ML20133D191

Forwards FEMA & Evaluation of 850521 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise.No Deficiencies Affecting Public Health & Safety Identified

ML20133D191
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	10/02/1985
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Dewitt R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
NUDOCS 8510080263
Download: ML20133D191 (2)

Text

,

OCT 0 21985 Docket No. 50-155 Consumers Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. B. DeWitt Vice President Nuclear Operations 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated September 9,1985, and associated final exercise evaluations on the offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted on May 21, 1985.

This was a full-participation exercise for Charlevoix and Emnet Counties and a partial-participation exercise for the State of Michigan. This final exercise evaluation lists several recommendations (which are referred to in the FEMA letter and attachments as other deficiencies or recommendations) regarding the offsite emergency response plans for the area around the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant.

Based on the performance of the offsite agencies during the exercise, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies affecting public health and safety in the event of an accident at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant, as a result, the approval under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect.

We fully recognize that the recommendations to be implemented may involve actions by other parties and political institutions which are not under your direct control. Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant to be addressed by you as well as others.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Comission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

" Original signed by W.D. Shafer" W. D. Shafer, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosure:

As stated See Attached List For Distribution 8510080263 851002 PDR ADOCK 05000155 i /h / (

p PDR

Consumers Power-Company 2 0 2 1985 Distribution cc w/ enclosure:

~D. J. VandeWalle, Director Nuclear Licensing D. P. Hoffman, Plant Superintendent DCS/RSB (RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Nuclear Facilities and Environmental Monitoring Section M p Philijs Boyd' h,a 10/02/85 L

M4

+ %v i Federal Emergency Management Agency f'

I j Washington, D.C. 20472 o o W SEP - 91955 MEMORANDtJ4 FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness .

and Engineering Response Of fice of Inspection and Enforcenent U.S. Nu lear Re 1 'ory Canmission FROM: rd . kr mm '*" ,

Assistant Associate Director Of fice of Natur'al and Techn01ogical

. Hazards Programs

~

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report of the May 21, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiologicai Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Big Rock Point Yclear Power Station Attached are two copies of the Exercise Report of the May 21,1985, joint exercise of the of fsite radiological epergency preparedness plans for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Station. \This exercise involved partial participation for the State of Michigan 'a'nd full participation for Charlevoix and Emmet Counties. The report dated July 24, 1985, was prepared by Region V of the Federal Emergency tbnagenent Agency (FEMA).

Although there were Category B deficiencies observed at the exercise, they did not seriously detract fran the overall denonstrated capability to protect the health and safety of the public. The State is preparing a schedule of corrective actions. As soon as they are received, we will send you a copy.

However, since there were no identified impediments to protecting the public health and safety during the exercise, the approval under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect.

If you have any questions, pl ease contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.

Attachments -

As Stated p

l EXERCISE REPORT BIC ROCK POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY JOINT EXERCISE .

Facility Location: Located in the State of Michigan, Charlevoix County.

Exercise Date: May 21, 1985 Date of Report: July 24, 1985

Participants:

State of Michigan (partial); Charlevoix County (full); Emmet County (full); and Consumers Power Company (full)

TEDERAL EHERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION V '

NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION 300 SOUTH WACKER DRIVE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606 f$ -

~jlJ T S V

'l5pf

f~

s , t I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

J33e State of Michigan 3 Charlevoix County 4 Emmet County 6 II. EXERCISE REPORT '

A. Introduction 8 Exercise Background 8 Participating and Non-Participating State 8 and Local Governments List of Evaluators 9 Evaluation Criteria 9 Exercise Objectives 9 Summary of Scenario 13 Ptate and Local Resources Planned 14 To be Used in the Exercise Deficiencies Noted In Past Exercises 15 Exercise Objectives Still to be 16 Effectively Achieved B. Narrative 17 State of Michigan 17 l

Charlevoix County 20 Emmet County 27 III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES Jgyj!

State of Michigan Deficiencies Affecting Public Health 36 and Safety other Deficiencies 37 Recommendations 38 2

l

-J

s , e

- Charlevoix County Deficiencies Affecting Public Health 39 and Safety Other Deficiencies 40 Recommendations 42 Emmet County Deficiencies Affecting Public Health 43 and Safety Other Deficiencies 44 Recommendations 45 I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

State of Michigan The May 21, 1985 Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise involved partial participation by the State Michigan. The State EOC was staffed primarily to support Charlevoix and Emmet Counties emergency operations during the exercise. The State of Michigan demonstrated the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. The State further demonstrated the capability to communicate with appropriate organizations through the use of primary means of communications (telephone and LEIN) and alternate means of communications. (datafax/ radio)

The State conveyed the protective action recommendations provided by the utility to the Counties within the prescribed time constraints in NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1. This included the ability to coordinate news releases and to provide the media with concise emergency status information.

The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC), located in the Holiday Inn at Petoskey, was activated prior to exercise initiation as stipulated in the scenario. It was operational by 0840. All required maps and charts were available. Additional charts were used during news briefings and in-house capability to produce visual aids was provided by the utility. The utility also provided administrative and clerical staff to support JPIC operations. A copy machine was available to JPIC staff. Approximately 30 typewriters and telephones were available for use by the media representatives. Eight journalism students (six from Petoskey High School and two from Charlevoix High School) supplemented the actual media representation. These students are complimented on their role-playing, particularly in their abi.lity to formulate penetrating questions that stimulated thought by the JPIC spokespersons.

3

. , s i

~

Communications demonstrated at the JPIC consisted of commercial telephone. Data f ax provided hardcopy capability between the JPIC and the State EOC in Lansing. Media kits were provided to media representatives, including the students acting as media representatives. Frequent briefings (nine in all) were conducted during the exercise. The Emergency Informatien brochure was '

referred to several times as a guide for media representatives for -

7 evacuation instructional information.

Briefings did include instructions for transients, persons with special needs, information concerning evacuation of school children, locations of reception and care centers and telephone numbers to call in emergencies and for assistance.

Briefings were conducted in an orderly manner. A State representative served as a moderator during the briefings. He introduced each spokesperson during the briefings and directed questions from media representatives to the appropriate spokespersons. A State spokesperson in addition to the moderator participated in each briefing to explain actions being taken by the State.

A utility spokesperson was assisted by a technical representative to explain plant conditions and a health physicist to explain radiological considerations. All briefings deliberately avoided the use of technical jargon and explanations were easy to understand.

Charlevoix County Alerting and mobilization of the EOC staff was initiated at 0844, i utilizing written call lists, following a call from the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant on the dedicated phone. The EOC positions as identified in the plan were fully staffed by 0942.

The Charlevoix County spokesperson at the JPIC was prepositioned.

The EOC and JPIC staff demonstrated the ability to maintain staf fing around the clock through either a shif t change or double staffing. Both spokespersons at the JPIC representing Charlevoix County took active parts in briefings, coordination of information and in fulfilling their responsibilities. There was no staff assigned to rumor control. The County spokesperson was the l individual sitting closest to the rumor control phone and inherited the job of answering it.

It is recommended that hard copy capability be established between the JPIC and the Charlevoix County EOC to enable EOC staff to see what is being released at the JPIC. )

The Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners was in charge of the EOC staff and effectively coordinated County activities.

Periodic briefings were conducted by the EOC staff who were involved in decision making as appropriate. The Governor initiated a disaster declaration at 0957. The Charlevoix County Commission Chairman questioned the Governor's declaration. The County remained at the Alert classification without a County Declaration of Disaster until the General Emergency classification was declared.

4

• , i Written messages were used and copies were distributed. Some information in the written messages was not part of the briefings which would have helped to highlight activities within the County.

Message handling and preparation can be improved in that some key messages were never written out and/or logged. It is recommended that the utility liaison in the Charlevoix County EOC provide more complete information on the plant conditions such as time the -

release started, type of release, duration of release, etc.

