05000272/LER-1982-047, Forwards LER 82-047/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-047/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20063B874
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/12/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20063B876	List: 05000272/LER-1982-047, Forwards LER 82-047/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8208260252
Download: ML20063B874 (3)

LER-2082-047, Forwards LER 82-047/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722082047R00 - NRC Website

text

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O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station August 12, 1982 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-047/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-047/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, C tp H. J. Midura

General Manager -

l Salem Operations RF:ks p l CC: Distribution l

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8208260252 820812

! DR ADOCK 05000272

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The Energy People }6 #}

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Report Number: 82-047/03L Report Date: 08-12-82 Occurrence Date: 07-26-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCUP9.ENCE:

Containment-Plant Vent Radioactivity Monitor - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-196.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 99% - Unit Load 1078 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1525 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.802625e-4 months <br />, July 26, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator observed a Containment / Vent Sampling System Trouble alaim. The operator checked the control panel and discovered thr. the sample pump was de-energized. The pump would not start _om the Control Room. The containment-plant vent monitor was declared inoperable, and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Actions 20 and 22 were entered, retro-active to the time of discovery. An operator was sent to check the supply breaker. He reported.that the breaker had tripped, but no problems were evident in a visual inspection of the enclosure. The breaker was reset and closed, and the pump was successfully started ~from the Control Room. At 1547 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.886335e-4 months <br />, after no further problems were noted, the containment-plant vent monitor was declared operable, and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Actions 20 and 22 were terminated.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

No apparent cause for the breaker trip was determined. A review of previous occurrences showed no similar trips with-out an identified problem. The pump has continued to operate satisfactorily since the breaker was reset.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment-plant vent radioactivity monitor provides indication of the concentration of radioactive gas and particulate in containment for the purpose of detecting Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage. It is also used to ensure that the release rate during purging or pressure relief is maintained below limits specified by the Technical Specifications.

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LER 82-047/03L -

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

A high radioactivity level initiates automatic closure of the containment' purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves. Redundant RCS leak detection capability is provided by the Containment Sump Monitoring System. Backup for the containment purge and pressure relief function is provided by the Plant Vent Effluent. Monitor 1R16, and relies on operator action to isolate the vent path. Failure of the containment plant vent monitor, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. Due to the backup monitoring capability, the event resulted in no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Action 20 requires:

With only two of the RCS leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days, provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and-analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required gaseous and/or particulate monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Action 22 requires:

With the Containment Purge and Pressure Relief Isolation System inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure relief penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves were being maintained closed in accordanca with operating instructions, in compliance with Actic 22. As noted, the pump was restarted and no more problems observed.

The monitor was declared operable and the limiting condition for operation was terminated. In view of the apparently.

isolated nature of the occurrence, no further action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Frahm / to--V General Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-75

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