IR 05000382/1997022
| ML20199F742 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199F728 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-97-22, NUDOCS 9711250005 | |
| Download: ML20199F742 (15) | |
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ENCLOSURE.2 U.S. NUCLEAR E2GULATORY COMMISSION --
_ REGION IV->
- Docket No.:
50 382-License No.:
' NPF-38
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- Report No.:
50-382/97 22'
Licensee:
Entergy Operations,-Inc.
Facility:
- Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location:
Hwy.18 Killona, Louisiana
~ Dates:'
September 21 through November 1,1997 inspectors:
J. M. Keeton, Resident inspector G. A. Pick, Senior Project Engineer <
T. R. Meadows, Reactor inspector K. D. Weaver, Resident inspector Appivved By:
P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D ATTACHMENT: _ Supplemental Information
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9711250005 971119
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' PDR-ADOCK 05000382
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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1Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
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NRC Inspection Report 50-382/97 22
- This routine, announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance,
- engineering, and plant support.- The report covers a 6 week period of resident inspection.
Operations-j The licensee implemented effective corrective actions for increasing operator
awareness of the applicability of Technical Specification (TS) limiting conditions for.
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operation (LCO) (Section M8.1).
The licensee implemented effective process changes, which improved the
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evaluations provided to operators by engineering that provided the basis for system operability (Section M8.1).
Maintenance A violation was identified for f ailure to properly secure wheeled items near
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safety-related equipment (Section M2.1.b).
A violation was identified with two examples for the f ailure_to establish the new
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baseline inservice test (IST) for Low Pressure Safety injection (LPSI) Pump A (Section E4.1).
Following a weld repair of a cracked charging pump discharge vent line, the vent
line again cracked after a short period of operation because of vibration-induced f atigue caused by inattention to detail by craft personnel (Section E2.1.b),
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Enaineerina Engineers performed a detailed and thorough operability evaluation of the effect on
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the LPSI system following the identification of voids in the system (Section 08.3).
Plant Suppor Overall, the licensee performed an effective fire drill (Section F4.1.b).
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Report De* ails -
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Summarv of Plant Status'
/During this inspection period 'the plant operated at essentially 100 percent power.
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1. Operations
- 01 -- ' Coriduct of Operations (71707);
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- 01.1^ general Comments (71707)
J The inspectors performed frequent' reviews of_ ongoing plant evaluations, control l
. room panel walkdowns, and plant tours. Observed activities were performed in a.
manner consistent with safe operation of the facility. The inspectors also_ observed several shift turnovers and daily routine shift activities. The shift turnovers were professional and thorough. The inspectors observed operators using self checking
= techniques when manipulating equipment, Three way communication was
. consistently used by the operators within the control room and in external
= communications with equipment operators and maintenance personnel.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
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LCJg.s.Ad) Insoection Followuo item 50 382/9507-02: Review of toxic gas 08 1 s
procedures.
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This item was initiated to ensure a detailed review of the resolution of concerns with Procedure OP-901520,'" Toxic Chemical Release." The licensee reviewed
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Procedure OP-901520 to identify any necessary enhancements. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee revised Procedure OP 901-520 as follows:
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(1) expanded Caution 16 to give guidance on using toxic gas detectors in the control room af ter it is isolated, (2) added a list of factors for the Duty Plant Manager to consider when making a decision to shut the plant down, (3) provided additional direction for taking samples, and (4) provided the Shift Supervisor / Control Room Supervisor discretion to direct Chemistry to sample the outside atmosphere.
Based on the reviews performed by the inspectors, it cppeared that the licensee had
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taken appropriate actions to address this issue.
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- 08.2_ (Closed) Violation 50-382/9610 01: Failure to acknowledge and evaluate computer alarms.
This violation was identified because operators failed to evaluate and acknowledge all computer and annunciator alarms as required by Procedure OP-100-OO1, " Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Duty." Inspectors found that, from November 5,1995, to May 23,1996, operators did not acknowledge or evaluate computer alarms because of a misunderstanding of the guidance documented in Procedure OP 100-001.
