IR 05000321/1988022

Insp Repts 50-321/88-22 & 50-366/88-22 on 880625-0722.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observations,Surveillance Testing Observations,Radiological Protection & Physical Security

ML20154C209
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	08/30/1988
From:	Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154C203	List: IR 05000321/1988022 ML20154C198
References
50-321-88-22, 50-366-88-22, NUDOCS 8809140276
Download: ML20154C209 (16)

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UNITED STATES

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h# NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N

1. g REGION ll

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4 101 MARIETTA STREET I ATLANTA, GEORGI A 3o323

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Report Numbers: 50-321/88-22 and 50-366/55-22 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366 License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: June 25 -July 22, 193S Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia Inspector: o g _ /cr d ,ehn*E. Menning Senior R#iident Inspector

[-36- Y Date Signed Accenpanying Personnel: Randall A. Musser Approved by: .__ / ,tJtMv_ -

M b 10 T Marvin V. Sinkule, Chier, eroject section 3B Date ligned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was ccnducted at tne site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Cbservations, Surveil-lance Tisting Obser asions. ESF System Walkdown, Radioicgical Protectian, P hy s i c a '. Security, Reportable Occurrences, Action on Inspector Followup Items, and Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matter Results: No violations or deviations were identifie Dh 0 321 PNU

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i 1 Persons Contacted Licensee Employees  ;

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T. Beckham, Vice President-Plant Hatch '

C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

• 0. Davis, Manager General Support J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager

• P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager ,

O. Fraser, Site Quality Assuran:e Manager

• M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager H. Nix, General Manager l T. Powers. Engineering Manager  !

• 0. Read, Plant Support Manager ,

• H. Sumner, Operations Manager S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager ,

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne ;

NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Menning

• R. Musser i

"Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the i last paragraph, Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant I operaticns. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits !

to the control room. Observations includ?d instrument readings, setpoints !

and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on

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equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to ;

limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in ef fect, daily l journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access  !

controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected ESF systems were confirmed operablo. The confirmation was made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow path align ent, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, niajor component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general conditio _ . - _

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General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions

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of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visite Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systens, missile

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hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment isolatio In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancies were observed by 1 the inspector and brought to the attention of licensee personnel:

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On July 10, 1988, water appeared to be leaking onto the floor from a

capture funnel under valve 2C11-F002A. This is a CR0 bydraulic

, system valve on elevation 130 in tha Unit 2 reactor buildin ' *

On July 13, 1988, apparently used gloves were observed on the floor

, outside of contaminated liquid sample panel IP33-P101. This panel is

! located on the 110 elevation in the southwest' diagonal of the Unit 1 reactor building, l

j During the performance of control room tours, the inspector noted that on i a few occasions operations personnel were lax in properly logging the

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responsible individual as control board operato Hatch procedure 30AC-0PS-003-05, "Plant Operations," paragraph 8.6.2.2 requires that the

! designated control board operator not leave the front panels without proper relief and documentation in the Plant Operator's Log for extended

periods (eg. , greater than approximately 5 minutes). This matter has been j brought to the attention of licensee personne During this repcrting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's l

controls on overtime of personnel who perform safety-related functions, j Section 6.2.2.g of the technical specifications establishes requirements

for the control of such overtime and Section 6.4 of licensee procedure 4 30AC-0PS-003-05, "Plant Operations," provides implementing instructions to

{ support the technical spacification requirements. The inspector reviewed i an Operations Department Overtime Report for the month of June and

! determined that the requ remen .s of 30AC-OPS-003-05 and the technical I specifications had been met. Darticular emphasis was placed on confor-l mance with the requiren'ent that overtime deviations be approved in advance by the Plant Manager.

l l The inspector noted during tours of the control room that the condition of l

critical drawings was deterioratin The edges of some drawings were

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crimped and torn. H o ,<e v e r , no cases were seen in which the deterioration

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had affected readability. On July 15, 1988, the inspector discussed these observations with the Operations Superintendent. The inspector was told that the current system of n'aintaining critical drawings in the control I

