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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217L0421999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-20 on 990815-0925 & Notice of Violation.Two Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20217N2111999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 on 990913-17 & 1004-08.No Violations Noted.Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Effective,Utilized Systems Approach to Training & Showed Continued Improvements Over Previous Insp Findings ML20217L0101999-10-18018 October 1999 Provides Update of Waterford 3 Effort for Review of Ufsar. Info Listed Includes Background Mgt Expectations,Review Status & Results,Clarifications Re Review & Conclusions ML20217L0141999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Update to NRC Staff Re Circumstances & Plans for Submitting Certification Rept on Waterford 3 Plant Specific Simulator ML20217G7051999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Comments on Four of NRC RO Examination Questions for Exam Administered During Week of 991004 05000382/LER-1999-014, Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20217D5151999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Application for Renewal of SRO License for C Fugate License SOP-43039-3,IAW 10CFR55.57.Without Encls ML20217C6251999-10-0505 October 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Util Ltr & Encl Exercise Scenario Package for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Based on Review,Nrc Determined That Exercise Appropriate to Meet Objectives ML20212J6921999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-18 on 990830-0902.One Noncited Violation Identified Re Failure to Follow Procedural Instructions to Ensure That Members on Fire Brigade Shift Were Qualified ML20216G2441999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-19 on 990830-0903.No Violations Noted 05000382/LER-1999-013, Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form IR 05000382/19993011999-09-21021 September 1999 Informs That NRC License Exam Previously Associated with NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-301 Will Be Incorporated Into NRC Insp Rept 50-382/99-14 ML20212D8761999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Staff Completed Midcycle PPR of Waterford 3.During Assessment Period,Number of Personnel Errors Occurred,Which Demonstrated Lack of Attention to Detail by Plant Personnel.Historical Listing of Issues,Encl ML20212C2471999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Five Final Applications for RO Licenses for G Esquival,Jm Hearn,Md Lawson,Re Simpson & PI Wood.Written Exam & Operating Test to Be Administered,Is Requested. Encls Withheld ML20212C2391999-09-16016 September 1999 Requests Cancellation of SRO Licenses for Bn Coble,License SOP-43835,due to Job Assignment Location & CA Rodgers, License SOP-43537-1,due to Resignation from Company, Effective 990901 ML20212C5881999-09-14014 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-15 on 990719-23 with Continuing in Ofc Insp Until 0819.No Violations Noted ML20211Q4421999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-07 on 990601-11.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20211M8391999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 25 to EP-001-020,rev 24 to EP-001-030,rev 25 to EP-001-040,rev 30 to EP-002-100,rev 22 to EP-001-010,rev 27 to EP-002-010,rev 26 to EP-002-102 & Rev 16 to EP-002-190.Listed Proprietary Revs to Epips,Encl ML20211L3681999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Five Preliminary Applications for Reactor Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed,Iaw 10CFR55.31.Encls Withheld ML20211K9741999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-16 on 990704-0814.Two Severity Level IV Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy 05000382/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211M3641999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Written Examination,Operating Tests & Supporting Ref Matl Identified in Attachment 2 of ES-210,in Response to NRC .Encl Withheld ML20211G5751999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards RAI Re IPEEE Submittal.Please Provide RAI within 60 Days of Receipt of Ltr,Per Util Response to GL 88-20,suppl 4 ML20211E3281999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Period of 990101-0630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Ltr Does Not Contain Commitments 05000382/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately 05000382/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211F5421999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Proposed marked-up TS Page Xviii, Index Administrative Controls, Correcting Page Number Re TS Change Request NPF-38-220.Editorial Changes for TS Change NPF-38-221 Discussed ML20211F3561999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards CTS Pages & TS Proposed marked-up Pages for Insertion Into TS Change Request NPF-38-207 Re Efas, Originally Submitted on 980702.Original NSHC Determination Continues to Be Applicable ML20211F4611999-08-24024 August 1999 Informs That NRC Reviewed Ltr & Encl Objectives for Waterford 3 Emergency Plan Exercise Scheduled for 991013.Exercise Objectives Appropriate to Meet Emergency Plan Requirements ML20211G1731999-08-23023 August 1999 Informs That Info Submitted in ,B&W Rept 51-1234900-00,will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20210T9791999-08-18018 August 1999 Discusses Which Responded to Reconsideration of Violation Denial (EA 98-022) Enforcement Action Detailed in .Concludes That Violation Occurred as Stated ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210S0561999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Voluntary Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for NRC Fys 2000 & 2001 for Waterford 3 ML20210Q6161999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Corrected Copy of Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3.Original Rept,Submitted with ,Contained Typos ML20217F2661999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Copy of 1999 Waterford 3 Biennial Exercise Package to Be Performed Using Waterford 3 CR Simulator ML20210R9231999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-10 on 990719-23.Violations Noted.Nrc Has Determined That One Severity Level IV Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams 05000382/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl ML20210H4291999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Rai,Associated with TS Change Request NPF-38-208,proposing to Replace Ref to Supplement 1 with Ref to Supplement 2 of Calculative Methods for CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model, in ACs Section of TSs ML20210F9451999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Version of Rev 29 to EPIP EP-002-100, Technical Support Ctr Activation,Operation & Deactivation. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210D3171999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Proposal for Final Resolution of Reracking Spent Fuel Pool at Plant,Per License Amend 144,issued by NRC in .No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr 05000382/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached ML20210D8701999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requests for Relief ISI-018 Through ISI-020 for Entergy Operations,Inc,Unit 3 ML20210B1521999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-382/99-13 on 990523-0703.