IR 05000395/1986012

Insp Rept 50-395/86-12 on 860601-0703.Violations Noted: Train B Charging Pumps Inoperable,Sys Not Verified When Diesel Generator Inoperable & Inadequate Procedure for Chemical & Vol Control Sys

ML20214U901
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	08/22/1986
From:	Dance H, Hopkins P, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214U889	List: IR 05000395/1986012 ML20214U887 ML20214U893
References
50-395-86-12, EA-86-126, NUDOCS 8610020013
Download: ML20214U901 (10)

Text

. UNITED STATES

[AMthig'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION li g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * 2 ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.: 50-395/86-12 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name: V. C. Summer Inspection Conduc ed: June 1 - July 3, 1986 Inspector : ao @ -J'

,m Rich rd Prefatte Date Signed g Perr f/1hL C. Hopkins r4Jn Date Signed a

Leo P. Modenos b '

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Date Sfgned Approved by : 'bY T _ Ow" I2 Hugh C./j0ance, Section Chief Dite Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted by the resident _ and regional inspectors onsite in the areas of licensee action on previous enforce-ment matters, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification, ESF system walkdown, onsite followup of events and subsequent written reports and onsite followup of events at operating reactor Results: Three violations were identified: 1) With one of two diesel generators inoperable, the license did not properly verify the operability of all required systems; 2) the B train charging pumps were inoperable and unable to be automatically started as intended; and 3) procedure did not provide adequate instructions for the startup and shut down of the chemical and volume control syste An enforcement conference was held on July 3,1986, in the Region II office to discuss the violations disclosed in this inspectio PDR ADOCK 05000395 G PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted

+*D. Nauman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

+*0. Bradham, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

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• J. Skolds, Deputy Director, Operations and Maintenance

• K. Woodward, Manager, Operations

• M. Browne, Group Manager, Technical and Support Services

• M. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance Services

• A. Koon, Manager, Technical Support

• G. Putt, Manager, Scheduling and Materials Management

+* Williams, Manager, Nuclear Education and Training

• L. Blue, Manager, Support Services

• S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Assurance Surveillance Systems

+*W. Higgins, Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance

• J. Sefick, Manager, Nuclear Security

+*B. Williams, Supervisor, Operations

+ R. Waselus, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering

+ K. Nettles, Group ~ Manager, Technical Services

+ S. Furstenberg, Control Room Supervisor  ;

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+ S. Lathren, Reactor Operator

+ W. Williams, Jr., Santee Cooper, Special Assistant, Nuclear Operations Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II

+ L. Reyes, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects

+ A. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety

+ G. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff

+ 0. Verrelli, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects

+ H. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects

+ H. Wong, Senior Enforcement Specialist, I&E Headquarters

+*R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector

+ L. Modenos, Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects

+ J. Hopkins, Project Manager, Nuclear Reactor Regulations

+ Attended Enforcement Conference on July 3,1986

• Attended Exit Interview on June 30, 1986 Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne . Exit Interview (30702,30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 30, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection finding ,. - - - - - .- -. .-- - . ..

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Three violations related to system electrical alignment errors and inade-t quate procedures that rendered the "B" train charging pumps inoperable for an automatic start on a loss of offsite power and subsequent safety injection were identified (paragraph 10). The licensee offered no objections to the above violations but stated that their corrective action 1 should prevent recurrence. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any -

of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this

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i n spc.cti o An enforcement conference was conducted in Region II office on July 3, 1986,

to discuss these violations (paragraph 11). Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 85-15-01, " Issue Essential Drawings for RHR COPS Modifications". This item addressed an inspector concern with the issuing of the as-built essential drawings for the cold overpressure protection syste These drawings were issued under Gilbert / Commonwealth letter CGGS 34767 on May 14, 1986. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 82-41-09, " Alternate Shutdown System License Condition First Refueling (SEC 9.5.1 SSER4)". This item involved the installation of source range monitor NI-33 at the alternate shutdown

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system control station. This item was addressed in SSER4 section 9. The installation activities were completed in December, 1984. The appli-cable surveillance procedure was implemented in January,1985 and the system operating procedure was implemented in February, 1985. This item is closed.

