Similar Documents at Maine Yankee |
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217N8371999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Summary of Changes Made to Maine Yankee Defueled Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Without Encl ML20217J0241999-10-13013 October 1999 Documents 991005 Telcon Between NRC & Util to Address All of Areas Identified in Reg Guide 1.179 & NUREG-1700 Re Final Survey Plan Except for One Area ML20212F4321999-09-24024 September 1999 Responds to 990921 e-mail to E Poteat,Requesting Waiver of Late Charges of Listed Amount for Annual Fee Invoice AR0431-99.Request Denied Because 10CFR15.37 Does Not Provide for Waiver Based on Info Provided in e-mail ML20212M2431999-09-22022 September 1999 Expresses Concern Re NRC Consideration of Adoption of Policy Based on Requests from Licensees,To Allow as Part of Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants & Demolition of Onsite Structures at Reactor Plant Sites ML20212E4611999-09-20020 September 1999 Responds to Concerning Possible Involvement in Weekly Telephone Calls NRC Staff Has with Maine Yankee Staff ML20212F1361999-09-20020 September 1999 Confirms That NMSS Has Received 990916 Submittal & Will Be Included as Attachment to Commission Paper Along with State of Maine Submittal ML20212F2521999-09-20020 September 1999 Confirms That NMSS Has Received 990916 Submittal & Will Be Included as Attachment to Commission Paper Along with State of Maine Submittal ML20212B7011999-09-14014 September 1999 Submits Comments & Raises Questions Re Generation of White Paper for Commission to Decide Merits of Rubberization ML20212A5911999-09-0808 September 1999 Responds to 990816 e-mail & 990901 Telcon with Respect to Comments Re Decommissioning of Maine Yankee Site.Concerns Raised with Respect to Status of Fuel at Maine Yankee Have Been Raised in Previous Ltrs to Us NRC ML20211M9371999-08-30030 August 1999 Addresses Two Issues Raised in s to Senator Collins & Governor a King That Relate to Construction of ISFSI at Maine Yankee ML20212B2181999-08-30030 August 1999 Responds to Re 990707 Message from N Allen Re Transportation Incident Involving Shipment from Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant ML20212E4841999-08-27027 August 1999 Informs That at 990429 Meeting of Myap Community Advisory Panel,R Shadis,Asked If Given Lack of Resident Inspectors & Limited NRC-license Review Correspondence,If Shadis Could Take Part in Weekly NRC Conference Calls with Licensee ML20216F1891999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards Copies of Maine Yankee & Yankee Rowe Refs Listed, Supporting Industry Position That Branch Technical Position Asb 9-2 Methodology over-estimates Spent Fuel Decay Heat ML20211C0591999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Addl Justification for Proprietary Request Re 990809 Submittal Info on Maine Yankee License Termination Plan ML20212A5981999-08-16016 August 1999 Expresses Appreciation for with Respect to e-mail Message Re Site Release Criteria Standards Can Never Be Verified Using Existing Database ML20211D7041999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Rev 17 of Maine Yankee Defueled Safety Analysis Rept (Dsar), Per 10CFR50.71 & 10CFR50.4 ML20217M6501999-08-0909 August 1999 Responds to 990719 E-mail Re Cleanup Stds at MYAPC Station & Verification of Meeting Cleanup Stds.Informs That NRC Criteria for Licensing NPPs Contained in 10CFR50 & That 10CFR50.82 Addresses Requirements for License Termination ML20210Q7201999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Draft Documents Re Info on Myap License Termination Plan & Diskette.Proprietary Info & Diskette Withheld ML20212B2271999-08-0606 August 1999 Discusses Concerns Re Recent Incindent Involving Transport of Nuclear Matl from Maine Yankee ML20210M8171999-08-0505 August 1999 Forwards Draft License Termination Plan/Amend Plan for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co, to Enhance Dialogue Between Various Stakeholders & Provide Springboard for Clarifying Mutual Expectations.With Three Oversize Drawings ML20210L2211999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Two Copies of Objectives & Sequence of Events for Maine Yankee Emergency Preparedness Exercise for 990922. Without Encl ML20210G3751999-07-28028 July 1999 Ack Receipt of June 30th Ltr That Responded to EDO Backfit Appeal Determination Re Bdba in Sfps.Staff Completed All Actions Associated with Backfit Appeal & Awaiting for New Info for Consideration Prior to Taking Addl Action ML20216D4311999-07-19019 July 1999 Informs That Util Intends to Construct ISFSI Located on Owner Controlled Property Currently Part of Maine Yankee Reactor Site ML20217M6571999-07-19019 July 1999 Expresses Concern Re Verification of Cleanup Stds at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co Power Station ML20210C6271999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Draft Site Characterization Summary in Support of 10CFR50 License Termination & Copy of Latest Decommissioning Schedule with Milestones Identified.Info Submitted Per License Termination Plan ML20196K4751999-07-0606 July 1999 Informs That Confirmatory Orders ,830314,840614 & 960103 Have Been Rescinded.Staff Determined That Due to Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Status of Facility,Orders No Longer Necessary for Safe Operation & Maint.Se Encl ML20210G3981999-06-30030 June 1999 Discusses Review of Ltr Re Maine Yankee Backfit Appeal with Respect to Emergency Plan Exemptions for Decommissioning Plants ML20209C7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to EDO Backfit Appeal Determination Re Emergency Plan Exemptions for Decommissioning Plants ML20209B4611999-06-29029 June 1999 Submits Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Plant Is Y2K Ready.Contingency Plans Developed to Mitigate Potential Impact of non-plant Y2K-induced Events ML20196D9191999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs That NRC Has Completed Review of Issues Raised in of Appeal to NRC Edo.Submits List Summarizing Actions Taken Since ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20207H3371999-06-11011 June 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Participation at 990413 Reactor Decommissioning Public Meeting & Responds to Concern Re Absense of Timeliness on Part of NRC Replying to Letters ML20195G9411999-06-10010 June 1999 Informs That Maine Yankee Considers Backfit Claim & Appeal Request of 980716 & 990316,to Be Acceptably Resolved Based on Staff 990518 Response ML20195F7531999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Copy of Insurance Endorsement