The Sheriff's communication center and the adjacent operations room comprise the County EOC. The Charlevoix County EOC is approximately 41/2 miles from the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant. Even though the plume blew toward the Charlevoix County EOC, the decision was made to shelter and continue operations rather than relocate to the alternate County EOC at Boyne City.

The EOC staff did discuss how they would deploy to the alternate EOC if it was ordered. The appropriate displays and maps were available in the EOC, the status board was maintained and emergency classification levels were posted. Telephone was the principal

means of communication for the EOC staff. Radio back-up communications were available through the Sheriff's radio and the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN). Hardcopy capability was demonstrated between the State and Charlevoix County.

Charlevoix County demonstrated its ability to alert the public within the 5-mile EPZ and to dissiminate an initial instructional 1

, message within 15 minutes over EBS. Prescripted messages were not l used. The EBS station was contacted two more times when the two evacuaction protective action recommendations were ordered.

Geographical landmarks were used to describe the affected areas in all messages released through EBS and the JPIC.

Charlevoix County demonstrated its organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of part of the plume EPZ through EOC staf f planning and by moving 25 students from the Charlevoix High School to the reception / congregate care facility at the East Jordan High School. Charlevoix County established and manned one access control point. Additional access control points were discussed during EOC briefings by the Sheriffs Department representative.

Arrangements were made for transportation of the mobility impaired persons. Information on mobility impaired persons is in written form and particular needs are identified. The orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ was also organizationally demonstrated through planning by the staff in the EOL.

A sufficient supply of dosimetry kits are available for emergency i personnel at Charlevoix. Dosimetry kits were issued to field personnel and included all required items with the exception of proper instructions on dosimeter use and record cards. Emergency workers were instructed to report their initial and final dosimeter readings to the County Radiological Defense Of ficer. The utilization of dosimeter record cards is recommended to ensure periodic recording of readings by emergency workers. Potassium iodide (KI) was issued to emergency workers but due to plant conditions the State never ordered emergency workers to take it.

l 5

The evacuees from the Charlevoix High School were monitored upon I arrival at the East Jordan reception / congregate care and decontamination center. The decontamination station was set up at the entrance of the school. Two teams with appropriate equipment checked each evacuee for contamination. Plastic bags were available for contaminated clothing and other articles. The East Jordan Fire Department washed down the school bus on a grass area -

adjacent to the parking lot prior to unloading the evacuees. After monitoring was completed .each person was registered. Commercial telephone was the primary means of communication with the Charlevoix County EOC. It is recommended radio back-up between the reception / congregate care center and the Charlevoix County EOC be considered. A back-up staf f roster was available to indicate around the clock capability.

Emmet County Emmet County demonstrated the ability to mobilize staf f and activate facilities following receipt of the Alert notification.

The notification message was received over the LEIN telecopy from the Michigan State Police Post in Petoskey. The Sheriff's Dispatch Center mobilized the EOC utilizing a written call list. All positions listed in the plan were staf fed. However, a complete shif t' change did not occur at the EOC nor the JPIC.

The primary communication syetem was the LEIN telecopier which interlinked Emmet County with the State and Charlevoix County.

Backup was provided by commercial telephone which also served as the primary communication system for the JPIC, schools, hospitals and EBS. Backup to these facilities would be provided by a combination of police / fire radios and squad cars.

The EOC was established in the County Sheriff's Department building. This location proved to be adequate for the demands of this exercise. Extended use facilities were available in the jail area of the building and a propane generator was demonstrated as part of the scenario situation calling for a power outage.

Appropriate maps were available and emergency classifications were posted. A status board was centrally located and updated frequently.

Participating EOC staf f displayed professionalism and carried out their assignments promptly. They were effectively managed by the Emergency Services Director who functioned as the Chief of Staff.

He consistently updated his staf f on important changes in the emergency situation and coordinated frequent multi-departmental briefings. The staff was involved in decision making as appropriate.

6

The staff in the County EOC was unclear on the role of the County PIO at the JPIC. The PIO at the County EOC was relying on the PIO at the JPIC.to activate the EBS and draft emergency public instructions for the County, based on information transmitted by ,

telephone from the EOC. The Emmet County EOC was unaware that when '

Charlevoix County activated the EBS it had been activated for both Counties and the appropriate emergency messages had been drafted .

and released by Charlevoix County.

The PIO at the JPIC received information via telephone from the County EOC for inclusion into news releases. This information was coordinated with the other PIO's at the JPIC.

The County Sheriff's Department conducted supplemental route alerting and a marine patrol was dispatched to warn boaters and individuals along the shoreline of the need to evacuate the area.

The representative in the EOC from the Department of Social Services was aware of the existence of a list of the mobility impaired individuals residing within the 5 mile EPZ, however none reside in Emmet County. There was an evacuation of two senior citizens, transported by bus from the Friendship Center at Petoskey to the reception / congregate care center at the Bear Creek Township Hall.

Personnel of the County Sherif f's Department were dispatched to the intersection of Horton Bay Road and U.S. Highway 31 where they controlled access to.the evacuated area. There was simulation of the dispatch of personnel from the Public Works Department to transport and set-up barricades at other access control points.

The officers were knowledgeable of evacuation routes, access control procedures, relocation centers and procedures for ingress / egress of emergency vehicles.

There are sufficient and appropriate resources available to keep evacuation routes clear during inclement weather and in the event of stalled or wrecked cars.  ;

There was a demonstration of the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure as demonstrated at the County EOC and reception / congregate care and decontamination center at the Bear Creek Township Hall. However, the two patrolmen dispatched to the intersection of Parton Bay Road and U.S. 31 were not issued dosimeters and/or TLDs. The patrolmen were issued KI along with instructions for its use prior to their departure. The County Radiological Defense Officer and Health Department representative at the EOC were knowledgeable on the use of the KI. Due to plant conditions the State never ordered emergency workers to take KI.

7

. l The Bear Creek Township Hall would be unsuitable for congregate care of evacuees for an extended period. The facility is located well outside the EPZ, however due to its size it could only house approximately 25 evacuees. The mass care of evacuees at Bear Creek Township facilities would be provided only until the evacuees could be transported to a designated congregate care center. It is recommended facilities listed in the County plan be utilized in -

future exercises. The center was activated after the notice was given by EOC staf f to mobilize. The center was manned by representatives from the County Health, Social Services, Fire Services and the American Red Cross.

There was not a system in place for traf fic control of incoming vehicles. The movement of people through monitoring, decontamination and registration was arranged in a manner that could possibly spread contamination.

11. Exercise Report A. Introduction Exercise Background This was the fourth joint exercise for the State of Michigan, Charlevoix and Emmet Counties and the Consumers Power Company resulting from a simulated accident at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant. The first joint exercise was June 24, 1980 and involved full participation by the State of Michigan, Charlevoix and Emmet Counties and the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant. The second joint exercise was April 6, 1982 and involved partial participation by the State of Michigan and full participation by Charlevoix and Emmet Counties and the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant. The third joint exercise was July 25-26, 1983 and involved full participation by the State of Michigan, Charlevoix and Emmet Counties and the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant. This report addresses the most recent joint exercise for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant conducted May 21, 1985. This joint exercise involved partial participation by the State of Michigan and full participation by Charlevoix and Emmet Counties and the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant.

Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments The 5-mile inhalation emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant impacts on the northwestern portion of the lower pennisula of Michigan and encompasses portions of Charlevoix and Emmet Counties as well as Lake Michigan. The 1980 permanent population within the 5- mile EPZ is estimated at 8,430. The influx of summer vacationers increases the population another 2,530 people.

8 L_ J

- The Michigan Counties of Charlevoix, Emmet, Cheboygan, Otsego, Antrim, Leelanau and Beaver Island are included in the 30-mile ingestion EPZ. The 1980 permanent population estimate is 55,440 people. These Counties did not demonstrate the procedures for implementation of ingestion EPZ protective actions as this activity was beyond the scope of this exercise. This exercise was conducted during normal working .

hours.