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20209G9771999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Objectives & Guidelines for Waterford 3 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991013.List of Objectives cross-referenced Where Applicable to Relevant Sections of NUREG-0654 IR 05000382/19990081999-07-12012 July 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-08 Issued on 990503 ML20209E5231999-07-0909 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL-92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes Staff Efforts Re TAC MA0583 ML20209D4051999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Revised TS Pages to Replace Attachment C,Entirely in Original TS Change Request NPF-38-207,per 990519 Discussion with C Patel of Nrc.Changes to Action 20 Delete Word Requirement & Revise Word Modes to Mode 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217L0101999-10-18018 October 1999 Provides Update of Waterford 3 Effort for Review of Ufsar. Info Listed Includes Background Mgt Expectations,Review Status & Results,Clarifications Re Review & Conclusions ML20217L0141999-10-18018 October 1999 Submits Update to NRC Staff Re Circumstances & Plans for Submitting Certification Rept on Waterford 3 Plant Specific Simulator ML20217G7051999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Comments on Four of NRC RO Examination Questions for Exam Administered During Week of 991004 05000382/LER-1999-014, Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-014-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of RCP Controlled bleed-off Flow.Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form Identifies All Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20217D5151999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Application for Renewal of SRO License for C Fugate License SOP-43039-3,IAW 10CFR55.57.Without Encls 05000382/LER-1999-013, Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-013-00,providing Details of Exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rates.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Encl Commitment Identification/ Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20212C2391999-09-16016 September 1999 Requests Cancellation of SRO Licenses for Bn Coble,License SOP-43835,due to Job Assignment Location & CA Rodgers, License SOP-43537-1,due to Resignation from Company, Effective 990901 ML20212C2471999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Five Final Applications for RO Licenses for G Esquival,Jm Hearn,Md Lawson,Re Simpson & PI Wood.Written Exam & Operating Test to Be Administered,Is Requested. Encls Withheld ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) ML20211M8391999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Rev 25 to EP-001-020,rev 24 to EP-001-030,rev 25 to EP-001-040,rev 30 to EP-002-100,rev 22 to EP-001-010,rev 27 to EP-002-010,rev 26 to EP-002-102 & Rev 16 to EP-002-190.Listed Proprietary Revs to Epips,Encl ML20211L3681999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Five Preliminary Applications for Reactor Operator Licenses for Individuals Listed,Iaw 10CFR55.31.Encls Withheld 05000382/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00,providing Details of Reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Identified on Attached Commitment Identification/Voluntary Enhancement Form ML20211M3641999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Written Examination,Operating Tests & Supporting Ref Matl Identified in Attachment 2 of ES-210,in Response to NRC .Encl Withheld ML20211E3281999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Period of 990101-0630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Ltr Does Not Contain Commitments 05000382/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00,providing Details of Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.All Commitments Contained in Submittal Are Identified on Attached Commitment Identification Voluntary Enhancement Form 05000382/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately1999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re Discovery of Condition of Noncompliance with App R Involving Inadequate Separation of Essential Cables Routed in Fire Area RAB-30 in Rab. Compensatory Measures Were Established Immediately ML20211F3561999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards CTS Pages & TS Proposed marked-up Pages for Insertion Into TS Change Request NPF-38-207 Re Efas, Originally Submitted on 980702.Original NSHC Determination Continues to Be Applicable ML20211F5421999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Proposed marked-up TS Page Xviii, Index Administrative Controls, Correcting Page Number Re TS Change Request NPF-38-220.Editorial Changes for TS Change NPF-38-221 Discussed ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20210Q6161999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Corrected Copy of Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3.Original Rept,Submitted with ,Contained Typos ML20210S0561999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Voluntary Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates, for NRC Fys 2000 & 2001 for Waterford 3 ML20217F2661999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Copy of 1999 Waterford 3 Biennial Exercise Package to Be Performed Using Waterford 3 CR Simulator 05000382/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Srs.Commitments Made by Util Also Encl ML20210H4291999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Rai,Associated with TS Change Request NPF-38-208,proposing to Replace Ref to Supplement 1 with Ref to Supplement 2 of Calculative Methods for CE Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model, in ACs Section of TSs ML20210F9451999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Version of Rev 29 to EPIP EP-002-100, Technical Support Ctr Activation,Operation & Deactivation. