05000272/LER-2005-001, Regarding Carbon Dioxide Migration Impacts Ability to Perform Safe Shutdown in the Event of a Fire
| ML050530241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/2005 |
| From: | Fricker C Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N05-0082 LER 05-001-00 | |
| Download: ML050530241 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| 2722005001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 FEB 0 9 2005 LR-N05-0082 o PSEG Nuclear LLC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272105-001-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NO. I FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report entitled 'Carbon Dioxide Migration Impacts Ability to Perform Safe Shutdown in the Event of a Fire", is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.1.
Sincere (arl,¢r e Pla t Manager-Salem Attachment BJT C
Distribution LER File 3.7
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95-2168 REV. 7/99
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
.6-2004)
, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the
- 3. PAGE Salem Generating Station 05000272 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Carbon Dioxide Migration Impacts Ability to Perform Safe Shutdown in the Event of a Fire
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEUNILRVFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR lENUMBER rN MONTH DAY YEAR Salem Unit 2 05000311 I Z ZZ ZZ FACILrIY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 26 2005 2005 - 001 -
00 02 09 2005
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check aff that apply) 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(aX3)(1)
- - 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(aX2)(vii) 1 0 20.2201(d)
Ii 20.2203(aX3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2XiiXA) 0l 50.73(a)(2Xv0ii)(A) 0 20.2203(aXl) 0 20.2203(aX4) 0 50.73(a)(2Xii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2Xviii)(B) o 20.2203(aX2)(1) 0l 50.36(cXlXiXA) 03 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2Xix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(aX2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1 Xii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(aX2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 03 73.71(aX4) 0 20.2203(a)(2Xiv)
El 50.46(aX3XIi) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(aX5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2Xv) 0 50.73(a)(2XiXA) 0 50.73(aX2Xv)(C) 0 OTHER 0
20.2203(a)(2Xvi) 0 50.73(a)(2XiXB) 0 50.73(a)(2XvXD)
Specify In Abstract below or in NRC. F;nnrm;RIA
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Brian Thomas, Licensing Engineer 856-339-2022CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACURR T
EIXFACTURER TO EPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION 0D YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE 04 29 2005 kBSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On January 26, 2005, the preliminary results of an engineering assessment identified that in the event of a carbon dioxide (C02) system actuation, areas requiring operator access may be inaccessible. In the event of a C02 system actuation due to a fire in the 4160 volt or 460 volt Switchgear Rooms, or Lower Electrical Penetration Areas, C02 migration would result in some of the adjacent areas having concentration levels that would require the use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) for entry or would be restricted to transit activities only. Some of these adjacent areas are required to be accessible by operators to perform actions in the field to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire in the Switchgear Rooms. Based on the timelines established in Salem's Manual Action Feasibility Study, the ability to safely shutdown in the event of a fire in the 4160 volt and 460 volt Switchgear Rooms could be impacted.
The cause of the carbon dioxide system migration from the Switchgear Rooms is under investigation. The results of this investigation will be reported in a supplement to this report by April 29, 2005. Immediate corrective actions consisted of the isolation of the carbon dioxide system and the establishment of compensatory measures in accordance with the Salem Fire Protection Program. Additional corrective actions will be determined upon completion of the event investigation.
The above event is being reported in accordance with 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.1 which requires a 14-day special report to be submitted for violations of Licensing Condition 2.C.10.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL I REVISION YEAR I
NUMBER NUMBER Salem Generating Station 05000272 l
2 OF 3
. 2005 001 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor (PWRI4)
Carbon Dioxide System {LW/-}*
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SSICCC)
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: January 26, 2005 Discovery Date: January 26, 2005 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Salem Units 1 and 2 were in Mode I (POWER OPERATION) at 100% reactor power. There was no equipment out of service that impacted this event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On January 26, 2005, the preliminary results of an engineering assessment identified that in the event of a carbon dioxide (C02) system actuation, areas requiring operator access may be inaccessible. In the event of a C02 system actuation due to a fire in the 4160 volt or 460 volt Switchgear Rooms, or Lower Electrical Penetration Areas, C02 migration would result in some of the adjacent areas having concentration levels that would require the use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) for entry or would be restricted to transit activities only. Some of these adjacent areas are required to be accessible by operators to perform actions in the field to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire in the Switchgear Rooms. Based on the timelines established in Salem's Manual Action Feasibility Study, the ability to safely shutdown in the event of a fire in the 4160 volt and 460 volt Switchgear Rooms could be impacted.
The carbon dioxide suppression systems for Salem Unit I and 2 were isolated (impaired) and compensatory measures were established in accordance with the Fire Protection Program. Isolating the carbon dioxide systems to the 4160 volt and 460 volt Switchgear Rooms allows for safe shutdown to be performed in accordance with the current operating procedures.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.1 which requires a 14-day special report to be submitted for violations of Licensing Condition 2.C.1 0 (Fire Protection).
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the carbon dioxide system migration is currently under investigation. The results of this investigation will be reported in a supplement to this report by April 29, 2005.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review for prior similar occurrences will be performed upon completion of the cause investigation.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION IYEAR NUMBER lNUMBER Salem Generating Station 05000272 3 OF 3 l 2005 001 00
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The Salem Fire Protection Program implements the philosophy of defense-in-depth protection against the hazards of fire and its associated affects on equipment important to safety by: 1) preventing fires from starting, 2) rapidly detecting, controlling, and promptly extinguishing those fires that do occur, and 3) providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant. Although this report documents the potential to impact the ability to safely shutdown Salem Units I and 2 in the event of fire in the 4160 Volt and 460 Volt Switchgear Rooms, no fire has occurred in these areas that has required the initiation of safe shutdown. Controls are in place to prevent fires from starting in these areas (i.e., combustible material control, hot work) and fire detection systems are present in these areas to alert the Control Room Operators and allow the onsite Fire Department to respond and take actions to suppress a fire in these areas.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) has occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02. This event is considered an NEI 99-02 SSFF since the ability to shutdown the reactor and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition could have been impacted in the event of a fire in the 4160 and 460 volt Switchgear Rooms.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. The carbon dioxide systems to the 4160V Switchgear room, 460V Switchgear Room and the Lower Penetration Areas were isolated on January 26, 2005. Appropriate compensatory measures were established in accordance with the Salem Fire Protection Program.
Additional corrective actions will be determined upon completion of the event investigation. This report will be supplemented by April 29, 2005.
COMMITMENTS
This report will be supplemented by April 29, 2005.