Dtd 990429,reflecting Change in Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR140.15(e) ML20195F6721999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/99-01 on 990214-0513.No Violations Noted.Operations & Radiological Protection Programs, Including Radioactive Liquid & Gaseous Effluent Control Programs,Were Inspected During Insp ML20206U9711999-05-18018 May 1999 Responds to & Addl Info Re Appeal of NRC Determination Re Claim of Backfit Concerning Permanently Shutdown Reactor Security Plan ML20207A2851999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization, Division of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Organization Chart Encl ML20206H1391999-05-0505 May 1999 Forwards Amend 164 to License DPR-36 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Consists of Changes to License in Response to 970930 Application ML20206H2311999-05-0404 May 1999 Responds to to Chairman Jackson.Forwards Copy of Recent Staff Response to Petition Submitted on Behalf of Ucs Re Fuel Cladding at Operational Reactors ML20206G5561999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Amend 163 to License DPR-36 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Revises Liquid & Gaseous Release Rate Limits to Reflect Revs to 10CFR20, Stds for Protection Against Radiation ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders ML20206D7191999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Listed Radiological Repts for 1998 Submitted IAW Relevant Portions of License DPR-36 & ODCM ML20206E2911999-04-28028 April 1999 Requests NRC Review of ISFSI Licensing Submittals,As Scheduled & ISFSI Approval for Operation by Dec 2000.Util Will Support Any NRC RAI on Expedited Basis.Licensing Milestone Schedule,Encl ML20206E3101999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Data Diskette Containing 1998 Individual Monitoring NRC Form 5 Rept,Per 10CFR20.2206(b).Without Diskette ML20206A5521999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Environ Assessment & Finding of No Significant Impact Related to Util Application Dtd 980714,for Amend to License DPR-36 to Revise App a TSs to Change Liquid & Gaseous Release Rate Limits to Reflect Revs Made to 10CFR20 ML20206A6871999-04-22022 April 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of Re Nepco in Capacity as Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20205N6211999-04-0707 April 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Appealed NRC Staff Determination That Util Had Not Raised Valid Backfit Claim in to Nrc.Staff Began Process of Convening Backfit Review Panel to Evaluate Appeal ML20205K6541999-04-0707 April 1999 Submits Nuclear Property Insurance Coverage Presently in Force to Protect Maine Yankee at Wiscasset,Me ML20206H2401999-03-30030 March 1999 Informs That Myap Recently Revealed That Approx 20% of Fuel Assemblies Now in SFP Are non-std & Require Special Handling & Dry Cask Packaging.Info Confirms Growing Evidence of Periodic Loss of Radiological Control ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:NRC TO UTILITY
MONTHYEARIR 05000309/19900181990-11-0101 November 1990 Discusses Enforcement Conference Rept 50-309/90-18 on 901018 Re fitness-for-duty Related Event.Viewgraphs Encl ML20058D3411990-10-30030 October 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-309/90-20 on 900924-27.No Violations Noted ML20062C0731990-10-22022 October 1990 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-309/90-21 on 901010-11.No Violations Noted ML20058B4941990-10-18018 October 1990 Forwards Exam Rept 50-309/90-16OL on 900827-31.All Individuals Passed All Portions of Exams ML20062A2281990-10-15015 October 1990 Advises That Util 900925 Response to Generic Ltr 90-03, Relaxation of Staff Position in Generic Ltr 83-08,Item 2.2 Part 2, 'Vendor Interface for Safety-Related Components,' Acceptable ML20062B7091990-10-12012 October 1990 Extends Invitation to Participate in 910220 Symposium & Workshop in King of Prussia,Pa Re Engineering Role in Plant Support ML20062A3671990-10-0909 October 1990 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/90-17 on 900731-0918.Violations of Regulatory Requirements Identified But Not Issued IR 05000309/19900011990-10-0505 October 1990 Discusses Requalification Program Evaluation Rept 50-309/90-01 (OL-RO) on 900312-15 & Forwards Notice of Violation ML20059N4631990-10-0202 October 1990 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Corrective & Preventive Actions Taken in Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-309/90-11 ML20059N0971990-09-26026 September 1990 Forwards Audit Trip Rept Re NRC Bulletin 88-011, Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification for Plant ML20059K9911990-09-20020 September 1990 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology Re Statistical Combination of Uncertainties for RPS Setpoints ML20059L4081990-09-14014 September 1990 Informs That 900827 Response to Generic Ltr 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing & Surveillance, Acceptable.Nrc Considers TAC 75679 Closed ML20059H5781990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Facility Response to Station Blackout Rule.Requests Revised Response to Listed Items That Require Resolution,Within 60 Days of Ltr Date ML20059H0601990-09-0707 September 1990 Discusses Unescorted Access to Licensee Facilities & fitness-for-duty Program,Per .Nrc Regulations Do Not Prohibit Licensee from Accepting Access Authorization Program of Another Licensee,Contractor or Vendor ML20059C9831990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Amend 117 to License DPR-36 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Modifies Tech Spec 3.14, Primary Sys Leakage, by Deleting Current Limit of 1.0 Gpm from All Steam Generator Tubes ML20059B7181990-08-23023 August 1990 Discusses NRC Understanding of Licensee Informing of Completion of Component Cooling Water Heat Balance to Support Operation at 2,700 Mwt.Updated Heat Load Analysis Expected to Be Retained Onsite W/Design Basis Documents ML20059E2501990-08-23023 August 1990 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/90-13 on 900620-0731.Weaknesses Noted in Procedure Quality & Adherence ML20059B9831990-08-13013 August 1990 Forwards Evaluation of Topical Rept Cen 387-P Re Pressurizer Surge Line Flow Stratification,Per NRC Bulletin 88-011,Item 1.b.Adequate Basis Not Provided to Conclude That Pressurizer Surge Line Meets All Appropriate ASME Code Limits ML20058N0501990-08-0606 August 1990 Discusses Licensee Engineering Initiatives.Encourages Initiation of Initiative Similar to Region V Establishment of Engineering Managers Forum to Share