Sampling Six Ingestion exposure pathway sampling teams, each consisting of two members, were notified, mobilized, and deployed to the Eeene IFO from Concord. Four of these teams' were observed during the exercise. Equipment kits were issued to the teams and inventoried prior to their depa*ture from the DPHS laboratory. Actual mobilization procedures were not observed duritc this exercise.

Prior to deployment into. the field, the Environmental Sampling . Team Coordinator briefed the teams that the release had terminated and that plant conditions

' had stab 111 red. Meteorological conditions were discussed and team assignments issued.

The teams 'were instructed to use telephone commtmications because several teams did not have radios in their vehicles. They were asked to call back to the Keene IFO when they had completed their sampling mission at the location (s) assigned to them. Although this briefing covered the logistics issues in effect for the ingestion pathway. portion of the exercise, as well as plant status and meteorological conditions, it did not cover the issue of where ground deposition could be expected and the type of contamination resulting from the accident.

The sampling teams were provided with equipment for performing the various types of sampling; however, several of the sampling kits were incomplete, in that labels, tags, ropes, shovels, and large plastic bags were missing. These missing items caused problems, for affected teams could not double-bag samples to prevent cross-

. contamination. A sand instead of a soll sample was taken because a plastic scoop was the only digging tool available, and the samples taken could not be properly tagged with information as to the time, date, and location of the sample. The teams were supplied with C3V-700 radiation-monitoring instruments; however, one team .was not familiar L with procedures for setting up and operating its instrument, and none of the instruments used by the teams had calibration stickers showing when the instruments had last been, calibrated The teams took various types of samples; however, at least one team was instructed to take samples in an area previously determined to be more than one mile away from the plume, which was not the most efficient use of personnel. One team was not familiar with proper procedures for taking water samples because it did not fill the container to within one inch of the top. As a result, an insuffielent sample of water was taken. Another team did not know how to conduct ground-level readings. That team was also unfamilla' with proper procedures for preventing contamination and cross-contamination while handling field samples. At least one member of each team was familiar with the sampling areas, and excellent maps indicating sampling points were given to each team. One team, upon returning to the Eeene IFO, was instructed to go to the airport from which CAP flew samples to the New Hampshire State laboratory in Concord.

Communication with the Keene IFO was maintained by commercial telephone because several of the team vehicles did not have radios. Each field team was Instructed to call the Keene IFO for further instructions, using one of five teleph3ne numbers, when it had finished its sampling mission at its assigned location (s).

(' ._

b Niw Ermpshire Field St.mpling 121 . .-

Personal protective equipment kits were issued to each team; however, one' team's kit contained only paper-type disposable boots, and no cotton-type gloves for use in protecting the plastle, surgical-type gloves. Each team member was issued both low-range (0-200mR) and mid-range (0-20R) direct-reading dosimeters, a TLD, and KI.

However, one team had only limited knowledge about the frequency at which the direct-reading dosimeters should be read and the maximum allowed radiation dose without authorization.

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The CDV-700 survey instruments used by the New Hampshire field sampling teams did not have calibration stickers stating when the equipment had Isst been calibrated. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.10) t Recommendation: All radiation-monitoring instruments issued to field _ sampling teams should be calibrated at the frequency recommended - by the manufacturer, and a' calibration sticker should be' attached to each, stating the calibration date, the calibrator, and the next calibration date.

2.

Description:

Because certain items were missing from the New Hampshire field sampling kits provided to the teams, samples were not properly labeled and double-bagged, and a sand instead of a soll sample was taken. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.11, J.11,I.8)

Recommendation: Sampling kits should have no items missing when they are issued to field sampling teams before the teams are sent out into the field.

~

n ' "- *

3.

Description:

One New Hampshire field sampling team was not familiar with procedures for setting up and operating its radiation-:

monitoring instrument. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, 1.8) ,

Recommendation: The field sampling teams should be trained in the proper procedures for setting up and operating their radiation-monitoring instruments in the field.

4.

