IR 05000382/1997028

Insp Rept 50-382/97-28 on 971214-980131.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support Activities

ML20202D792
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	02/11/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202D791	List: IR 05000382/1997028 ML20202D786
References
50-482-97-28, NUDOCS 9802170177
Download: ML20202D792 (12)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-382 License No.: NPF 38 Report No.: 50 382/97 28 Licensee: Entergy Operations, In Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 :

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Location: Hwy.18 Killona, Louisiana Dates: December 14,1997, through January 31,1998 Inspector: J. M. Keeton, Resident inspector Approved By: P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D ATTACHMENT: Supplementallnformation

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9902170177 990211 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G- PDR we

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-382/97 28

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This routine, announced inspection included aspects of operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support activities. The report covers a 7 week period of resident inspectio . Operations

• The failure to load the appropriate azimuthal power tilt (Aztift) value into the core operating limits supervisory system (COLSS) prior to exceeding 20 percent power was a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 4.2.3.2a. This is a noncited violation (Section 08.1).

• Positive reactivity was added to the reactor coolant system in a plant condition that prohibited positive reactivity changes, as specified in TS 3.7.6.2.b (ventilation specification). The reactivity addition was minor and did not approach shutdown margin requirements. This is a noncited violation (Section 08.2).

• Conduct of the control element assembly (CEA) operabikty check was very goo Operators appropriately supplemented the shift complement and a high level of supervisory oversignt was evident (Section M1.2).

Maintenanco .

• Material condition of the valve actuators installed in the ultimate heat sink was poor (Section M2.1).

• Instrumentation and control (l&C) technicians attempted to expand a work package scope without appropriate authorization. Specifically, the technicians wanted to test a component not listed in the work package (Section M3.1).

Plant Gucoort

• The inspectors found trash inside a seismic support in Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room A. During followup by the licensee, oil was found in a seismic support in EDG Room B. The licensee evaluated the additional fire loading created by these items and determineo that the additional fire loading remained well below the actual fire loading (Section 02.1).

• Technical Support Center (TSC) responders had n .en notified that control room access was restricted (Section PS.1).

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Report DitAlla Eummary of Plant Status During this inspection period, the plant operated at essentially 100 percent powe l. Onorations ,

01 Conduct of Operations (71707)

01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspector performed frequent reviews of ongoing plant evaluations, control room panel walkdowns, and plant tours. Observed activities were performed in a manner consistent with safe operation of the facility. The inspector also observed several shift turnovers ar'd daily routine shift activities. Control room logs were verified to be appropriately completed and reviewe ,

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Transient Combustible 1 Discovered in EDG Room 6 On December 1,1997, the inspector was observing a scheduled suNeillance run of EDG A, when several combustible items were found inside a seismic support. The inspector informed a senior reactor operator in training, who also observed the items in the support. On December 17, the inspector checked the seismic support and found that the tresh was still there. The Shift Superintendent was notified and Condition Report 97 2754 was written.1he trash removed from the support consisted of cigarette butte, chewing tobacco, safety ribbon, a styrofoam cup, a candy wrapper, chewing gum, valve labels, a cough drop wrapper, and other unidentifiable items. Other seismic supports in both EDG rooms were inspected, in EDG Room 8, approximately 1 pint of lobe oil / fuel oil mixture was discovered in a similar seismic suppor Engineers performed a calculation of the additional fire loading in the rooms, which demonstrated that the additional fire loading remained well below the maximum fire loads. Operability of the EDGs was not affecte in addition to removing the trash, the maintenance manager assumed the lead in informing personnel on management's housekeeping expectations. Additionally, zone walkdowns had been implemented placing emphasis on inspecting for trash in less obvious area .