Experiences ML20056A9401990-08-0303 August 1990 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/90-08 on 900507-11.No Violations Noted IR 05000309/19890821990-07-30030 July 1990 Advises That Util Actions to Address NRC Bulletin 88-010 Re Nonconforming molded-case Circuit Breakers Complete,Per Insp Rept 50-309/89-82 ML20055G5971990-07-19019 July 1990 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/90-10 on 900516-0619 & Notice of Violation.Util Actions to Prevent Recurrence of Similar Personnel & Procedural Errors Be Formally Submitted in Response to Encl Notice of Violation ML20055G3211990-07-16016 July 1990 Accepts Util 900702 Response to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardeness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor/Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Design ML20055G7381990-07-13013 July 1990 Forwards Enforcement Conference Rept 50-309/90-11 on 900627 & Notice of Violation.Disagrees W/View Re Licensee Identified Violations.Weaknesses in Planning,Oversight & Controls of Radiological Work Resulted in Violations ML20055E6501990-07-0909 July 1990 Discusses Generic Implications & Resolutions of Control Element Assembly (CEA) Failures at Maine Yankee.Waterford Unit 3 Does Not Have Old Style CEAs Installed in Reactor Core & Does Not Plan to Use Any in Future ML20055F1471990-07-0606 July 1990 Discusses Generic Implications & Resolution of Control Element Assemblies Failure at Plant.Requests Description of Analyses Planned & Schedule for Completion of Analysis within 60 Days of Ltr Receipt ML20055G1581990-07-0505 July 1990 Advises That Changes to Plant Physical Security Plan, Acceptable,Per 890817,900116 & 0612 Ltrs ML20055C8801990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Radiological Controls Insp Rept 50-309/90-09 on 900507-11.No Violations Noted.Observations by Inspector Indicated Improvement in Radiological Planning & Control of Outage Work Activities ML20059M9201990-06-13013 June 1990 Forwards NRC Performance Indicators for First Quarter 1990. W/O Encl ML20055C2891990-02-20020 February 1990 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Assessment of Asymmetric LOCA Load Problems.Reviews Included Evaluation of plant-specific Cavity Pressure,Subcooled Blowdown & Structural Analyses ML20248D3771989-09-27027 September 1989 Forwards Amend 10 to Indemnity Agreement B-51,reflecting Changes to 10CFR140,effective 890701 IR 05000309/19890111989-09-19019 September 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/89-11 on 890801-31.Instances That Need Mgt or Supervisory Attention Noted ML20247M4601989-09-18018 September 1989 Forwards Radiological Controls Insp Rept 50-309/89-15 on 890821-24.No Violations Noted.Continuing Problems Noted Re Radiation Protection Deficiency Corrective Action Program ML20247G1121989-09-0909 September 1989 Requests Detailed Design Analysis Supporting Util 890331 Proposed Design Enhancements Involving Offsite Automatic Bus Transfer Sys & Replacement of Existing X-14 Transformer W/Larger,More Capable Transformer ML20247L1471989-09-0808 September 1989 Advises That Licensee Prepare Request for Disposal of Slightly Contaminated Chemical Cleaning Solution as Licensee Prepared 881102 Request Re Technical Content, Justification & Format & Modify or Resubmit Application ML20247J7561989-09-0707 September 1989 Requests Addl Info for Closeout of IE Bulletin 79-15, Including Type & Application of Listed Pumps,Drawings, Sectional Assemblies & Parts List of Subj Pumps,Applicable P&Ids of Subj Pumps & Testing Requirements & Procedures ML20246P0701989-08-31031 August 1989 Approves Inplace Disposal of Residual Contaminated Soils at Plant Under 10CFR20.302(a),per Util .No License Amend & Environ Assessment Necessary ML20246F8591989-08-22022 August 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-309/89-14 on 890724-28.No Violations Noted ML20246E7671989-08-21021 August 1989 Forwards Resident Insp Rept 50-309/89-13 on 890622-0731.Well Developed Controls Identified in Power Upgrade Program. Inconsistencies Noted in Implementation of Radioactively Hot Particle Controls ML20246B2691989-08-11011 August 1989 Ack Receipt of Util Informing NRC of Need for Addl Time to Prepare Response to Notice of Violation Re Insp Rept 50-309/88-20.Addl Time Granted ML20248C5401989-08-0303 August 1989 Forwards Request for Addl Info in Support of Util 890518 Response to ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62, Requirements for Reduction of Risk from ATWS Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Per 890628 Telcon ML20247Q7071989-07-28028 July 1989 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/89-09 on 890518-0621.No Violations Noted ML20247H6631989-07-19019 July 1989 Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-309/89-10 on 890612-16.No Violations Noted ML20247D0771989-07-14014 July 1989 Provides Emergency Exercise Objective & Scenario Guidelines for Emergency Exercise Schedule for Wk of 891106.List Schedule That Should Be Used for All Exercises ML20246L4201989-07-14014 July 1989 Forwards Revised Pages 3.10-16 & 3.10-17 to Amend 107 to License DPR-36,correcting Typos ML20246P5191989-07-12012 July 1989 Forwards Requalification Exam Rept 50-309/89-05OL Conducted on 890515-18.Program Rating:Satisfactory ML20246F6171989-07-10010 July 1989 Forwards Amend 113 to License DPR-36 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Modifies Tech Specs to Reflect Operating Limits for Cycle 11 Operation IR 05000309/19880231989-06-28028 June 1989 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-309/88-23 IR 05000309/19890071989-06-26026 June 1989 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-309/89-07 ML20245A2381989-06-14014 June 1989 Advises That Fulfills Licensee Requirement in Responding to NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss 1990-09-07
