05000272/LER-2008-001, Inadvertent Start of an Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing
| ML090130479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/2008 |
| From: | Braun R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N08-0296 LER 08-001-00 | |
| Download: ML090130479 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2722008001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236,, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 0 PSEG Nuclear L.L. C.
DEC.3 1 2008 1 OCFR50.73 LR-N08- 0296 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington DC 20555-001 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 NRC Docket No. 50-272
SUBJECT:
Inadvertent Start of an Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing This Licensee Event Report (LER) number 272/2008-001 "Inadvertent Start of an Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
The attached LER contains no commitments. Should you have any questions or comments. regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. E. H. Villar at 856-339-5456.
Sincerely, Robert Braun Site Vice President - Salem Attachments (1)
Document Control Desk Page 2 LR-N08- 0296 DEC, 3 1 2008 cc Mr. S. Collins, Administrator-Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. R. Ennis, Licensing Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 08B1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)
Mr. P. Mulligan, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Salem Generatino Station - Unit 1 05000272 1 of 4
- 4. TITLE Inadvertent Start of an Emergency Diesel Generator During Testing
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER___
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MOTH DA
'EA YARSEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR MONH DY YAR EAR NUMBER NO.
DOCKET NUMBER 11 05 2008 2008 0 0
1 0
12 31 2008
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 El 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
[3 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[3 73.71(a)(4)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 0%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below nr in Nl#* Fnrm 'ARRA
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME FTELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
Enrique Villar, Regulatory Assurance Engineer (856) 339 -5456MN-REPORTABLE 1MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACUR TEPIA
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACUR TEPO X FACTURER TO EPIX CAS
.FACTURER TO EPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED.
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
. El NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On November 5, 2008, Salem unit I was shutdown in Mode 5 completing its nineteenth refueling outage (1 R1 9) activities. During the performance of an overlap test to complete the Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2 required Mode Operation surveillance test for the 11 containment fan coil unit, the lA vital bus unexpectedly de-energized and the 1A safeguards equipment controller actuated in the blackout mode starting the 1A emergency diesel generator.
The apparent cause of the event was a technical rigor / human performance error made in the test plan development that was not identified and corrected in the subsequent reviews. Correctiveactions taken included: an, extent of condition review to ident'ify similar test plan errors, no additional errors were identified; shared lessons learned with the plant engineering department and station personnel.
Additionally the Mode Operations surveillance test procedures will be revised to include specific requirements for the use of alternate test methodologies in the event.a component(s) is not available for Mode Operations testing or fails to properly actuate during the test.
This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A); "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(A)...."
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR/4)
Containmernt Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) {BK},
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) {EK}.
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as
{SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: November 05, 2008 Discovery Date: November 05, 2008 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Salem Unit 1 was in Operational Mode 5 at 0% reactor power.
No additional structures, systems or components were inoperable at the time that contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On November 5, 2008, Salem unit 1 was shutdown in Mode 5 completing its nineteenth refueling outage (1R19) activities. During the performance of an overlap test to complete the Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2 Mode Operation surveillance test for the 11 containment fan coil unit (CFCU) {BK}, the 1A vital bus unexpectedly de-energized and the 1A safeguards equipment controller (SEC) actuated in the blackout mode starting the 1A emergency diesel generator (EDG) {EK}.
- - All equipment functioned as designed and control room personnel responded appropriately and in accordance with procedures and. policies. Once the operating personnel determined that the actuation was unwarranted, all unnecessary actuated components were stopped, and the 1A vital bus was restored to its normal lineup. The 1A EDG was stopped and placed in its normal standby alignment.
This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(A)..."
NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The apparent cause of the event was a technical rigor / human performance error made in the test plan development that was not identified or corrected in the subsequent reviews. The engineer who developed the test plan and the engineer who performed the independent review of the test plan failed to identify that depressing the B1 test button on the 1A SEC would actuate backup trips on the 1A 4KV vital bus infeed breakers, which would de-energize the bus and start the EDG.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
Salem Generating Station LERs for years 2008 back to 2005 were reviewed for similar occurrences of an inadvertent Engineered Safeguard Feature (ESF) actuation during testing. The following two (2)
LERs were identified:
LER 272/2007-001 "ESF Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps in Mode 3" LER 311/2006-002 "Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps in Mode 4" The apparent causes and corrective actions associated with these LERs were different and specific to these events and they would have not prevented this occurrence.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no safety consequences associated with this event. All equipment functioned as designed. Once the operating personnel determined that the actuation was unwarranted, all unnecessary actuated components were stopped and the plant restored to its normal configuration.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02, Regulatory'Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, did not occur. This event did not prevent the ability of a system to fulfill its safety function to either shutdown the reactor, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. An extent of condition review was performed-to identify similar test plan errors; no additional errors were identified.
- 2. The lessons learned were shared with the plant engineering department and station personnel.
- 3. The ModeOperations surveillance test procedures will be revised to include specific requirements for the use of alternate test methodologies in the event a component(s) is not available for Mode Operations testing or fails to properly actuate during the test. The methodologies will be subject to the same review and approval process rigor as the original surveillance test procedure.
COMMITMENTS
No commitments are made in this LER.