ML20206H240
ML20206H240 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Maine Yankee |
Issue date: | 03/30/1999 |
From: | Brack H AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
To: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
Shared Package | |
ML20206H235 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 9905110108 | |
Download: ML20206H240 (6) | |
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Center for Bialogical Monitoring, Inc.
Sponsor of RADNET: Nuclear Information on the Internet SOURCE POINTS OF ANTIIROPOGENIC RADIOACTIVITY World Wide Web at http://home. acadia. net /cbm BOX 144, HULLS COVE, ME 04644-0144 207/288-5126 FAX: 207/288-2725 EMAIL: sbrack@ acadia. net March 30,1999 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 l
Dear Chairperson Jackson:
The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC) has recently revealed that approximately 20% of the fuel assemblies now in the spent fuel pool are " nonstandard" and require special handling and dry cask packaging. This information further confirms growing evidence of periodic loss of radiological controls at MYAPC. Preliminary site characterization data gathered by GTS Duratek in 1998 constitute a predicator of this fuel cladding failure.
The NRC has no legal basis for proceeding with further decommissioning activities at MYAPC until source term analyses of the fuel cladding failure accidents which have occurred there are implemented and completed by some other more trustworthy entity than the NRC or the licensee.
Perhaps the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) or GTS Duratek could execute the source term analyses mandated by 10 CFR Part 20. Nowhere in Part 20 are there any provisions that allow the NRC or its licensees to escape documentation of the fuel cladding failure that has been so graphically illustrated by the initial cursory site characterization of the MYAPC facility by GTS Duratek in 1998 and recently verified by the disclosure of the 20% fuel assembly l
damage rate.
Enclosed are copies of a Brief to the U.S. Attomey for Maine and a letter to the decommissioning operations contractor (DOC), Stone & Webster, summarizing the present position and intentions of the Center for Biological Monitoring.
How did the NRC end up in the untenable position of smugly asserting compliance with federal statutes when "under color of official right" it is in blatant noncompliance with these statutes?
Yours truly, h
H. G. Brack Director ofInvestigations Radiological Surveillance Programs Center for Biological Monitoring 9905110108 990504 PDR ADOCK 05000309 W
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Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.
Sponsor of RADNET: Nuclear Information on the Internet i
SOURCE POINTS OF ANTHROPOGENIC RADIOACTIVITY
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World Wide Web at http://home. acadia. net /cbm BOX 144,IIULLS COVE, ME 04644-0144 207/288-5126 FAX: 207/288-2725 EMAIL: sbrack@ acadia. net i
March 30,1999 Stone & Webster Construction Co., Inc.
Manager of Nuclear Decommissioning 245 Summer St.
Boston, MA 02210 i
Dear Mr. Nauman:
I am completing a review of the GTS Duratek Site Characterization Management Plan of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC) facilities. A number of unexpected residual radiation anomalics are contained within the characterization report (eight volumes, Maine State Library.) The licensee has recently announced the existence of 250 to 290 " nonstandard" fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool which shed light on the anomalies in the characterization survey. This represents a revision of previous (oral not written) licensee assertions that leaking fuel assemblies were associated with only a single " bad batch"(37 assemblies) in the early years ofplant operation. It is now clear that a series of fuel cladding failure accidents (FCFAs) have occurred at MYAPC and that this facility is, in essence, the location of a yet to be documented series of nuclear accidents. Some of the damage to fuel assemblies may be the result of grid to rod fretting towards the end of reactor operations and debris now in the spent fuel pool may point to other events in addition to fuel cladding failure. Fuel cladding failure, however, appears to be
'he primary source of residual radiation anomalies (fission products and hot particles) recently documented in reactor water systems and plant environs.
I would like to share the following observations with Stone & Webster:
- 1. Future decommissioning activities will likely extend the release duration ofpast fuel cladding failures.
- 2. Source term analyses (ofisotope quantities, chemical and physical forms and release time) must be executed to determine the amount, pathways and destinations of fission products released during fuel cladding failures.
- 3. Much more extensive spectroanalyses of removable smear samples from plant equipment and water systems must be executed to document the pathways of fuel-derived fission products within the plant itself. The 48 removable smear samples analyzed in the Duratek report for gamma-beta contamination, while showing a high percentage of anomalies, constitute a grossly inadequate database for decommissioning any type of reactor.