List of Evaluators For this exercise, there was a total of nine (9) federal evaluators observing off-site exercise activities. On-site exercise activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.The off-site evaluation team included six (6) evaluators from FEMA Region V and three (3) contract evaluators from Argonne National Laboratory (ANL).

The evaluator assignments were as follows. ,

Of f-Site Exercise Evaluation Team Director Wallace Weaver, FEMA State of Michigan Evalation Team Robert Shapiro, Team Leader, FEMA Ray Kellogg, FEMA Charlevoix County Evaluation Team Dan Bement, Team Leader, FEMA Bill Gasper, ANL Walter O'Keefe, FEMA Ray Kellogg, FEMA Emmet County Evaluation Team Woodie Curtis, Team Leader, FEMA Sue Ann Curtis, ANL Ray Kellogg, FEMA Frank Kay, ANL Evaluation Criteria The plans being evaluated by this exercise were developed using the " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1). Therefore, these criteria and the exercrit based on these criteria, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983, were used for exercise evaluation.

Exercise Objectives Objectives for this exercise were eclected from among the 35 standard objectives listed in Tab "M" of the " Modular Format For Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise .

Observations and Evaluation" dated June, 1983. The objective f numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".

9

e The State of Michigan selected the following six (6) objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

3. Demonstrate the ability to make decisiens and to coordinate emergency activities from the State Emergency i Operations Center (SEOC). .

Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all 5.

appropriate locations and organizations from the SEOC.

13. Demonstrate the ability to alert the public within the 5-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.

1

14. Demonstarate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion, via the Joint Public Information Center with limited State staffing, f 24. Demonstrate the ability to brief the sedia in a clear, accurate, and timely manner at the Joint Public Information Center with limited State staffing.

25. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

Charlevoix County selected the following twenty (20) exercise objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to b'e demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff the EOC and JPIC and maintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 5-mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes (using simulated activ,stion of the siren system and contact to local EBS).

14. Demonstrate ability to formuiste and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely f ashion (via the JPIC and simulated EBS messages).

10

__ . _ _ . _ . . _ - _ _ - _ - - _ - ~ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to j manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume 1 EPZ.

! 16. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

2

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

$ 18. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.

19. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer K1, once the decision has been made to do so.

24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner at the JPIC.

' 25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of inforestion released (at the E30 and JPIC).

26. Demonstrate ability to establish 'and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

, 28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees (by opening one facility).

4

29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for

' decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

Emmet County selected the following eighteen (18) exercise ob jr:c t ive s , including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff the EOC and JPIC and maintain staffing around the clock.

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

11

a

- 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 5- ,

mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes (using simulated activation of the siren system and contact to local EBS).

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion (via the JPIC and simulated EBS messages).

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

18. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

24 . Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner at the JPIC.

25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released (at the EOC and JPIC).

27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees (by opening one facility).

29. Demanstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

12

. l Summary of Scenario The Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant radiological emergency preparedness scenario developed by writers from the utility and the State took into consideration deficiencies identified in past exercises in order to develop a scenario that would allow demonstration of past exercise defielencies as well as -

allow demonstration of exercise objectives selected by the State of Michigan, Charlevoix and Emmet Counties.

Representatives from the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant, the State of Michigan, Charlevoix and Emmet Counties and FEMA Region V net on February 11, 1985 at _ the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant to select the exercise objectives and to discuss the scope of the exercise. Submission of the scenario to FEMA Region V was according to deadlines outlined in Nuclear Regulatory (NRC) Cummission and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidance. Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company Inc. reviewed the off-site portion of the scenario for FEMA and found the scenario adequate to exercise the objectives stlected.

At 0830 Maintenance is performing a monthly battery inspection. In the emergency diesel generator room, a repairman drops his tool kit onto the unshielded batteries.

These batteries are and explode spraying acid onto the repairman's legs. These batteries must be replaced by Maintenance and the repairman must be treated for acid burns.

The plant declares an Alert and notifies the State and County initial warning points. The Emergency Management Division, Michigan Department of State Police, confers with the Radiological Health Services Division, Michigan Department of Public Health. A State of Disaster Declaration is requested and received from the Governor.

Between 1000-1120 a problem occurs within the No. I recirculation (recire) pump. The problem results in excessive pump vibration and the generation of a fault current of 600 amps. The circuit breaker for the No. I recire pump has failed and will not (and also cannot) be closed. The fault current persists until the main breaker (the one that connects the plant AC power to the grid) trips, resulting in a loss of AC power. The problems with recire pump No.1 result in high temperature, alarm in containment, recire pump No.1 seal ruptures, reactor trip on low steam drum level, fire alarm in outside cable penetration room, reactor depressurization system activates and core spray activates. At about 1021 the plant declares a General Emergency and notifies the Michigan State Eeergency Operations Center and makes a protective action recommendation. The State orders evacuation of all sectors to two miles and sectors K,L and M to five miles. The protective action is relayed to Charlevoix and Emmet Counties via the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) and hotline phones.

13

- At 1040 fuel f ailure begins. The containment radiation monitors begin to show increasing radiation levels. The fuel will continue to fail until core cooling is established.

Release of radio-nuclides begins from hole in containment and out the outside cable penetration room (via the blown open door) to the environment. The ratio of iodine released to noble gas is 1/300 because of retention of iodines in .

containment. The State EOC is notified of the release. The State analyzes the data and orders additional protec*.ive actions if necessary.

The core containment vessel is refilled with water at approximately 1120. The State .is notified the core is covered and thLc the fuel failure is stopped. In all, 50% of the noble' gases were released as well as 5% of most of the other fission products.

Between 1120-1330 the primary system is cooled and refilled due to the feedwater addition. The containment is being depressurized due to the release of energy out of the hole (with no energy input from the primary system) and the cold Lake breeze on the thin containment shell. Containment is depressurized, the hole can be plugged and the release is terminated. The State EOC and the JPIC are notified of plant status.

Between 1330-1400 the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant is in a more stable condition. The utility initiates discussions with the State to de-escalate. Radiation levels continue to fall off-site with end of release.

The actual events followed the pre-exercise acerario. The Alert was declared at 0844 and the General Emerdency at 1018.

There was no Unusual Event or Site Area Emergency declared.

The initiation of recovery / reentry activities occurred at 1355. The simulated accident at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant resulted in both sheltering and evacuation protective action recommendations. The order to shelter at 1028 and to evacuate at 1054 and again at 1150.

During the evaluation of this exercise the scenario was found to be sufficient to stimulate emergency response by the State and Local exercise participants. The Federal evaluation team was able to evaluate Charlevoix Cainty's emergency response capab ilit ie s . The scenario did allow for the demonstration of the objectives selected by Charlevoix County.

State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used In the Exercise During this exercise the State of Michigat planned to use the State EOC in Lansing and the JPIC at the Holiday Inn, Petoskey, Michigan. The State of. Michigan planned to use the necessary communication systems to conduct emergency operations.

14

- Charlevoix and Emmet Counties planned to demcnstrate their EOC f acilities, emergency response staf f and communication systems capabilities. The Counties also chose to desonstrate their capabilities for access control by deploying staff, resources and equipment for one access control point. Charlevoix and

' Emmet Counties also planned to have spokespersons at the JPIC to demonstrate their ability to coordinate public information -

and rumor control.

i In addition, Charlevoix and Emmet Counties each planned to demonstrate one reception / congregate care facility and decontamination center.

4 Deficiencies Noted In Past Exercises

' There were three significant deficiencies identified for the State of Michigan during the evaluation of the July 26, 1983 joint participation exercise for the Big Rock Point Nuclear ,

Power Plant. There were no significant deficiencies identified for either Charlevoix or Emmet Counties.

Corrective actions for these three significant deficiencies for the State of Michigan have been demonstrated as the result of the May 21, 1985 Big Rock Point exercise and the previous State of Michigan partial participation exercise conducted January 25, 1984 at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant and the previous State of Michigan full participati)n exercise conducted June 27, 1984 at the Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant.