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210D3171999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Proposal for Final Resolution of Reracking Spent Fuel Pool at Plant,Per License Amend 144,issued by NRC in .No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr 05000382/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,providing Details of Operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Exhaust Stack & Steam Supply Piping.All Commitments Identified on Attached ML20209G9771999-07-13013 July 1999 Forwards Objectives & Guidelines for Waterford 3 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 991013.List of Objectives cross-referenced Where Applicable to Relevant Sections of NUREG-0654 ML20209D4051999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Revised TS Pages to Replace Attachment C,Entirely in Original TS Change Request NPF-38-207,per 990519 Discussion with C Patel of Nrc.Changes to Action 20 Delete Word Requirement & Revise Word Modes to Mode ML20209B6081999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Encl 05000382/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00,providing Details of Discovery of Untested Electrical Contacts in safety-related Logic Circuits1999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00,providing Details of Discovery of Untested Electrical Contacts in safety-related Logic Circuits ML20196G5731999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards Operator Licensing Exam Outlines Associated with Exam Scheduled for Wk of 991004.Exam Development Is Being Performed in Accordance with NUREG-1021,Rev 8 ML20212J4121999-06-23023 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Reconsideration of EA 98-022. Details Provided on Actions Util Has Taken or Plans to Take to Address NRC Concerns with Ability to Demonstrate Adequate Flow Availability to Meet Design Requirements ML20196E9371999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Revs Made to EP Training Procedures.Procedures NTC-217 & NTC-217 Have Been Deleted.Procedure NTP-203 Was Revised to Combine Requirement Previously Included in Procedures NRC-216 & NTC-217 ML20196A1021999-06-17017 June 1999 Provides Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Per 990513 Request of NRC Project Manager ML20195F3671999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards Rev 21,Change 0 to EP-001-010, Unusual Event. Rev Reviewed in Accordance with 10CFR50.54(q) Requirements & Determined Not to Decrease Effectiveness of Emergency Plan ML20195C7801999-06-0303 June 1999 Submits Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-08.Corrective Actions:All Licensee Access Authorization Personnel Were Retrained Prior to Completion of Insp ML20195C2951999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Annual Evaluation of Changes & Errors Identified in Abb CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models Used for LOCA Analyses.Results of Annual Evaluation for CY98 Detailed in Attached Rept,Based Upon Suppl 10 to Abb CE Rept ML20195C0241999-05-28028 May 1999 Notifies NRC of Operator Medical Condition for Waterford 3 Opertaor Sp Wolfe,License SOP-43723.Attached NRC Form & Memo Contain Info Concerning Condition.Without Encls ML20196L3281999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Entergy Is Withdrawing TS Change Request NPF-38-205 Re TS 3.3.3.7.1, Chlorine Detection Sys & TS 3.3.3.7.3, Broad Range Gas Detection Submitted on 980629 ML20206S4691999-05-17017 May 1999 Requests Waiver of Exam for SRO Licenses for an Vest & Hj Lewis,Iaw 10CFR55.47.Both Individuals Have Held Licenses at Plant within Past Two Year Period,But Licenses Expired Upon Leaving Util Employment.Encl Withheld 05000382/LER-1999-004, Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery That Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed for ESFAS Containment Cooling Function,As Required by TS SR 4.3.2.31999-05-14014 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery That Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed for ESFAS Containment Cooling Function,As Required by TS SR 4.3.2.3 ML20206N1921999-05-10010 May 1999 Provides Revised Attachment 2 for Alternative Request IWE-02,originally Submitted 990429 Re Bolt Torque or Tension Testing of Class Mc pressure-retaining Bolting as Specified in Item 8.20 of Article IWE-2500,Table IWE-2500-1 ML20206J1471999-05-0606 May 1999 Requests That Implementation Date for TS Change Request NPF-38-211 Be within 90 Days of Approval to Allow for Installation of New Monitoring Sys for Broad Range Gas Detection Sys ML20206J1721999-05-0606 May 1999 Notifies That Proposed Schedule for Plant 1999 Annual Exercise Is Wk of 991013.Exercise Objective Meeting Scheduled for 990513 at St John Baptist Parish Emergency Operations Ctr ML20206G8021999-05-0404 May 1999 Provides Revised Response to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/99-01.Licensee Denies Violation as Stated.Change Made Is Denoted by Rev Bar & Does Not Materially Impact Original Ltr ML20206E7811999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposes Alternatives to Requirements of ASME B&PV Code Section XI,1992 Edition,1992 Addenda,As Listed.Approval of Alternative Request on or Before 990915,requested ML20205T2531999-04-22022 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-S02-00,describing Occurrence of Contract Employee Inappropriately Being Granted Unescorted Access to Plant Protected Area ML20205R2611999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Rev 19 to Physical Security Plan,Submitted in Accordance with 10CFR50.54(p).Plan Rev Was Approved & Implemented on 990407.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20205Q3241999-04-16016 April 1999 Submits Addl Info Re TS Change Request NPF-38-215 for Administrative Controls TS Changes.Appropriate Pages from New Entergy Common QA Program Manual Provided as Attachment to Ltr 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARW3P90-1505, Forwards Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule & Proposed Requalification Exam Schedule,Per Generic Ltr 90-071990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule & Proposed Requalification Exam Schedule,Per Generic Ltr 90-07 W3P90-1163, Forwards Relief Requests Associated w/10-yr Inservice Insp Program Per Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i) of 10CFR501990-09-0606 September 1990 Forwards Relief Requests Associated w/10-yr Inservice Insp Program Per Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i) of 10CFR50 W3P90-1191, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-15. Corrective Actions:Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure PE-005-004 Will Be Revised to Ensure That Normally Closed Valves Opened & Verified to Close for Toxic Gas Signal1990-08-31031 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-15. Corrective Actions:Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure PE-005-004 Will Be Revised to Ensure That Normally Closed Valves Opened & Verified to Close for Toxic Gas Signal W3P90-1194, Submits Fitness for Duty Performance Data for 6-month Period from Jan-June 19901990-08-29029 August 1990 Submits Fitness for Duty Performance Data for 6-month Period from Jan-June 1990 W3P90-1184, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-14. Corrective Actions:Local Leak Rate Test Activities Shall Be Administratively Controlled to Require Use of Test Method Other than Pressure Decay1990-08-20020 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-14. Corrective Actions:Local Leak Rate Test Activities Shall Be Administratively Controlled to Require Use of Test Method Other than Pressure Decay W3P90-1187, Forwards Booklet Entitled, Safety Info - Plans to Help You During Emergencies, Recently Distributed to General Public1990-08-17017 August 1990 Forwards Booklet Entitled, Safety Info - Plans to Help You During Emergencies, Recently Distributed to General Public W3P90-1189, Forwards Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Emergency Preparedness Exercise for 901024. Annual Exercise Will Be Performed Using Control Room Simulator1990-08-17017 August 1990 Forwards Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Emergency Preparedness Exercise for 901024. Annual Exercise Will Be Performed Using Control Room Simulator W3P90-1162, Forwards Rev 4 to 