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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item TI 2515/77, " Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues". The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses and actions taken on biofouling of cooling water heat exchanges. A written report on this issue was provided to Region II under separate correspon-dence on June 20, 1986. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 86-09-02, " Procedure For Drain Valves". The inspectors reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to preclude recurr-ence. A .special program for misaligned valves has been implemented under Special Instructions 86.14. It appears that the actions taken are adequat This item is closed.

(Closed) Violation 85-22-01, " Inadequate Review of Surveillance Test Procedures". The inspectors reviewed the procedural changes that have been

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implemented. It appears that the licensee has taken appropriate steps to

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correct deficiencies in procedural reviews of surveillance test procedure This item is considered close (Closed) Violation 85-21-01, " Failure To Apply Electrolyte Level Correction Factor During Battery Inspection". The licensee provided a written response to this violation in a letter to Region II, dated July 12, 198 The

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inspector reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions taken to

preclude recurrenc Followup inspections in this area indicate that this .

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item has been adequately resolved. This item is close '

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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item, 79-29-01, " Inadequate Preoperational Test Procedures". The inspector reviewed a memo from J. P. O'Reilly to D. G. Eisenhut dated July 9,1982 (under module 94300) on the " Status of Facility Completion", and confirmed that construction and pre-operational testing of the Summer facility had been completed in substantial agreement with docketed commitments and regulatory requirements. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item, 82-41-16, " Inadequate Core Cooling Instru-ments (NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2)". The inspector reviewed the .11censee's response and the SER submitted by NRR dated August 3, 1984. Based on NRR's review and acceptance of the actions taken by the licensee, this item is close . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accor-dance with license requirements. The inspectors observed . portions of selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveillance tes The inspectors also verified that the required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, that required test instrumentation was l properly calibrated, that data met TS requirements, that test discrepancies were rectified, and that the systems were properly returned to service. The following specific surveillance activities were observed:

STP 150.001 Reactor Coolant Leak Test STP 209.002 Surveillance Test Procedure for Incore/Excore Axial Offset STP 209.001 Incore/Excore Axial Offset Mapping STP 360.034 Reactor Building Sample Line Atmospheric Monitor (RMA2) Operational Testing STP 121.002 Main Steam Valve Operability Testing STP 102.002 NIS Power Range Heat Balance STP 114.002 Operational Leakage Test STP 120.002 Emergency Feedwater Turbine Pump Test STP 115.002 Reactor Building Door Leak Test and Interlock Operability STP 142.004 Manual Reactor Trip Cperational Test STP 130-003 Valve Operability Testing Modes 1,2 and 3

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STP 102-002 NIS Power Range Heat Balance I REP 109-001 Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions STP 115-032 Reactor Building Air Lock Door Seal Leak Test STP 310.006 NIS Power Range (N42) Calibration STP 125.001 Electric Power Systems Weekly Test STP 102.002 Nuclear Power Range Heat Balance STP 114.002 Operational Leakage Test STP 133.001 Axial Flux Difference Calculation STP 126.002 Spent Fuel Ventilation Operability Test STP 134.001 Shutdown Margin Calculation STP 102.001 Analog Channel Operational Test (N-31, N-32)

STP 102.003 Analog Channel Operational Test (N-35, N-36)

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications (TS) and appropriate industry codes and standards. The inspectors also determined that the ;

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procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by quali fied personne The inspectors independently verified that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several out-standing job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety-related maintenance and a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing on a given system. The following specific maintenance activities were observed:

ICP 400.018 Service Water Pump "C" Discharge Pressure Transmitter (IPT 4443) Calibration Test MWR 8600433 Replacement of Exhaust Boot on Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine MWR 8503031 Repair Valve XVT0010-CU on the Downstream Test Vent for XVT08152CS, Containment Spray MWR 8600302 Repair Leak on High Pressure Turbine