There were thirty-three (33) minor deficiencies identified during the July 26, 1983 exercise in the areas of plcns, training and resources. While minor deficiencies did not require a Schedule of Corrective Actions and were not

" tracked" by FEMA, these thirty-three minor defi.ciencies were reviewed to determine if appropriate corrective actions have been implemented.

The results of this review shove the State of M:.chigan had thirteen (13) minor deficiencies as the result of the July 26, 1983 Big Rock Point exercise. Corrective actions for all

' thirteen (13) minor deficiencies have been demonstrated by the State of Michigan as the result of the May 21, :.985 Big Rock Point exercise and the previous State of Michigan full participation exercise (Fermi II) conducted June 27, 1984.

Charlevoix County had twelve (12) minor deficie tcies identified during the July 26, 1983 Big Rock Point exercise

] and eleven (11) were demonstrated to be adequat ely corrected i during the May 21, 1985 Big Rock Point exercise.

Emmet County had eight (8) minor deficiencies ifentified

• during the July 26, 1983 Big Rock Point exercise and seven (7) t were demonstrated to be adequately, corrected during the May j 21, 1985 Big Rock Point exercise.

15

. Of the two (2) deficiencies not adequately corrected, both were partially corrected-and the remaining areas for improvement are reflected in the Category B deficiencies discussed later in this report.

Exercise Objectives Still To Be Ef fectively Achieved Because of the deficiencies noted in this report, the following exercise objectives were not completely demonstrated. Appropriate action will be required to correct the exercise deficiencies and these objectives must be successfully demonstrated during the next biennial radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant.

State of Michigan All exercise objectives for the State of Michigan were ,

effectively achieved.

,Charlevoix County Charlevoix County did not completely demonstrate the following four exercise objectives.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staf f and activate facilities promptly.

, 3. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

i

( 26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

Emmet County did not completely demonstrate the following five exercise objectives.

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staf f the E0C and JPIC and maintain staffing around the clock.

20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

28. Demonstrate adequacy of f acilit ies for mass care of evacuses.

29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedure for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and '

I vehicles.  ;

16 l

. B. Narrative State of Michigan Activation and Staffing The May 21, 1985 Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise ,

was the fourth such exercise in which the State of Michigan participated. The State of Michigan participation in this exercise was limited in that the State of Michigan activated and staf fed the State emergency operations center in Lansing and the JPIC sufficiently to support the emergency response demonstrated fully by Charlevoix and Emmet Counties. Staff alerting, mobilization and activation of these two facilities have been evaluated and successfully demonstrated during previous exercises. Therefore, during the May 21, 1985 Big Rock Point exercise State staff were prepositioned.

For the purpose of this exercise there were suf ficient EOC organizational representatives present to support the Counties who were fully participating in the exercise. There is a direct communication link (dedicated telephone) with the utility which is monitored continuously by the Operations Division, Michigan Department of State Police.

Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations management was conducted in a manner to support emergency operations implemented by Charlevoix and Emmet Counties. There was an individual ef fectively in charge and this was the person so designated in the plan. The EOC staff were involved in decision making and periodic briefings were held to update the EOC staff on the situation. Message logs were kept and messages were reproduced and distributed as

, appropriate resulting in efficient message handling.

The EOC staff was notified of the Alert declaration by Big Rock Point at 0902 and the General Emergency at 1018 The scenario play skipped the Unusual Event and Site Area Emergency classifications. Consequently, the State of Michigan issued at 1054 the General Emergency protective action order to evacuate all sectors out to two miles and to evacuate sectors K,L and M out to five miles and to shelter remaining sectors, other than K,L and M, between two to five miles. The protective actions were upgraded to evacuate all sectors out to five miles at 1150. FEMA Region V was contacted and requested to obtain Coast Guard assistance for notification of the people on Lake Michigan and inland waterways.

17

Facilities The State EOC has been evaluated during numerous past exercises and has been found to be sufficient for the conduct of emergency operations. This was not an objective and as such not evaluated during this exercise.

Communications Communications between the State EOC, the JPIC, the Big Rock Pcint Nuclear Power Plant and Charlevoix and Emmet Counties were effective and efficient. Telephone was the principal means of exchanging information. Hardcopy capability exists between the State EOC and the JPIC. Alternate means of communications such as the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), datafax and radio were also demonstrated during the exercise. The Emergency Management Division, Michigan Department of State Police communications system is reflected below:

Organization Primary Systems Back-up Systems State EOC Telephone LEIN, Teletype, Radio and Datafax County EOC's Telephone LEIN Contiguous States Telephone Teletype and Radio Utility Telephane Radio and Datafax EOF Telephone Datafax JPIC Telephone Datafax EBS Telephone Radio FEMA Telephone Teletype, Datafax and Radio JDose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Radiological assessment is not evaluated during partial State participation exercises. These objectives are carried out only in terms of supporting local government exercise play, primarily through simulation at the State emergency operations center. Actions taken by the State of Michigan were based on the exercise scenario and the protective action recomrendations of the utility. Although not an exercise objective, recommendations for protective actions issued by the State of Michigan were accomplished in a timely manner.

The State of Michigan also considered a recommendation for the use of potasium iodide (KI) for emergency workerb even though this also was not a specific exercise objective to be evaluated. No recommendation was made for the use of K1 since plant conditions did not warrant it.

RQ

F Public Alerting and Instructions Since this was a partial participation exercise for Michigan, the limited EOC staf f reviewed the protective action recommendations from the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant before forwarding protective action recommendations to .

Charlevoix and Emmet Counties. Activation of the siren system and EBS is a local responsibility in Michigan. State action under this objective was to support the Counties by confirming, through simulation at the EOC, the General Emergency and the Governor's order to evacuate or shelter in place. The Counties implementation of the protective action recommendation to alert the public within the 5-mile EPZ and to disseminate an initial instructional message within fifteen (15) minutes will be addressed in the Charlevoix and Emmet Counties portion of this report.

Protective Action Evacuation activities such as activation of reception centers, congregate care facilities, relocation of special needs individuals and access control are the responsibility of local governments. Ingestion pathway protective action was not an objective for the State Michigan during this exercise.

Radiological Exposure Control Radiological Exposure Control was not an exercise objective for the State of Michigan and therefore was not evaluated.

Media Relations There were no media briefings conducted in the State EOC.

Media activities in the State of Michigan are conducted at the JPIC.

A State representative served as the moderator during the briefings at the JPIC. He introduced each spokesperson during the briefings, directed questions from media representatives to the appropriate spokesperson and managed each briefing resulting in an orderly presentation. A State spokesperson, in addition to the moderator, participated in each briefing to explain actions being taken by the State. A utility spokesperson was assisted by a technical representative to explain plant conditions and a health physicist to explain radiological considerations. All briefings deliberately avoided the use of technical jargon and explanations were presented in understandable terms.

The rumor control telephone was not manned by Charlevoix County. Therefore, the State should initiate action with the utility and both Counties to ensure adequate manning of the rumor control telephone.

19

Recuvery and Reentry This exercise scenario was designed to demonstrate local alert, notification and mobilization. Recovery and reentry play was purposely designed to be very limited and was not an exercise objective to be evaluated. The limited recovery and reentry play in the scenario was designed to bring the off- -

site conditions back to normal conditions to logically terminate the exercise. Recovery and reentry was an exercise objective for evaluation during the July 26, 1983 full participation exercise and is a part of that exercise report for the State of Michigan.

Charlevoix County Activation and Staffing Staf f alerting and mobilization procedures were demonstrated at 0844 when the utility notified Charlevoix County over the dedicated phone line of the Alert condition at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant. The dedicated phone between Charlevoix County and Big Rock Point is monitored on a 24-hour per day basis by the Sherif f's radio dispatcher. Written updated call lists were used by the Charlevoix County Emergency Services Director to alert and mobilize the EOC staff. Since this was done during normal working hours the phone in the EOC was used. The Charlevoix County Emergency Services Director has a radio in his car as well as a call forwarding telephone capability from his office to his home.

