05000272/LER-1982-038, Forwards LER 82-038/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-038/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20054L564
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/23/1982
From:	Frahm R, Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054L565	List: 05000272/LER-1982-038, Forwards LER 82-038/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000272/LER-1982-038-03, /03L-0:on 820604,pressurizer Pressure Discovered Less than Tech Spec Requirements.Caused by Shift of Pressure Controller from Auto to Manual Mode W/O Operator Action. Incident Termed Isolated Controller Malfunction
References
NUDOCS 8207080247
Download: ML20054L564 (3)

LER-1982-038, Forwards LER 82-038/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2721982038R00 - NRC Website

text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station June 23, 1982 Mr.

R. C. Ilaynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Ilaynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-038/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-038/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, lcl,%he$w II. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ks CC:

Distribution 8207080247 820623

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(h PDR ADOCK 05000272 PDR The Energy People

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Report Number:

82-038/03L Report Date:

06-23-82 Occurrence Date:

06-04-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

DNB Parameters (Pressurizer Pressure) - Out-of-Specification.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-142.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1110 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0225 hours0.0026 days <br />0.0625 hours <br />3.720238e-4 weeks <br />8.56125e-5 months <br />, June 4, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator noticed that Reactor Coolant System temperature had decreased slightly.

The temperature decrease prompted a visual survey of the control board which showed that pressurizer pressure was approximately 2190 PSIA and decreasing.

Further investigation revealed Spray Valve 1PSl was approximately 8% open, with the pressure controller in the manual mode, and the spray valve controller in automatic.

The operator immediately switched the spray controller to manual and shut the valve.

With pressurizer pressure less than the 2220 PSIA required by the Technical Speci-fications, Action Statement 3.2.5 was entered.

Pressurizer pressure was increased through manual control until 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br /> when it was within specification limits.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

An investigation of the event revealed that the pressure controller, which was normally in the automatic mode, had apparently shifted to manual without operator action.

The spray valve controller was still in auto, and the valve remained in a positica determined by the pressure demand signal which was being generated at the time the pressure controller shifted.

This signal reflected an existing temporary increase in actual over desired pressure, and the resultant increased spray flow caused pressure to decrease slowly.

Negative reactivity induced by the pressure change was balanced by positive reactivity from the slight decrease in Reactor Coolant System temperature noted by the operator.

The Reactor Coolant Low Pressure Heaters On annunciator, which would have alarmed at 2225 PSIA with the controller in automatic, was not received in manual, since the alarm is sensed off the pressure demand signal. Investi-gation revealed no apparent cause for the pressure controller shifting to the manual mode.

The controller tested satisfactorily, and follow-up observation showed no further problems.

The occurrence was consequently assumed to involve an isolated instance of controller malfunction.

LER 82-038/03L.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer pressure decreased to a minimum of 2185 PSIA as a result of the occurrence.

The total time that pressure was less than 2220 PSIA was 5 minutes.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and was reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

In accordance with the Technical Specification basis for Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.5, compliance with the Specification limits assure DNB parameters are within the steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses of the FSAR.

The limits are consistent with the initial FSAR assumptions, and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum DNBR of 1.30 throughout each analyzed transient.

The FSAR does not consider, however, events starting during transients which are already in progress.

Action Statement 3.2.5 requires:

With any of the DNB parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit contained in the action statement insures that, following unexpected transients of the type involved in this occurrence, DNB parameters are returned within the envelope assumed in the FSAR.

Pressurizer pressure was within the DNB limit within 5 minutes of the occurrence and consequently,-no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved.

In the event the operator had failed to notice the decreasing pressure, a Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip would have initiated a reactor shutdown at 1880 PSIA, maintaining a minimum DNBR of 1.30, as demonstrated by the FSAR.

As such, the occurrence would still not have involved any risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

At 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br />, June 4, 1982, pressurizer pressure was within limits, and Action Statement 3.2.5 was terminated.

Pressure control was returned to the automatic mode.

As previously stated, an investi-gation indicated no problem with the controller involved and subsequent observation substantiated this conclusion.

No further action was deemed necessary to prevent recurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By R.

Frahm ebd General M6nage'r -

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Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-63