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- The corrective actions involved hardware or software changes to the computer alarm system. The inspectors found that the licensee took the following actions to
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correct the identilied problems' and prevent further violations: (1) operators can lock
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out unacknowledged alarms.to protect them frora being acknowledged before they
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are released; (2) a hot key was provided to allow return to the first page of the
- alarm page; (3) points in the alarm bac.klog can be pulled'up via description or point
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identification;_(4) a message / alarm backlog file was added; and (5) point identifications that degrade in quality were added to give operators a single occurrence alarm to alent them.
Based on the reviews performed by the inspectors, it appeared that the licensee had
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taken appropriate actions to address this issue.
- 08.3 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-382/9614-01: Response to waterhammer events in the LPSI system.
This item was initiated because of questions about the appropriateness of the resok tion of nitrogen pockets forming in the LPSI system that resulted in a waterhammer. After the licensee located gas pockets in the LPSI B piping high points between the flow control valves and the inside containment isolation check
valves, the licensee identified the nitrogen source as leakage from the safety injection tanks.
In response to Condition Report (CR) 96 1965, engineers performed a detailed engineering evaluation to assess the safety significance of the nitrogen pockets.
The evaluation concluded that the LPSI B piping and supports could withstand a system initiation with nitrogen in the syatem; therefore, there was no adverse impact on safety. The licensee implemented the following immediate actions to mitigate the consequences of this condition: (1) periodically verify that the arc length of the nitrogen pocket did not exceed preset limits: (2) check for nitrogen pockets following any valve stroke or pump surveillance; and (3) increase the refueling water storage pool level above the 93 percent level to increase the
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pressure exerted on any residual nitrogen pockets that may have formed between system ventings. As a long-term corrective action, the inspectors confirmed that the licensee had installed high point vents between the flow control valves and the inboard containment isolation valves during Refueling Outage 8.
Because of concerns with system operability and questions about the appropriateness of the short-term corrective actions, Region IV requested the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to evaluate the licensee's position with respect to
-. continued' system operability. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation conc:uded that the system remained operable and that both the short-and long-term actions adopted-by the licensee adequately addressed and/or corrected the abnormal condition.
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The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed a detailed thorough interim operability evaluation. Also, the inspectors confirmed that the licansee had developed a procedure to assess whether normally liquid filled piping contained voids and that qualified personnel performed the ultrasonic testing. The iicensee eliminated the pressure locking concerns' expressed _by the inspectors following the waterhammers by installing vents in the valve bodies.--
II. Maintenance J
M1 Conduct of Maintenance (62707,61726)
~ M1.1 General Comments The inspectors observed the following surveillance activities:
OP-903-068 Emergency Diesel Generator and Subgroup Relay Train B Operability Test
OP-903-001 Refueling Water Storage Tank Level and Concentration Mi-003 431 Containment Hydrogen Analyzer A Functional Test and
Calibration HRA1 A3800
OP-903124 Controlled Ventilation Area System Pressure Boundary
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Test In addition, the inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activities performed in accordance with the listed work authorizations (WA):
WA 01162607 Change High Pressure injection Pump A Motor and
Bearing Oil i
WA 01163186 Replace High Pressure injection Pump A Inboard Bearing Gasket WA 01155240 Repair Faulty Pressure Switch for the Number 1
Nitrogen Accumulator Pressure Regulator The inspectors found the conduct of these maintenance and surveillance activities to be good. All activities observed were performed with an appropriate authorization package or test procedure. When necessary, appropriate radiation c.ontrol measures were implemented.' The inspectors observed supervisors
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monitoring job progress.
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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment j
M 2.1 Imoronerly Stored Wheeled items in Reactor Auxiliarv Buildina j
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Scope (71707)
The inspectors performed this inspection during a tour of the reacur auxiliary building. The inspectors also reviewed the administrative procedures related to equipment storage. A followup tour was conducted to verify that appropriate immediate corrective actions had been taken.
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Observations and Findinas On October 23,1997, during a plant tour, the inspectors observed numerous items on wheels stored throughout the reactor auxiliary building with their wheel restraints improperly engaged. After reviewing Procedure UNT-007-006, " Housekeeping,"
Revision 7, the inspectors determined that lic6nsee personnel had not complied with the procedure. Some of the items were stored in passages in the vicinity of safety-related cable runs and instrument sensing lines. The failure to properly store wheeled items in the vicinity of safety-related equipment, as specified in procedures, is a violation of TS 6.8.1.a (50-382/9722-01).