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20212F4321999-09-24024 September 1999 Responds to 990921 e-mail to E Poteat,Requesting Waiver of Late Charges of Listed Amount for Annual Fee Invoice AR0431-99.Request Denied Because 10CFR15.37 Does Not Provide for Waiver Based on Info Provided in e-mail ML20212E4611999-09-20020 September 1999 Responds to Concerning Possible Involvement in Weekly Telephone Calls NRC Staff Has with Maine Yankee Staff ML20212F1361999-09-20020 September 1999 Confirms That NMSS Has Received 990916 Submittal & Will Be Included as Attachment to Commission Paper Along with State of Maine Submittal ML20212F2521999-09-20020 September 1999 Confirms That NMSS Has Received 990916 Submittal & Will Be Included as Attachment to Commission Paper Along with State of Maine Submittal ML20212A5911999-09-0808 September 1999 Responds to 990816 e-mail & 990901 Telcon with Respect to Comments Re Decommissioning of Maine Yankee Site.Concerns Raised with Respect to Status of Fuel at Maine Yankee Have Been Raised in Previous Ltrs to Us NRC ML20212B2181999-08-30030 August 1999 Responds to Re 990707 Message from N Allen Re Transportation Incident Involving Shipment from Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant ML20211M9371999-08-30030 August 1999 Addresses Two Issues Raised in s to Senator Collins & Governor a King That Relate to Construction of ISFSI at Maine Yankee ML20217M6501999-08-0909 August 1999 Responds to 990719 E-mail Re Cleanup Stds at MYAPC Station & Verification of Meeting Cleanup Stds.Informs That NRC Criteria for Licensing NPPs Contained in 10CFR50 & That 10CFR50.82 Addresses Requirements for License Termination ML20210G3751999-07-28028 July 1999 Ack Receipt of June 30th Ltr That Responded to EDO Backfit Appeal Determination Re Bdba in Sfps.Staff Completed All Actions Associated with Backfit Appeal & Awaiting for New Info for Consideration Prior to Taking Addl Action ML20196K4751999-07-0606 July 1999 Informs That Confirmatory Orders ,830314,840614 & 960103 Have Been Rescinded.Staff Determined That Due to Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Status of Facility,Orders No Longer Necessary for Safe Operation & Maint.Se Encl ML20196D9191999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs That NRC Has Completed Review of Issues Raised in of Appeal to NRC Edo.Submits List Summarizing Actions Taken Since ML20207H3371999-06-11011 June 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Participation at 990413 Reactor Decommissioning Public Meeting & Responds to Concern Re Absense of Timeliness on Part of NRC Replying to Letters ML20195F6721999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/99-01 on 990214-0513.No Violations Noted.Operations & Radiological Protection Programs, Including Radioactive Liquid & Gaseous Effluent Control Programs,Were Inspected During Insp ML20206U9711999-05-18018 May 1999 Responds to & Addl Info Re Appeal of NRC Determination Re Claim of Backfit Concerning Permanently Shutdown Reactor Security Plan ML20207A2851999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization, Division of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Organization Chart Encl ML20206H1391999-05-0505 May 1999 Forwards Amend 164 to License DPR-36 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Consists of Changes to License in Response to 970930 Application ML20206H2311999-05-0404 May 1999 Responds to to Chairman Jackson.Forwards Copy of Recent Staff Response to Petition Submitted on Behalf of Ucs Re Fuel Cladding at Operational Reactors ML20206G5561999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Amend 163 to License DPR-36 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Revises Liquid & Gaseous Release Rate Limits to Reflect Revs to 10CFR20, Stds for Protection Against Radiation ML20206A5521999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Environ Assessment & Finding of No Significant Impact Related to Util Application Dtd 980714,for Amend to License DPR-36 to Revise App a TSs to Change Liquid & Gaseous Release Rate Limits to Reflect Revs Made to 10CFR20 ML20206A6871999-04-22022 April 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of Re Nepco in Capacity as Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20205N6211999-04-0707 April 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Appealed NRC Staff Determination That Util Had Not Raised Valid Backfit Claim in to Nrc.Staff Began Process of Convening Backfit Review Panel to Evaluate Appeal ML20205D5141999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Ser,Accepting Util 980819 Request for Approval of Rev 1 to Util CFH Training & Retraining Program.Rev 1 Adds Two Provisions to CFH Training Program & Changes One Title ML20205D4011999-03-26026 March 1999 Responds to Sent to Lj Callan Re Emergency Preparedness & Financial Protection Exemption Requests Made by Util & Requests Meeting Scheduled at NRC Headquarters Be Rescheduled & Held in Vicinity of Myaps ML20196K9111999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/98-05 on 981101-0213.Determined That Two Violations Occurred Based on Insp Results & Review of 1997 LER Prior to Permanent Shutdown Determined That Addl Violation Occurred.Violations Treated as NCVs ML20205G7431999-03-26026 March 1999 Documents 990224 Telcon During Which Issues Raised in to NRC Were Discussed.Issues Discussed Re Appeal of Director'S Decision on Claim of Backfit Re Beyond DBA in SFPs ML20204C4501999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards Amend 162 to License DPR-36.Amend Revises App a TSs of Subj License to Change Limiting Condition for Operation for Fuel Storage Pool Water Level from 23 Feet to 21 Feet ML20204F2481999-03-15015 March 1999 Responds to Expressing Concern Re 10CFR61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radwaste & Perceptions of Insufficient Radiological Monitoring of NRC Regulated Facilities.Addresses Issues Raised ML20205G9801999-03-15015 March 1999 Responds to to Chairman Jackson of Nrc,Expressing Concerns Related to 10CFR61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste ML20203H1901999-02-19019 February 1999 First Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Documents Listed in App a Being Released in Entirety ML20203B9001999-02-0808 February 1999 First Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Documents Listed in App a Already Available in PDR, Documents in App B Released in Entirety & Documents in App C Being Withheld in Part (Ref Exemption 6) ML20203D6751999-02-0303 February 1999 Responds to Requesting NRC Evaluate Two Issues Pertaining to Maintaining Isolation Zones & Vehicle Barrier Sys as Backfits Under 10CFR50.109 ML20199C9031999-01-0707 January 1999 Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) & 10CFR140.11 for Util.Exemption Issued in Response to Licensee Application Dtd 980120,requesting Reduction in Amount of Insurance Required by Facility ML20198J9181998-12-23023 December 1998 Refers to 981109 Response to Notice of Violation Re Violations Stemming from Independent Safety Assessment Team Insp ML20198J3831998-12-21021 December 1998 Reesponds to Which Continued to Raise Several Concerns Re Belief That NRC Regulatory Action Resulted in Loss of Nuclear Generation & Put Industry Future at Risk. Assures That NRC Addressing Impact of Policies on Licensees ML20206N7481998-12-15015 December 1998 Responds to Re NRC Regulatory Oversight