IR 05000395/1986009

Insp Rept 50-395/86-09 on 860401-0531.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observations,Esf Sys Walkdown & Operational Safety Verification

ML20203C165
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	07/08/1986
From:	Dance H, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203C153	List: IR 05000395/1986009 ML20203C148
References
50-395-86-09, 50-395-86-9, NUDOCS 8607180369
Download: ML20203C165 (8)

Text

. . . . ._~ .. - - - .. . .- . .

t UNITED STATES -

/g r.fC

. #o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[" o REGION ll j 101 MARIETTA STREET, $ ,

• t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 i

'+9.. ...

Report No.: 50-395/86-09 )

Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218

, l Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 i

Facility Name: V. C. Summer

'

Inspection Cond cted: April - May 31, 1986 Inspect s: '- '7 7, -

Rich dL Da'te Si ned

/

i ,w t.Prevate h

Perry C. Hopkins

-

, ,/

Da'te Signed w

Approve by: ~

N Hugh C. Dance, Section Chief

/ 7 Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted by the. resident

, inspector on site in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, on site followup of events and subsequent writ. ten reports, monthly surveillance observations, engineered safety features system walkdown, monthly maintenance observation, and operational safety verificatio Results: No violations or deviations were identifie r a

r l

!

-

' 8607180369 860708 PDR ADOCK 05000395

, o PDP

__ - _

, - _ _ , . _ _ ,_ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - . _ - - -

. __ _ _

.

.

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Nauman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations 0. Bradham, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations J. Skolds, Deputy Director, Operations and Maintenance K. Woodward, Manager, Operations M. Browne, Group Manager, Technical and Support Services

,

M. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance Services A. Koon, Manager, Technical Support

'

G. Putt, Manager, Scheduling and Materials Management M. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Education and Training L. Blue, Manager, Support Services S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Assurance Surveillance Systems W. Higgins, Associate Manager, Regulatory. Compliance J. Sefick, Manager, Nuclear Security B. Williams, Supervisor, Operations

!

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview (30702, 30703)

!

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 2,1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector *, described the

! areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the license The following items were identified during the inspection: Unresolved Item - (395/86-09-01) Battery Room Temperature Setpoint Paragraph 4 B.

.

Inspector 4 Paragraph Followup Item (395/86-09-02) Procedures for Drain Valve The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio .

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) .

.

,

(Closed) Violation (86-06-02) Failure to Maintain Hourly Fire Watch: The

i licensee provided a written response to this violation in a letter to Region II dated May 15, 198 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's ,

I response and corrective action taken to prevent recurrence. The licensee has- conducted additional training of personnel in this area to preclude i

l l

,

!

- - _ . -. . _ - _ - _ - -

- -. ---. . - - ._ .-

L_- .. . . . - . . . _ _ - .- . .

-

, 2 i

additional mistakes of this nature. This additional training appears to be adequate to address and resolve this incident.

! This item is close (Closed) Violation 86-05-07: Failure to Provide Training to a Key Member of the Emergency Organization on the Fission Product Barrier Approach to

-

Event Classification. The this item to Region II dated Aprilinspector 23, 198 reviewed the licensee's The inspectors response attended the on special 1_ training conducted for this individual- on March 14, 198 Additional recurrence. corrective actions taken by the licensee should prevent This item is close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 85-03-02: Approval of Westinghouse Tech Manual For DS 416 Breakers For Site _ Us This item was the result of the

,

vendor technical manual failure to incorporate a list of all shafts that use

'

retaining rings and a list of torque values for nuts, bolts and screws. A review of the revised vendor technical manual VCS-IMS 948-1066 by the

'

inspector shows that this information has been incorporated into this manual. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 85-30-02: Licensee Commitments to Improve

!

Timeliness of The Processing of Substantial Safety Hazard (SSHs)

Determination determining the This item related to the timeliness in evaluating and

reportability of safety hazard As a result of the inspector's concerns the licensee revised Nuclear Licensing Procedure processing" of (NL-111) Processing SSHs, and Dispositions of 10CFR Part 21 Items" to expedite implemented in November 198 The changes reflected in this procedure were should effectively resolve this item. Adherence to these procedural requirements This item is close (Closed) IE Circular 81-14:

Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Clos The applicable were Licenseetoreceived V.C. Summer and evaluated the recommendations of the circul Station. The inspectors reviewed the engineering from the evaluatio evaluations and implementation of applicable recommendations adequate. This item isThe Licensee action on this circular appears to be close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 84-25-01: Implementation of Human Factors Acceptable Post Acciden Solution to accuracy problems of Steam Generator Wide Range Level This problem was identified by the licensee during validation addresses of emergency operating procedures in August 1984. This concern indication the use of cold calibrated steam generator wide range level j with the plant ho Under these conditions an error of '

approximately 30 percent will exist. To address this item the licensee has provided a table (V-9) in the station curve book for use by the operators to convert to wide range indicated level to actual leve and requalification above tabl training emphasize this item and the need to use theOperator traini knowledgeable on this item. Interviews with control room operators indicate that they ar This item is closed.

d A

i l l

l

i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

.