10-Yr Inservice Insp Program First Interval 1985-19951990-08-16016 August 1990 Forwards Rev 4 to 10-Yr Inservice Insp Program First Interval 1985-1995 W3P90-1174, Forwards Rev to Emergency Plan & QA Program,Consisting of Chart Indicating Changes to Util Organization1990-08-0707 August 1990 Forwards Rev to Emergency Plan & QA Program,Consisting of Chart Indicating Changes to Util Organization W3P90-1177, Forwards Revised Objectives for Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 9010241990-08-0303 August 1990 Forwards Revised Objectives for Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 901024 W3P90-1164, Forwards Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Basemat Monitoring Program Special Rept 3. Rept Documents Continued Integrity of Basemat as Verified by Program from Time of Inception of Monitoring in 1985 Through Mar 19901990-08-0303 August 1990 Forwards Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Basemat Monitoring Program Special Rept 3. Rept Documents Continued Integrity of Basemat as Verified by Program from Time of Inception of Monitoring in 1985 Through Mar 1990 W3P90-1167, Forwards Rev 12 to Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction EP-001-001, Recognition & Classification of Emergency Conditions, Reflecting Name Change of State Agency to Louisiana Radiation Protection Div1990-07-19019 July 1990 Forwards Rev 12 to Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction EP-001-001, Recognition & Classification of Emergency Conditions, Reflecting Name Change of State Agency to Louisiana Radiation Protection Div W3P90-1148, Responds to NRC 900503 Submittal Concerning Review of Util Rev 6,Change 1 to Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves1990-07-17017 July 1990 Responds to NRC 900503 Submittal Concerning Review of Util Rev 6,Change 1 to Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves W3P90-1143, Advises That 900404 Request for Addl Info Re Tech Spec Change Request NPF-38-103 Will Be Provided by 900803.Change Will Extend Test Frequency of Channel Functional Tests for ESF Actuation Sys & Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation1990-07-0606 July 1990 Advises That 900404 Request for Addl Info Re Tech Spec Change Request NPF-38-103 Will Be Provided by 900803.Change Will Extend Test Frequency of Channel Functional Tests for ESF Actuation Sys & Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation W3P90-1379, Provides Notification That Util Has Consolidated Operation of All Nuclear Facilities,Effective 9006061990-07-0202 July 1990 Provides Notification That Util Has Consolidated Operation of All Nuclear Facilities,Effective 900606 ML20044A5541990-06-26026 June 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 90-04 Requesting Info on Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions ML20044A5551990-06-22022 June 1990 Describes Changes Required to Emergency Plan as Result of Transfer of Operations to Entergy Operations,Inc. Administrative Changes to Plan Necessary to Distinguish Support Functions to Be Retained by Louisiana Power & Light W3P90-1365, Provides Notification of Change in Operator Status Per 10CFR50.74 Due to Entergy Corp Consolidating Operation of All Nuclear Generating Facilities,Including Plant Under Util1990-06-19019 June 1990 Provides Notification of Change in Operator Status Per 10CFR50.74 Due to Entergy Corp Consolidating Operation of All Nuclear Generating Facilities,Including Plant Under Util ML20043G3431990-06-14014 June 1990 Requests That All NRC Correspondence Re Plant Be Addressed to RP Barkhurst at Address Indicated in 900523 Ltr ML20043F5121990-06-0808 June 1990 Forwards List of Directors & Officers of Entergy Operations, Inc.Operation of All Plants Transferred to Entergy on 900606 ML20043F2621990-06-0606 June 1990 Requests Withdrawal of 900504 Request to Extend Implementation Date of Amend 60 Re Transfer of Operations to Entergy,Inc.All Necessary Regulatory Approvals Obtained & License Conditions Implemented ML20043C1861990-05-29029 May 1990 Submits Response to 900426 Comments Re Investigation Case 4-88-020.Util Issued P.O. Rev Downgrading Order of Circuit Breakers & Eliminating Nuclear Requirements ML20043E5441990-05-24024 May 1990 Forwards Public Version of Change 1 to Rev 2 to EPIP EP-002-015, Emergency Responder Activation. Release Memo Encl ML20043B3501990-05-23023 May 1990 Forwards Response to Concerns Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-02.Response Withheld ML20043B3781990-05-23023 May 1990 Requests Change in NRC Correspondence Distribution List, Deleting Rt Lally & Adding DC Hintz,Gw Muench & RB Mcgehee. All Ref to Util Changed to Entergy Operations,Inc.Proposed NRC Correspondence Distribution List Encl W3P90-1314, Requests NRC Concurrence That Design/Controls/Testing to Minimize Potential for Common Header Blockage Acceptable Per 900510 Meeting.Tap Alternatives for Shutdown Cooling Level Indication Sys Discussed1990-05-21021 May 1990 Requests NRC Concurrence That Design/Controls/Testing to Minimize Potential for Common Header Blockage Acceptable Per 900510 Meeting.Tap Alternatives for Shutdown Cooling Level Indication Sys Discussed ML20043B3271990-05-21021 May 1990 Forwards Justification for Continued Operation Re Taped Splice for Use in Instrument Circuits,Per 900517 Request ML20042F5251990-05-0404 May 1990 Requests Extension of 90 Days to Implement Amend 60 to License NPF-38 in Order to Provide Securities & Exchange Commission Time to Review Transfer of Licensed Activities to Entergy Operations,Inc ML20042E5501990-04-17017 April 1990 Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Feedwater Isolation Valve Bases Change Request Dtd 891006 ML20012F4551990-04-10010 April 1990 Forwards Rev 10,Change 4 to Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld ML20012F5491990-04-0606 April 1990 Advises That Util Installed Two Addl Benchmarks for Use as Part of Basemat Surveillance Program to Increase Efficiency of Survey Readings.New Benchmarks Will Be Shown on FSAR Figure 1.2.1 as Part of Next FSAR Rev ML20012F3181990-04-0606 April 1990 Forwards Util,New Orleans Public Svc,Inc & Entergy Corp 1989 Annual Repts ML20012E8971990-03-30030 March 1990 Submits Results of Evaluation of Util 900414 Response to Station Blackout Rule (10CFR50.63).Station Mod May Be Required to Change Starting Air Sys to Accomodate Compressed Bottled Air ML20012E2551990-03-27027 March 1990 Responds to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/90-01. Corrective Actions:Qa Review of Licensed Operator Medical Exam Records Conducted & Sys Implemented to Track Types & Due Dates of Medical Exams Required for Operators ML20012E0511990-03-27027 March 1990 Forwards Rev 10,Change 3 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld ML20012D5461990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Documentation from Nuclear Mutual Ltd,Nelia & Nuclear Electric Insurance Ltd Certifying Present Onsite Property Damage Insurance ML20012D4911990-03-21021 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900208 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Investigation Rept 4-89-002.Corrective Action:Proper Sequence of Insp Hold Point Placed in Procedure Under Change Implemented on 880425 ML20012C0691990-03-14014 March 1990 