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MWR 8503043 Replace Mechanical Seal on Waste Gas Compressor MWR 86W0026 Installation of Spare Power Range Drawer MWR 8610254 Inspect, Replace Relay LSXAMD on XCP6112 MWR 8610253 Inspect Contacts, Measure Resistance, and Replace Relay FW61BX on XCP6101 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs, records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with applicable requirement Specific items inspected in the control room included: adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room personnel; TS and procedural adherence; operability of equipment and indicated control room status; control room logs, tagout books, operating orders, jumper / bypass controls; computer printouts and annunciator Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify equipment operability; control of ignition sources and combustible materials; the condition of fire detection and extinguishing equipment; the control of maintenance and surveillance activities in progress; the imple-mentation of radiation protective controls and the physical security pla Tours were conducted during normal and random off-hour period On May 5, 1986 during a review, the licensee identified that the set points for ITE 9880A and ITE 98808, for battery rooms A & B high temperature alarm set points, were set at 99 degrees F in accordance with instrument and control procedures, ICP 100.021 and ICP 100.02 l Technical Specification 3.7.11 established in Table 3.7-7, a temperature limit of 88 degrees F. Engineering change notice (ECN) 2424 dated August 4, 1982 established the set points to be 85 degrees F. However, in March of 1983 a personnel error was made while transposing set points from ECN 2424 to the procedure. This resulted in a 99 degrees F rather than an 85 degrees F set point being incorporated into the procedure. The error in transposing correct set points resulted in the irsuance of an inadaquate procedur Unresolved item 86-09-01, which originally identified this item, is close In accordance with the NRC enforcement policy in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, a violation will not be issued for this licensee identified ite The licensee took immediate steps to evaluate and correct the procedures and to establish the correct set points on the affected ur its and to verify the battery room temperatures were within the allowable limit The licensee reviewed recorded daily electrolyte temperature for each battery pilot cells for May, June, July, August and September of years 1983, 1984, and 1985, and

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random reviews of other recorded readings. The highest temperature found in this review revealed that the highest known reading was 79 degrees F, with the majority being in a range of approximately 74 F - 75 degrees Other than the above, no other violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors verified the operability of an engineered safety features (ESF) system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for equipment conditions and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, house-keeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriat The inspectors compared both local and remote position indication No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports (92700, 93702)

The inspectors reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LER's) and Special Reports (SPR's) to ascertain whether the licensee's review, co'rrec-tive action and report of the identified event were in conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications, license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls. Based upon this review the following items are close 'LER 85-26 Inoperable Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump, Repair and Retest of Valve LER 85-30 Out of Tolerance Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoints SPR 85-005 Inoperable Delta Temperature Detection System for Meteorological Data LER 84-044 Residual Heat Removal Suction Isolation, the Cause Was Determined to be Drawing Errors SPR 85-013 Inoperable Meteorological Instrumentation due to Lightning Strike LER 84-042 Reactor Building Purge Supply and Exhaust Valves LER 84-043 Inoperable Reactor Building Penetration

$PR 85-033 Diesel Generator "B" 0-Ring Failure

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactor (93702) On June 18, 1986 the licensee identified an error in the 5 Cals Calorimetric Computer Program used to control reactor thermal powe Preliminary investigation indicates that reactor thermal power may have exceeded the technical specifications limit of 2775 MWt by approxi-mately one percent when operating at 100 percent power. The licensee immediately reduced power by approximately one percent and suspended further use of this program until an evaluation could be complete The licensee is presently using feedwater temperature for a computer

' calorimetric and backing this up with manual calculations every 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> This item was documented in Off-Normal-Occurrence Report No.86-116 and the resident inspector was informed of the event and corrective action

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being taken on June 19, 1986. The licensee is currently evaluating this event to determine what additional corrective action is require This item will be tracked as an inspector followup item, Error in 5 Cals Program, 395/86-12-02, On May 31,1986, at 10:26 AM, a reactor trip from 100 percent power occurred. During' an operational test (STP 302-039) of power range channel N-42, one of the four power range channels, the bistables associated with N-42 channel was inadvertently left in the tripped

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position while:a test was being performed on channel N4 Initiation of a two.out of three protection system logic resulted in an over-

temperature delta temperature reactor tri Immediately following the reactor trip, the condensate system experi-enced severe water hamme The licensee investigated the event and determined the cause to be incomplete work and inadequate testing of modifications associated with MRF 20388-0049. Subsequent engineering evaluations and repairs were completed and the unit restarted on June 4, 1986. Additional details on this event are contained in

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Licensee Event Report 86-00 On June 29, 1985 at 2:15 AM the unit tripped from 90 percent power due to the feedwater isolation valve on steam generator "A" going shu This resulted in an automatic reactor trip from steam flow /feedwater flow mismatch and low low steam generator water level. No safety injection occurred and systems responded as required to the automatic trip. An investigation by the licensee determined the cause to be a high resistance connection in.a plug connector to the solenoid for the hydraulic valve actuator. The plug was replaced and the unit was returned to power on July 1, 198 Additional information will be provided by the licensee in an LE No violations or deviations were identified.

