IR 05000382/1997007

Insp Rept 50-382/97-07 on 970825-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Previously Identified Insp Findings

ML20216G924
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	09/10/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216G910	List: IR 05000382/1997007 ML20216G905
References
50-382-97-07, 50-382-97-7, NUDOCS 9709160092
Download: ML20216G924 (8)

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I MCJ.OSURE

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV l l

Docket No.: 50 382 License No.: NPF-38 Report No.: 50 382/97-07  :

Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location: Hwy.18 Killona, Louisiana Dates: August 25-28, 1997

Inspector

L. E. Ellershaw, Reactor inspector, Maintenance Branch Approved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

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i 9709160092 970910 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G PDR

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E2MLCUTIVE SUMMARY Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 NRC Inspection Report 50 382/97-07 This inspection consisted of followup on previously identified inspection findings. The inspection report covers a 4-day period onsit Maintenance

The inspector identified a poor practice regarding control room use of unauthorized symbols to show the type of engineered safety feature actuation signals that certain equipment received. Further, at least one valve was shown to receive the wrong signal, whbe another valve was shown to rocsive no signal (Section M8.4).

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l-3-Beoort Details Summary of Plant Status The plant was in full power operation during the inspection period, i 11. Maintenance M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M 8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9609 01 (EA 96 255/02013): Failure to implement timely corrective action after it was identified that required valves were not included in the inservice test program, and other valves that were in the inservice test program were not being properly teste The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 27,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.

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M8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followun item 50-382/9620-01): Review and evaluate pump data that was used to support the licensee's position that the pumps had not degraded to the point where they would not meet system design requirements, and that there were no operability concern During this inspection, the inspector reviewed and evaluated inservice test program pump data (i.e., inservice test flow rates, pump curves, and current system design basis accident requirements). This data supported the licensee's position. Licensee personnel recognized the need for reevaluation anytime the reference values are changed. Section 5.5 in Administrative Procedure UNT-006-021, " Pump and Valve

' Inservice Testing," Revision 2, required all pump reference data to be compared against d9 sign values contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report and the applicable Technical Specification.

M8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9620 02 (EA 96-255/03014): Failure to fully close Valve CS 118A in accordance with Procedure OP 903 035, following the September 19,1995, containment spray pump operability check, until discovery on November 11,1995.

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During this inspection, the inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 27,1997, including refurbishment of Valve CS 118A, had been implemented and were complete. No additional problems were identifie ..

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l M8.4 (Closed) Violation 50-382/9620-03 (EA 96-255/01013): Failure to perform the required written safety evaluation to provide the bases for a determination that the deviation from the Final Saiety Analysis Report regarding the containment vacuum relief instrument and monitoring lines did not involve an unreviewed safety questio During this inspection, the inspector verified that the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 27,1997, including a plant modification and approval of Amendment 128 to Facility Operating License NPF 38, were adequate and complete, l

One of the issues associated with Amendment 128 to the facility operating license was a modification in which two automatic containment isolation valves would be located outside containment, with continuous direct position indication in the control room. This issue was appropriately Uplemente During verification of the modification, the inspector identified a poor practice. Ea of the two automatic containment isolation valves, identified as CVR-0400 and CVRa401, had a functional, continuous direct position it'dication gage located on a contial panelin the control room. The inspector also observed a star shaped l symbol attached to the indicator gage of Valve CVR-0400. This symbol was also j affixed to some other gages located on the panel. There was no symbol on the indicator gage for Valve CVR-040 Also attached to the control panel was a reference placard which showed various symbols and provided a description of the expected signals associated with each of the symbols. The placard showed the star shaped symbol as representing a safety injection actuation signal, while a square shaped symbol represented a containment isolation actuation signal. Since the function of the two valves was containment isolation, it was clear that both indicator gages should have been marked with a square-shaped symbo Since one indicator gage was apparently mismarked and the other was not marked at all, the inspector asked control room personnel how this might impact any of their activities. The inspector was informed that the use of the symbols wu 'neant to be an aid, but they were not proceduralized nor were they addressed in the emergency operating procedures. Licensee personnel initiated Condition Report 2166 on August 27,1997, to evaluate this condition. Subsequent NRC review of the licensee's evaluation is considered an inspection followup item (50-382/9707-01).