Advises That Util Intends to Address Steam Generator Overfill Concerns (USI A-47) Utilizing Individual Plant Exam Process,Per Generic Ltr 89-14 ML20012C0421990-03-12012 March 1990 Forwards Questionnaire in Response to Generic Ltr 90-01, Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey. Results Not Reflective of Particular Calendar Yr ML20012B6731990-03-0707 March 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-011,Action 1.a Re Insp of Surge Line to Determine Discernible Distress or Structural Damage & Advises That Neither Surge Line Nor Affiliated Hardware Suffered Any Discernible Distress or Structural Damage ML20006F5321990-02-22022 February 1990 Forwards Payment for Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in Response to Enforcement Action EA-89-069 ML20011F1401990-02-21021 February 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-382/89-41. Corrective Action:Review of Independent Verification Requirements Re Maint Activities Performed ML20006F1731990-02-19019 February 1990 Forwards Corrected Pages 9.2-21 & 9.2-22 of Rev 3 to FSAR, Per 891214 Ltr ML20006E5781990-02-13013 February 1990 Forwards Third Refueling Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3. ML20006D0571990-02-0202 February 1990 Responds to SALP Rept for Aug 1988 - Oct 1989.Contrary to Info Contained in SALP Rept,Civil Penalty Not Assessed by State of Nv for Radioactive Matl Transport Violations.Issue Resolved W/State of Nv W/O Issuance of Civil Penalty ML20006C1631990-01-30030 January 1990 Requests Extension of Commitment Dates in Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-382/89-17 & 50-382/89-22 to 900222 & 19,respectively.Violations Covered Use of Duplex Strainers & Missing Seismic Support for Cabinet ML20006C1581990-01-29029 January 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-13 Re safety-related Open Svc Water Sys.Instruments in Place on Component Cooling Water Sys/Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Sys HXs Which Connect to Plant Monitor Computer ML20006C1611990-01-29029 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003 Re Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Instructions for Determining Acceptable Refueling Boron Concentration Provided in Procedure RF-005-001 ML20006B4121990-01-26026 January 1990 Informs That Photographic Surveys Discontinued,Per Basemat Monitoring Program.Monitoring Program Implementing Procedure Will Be Revised to Reflect Change ML20006A7091990-01-22022 January 1990 Forwards List of Individuals That No Longer Require Reactor Operator Licenses at Plant 1990-09-06
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POWER & LIGHT / NEW CALEANS LOUSANA 70174-e000 9 [504)308-2345 MIDDLE SDUTH UTluTIES SYSTEM February 27, 1985 W3P85-0449 3-A1.01.04 A4.05 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. G.W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 LP&L Report on the Evaluation of Containment Coatings
REFERENCES:
- 1) LP&L Letter, W3P85-0130, dated January 17, 1985
- 2) Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) Report, Revision 1 Titled, " Evaluation of Paint and Insulation Debris Effects on Containment Emergency Sump Performance",
dated October 1984
Dear Sir:
Louisiana Power & Light on January 17, 1985 submitted to the NRC the subject report on the evaluation of containment coatings. Subsequently, a meeting was held, at the request of the NRC, on February 11, 1985 among LP&L, Ebasco, and the NRC to review the subject report.
During the meeting, extensive discussions were held relative to the method-ologies, assumptions, and other evaluations contained in the report. The purpose of this letter is tl. refore to present LP&L's position on the various issues or questions that were raised in the meeting.
LP&L's position remains that paint coatings in the Containment are substan-tially qualified, and there would be no adverse impact on post accident fluid systems in the event of a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA).
Secondly, LP&L and Ebasco presented a highly conservative analysis which demonstrated, based on calculational methods and the postulated failure of all paint coatings, except insulated piping and painted concrete, that the performance of the SIS Sump and post accident fluid systems would not be unacceptably degraded. Finally, other issues or questions raised by the NRC have been evaluated, and while LP&L intends to perform additional confirmatory analyses, as discussed in Section VII of this letter, LP&L is convinced that the conclusions in the report remain valid.
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Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 Page 2 The issues or information addressed in this letter are the following:
I Qualification of Paint II Analysis III NPSH Available To HPSI and CS Pumps IV Impact of Paint on TSP Baskets V Jet Impingement VI Postulated Ingestion of Paint Fragments VII Testing and. Surveillance VIII Conclusions A discussion of these subjects follows in the stated order.
I. Qualification of Paint A. General The protective coating systems and the applications at Waterford Unit 3 are considered to be substantially qualified, and the measures and corrective actions previously taken by LP&L provide substantial assurance that the paint coating system will not fail under DBA conditions.
FSAR Section 6.1.2.1 and LP&L response to NRC Question 281.2 describe LP&L's program for protective coatings. The NRC re-viewed this program and concluded in SSER 1 that the protective coating systems and the applications were acceptable and met the requirements of Appendix B to 10CFR50.
B. Coatings DBA Tested and Qualified LP&L conducted an evaluation of the paint coatings inside con-tainment, reference FSAR Section 6.1.2.1, and LP&L determined that paint coatings applied to significant surface areas inside the containment are in substantial compliance with ANSI N102.1, N5.12, and N101.4. These paint coatings were tested and qual-ified under DBA conditions. The coatings were evaluated at independent laboratories or at the coating manufacturer's labo-ratories for stability, radiation, chemical, and fire effects in accordance with the requirements of ANSI Standards N5.12 and N101.2. Also, the Quality Assurance during the manufacturing, transportation, and storage for field coating work was in compliance with ANSI N101.4, in conjunction with the general QA requireregts of ANSI N45.2. Coatings applied to approximate 269,950ft}y 91,900 ft of steel containment vessel plates and of uninsulated piping and structural main equipment, reference FSAR Table 6.1-3, was tested and qualified under DBA conditions.
Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 Page 3 C. Coatings Not DBA Tested and Not Qualified The only_ source of_ unqualified paint coatings is due to paint coatings applied to equipment purchased prior to LP&L's commit-ment (March 1975) to_the NRC Green Book, WASH-1309. These paint coatings were-not DBA tested and did not require QA compliance.
These paint coatings, however, were evaluated and were determined to be adequate for the intended function as recommended by the manufacturer. The. application in the shop was done in accordance with a written procedure as submitted for review and approval.