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room was interfm, and that the department hoped to have an improved system in place prior to the upc.oming Unit 1 outage. During these discussions, the inspector also expressed a concern related to the proximity of the drawings to the 603 panels in the control roo The drawings are currently secured by metal "sticks" ard maintained in an area inmediately behind the 603 panel The backs of these panels are uncovere It appeared to the inspector that personnel could inadvertently contact circuits in the panels with the "sticks" and thereby damage equipment or become injured. The Operations Superintendent agreed to consider the inspector's concern relative to the 603 panel At 0126 on July 18, 1988, an unanticipated closure of the No. 3 main turbine control valve occurred in Unit 2. The unit was operating at rated power at the time of this even The EHC system responded by fully opening the other control valves and opening the No. I bypass valv Shift personnel subsequently decreased load with recirculation flow to approximately 450 Ne. The No. 3 control valve was observed to reopen and close again af ter the initial closing. The licensee determined that the anomalous operation of this control valve was most likely caused by an existing high temperature condition in the main control room. The compressor for control room air conditioner Z41-B003A had failed the previous day. At 0020 on July 18, 1933, the PSW inlet pressure control valve for control room air conditioner Z41-8003B closed and would not reope Since only one air conditioner was then operating, temperatures in the main control room increased to a maximum of approximately 95 degrees F. Air conditioner Z41-B0038 was returned to service at 0345 on July 18. Shift personnel subsequently increased reactor power with recirculation flow to approximately 90 percent of rated. Power was maintained at that level until control room temperatures dropped to more nermal levels. During this time period personnel observed operation of the No. 3 control valve to provide assurance that the anomalous operation was indeed temperature ielated. At approximately 0930 on July 18, 1933, shift persont.el init.iated the ircrease on reactor power from 90 percent to rate As reported previously in Inspection Report Nos. 50-321,366/38-14 and 50-321,366/s9-17, the licensee continues in their ef fort to repair the Unit 1 spent fuel pool liner leak. The licensee has discovered an impression in the fuel po31 liner bottom surface close to the transfer canal between Unit I spent fuel pool and the reactor cavit This impression is the shape and size of a "Baby's Foot" and is of unknown origi The licensee has confirmed that this impression is a source of leakage, as the lino- leakage rate decreased apprcximately 15 percent from a previously identified rate of 4.7 gpm when a suction cup device was placed over the area. The licensee is currently seeking a cuntractor to develop a welding procedure for repair of the area in question. All easily accessible areas of the fuel pool liner have been inspected, but the 11 ensee is taking neasures to develop a method to inspect under the l

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feel racks if repair of the "Baby's Foot" does not stop the liner leakage.

J The inspector will continue to monitor the licensee's progress in (

j repairing the spent fuel pool liner leakag t fio violations or deviations were identifie l

[ Maintenance Observations (62703) Units 1 and 2

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During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance activitie The observations included a review of the work documents for j

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adequacy, adherence to procedure,. proper tagouts, adherence to technisal i 4 specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the !

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actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, -

and adherence to the apprttriate quality control The primary [

maintenance observations during this month are sumnarized below:

I Maintenance Act hl_ty Date I I

l Preparations for the removal of 07/05/88 (

l the 20 Residual Heat Removal Service r l Water Motor and Pump for maintenance  !

! per MWO 2-28-1809 (Unit 2) l 1 L i b Manufacture of a 3" minimum flow line 07/07/88 [

for the IC Plant Service Water pump l cer MWO 1-SS-3720 (Unit 1) .

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} Thirty-six month inspection of limitorque 07/10/88 ,

! operator on HPCI Stean. Supply to RHR l j valve IE11-F140A per procedure  !

j 52PM-MNT-005-05 (Unit 1)  !

l i j Thirty-six month Limitorque Valve Operator 07/21/S3 [

t Inspection on RCIC Torus suctien valve  !