The EOC was fully staffed by 0942 with a11' positions as identified in the plan. The EOC staf f demonstrated the ability to maintain staffing around the clock through the use of a shift change or double staffing. Both shifts displayed adequate training and knowledge of their duties and responsibilities. Charlevoix County did not have a liaison person at the utility Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) but the utility did have a liason at the Charlevoix County EOC.

Emergency Operations Management The Chairman of the Charlevoix County Board of Commissioners (as designated in the plan) was in charge and ef fectively coordinated County emergency response activities. Periodic briefings were conducted by the EOC staff. Decisions were made after consideration of the facts as brought out by the EOC staf f. The Charlevoix County Chairman questioned the Covernor's Declaration of Disaster during the Alert classification at 0957 and kept the County at the Alert classification without a County Declaration of Disaster until the General Emergency was declared. The State liaison indicated to the staf f the State Declaration of Disaster was based on imminent threat and was 6eclared to give a legal bawls to activate and mabilize State resources.

20

n Copies of the County emergency operation plan, written procedures and checklists were available in the EOC for reference. Message logs were kept. Written messages were used and copies distributed. Some information in the written messages was not part of the periodic briefings which would have helped to keep EOC staff aware of activities occurring within the County. -

One example was impediments to the evacuation which was in some messages but not highlighted in any briefings. Message handling and preparation can be improved in that some key messages were never written out. One good example of this is the first evacuation order given by the State which was never written out but action was taken by the EOC staff to implement the evacuation order.

Deficiency:A.I.b. Some key messages were never written out and/or logged, e.g. the first evacuation order given by the State of Michigan.

Recommendation: All key messages such as evacuation orders

~should be written out and logged. The Federal evaluators at Charlevoix County think this message was not recorded because prescripted messages were not used and the public affairs staff person in the EOC concentrated on sketching out the A*oPolitical boundaries of the evacuation area for EBS to meet the 15 minute initial notification criteria.

Access to the Charlevoix County EOC was controlled. The State requested that FEMA contact the U.S. Department of Transportation to close air space eight miles around the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant.

Facilities The 1;heriff's communication center and the adjacent operations room comprise the Charlevoix County EOC. The EOC is small in size but has been determined to be adequate in this exercise and previous exercises. It is located approximately 41/2 miles from the Big Rock Nuclear Power Plant. Even though the plume van moving toward the Charlevoix County EOC the decision '

was made to continue operations out of the Charlevoix County primary E0C at the Sheriffs Department rather than relocate to the alternate county EOC at Boyne City. The County damage assessment staff based their recommendation to stay in the primary EOC on known conditions at the plant and meterological conditions. It was pointed out it would take about one hour for any release to reach the EOC.

21 h

l

Radiological monitoring equipment was placed at the EOC windows. The EOC staf f did discuss how they would deploy to the alternate EOC if it had been ordered. Although the primary EOC is capable of sustaining operations within the plume, it is recommended the County demonstrate, at least once, its ability to conduct emergency operations out of the alternate EOC rather than to continue discussing how this ,

would be done.

Noise was adequately controlled. The EOC was well lighted and there was sufficient furniture to accomodate the staff.

Bunks, showers and a kitchen are available to support extended operations. Backup power is available but was not an objective to be evaluated. The status board was clearly visible and kept up to date on significant events. Displays, emergency classification levels and maps in the EOC conform with NUREC-0654 criteria.

Communications The communications systems demonstrated at the Charlevoix County EOC during the exercise functioned well. The primary system used by the agencies represented at the EOC, with the exception of the police, is the commercial telephone system.

Police radio and the LEIN are used as the backup system for most of the operations. Hard copy transmission was demonstrated between the State EOC and Charlevoix County.

A dedicated telephone line has been installed for use by the EOF for the initial activation notification to the EOC. This phone is located in the Sheriff's Department communications room. Subsequent communication occurs over the commercial telephone system. An intercom system is set up between the communication room and the EOC operations room. This system minimizes the need for couriers between these two areas.

Backup communication systems are not available between the EOC and the JPIC. The commercial telephone system is the only communications link between these two sites. The equipment needed to provide the capability for hard copy transmission of messages between the JPIC and the EOC is not available. Hard copy capability is recommended between the EOC and the JPIC.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation The EOC staff discussed the problems associated with relocating the EOC and decided there was sufficient time (one hour) available to delay a decision. There was no indication Boyne City was alerted so that the alternate EOC would be ready. The County Emergency Services Director discussed with the County Board Chairman his recommendations to close the primary EOC if the alternate EOC should be activated.

22

. -SEP.04 '85 09:08 FEt1A PEGION V CHICAGO 1 P.02 Very little information was provided to Charlevoix County on  !

the nature of the release from the plant or the expected '

& ration of the release. It is recomended that the utility ,

liason provide frequent updates whid include information on 1 plant status. Dose projection is a state responsibility at the BOC in Lansing. Pertinent information would be communicated to the Ccunty as appropriate.

Forsulation of protective action reocumendations are not a responsibility of the County. The State provides the County with its recorsnendations, and the ccunty implements them.

! Protective actions were rea &ed for the plume exposure pathday

' utilizing the limited data provided by the State and utility.

Although KI was issued to emergency wrsonnel along with the dosimetry kits, the decision to use (I was not made by the ,

, Stata & e to the conditions at the plant.

! Public Alertina And,Jns,tru.c.t. ion.

Charlevoix County has an active role in public alerting. They are responsible for the implementation of the pronpt alert and notification sytes, drafting of IBS messages, s1bsequent transir.ission of messages to IBS stations and activation of the l tone alert radio system.

haring the exercise the plant notified the State of a General Emergency at 1018. 'Ihe State made its assessment and at 1028 notified the County of its reconmendation to shelter in place 0-2 miles all sectors and 2-5 miles in sectors K, L and M.

Sirens and the tone alert radio system were activated at 1031 An IBS message was draf ted and transmitted to the radio station at 1042. Message clarity could be enhanced and delays in the time reqJired to physically draft the message could have been re&oed by the use of prescripted EBS nessages. Two

m2bsagJent IBS messages were prepared at the BOC. These included the evacuation sessage at 1054 and the extended eva mation sessage at 1150 As mentioned earlier, the second IBS message (first evacuation message) was not properly recorded and logged into the EOC sessage handling system. The IBS messages did describe the sectors utilizing familiar roads and boundaries. Follow-up calls were placed to schools at 1047 to verify receipt of the General Energency declaration and shelter recomendation.

, Distribution of instructions to the public by Charlevoix County is a function of the County PIO's at the EOC and the JPIC. Actual information is transmitted from the BOC to the

! JPIC for inclusion by the County pIO into the news releases generated at the JPIC. The timing of public instructions was i

ooordinated with the public alerting process insuring that the sirens wara followed by inrtructional sessages. Due to the i limitations of the scenaric, the instructional messages were not periodically repeated.

23

e Revisions need to be made to both County plans which will ensure that Charlevoix County is aware that they are responsible for notifying the EBS stations. Without this change to the plan confusion exists in regards to Emmet County's role in EBS notification. The revision should reflect that Emmet County will provide information to Charlevoix County for. inclusion into the EBS messages. -

jProtective Action The Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department activated and manned one access control point located at the intersection of Route 31 and Barnard Road just west of Charlevoix. The officer was dispatched from the Sheriff's Office following the declaration of the General Emergency. He was familiar with the evacuation routes and the proper procedures used to maintain a continuous traffic flow. The locations of the reception, congregate care and decontamination centers were known. Communications were demonstrated between the access control point and the EOC dispatcher. The capability to communicate with other access control points is available but was not demonstrated. The Sheriff's deputy maintained frequent communication checks with the Charlevoix County EOC dispatcher to obtain updated information. Proper procedures and methods were used to maintain a steady flow of traf fic (i.e. keeping shoulder clear, dealing with impediments.

etc.). A dosimetry kit was issued to the Sherif f's deputy prior to his deployment from the EOC.