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08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

0 (Closed) Lietnn,1 Event Reoort (LER) 96-Q10: COLSS Not Monitoring Artilt Due to Constants Not Being Loaded On August 5,1996, following a forced maintenance outage, reactor power was increased above 20 percent with the hcorrect Artilt value load 6d in the computer. During the outage, the plant monitoring computer had been rebooted and the Aztilt default value of 0.030 was loaded. This value was nonconservative because the correct value should have been 0.0217. Therefore, TS 4.2.3.2a, which requires COLSS to continuously monitor Aztilt to ensure the Aztilt limit remains within the allowed value, could not be me The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the license Procedures OP-010-001, " General Plant Operations," and NE-007 013, " Plant Monitoring Computer Failures and Reboot Procedure," were revised to require that the constants be venfied prior to going above 20 percent reac'or power. Also, Work Authorization (WA) 01151611 was completed in October 1996 to reset the default value of the Aztilt to 0.0. This will cause an alarm in the control room if the Aztilt values have not been update This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, was not willful, actions taken as a result of a previous violation thould not have corrected this problem, and appropriate corrective actions were completed by the licensee (50 382/9728 01).

08.2 (Gomed) LER 50-382/97-022: Positive Reactivit: lon in Violation of TS 3.7 S. On June 14,1997, during Refueling Outage 8, Mode 5, the plant was in a TS action statement that prohibited positive reactivity changes. At this time, reactor cooling system boron concentration was 2290 part per million and the refueling water storage pool was 2266 part per million. Operations performed a makeup to the reactor cooling system from the refueling water storage pool, which constituted a positive reactivity addition that was prohibited by T The inspector reviewed the root cause of the event and the proposed corrective actions and concluded that the issue was being appropriately addressed. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, was not willful, actions taken as a result of a previous violation should not have corrected this problem, and appropriate corrective actions were completed oy the licensee (50-382/9728-02).

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ikMaintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance (61726,62707) '

t M1,1 General Comments The inspector observed the following surveillance activity:

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OP 903 005 CEA Operabilit/ Check

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in addition, the inspector observed portions of the following maintenance activities in

accordance with the listed WA

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WA 01165281 Ultrasonic Test and Venting Reactor Building Penetration No. 39

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WA 01166203 Water Chiller WC 1 (3A 5A) Compressor Postmaintenance

Test Following Reattachment of Vane Controller ldier Arm

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WA 011668SS Troubleshoot Low Position Indicatioi on CEA 10 M1.2 CEA Goerability Check Inspection Scone (61726)

The inspector reviewed thu surveillance procedure, observed licensed operators performing the surveillance, reviewed the surveillance data, and verified that results conformed with TS requirements.

, Observations and Findings On January 22,1998, the inspector observed the operators during the prejob briefin Instructions from the control room supervisor were detailed and clear. The lengthy surveillance required full attention of the two reactor operators and the control room supervisor. An additional operator was assigned to cperate the remainder of the control room with oversight by the Shift Superintendent. Breaks were appropriately taken to keep the operators focused on the survei!4 nce. Communications were three-way and effective. The inspector noted continual use of self-checking and peer-checking techniques. Overall conduct of the surveillance was very goo The inspector reviewed the surveillance procedure and associated TS No discrepancies or inconsistencies were identified. The ini;pector reviewed the test data and found that data was accurate and complete. Test results had been appropriately reviewed and verified. TS requirements for CEA position had been me __

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4 Conclusions The surveillance was performed in a professional manner in accordance with the appropriate procedures and received good supervisory oversigh M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Failure of Manual Actuator for Comoonent Cooling Water C SW) Valve CC-177B Insoection Scooe B2707)

The inspector evaluated the material condition of the CCW manual valve actuators associated with the ultimate heat sin Observations and Findinos On January 5,1998, while performing Procedure OP 903118, " Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Tests," the operator found that Valve CC 1778 could not be closed using reasonable force. This valve provided dit, charge isolation capabilities for Dry Cooling Tower Bundle 9. Train B of the CCW system was declared inoperable in accordance with the appropriate TS. On January 6, the valve actuator was replaced by a ,

new Model 2KE Kenneth Elliott actuator from the store room. The valve moved freely upon replacing the actuato The inspector observed disassembly of the faulty actuator. The actuator appeared heavily rusted in some areas, although, when the side plate was removed, there was no visible damage to the worm gear or bull gear. With the gears removed, the handwheel shaft was still binding in the actuator housing and could not be rotated with reasonable forc The Kenneth Elliott valve actuators are used throughout the CCW and auxiliary component cooling water systems. The dry cooling tower fan cooling bundles (10 in each train) each have an inlet and outlet isolation valve equipped with the same type of actuator. The inspector ovaluated the other valve actuators in the CCW and auxiliary component cooling water systems that are exposed to extreme environmental condition Many of the actuators of this type exhibited some degradation (i.e., rust, seepage around seams, cracked housings, cracked hand wheels, etc.). All other valves in the dry cooling tcwer area had been operated satisfactorily. In general, the material condition of these valve actuators was poo Additionalinspection related to the use of these valve actuators in an adverse environment and will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/98 0 .__ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _._ _ _ _ __ - . - _ _ . _- . _

