IR 05000382/1997025

Discusses Insp Rept 50-382/97-25 on 980205 & Forwards Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $110,000

ML20249A959
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/16/1998
From:	Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Dugger C ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
Shared Package
ML20249A960	List: IR 05000382/1997025 ML20249A961
References
50-382-97-25, EA-98-022, EA-98-22, NUDOCS 9806190192
Download: ML20249A959 (7)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION nEcioN iv S 611 HYAN PLAZA ORIVE SURE w0 U g '

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 *...-       June 16, 1998 EA 98-022 Charles M. Dugger, Vice President Operations - Waterford 3          j Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY -

      $110,000 (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-382/97-25)- AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (Vil.B.6)     j
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Dear.Mr,

Dugger: 1 This is in reference to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted in the NRC's Arlington, Texas office on March 26,1998. The conference was conducted to discuss several apparent violations which were identified during an NRC engineering team inspection at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford-3) reactor facility operated by Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy). The inspection was concluded on February 5,1998, and a report describing the inspection results and apparent violations was issued on March 12,1998. The apparent violations primarily involved high pressure safety injection (HPSI) and emergency feedwater (EFW) flow issues at Waterford-3.

Based on the information developed during the inspection, and the NRC's review of the information that you provided during the conference and in a letter dated May 7,1998, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. As discussed at the end of this

  . letter, some of the apparent violations discussed at the conference have been modified and two of the apparent violations have been withdrawn. The remaining violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty and the circumstances surrounding them were described in detail in the subject inspection report.      /

In brief, the violations involve two main issues: (1) failing to address uncertainties in HPSI flow / values, resulting in operating the Waterford-3 facility without assurance, as required by 10 CFR 50.46, that the emergency core cooling system was capable of limiting peak cladding temperatures to 2200*F; and (2) reducing design EFW flow values without recognizing that an h unreviewed safety question existed, resulting in a failure to obtain NRC approval prior to ' modifying (reducing) EFW flow values that had been assumed in design documents and had been considered by the NRC in approving the licensing of the facility.

There are multiple violations associated with the HPSI flow issues, including: the failure to

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adequately consder test instrument uncertainties and valve position variability when performing

  , surveillance testing of HPSl; the failure to identity and correct this concern despite several indications of the problem at various points in time; and the failure to make timely reports to the L        ~

I 980619019'2 900616 PDR ADOCK 05000302 0 , PDR j

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-NRC and develop a corrective action plan within the required time frame. Separately and collectively, these violations represent a failure of the Waterford-3 engineering program to: (1) aggressively pursue such issues when first identified, and (2) to pursue such issues without prompting by the NRC. Ultimately, the potential safety consequence of the HPSI flow issues was reduced by reliance on a new method of analyzing the capability of emergency core cooling which was approved for Combustion Engineering (CE) plants such as Waterford-3. The new analytical method, however, was not approved by the NRC until December 17,1997. Thus, j Waterford-3 was operated from July 28,1997, until the new CE analytical method was approved on December 17,1997, in a condition where acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 for peak cladding temperatures _could not be met using the approved analysis methods that were applicable at the time. It is only fortuitous that Entergy was able to take credit for the revised CE analytical method -- and therefore conclude that this was not an issue of potential safety l consequence -- when these issues were pursued during the NRC's engineering team inspection. . The inability to meet 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criteria employing the applicable approved licensing basis code is of significant regulatory concern. The nature of the failures associated with HPSI flow issues (Violations A through D) are considered in the aggregate to represent a significant breakdown in the control of licensed activities which had the potential to affect the safety of the facility, and are therefore collectively classified at Severity Level ill in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. 1 in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 problem. Because the Waterford-3 facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Actica in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC has determined that credit for identification is not warranted because the discovery of these violations and Entergy's l

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pursuit of HPSI flow uncertainties were prompted by NRC's engineering team inspection. The l

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NRC also has determined that credit for corrective action is not warranted because, despite significant efforts to resolve HPSI flow uncertainties, your initial actions upon recognizing this prob!cm were not prompt and not in compliance with reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.46, as evidenced by Violation B. This results in the assessment of a civil penalty at twice the base value.

Therefore, to emphasize the importance of maintaining the integrity of the licensing basis and aggressively pursuing indications that key assumptions in the licensing basis may have been flawed in a manner important to safety, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $110,000 for the violations involving HPSI iiow uncertainties.

'The NRC issued a Severity Level til problem on February 5,1998 (EA 97-589) for violations associated with a November 1997 mispositioned valve controller in the auxiliary component cooling water system at Waterford 3, and a Severity Level ll1 problem with a 555,000 civil penalty on May 9,1997 (EA 97-099) for violations associated with containment fan coolers.

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l Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-The violation of 10 CFR 50.59 associated with EFW flow is based on Entergy having reduced design basis EFW flows after recognizing that the assumed design basis flows could not be l achieved by the motor-driven and steam-driven EFW pumps. Entergy's safety evaluation for ^ reducing design basis EFW flow from 700 gallons per minute to 575 gallons per minute was less conservative than the originallicensing basis analysis. However, Entergy concluded that EFW flow was still sufficient to remove decay heat from the reactor coolant system and to enable reactor coolant system cooldown upon loss of normal feedwater flow using a revised analysis.

While the NRC has not independently reviewed Entergy's revised analysis, it is apparent that Entergy failed to recognize that this change in the design basis required NRC approval because it introduced an unreviewed safety question (USQ) as defined by 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2).