Air and water traffic control was addressed at the EOC by the communication with DOT and the FAA. Appropriate actions were taken to control the access to contaminated areas by the simulated manning of other access control and traffic control points on the major evacuation routes.

Information was available at the EOC in written fore concerning the location of the mobility-impaired and any associated special transportation requirements needed.

Transportation arrangements were made for these individuals.

A properly equipped bus was dispatched to the EOC for observation by the evaluation team. The bus was equipped with provisions for transportation of individuals confined to a wheel chair, radio equipment for communication and two assistants to help with the loading, unloading and care of the mobility-impaired.

There were sufficient numbers of buses and drivers available to cover the ef fected schools in the plume EPZ. Drivers are contacted via commercial telephone and radios. Per the scenario this activity was not demonstrated. An EBS message prepared at the EOC provided parents with information concerning the relocation of school children.

24

It was agreed between FEMA Region V and the State of Michigan prior to the exercise that it would not be necessary to demonstrate the alerting and mobilization of the staf f at the reception center, congregate care facility and the decontamination center. Sufficient staff at these facilities were prepositioned. Evidence was provided that the Social Service official is aware of the procedures to activate the .

relocation center.

The entire group of evacuees plus the bus driver were monitored on arrival. After the radiological monitoring process was complete each person was registered. The facility at the East Jordan High school.could accomodate approximately 537 in the shelter. Immediate feeding capability would come from the school supplies and be reimbursed at a later date.

One Red Cross volunteer was at the center and was knowledgeable of the procedures. Telephone was the primary means of communication between the reception / congregate center and the County EOC. It is recommended radio backup also be established.

The decontamination station was set up at the entrance of the East Jordan High School. Two teams with appropriate equipment checked each evacuee for contamination. If there was any evidence of contamination they would be escorted to the shower for decontamination. There were plastic bags available for contaminated clothing and other articles. The East Jordan Fire Department was on site and washed down the school bus on a grass area adjacent to the parking lot. The estimated capacity for decontamination of vehicles would be approximately six per hour and evacuees would be about 50 per hour. It is recommended that a defined pathway for contaminated individuals be laid out using paper, plastic or other appropriate means.

Radiological Exposure Control There is a sufficient supply of dosimetry kits available for emergency personnel at Charlevoix County. These kits consist of a low-range (0-200mr) and a high-range (0-200R) direct read dosimeter; a TLD (with instructions) and KI (also with instructions). Record cards and proper procedures for recording exposure readings were not included along with the kits. Information concerning the frequency of the reading of the dosimeters and subsequent recording was missing.

Dosimeters were charged prior to distribution at the EOC.

Emergency workers were instructed to record initial and final dosimeter readings and report them to the Radiological Defense Officer upon their return to the EOC.

Deficiency: K.3.b. Dosimetry kits issued to emergency workers did not include record cards and proper instruction on record keeping. Emergency workers were instructed to record their dosimeter readings only at the initiation and termination of their shift.

25

s, .

Recommendation: Record cards and proper instructions on dosimetry use and record -keeping should be added to the dosimetry kits. The record card should be used to ensure periodic rec. dings are recorded by emergency workers rather than just at the beginning and end of each shift.

The use of KI by emergency workers was not required, however, -

field personnel were aware that the recommendation would come from the EOC. The Radiological Defense Officer at the EOC was knowledgeable of the proper use of KI. The use of KI was not recommended due to plant conditions. The County was prepared to give the recommendation to use KI if authorized by the State. Field personnel knew their maximum allowable dose

, exposure and the procedures to be followed to obtain authorization to exceed that level. The location of the decontamination centers which were activated by the County as well as the procedures involved in decontamination were also known by emergency workers.

Proper procedures were implemented during the exercise to protect the EOC staff from exposure. Windows and doors were secured and ventilation systems were shut down.

Media Relations The Charlevoix County spokesperson at the JPIC was prepositoned with the result that mobilization of staff was not demonstrated.

De fic iency :E.2. Mobilization of the JPIC PIO position was not demonstrated.

Recommendation: Charlevoix County selected an exercise objective to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. Since this was not demonstrated by the JPIC staff, this ability should be demonstrated at the next biennial exercise.

The County demonstrated a shift change in the JPIC. Both spokespersons representing Charlevoix County took active parts in briefings, coordination of information and in fulfilling their responsibilities. The County spokesperson was the individual sitting closest to the rumor control telephone and inherited the job of answering it. The lack of designated personnel for rumor control is a deficiency requiring County attention.

De f iciency :G.4.c. The Charlevoix County spokesperson at the Joint Public Information Center also answered the rumor control phone. There was a lack of a separate, designated

. individual responsible for rumor control.

Recommendation: Charlevoix County needs to identify an individual to be responsible for rumor control other than the County spokesperson. Federal evaluators feel this should be a separate person since the spokesperson is too busy to do both jobs. 26

Recovery and Reentry Even though recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective, Charlevoix County still undertook recovery and reentry activities. The following comments are made not as part of the evaluation but simply to reflect actions taken.

Protective actions relaxation was based on monitor data indicating safe levels of radioactivity. Reentry and recovery decisions were communicated promptly to all response organizations and arrangements were made to provide the public with information on safety precautions during recovery, possible health effects of low level exposure and availability of compensation for financial losses sustained.

Ennet County Activation and Staffing In Emmet County, the initial notification of an Alert was received at 0845 by the State Police Post from the utility.

The call was transmitted over a dedicated line. The LEIN telecopy system was then utilized to notify the County Sheriff and other State Police officials. The Emmet County Sheriff's Dispatcher received this notification at approximately 0857.

The Dispatch Center did not verify this call although they did receive a subsequent call from the utility at 0911 which confirmed a continuation of the Alert status. Mobilization of the EOC was initiated at 0900, prior to verification, utilizing a written call list. The list appeared to be up to date and the telephone numbers were correct.

Deficiency:E.1. EOC activation and staff mobilization were initiated prior to verification of the Alert notification.

Recommendation: Staff responsible for activation and mobilization of the County's emergency response should receive additional training as to the proper procedure for verification of the notification of emergency action classification levels.

27

0 The EOC was operational at 0945 and staffing was complete at 0950. The Dispatch Center provides 24-hour monitoring of the notification system and is available to call up key EOC staff at any hour. During this exercise, 17 organizations participated including County, State and utility representatives. The staff members demonstrated professionalism and decison making ability in carrying out -

their assignments to coordinate emergency activities. A complete shift change was not demonstrated. Replacement staff were not available for the positions of the County Commission Chairperson, Radiological Defense Of ficer, the two PIO officers, one each at the EOC and the JPlc, and the utility liaison. All participating staff maintained message logs and remained in frequent contact with their agency personnel.

Deficiency:A.4. The County did not demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing around the clock. Note: A shift change for the Radiological Defense Officer was not demonstrated during the last exercise.

Recommendation: The capability to maintain continuous 24-hour operations should be demonstrated for the entire EOC and JPlc staff at the next biennial exercise.

jEmergency Operations Management The Emmet County -EOC staff was ef ficiently managed by the Emergency Services Director position of both shif ts. The Director, as specified in the plan, is the Chief of Staff and operates under the direction of the County Board of Commissioners. The Director utilized the staff's capabilities and resources very effectively. He promptly notified the staff of important changes in the emergency situation and coordinated frequent multi-departmental briefings. When important decisions were made, the appropriate staff were involved. All participating agencies referenced the plans and checklists and maintained message logs. Message and information flow was efficient.

The Alert notification was received at 0857 and the General Emergency at 1018. Recommendations to shelter in all sectors within five miles occurred at 1028. The evacuation of the two mile ring and sectors K,L and M from two to five miles occurred at 1055 and the evacuation order for the entire five mile EPZ was received at 1150. EOC staff placed the calls to activate the combined reception / congregate care and decontamination center at the Bear Creek Township Hall at 1037.

28

bg 1 Facilities The EOC temporary facility is located in the Emmet County Sheriff's Department. This facility had adequate furniture, space, lighting, telephones and noise control to support operations. Extended use facilities were available in the jail area of the building. Backup power was provided by a -

propane generator which was demonstrated as part of the scenario situation calling for a County power outage.