The inspectors notified the shift superintendent of the observed discrepancies and he immediately dispatched auxiliary operators to identify any equipment not meethg the requirements of Procedure UNT-007-006 and take the actions necessary to comply with the procedure. CR 97 2497 was issued.
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Conclusions The licensee violated tha requirements for storage of wheeled carts in safety related areas. Af ter the deficiencies were identified, the licensee implemented immediate corrective actions.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9605-04: Inadequate procedure guidance for dry cooling tower (DCT) logic card replacements.
This item involved the failure to electrically isolate the DCT A logic cabinet prior to a printed circuit card replacement activity and, as a result, DCT f ans were inadvertently rendered inoperable.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly completed the test. Also, the licensee provided training to instrumentation and control planners and technicians to emphasize the requirement to electrically isolate equipment prior to maintenance.
The inspectors confirmed that the immediate corrective actions implemented to
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address the failure to enter TS LCO included issuing a tremorandum-to plant
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personnel, which indicated increased sensitivity was needed to prevent inadvertent -
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entry into TS LCO. In addition,"the Operations Manager issued Standing Instruction 96-06 to reemphasize the need to enter the appropriate TS LCO whenever any_ question existed related to a plant component.
The inspectors verified that th'e licensee completed the following long-term corrective actions: (1) revised Procedure OP-100-010, "Equiptrent Out of Service,"
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of a TS LCO; (2) developed an equipment out-of service /TS database to aid -
operators in determining the applicable TS for components removed from service;
-and (3) established guidance in Procedure OP-100-014, "TS Compliance," for actions needed for partially _ completed surveillances and confirmed that the j
guidance reflected management expectations.
As corrective actions, the licensee revised Procedure UNT-007 053, " Engineering Work Authorization," to specify that Engineering Inputs will not be used to make operability duerminations or configuration changes, all nonconforming conditions were documented on a CR, Engineering inputs have a second technical reviewer signature, and complex engineering questions will be asked and answered with the Problem Evaluation /Information Request.
The licensee also developed a new process described in Procedure W4.104,
" Engineering Request," for personnel to request and receive engineering support.
The inspectors noted that, over the past year, the licensee had successfully prevented inappropriate use 7f Engineering Inputs by the administrative controls that were established and by increasing management expectations. The inspectors determined that the licensee had provided continuing training to engineering personnel.
The inspectors confirmed that the corrective actions were properly implemented by the licensee.
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M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50 382/9614-02: ~ lnadequate procedure for testing hydrogen analyzer.
- This violation occurred because the licensee did not maintain an adequate procedure or instruction to functionally' test and calibrate the containment hydrogen analyzers.
The inspectors verified that the licensee revised Procedure Ml 003431,.
- " Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Functional Test and Calibration HRAIA3800 A or B," to provide additional guidance, eiiminate preconditioning instructions in
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- Section 8.2,' and add Attachment 10 to record as found flow and pressures with the
. appropriate acceptance criteria.
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-j The. inspectors noted that instrumenti, tion and control technicians satisfactorily -
.e completed this surveillance using the revised procedure and determined thct thel corrective actions were appropriate.'
M8.3 e (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50 382/9Q,QQ2:-Logarithmic power channels indicating 5 percent of scale below actual power.
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On January 29,1996, the licensee discovered that Logarithmic Power Channels A,.
8, C, and D read below actual thermal power by 3 5 percent. The licensee -
c identified that the error occurred because of a failure to periodically correlate log power to linear power at 100 percent power. The licensee identified that the'
deviations could have resulted in a condition at low power that would cause the log
power trip to occur at a nonconservative, higher power level.
The inspectors verified that the licensee revised Procedure OP 903102, " Safety Channel Nuclear Instrumentation Functional Test," to functionally test the channels with new limits; recalibrate the channels with the correct bias to lower the high log -
power trip setpoint from 0.257 to 0.0257 percent; and revise Procedures Mi-005 563, "Plent Protection System Channel A,- B, C, D Functional Test,". and OP-903 ? O7, " Plant Protection System Channel A, B, C, D Functional Test," to include the new high log power trip settings..
The inspectors verified that the licensee implemented the following long-term corrective actions to prevent recurrence: (1) developed a procedure to adjust the general channel bias as necessary to correct for the change in the flux ratio between core reloads, including instructions to provide operations with the new test limits each time the bias'is reset, (2) revised the nuclear instrumentation system description to include the need to adjust the general bias and perform the correlation at 100 percent power, and (3) revised the associated technical manual to include information on the need to adjust the general bias.