1E51-F031 per procedure 52PM-MNT-005-05 t and F40 1-55-3247 (Unit 1) l 4 L l During this reporting period, the irispector noted that repeato'd problems l l were experienced with Unit 1 LPCI itiverter 1R44-5002. On June 28, 1928, ,

} the inverter's output breaker tripped and attempts to restart the inverter i

were unsuccessful. On July 5, 1988, 21arns were received indicating that !

fuses were blown. On July 15, 1988, the LPCI inverter again tripped and {

could not be restarte Related naintenance was performed under MW0s ;

1-88-3666, 1-88-3763, and 1-88-399n. The inspector noted that in each l case fuses were found to be blown and replaced. These recurring problems 8 were discussed with licensee personne The inspector learned that the !

licensee believes that the first problem was caused by high inverter recm F tenperatures. A cooler serving this room was found to be tripped and was l subsequently restarted. The licen: .e indicated that any additional action l l in this area would be based upon future problems that are identified. The f i inspector will track additional problens with this LPCI inverter and the l 1 licensee's corrective action I

I tio violations or deviations were identifie j

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4 Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2-

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The inspectors observed the pe. formance of selected surveillances. The  ;

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ebservation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy '

cor'ormance to technical :pecifications, verification of test instrument ,

cal'bration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances,  !

removal from service and return to service of the system or components  !

affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing abservations during this month are summari:ed below: g Sy veillance Testing Activity Date i High Pressure Coolant injection 06/30/83

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Pump Operability per procedure j 345V-E41-002-15 (Unit 1)  ;

i Diesel Generator 1B Monthly lest 07/OS/8S <

, per pro:.edure 345V-R43-002-1S ,

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I (Unit 1)

l Slibration of Remote Shutdown 07/10/83 ,

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Reactor Vessel Level Differential '

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Pressure Transmitter 2CS2-N005 per

! procedure 575V-CS2-003-2 (Unit 2) l

. RHR Service Water Pump 2C Quarterly 07/21/83 [

. 15T per procedure 345V-E11-004-2S l (Unit 2) .

! On June 28,198S, while performing Diesel Generator IB/2B monthly testing  !

j per procedure 345V-R43-002-25 (The "1B" Diesel Generator is a swing diesel l

and serves both Units 1 and 2), the voltage regulator failed upscale when r

! placed in automati The diesel was declared inoperable, and repair l j comerced on the voltsge regulato . After replacement of the voltagt  ;

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replator, an operability test was performed per procejure i 345V-R43-002-25. During this run, a generator field ground annuncia.or l

} was received in the control room. The licensec performed an extensive  !

] investigation into the situation. No grounds could be found in the l J diesel's circuitry. The licensee has attributed the condition to a "hung ,

I up" relay as the condition could not be repeated. All relays that could l have caused the alarmed condition were checked and performed satisfac- i

toril To preclude a recurreace, the involved relays were cleaned to

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allow for optwum performance. Following a successful operability run, {

i the diesel was declered operable on July 1, '93 !

i I On July 8,193S, while perforning Diesel Generator 1B/2B nonthly testing i per procedure 345V-R43-032-25, the diesel tripped approximately 1 minute i'

after being tied to the bu The ciesel was declared inoperabl l

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Following an investigation, the trip was determined to be caused by reverse powe It was determined that the reverse power relay was picked up due to a voltage mismatch in one of the phases between the bus and the diesel. Latir the same day, after determining the cause of the trip, the diesel wSs run satisfactorily and was declared operabl During this reporting period, the inspector noted that the li .ensee experienced difficulties on two occasions during the performance of procedure 34GO-005-026-25, "Main Turbine and Auxiliaries Weekly Test."

Section E of this procedure provides instructicas for the full closure testing of the Unit 2 main turbine stop valve In essence, test pushbuttons at the turbine control panel for the individual stop valves are depressed ard held, and the valve position indications are observed to verify proper closin The test pushbutton is released when the stop valve reaches the fully closed position. This allows the salve to return to the fully open position. During testing on July 9 and 27,1988, the No. 3 stop valve did not immediately open af ter the test pushbutton was released. The valve, in both cases, opened only after repeated operations of the test pushbutto The licensee had previously experienced difficulties cpenir.g this valve during the Unit 2 startup on May 31, 19S The problem during startup was attributed to a flow blockage. A metal particle was removed from an inlet orifice to the solenoid operated test valve for the No. 3 stop valve. The inspector dircussed the recent test '

problems with the licensee, and determined that the licensee is actively pursuing this matter. The inspector will track the licensee's progress and track any additional testing difficulties with the No. 3 stop valv No violations or deviations tre identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710) (Unit 2)