Description:

One New Hampshire field sampling team was not famillar with proper procedures for taking water samples because

s . =

- N;w Hampshire Fiold Sr pling -

. 122 it did not fill the container to within one inch of the top. As a result, an insufficient sample of water was taken. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8, J.11)

Recommendattom The field sampling teams should be instructed in proper procedures for the various types of sampling required in the field.

l

5. Description One New Hampshire field sampling team was not familiar with proper procedures for taking radiation ground-level readings and procedures for preventing contamination and cross-contamination while handling field samples. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA- l REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.8)

Recommendattom The fleid sampling teams should receive l additional training in the use of radiation-monitoring instruments and proper techniques for handling field samples.

6. Description One New Hampshire field sampling team was instructed to take samples in an area previously determined to be I more than one mile away from the plume. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA- I REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8)

Recommendation The field sampling teams should be Instructed to take samples in areas known to be contaminated in order to determine the type and level of contamination.

7. Description One New Hampshire field sampling team had only limited knowledge about the frequency at which dosimeters should be read and the maximum allowed radiation dose without ,

authorization. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, II, K.3.b, K.5.a)

Recommendation The field sampling teams should receive a basic

. health physics course in radiological exposure control.

8. Description The initial briefing for the New Hampshire field sampling teams did not cover the issues of where ground deposition l

could be expected and the type of contamination re:ulting from l the accident. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.8, J.11)

Recommendation The field sampling team coordinator should be trained to provide information regarding ground deposition and the type of contamination expected.

~

_m.--__ _ _ . _ _ _ .- _ _ _ _ _ ---___. . - _ - _ _ _ . _

New Hampshira Fic1d S= pling '

123 .

Areas Recommended forImprovement -

1.

Description:

Because several New Hampshire fleid sampling teams did not have radios in their vehicles, all teams were instructed to contact the Keene IFO via commercial telephone.

Recommendation: The field sampling teams should have radios in their vehicles, and the radios should be used for maintaining contact with the Keene IFO.

2. I%seription: The personal protective equipment kit issued to one field sampling team had only paper-type disposable boots and no cotton-type gloves.

Recommendation: The personal protective equipment kits issued to field sampling teams should be provided with more durable boots and cotton-type gloves.

-___-_-________m_ . . _ - . . - _ _ . _ . - - _ - . . _ - .

. s ,

Massschusstes EOC 124 2.2.3 Massachusetts State Operations 2.2.3.1 Massachusetts EOC The Massachusetts EOC, located in the hardened underground Civil Defense Headquarters in Framingham, had an amphitheatre layout, which facilitated effective communication among the staff and viewing of the various maps and displays. For the ingestion exposure pathway exercise, Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) staff and representatives from State Food and Agriculture and Environmental Quality Engineering, the agencies most directly involved, were placed at the same table to enhance communication among them.

The staff was repositioned for this exercise, which was simulated to occur on Day 3. The MCDA Director was clearly in control, deferring to the Director of MDPH's Radiation Control Program on technical matters. Only two briefings were held.

Infrequent briefings led to excessive informality. More frequent briefings would have been helpful.

The Massachusetts EOC received an analysis of radiation levels in Connecticut River water, soil, milk, and forage samples from severallocations in Massachusetts from the laboratory in Jamaica Plains. This information was legible and received in a timely manner via telefax. The radiation was at background levels, which greatly limited the number of ingestion pathways. The representatives from MDPH, Food and Agriculture, and Environmental Quality Engineering worked well together to identify commodities with possible risk of contamination (e.g., Connecticut River water, apple cider, milk, and Christmas trees from Vermont). They were also able to identify additional commodities that might be at risk if the incident had occurred in another season.

If radiological deposition had occurred in Massachusetts, MDPH could have used its computer already set up in the EOC with a data base about farmers in the State. Use of the computer to identify farmers engaged in speelfled agricultural pursuits (e.g., dairy and tree farming) in the ingestion EPZ was demonstrated.