LFnaineerina
'E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Charoino Pumo'A Weld Cracks
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Insoection Scone (37551)-
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the weld cracks associated with the Charging Pump A discharge relief valve vent line as documented in CR 97-2277.
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Observations and Findinas On September 18,1997, the licensee identified a sms....eak at a weld on the Charging Pump A discharge relief valve vent line. Since the leak could not be stopped without isolating the pump, operators tagged out and isolated Charging Pump A, declared Charging Pump A inoperable, and entered TS 3.1.2.3.
Maintenance issued WA 01163516 to repair the vent line. Mechanics removed the vent line and tubing, shipped a sample of the cracked weld to the River Bend facility for examination, and restored the vent line to its original configuration. The licensee
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had installed the vent lines on all three charging pumps in 4 cordance with WA 01150339 in October and November 1996. The modification provided a vent valve at the high point in the discharge line of the charging pumps to allow effective removal of air following maintenance.
On October 15,1997, River Bend personnel informed the licensee that the weld cracked because of vibration-induced fatigue, Engineering personnel determined that Charging Pump A had operated 3000 hours0.0347 days <br />0.833 hours <br />0.00496 weeks <br />0.00114 months <br /> from the time the weld was installed until it f ailed. After the weld was repaired, differential displacements measurt d at the vent valve were determined to be 11 mits. Engineers determined that no immediate or near-term concerns existed for the weld failing again since the pump had operated 3000 hours0.0347 days <br />0.833 hours <br />0.00496 weeks <br />0.00114 months <br /> prior to the failure. Engineers also measured the differential displacements at the respective vent valves installed on Charging Pumps B and A/B at approximately 2.6 mils.
Subsequently, the engineers initiated a WA repair package to provide for a more f atigue-resistant weld as a long term, permanent corrective action. Engineering personnel determined that the new design would be performed during upcoming system outage windows provided the run time for Charging Pump A stayed below 3000 hours0.0347 days <br />0.833 hours <br />0.00496 weeks <br />0.00114 months <br />. Engineering personnel documented their determination in a conversation memorandum dated October 15,1997. Concurrent with the ongoing engineering evriuations discussed above, on October 12,1997, an auxiliary operator discovered a smallleak at the same weld that had previously ben.1 repaired. Operators again secured and declared Charging Pump A inoperable.
Mechanics removed the vent line and a weld sample was again analyzed. 'ihe inspectors were informed that during the welding process, a file had been used to remove excess weld material from the vent tubing where the tubing failed. As a result, a stress riser accelerated fatigue cracking of the vent line. The inspectors questioned the appropriateness of using a file to remove excess weld materials from the vent Wne. Personnel responded that welding procedures allowed thic, and that filing excess material was a common practice. On October 15,1997, the licensee installed a new vent line configuration for Charging Pump A. Enhancements in the new design included increasing the wall thickness of the vent tube from 0.083 inches to 0.120 inches, shortening the vent tubo spool pieces, and adding a vent line suppor <.
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- Conclusions Upon failure of a charging pump discharge vent line, operators properly entered the appropriate TS LCO. The original WA repair package would have temporarily corrected the deficiency; however, poor attention to detail by craft personnel resulted in a stress riser and premature failure of the repaired vent line. The modified configuration should prevent additional f atigue f ailures.
E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4.1 LPSI Pumo IST
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Scope (71750)
The inspectors evaluated the engineering staff performance after learning that the licensee had f ailed to perform a baseline test for LPSI Pumps A and B during Refueling Outage 8, as documented on CRs 97-2390 and 97-1405.
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Observations and Findinas On October 6, *,997, the licensee determined, during performance of the IST for LPSI Pump A, that the differential pressure was low and entered the Alert range, which required increased frequency testing. The licensee initiated a WA to evaluate the cause of the low differential pressure. On October 8,1997, the licensee determined that the differential pressure transmitter had been recalibrated in May 1997 when the licensee determined that the more appropriate calibration temperature should be 120 F instead of 400*F. The licensee initiated CR 97 2397 to document the f ailure.