The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and e~eaker/ switch lineups a.id equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room to ensure that lineups were in accordante with ape ability r?auirements and that equip?.ent material conditions ere satisfactory. The Unit 2 RHR5W system was walked down in detai No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2 The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological piotection progra a in the course of the monthly activitie The performance of health physics and other persennel was cbserved on various shif ts to include: involvenent of health physics supervisic7, use of radiaticn work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of high radiatien areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, and posting and labelin No vio'ations )r deviations were note ,

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7 Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2 In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors includet a review of the licensee's physical security pregram. The performance of various shifts of the security force was coserved in tne conduct of daily activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of arred response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory post The resident inspectors verified the absence of obstructions in the isolation zone area en each side of the protected area fence that could conceal an unauthorized entry or interfere with the capability of the detection /arsessment syste The adequacy of illumination in the protected sa was also verifie On July 14, 1938, the resident inspector vi i' ed the central and secondary alarm stations and determined that survet sce equipment was functioning properl No violations or deviations were identified, Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700) Units 1 and 2 A number of Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that technical specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost considera-tio Unit 1: 87-03 Personnel Errors in Technical Specification Amendment Irplementation Cause Missed Surveillances This LER concerns a failure to satisfy all technical specification surveillance requiremer.ts for liquid radwaste effluent line radiation monitors 1Dll-K604 and 2011-K60 More specifically, the involved surveillance procedures did not demonstrate automatic isolation of the release pathway whan the controls for the m nitors were taken out of the operate mode. The licensee alsn determined that the Unit 1 design did r.o t provide for such an automatic isolatio Corrective action involved modifying the surveillance procedures and chancing the desion via implementation of DCR 87-13. procedure 57SV-011-011-IS, "Liquid Radwaste Ef fluent Radiation Monitor Functional Test,"

was revised effective 2/13/8 The revision of procedure 575V-D11-011-25, "Liquid Radvaste Ef fluent Radiation Monitor Functional Test," became effective en 9/2/S7, This natter appr* s to be a violation of the technical specificatien , ryei. lance requirement . .

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However, since all the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2. Appendix C,Section V, were satisfied, this licensee-identified violation is not being cite Review of the LER is close '

87-06 Area Radiation Monitor Signal Causes Control Roon Ventilation to Pressuri:e This LER identified two instances in which the MCREC system went into the pressuri:ation rode of operation in response to high radiction signals from a refueling floor ARM. In both cases, the high radiation signals were caused by irradiated outage related equipment rtored near the ARM combined with spiking of the monitor, The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions. One corrective action involved a review of the two events by site engineering to determine if additional corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors reviewed two related reports of this engineering work ioentified as LR-80P-004-10S7 dated 10/14/87 and LR-EN3-023-1037 dated 10/27/87. The inspectors noted that the licensee has initiated DCR 87-HCD-180 to upgrade the refueling floor ARMS to eliminate spurious actuations of the MCREC syste This DCR will (1) change + he ARM upscale trip relay to a time delay drop out type, (2)

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change the ARM type to cover a range of 10 to 10 2 mr/hr, and (3) n:odify the actuation logic for ARM upscale trips so require coincident trips before MCREC system pressuri:ation mode actuation. Review of this LER is close Personnel Error Results in Reduction of Vessel Level and ESF Actuations The events of this LER were cited as part of violation 321/87-12-01. Review of the LER is closed since this matter was '. racked with the violatio Inadequate Design for Inverter Cooling Causes Power Failure Resulting in Reactor Scram This LER concerned failure of the vital AC inverter due to high room tsmperature The high room terperatures were attributed to inadequate ventilation desig In reviewing this matter with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined that the Jxisting inverters ray not be used again or replace The licensee is currently ccnsidering other cotions for providing power to the vital AC load Consequently, the corrective actions identified as hos. 3, 4, and 5

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! t in the LER are most likely no longer appropriate. The l

inspectors indicated to the licensee that the LER t i should be revised to reflect the ' changes in their i plan Review of this LER remains ope I

< 87-12 Low Setpoints and Closed Dameer Cause High Temperature ;

I Is)1ation of Reactor Water Cleanup '

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RWCU system on a high ambient temperature signal. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action ]

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The long term corrective action to prevent recurrence involved a planned increase in the i n s'.rume n t set- J points for the air temperature sensors in the PWCU area. A proposed change to the technical specifica-tien had been submitted to the NRC prior to this even These changes were issued as Amendments No and 79 to the Units 1 and 2 technical specifica-tions, respectively, on 8/10/8 Review of this l LER is close ,