Deficiencies ,

l None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.

i I

Areas Recommended for improvement

~

1. Description Only two briefings were held during the ingestion exposure pathway exercise at the Massachusetts EOC.

I

r. .

Masscchusstes EOC '

125 .

Recommendations: The MCDA Director and/or MDPH chief '.

representative should hold more frequent briefings.

2.

Description:

This exercise did not demonstrate Massachusetts' ability to identify the need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance (FEMA Objective 32).

! Recommendation: A future exercise should test Massachusetts' ability to identify the need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

3.

Description:

Massachusetts did not demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure (FEMA Objective 34).

Recommendation: A future exercise should test Massachusetts' ability to estimate total population exposure.

Massachusetts Stcto Laboratory 126

~

2.2.3.2 Massachusetts State Imboratory The Massachusetts State Laboratory is located at 305 South Street in Jamaice Plain, a suburb of Boston. Their radiation measurement instruments included a multichannel analyzer, a TLD reader, a GM Counter (0.05-100 mR/hr), a liquid scintillation spectrometer, Gell and sodium lodide detectors, and an older model Tracerlab Beta Counter.

Only two persons and a supervisor were present. Additional staffing is available through the New England Radiological Health Compact. These persons would provide a second shift espability for the Massachusetts State Laboratory. The capecity for handling samples with low activity is qui *e low, two to three samples per hour. Gross alpha and beta cross-checks with EPA samples have been recently done, but no data on other samples such as milk s,nd food are available.

Use of a multichannel analyzer was correctly demonstrated for the measurement of gamma emitting radioisotopes; however, SOPS for the methodology were not available for review. Procedures for the preparation and measurement of the radioactivity on air sample filters and on soll/ vegetation samples were not demonstrated. Snow, water, and milk sample procedures were correctly shown.

Deficiencies None.

Area Requiring Corractive Action

Description:

The Massachusetts State laboratory capability for the ,

analysis of ing3stion pathway samples needs to be improved, both as to quantity and quality. Standard operating procedures should be available in accordance with the plan. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, 1.8).

Recommendation: The Massachusetts State laboratory staff need to develop and retain standard operating procedures in the laboratory.

Also, additional trained staff and equipment should be provided for the laboratory.

Areas Recommended for Imprtrver.lartt None.

l l

p^ ,

~

[

-821chsrtown Area IV EOC .

L 127 . . .

l* #

'

• 2 2.2.3.3 Delchertown Area IV EOC The Area IV EOC at Belchertown did not participate in ingestion exposure pathway exercise activities. Its exercise functions terminated at the end of the plume I exposure pathway prtion of the exercise. Massachusetts directs all ingestion pathway activities from the State EOC.

Deficienctss None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.

Areas Recommered forImprovement

'None.

i l

• Massachusetts Field S=pling l .

128 y 2.2.3.4 Mammachusetts Fleid Sampling Two ingestion pathway sampling teams, each consisting of two members, were l dispatched into the field from the Greenfield EOC. Prior to deployment, the field teams ,

were given an excellent briefing on the status of activities by their field team {

coordinator. A form directing the types of samples to be taken was given to each team, {

along with maps indicating the sampling locations.

The teams checked their equipment prior to departure and noted items missing from the kits. The equipment supplied was more than adequate; however, labels would not stick on containers because of the low temperature, and the bags supplied for soll samples were too small. One team was not supplied with appropriate procedures for taking samples such as soll samples. The teams were familiar with the area and easily found their sampling locations. Various types of samples were taken by only one team, and log sheets were completed. The samples were returned to the Greenfield EOC and then transported in a State vehicle to the laboratory in Jamaica Plains.

Radio communication problems with the Greenfield EOCs radio base station were experienced by both teams prior to departure. A relay was established by using a car on the top of a hill, which allowed communications with the field team coordinator; however, one team's radio, including the backup, still experienced communication problems.