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c, Conclusions Material condition of the manual valve actuators inspected in the ultimate heat sink area was poor, M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 1&C_Troubleshootino of CEA-10 Position Indicatiog Insoection Scogn.(62io7)

The inspector reviewed the work package, observed l&C technicians during portions of the troubleshooting, and observed interactions between the technicians and operator Q5servations and Findinas On January 21,1998, l&C technicians were troubleshooting CEA 10 position indication

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in accordance with WA 1166865, in response to CR 98-0077. The CEA 10 position indic1 tion was 2A inches lower than any other assembly in the CEA group. This position was well within the group deviation limits required by TS 3.1.3.1, which states that each CEA of a given group must be within 7 inches of all other CEA in its grout. The l&C technicians originally took voltage readings on CEA-10 indication and found that the voltage reading was not steady and appeared to drop when the meter was placed across the terminals While taking the vo!tage readings, trip indication was received on Core Protection Calculator (CPC) B and the indication immediately cleared. This prompted the writing of CR 98-0077, Tlis inspector again observed a spurious trip of CPC B when the technicians checked the voltage for CEA 10. This time a voltage drop was not observed, The inspector verified that the voltmeter was checked by the measuring and test equipment laboratory and no problems were identified. The l&C technicians requested that the Shift Superintendent give them permission to try the voltage reading on a different CEA to see if the same problem occurred. The inspector asked if this action was within the scope of the WA and if they had discussed the action with their first line supervisor. The action was not in the WA scope nor had they contacted their supervisor. The Shift Superintendent halted the work activity until the issue was appropnately resolve The WA was completed without changing the scope. The technicians lifted, inspected, and relanded the positive lead for the CEA. Position indication for CEA 10 retu,ned to  ;

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normal for the CEAs in that group. The technicians speculated that an oxide film had developed on that terminal, which had increased the resistance, and was displaced when the terminal was relanded. The reason for the spurious trip of CPC B could not be determined and was entered as another data point in an ongoing investigation of spurious trips of the CPCs.

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. Conclusions l&C technicians attempted to expand the scope of their WA without appropriate authorization, M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Unresched item 50 382/9702 02: Adequacy of Vacuum Fill Procedure to Meet TS Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.J (formerly TS Section 4.4.2.j)

This issue involved a concem regarding the licensee's abilit) a comply with TS Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.J which requires that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) be maintained full of wate The inspector reviewed the results of the special test performed under WA 0115654 The test was completed satisfactorily on February 22,1997. As a result, the methodology for venting the high points in the ECCS were incorporated into Procedure OP 903 026, * Emergency Core Cooling System Valve Lineup Verification."

This procedure required ECCS high point venting at least once every 31 day The inspector reviewed the licensee efforts to ensure that routine venting of the ECCS high points maintained the system in a filled condition. The inspector concluded that the procedure was adequat ILfjant Sunnort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Response to Soill in Soent Resin Tank (SRT) Pumo Room Insoection Scoce (71750)

The inspector performed an in plant inspection to verify that the resin spill was containe Observations and FindtD98 On December 26,1997, during a routine short cycle recirculation of the SRT in accordance with Procedure OP 007-005, Resin Waste Management," a radwaste technician noted a decrease in differential pressure across the spent resin transfer pum He stopped the pump and retumed the valve alignment to normal. A radiation protection technician stationeci in the vicinity of the SRT pump room reported that water and re';;a were observed on the floor in the pump roo The inspector verified that immediate actions were taken by the radiation protection technicians to ensure that the resin was contained within the SRT and trcnsfer pump 1 rooms. Air samples were taken to ensure that no airborne activity resulted. Radiation