87-13 Feedwater Controller Fails Causing Feedwater Decrease Resulting in Reactor Scram The events of this LER were previo 11y discussed in NRC Inspection Nos. 50-321/87-21 and 50-366/87-2 ;

The root cause of this event was determined to be equipment failur Two capacitors in the master feedwater controller amplifier short circuited, resulting in a loss of voltage output signal to the individual feedpump controller Corrective action involved replacing the capacitors, functionally testing the control amplifier circuit board, and checking emponents in the Unit 2 feedwater control contrn1 i re,u i t ry . Review of this LER is closed, l

S7-14 Equipnent Failure and Instrument Drif t Cause Monitor Activation and ESF Actuatic, This LER concerned three unanticipated initiations of the MCREC system in the pressurication mod Operation in this mode was initiated on radiation signals f rom a ref ue'.ing floor ARM, The first two events were caused by a leaking GM tube. The third event was attributed to instrument drif The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by l the licensee. A long term solution to the problem of l

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spurious MOREC initiations is discussed above in the review of LER 3746. deview of this LER is closed.

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I 10 Unit 2: 87-02 Personnel Error During Maintenance Combined With l

Failed Instrument Cause ESF Actuation

This LER concerns auto-initiation of the SGTS dur.ng d the performance of surveillance procedure 575V-011-007-25, "Refueling Floor Exhaust Vent Radiation Monitor Instrument FT & C." During the performance of this procedure, an I&C technician inadvertently activated the "A" trip system for SGTS initiation while attempting to troubleshoot radiation sensor 2D11-K611 Power caoles were disconnected without the use of procedures or instructions. Corrective action involved reconnecting the cables, repairing radiation monitor 2011-N012A, and nodifying procedure 57SV-011-007-2S to caution personnel that the SGTS will actuate if more than one refueling floor radiation monitor is removed from service. In reviewing this matter, the inspectors noted that the procedure modication involved Precaution 5.1.1 in Revision 2 of the procedur Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires the implementation of procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of RG 1.33 Revisien 0, February 197 Section 9 of Appendix "A" of RG 1.33 recommends that maintenan e that can affect the perfcrmance of safety-related equipment be performed in accordance with written procedures, instructions, or appropriate drawings. This matter appears to be a violattun of Technical Spec',fication 6.8. Fiowever, since all of t.he requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C Section V, were satisfied, this licensee-identified vislation is not being cite Additionally, review of the LER is close Inadequate Design for inverter Cooling Causes Power Fai'ure Resulting in Rec. tor Scram This LER concerns failure of the vital AC inverter due to inadequate roem cooling. In reviewing this r.atter, the inspectors noted that corrective actions Nas. 3 and 4 in the LER were probably no longer appropriat As discussed previously in the review of Unit 1 LER S7-11, the 'icensee is con ,idering elimiration of the vital AC inverters. The inspectors inJicated to the licensee that the LER should be revised to reflect changed commitment Review of this LER remains ope Failed Instrument Line Leakage Esceeds Allowable Limits Resulting in Reactor Snutdown This !ER concerns a leak in a 1-inco. instrument ,rne that connects the 2S-irch recirculation discharge piping with a flow transm'tte Failure occurred in the heat af fected zone adjacent to a socket weld, t

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l Corrective action involved shutting Juw1 the unit and installing a weld overlay. The 11contee also intended to subsequently remove and metallurgically analyze the failed area. The LER indicated that the analysis results would be presented in an update to the LER l wht:h would be developed by approximat'ely April 25, l 1933. The inspectors reminded licensee personnel of the commitment to provide these results. Review of this LER remains oper.

, 87-12 Calcium Deposits Foul Chiller Causing High Room l Temperature and ESF Valve Isolation

The events of this LER concern the unanticipated closing of the outboard RWCU suction valvt as a result of a high ambient air temperature condition in the RWCU heat exchanger room. The high temperature condition, in turn, was caused by failure of reactor building and radwaste building chiller " A". The chiller was found to be fouled by calcium deposits which tripped the chil(er moto The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions tahen by the licensee, which included the fnstallation of a chemical I

treatment system on the chillers' cooling tower to i prevent future calcium accumulations. I r. reviewing

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this matter, the inspectors noted that r21ated chemical l treatment operations are delineated in procedure 3450-P65-001-25, "Radwaste Guilding Chilled Water System." Review of this LER is closed.