of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.Although Staff Does Not Agree with Charges That Staff Acted Inappropriately & Ineffectively,Ltr Referred to NRC OIG for Action ML20196G0291998-12-0202 December 1998 Forwards EA & Fonsi Re Util Request for Exemption from Financial Protection Requirement Limits of 10CFR50.54(w) & 10CFR140.11 for Plant,Submitted in Ltr of 980120 ML20196G2751998-11-27027 November 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/98-04 on 980803-1031.No Violations Noted.During three-month Period Covered by Insp Period, Conduct of Activities During Continued Decommissioning at Maine Yankee Facilities Was Safety Focused ML20195C3771998-11-0606 November 1998 Discusses Director'S Decision Re Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co Claim of Backfit Re beyond-design-basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools.Copy of Author Memo to NRR Staff Directing Them to Address Issues Encl ML20154J3421998-10-0808 October 1998 Responds to Forwarding Response of 2 Individuals to NRC DFI Issued 971219 to Yaec & Duke Engineering & Services Inc.Dfi Did Not Require Response from Individuals Identified in DFI as LOCA Group Mgr & Lead Engineer ML20154J4361998-10-0808 October 1998 Responds to Forwarding Response of Duke Engineering & Services,Inc to NRC DFI Issued 971219 to Duke Engineering & Services,Inc & Yaec ML20154J8451998-10-0808 October 1998 Responds to Which Forwarded Response to NRC Demand for Info Issued on 971219 Re OI Rept 1-95-050. Related Ltr Also Issued to Maine Yankee Identifying Apparent Violations IR 05000306/19960091998-10-0808 October 1998 Discusses Results of Several NRC Insp Repts 50-306/96-09, 50-309/96-10,50-309/96-11,50-309/96-16 & 50-309/97-01, Conducted Between 960715 & 970315,three Investigations Repts 1-95-050,1-96-025 & 1-96-043 & Forwards Notice of Violation ML20154J4511998-10-0808 October 1998 Responds to Which Replied to NRC DFI Issued 971219 to Yaec & Duke Engineering & Services,Inc.Nrc Staff Completed Review of Responses of Yaec & Duke Engineering & Services Inc & 2 Individuals ML20154D7271998-10-0202 October 1998 Forwards RAI Re Spent Fuel Pool & Fuel Assemblies.Response Requested within 30 Days of Date of Ltr ML20154A9041998-09-28028 September 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-309/98-03 on 980503-0801.No Violations Noted.Insp Exam of Licensed Activities as They Relate to Radiation Safety & to Compliance with Commission Regulations ML20153G0941998-09-18018 September 1998 Refers to CAL 1-96-15 Issued on 961218 & Suppl Issued 970130,confirming That Facility Will Not Restart Until Addl Actions Were Completed.Issues That Were Subj of CAL & Suppl Were Re Operation of Facility & Not Permanent Shutdown ML20153C0851998-09-16016 September 1998 Responds to 980723 e-mail to Senator SM Collins of Maine Re Several Concerns Raised About Disposal of Reactor Vessel from Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station.Nrc Made No Generic Decision,Acceptable for All Rv with Internal Components ML20197J5931998-09-16016 September 1998 Informs That on 980903 NRC Granted Exemption to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co from Certain Sections of 10CFR50 Re Emergency Response Planning,Allowing Licensee to Discontinue Offsite Emergency Planning Activities ML20151V0461998-09-0707 September 1998 Responds to Which Raised Several Concerns Re NRC Oversight of Decommissioning of Plant ML20197C7981998-09-0303 September 1998 Forwards Exemption,Environ Assessment & SER in Response to 971106 Request to Discontinue Offsite Emergency Planning Activities & to Reduce Scope of Onsite Emergency Planning as Result of Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Status of Plant 1999-09-08
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Docket No. 50-309 Distribution:
LAXicket File EJordan LPDR JNGrace PDR WJones Mr. J. B. Randazza ORB #3 Reading DBrinkman Executive Vice President DEisenhut RDiggs Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 0 ELD KHeitner 83 Edison 0.-ive LHarmon PKreutzer Augusta, Maine 04336 Gray Files 4 ACRS 10 HDenton TBarnhart 4
Dear Mr. Randazza:
SUBJECT:
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT UPDATE - TMI ACTION PLAN ITEM II.E.1.1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM We have continued our review of your auxiliary feedwater system under the TMI Action Plan, Item II.E.1.1. This review includes the meeting we held with you on June 28, 1983 and our evaluation of your submittal dated September 22, 1983. This review updates the status report we provided to you by letter dated March 24, 1983, which reflected your earlier submittals.
We conclude that you have now provided acceptable commitments for all but four items. The responses to two of these four items are acceptable pending receipt of an additional submittal by you; they are:
- 1. Short Term Recomendation 1 - Technical Specification regarding AFWS operability testing;
- 2. Long Term Recomendation 4 (part b) - Evaluation of postulated steam and feedwater line breaks.
Regarding the second two items, your responses are unacceptable. They are:
- 3. Additional Short Term Recomendation 1 - Redundant level instrumentation and low level alarms for the AFW primary water source;
- 4. Long Term Recomendation GL Automatic initiation of the turbine-driven pump.
We have enclosed a supplement to cur SE (Enclosure 1) which closes out the open items which we have found to be acceptable. -The supplement also
. provides the bases for our conclusions regarding the four remaining items.
In addition, the Maine Yankee Technical Specifications contain Limiting Conditions for Operation Specifications (LCOs) only for the two motor-driven AFW system pumps, k)[kbo ON P
The turbine-driven pump is not included in the Technical Specifications and, as a result, may be continually inoperable without any requirement to be returned to an operable status. We require that you propose an LC0 for this pump. This LC0 should follow the format of the Standard Technical Specifications and should not allow the turbine-driven pump to be inoperable for in excess of seven days. Enclosure 2 provides the basis for this position.
It is the Comission's goal to complete our review of these items related to the TMI Action Plan by September 30, 1984. Therefore, we request that you provide the requested items within 30 days of your receipt of this letter.
Any(questions at 301) 492-7364. should be addressed to the NRC Project Manager, Kenneth C. He The infomation requested in this letter affects fewer than ten respondents; therefore OMB clearance is not required under P. L.96-511.