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1 Inoperability of Charging Pumps (93702)

While operating in Mode 1 at 100 power on June 11, 1986, the operator at the controls -questioned why B charging pump control switch was in the -

pull-to-lock position. The shift supervisor ordered that the switch be placed in the normal-after-stop position. Due to questions that arose as to the operability of the B pump and B train under the above conditions, an investigation was conducted to determine how .long the switch was in the pull-to-lock position and the applicaole statu '

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A subsequent investigation by the licensee revealed that the control switch for the B pump had been placed in the pull-to'-lock position at approximately-1:00 p. m. on June 6, 1986. The switch had been placed in this position due to questions on- pump operability while performing work activities on a solenoid valve in the cooling water supply to the lube oil coole The above investigation, after extensive research, revealed that placing B pump control switch in the pull-to-lock position prevented the B and C charging

, pumps, aligned to B train, from starting automatically during a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and subsequent safety injection (SI). TS Action Statement 3.5.2.a requires with one ECCS subsystem inoperable, the licensee must restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in hot standby I within the following six~ hours. The B train charging pumps were inoperable for a period of 111 hour0.00128 days <br />0.0308 hours <br />1.835317e-4 weeks <br />4.22355e-5 months <br /> Failure to restore the inoperable subsystem train B of the charging pumps or shutdown as specified is a violation (86-12-01)~of TS 3.5. A further review of events during this time period revealed that while the control switch was in pull-to-lock, A diesel generator was taken out of service on June 10, 1986, for a raintr . ce ~ period of approximately thirteen hours. During this thirteen hour period no charging pumps would have been available to . start automatically under a LOOP and subsequent SI. Charging pumps B and C were aligned to the B train and dependent upon the remaining operable diesel generator as a source of emergency power. Charging pumps B

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and C were inoperable because the control switch position for the B pump would have prevented the automatic start of the pump and electrical inter-locks would have prevented the automatic start of the C pump under the conditions of a loss of offsite power followed by a safety injection signa TS Action Statement 3.8.1.1.c requires with one diesel generator inoperable, the licensee must verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining operable diesel generator as a source of emergency power are operable. If these conditions are not satisfied within two hours, the unit'must be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the next 30 hour3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> Failure to place the unit in hot standby within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> + 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />)

is a violation (86-12-01) of TS 3.8.1.1.c.

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Review of the system operating procedure (S0P-102) revealed that it did

not fully address or cover this design feature of the swing pump alignmen The failure to have an adequate procedure to cover this particular

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operation is a violation (86-12-01) of TS 6.8.1 which requires that the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, be established, implemented, and maintaine . Enforcement Conference An enforcement conference was conducted .in the Region II Office on July 3, 1986, to discuss the violations referenced in paragraph 10. The licensee presented the sequence of events that resulted in the misalignment of the charging pumps and emphasized that although this event appears to be similar to violation 86-06-01, they believed it to be different. The i licensee has implemented both interim and long term corrective action to i preclude recurrence. Interim measures include: (1) abandonment of adminis-trative inoperability. philosophy, (2) require racking down of breakers on components that are not fully operable, (3) allow use of pull-to-lock only

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when specifically covered by procedures, and (4) issued a moratorium on implementing design changes. Long term corrective actions include: (1)

human factors evaluation of plant systems, (2) procedural ' reviews and updates, (3) stricter enforcement of procedural adherence, (4) increased preplanning for maintenance and mcdifications, (5) improvements to equipment status control program and (6) greater training emphasis on determining equipment operability and lessons learne The NRC regional representative stated that the licensee's review of this complex design appeared t.o be thorough. However, it is the licensee's responsibility to understand the design alignment features of their systems

and the recent review of the swing pump alignment on the component cooling

, water and service water event of January 30, 1986 (violation 86-06-01)

should have increased the licensee's awareness of all swing pump arrange-ments at .their plant. The meeting was beneficial in that the views of the licensee and the NRC were candidly expressed.

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