There was a clear demonstration of the adequacy of this facility and available displays for supporting emergency operations in Emmet County. Quality maps and graphics were available for the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control and populations by sectors. A status board was centrally located and kept up to date on significant events. Emergency classification levels were posted.

Communications The EOC staff demonstrated their capabilities to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field staff. The primary communication system was the LEIN system which interlinked Emmet County with the State and Charlevoix County. Commercial telephone was the secondary communications system.

Communications with the JPIC, schools, hospitals and EBS was by commercial telephone. Backup would be provided by a i combination of police / fire radios and squad cars. I Conferencing was available on the land lines and radios. In l addition, a radio and television were available for monitoring EBS and other emergency information transmitted to the public.

The LEIN system and radios were maintained in a separate area, reducing operational noise in the EOC. Messages to and from the communication area were carefully recorded on a special form. Messages were tracked by the communications officer and multiple copies were supplied to the appropriate agencies by runners. An intercom directly linked the EOC with the communications room.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Dose projection is the responsibility of the Michigan Department of Public Health, Radiological Health Services Division. j l

I 29 1

t, , ,

Public Alerting and Instructions The staf f in the County EOC vas unclear on the role of the County Public Information Officer at the JPIC The PIO at the County EOC was relying on the PIO at the JPIC to activate the EBS and draft emergency public instructions for the County based on information transmitted by telephone from the EOC. .

The Emmet County EOC was unaware that when Charlevoix County activated the EBS it had been activated for both Counties and the appropriate emergency messages had been drafted and released by Charlevoix County. It is recommended that the role of the County PIO at the JPIC needs to be clarified with EOC staff and the plan should be revised to clarify that activation of the EBS stations by Charlevoix County is for both Counties, if that is the intent.

Supplemental route alerting was initiated by a squad car manned by two patrolmen from the County Sheriff's Department and a marine boat patrol. This route alerting was started during the General Emergency, at approximately 1158, when notification to evacuate all sectors out to five miles was disseminated. According to EOC staff of the County Sheriff's Department the portion of the five 5-mile EPZ within Emmet County is sparsely populated with approximately fifty (50) families and there are no schools, factories, businesses or other institutions within the EPZ.

Protective Action The County Sherif f ordered the dispatch of a Sherif f's Department vehicle to set up a traffic control point at the intersection of Horton Bay Road and U.S. Highway 31 at approximately 1235. The two deputies, assisted by County Public Works personnel, were instructed to set-up barricades and prepare to control ingress / egress to the evacuating area.

The officers were knowledgeable of evacuation routes, access control procedures, relocation centers and procedures for entry of emergency vehicles into the EPZ. They were also aware that they were to report to the decontamination and relocation center for monitoring after there assignment was completed.

The of ficers stated that in the event of any impediments (such as accidents or inclement weather conditions) they would call the dispatcher at the EOC for assistance. According to EOC staff of the County Sheriff's Department, there are appropriate resources available to keep evacuation routes clear during inclement weather and in the event of stalled or wrecked cars. In accordance with the County plan the Sherif f's Department dispatched a boat and shoreline patrol to warn boaters and individuals and to control access to the af fected area via the waterway in Emmet County.

30

The representative in the EOC from the Department of Social Services was aware of the existence of a list of the mobility impaired individuals residing in the 5-mile EPZ. However, none reside in Emmet County. There are no schools or other institutions within that portion of the 5 mile-EPZ affecting Emmet County.

A reception / congregate care and decontanination center was opened at the Bear Creek Township Hall. The center was operational at 1145. The personnel utilized a kit obtained from the EOC to erect signs and to establish flow paths, personnel monitoring, decontamination, registration and nursing stations. There was no individual from Social Services who was trained in relocation center operations and who would assume the role of shelter manager.

Deficiency: A.2.a There was no shelter manager assigned to direct operations at the Bear Creek Township Hall reception / congregate care center.

Recommendation: A trained shelter manager should be assigned for each reception / congregate center which would be activated.

The registration, monitoring and simulated decontamination was demonstrated on two senior citizen evacuees transported from the Friendship Nursing Home. There were two monitoring teams available to perform whole body scanning of the evacuecs.

Non-contaminated and decontaminated personnel were directed to the registration station to complete registration forms.

Registration personnel did inquire of special needs and there is a space on the form to enter special needs of evacuees.

The Bear Creek Township facility was used as the relocation center due to the unavailability of Petoskey High School for this exercise. The facility is unsuited for monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees. It is small and has only one sanitation facility for use by male and female evacuees. Flow paths for processing evacuees were difficult to establish. The flow patterns directing peeople to the registration desk and the decontamination station were not separated.

Congregate care of evacuees at Bear County Township f acilities would be provided only until they could be transported to a designated congregate care center. The facility was located outside the EPZ plume, however due to its size it could only house approximately 25 evacuees. Sleeping accommodations and food supplies were not stored at this location to support congregate care of evacuees.

31

,, - . _ _ . _ _ ., _ _ _ - . . - - ,, e-_. , _ , , . _ _ . . . - . _ _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ . . , ,

. ... SEP.04 '85 09

09 FEMA REGION V CHICAGO 1 P.02 .

'there was a connunication link with the ROC via telephone with  ;

Fire Services radio available for backup and for obtaining i astulance service to transport injured persons to Northern j Midigan Hospital. The relocation center staff were not aware l of how many evacuees were expected to arrive. The staff was j provided periodic updates of inforastion from the EOC Social i Services personnel. It is reconnuended that '

reception / congregate care be denonstrated at the next full '

scale exercise and be con &cted at Petoskey Bigh S&ool as  !

designated in the plan.

l The decontamination center was also located at the Bear Creek

'tbwnship Sall. Personnel who would go to the facility would.

be asnergency workers, bus drivers and evacuees. Proce&res '

were denonstrated for the need to decontaminate by sonitoring '

personnel and vehicles prior to making the decision to decontaminate. Contamination decks were perforned by personnel monitors. C W-700 nonitors with probe shield were

, used to perform whole body scan for external con'htion.

Indivikals classified as contaminated were routed to the decontanination station and instructed to remove clothing and place contaminated articles in plastic begs provided for this

• purpose. The indivi&al was instructed to wash gently, rinse twice and pat dry and proceed to the post decontamination monitoring station. If free of contamination, the individual would be provided clothing and released to proceed to the registration desk.

Vehicles were also decked for contamination utilizing the CW-700 nonitors. A system was not in place for traffic control (i.e. signs, barricades, zoned parking area) to sonitor incoming vehicles, control of contaminated and clean vehicle parking and for vehicle decontamination.

Deficiency: K.5.b. 'Ihe County did not fully denonstrate proce& res'for segregation of contaminated evacuees, emergency workers, equipnent and vehicles.

_Rg,ccxmendation: Appropriate procet res for the segregation of contaminated people, vehicles and agaipment at the reception / congregate care.and decontamination centers should be developed.' .

l Contaminated vehicles were washed down by Fire Services 1 personnel. The vehicle was parked near a field for runoff of I water in order that it may disposed of after decontamination }

at a later date if required. A punper would be used to hose 4 down the vehicle from top to the lowest level.

Only two monitors (CW-700) were available for sharirs between l personnel monitoring and post deepntamination personnel monitoring and vehicle and post decontamination vehicle monitoring. No nonitors were available for backup in case of

)

failure. It is reconnended that additional m>nitors be l mapplied for decontamination and relocation center use.  ;

32

• Radiological Exposure Control There was an adequate supply of dosimetry at the County EOC and distribution of dosimetry for emergency workers was demonstrated by the County Radiological Defense Officer. The dosimetry included low and high range dosimeters and permanent record badges. Workers receiving the dosimeters would be -

issued instructions along with the dosimeters. There also was an adequate supply of potassium iodide (KI) on hand at the EOC for issuance to emergency workers. The County Radiological Defense Officer and Health Department representative were responsible for the control and procedure for issuance of the KI. The Radiological Defense Officer was aware of emergency worker exposure control to include the maximum dose allowed without authorization. He was also aware of the decontamination procedures for emergency workers and evacuees including when and where to go for decontamination. The Emmet County EOC is well outside the 5-mile EPZ of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant.