Sincerely, original signed by G Q")L$b
{ James R. Miller, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page ORBA3 ORB #3:DL r #3:DL 658
'PXf,dtzer KHeitner;ef 1 JMiller (sli/F 09/,f,0/84 60F/ l /84 'Of/f/84 g gg 4,4 O DN
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ,
cc: '
Charles E. Monty, President -
Mr. P. L. Anderson Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Pro.iect Manager Edison Drive Yankee Atomic Electric Company Augusta, Maine 04336 , 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Manager - Washington Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc. Region I Office 7910 Woodmont Avenue ATTN: Reg. Radiation Pepresentative Bethesda, Maryland 20014 JFK Federal Buildi.ng Boston, Massachusetts 02203 John A. Ritsher, Esquire Ropes A Gray Mr. John H. Garrity, Senior Director 225 Franklin Street Nuclear Engineering and Licensing Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive State Planning Officer Augusta, Maine 04336 Executive Department 189 State Street Augusta, Maine 04330 Mr. E. C. Wood, Plant Manager Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 3270 Wiscasset, Maine 04578 Regional Administ'rator. -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 First Selectman of Wiscasset Municipal Building U.S. Route 1 Hiscasset, Maine 04578 Mr. Cornelius F. Holden ,
Resident Inspector c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box E Wiscasset, Maine 04578 1
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'g UNITED STATES y)' g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,.' .j WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 l
\%*...- j# SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM EVALUATION,
- TASK ACTION PLAN, ITEM II.E.1.1 MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY l MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION l DOCKET NO. 50-309 l
- 1. Shcrt: Tem'Recomendation 1 "The licensee should propose a revision to !
the Technical Specifications to require periodic AFWS operability testing on a monthly frequency rather than quarterly in ca.fifomance with current I
Standard echnical Specifications."
l In a su5mittal dated September 22, 1983, the licensee comitted to sub-mit a propcsed change to the Technical Specif'ications to require monthly auxtliary feedwater system operability testing in lieu of the present testing on a quarterly 5 asis. Thelicensee;froposestoperformthese pump tests at minimum recirculation flow with separate cycle testing r
of key valves. We conclude that.this comitment is acceptable provided that the licensee staggers the tests so that a single emr cannot
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. make more than 'one train or pump inoperative. Pending receipt of a clarification on this one point we consider this item resolved.
- 2. Sh::rt Tem Recomendation 2 "The licensee did not submit sufficient
! i information for us to conclude that all ' failures will result in opening the pneumatic-operated AP.4 flow control valves and steam admissien valves f- '
to the turbine-driven AFW. pump.
)[e[concludethatthelicenseeshould esta511sh stiitable emergency procedures for operation cf the pneumatic-
, c g operated valves in the event that valves were to fail closed due to an unanticipated failure mode of the comon AC bus."
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l In a submittal dated August 21, 1981, the licensee specified that the l
Maine Yankee emergency procedures include direction for manual control of feedwater control valves, if necessary. In a meeting on June 28, 1983, the licensee stated that the amergency procedures for loss of all AC power i include manual control of the valves in the line carrying steam to the ;
turbine of the AFW steam-driven pump. On loss of AC the valves would nomally fail in the open position (see Long Tem Recomendation GL-3 for detailed discussion); manual control serves as a precautionary measure in !
t the event an unusual failure should occur. We find this to be acceptable. !
- 3. Additional Short Tem Recommendation 1 "The licensee should provide redundant level indications and low level alams in the control room for t!ie AFW system primary water supply, the demineralized water storage tank (.DWST), to allow the operator to anticipate the need to make up water or transfer to an alternate water
- prevent a low pump l suction pressure condition from oc' ine low level setpoint sheuld allow at least 20 minutes ;rator action, assuming that the largest capacity AFW pump is operating."
In a su5mittal dated August 21, 1981, the licensee reported that the following instrumentation was available for the DWST:
- 1. A low level alam (at the control board) when the volume of water l in the tank is reduced to 100,000 gallons (six-hour supply of water),
- 2. A low-low level alam (at the control board) at 10,000 gallons (30-minute supply),
- 3. Level indication at the control board, and
- 4. Local level indicating gauge at the tank.
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- In addition to the instrcmentation, the auxiliary operator records the level of water in the DWST twice each shift.
The plant Technical Specifications require that at least 100,000 gallons ,
of primary grade feedwater be available to allow the reactor to be l maintained in a power operating condition (Condition 7. Specification 3.8D) but do not specify where these 100,000 gallons are stored. The licensee corrected this condition by providing a Technical Specification (Proposed Change No. 97) which includes a requirement that a volume of feedwater in excess of 100,000 gallons be held in the demineralized water storage tank in order to be able to maintain the reactor in a power ;
operating condition. We. find this change to the Technical Specifications (Paragraph 3.8.E.2) acceptable. However, we find that the licensee
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is not in ' compliance. with the recommendation which specifies that redundant level alarms and indications be provided in the control room i so that the control room operator has at least twenty minutes to shift
,the AFW system to an alternate water supply. The Maine Yankee licensee
'should provide the redundant alarms and indications as recommended below.
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In a submittal dated September 22, 1983, the licensee stated that the annunciator system at Maine Yankee is not Class lE; therefore, any level alarms will not be safety grade. The staff is aware that annunciator systems are not necessarily Built to Class lE standards. For this recommendation it would be acceptable to provide a second, redundant alarm Which uses a power sourca different from the alarm already in place and of the same quality as the existing alarm. The redundant level indication, however, should be Class 1E, utilizing a lE power source separate from the level indication already in place. Both of the redundant alarms should annunciate in the control room; both level indications should also be provided in the control room. The licensee should commit to supply the redundant alarm and indication.
- 4. Short Term Recmmtendation GS-5 "The as-built plant should be capable of providing the required AFW flow for at least two hours from one AFW pump train independent of an ac power source. If. manual AFW system initiation flow control is required following a complete loss of ac power, emergency l
procedures should be established for manually initiating and controlling the system under these conditions. Since the water for cooling the lube oil for the turbine-driven pump bearings may be dependent on ac power, design or procedural changes shall be made to eliminate this dependency as soon as practicable. Until this is done, the emergency procedures
! should provide for an indiv'idual to be stationed at the turbine-driven l
pump in the event of the loss of all ac power to monitor pump bearing i
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and/or lube oil temperatures. If necessary, this operator would operate :
the turbine-driven pump ir, an on-off mode until ac power is restored.
