ML20198J918

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Refers to 981109 Response to Notice of Violation Re Violations Stemming from Independent Safety Assessment Team Insp
ML20198J918
Person / Time
Site: Maine Yankee
Issue date: 12/23/1998
From: Lieberman J
NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
To: Meisner M
Maine Yankee
References
EA-96-299, EA-96-320, EA-96-397, EA-97-034, EA-97-147, EA-97-34, EA-97-375, EA-97-397, EA-97-559, NUDOCS 9812300296
Download: ML20198J918 (4)


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.g December 23, 1998 EA Nos. 96 299;96-320;96-397;97-034; 97-147 (ISA)

EA Nos.97-397; 97-375;97-559 (Investigations)

Mr. Michael J. Meisner, President Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 329 Bath Road Brunswick, Maine 04011

SUBJECT:

MAINE YANKEE RESPONSE TO NOTICES OF VIOLATION DESCRIBED IN NRC PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT ACTION OF OCTOBER 8,1998 i

i This refers to your November 9,1998 response to our Notices of Violation transmitted to you on October 8,1998 regarding violations stemming from the independent Safety Assessment (ISA) Team inspection and follow-up inspections, as well as from NRC Office of Investigations (01) findings, principally pertaining to your small-break-loss-of-coolant-accident (SBLOCA) analysis. These inspections and investigations were conducted between July 1996 and March 1997. In your response, you denied one of the violations (violation ll.A of Notice 2) and you requested that the severity level of other violations be reduced (violations 1.A and I.B of Notice 2).

With respect to your denial of violation ll.A of Notice 2, involving your use of a SBLOCA code that was not specified in the applicable Technical Specification (TS), you argued, that because

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it was determined that the large-break-loss of-coolant-accident (LBLOCA) was limiting and that the operating limits were determined from the limiting condition, that the TS was not violated i

since the large break code used was one of those specified by the TF. As we discussed at j

the predecisional enforcement conference, this argument is flawed. The NRC continues to maintain that in order to properly determine core operating limits, both a small break and a e

large break analysis must be performed to determine which break is limiting and that determination must be made using the codes specified in the applicable " Core Operating Limits" TS. Then, once the limiting break is identified, the core operating limits are determined from that analysis. Maine Yankee did not use the small break code specified in the TS in making the determination of which break category was limiting. Therefore, since determining the limiting condition is an integral part of the process of establishing the operating limits, we maintain the TS was violated. Accordingly, this Severity Level IV violation will not be withdrawn.

We acknowledgeI that you have pointed out an apparent disparity in NRC expectations regarding this issue, noting that multiple other licensees had TS that did not specify a small break code in the analogous specification. Nonetheless, Maine Yankee's TS did provide such specificity, and therefore, you were required to use the specified small break code. You stated in your correspondence that Maine Yankee's understanding was that the NRC expects "that any analytical methods NOT used in setting Core Operating Limits, but which do provide the basis for using approved methods shall be referenced in the applicable Technical Specification 9812300296 981223 4

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i section." You requested that the staff provide generic industry notification of this position.

i This is not the staff's position. It is the staff's position that an integral part of determining the i

core operating limits related to loss of coolant accidents includes determination of the limiting break size. Determination of the limiting break size includes analysis of both the small-break spectrum and the large-break spectrum. If the facility Technical Specifications specify the j

analytical methods for each spectrum, the licensee is constrained to use the specified j

methods.

The staff's experience with other licensees does not indicate a generic misunderstanding of this position. Accordingly, the staff has determined that a generic industry notification such as you requested is not warranted.

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With respect tc your request that the NRC reconsider the severity of Violations 1.A and I.B of j

Notice 2. involving your failure to account for a gap in the spectrum of postulated break sizes in your emergency core cooling system analyses for Cycles 14 and 15, you argued that the j

violations are not deserving of Severity Level 11 categorization because there were no actual or potential consequences. The fundamental premise of Section IV of NUREG 1600, Rev.1, j

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" General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement l

Policy) is that the severity level of violations be based on their relative significance. As l

provided for in Section IV of the Enforcement Policy, the NRC reviews each case being j

considered for enforcement action on its own merits to ensure that the severity of a violation is characterized at the level best suited to the significance of the particular violation. As we indicated in our October 8,1998 correspondence, although subsequent evaluation determined I

that there were no actual safety consequences, the significance of these violations lies in the j

fact that for Cycle.14 operations, Maine Yankee operated the facility without having demonstrated that its ECCS systems were capable of mitigating the most severe postulated j

loss-of-coolant accident, if the most limiting break had been within the portion of the break i

spectrum that was not analyzed, there was no predetermined assurance that the ECCS systems were capable of performing their intended functions.

For this reason, when this issue was first identified, the NRC issued an Order on January 3,1996 modifying the facility l

operating license to derate the plant to the original licensed thermal power limit to regain the necessary assurance that ECCS performance was acceptable for continued operation. We j

continue to believe that these violations are best suited for characterization as a Sevarity Level j

11 problem. Therefore, your request for reissuance of these violations as a Severity Levellil j

problem is respectfully denied.

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Despite your disagreement with violation ll.A of Notice 2, no additional response to this letter is required since this involved a violation of a TS that is not applicable given Maine Yankee's i

decommissioning status. The remainder of your response was found to have been responsive to our concerns.

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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 3

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely, James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement Docket No. 50-309 License No. DPR 36 cc:

R. Fraser, Director - Engineering J. Block, Attorney at Law P. Anderson, Project Manager (Yankee Atomic Electric Company)

L. Diehl, Manager of Public and Governmental Affairs T. Dignan, Attorney (Ropes and Gray)

G. Zinke, Director, Regulatory Affairs W. Odell, Director, Operations M. Ferri, Director, Decommissioning M. Lynch, Esquire, MYAPC P. Dostie, State Nuclear Safety inspector P. Brann, Assistant Attorney General U. Vanags, State Nuclear Safety Advisor C. Brinkman, Combustion Engineering, Inc.

W. Meinert, Nuclear Engineer First Selectmen of Wiscasset M. Kilkelly, State Senator, Chair - Community Advisory Panel Maine State Planning Officer-Nuclear Safety Advisor State of Maine, SLO Designee State Planning Officer - Executive Department Friends of the Coast

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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC SECY CA WTravers, EDO MKnapp, DEDE HMiller, RI FDavis, OGC SCollins, NRR BBoger, NRR Enforcement Coordinator I, ll, lil, IV BBeecher, GPA/PA DBangart, OSP HBell, OlG Martin, AEOD i

OE:EA (2 copies) (Also by E-Mail)

NUDOCS DScrenci, PAO-RI NSheehan, PAO-RI Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

Resident inspector - Maine Yankee i

DDorman, NRR MWebb, NRR l

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To r:ccive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy

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NAME WM JLieberman TCollins-/B JZwolinsk@

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DATE 12/R2 /$8 12/PJ98 12/J12/98 gi44 12/Z.1/98 12/1)/98 W OFFICE RI:RAab_l NAME HMiller t.MW DATE 12R//98 G:\\nc:ses\\relap5\\ackletter.rel 4

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