05000311/LER-1982-032, Forwards LER 82-032/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-032/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20053E168
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/19/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20053E169	List: 05000311/LER-1982-032, Forwards LER 82-032/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8206070666
Download: ML20053E168 (3)

LER-2082-032, Forwards LER 82-032/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
3112082032R00 - NRC Website

text

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O >SEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station May 19, 1982 Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-31.1 REPORTABLE OCCUh. INCE 82-032/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-032/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, g b[OIC H. J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ksfM y CC: Distribution i

l 8206070666 820519 gDRADOCK05000 p tb

% 21H9 C0Y) 1I-81

Report Number: 82-032/03L

' Report Date: 05-19-82 Occurrence Date: 04-28-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Axial Flux Difference Outside Target Band and Control. Rods Outside Insertion Limit.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-101.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1140 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1544 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.87492e-4 months <br />, April 28, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator received the No. 21 Steam Generator Feed-water Pump (SGFP) High Vibration alarm. The operator observed tha t No . 21 SGFP had tripped, and immediately reduced turbine load. Control rod insertion and boration were commenced to maintain reactor coolant temperature within limits. At 1546-hours, the axial flux difference (AFD) went out of the +6,-9%

target band, and Action Statement 3.2.1.a.2.a was entered. The Control Rod Low Low Insertion Limit alarm was received at 1553 hours0.018 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.909165e-4 months <br />, and control rod insertion was secured. With the control banks 7 steps below the insertion limit, Action Statement 3.1.3.5 was entered.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of No. 21 SGFP trip was determined to be attempted i sabotage, in conjunction with a labor dispute. The instrument valves on the low vacuum trip sensing line were deliberately re-positioned resulting in the pump trip.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.2.1.a.2.a requires:

l With the indicated AFD outside the +6,-9% target band I and with thermal power between 50% and 90% of rated thermal power, power operation may continue provided

1) The indicated AFD has not been outside the +6,-9%

target band for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> penalty deviation cumulative during the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and

2) The indicated AFD is within Technical Specification limits as shown on Figure 3.2-1.

LER 82-032/03L . .

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE Continued:

Otheraise, reduce thermal power to less than 50% of rated thermal power within 30 minutes, and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux - High Trip setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of rated thermal power within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3.1.3.5 requires:

With the control banks inserted beyond the insertion limits, either

1) Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or

2) Reduce thermal power within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to that fraction of rated thermal power allowed by the group position, or

3) Be in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

With boration in progress, the operator stepped rods out to restore the banks to within limits, and at 1554 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.91297e-4 months <br />, Action Statement 3.1.3.5 was terminated. At 1621 hours0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.167905e-4 months <br />, the AFD came back into the target band, with a total of 35 minutes penalty accumulated, and Action Statement 3.2.1.a.2.a was terminated.

As a result of the attempted sabotage, plant security and surveillance tours were increased. A letter warning employees of the severe consequences of tampering with plant equipment was issued. Bargaining unit personnel were escorted off site prior to the anticipated strike. Subsequently, testable safety related equipment was inspected for evidence of sabo-tage and operationally tested; no additional problems were discovered. The impact of the attempted sabotage was strictly of an economic nature, and at no time were the general public or the environment endangered.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By R. Frahm Mh hdbs

' General ' Manager Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. 82-51