3 Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports (92700, 93702)

The inspectors reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Special Reports (SPRs) to ascertain whether the licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified event were in conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications, license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls. Based upon this review, the following items are closed:

LER 86-05 Inoperable Fire Barriers SPR 85-15 Fire Rated Assemblies SPR 85-10 Degraded Fire Barrier SPR 85-02 Fire Detection Instrumentation LER 84-37 Steam Generator Wide Range Level Indication

,

OPERATIONAL EVENTS: On April 2,1986, with the plant in Mode 1,100% power, the turbine generator tripped followed by a reactor trip. The cause was determined to ledbetoan abnormal a loss connection of main on excitatio generator a current transformer connection that The licensee performed corrective maintenance and subsequently returned to power. Additional information is contained in LER 86-00 On May 5,1986, the licensee identified that the set points for ITE 9880A and ITE 98888, for battery rooms A and B High Temperature alarm set points, were set at 99 degrees F in accordance with Instrumentation and Control Procedures ICP 100.021 and ICP 100.022. Technical Specifica-tions 3/4 7.11, table 3.77 establishes temperature limits of 88 degrees F. Engineering Change Notice (ECN) 2424 dated 8-4-82 established the set points at a conservative 85 degrees F. However, in March of 1983 an error was made while transposing set point data from ECN 2424 to the procedure. This resulted in a 99 degrees F set point rather than an 85 degrees F set point being incorporated into the procedur The licensee has initiated procedural changes and is performing an ergineering evaluation to determine the consequences of the incorrect set point. The licensee is preparing an LER on this event. This event is currently being investigated and will be tracked as an unresolved item, " Battery Room Temperature Setpoint",

395/86-09-0 On May 4, 1986, with the plant at 100% power, STP 125.002 (Diesel Generator Operability Test) was completed at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />. Upon a review of the test data by the licensee it was noted that a 150 degrees F differential temperature existed between two exhaust cylinders. Upon further investigation, an unusual noise was in the vicinity of cylinder # MWRs 8600669 and MWR 8600671 were issued. After consultation between the vendor and licensee maintenance department it ;

was discovered that a seal on the intake air manifold for #5 cylinder '

was leaking. Af ter seal replacement, the noise and cylinder exhaust l

l l

=.

. 4 temperature was normal. . During subsequent testing the automatic voltage regulator card faile The card was replaced and tested satisfactory. The Diesel Generator was declared operable at 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> May 7, 1986. The licensee will address this item in a Special Repor On March 15, 1986, during the performance of STP 121.002 (Mainsteam Valve Operability . Testing) the Terry turbine started, and water

ruptured the exhaust line boot. After investigation by the licensee it was determined that condensation had accumulated in the exhaust lin Upon starting, the water ejected by the steam exhaust had caused the boot to rupture. Additional investigation revealed that the high level alarm switch (ILV 2031) did not perform its function. Valves 22550. A and B, were in the closed position. Valve Lineup performed on January 21, 1986, showed the valve open. Engineering is evaluating the need for permanent replacement of the exhaust line boot. The licensee has committed to develop a program to track misaligned valves that are manipulated outside of established procedures / controls and that these additional controls will be in place by June 1, 198 This is an inspector followup item, Procedures For Drain Valves (395/86-09-02). On May 30,1986, while performing STP 307-039 (Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Operational Test) an Instrumentation and Control technician placed Channel N-42 in test and inadvertently started working on Channel N-4 This work generated a 2/3 logic on the over temperature delta temperature protection circuitry and resulted in a reactor trip from 100 percent power. All primary system responded normally. However, problems were experienced in the secondary syste Shortly after the trip, and due to increasing level in the Deaerating (OA) tank, the operator manually tripped "B" condensate pump. As level continued to increase, "A" condensate pump tripped on high level in the DA tan At this time "C" condensate pump was not running and was in standb After approximately four minutes the DA tank level recovered below the high level trip and "B" and "C" condensate pumps automati-cally restarte Since water has drained to the condenser from condensate lines and some low pressure feedwater heaters, this

automatic starting of the pumps resulted in a severe water hammer in .

'

the condensate piping between the condensate pumps and the DA tan The plant is currently shutdown and in Mode' 3. Licensee personnel j assisted by Gilbert Associates Incorporated (GAI) are currently investigating these areas for damage and are in the process of evaluating for required repairs. The inspector will continue to follow

, this repor item and will further addressed this item in the next monthly No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety-related systems j

and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of

, . . _ , - .-

. .-. - . . - - _ .-

.

