05000272/LER-2015-001

LER-2015-001, Fuel Movement in Progress With Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Inoperable

Salem Generating Station - Unit 1
Event date:	01-16-2015
Report date:	10-19-2015
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
2722015001R02 - NRC Website

0001, or by Internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor {PWR/4} Fuel Handling Building Ventilation- {VG/AHU} Fuel Handling Building Differential Pressure Indicator- {VG/PDI} Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/COO}.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Event Date: January 16, 2015 Discovery Date: January 16, 2015

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Salem Unit 1 was in Operational Mode 1, operating at approximately 100 percent power. The Fuel Handling Building (FHB) differential pressure (D/P) LO Alarm in the control room was locked in, I necessitating the use of local indication to support fuel movement. No additional structures, systems or components were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this event.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On 1/16/2015, at approximately 0807, Reactor Engineering, and Outage Services commenced fuel sipping in accordance with procedures. Conditions to perform fuel movements in the fuel handling building were verified to be in accordance with the Salem Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Manipulations procedure.

Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.12 requires two exhaust fans and one supply fan shall be OPERABLE and operating, and capable of maintaining slightly negative pressure in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) during movement of irradiated fuel in the FHB. The Control Room alarm which would provide audible indication of low FHB differential pressure (D/P) {VG/PDI} was locked in. Procedures allow fuel movement to continue with dedicated personnel monitoring a local D/P gauge. A camera was focused on the gauge, with the display in the Control Room. FHB D/P was observed oscillating slightly positive with fuel movement continuing. At approximately 1004 on 01/16/15, movement of irradiated fuel was secured due to the oscillations of the FHB D/P.

This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

2 DOCKET

CAUSE OF EVENT

A causal evaluation determined that FHB equipment issues led to the FHB D/P alarm being locked in. A separate causal evaluation determined that Operations control room crew members failed to apply fundamentals of control board awareness and effective crew teamwork. A dedicated individual was not assigned by the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) to continuously monitor FHB air D/P indication as required by procedure. The operating crew chose to monitor the local FHB air D/P indicator using a camera with a display on the CRS's monitor. The CRS elected to assume monitoring of the FHB D/P indication when the responsibilities of his position did not allow him to provide continuous monitoring to ensure the requirements to move fuel were satisfied at all times.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences associated with this event. The fueling handling accident (FHA) in the fuel handling building is a Condition IV (Limiting Fault) accident as defined in the Salem UFSAR.

The potential radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident in the FHB were reevaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.67, Accident Source Term, in 2002. The fuel handling accident in the FHB does not credit the charcoal filtration which is part of the FHB ventilation (FHV) system. The FHV System consists of one supply fan and two exhaust fans. TS 3.9.12 requires all these fans to be running to maintain negative pressure in the FHB during movement of irradiated fuel. The charcoal filtration system was removed from TS by sequential implementation of Alternative Source Term via Amendments 251 and 263 for Salem Unit 1.

An engineering evaluation concluded that the momentary FHB D/P excursions seen on 01/16/15 were bounded by the maximum release flows in the accident analysis. The events of 1/16/15 did not result in a loss of safety function, and any consequences from a postulated fuel handling accident on 01/16/15 would have been bounded by the existing FHA analysis.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

This event does not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of Salem Unit 1 and 2 Licensee Event Reports for the previous three years identified no other similar events.

0001, or by Internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

CONTINUATION SHEET

2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 1. FACILITY NAME

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Operating crew expectations were reinforced with respect to the assignment of personnel for continuous monitoring of equipment.

2. The control room FHB D/P LO Alarm response procedure was revised to provide operators with additional guidance for responding to FHB D/P LO Alarms during fuel movement.

3. The underlying equipment issues were mitigated in accordance with the station's work management process.

COMMITMENTS

This LER contains no regulatory commitments.