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87-13 Uninsulated Steam Piping Raises Differential Air Temperature Causing ESF Valve Isolations l

Th.s LER concerns an unanticipated isolation of the RCIC system due to missing insulation on some HPCI steam supply piping, Approximately six feet of pipe were not insulated and this piping was near one of the RCIC torus chamber differential air temperature sensors. Plant personnel were unaole to determine when er why the HPCI steam supply piping was u.t i n s ul ated. In reviewing this matter, the inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective actions were both extensive and appropriate. Review of this LER is close Surveillance Supervisor Makes Incorrect Assurption Resulting in 'tissed Surveillance Test The events of this LER concern a failure to satisfy two 92-day technical specification surveillance requirerents until th< surveillance period and grace

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period had elapsed. The surveillances were missed by one day. More specifically, the quarterly surveil-lance requirements o/ Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3.b for diesel generator batteries 2R42-S002A and 2R42-5002C and of Technical Specification 4.S.2.3.2.b for station batteries 2R42-5001A and 2R42-5001B were not met on time. Th; required surveillances were completed satisfacterily seen after the problen was identified. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by the license This matter appears to be a violation of the referenced technical specification requirements. However, since all the requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C, Section V, were satisfied, this licensee-identified violation is not cited. Review of the LER is considered close Equipment Aging Causes Defective Amplifier Resulting In loss of Automatic Safety Function The events of this LER concern a f ailure of the HPCI system to function properly in the automatic mode of operation during routine surveillance testing. The manual / auto flow controller would not reach 100 percent output in the autematic mode. The flow controller would only achieve 70 percent output. The flow controller did function properly in the manual mod Investigatitn revealed a defective amplifier card in the centrol a plifier nodule and a aefective solder joint in the Hi/ Low current limiter of the control amplifier module for contrciler amplifier 2E41-K61 The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the license Review of the LER is close Three licensee-identified violations that were r.ot cited were identifie . Action on Inspector Follonup Items (IFI) (92701)

(Closed) IFI 321.366/57-09-01, Ensure that respon.e tire of HPCI system is not af fected by raintenanc Table 3.3.3-3 of the Unit 2 technical I specification specifies all0wable response times for the HPCI systen. An inspector observed that the existing quarterly HPCI pump operability test !

did not demonstrate that systen response times were acceptable following !

raintenance. The IFI was opened to ensure that the licensee had a method in place to demonstrate the accentability of such times. The licensee has rodified three procedures to provide this metho Procedure 345V-E41-002-25, "HPCI pump Operability," was revised to include testing of the permissive logic ter valve 2 Ell-F006. The permissive tire plus the stroke tire of ZE41-F006 must be less than er equal to 29 second Procedure 425V-E41-002-23 "HPCI Systen Logtc Systen Functional Test," was -

revised to reasure the time celay between receipt of a HFCI initiation I f

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I signal until 2E41-FCC6 opens full Procedure 575V-MNT-004-25, :

"Instrumentation Time Response Testing Comparison with Technical l Specifications," was revised to provide for " 5ing of the initiation logic  ;

from sensor actuation to actuation cf the Icst relay. The inspector j reviewed procedures 43SV-E41-C02-25, Rev. 5; 425V-E41-002-25 Rev.3; and 575V-MNT-004-25. Rev. 3. Revi u ef this IFI is close ,

(Closed) IFI 321,366/S6-22-05, Provide enaineerino review of causes of i main steamline leak detection instrumentation drif t. This IFI was opened following review by an inspector of several W0s associated with the l calibration of turbine building nain steamline leak detection instrumen- l

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tation 1U61-N101 A - D. The inspector was ccncerned about instrument trending, and the causes of observed instrumentation drif The I&C :

supervisors indicated at that tine that the drift was possibly due to [

environmental conditions at tne time of calibratio The inspector !

requested a related engineering review and opened the IFI. In following ,

up on this matter, the resident inspector reviewed the results of the  ;

licensee's study as documented in letter A04.43 dated November 4, 193 r The licensee determined that environmental conditions at the time of l calibration or testing should not be a factor in instrument drif *