- 4. The equally cursory characterization of" unaffected" plant areas and adjacent off-site environs also provides graphic evidence of breach of fission product barriers. A much more comprehensive program of spectroanalyses of soil and sediments as well as of selected bioaccumulators must be impicmented as part of the fuel cladding failure (FCF) source tenn analyses. Thepathways and destinations offuel assembly-derived contamination that has breached reactorfission product barriers at MYAPC must be documentedprior to any further decommissioning activities.
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. 5.. It is now clear that previous NRC licensee-generated event reports, annual effluent reports,
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reactor water systems and storage tank grab samples and other monitoring data are unreliable and cannot be usedfor source term analyses. In fact, the licensee should and must be prohibited from supervising or controlling the documentation of these fuel cladding failures, etc. Stone & Webster shares MYAPC's conflict ofinterest between profits and documentation. Fuel cladding failure source term analyses must be executed by an entity without such conflicts ofinterest.
- 6. Resumption ofdecommissioning activities by Stone & Websterprior to accident characterization should result in the most vigorouspossibleprosecution ofparticipants
. allowed by law, possibly includingpursuit of Title 18 civil or criminal complaints (sections
$1503, $1964, etc.)
I look forward to working with Stone & Webster to accurately document the source term for MYAPC fuel cladding failure accidents (FCFAs). I have the following questions and requests:
Please advise me who you think at Stone & Webster would be most effective in maintaining an open dialogue about this admittedly controversial subject?
To whom should I address my questions about the progress of accident characterization e
efforts and the resulting database?
l Would any representatives from Stone & Webster come to join me for a meeting (or dinner) l to review decommissioning procedures and data?
Who at Stone & Webster, if anyone, is in charge of the fuel assembly verification program e
announced by MYAPC at a prior Community Advisory Panel meeting?
l I would be interested in having one or more face to face meetings with Stone & Webster to discuss these issues, either in Boston, Portland or elsewhere. Please advise me of the status of source term analyses ofloss ofradiological controls at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.
Thank you for your attention in this matter.
f i
Yours truly, L
b H. G. Brack Director ofInvestigations Radiological Surveillance Programs Center for Biological Monitoring cc. Dave Barry, Don Clark, Community Advisory Panel members, Scott Gray, Shirley Jackson,
- Mary Ann Lynch, Michael Masnik. NRC Commissioners, Michael Webb, John Zwolinski 2
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F Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.
Sponsor of RADNET: Nuclear Information on the Internet SOURCE POINTS OF ANTHROPOGENIC RADIOACTIVITY World Wide Web at http://home. acadia. net /cbm BOX 144, HULLS COVE, ME 04644-0144 207/288-5126 FAX: 207/288-2725 EMAIL: sbrack@ acadia. net March 30,1999 Brief to the Office of U.S. Attorney for Maine Undocumented fuel cladding failures at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant (MYAPC) 10 CFR Chapter 1, Part 10.4 directs the NRC to " conduct its operations in a manner e
consistent with traditional American concepts ofjustice."
10 CFR Chapter 20, Part 20.103 mandates measurement of radiation levels and e
concentrations.
10 CFR 20.1302 requires surveys of radiation levels in unrestricted areas.
10 CFR 20.1402 sets site release criteria for residual radiation at 25 mrem /yr TEDE for e
members of the general public for all isotopes in all pathways, 10 CFR 20.1406 mandates minimization of contamination; 10 CFR 20.1501, surveys that are e
reasonable under the circumstances; 10 CFR 20.2103, record keeping; 10 CFR 20.2202, notification ofincidents; 10 CFR 20.2207 reporting contamination exceeding regulatory limits.