. 5 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveillance test involving safety-related systems. The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, that required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, that data met TS requirements, that test discrepancies were rectified, and that the systems were properly returned to service. The following specific surveillance activities were observed:

STP 201.001 Core Reactivity Balance STP 125.002 Diesel Generator Operability Test STP 212.001 Reactor Core Flux Mapping STP 120.002 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump STP 360.040 Fuel Building Exhaust Atmospheric Radiation Monitor STP 345-074 Solid State Protection System Actuation Relay Test For Train "B" STP 123.003 Service Water System Valve Operability Test STP 125.001 Electrical Power Systems Weekly Test STP 125.002 Diesel Generator Operability Test (DG "A" and "B")

STP 125.004 Diesel 3enerator Load Rejection Test STP 121.002 Main Steam Valve operability test STP 303.001 Steam Generator Pressure STP 133.003 Axial Flux Difference Calculation STP 102.002 NIS Power Range Heat Balance STP 108.001 STP 114.002 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Calculation Operational Leakage Test STP 144.001 Nuclear Sampling System Valve Operability Test STP 396.014 Emergency Feedwater Suction Pressure Instrument STP 501.002 D.C. Battery Quarterly Surveillance Test STP 395.057 Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Instrument STP 345.027 Steam Generator "A" Narrow Range Level Instrument No violations or deviations were identified. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The (ESF)

inspectors verified the operability of an engineered safety features system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Service Water Syste The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuratio The inspectors performance lookedand (hangers for equipment conditions and items that might degrade supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriat The inspectors compared both local and remote position indication No violations or deviations were identifie _

. . . . - _ --- . _ .. .

. - - - - . ..-

d

. 6

. ~ Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety-related systems and

' components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications (TS) and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors also determined that the

'

procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these

+

activities were accomplished by qualified personnel. The inspectors

independently verified that equipment was properly tested before being

returned to service. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety-related maintenance and a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing on a given system. The following specific maintenance

activities were observed

j MWR 20809002 Replacement of RTD (ITE 006068) on the RHR system KdR 86M0105 Electrical testing of Timer, Leads and Connection on the Chiller  ;

K4R 8600594

~

Verify setpoints on Rod Control Unit K4R 8610169 Repaired / Adjusted-Atmospheric Radiation Monitor I K4R 0081

'

K4R 86006268 Inspect Verify Key Inserted on Valve Shaft XV8031286-SW Replace Limit Switch on DG "A" XVP10987A-0G Airstart Header Isolation Valve KdR 208400005 Install Battery Packs, Light Heads and Conduit K4R 31700012 Install Jumper Across Slow Speed Contact for SWXES20036, on Service Water Pumps

,

l K4R 86E0069

Repair Brackets on Main Control Board XCP6100 KdR 8600046

! Repair and Replace Circuit Card SN802397 Component Cooling Instrument

, MdR 86066 Diesel Generator "A" Lower Train Housing Plugged "0" Ring

!

KdR 86M0065

!

MWR 205780013 Replace Cooling Water to the Injectors to #12 Cylinder

! KdR 86M0084 Install Conduit Components for "E" Train Charging Pump Repair Weld on Service Water Piping

! MWR 8600435 Repair Switch as Necessary on ILS02031  :

PMTSP 0070414 "E" Field Intrusion Detection System Operational Test PMST P0006-9496 Inspection and Maintenance on Auxiliary Switches for Limitorque Operator XVB3126A KdR 86E0027 Equalizing Charge on Cells 56 and 57 of Battery XBA1B MWR 20819.001 and Installation of Padeyes to Support Diesel Generator MRF 20819.004 Turbo Charger During Maintenance i PMST 0069812 011 Change on Residual Heat Removal Pump "A" Motor i

No violations or deviations were identified.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

,

The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs, records and

'

held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with applicable requirement (

.

i i

,

Specific items inspected in the control room included: adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room personnel; TS and procedural adherence; operability of equipment and indicated control room status; control room logs, tagout books, operating orders, jumper / bypass controls; computer printouts and annunciators. Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify equipment operability; centrol of ignition sources and combustible materials; the condition of fire detection and extinguishing equipment; the control of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress; the implementation of radiation protective controls and the physical security pla Tours were conducted during normal and random off-hour period The inspectors as part of the control room and equipment status review questioned the licensee's actions taken when annunciators become inoperable or are taken out of service. The licensee presently publishes a weekly listing and status for all main control board equipment and annunciators that are out of service. The inspectors expressed an interest in alternate methods used to alert the operator when critical annunciators are taken out of service. These instruments are the primary means of alerting the operator to equipment or system malfunctions. After discussicns on this issue, the licensee agreed to evaluate the need for additional monitoring of applicable parameters monitored by the affected annunciator. An example is: taking hourly vice one per shift reading when an annunciator is out of servic The licensee revised Operations Special Instruction (SI) 86-02 on May 23, 1986, to provide instructions for operator response to failed or otherwise inoperable annunciators. This instruction appears adequate to address this ite Adherence to this instruction will be routinely evaluated by the inspector No violations or deviations were identifie _