From review of the test data, the inspectors determined that the data from a June 1997 test did not decrease the differential pressure to the Alert range; therefore, the IST performed on October 6 provided the first opportunity since the calibration temperature change in May 1997 to disclose that a change to the pump IST baseline was required. The operability assessment properly concluded that, even with the as-found data values low, LPSI Pump A remained operable. Since the same deficiency affected LPSI Pump B, the licensee evaluated the LPSI Pump B data and concluded that LPSI B remained operable. The inspectors independently evaluated the data associated with LPSI Pump B IST and agreed with the conclusion that LPSI Pump B remained operable. The inspectors determined that the licensee successfully completed an IST for LPSI Pump B on October 22,1997.
On October 8,1997, operators requested (Engineering Request W3-97-M010) that a new IST baseline value be determined for LPSI Pump A. The inspectors concluded that the evaluation for the new baseline value in Engineering Request W3 97 M010 provided strong justification that no pump degradation had actually occurred and appropriately justified the new baseline value _ _ _ _
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In May 1997, after operations identified that the correct temperature for calibration of the LPSI flow instruments was 120'F, the licensee f ailed to identify that a new IST baseline for the pump was required. ASME Section XI, ' Rules for Inservice inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," 1980 Eoition,
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Paragraph IWP 3112 specifies requirements for esta3tishing a new set of reference values. The failure to perform an IST baseline evaluation and establish new reference values as soon as practicut following recalibration of a discharge flow instrument is Example 1 of a violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(f) (50 382/9722-02).
The licensec also determined that they had failed to meet the requirement for performing an IST and obtaining reference value data at the existing baseline in May 1997, as Jocumented in CR 97 2405. This is a repeat occurrence of a noncited violation described in NRC Inspection Report 50 382/96 12, Section M1.3, which involved a f ailure to obtain the required information on the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump after modifying the goverrw controls. Specifically, the licensee did not obtain as-found data on LPSI Pump A in May 1997 and evaluate the condition of the pump prior to changing the calibration temperature for the discharge flow differential pressure transmitter. The f ailure to initiate an IST to verify the existing reference values for LPSI Pump A in May 1997 prior to recalibrating the discharge flow transmitter is Example 2 of a violation of 10 CFR 50,55alf) (50-382/9722-02).
Normally, discretion would be exercised for this violation and a noncited violation issued; however, discretion could not be granted for this violation because this was a repeat occurrence within the last 2 years.
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Conclusions The licensee determined that they had failed to obtain and evaluate the existing LPSI Pump A conditions prior to recalibrating the discharge flow transmitter operating temperature; this had been documented as a repeat occurrence. Also, the licensee did not perform a new baseline IST to obtain the new reference values as soon as possible. These deficiencies resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 50.55alf).
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Violation 50 382/9605-06: Failure to ensure that regulatory requirements translated into procedures.
The licensee stated in their vietation response that the corrective actions were the same as described in the response for Violation 50-382/9605-04. Since the inspectors have verified that the corrective actions for Violation 50 382/9605-04 were satisfactorily completed, this item is considered closed.
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l IV. Plant Suonort
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._ Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R 1.1 - General Comm?nts (71750)'
J Routine' tours of the radiological controlled area revealed that:-(' l posting cf areas l
was in accordance with requirements, (2) controlled access areas were properly locked, (3) personnel were wearing appropriate dosimetry rmd protective clcthing,
- and (4) the small number of contaminated areas continued to be a strength.
The inspectors. concluded that observed radiation protection activities were performe.J in accordance with procedures and were consistent with as low as reasonably achievable principles.
-S1-Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S 1.1 Protected Access and Vehicle insoection (71750)
~ The inspectors observed routine' ingress and egress at the orotected area access point. Security officers appropriately performed screening and search of personal items. On October 25,1997, the inspectors observed security officers perform a thorough vehicle inspection of a truck entering the protected area.
F4 Fire Protection Staff knowledge and Performance-Fire Brigi e Re3ngnas d
F4.1 a.
Sqqpe (71750)
On October'11,1997, the inspectors observed the licensee perform a fire drillin the turbine building 13.8/4.16 kV switchgear room. Also, the inspectors responded to a call-out of the fire brigade later in the day, b.