Further, paint coatings applied to equipment in this category-received an evaluation as soon as the equipment was delivered to the site, and where necessary,_ qualified coatings were reapplied in acc rdance with Regulatory Guide 1.54. Approximately 13,950 2
ft of paint coatings received this level of evaluation and were applied to various equipment inside containment, reference LP&L response to NRC Question 281.2.
D. Corrective Measures Substantial corrective measures have been taken by LP&L to correct any deficiencies in the paint coatings.
Coating problems identified by Sline Industrial Painters Incor-porated were documented in Ebasco Nonconformance Report W3-3648-and corrected by LP&L. LP&L directed Ebasco to conduct an evaluation of the entire. coating system inside the Containment vessel. A 100% inspection and repair plan of the coating system was developed and fully implemented by LP&L and Ebasco. All defective areas were marked, hand tool cleaned, or blast cleaned and'recoated using approved specifications and procedures in accordance with ANSI N101.2, N5.12, and N101.4. The inspection and repair actions taken by LP&L were reported to the NRC in Significant Construction Deficiency (SCD) 56.
Further, an in-situ DBA test was conducted. Three containment liner surface areas were selected. Steam was applied on each area via the chamber at temperatures and pressures simulating DBA values. Also, borated water simulating the containment spray i solution was poured into the chamber and allowed to come'in contact with the paint coating. The paint coating surface area was examined after the test, and the coating system did not exhibit any failures. The in-situ test and results were also l
reported to the NRC in SCD 56.
L The NRC, based on the foregoing corrective actions, documented I- full closure of SCD 56.
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t Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 Page 4 II. Analysis The paint coating analysis performed by Ebasco was a highly conserva-tive analysis, and the analysis demonstrated that there would be no adverse effect on post accident fluid systems. The assumptions and derivations for generalized motion and transport of paint particles that were developed by Ebasco in the Texas Utilities Generating Company Report (TUGCO), reference two (2), were utilized. The assumptions and the nethodologies employed constituted gross conservatisms. The following is a summary of the analysis.
A. General The analysis assumed that, except for insulated piping and painted concrete, all paint coatings inside Containment, regard-less of qualification, failed. The analysis then assumed that all the failed paint would fall to the bottom of the containment and thereby be available for transport to the SIS Sump region.
In actuality, a portion of the paint would remain on higher levels. Transport of the paint was analyzed in two parts, that paint that falls far from the SIS Sump (far field) and that paint that falls closer than a perimeter of 3.42 feet from the SIS Sump (near field).
B. Far Field It was determined that paint falling far from the SIS Sump could physically only reach the SIS Sump by traveling through four critical regions because of the structural configuration of the Containment. The water velocities in each of these four critical regions were then calculated by another conservative assumption that the total flow of the HPSI pumps would pass through each critical region, i.e., the break was assumed to be near the critical region and then the transport of paint fragments to the SIS Sump was analyzed. The analysis determined that the velocity in only one critical region was marginally sufficient, by 0.071 ft/sec, to transport paint from a quadrant of the containment to the quadrant where the SIS Sump was located. However, based on the water velocity at the SIS Sump screen documented in FSAR Section 6.2.2.2.2.1, a water drift velocity in the SIS Sump region of 0.0227 ft/sec was determined which is insufficient to transport the paint particles fragments which were postulated to fail. Therefore, the analysis thus determined that paint falling outside a perimeter of 3.42 feet from the SIS Sump, which would constitute the majority of the paint assumed to fail (approxi-mately 99.5%), would settle to the bottom of the containment and would not clog the SIS Sump screens.
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.Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 IPage 5 C. Near Field The transport of paint fragments near the SIS Sump was modeled by defining an inclusion area, a rectangular region bounded by perimeters of 2.04 and 3.42 feet from the SIS Sump, around the SIS Sump whereby paint fragments could reach the SIS Sump verti-cal screens. The inclusion area around the SIS Sump was de-termined by applying the transport theory utilized in the'IUGC0 report. The time-required for a paint fragment to settle to the containment concrete floor was determined.~ By using the local
-velocities of the water near the SIS Sump, documented in FSAR K Section 6.2.2.2.2.1, the minimum and maximum distances that the i paint fragment could reach the SIS Sump vertical screens was determined, or an inclusion area, since paint fragments farther
'than a distance of 3.42 feet would settle to the concrete floor and paint.fragnents closer than a distance of 2.04 feet would settle on the SIS Sump horizontal screen. The SIS Sump horizontal screen was assumed to be clogged due to the assumed failure of the paint coatings.
.Various conservatisms were applied in defining the inclusion area. A paint fragment size of 0.078 inches was assumed as that size was the minimum size that would cause blockage of the SIS Sump screens. The maximum water level or the maximum time
-required for the paint fragment to reach the containment concrete floor was utilized. The maximum drag coefficient was assumed to act on the paint fragment to maximize'the paint fragment settling time. A horizontal orientation of the paint fragment was assumed to maximize the paint fragment settling time. All paint fragments falling in the inclusion area were modeled as hitting the water surface and stopping, rather than intruding into the water surface, thus again maximizing the settling time of the paint fragment.
'All paint.directly above the inclusion areg was assumed to fall in the inclusion area. 'A total of 1745 ft of paint was assumed.tg fall in the inclusion area. As a benchmark only about 13,950 ft of the containment paint is not qualified. Since approximately 99.5% of the unqualified paint would fall in the far field regions of the contain9ent, only about 0.5% gf the unqualified paint or about 70 ft (compared to 1745 ft
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assumed in the analysis) could be available to fall in the near field region. Further, a significant amount of the paint dislodg-ing directly above the near field region would be captured or blocked by intervening grating floors or. structures.
