05000272/LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20071J854
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/07/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20071J855	List: 05000272/LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8204270390
Download: ML20071J854 (3)

LER-2082-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722082015R00 - NRC Website

text

. - - . . _ . _ . . .

O PSIEG Putilic Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station April 7, 1982 c3

• O Mr. R. C. Haynes (Y __

Regional Administrator s' -r Y I' g/,9

\

USNRC Region 1 g_

nn o G N9 y .'- .

631 Park Avenue

' ' . , rt i '!

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406  % u j$.'<(:,;;',j,/,N" '? IM

/'-

Dear Mr. Ilaynes :

4 9" LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-15/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-15/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l(, hl$Ao*AJ H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations FD:ks CC: Distribution 8204270'S90 1>

b

\s 5 ,/

The Energy People

(,21i"# rJ- 9 911 M 1

Report Number: 82-15/03L Report Date: 04-07-82 Occurrence Date: 03-16-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Loss of No. lA Vital Bus - Wire to Undervoltage Relay Shorted.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-055.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe.

DESCPEPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On March 16, 1982 the 1A Vital Bus Undervoltage Annunciator alarmed and the Control Room Operator observed that No. lA Vital Bus was de-energized. Power was lost to No. 11 Component Cooling Pump and Nos. 15 and 16 Service Water Pumps, resulting in a loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Service Water (SW) flows; the redundant CCW and SW pumps were tagged out for maintenance. At 1055 hours0.0122 days <br />0.293 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />4.014275e-4 months <br /> all charging pumps and both Residual Heat Removal ( RHR) loops were declared inoperable due to the loss of CCW, and Action Statements (A.S.) 3.1.2.3 and 3.4.1.4 were entered. None of the boron injection flow paths were operable due to the loss of the charging pumps, and A.S. 3.1.2.1 was entered. At the same time the loss of SW resulted in all diesel generators being declared in-operable, and A.S. 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 being entered.

These occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

All Technical Specification requirements for Mode 5 operation were met, however, and this event did not result in any risk to the health or safety of the public, or to the environment.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

A wire to the TD5 undervoltage relay had shorted to the feeder cubicle door, causing the lA Vital Bus infeed breaker to trip without automatic transfer.

I

LER 82-15/03L 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Technical Specifications require that all operations involving core alterations'or positive reactivity changes be suspended if any of the following conditions exist:

1. Less than a minimum of one boron injection flow path is operable sA.S.3.1.2.1.),

2. No operable charging pump in the boron injection flow path above (A.S.3.1.2.3),

3. Less than a minimum of two operable diesel generators (A.S.3.8.1.2).

Technical Specification 3.4.1.4 requires:

With less than two RHR loops operable, immediately initiate corrective action to return both loops to operable status as soon as possible; with no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) , and immediately initiate action to return an RHR loop to operation.

Technical Specification 3.8.2.2. requires:

l With less than a minimum of two operable A.C. electrical bus trains each aligned to an operable diesel generator, establish containment integrity within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

All core alterations and positive reactivity changes (including reduction of RCS boron concentration) were suspended. Action was immediately taken to restore 1A Vital Bus, and thereby re-turn both RHR loops to an operable status and one RHR loop to operation in minimum time.

At 1128 hours0.0131 days <br />0.313 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29204e-4 months <br />, March 16, 1982, SW flow was restored, all diesels l were declared operable, and A.S.3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.2 were l terminated. The faulty wire was replaced, and 1A Vital Bus and l CCW flow were restored. All charging pumps, a boron injection l flow path, and both RHR loops were declared operable. One j RHR loop was placed in operation, and at 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br /> A.S.3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3 and 3.4.1.4 were terminated.

i i

FAILURE DATA:

i l Crimped Wire i

Prepared By R. Frahm /

Genefal Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-38 I

- - - .--w-w . -- ..