Observations and Findings Tne drill scenario was initiated by a fire in a breaker, with heavy smoke in the upper
_ levels of the switchgear room. The inspectors concluded that the fire team leader approached the fire in a conservative manner, with the safety of the fire team members and the plant in mind. For example, the fire team leader had two groups of three men each enter the switchgear room. The second group was expected to stay behind _the first and spray over their heads, if required. The inspectors noted that the fire team leader remained in constant communication with the control room.
Because of the severity of the fire, a second fire team was required to substitute for the initial fire team, The inspectors identified one communication weakness during h-
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this substitutien prosess.LThe backup group of three men, during the initial entry, ran out of fire hoto and could not properly perform their expected roles once the forward grour of men approached the breaker. When the second set of fire teams;
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entered the switchgear room,;this lack of proper hose length had not been -
communicatedi ~ Consequently, the men in the second fire team also had an'
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insufficient amount of hose. The inspectors noted _that the fire brigade locker had a
- portable blower with approximately 50 feet of _ electrical cord.' However, the,
inspectors questioned whether this length of electrical cord would be sufficient in a real emergency with the secondary plant power secured when operators secured power to the ncnsafety related bus.
During followup discussions, the inspectors found that the iicensee added:
discussion of turnover communications to the lesson plan for tho fourth quarter fire
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- team training. The licencee informed the inspectors that additional extension cords were located in the other fire brigade lockets in the turbine building. The inspectors found these actions to be appropriate for the identified deficiencies.
t Later that day at e.pproximately 6:30 p.m. (CDT), the control room announced that the fire brigade should respond to a fire in the supplemental chiller building. The inspectors responded to the fire locker and monitored the fire brigade activities at
the supplemental chiller building.. The fire team leader requested that the fire l
brigade not respond in bunker suits and had the power secured to the lights in the building. The fire team leader determined that water had dripped from a hole in the
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roof into a light ballast, which had failed,
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Conclusions The inspectors noted that the fire team's response to both a fire drill and an actual call out of the fire team was quick. The fire drill had an appropriate level of realism.
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Areas of weakness ideatified by the inspectors were apprcpriately addrecsed by the licensee.
V. Manaaement Meetings X1 Exit Mneting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on November 10,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings preser.ted.
The inspec' tors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the 4-inspection should be censidered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED ljpensee F. J. Drummond, Director, Site Support J. R. Douet, Manager, Maintenance C. M. Dugger, Vice-President, Operations E. C. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety & Regulatury Aff airs T. J. Gaudet, Manager, Licensing J. G. Hoffpauir, Manager, Operations i
. D. A. Landeche, Superintendent, Radiation Protect on T. R. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations J.'J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Pionning D. C. Mather.y, Manager, Operations D. Matthews, Licensing Specialist G. D. Pierce, D; rector of Quality B. N. Proctor, Superintendent, Systems Engineering L. N, Rushing, Manager, Mechanical / Civil Engineering C. H. Thomas, Communications Specialist D. W. Vinci, Superintendent, System Engineering A. J. Wrape, Director, Design Engineering G. S. Zetsch, Supervisor, Security Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37651 Onsite Engineering 01726 Surveillance Observations 62707 Maintenance Observations 71707 Plant Operations 71750 Flant Support Activities 92901 Followup - Plant Operations 92002.
Followup - Maintenance 92903 Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED-
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-50 382/9722 01
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Failure to properly store equipment (Section M2.1) _
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-50 382/9722 02 VIO -
Failure _to perform IST baselining (Section E4.1)
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50 382/9507 02
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Review of toxic gas procedures (Section 08.1).
50 S82/9610-01 VIO.
Failure to ackrowledge and evaluate computer alarmo t
(Section 08.2),
L50 382/9614 01 URI Response to waterhammer events in the LPSi~ system
. (Section 08.3)..
50 382/9605 04 VIO Inadequate procedure guidance for DCT logic card replacements (Section M8.1).
50 382/9614 02 VIO Inadequate procedure for testing hydrogen analyzer
(Section M8.2).-
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FJ-382/96 003 LER Logarithmic. power channels indicating 5 percent of scale
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below actual power (Section M8.5).
50-382/9605-06 VIO Failure to ensure that regulatory requirements translated
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into procedures (Section.E8.1).
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
L CR condition report DCT dry cooling tower IST.-
inservice test
'
LCO limiting conditions for operation LPSll low pressure safety injection-NRC-Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR-
- public document room TS Technical Specification
,
WA work authorization-
_
..
,
.
_
.
_