The analysis applied still another highly conservative assumption, ;
that each and every paint fragment of 0.078 inches would align
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Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 Page 6 itself one next to the other, with no overlap, on the SIS Sump vertical screens. No credit was taken for the horizontal screen, i.e., it was assumed to be blocked. The analysis determined that using the foregoing highly conservative methodology and analysis that about 34.5% of the vertical screen area would not be blocked. This unclogged area of the SIS Sump vertical screens is more than sufficient to prevent pump vortexing and to provide for adequate NPSH to ensure proper operation of HPSI and CS pumps.
III. NPSH Available To HPSI And CS Pumps NPSH evaluations assuming the clogging of SIS Sump screens have been previously performed, and the results of these evaluations have demonstrated that adequate NPSH is available ensure proper opera-tion of the HPSI and CS pumps. These evaluations are documented in the responses to NRC Questions 211.64 and 211.10 and FSAR Sections 6.2.2.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2.2.3. A basis for the NPSH information documented in the foregoing FSAR questions and sections is a full scale hydraulic model test that was performed by Western Canada Hydraulic Laboratories, (WCHL).
The test conducted by WCHL was a 1:1 scale model of the Waterford Unit 3 SIS Sump, intakes, screen cage, and all containment geometry significantly affecting the approach flow conditions. The head lost tests were conducted with the top screen completely blocked and with 50% of the vertical screens blocked.
Based on the WCHL tests the maximum screen loss was found to be 0.098 ft. at 11,780 GPM flow and 50% screen blockage, For post LOCA recirculation mode, only the operations of the containment spray pump and the high pressure safety injection pump is required with the combined flow rate of 3140 GPM capacity. This flow is substantially less than the 11,780 GPM flow used to determine the maximum screen loss. Since the head loss through the screen is proportional to velocity head, measured screen loss can be extrapolated to 3140 GPM flow and 90% blocked screen, by the calculation shown here:
Screen loss = (3,140)2 x (0.098) x (*9) = 0.0225 ft.
(11,780)2 (.5)2 Thus, 0.0225 ft. is the screen loss at 90% blocked screen and 3140 GPM flow. The screen loss with 11,780 GPM flow and 90% screen blockage is 0.317 ft.
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t Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 Page 7 The NPSH required and NPSH available are shown here, reference FSAR Sections 6.2.'2.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2.2.3, for Containment Spray (CS) and High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pumps:
Pump Flow (GPM) NPSH (Available) NPSH Required % Margin CS 2250 27.27 14 94.8 HPS1 890 25.35 18 40.8 The NPSH margins available for CS and HPSI are 94.8% and 40.8%.
Thus, the calculated NPSH screen losses of 0.0225 ft. and 0.317 ft..
represent an insignificant 0.2% and 2% respectively of the NPSH required for CS and even less for HPSI. Therefore, 90% blockage of the S S Sump screen has a minimal effect on pump NPSH.
IV. Impact of Paint on Trisodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate (TSP) Baskets Postulated paint blockage of the TSP basket is not expected to have any adverse effect since the TSP is expected to be substantially dissolve prior to the recirculation mode.
TSP is used as a pH control agent for water circulated within con-tainment following a LOCA. Borated water from containment spray and safety injection tanks characteristically exhibit a pH below 5. TSP is utilized to raise and stabilize the pH to approximately 7 to reduce the possibility of chloride stress corrosion cracking. FSAR i Figure 6.1-1 shows the length of time necessary to reach a pH of 7 is between 2-3 hours depending on the boron concentration in the con-tainment spray. The FSAR data was conservatively calculated using a water temperature of 120'F in the SIS Sump.
Combustion Engineering (CE) has measured the dissolution rate of TSP in water under conditions much more conservative than would be encountered during Containment Spray System operation. TSP granules were compressed under a pressure of 20,000 psi into cylindrical pelletshavingdimensionsof0.53inchesindiamegerby0.78 inches in length and having a bulk density of 1.65 gm/cm , which is higher than the density of the crystalline TSP. This form of TSP has a lower area to volume ratio and lower solubility than the bulk chemical, so represents a conservative form for testing the rate of dissolution.
In stagnant water at b5'F, the pellets dissolved in 375 seconds. At 200'F, dissolution time was reduced to 250 seconds. The report concludes that dissolution rate of TSP increases with temperature, and for granular TSP is almost instantaneous.
FSAR Section 6.1.3 indicates that containment spray water will dissolve the TSP within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> following CSAS, with approximately one-fourth dissolved during the injection mode. Even if the top and
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e Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 a Page 8 i
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, outward faces of the TSP baskets were to be completely covered with coating particles and flowthrough action were inhibited, it is evident from the solubility data that so long as the TSP is in I
contact with water - even completely stagnant water - it will dissolve, and within a short period of time.
Further, chloride stress corrosion cracking is a long term effect.
Even if partial blockage of the TSP baskets caused an increase in the time required to reach pH 7, the relative times involved would not decrease the effectiveness of the pH control system.
i t V. Jet Impingement A review of the jet impingement drawings was conducted. None of the Jets' destruction areas (7L/D criteria of NUREG-0897, Rev. I Draft) are within the near field of the SIS Sump. Therefore, the results of the subject report remain valid considering the 7L/D criterion.
FSAR Figures 1.2-17 through 1.2-22 provide General Arrangement Plans and Sections of the Reactor Building. As depicted by these figures, the RCS is surrounded with reinforced concrete. Also, the Main Steam Lines are more than 50 ft. horizontally and 50 ft. vertically from the SIS Sump, and there are intervening structures.
FSAR Figures 1.2-18 and 1.2-20 show blowout areas by each Reactor Coolant Pump. However, the closest break is more than 15 ft. verti-cally and more than 35 ft. horizontally (around corners) from the SIS i Sump. ,
VI. Postulated Ingestion of Paint Fragments
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LP&L also evaluated the potential adverse effects of the postulated ingestion of paint fragments into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the reactor core. The evaluation determined that there is no
' , adverse effect on post accident fluid systems as a result of the postulated ingestion of paint coating fragments into the RCS and the reactor core.