Adequate lighting powered by direct current (de) power sources and ,
communications at local stations should also be provided if manual initiation and control of $he AFW system is needed (see Recommendation GL-3 for the" longer-term resolution of this concern)."
. See response to Item GL-3 below.
" Licensees with plants in which all
- 5. Lono Term' Recommendation'GL-2 (primary and alternate) water supplias to the AFW system pass through YalYes in a single flow path should install redundant parallel flow '
paths (piping and valves). Licensee with plants in which the primary AFW system water supply passes through valves in a single flow path, but the alternative AFW system water supplies connect to the AFW system pump suction piping downstream of the above valve (s) should f
install redundant valves parallel to the above valve (s) or provide automatic opening of the valve (s) from the alternate water supply The licensee should propose Technical upon low pump suction pressure.
Specifications to incorporate appropriate periodic inspections to verify the valve positions."
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The primary water supply for the Maine Yankee AFW system (from the demineralizedwaterstoragetank-DW5T)passesthroughavalvein a single flow path with the alternative water supply '(from the primary water storage tank - PWST) connecting to the AFW pump suction piping downstYeamofthesinglevalve. In a submittal dated September 22, 1983, the licensee proposes to remove the internals from the valve in order to avoid possible valve failure which wuld b' lock the flow of water from the DWST to the AFW pumps. The licensee comitted to remove the valve internals during the next refueling outage. We find this acceptable.
- 6. Long Tem Recomendation GL-3 "At least one AFW system pump and its associated flow path and essential, instrumentation should automatically initiate AFW system flow and be capable of being operated independently of any ac power source for at least two hours. Conversion of de power is acceptable."
In a submittal dated August 21, 1981, the licensee reported that water for cooling both the turbine bearings and the lube oil for the turbine-driven AFW pump is provided by a tap off the pump discharge. There are three soler.oid-controlled, air-operated valves in the steam !
admission line to the turbine intercept valve; presently, two are designed to fail open en loss of air or power while one, the contain-ment isolation valve, is designed to close on loss of air or ac.
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Power for the isolation valve may be provided by the station battery ,
through inverters on loss of ac or the valve may be operated manually.
i In addition, the air-operated turbine governor has an independent air receiver which will permit the governor to maintain control for four ,
hours. .
Thus, the turbine-driven pump may be operated for two hours following a loss of all ac, as specified in the recongendation. This complies ;
with all parts of the recommendation except the automatic initiation requirement. The licensee, in a submittal dated September 22, 1983, ,
notes that the steam-driven AFW pump is initiated manually instead
-- of being initiated automatically followi'ng station blackout. (loss of all AC). The licensee is also modifying the' containment isolation , l
- valve on the steam admission line to the steam-driven AFW pump so that the valve will receive its control air from the excess flow control valve accumulator, a reliable source of control air; thus, the valve will remain open in the event of a station blackout. The licensee also [
f states that the steam-driven AFW pump is not required to mitigate any design basis accident at Maine Yankee and that it is required following a station blackout which is, the licensee notes, a nondesign basis event.
t The licensee states further, that the operator has "...more than sufficient time..." (i.e., 30 minutes) to start the steam-driven AFW pump in the event of a station blackout. Note that the 30-minute time interval includes loss of water from the steam generators due to normal blowdown.
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We have considered the information provided by the licensee. However, it is the staff's position that for station blackout, the only source of cooling to the plant will be that turbine-driven AFW pump. We do ,
not believe that the station operators should be depended upon to
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perform .this important function. Therefore we require that the licensee
' i provide automatic initiation of the steam-drivan pump in the event of a station blackout. ,
- 7. Long Term Recommendation 4 (part b) "In tha event of a steam o'r
.feedwater line break (main or auxiliary), isolation of.the auxiliary feedwater flow path to the affected steam generator is accomplished manually. The licensee should evlauate these postulated pipe breaks and (1) determine any.AFW system design changes or procedures necessary to detect and isolate the break and direct the required feedwater flow to the steam generator (s) before they boil dry or (2) describe how the plant can be brought to safe shutdown condition by use of other systems which would be available following such postulated events."
In a submittal dated April 28, 1981, the licensee reported that the ,
1 AFW system would be modified (and verified that modification had been ;
accomplished during the cycle 6 outage) as follows: l l
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(1) Provision of automatic starting of the two motor-driven AFW pumps upon low water level signal from any one of the three steam generators.
(2) Modification of the auxiliary feedwater control valves so that each ,
closes individually upon a low steam generator pressure signal. In the event of a steam line break this will isolate the steam generator in the train which contains the ruptured piping, (3) Provision of a five-minute delay in initiation of the two motor-driven l AFW pumps (or tripping of the two motor-driven pumps for five minutes if already running) upon receipt of the steam generator low pressure signal, tn order to prevent an overpower transient in the event of a steamline Break. ,
Note that this design requires operator intervention to direct AFW flow to the undamaged steam generators, if the control valve in the damaged steam generator were to fail and remain open after receipt of the EFCV signal, in order to prevent stemm generator "dryout" Because most of the water from the AFW system would then be diverted to the damaged steam generator.
In a further submittal dated September 22, 1983 the licensee stated their plans to install additional AFW valves, in series with the existing flow control valves and to remove the 5-minute delay (or
pump trip and delay in the event of operating AFW pumps) in starting the motor-driven AFW pumps. In this way the auxiliary feedwater will be isolated from the affected steam generator and no operator intervention will be required to assure continued water flow to the unaffected steam generators in the event of a feedwater or steam-line break. However, the licensee has not provided us with sufficient design details to assure us that the design is single-fai'ure proof.