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7 doses to the initial responders were below the dose limits. The SRT access door had been locked and appropriately posted. At the end of this inspection, the licensee was in ;

the process of formulating a plan to clean up the resin in the roo Cleanup of the resin in the SRT pump room will be monitored by the NRC and reported at a later dat P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Planning P Review of EmeIggegyJupcase Oraanization Trainino Durino Limited Control Room

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Enveloce Occupancy Insoettion Scooe (71750)

The inspector reviewed the emergency response procedures and interviewed members of the emergency response organization to verify training on appropriate response during periods of limited control room envelope acces Observations and Findinas On Januay 19,1998, the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning nomial intake dar:per, HVC-101, failed its localleak rate test. The syste, vas declared inoperable and the control room envelop was placed in the isolate mode in accordance with Procedure OP-100-014, " Technical Specification and T echnical Requirements Compliance,* Section 6.6, Specific System Guidelines, con'rol room access was limited to 16 people at any one time when the control room envelop was isolate The inspector performed a review to determine how the TSC could be manned since the TSC was located inside the control room envelope. The inspector found that the emergency response procedures contained provisions for directing the TSC staff to the altarnate TSC, if control room envelope access was limited. However, the inspector also determined that TSC members had not been specifically advised that the control room access was restricted at the time the control room was isolated. This situation could have resulted in TSC responders, on site during normal wxk hours, responding directly to the TSC upon paging system announcement of an event declarat;on. This could have resulted in unnecessary confusion or endangerment to TSC responder The inspector discussed these observatioc eth the General Manager, Plant Operations, who r 9cted the Emergency Planning Manager to no;ify ali TSC responders that control room ~ ss was restricted and that they should respond to the alternate TSC. When repairs to HVC 101 were completed and the control room access restriction lifted, the Emergency Planning Manager notified the TSC responders that access to the normal TSC was availabl . - . -- -- .. . - _ . - . . - . . . . . _ - . _ - . - - . - . - - - -

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A plan of action to remove the 16 person limit on the control room when in isolate has been escalated by the licensee. The inspector determined that interim actions to man the backup TSC were 8n effect and training had been received prior to this inspectio c. Conclusions The provisions for directing TSC responders to the alternate TSC when control room .

access is restricted was proceduralized and training was completed. However, TSC 1 responders had not been specifically notified that the control room access had been restricted for an indefinite time for maintenanc V. Mananoment Meetinan ,

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on February 5,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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ATTACHMENT SUF'PLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSQNS CONTACTEQ

Licensee F. J. Drummond, Director Site Support C. M. Dugger, Vice President, Operations T. J. Gaudet, Manager, Licensing ,

E. C. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Sefety & Regulatory Affairs T. R. Leonard, General Manager, Plant Operations D. C. Matheny, Manager, Operations G. D, Pierce Director of Quality ,

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D. W, Vinci, Superintendent, System Eng:neering A. J. Wrape, Dir?ctor, Design Engineering i

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JMSPECTION PROCEDURES USED ,

61726 Survnillance Observation

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62707 M -ice Observation 71707 3perations 71750 Plant Support Activities 92901 Followup Operations

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92902 Followup - Maintenance

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ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED ORitDttd 50 382/9728-01 NCV COLSS not monitoring Aztilt due to constants not being loaded (Section 08.1).

J 382/9728-02 NCV Positive reactivity addition in violation of TS 3.7.6. (Section 08.2).

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2-C1Q11td 50 392/96-010 LFR COLSS not monitoring Artilt due to constants not being loaded (Section 08.1).

50 382/9728-01 NCV COLSS not monitoring Aztilt due to constants not being loaded (Section 08.1).

50 382/97 022 LER Positive reactivity addition in violation of TS 3.7.6. (Section 08.2).

50-382/9728-02 NCV Positive reactivity addition in violation of TS 3.7.6. (Section 03.2).

50 382/9702 02 URI Adequacy of vacuum fill procedure to meet TS Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.J (formerly TS Section 4.4.2.j)

(Section MB.1).

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CCW component cooling water CEA control element assembly COLSS core operating limits supervisory system CPC core protection calculator ECCS emergency core cooling system EDG ernergency diesel generator l&C instrumentation and control LER licensee event report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission SRT spent resin tank TS Technical Specification TSC Technical Support Center WA work authorization

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