At the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company in Wiscasset, Maine, the NRC has clearly and consistently violated the letter and spirit of the Code of Federal Regulations through
- 1. Inadequate documentation of the environmental impact of plant operations including a general failure of historic documentation of the residual radiation levels and pathways of isotopes characterizing long-lived spent fuel wastes (LLSFW)
- 2. Failure to mandate a decommissioning activities environmental impact statement (EIS)
- 3. Premature acceptance of an inadequate and vague Preliminary Site Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR)
- 4. Tolerance of a cursory post-operational site characterization database (GTS Duratek)
- 5. Failing to adequately document the radiological profile of reactor water systems decontamination releases or to allow public discussion or review of this documentation
- 6. Failing to document the environmental impact of reactor water systems decontamination releases by allowing licensee scheduling of cursory marine sediment characterization prior to i
liquid effluent releases
- 7. Ignoring additional emerging evidence ofloss of radiological controls and breaches of fission product barriers which graphically illustrate the necessity of additional site characterization prior to major decommissioning activities
- 8. Failure to adequately document the quantities, pathways and destinations ofliquid effluent releases, including the 1984 reactor water storage tank (RWST) accident
- 9. a stubbom inability to recognize the necessity of upgrading obsolete radiological surveillance programs
- 10. Systematic avoidance of spectroanalyses of biologically significant radionuclides in abiotic and biotic media other than through cursory and misleading annual environmental monitoring reports
- 11. An over reliance on inaccurate and inadequate " drive-over" gamma scanning technology for pre-decommissioning characterization in lieu of more costly spectroanalyses
- 12. Tolerance of a lack of public hearings, discussion, debate and documentation both during reactor operation and decommissioning in violation of" traditional American concepts of justice"
- 13. Encouragement of a licensee controlled Community Advisory Panel (CAP) that is both a conduit of misinformation and a forum for evasion, deception and obstruction ofjustice.
- 14. A refusal to acknowledge that the MYAPC facility has been the location of a series of fuel cladding failure accidents (FCFAs),1974-1998
- 15. A concomitant refusal to recognize the statutory obligation ofdetailed post-accident source term analyses to determine the quantities, chemical and physical forms and release durations of contamination derived from the " nonstandard" fuel at MYAPC
- 16. Failure to conduct operations in a manner consistent with traditional American concepts of justice by the maintenance of secret records and databases, beginning with routine radiological incident reports (RIR) and extending to nuclear accidents not yet disclosed to the public, the MYAPC fuel cladding failure cover-up being indicative of a much broader pattem of NRC evasions and self-deception In view of the anomalies in residual radiation levels at MYAPC plant systems and environs and a 20% fuel assembly damage rate, the NRC is not conducting itselfin a manner that is " reasonable under the circumstances" or consistent with the statutory requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations l
Nowhere in the Code of Federal Regulations does it suggest the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shouldjoin with the licensees to conduct for-profit reactor operations in the manner of a Banana Republic. The NRC has demonstrated an exceptional inability to revise and upgrade its documentation of the environmental impact of reactor operations, accidents and decommissioning procedures not only to meet the statutory requirements of federal law but also to meet the challenges of radiological surveillance programs in the post-Chemobyl era. The NRC has formed a closed society with its licensees and, in Maine, with state government and associated political supporters. There has been no advance or reform in monitoring programs since the AEC was established in 1954. With the promulgation ofsite release criteria of 25 l
mrem /yr TEDE for members of the general public, the NRC has shot itselfonce in each foot and then again in the head for good measure: it lacks the database to validate the site release criteria.
I There is now clear evidence of fuel cladding failure accidents at MYAPC and other New England reactors, coupled with an NRC failure to document the source term of these releases. In effect, the NRC is facilitating a for-profit cover-up ofinstances ofloss of radiological controls which are required by federal law to be documented. Without this documentation, the NRC has 2
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i no legal authority to allow decommissioning activities at MYAPC to proceed. In fact, the inability of the NRC to observe or question the historic inadequacies in its radiological smveillance programs and the resultant lack ofdocumentation of both routine emissions and accidental releases undermines the legal basis for any reactor operations in the United States. If the NRC is unable to understand and enforce both the letter and spirit of 10 CFR Chapter 1, Part 10.4 or the monitoring and documentation requirements in 10 CFR Chapter 20, who will assume its oversight responsibilities? Will the Department of Justice also serve as a facilitator of NRC noncompliance with federal law?
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H. G. Brack
- Director ofInvestigations Radiological Sun eillance Programs Center for Biological Monitoring 4
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