Therefore, pending receipt and satisfactory review of a .further submittal by the licensee, we find that the licensee has complied with the portion of the recastendation relating to a main feedwater or steamline Break.
e With regard to failure of the common AFW system discharge manifold, the' licensee noted that each AFW pump discharge can be directed to the feedwater pump discharge lines upstream of the first point heaters. This involves closing one AFW pump discharge valve, opening another valve at the discharge of each AFW pump (leading to the normal feedwater lines) and opening one valve in the common manifold to the nornal feedwater lines. Thus, three valves will need to be operated (one closed, two opened) to switch the first AFW pump flow to the alternate flow path (each of the otht : two pumps only requires closing one discharge valve and opening another if either pump is needed). The licensee should show that the AFU pumps can be diverted by the plant operators in sufficient time to prevent steam generator
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dryout in the event of an AFW manifold break when either (or both) motor driven pump is fieing used in its normal operating mode (not foraccidentmitigation). Pending receipt of a satisfactory submittal regarding operator diversion time, we find the portion of the recomendation relattrg to an AFW line break complete.
- 8. Basis for AFW System Flow Reouirement "In Enclosure 2 to our letter of Octo5er 18,1979, we requested the licensee '.o provide certain information regarding the design basis for AFW flow require-ments. The licensee stated in a letter dated November 20, 1979, that the required infomation would -be :,ubmitted at a later date."
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In a submittal dated August 21, 1981, the licensee noted that the design basis events for the Maide Yankee AFW system were those shown in Ta51e 1, 5elow. The bounding event for the design of the AFW systs is the loss-of-rsain-feedwater (LMFW). The licensee reported that loss of a,11 AC and feedwater line break were not part of the spectrum of design Basis events for Maine Yankee.
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Table 1
- 1) Loss of Main Feedwater (LMFW)
- 2) LMFW w/ loss of offsite AC Power
- 3) Turbine Trip with and without bypass
, 4) Main Steam Isolation valve closure
- 5) Main Steam Line Break
- 6) Small break LOCA l In the eventJ LMFW event occurred, the licensee stated that the steam generators would dry out in 13 minutes with offsite power available and in 30 minutes with offsite power unavailable assuming the AFW system did not j start. Further, the licensee noted that, in the event of a loss of all AC, ;
the operator would have 30 minutes in which to start the turbine driven AFW pump before steam generator dryout occurred.
The licensee reports that a single AFW pump is capable of removing the total x
combined heat resultiing from reactor coolant pump operation and decay heat seven minutes after the i.MFW event begins. In addition, the minimum inventory of 100,000 gallons of water available (discussed above in Additional Short Tem Recomendation 1) to the AFW system in the DWST is sufficient to remove the I combined heat load (generated by reactor coolant pumps and decay heat) for at t least four hours -- eight hours if the reactor coolant pumps do not operate. ,
r We find the licensee's design basis flow requirements for the AFW system l acceptable because the licensee has shown that the design flow rat.. is capable of mitigating those transients and accidents for which use of the AFW system ,
is necessary to assure a safe plant shutdown. ,
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Enclosure 2 Basis for Position The Technical Specifications for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant presently The require only that two AFW pumps Be available during normal operation.
technical specifications consider only the motor-driven pumps, thus allowing the tur5ine-driven pump to be out of service for an indefinite period of time. This is unacceptable since the turbine-driven pump is the main soorce of plant protection in the event of. loss of all AC power, In several plants, loss of all AC power h'as been found to be a significant contributor to the risk of core melt. Thus, the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for Com5ustion Engineering Pressurized Water Reactors (NUREG-0612, Revision 2} require that three AFW pumps (two driven by electric power, one by steam) Se operable when the nuclear power plant is in the operational mode (Mode 1),in the startup mode (Mode 2), or in the hot standby mode (Mode 3).
In the event one AFW pump becomes inop~erable, the Technical Specifications allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (three days) for repair before requiring that the plant shut down; the plant must be in hot standby within six hours and in hot shutdown in the ,next.six hours.
In the event of inoperability of two AFW pumps, the STS require that the plant be in hot standby within six hours and in hot shutdown within six hours thereafter.
In a Peview of the Zion Station, detailed studies were made of the problem of pump inoperability with special concern in the area of loss of all AC and the effect of steam-driven. pump inoperability upon the risk of core melt.
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These studies which utilized AFW pump outage data for the Zion plant did not show significant improvement in risk of core melt when considering pump unavailability of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in contrast to a seven day unavailability for operation for assumed infrequent outages when applied to the motor driven AFW pumps. However, they did indicate that a major accident sequence contributor to the total plant risk of core melt, namely loss of all ac power (in which case the motor-driven pumps anr unavailable and cannot be given credit for mitigation of this event) is affected by the availability of the turbine-driven AFW pump. Discussions with,the licensee indicated that.the turbine-driven pump was down for repair at fairly frequent intervals.
Consequently, we determined that turbihe-driven pump availability should be more closely followed and kept at the maximum possible level. Thus, we concluded that the licensee's technical specifications should be revised to allow a motor-driven pump to be inoperable for seven days prior to beginning hot shutdown. However, we recommended that the licensee propose modifications to the technical specification concerning the operability of the turbine-driven pump to indicate that every measure possible be taken (including continuous work on all shifts) to restore that pump to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Should all efforts to complete the repairs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> fail, the turbine-driven pump may remain inoperable up to seven days before initiating hot shutdown. .
Independent evaluations of the effect on the risk of core melt resulting from various allowable outage times for two AFW pumps simultaneously have been performed which show only an insignificant effect on core melt if a !
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second pump is allowed to Se inoperable for as much as eight hours before proceeding to hot stand 5y witMn six hoors thereafter and thence to hot shutdown within the next six hours. In our judgement, it is prudent to allow some time period to assess the caose of a loss of redundancy in the ARIS rather than immediately challenging the one operable purap by initiating a reactor shutdown.
Thus, in reviewing the Zion technical specifica,tions we recomended that an eight hour interim be allowed before requiring that the plant shut down with two AR1 pumps simultaneously inoperable.
In conclusion, we are willing to accept a modified version of the STS which allows the turbine-driven pump to be inoperable for a period of up to seven days. However, we believe such a specification should include a provision to assure that overall availability of the turbine-driven pump remains high. The AFW system pumps should be required to be operable in the hot shutdown condition (condition 5), the hot standby condition (condition 6), and the power operation condition (condition 7) in order to conform with the modes (1, 2 and 3) in which AFW pump operability is required in the STS, i