05000272/LER-2013-001, Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Exceeding Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Limit

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Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Exceeding Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Limit
ML13295A018
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
(DPR-070)
Issue date: 10/21/2013
From: Jamila Perry
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N13-0232 LER 13-001-00
Download: ML13295A018 (6)
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LER-2013-001, Regarding Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Exceeding Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Limit
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
2722013001R00 - NRC Website
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text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 OCT 21 2013 LR-N13-0232 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

LER 272/2013-001-00 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 NRC Docket No. 50-272 Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Pressurizer Spray Valve Packing Leakage The Licensee Event Report, "Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Pressurizer Spray Valve Packing Leakage," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), "the completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications".

The attached LER contains no commitments. Should you have any questions or comments regarding the submittal, please contact David Lafleur of Salem Regulatory Assurance at 856-339-1754.

Sincerely,

~~p:7 Site Vice President - Salem Attachments (1)

Document Control Desk Page 2 LR-N13-0232 cc Mr. W. Dean, Administrator - Region 1, NRC Mr. John Hughey, Licensing Project Manager - Salem, NRC Mr. P. Finney, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Salem (~~4)

'/

Mr. P. Mulligan, Manager IV, NJBNE Mr. T. Joyce, President and Chief Nuclear Officer - Nuclear Mr. T. Cachaza, Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator Mr. L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator Mr. D. Lafleur, Salem Regulatory Assurance Page 2 of2

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

13. PAGE Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 05000272 1 of 4
4. TITLE Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Exceeding Reactor Coolant System Unidentified Leakage Limit
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR DOCKET NUMBER 08 22 2013 2013 0 0

1 0

10 21 2013

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 D

20.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71 (a)(4) 100%

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(8)

D 73.71 (a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 181 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D

50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D OTHER D

20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Efforts to isolate Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 were unsuccessful and at 1628, operators commenced turbine load reduction at a rate of 30% per hour in accordance with operating procedures. At 1636, Unit 1 commenced containment pressure relief in accordance with procedures. Containment pressure was reduced to less than 0.3 psig and Unit 1 exited TSAS 3.6.1.4 at 1647.

A 4-hour notification was made to the NRC at 1708, under the requirements of 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(2)(i) for "The initiation of. any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications."

Containment pressure relief was completed at 1730 with a final containment atmospheric pressure of 0.13 psig.

Unit 1 entered Hot Standby conditions at 2005.

At 2212, Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 was isolated and estimated unidentified RCS leakage rate was observed to decrease. An RCS water inventory balance completed on August 23, 2013 at 0102 indicated an unidentified RCS leak rate of 0.08 gpm. Unit 1 exited TSAS 3.4.6.2.b at 0159 after review of the RCS leak rate calculations.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The most probable cause of the Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 packing failure was due to a loss of packing consolidation. Initial examination of the valve indicated a packing torque of less than 10 ft.-Ibs.

which is less than the specified required value of 16 ft.-Ibs.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 for the previous three years did not identify any similar events.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences associated with this event. The 3.6 to 4.3 gpm RCS leakage rate at normal operating temperature and pressure was well within the capacity of the normal RCS charging and makeup system. Therefore, by definition, this event was not a Small Break Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). All identified consequences were bounded by UFSAR analyses for a Small Break LOCA. No Engineered Safeguards actuations were necessary as a result of this leak. RCS leakage throughout the event remained well below Emergency Plan entry requirements of greater than or equal to 10 gpm unidentified leakage or greater than or equal to 25 gpm identified leakage.

Operators responded appropriately to indications of increased RCS leakage and all safety systems operated as required. The plant completed an orderly shutdown and the leak was isolated. Leakage from Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 and any associated gaseous activity which came out of solution was confined to the containment and auxiliary building c;md was processed by normal treatment systems. Radiation release rates for containment pressure relief remained well below the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) limits and personnel.exposures were considered routine and within normal operating limits.

A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline did not occur. This event did not prevent the ability of a system to fulfill its safety function to either shutdown the reactor, remove residuaL heat; "control the release of radio?ctive material; or mitigate the consequences of 'an accident.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 was manually isolated following plEint shutdown and the valve packing torque was adjusted to its required 16 ft.-Ibs. An evaluation determined that Salem Unit 1 could operate safely until the next refueling outage with one Presswizer Spray Valve isolated. Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 will remain manually isolated until plant conditions allow further investigation and repair.
2. Prior to the Unit 1 startup, Operations shift crews received just-in-time training for startup and power operation transients with one Pressurizer Spray Valve isolated.
3. Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 valve utilizes composite end rings.in its packing configuration. An extent of condition review was made of the Salem Unit 1 and 2 Air OperatedValve Program Category 1 and 2 Air Operated Valves that utilize composite end rings in the same packing sequence. Category 1 valves are active Safety Significant valves that are high risk and Category 2 valves are active Safety Related Valves that do not have high safety significance. The review of as-left packing loads determined that the gland stress was adequate to prevent packing failure on all valves reviewed with the exception of 21AF11, Auxiliary Feedwater Level Control Valve. A local torque check will be performed on 21 AF11 as plant conditions permit.
4. A boron leak evaluation was performed to determine any adverse impact to Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1 surrounding areas inside Containment. The evaluation concluded that it would be acceptable to clean the leakage residue from the Pressurizer enclosure in the next Unit 1 refueling outage.
5. A causal analysis is in progress to determine the causes and necessary corrective actions associated with the packing failure of Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PS1.

COMMITMENTS

No commitments are made in this LER I.!:::::::;:.;:::::;. ::::;:::::;::::

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