Rather, instrument drift is attributed to the anticipation characteristics l of the switches in question. The vendor advised the licensee that the switches may trip earlier than the desired setpoint when cycled for the first 'ime. The vendor recovended that the switches be cycled several

. i tires t.efore setpoint ad,iustments are mad Resiew of this IFI is close ,

i 10 Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) i (Closed) Violation 321,206/5S-07-03, Inadeauate APRM surveillanc The GPC letter of response dated May 12. 1953, was eviewed. Corrective action  !

involved revising surveillarce procedures to provide for weekly functional }

testing of the APRM flow referenced thu mal power and APRM downscale i trip Tne insrector verified that required surveillance procedure l changes had been nad Procedures 345V-C51-002-15, Re , and [

345V-C51-032-25, Rev. 3, were reviewed. This ited is close }

(Closed) Violaticn 321,366/SE-07-04, Failure to follow surveillance i procedures. The licensee's letter of response dated May 12, 1953, was i reviewed. Ccerective action involved counselling involved I&C personnel r and labeling main control room cabinets on the inside. Inc labeling of  ;

the panels was cc pleted on April S. 1933, and subseauently verified by  !

the inseector. The item is cle'- I

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(Closed) Violation 366/38-07-05, Ir- Nuate turbine control valv. test I precedure, The C?C letter of respcnse daeed May 12, 1938, was res ewe Corrective action involved upgrading tne inadeauate surveil'ance precedur The inspector reviewed procedure 345V-C71-005-25, Rev. 2,

"Turbine Centrol Valve Fa o Closure Instrument Furctional Test," and determined that reauireJ .:hanges had been rad Inis item is close _

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l (Closed) Violation 321/SS-05-01, bypassing of APRM downscale scram input The GPC letter of resporise dated March 29, 1933 was reviewed. Corrective action involved revising APRM test procedures and plant startup procedures to provide guidance for bypassing IRMs and APRMs when the reactor is in the RUN node. The inspector reviewed APRM test procedures 345V-C51-002-15, Rev. 2, and 345V-C51-002-25 Rev. 3. Plant startup procedures 34GO-0PS-001-15, Rev. 8, and 3430-OPL-001-25, Res . 4, were al so reviewe Since corrective actions have been completed, this item is close . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were surrarized on July 25, 1933, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectiori. Dissenting corrents were not received from the license Item Number Status Descriptien/Refe_rence Paragraph

321,366/83-07-03 Closed VIOLATICN - Inadequate APRM Surveillance (paragraph 10)

321,366/35-07-04 Closed VIOLATION - Failure to Follow Surveillance Procedures (paragraph 10)

366/83-07-05 Closed VIOLATICN - Inadequate Turbine Centrol Valve Test Procedure (paragraph 10)

321/33-05-01 Closed VIOLATION - Bypassing of APRM Downscale Scram inputs (paragraph 10)

321,366/87-09-01 Closed IFI - Ensure that Response Tire of HPCI Syster. is no'. Affected by Maintenance (paragraph 9)

321,366/S6-22-05 Closed IFI - Provide Ergineering Review c ef Causes of Main Steamline Brett Detection Instrumentation Drift (paragraph 9)

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. 11. Acronyms and Abbreviations l

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I APRM -

Average Power Range Monitor  !

] ARM -

Area Radiation Monitor  !

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CR0 -

' Control Rod Drive  !

j DCR -

Design Change Request EHC -

Electronydraulic Control ESF -

Engineered Safety Feature r FT & C - Functional Test and Calibration  !

GM -

Geiger-Mueller  !

GPM -

Gallons per Minute t

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HPCI -

High Pressure Coolant Injection l I&C -

Instrumentation and Control  ;

i IRM -

Intermediate Range Monitor  !

i IST -

Inservice Testing l LER -

Licensee Event Report LPCI -

Lcw Pressure Coolant Injection

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MCREC -

Main Control Room Environeer.tal Control

) MWO -

Maintenance Work Oraer

! PSW -

Plant Service Water

RCIC -

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling i RG -

Regulatory Guide

RHR -

Residual Heat Removal i RHRSW -

Residual Heat Removal Service Water

) RWCU -

Reactor Water Cleanup

SGTS -

Standby Gas Treatment System i

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