The officers manning the access control point at Horton Bay Road and Route 31 were not issued dosimeters and TLD's by the kadiological Defense Officer prior to being dispatched to the control point. They did however have KI and instructions for its use.

Deficiency: K.3.a. and K.3.b. The County did not deconstrate ability to continuously monitor and contro1~ emergency worker expo 1ure for field workers involved with access control.

Recommendation: Emergency workers manning access control points should be issued proper dosimetry and TLD's with instructions for periodic readings and recording.

Media Relations There were no news media briefings at the Emmet County EOC.

According to the PIO all news media representatives arriving at the County EOC will be directed to the JPIC at the Holiday Inn, Petoskey.

Emmet County demonstrated mobilization of the JPIC staff f.n real time. The spokesperson was notified by the Enmet County Sheriff's Dispatcher at 0926 and was present in the JPic at 1000. The spokesperson took an active part in briefings, coordination of information and fulfilling assigned responsibilities. As noted earlier, the County's scheduled shift change did not occur in the JPIC.

Recovery and Reentry Even though recovery and reentry was not an exercise objective, Emmet County still undertook recovery and reentry activities. The following comments are made not as part of the evaluation but simply to reflect actions taken.

33

Protective actions relaxation was based on monitor data indicating safe levels of radioactivity. Reentry and recovery decisions were communicated promptly to all response organizations and arrangements were made to provide the public with information on safety precrutions during recovery, possible health effects of low level exposure and availability of compensation for financial losses sustained. The Emmet .

County Damage Control Officer tracked costs incurred in Emmet County during this simulated accidents. Simulated costs incurred included the loss of Hotel Convention Costs (reserved), the loss of revenue from local stores resulting from standing orders for replacement clothing for contaminated individuals, the loss of revenue for normal local purchases such as food, gasoline, etc. and the loss of recreational revenues.

e 34

)

e, e .

III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES e

. 35

. . e

• UTILITY: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant

~ ~

Summary Listing of Deficiencies.

Michigan May 21, 1985 (State) (Date)

Michigan (Community)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency_

Proposed _

Date Date None 4

4 36 he - _ __ _ _ k

1 4 . UTILITY: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant i Summary Listing of Deficiencies i Michigan May 21, 1985

~lStatei (Date)

Michigan (Community)

B. Other Deficiencies i

i NUREC Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date 1

None

=

I .

i 4

d I

37 r

5

. 8 9

1 )

e t

. 1 a 2 D

(

y e a

M ~

t n

a l

P r s e ie w

o c P n e

r i a c s e i n l f o c e i u D t N a f d t o n n e 8 i g n e 3 o n n P i o t c k s e c i R o L R .

y C g r i a B m m

u Y S T

I L

I T

U

~)

y n) n t a e a i g t g n i a i u .

h t h m c S c m i ( i o M M C e

( n o

N k

l

, s. -

UTILITY: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Srmmary Listing of Deficiencies Michigan __

May 21, 1985 (State) (Date)

Charlevoix County (Community)

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed _

Date _

Date None i

4 e

1 I

n 1

t 39 i

w -

UTILITY: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Summary Listing of Deficiencies Michigan May 21, 1985 (State) (Date)

Charlevoix County (Community)

B. Dther Deficiencies NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item _

ofjDeficiency Proposed _

Date Date A.I.b. Some key messages were never written out and or/ logged, e.g. the first evacuation order given by the State of Michigan. (FEMA exercise objective 3)

E.2 The Charlevoix County spokesperson at the JPIC saa prepositioned with the ,

result that alerting and mobilization of Charlevoix County staff at the JPIC was not demonstrated. (FEMA Exercise objective 1).

G.4.c. Charlevoix County staffing at the JPIC was deficient for rumor control. The Charlevoix County spokesperson also answered the rumor control phone.

There was a lack of a separate, designated individual for rumor control.(FEMA exercise objective 26) 40 L _ d

?

. 1

. . m.

UTII.ITY : Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Summary Listing of Deficiencies Michigan. May 21, 1985 (State)~ (Date)

Charlevoix County (Community)_

B. Other Deficiencies NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency _ _ _ Proposed Date Date K.3.b. Dosimetry kits were issued to field personnel and included all required items with the exception of proper instruction on dosimetry use and records as well as record keeping cards.

Emergency workers were instructed ,

to record their initial and final dosimeter reading and report them to the Charlevoix County Rad iological Defense Of ficer.

• ( FEMA exercise objective 20) 41

m e

• UTII.ITY : Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Summary Listing of lieficiencies Michigan May 21, 1985

( S tla t e ) (Date)

Charlevoix County (Community)

C. Recommendations

1. Although not required by NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1, it is recommended that hard copy capability he established between the JPIC and the Charlevoix County EOC to enable EOC sta f f to see what is released at the JPIC.

2. Some information in the written messages was not part of the periodic briefings which would have helped to keep EOC staff aware of activities occurring within the County.

3. The utility liaison in the Charlevoix County EOC should provide periodicly complete information on the plant conditions such as start time of release, nature of release, duration of release and actions taken by the utility.

4. Charlevoix County demonstrate its ability to conduct emergency operations out of the alternate EOC rather than just conduct a discussion on how this would be done.

5. Although pre-scripted messages were available they were not used. The initial Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) evacuat' ion message using geographical and political boundaries was written out long hand by the Public Affairs Officer in the EOC. This initial message could have been handled much faster if pre-scripted messages using geographical and political boundries were used.

6. Revisions need to be made to both County plans which will ensure that Charlevoix County is aware that they are responsible for notifying the EBS stations. The revision should reflect that Emmet County will provide information to Charlevoix County for inclusion into the EBS messages.

7. It is recommended that radio backup capability be established between the Charlevoix County EOC and the reception / congregate care center.

8. It is recommandad that a defined pathway for contaminated individuals be laid out using paper, plastic or other appropriate means.

42

i m

UTILITY: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Summary 1.isting of Deficiencies Michigan May 21, 1985 (Statd) (Dete)

Emmet County

( Commun it y) -

A. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency Proposed Date Date None o

e I

i i 43 I

f UTILITY: Big Rock Point Nucicer Power Plant * * * * '

Summary Listing of Deficiencies Michigan May 21, 1985 (State) (Datel '

Emmet County (Community)

B. Other Deficiencies NUREG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of Deficiency _ _

Proposed Date Date A.2.a There was no shelter manager assigned to direct operations at the Bear Creek Townsh ip IIall reception / congregate care center.

(FEMA exercise objective 28)

A.4 The County did not demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing around the clock at the EOC and ,

JPIC. (FEMA exercise objective 2)

E.1. EOC activation and staff mobilization were initiated prior to verification of the Alert notification. (FEMA exercise objective 1)

K.3.a. The County did not demonstrate K.3.b ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure for field workers involved with access control.

(FEMA exercise objective 20)

K.S.b. The County did not fully demonstrate procedures for segregation of contaminated evacuees, emergency workers, equipment and vehicles. (FEMA exercise objective 29) 44

r 3

b

_ ps UTILITY: Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant Summary Listing of Deficiencies Michigan ~

May 21, 1985 (State) (Date)

Emmet County (Community)

C. Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the role of the County Public Information Officer (PIO) in the Joint Public Information Center needs to be clarified with the Emmet County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff and the plan should be revised to clarify that the activation of the EBS stations by Charlevoix County is for both Emmet and Charlevoix Counties, if that is the intent.

2. The Bear Creek Township Hall would be unsuitable for congregate care of evacuees for any extended period. It is limited in space and facilities for this purpose. It is recommended facilities defined in the County plan be used in future exercises.

3. It is recommended that additional monitors be supplied for decontamination and relocation center use. .

45 9

-