Personal protective kits were supp) led to the teams. Permanent-record dosimeters were provided to one team, but not the other. Both teams had low-range (0-200mR) and high-range (0-200R) direct-reading dosimeters, but nsither team had mid-range (0-20R) dosimeters. See paragraphs on pages ril and zill regarding inconsisteneles in planning provisions and exercise inadequacies related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. Good radiatloc ytection techniques were followed by the team taking samples. Boots and gloves were worn, and samples were double-bagged and monitored.

Deficiencies None. -

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Description One Massachusetts field sampling team periodically experienced radio communication problems with the Greenfield EOC, with both its primary and backup radios, throughout the  !

exercise. (NUREG-0634/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. !!, I.8, F.1.d)

Recommendation: The radios used by the one Massachusetts field sampling team should be repaired or replaced.

~ -. . . - _ .

e, ..

Mw'*chusetts Fiold Scmpling 129

~

2.

Description:

One Massachusetts field sampling team did not have permanent-record dosimeters, and neither team had mid-range (0-20R) dosimeters. See paragraphs on pages xil and zill regarding

. inconsistencies in planning provislam and exercise inadequaeles related to dosimetry, as well as information related to FEMA recommended emergency worker dosimetry systems. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a)

Resmmendation: Emergency workers should be provided with dosimetry to meet the evaluation guidance contained in Objective 6 of FEMA's Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

Areas Recommended (o.'Intprtvement

1.

Description:

One Massachusetts field sampling team did not have sampling procedures with them.

Recommendation: Field sampling teams should have sampling procedures with them for reference.

2.

Description:

The Massachusetts field san.pling kits did not contain Ir.rge enough bags for holding soll samples, and the labels would not stick on the containers.

Zecomtnendation: All field sampling kits should have appropriate supplies before being lasued to teams going into the field.

,~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . k

Dr3rgency Operatiens Fccility 130 2.2.4 Utility and State Coordination l

2.2.4.1 Emergency Operations Facility l

The role of the EOF during the ingestion exposure pathway portion of the

) exercise was limited to providing data from the VYNPP field teams and laboratory l analysis to the States to supplement the other data available to the States EOCs. This l transfer was dor.e efficiently by: (1) calling each State EOC on the Gedicated telephone line to determine the proper telefax number to use; (2) transmitting the data by telefax; and (3) rechecking, via the dedicated line, to make sure each transmission had been received.

Deficiencies None.

Artns Requiring Corrective Action None.

el Aress Recommerdad forImprirvomerit None.

I 1

i l

W:dio C:ntar: ~Q- .

131

• h .

2.1.4.1 Media Center .

The' Media Center .was not. activated during' the ingestion exposure pathway cxercite because there were no speelfic objectives to be demonstrated. However, cmergency public instructions were drafted in the form of a news release at each State EOC during the ingestion exposure pathway exercise.

Deficiencies None.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None.

kaas Recommended forimprovement None.

vm l

... s i

. , . 133 4 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Section 2 of this report lists defielencies and areas requiring corrective action, along with the recommendations noted by the Federal evaluators. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section 11 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, entitled Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (Nov.1980), exercise objectives, and the evaluation criteria provided in Sec.1.5 of this report.

The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficieneles and areas requiring corrective action noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the State and local plans, as appropriate.

FEMA requests that the State and local jurisdictions submit the measures that they have taken or that they intend to take to correct deficiencies and areas requiring correction action. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including projected and actual dates of completion for implementing corrective actions, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately.

The definitions of exercise inadequacies are as follows:

Deficioneles are demonstrated rd abserved inadequacies that would cause a finding the* Off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected 1 through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, cr other actions.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are demonstrated and observed '

~w' inadequacies of State and local government wrformance; and although their correction is required during the next schaduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact publie '

health and safety.

Table 2 summarizes the defW icles and areas requiring corrective action identified in this exercise, but not the areas recommended for improvement. Table 3 gives the enrrent status of deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action identified in the exercises of February 18, 1982, September 21,1983. April 17,1985, and D,ecember 2-3, 1987. Table 4 lists the status of each of the 35 FEMA core objectives for each State and local jurisdiction by exercise year.

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