Laboratory tests conducted by Paint Manufacturers and information provided by Paint Manufacturers indicate that the failure mode of the primer and topcoat coating combinations applied at Waterford Unit 3 is blistering or cracking, i.e. the flaking or peeling mode. Flaking or peeling is the failure of the paint coating film by flakes of small particles, 1/8 inch to l' inch particles, reference TUCCO report. Thus, any postulated failure of paint coatings would be large particles in the range of 1/8 inch to 1 inch in size rather than the small particle size (0.078 inches) assumed in the sump
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Mr. G.WL Knighton W3P85-0449 Page 9 i blockage analysis.. The amount of paint available for ingestion by the RCS and the reactor core was determined by assuming that the l paint coatings failed as fragment 0.078 inches in size and could pass i through the SIS Sump vertical screens. This assumption thus provided a' conservative basis for the ingestion evaluation.
- As stated previously, the SIS Sump will not pass any paint coating particles greater than 0.078 inches in size. Combustion Engineering
~(CE) han confirmed that particulate matter 0.090 inches in diameter will have no detrimental effect on the operation of the HPSI pumps.
CE has-also confirmed that particulate matter 0.250 inches in diameter will have no detrimental effect on operation of the HPSI pumps. The containment spray nozzle is not susceptible to blockage since the nozzle throat diameter is much greater than the postulated paint coating particle assumed to ingested, i.e. 0.375" is much greater than 0.078". Other various types of equipment, such as valves, pumps, heat exchangers, orifice flow elements, and vortex breakers s-
'were also evaluated, and it was determined that paint coating particles 0.078 inches in diameter assumed to be ingested would have no' detrimental effect.
-The effect of the postulated ingestion of paint coating into the reactor core was also evaluated, and the evaluation determined that there is no detrimental'effect on the core. Any paint coating blockage assumed to occur in the core would have the greatest propen-sity for occurring at the fuel spacer grid - fuel rod intersections.
FSAR Section 4.2.2.1, FSAR Table 4.2-1, and FSAR Figures 4.2-8 and 4.2-9 depict the configuration and dimensions of the fuel spacer grids. By design, particulate matter up to 0.090 inches in size will' not become lodged in this area.
The distance between fuel spacer grids on a fuel assembly is approxi-mately 15 inches. Therefore, even given the unrealistic assumption that at the spacer grid-fuel rod intersection paint coating blockage did occur, there would be cross flow in the regions of the fuel assembly where there is no fuel spacerJyrids, and therefore there would be adequate cooling of the core.
L Finally, an experimental and analytical program has been conducted to determine the effects of fuel assembly coolant flow maldistribution during normal reactor operation, reference FSAR Section 4.2.3.2.16.
t The program and results included the following:
i a) The assembly inlet flow maldistribution caused by blockage of a core support plate flow hole. Evaluation of the flow recovery' data indicated that even the complete blockage of a core support plat 2 flow hole would not produce a W-3, J
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Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449 Page 10 Burnout Heat Flux Correlation, DNBR of less than 1.0 even
- though the reactor might be operating at a power sufficient to produce a DNBR of 1.3 without the blockage.
b) The flow maldistribution within the assembly caused by complete blockage of one to nine channels was also evaluated.
Flow distributions were measured at positions upstream and downstream of a blockage of one to nine channels. The influence of the blockage diminished very rapidly in the upstream direction. Analysis of the data for a single channel blockage indicated that such a blockage would not produce a W-3 DNBR of less than 1.0 downstream of the blockage even though the reactor might be operating at a power sufficient to produce a DNBR of 1.3 without the blockage.
The experimental and analytical program demonstrated that, even at normal power conditions, the influence of blockage in the core diminishes very rapidly.
VII. Testing and Surveillance Surveillance and testing measures have already been implemented by LP&L.
As stated in Section I of this letter, the containment coati:?gs are substantially qualified. Previously identified coating deficiencies have been identified, and corrective measares have been taken, including 100% inspection of coating systems and repair of all deficient areas in accordance with approved specifications and procedures pursuant to ANSI N101.2, N5.12, and N101.4.
Also, as stated in Section I of this letter, an in-situ test of the containment coating was conducted by Ebasco. The testing simulated DBA conditions in the containment and applied borated water, simulat-ing the containment spray solution. The testing demonstrated the integrity of the coating system.
VIII. Conclusions LP&L strongly believes that by virtue of the conservative analyses and the evaluations presented in the subj,ect report and the informa-tion presented herein that the highest degree of assurance has been provided substantiating the integrity of the Unterford Unit 3 paint coatings and the acceptable performance of post accident fluid systems. Accordingly, LP&L recommends that the license condition on paint coatings be rescinded for Waterford Unit 3.
9 Mr. G.W. Knighton W3P85-0449
- Page 11 Notwithstanding the foregoing position, LP&L intends to implement additional confirmatory measures. LP&L will perfonn additional confirmatory evaluations which include a three dimensional analysis of the near field effect of paint coating fragsents on the SIS Sump and a confirmatory evaluation of the particle size failure characteristics of the paint coatings used at Waterford Unit 3. The results of the analysis and confirmatory evaluation are expected to be completed by 1 April 1985. The NRC will be notified by letter should the analysis or confirmatory evaluation significantly impact the conclusions stated in the subject report or in this letter.
Finally, LP&L will perform a thorough and careful visual inspection of all affected areas of the containment using optical aids, such as binoculars to detect current or incipient failures of coated surfaces. The visual inspections will be implemented at each refueling outage, and the results of the visual inspections will be reviewed and documented using currently approved LP&L procedures.
LP&L will perform additional inspections, evaluations, or testing as appropriate in the unlikely event that the visual inspection indicates significant coating failure or significant degradation.
Repair of all deficient areas would be performed in accordance with approved specifications and procedures pursuant to ANSI N101.2, N5.12, and N101.4. LP&L believes these confirmatory actions assure reasonable safety.
Please feel free to contact me or Robert J. Murillo, Safety and Environ-mental Licensing Unit Coordinator, should you have any qtestions concerning this letter.
Very truly yours, K. W. Cook Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager KWC/RJM/ch cc: E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, R.D. Martin, J. Wilson, G.L. Constable
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