M8.5 (Closed) Ins.pection Followuo item 50-382/9623-02: Two missing lockwasher were identified on the turbine-driven emargency feedwater pump stop Valve MS-416 trip solenoi The licensee initiated Condition identification 305736 to evaluate whether lockwashers should be installed on the trip solenoid. Licensee evaluation

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5-determined that additional puidance to craft was needed. Revision 00 to lesson Plan W-3 LP-GMAD-0007, " Fasteners," was developed and presented to all maintenance personnel. The basis for the guidance in the lesson plan was

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developed from ASME Code 018.21.1, ANSI B18.22.1, EPRI TR 104213, " Bolted Joint," and Machinery's Handbook (Edition 22). The inspector verified that the corrective actions were adequate and complet M8.6 (Closed) Inspec1 ion Followuo item 50-382/9632-04: Evaluation of potential accelerated general corrosion and its effect on wall thickness of the emergency diesel generator air receiver The licensee initiated Condition Report 96-1792 on November 13,1996, to

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evaluate possible degradation of the air receivers due to accelerated corrosion, Based on ultrasonic examinations, it was determined that the corrosion rate on the

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inside wall of the air receivers is minimal. The licensee concluded that the regularly scheduled monthly surveillance task used to remove moisture from the receivers was effective. The licenses was considering establishing the use of ultrasonic thickness measurements on a 5-year interval, for trending purposes.

The inspector considered the actions taken t,y the licensee to be reisponsive to the issue of corrosion and its effect on the diesel generator air receiver V. Manaoement Meetin:ig I

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 28,1997. The licensee personnel acknowledged the findings presented, i

The inspectors asked the licensee personnel whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED E. Beckendorf, Superintendent, Plant Security M. Branden, Supervisor, Licensing R. Burski, Director, Plant Modifications and Construction F. Drummond, Director, Plant Support E. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs T. Gaudet, Manager, Licensing J. Howard, Manager, Procurement and Engineering Programs C. Karling, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer T. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations E. Linnartz, Operational Experience Engineer D. Marpe, Superintendent, Maintenance l P. Melancon, inservice Test Coordinator, Programs Engineering G. Robin, Supervisor, Programs Engineering L L. Thomas, Supervisor, Licensing l D, Urciuoli, Senior Licensing Engineer D. Vinci, Manager, Plant Engineering A. Wrape Ill, Director, Design Engineering INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance i

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50 382/9707 01 IFl Review licensee's evaluation regarding use of unauthorized control room panel symbols (Section M8.4)

Closed 50-382/9609 01 VIO Failure to promptly correct identified (EA 96 255/02013) deficiencies in the inservice test program (Section M8.1)

50-382/9620 01 - IFl Review data used to support licensee's position that safety-related pumps had not degraded to the point where they would not meet system design requirements (Section M8.2)

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C 2-50 382/9620-02 VIO Failure to shut Valve CS-118A (EA 96-255/03014) following completion of containment spray pump testing (Section M8,3)

50 382/9620-03 VIO Failure to perform a required written (EA 96 265/01013 safety evaluation to provide the bases for a determination that the difference between the plant configuration and the FSAR was not an unreviewed safety question (Section M8,4)

50 382/9623-02 IFl Review licensee's evaluation regarding two missing lockwashers on the trip solenoid of the turbine-driven emergency feodwater pump stop valve (Section M8.5)

l 50-382/9623-04 IFl Review licensee's evaluation of potential accelerated general corrosion and its effect on wall thickness of the emergency diesel l generator air receivers

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED l

Procedures NOECP-258, " Control of the Waterford 3 Pump and Valve Inservice Test Program,"

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STP 01155355, "Special Test Procedure, CS-118AIB) Leak Test," Revision 0 l

UNIT-006-019, " Control of Local Leak Rate Testing," Revision 1 OP 100-009, " Control of Valves and Breakers," Revision 14 Dtgwinos and Calculations l-Drawing 1564 B-430, sheets DP-26 and 31 Calculation GA-CB-004 B, " Design Report for Air Starting Receiver"

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3 Condition Reports and Anolicable Root Cause Analvsis Reoorts CR 96-1103 and CR 96-1177, dated September 18,1996 -

CR 96-1123 and CR 961143, dated Abgust 20,1996 CR 96-0619, dated November 7,1996 CR 96-0414, dated May 14,1996 l

CR 961792, dated November 13,1996 l CR 97 2166, dated August 27,1997

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Other Documents L

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Condition Identification Report 305736, dated November 5,1996 I

l Work Authorization 01152820

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License Amenc..nent No.128 to Facility Operating License NPF 38, dated May 20,1997 Lesson Plan W 3-LP-GMAD-0007, " Fasteners," Revision 00 Inservice Test Basis Document, Change 1 to Revision 0, dated February 24,1997 Purap Curves and Teat Data for Safety-related Centrifugal Pumps

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