Specifically, a USQ was introduced because EFW flow was reduced below the value assumed in the plant Technical Specification bases and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), as well as the value considered by the NRC in its Safety Evaluation Report at the time the facility was licensed, thereby reducing the margin of safety assumed by the NRC in licensing the facility, in particular, in your assessment of the reduced EFW flow, you were not able to demonstrate that plant response to a design basis event analyzed in the FSAR continued to

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. meet applicable requirements using the analysis and assumptions integral to the FSAR analysis. 1 At the conference, Entergy disputed the NRC's view that this change to design basis assumptions involved a USQ. Entergy argued that the margin of safety had not been reduced --

and therefore NRC approval was not required - because the reduced EFW flows were still sufficient to achieve cooldown and prevent reactor coolant system pressures from exceeding design basis values Entergy argued that a reduction in the specific EFW flow value input was not a reduction in the margin of safety, provided the plant's fission product barriers remained intact. After careful consideration of this argument, the NRC has concluded that the violation occurred for the reasons discussed above.

The failure to request NRC approval for a change that introduced a USO deprived the NRC of the opportunity to assure that plant safety had not been adversely impacted. Such failures are a matter of significant regulatory concem and must be resolved by a submittal requesting NRC review and approval under 10 CFR 50.90. Thus, the violation of 10 CFR 50.59 related to reduced EFW flow (Violation E) has been classified at Severity Level ill in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. As previously discussed, a civil penalty with a base value of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level ill violation. However, based on the specific circumstances of this case and our consideration of the information that you presented at the conference, the NRC has determined that no civil penalty will be considered for this violation in accordance with.

the discretion described in Vll.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

The following modifications were made to the apparent violations described in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/97-25 and discussed at the March 26,1998, predecisional enforcement conference:

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-l (1) Apparent Violation 1, involving 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(i), failure to evaluate the effect of reduced HPSI flow on peak cladding temperature, was withdrawn based on your assertion that you did evaluate the effect of the reduced HPSI flow on peak cladding temperature on December 5,1997. It has been replaced with Violation A in the enclosed Notice; (2) Apparent Violation 3, involving 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, has been modified to include specific examples of opportunities to identify and correct HPSI flow uncertainty issues and to incorporate what had been Apparent Violation 6.a. as one of the specific examples; (3) Apparent Violation 4.c., involving flow instrument uncertainty in testing the ACCW/CCW heat exchanger, has been withdrawn. You submitted your technical basis for denying this apparent violation on May 7,1998 (W3F1-98-0078). The NRC has reviewed this basis and disagrees that the measurement uncertainties associated with thermal performance testing can be credited for measurement uncertainties associated with the flow balance test in a rigorous uncertainty analysis. However, based on your evaluation that the system is still operable using a rigorous application of uncertainty and based on the lack of explicit regulatory or industry standards / requirements for application of instrument uncertainties beyond Technical Specification parameters, we agree that the apparent violation should be withdrawn.

'(4) Apparent Violation 5, involving procedural char.ges that instructed operators to secure charging pumps, has been withdrawn. This is based on your conclusion that these instructions do not conflict with taking credit for charging pumps in the small-break LOCA analysis because the analysis predicts that a recirculation actuation signal will not occur for a small-break LOCA; and (5) Apparent Violation 6.c., involving containment isolation valves associated with the hydrogen analyzers, has been withdrawn because we agree that it is within your authority to reclassify containment isolation valves to a configuration previously approved by the NRC (i.e., from automatic to manual / remote manual).

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely, .

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Ilis W. Merschoff Regional Adminis tor Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 _

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -5-Enclosure: Notice of Violation and i Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty cc w/ Enclosure: Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O.' Box 31995 i Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O! Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 General Manager, Plant Operations , Waterford 3 SES I Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B ' Killona, Louisiana 70066 Manager - Licensing Manager 1' Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066

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l Chairman , Louisiana Public Service Commission One American Place, Suite 1630 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697 l Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 l l ! ! L

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Entergy Operations, Inc. -6-

. William H. Spell, Administrator Louisiana Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135 Parish President St. Charles Parish P.O. Box 302 Hahnville, Louisiana 70057 i

Mr. William A. Cross ' Bethesda Licensing Office 3 Metro Center, Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 l

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I Entergy Operations, Inc. -7-bec w/ Enclosure: - l PDR IE 14 LPDR NUDOCS , SECY EC's: RI, Rll, Rlli CA PA (0-2G4) l EDO (0-17G21) OlG (T-5D28) DEDO (0-17G21) LIEBERMAN, OE (0-7H5) j- OE:EAFile (0-7H5) 01 (0-3E4) CHANDLER, OGC (0-15818) GOLDBERG, OGC (0-15B18) NRR (0-12G18) BOGER, NRR/ADP (0-12G18) PATEL, NRR OC/DAF (T-9E10) AEOD (T-4D18) RA Reading File GSanborn-EAFile RIV Files MIS Coordinator . PAO-Henderson l ' RSLO-Hackney HARRELL STETKA L l . E-MAIL DISTRIBUTION: l OEMAIL JDyer (JED2) l TPGwynn (TPG) WBrown (WLB) GSanborn (GFS) GMVasquez (GMV) l BHenderson (BWH) CHackney (CAH) DKunihiro (DMK1) i ' Art Howell(ATH) Chamberlain (DDC) KPerkins (KEP) Harrell(PHH) i KBrockman (KEB) Stetka (TFS) LSmith (LJS) FitJ AL\ EA41ro22. FrJ L - DOCUMENT NAME: G:\EA\CAOC0i WAT3HPC"E ^ 00022.DIT To receive copy of dorument, Indicate in box:"C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Co with enclosures "N" = No copy

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